Safety analysis method and apparatus for automotive-grade chip, and device and storage medium
By constructing a circuit failure fault tree, transient fault events of automotive-grade chips are identified, solving the problem that existing tools are difficult to perform transient fault measurement and analysis, and realizing safety analysis and optimization design of automotive-grade chips.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/CN2023/137181
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-04
- Filing Date
- 2023-12-07
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-07
AI Technical Summary
Existing security analysis tools are unable to effectively measure and analyze transient faults in automotive-grade chips, making comprehensive security analysis difficult.
By acquiring circuit netlist data and safety attribute data of automotive-grade chips, a circuit failure fault tree is constructed, the first and second failure events are identified, and safety metric data is determined for safety analysis.
It enables quantitative and qualitative analysis of transient faults in automotive-grade chips, accurately identifies the impact of transient faults on safety objectives, and provides data support for chip optimization and safety assessment.
Smart Images

Figure CN2023137181_07112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Security analysis method, device, equipment and storage medium for automotive-grade chips Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of chip security technology, and in particular to a security analysis method, device, equipment and storage medium for automotive-grade chips. Background Art
[0002] With the gradual implementation of intelligent driving, more and more automotive components have strengthened their demand for functional safety. The basic rules for the functional safety of intelligent driving automotive components and automotive chips have gradually been standardized to ensure that the chips function normally without sudden problems and can issue normal alarms and implement safely.
[0003] At present, there are few functional safety analysis methods for automotive-grade chips, and the safety failure analysis of automotive-grade chips is still in its infancy. Although existing safety analysis tools can achieve partial fault detection, the safety analysis tools in related technologies are difficult to measure and analyze transient faults of automotive-grade chips, making it difficult to effectively conduct safety analysis of automotive-grade chips.
[0004] Summary of the Invention
[0005] In view of this, embodiments of the present invention provide a security analysis method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for automotive-grade chips to solve the problem of difficulty in effectively performing security analysis on automotive-grade chips.
[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a safety analysis method for an automotive-grade chip, the method comprising: obtaining safety attribute data and circuit netlist data of the automotive-grade chip, the safety attribute data including a safety target; determining a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip from the circuit netlist data, wherein the first fault event is an event that deviates from the safety target, and the second fault event is an event that triggers a transient fault of the chip; generating a circuit failure fault tree based on a logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event; determining safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree, the safety measurement data being used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
[0007] The safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips provided in an embodiment of the present invention obtains the circuit netlist data and safety attribute data of the automotive-grade chip, combines the circuit netlist data and safety attribute data to determine a first fault event and a second fault event, and construct a circuit failure fault tree. This method can thereby screen out logical units in the circuit that are prone to transient faults and may cause deviations from safety targets. Subsequently, safety metric data is determined using the circuit failure fault tree, thereby comprehensively considering the logical structure of the chip circuit to accurately calculate safety metric data that affects safety targets due to transient faults. This safety metric data can then be used to effectively perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
[0008] In combination with the first aspect, in one embodiment, a circuit failure fault tree is generated based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event, including: determining the hierarchical structure between the first fault event and the second fault event based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event; determining the event logic expression at each level in turn according to the hierarchical structure; and generating a circuit failure fault tree based on the event logic expression corresponding to each level.
[0009] The automotive-grade chip safety analysis method provided by the present invention sequentially constructs event logic representations at each level based on the hierarchical structure between the first and second fault events, making the event logic representations at each level dependent on each other to generate a corresponding circuit failure fault tree. This circuit failure fault tree clarifies the propagation path of transient faults, facilitating the effective identification of safety issues caused by transient faults.
[0010] In combination with the first aspect or its corresponding implementation method, in one implementation method, the event logic expression at each level is determined in sequence according to the hierarchical structure, including: taking the first fault event as the top event and the second fault time as the bottom event, and determining the circuit logic relationship between adjacent levels from top to bottom according to the hierarchical structure; based on the circuit logic relationship, the events of each level are logically represented using the events of the next level to obtain the event logic expression of each level.
[0011] The safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips provided in an embodiment of the present invention constructs event logical expressions for each level from top to bottom, and logically represents events at each level using events at the next level. This can clearly indicate the impact of transient failures at the next level on the level above it, and by analogy step by step, can obtain the topological relationship from the bottom-level logical units to the top-level safety goals. In this way, the relationship between top events and bottom events is constructed, thereby accurately identifying the bottom-level events that cause the unexpected occurrence of top events, so as to perform security reinforcement during chip circuit design.
[0012] In combination with the first aspect, in one embodiment, the safety measurement information of the automotive-grade chip is determined based on the circuit failure fault tree, including: determining a set of transient fault events that trigger a first fault event based on the circuit failure fault tree, the transient fault event set including one or more second fault events; determining the failure probability corresponding to each transient fault event in the transient fault event set; and obtaining safety measurement information based on each failure probability.
[0013] The safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips provided in an embodiment of the present invention analyzes the set of transient fault events that trigger the first fault event to determine the failure probability of each transient fault event. The failure probability of each transient fault event is combined and transmitted to the top level of the circuit failure fault tree to obtain safety measurement information, thereby realizing the measurement of transient faults against violations of chip safety goals and providing data support for subsequent chip optimization iteration and safety assessment.
[0014] In combination with the first aspect or its corresponding embodiment, in one embodiment, based on the circuit failure fault tree, determining a transient fault event set that causes a first fault event includes: identifying multiple second fault events corresponding to the first fault event based on the circuit failure fault tree; sequentially detecting the occurrence signal value of the first fault event when each second fault event occurs; when the occurrence signal value of the first fault event is a preset value, determining a minimum second fault event set that causes the first fault event to occur, and determining the minimum second fault event set as a transient fault event set.
[0015] The safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips provided by an embodiment of the present invention combines the relationship between the occurrence signal value of the first fault event and the occurrence of the second fault event to screen out the minimum set of second fault events that can trigger the first fault event. This achieves a qualitative analysis of the quantitative analysis of transient faults on chip safety and can determine the most direct transient fault that causes the first fault event.
[0016] In combination with the first aspect or its corresponding embodiment, in one embodiment, safety measurement information is obtained based on each fault probability, including: when the first fault event is equal to the logical AND of each transient fault event, each fault probability is accumulated to obtain safety measurement information.
[0017] In combination with the first aspect or its corresponding embodiment, in one embodiment, safety measurement information is obtained based on each fault probability, including: when the first fault event is equal to the logical OR of each transient fault event, determining the opposite probability corresponding to each transient fault event, the opposite probability is the difference between 1 and the fault probability; and obtaining safety measurement information based on the cumulative result of each opposite probability.
[0018] The safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips provided in an embodiment of the present invention determines safety measurement information based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the transient fault event, realizes quantitative analysis of the impact of transient faults on chip safety, and facilitates accurate calculation of the probability measurement value of the impact of transient faults on chip safety.
[0019] In second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a safety analysis device for automotive-grade chips, which includes: a data acquisition module for acquiring safety attribute data and circuit netlist data of automotive-grade chips, where the safety attribute data includes safety targets; a fault event determination module for determining a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip from the circuit netlist data, where the first fault event is an event that deviates from the safety target, and the second fault event is an event that triggers a transient fault of the chip; a fault tree generation module for generating a circuit failure fault tree based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event; a safety measurement module for determining the safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree, where the safety measurement data is used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
[0020] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer device comprising: a memory and a processor, the memory and the processor being communicatively connected to each other, computer instructions stored in the memory, and the processor executing the computer instructions to execute the security analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment thereof.
[0021] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer instructions stored thereon, the computer instructions being used to enable a computer to execute the security analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to the first aspect or any corresponding embodiment thereof. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0022] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the specific embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.
[0023] FIG1 is a schematic flow chart of a security analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to some embodiments of the present invention;
[0024] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a safety analysis of transient faults of an automotive-grade chip according to some embodiments of the present invention;
[0025] FIG3 is a flow chart of another method for security analysis of an automotive-grade chip according to some embodiments of the present invention;
[0026] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a circuit failure fault tree of a CPU-ALU branch according to some embodiments of the present invention;
[0027] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a branch of an ALU circuit failure fault tree according to some embodiments of the present invention;
[0028] FIG6 is a structural block diagram of a security analysis device for an automotive-grade chip according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0029] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of a computer device according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0030] To make the purpose, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more clear, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without making creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0031] To ensure the safety of vehicle electronic systems, the International Standardization Organization (ISO) functional safety standards were developed. These standards are primarily applied to specific electrical components, electronic devices, and programmable electronic devices in the automotive industry, aiming to improve international standards for the functional safety of automotive electronic and electrical products. With the gradual implementation of intelligent driving, more and more automotive components are increasingly demanding functional safety.
[0032] Currently, China lacks a deep understanding of the international automotive functional safety standards system. Few domestically produced automotive chips have passed functional safety process certification. Functional safety failure analysis for automotive-grade semiconductor components is still in its infancy, with no standardized or commercially available functional safety analysis techniques or tools. While commercial functional safety analysis tools based on current safety standards exist abroad, these tools do not support qualitative and quantitative analysis of transient faults.
[0033] From a microscopic circuit perspective, not all transient faults at circuit nodes will cause chip failure, and not all failed chip electronic components are relevant to vehicle safety. Chip safety analysis requires analysis and screening of the chip's various logic units based on safety requirements, identifying safety-related logic units. The safety of automotive-grade chips is closely tied to the circuit implementation of the logic algorithms, which is reflected in three aspects: first, whether the circuit unit design itself is fault-tolerant. Generally, fault-tolerant design employs spatial or temporal redundancy. Second, whether transient faults generated by circuit nodes are affected by circuit shielding effects such as logical shielding, time window shielding, and electrical shielding, and whether they are shielded during transmission. Only faults that are not shielded can cause circuit failure. Third, whether the circuit failure caused by the transient fault is safety-related, that is, whether it violates the safety goal.
[0034] The technical solution of the present invention adopts the fault tree analysis method to establish the topological relationship between the bottom-level logic units and the top-level safety goals, generate a circuit failure fault tree, and combine factors such as safety goals, circuit implementation, and shielding effects. The fault tree analysis method is used to study the propagation path of transient faults, and screen out weak logic units in the circuit that are prone to transient faults and will cause violations of safety goals, so as to achieve safety analysis of automotive-grade chips.
[0035] According to an embodiment of the present invention, an embodiment of a safety analysis method for an automotive-grade chip is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart of the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described can be executed in an order different from that shown here.
[0036] In this embodiment, a security analysis method for automotive-grade chips is provided, which can be used in computer devices such as servers and computers. FIG1 is a flow chart of the security analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG1 , the flow chart includes the following steps:
[0037] Step S101: Obtain security attribute data and circuit netlist data of an automotive-grade chip, wherein the security attribute data includes a security target.
[0038] Automotive-grade chips are semiconductor components used in vehicles. Automotive-grade chips contain multiple circuit components, which have corresponding connection relationships with each other. Circuit netlist data is a netlist used to describe the connection relationships between circuit components. Specifically, the circuit netlist data can be determined by analyzing the connection relationships between the circuit components contained in the automotive-grade chip. As shown in Figure 2, the functions of automotive-grade chips need to be completed through multiple levels of description. The circuit netlist data can be described in the form of a gate-level netlist, that is, the circuit components described are gates or components of the same level.
[0039] Safety attribute data is used to characterize the safety performance of automotive-grade chips. The safety attribute data includes safety targets and safety levels, where the safety targets represent the safety requirements of the chip, and the safety levels correspond to the safety targets. Specifically, the safety targets can be derived step by step based on specific application requirements, or they can be obtained based on safety elements out of context (SEooC). Of course, other methods can also be used to obtain them, which are not specifically limited here. Those skilled in the art can determine them according to actual needs.
[0040] Step S102: Determine a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip from the circuit netlist data.
[0041] The first fault event is an event that deviates from the safety target, and the second fault event is an event that causes a transient fault in the chip.
[0042] Based on the circuit netlist data, the connection relationships between various circuit components can be determined, and each circuit component is subject to transient faults. Transient faults are soft faults that disappear after a single occurrence. The occurrence of transient faults can cause the chip to violate safety objectives and affect the safety of the entire vehicle.
[0043] Circuit netlist data represents the connections between various circuit components in the form of logic gates, meaning that a chip circuit contains multiple logic units. Computer equipment must analyze the different logic units in the chip circuit based on safety objectives and identify those relevant to those objectives. Failures in logic units at the top logic layer that deviate from safety objectives are considered primary failure events, meaning that the occurrence of a primary failure event will inevitably impact vehicle safety. Simultaneously, transient failures in logic units at the bottom logic layer are considered secondary failure events, meaning that the occurrence of a secondary failure event will trigger the occurrence of a primary failure event.
[0044] Step S103: generating a circuit failure fault tree based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event.
[0045] The circuit failure fault tree is used to characterize the logical cause and effect of the first fault event and the second fault event, that is, to describe the cause and effect relationship of failures of various logic units contained in the automotive-grade chip through fault event symbols, logic gate symbols and transfer symbols.
[0046] Specifically, the circuit failure fault tree uses an inverted tree structure to take the first fault event as the root of the inverted tree (i.e., the top event), searches for possible events that trigger the first fault event, and uses them as branches of the circuit failure fault tree (i.e., intermediate events), and so on, step by step until the second fault event at the bottom (i.e., the bottom event) is found.
[0047] By analyzing the circuit netlist data, the computer device can determine the multiple logical units between the first fault event and the second fault event. Based on the logical relationships between the various logical units, the logic can be recursively deduced to the logical unit corresponding to the first fault event. This allows the logical relationship between the transient faults of all logical units and the second fault event to be determined. Thus, based on this logical relationship, a circuit failure fault tree can be constructed with the first fault event as the top event and the second fault event as the bottom event.
[0048] Step S104: Determine safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree. The safety measurement data is used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
[0049] Safety metric data represents the probability measurement value of transient failures for violating chip safety goals. This safety metric data can be used to conduct safety analysis of automotive-grade chips, so as to strengthen the weak logic units in automotive-grade chips in a targeted manner. At the same time, it can provide a basis for safety testing and safety level assessment of automotive-grade chips.
[0050] Based on the constructed circuit failure fault tree, the computer device identifies multiple secondary fault events that trigger the first fault event. It then performs a qualitative analysis of these multiple secondary fault events to identify the simplest combination of these secondary fault events. The computer device then quantitatively analyzes each secondary fault event in this simplest combination to determine the corresponding failure probability. These failure probability values are propagated upwards until they reach the top level of the circuit failure fault tree. The final failure probability value is determined based on the logical relationship between the first and second fault events. This top-level failure probability value serves as the final safety metric.
[0051] The safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips provided in this embodiment obtains the chip's circuit netlist data and safety attribute data. Combining these data, the method identifies a first fault event and a second fault event to construct a circuit failure fault tree. This method can identify logic units in the circuit that are prone to transient faults and can cause deviations from safety targets. Subsequently, safety metrics are determined based on the circuit failure fault tree. This method comprehensively considers the chip's circuit logic structure to accurately calculate safety metrics related to transient faults affecting safety targets. This safety metric data allows for effective safety analysis of automotive-grade chips.
[0052] In this embodiment, a security analysis method for automotive-grade chips is provided, which can be used in computer devices such as servers and computers. FIG3 is a flow chart of the security analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG3 , the flow chart includes the following steps:
[0053] Step S201: Obtain security attribute data and circuit netlist data of the automotive-grade chip. The security attribute data includes security targets. Detailed descriptions refer to the descriptions of the corresponding steps in the above embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
[0054] Step S202: Determine a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip from the circuit netlist data. The first fault event is an event that deviates from the safety target, and the second fault event is an event that triggers a transient fault in the chip. For detailed descriptions, refer to the corresponding steps in the above embodiment and are not repeated here.
[0055] Step S203: generating a circuit failure fault tree based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event.
[0056] Specifically, the above step S203 may include:
[0057] Step S2031: determining a hierarchical structure between the first fault event and the second fault event based on a logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event.
[0058] A hierarchical structure is a multi-level structure of logical units between the first and second fault events. As shown in Figure 2, there are three levels between the first and second fault events, with each level corresponding to a corresponding logical unit. A transient fault in a logical unit at each level can affect the normal operation of the logical unit at the level above it.
[0059] Step S2032: determine the event logic expression at each level in sequence according to the hierarchical structure.
[0060] Starting with the logical unit corresponding to the first fault event, the logical units of each level are represented by the logical units of the next level down, according to the hierarchical structure. When a transient fault event occurs in the logical unit of the next level down corresponding to the current level, it is transmitted to the current level. The transient fault event of the current level can then be represented by the transient fault of the logical unit of the next level down, thus obtaining the logical representation of the event at the current level. Similarly, the transient fault event of the logical unit of the previous level is represented by the transient fault event of the next level down, thus obtaining the logical representation of the event corresponding to each level.
[0061] In some optional embodiments, the above step S2032 includes:
[0062] In step a1, the first fault event is used as the top event, the second fault time is used as the bottom event, and the circuit logic relationship between adjacent levels is determined from top to bottom according to the hierarchical structure.
[0063] Step a2: Based on the circuit logic relationship, the events of each level are logically represented by the events of the next level to obtain the logical expression of the events of each level.
[0064] Taking the first fault event as the top event and the second fault time as the bottom event, we start from the first fault event and work our way down to determine the circuit logic relationships between adjacent levels. Based on the circuit logic relationships between adjacent levels, we sequentially represent the previous level's transient fault events with the next level's transient fault events. This process continues layer by layer until all levels are replaced with bottom events. Ultimately, the top event can be expressed entirely using bottom events.
[0065] For example, the hierarchical result between the first fault event and the second fault event is 1, and the hierarchical result of the second fault event corresponds to two logical units. The transient fault events of these two logical units are represented as events A and B, respectively. If the first fault event and the second fault event are determined to be in a logical AND relationship based on the circuit netlist data, the result of the logical representation of the first fault event using the second fault event is: AB. If the first fault event and the second fault event are determined to be in a logical OR relationship based on the circuit netlist data, the result of the logical representation of the first fault event using the second fault event is A+B.
[0066] By constructing the logical expression of events at each level from top to bottom and logically representing events at each level using events at the next level, we can clearly see the impact of transient faults at the next level on the level above it. By analogy, we can obtain the topological relationship from the bottom logic unit to the top security goal. In this way, we construct the relationship between top events and bottom events, which enables us to accurately identify the bottom events that cause the unexpected occurrence of top events, so that we can perform security reinforcement during chip circuit design.
[0067] Step S2033: Generate a circuit failure fault tree based on the event logic expressions corresponding to each level.
[0068] By expressing the logic of events at each level, we can determine the logical dependencies between adjacent levels. Based on these logical dependencies, we can build the connection relationships between adjacent levels. Thus, by combining the connection relationships between adjacent levels, we can generate a circuit failure fault tree.
[0069] Step S204: Determine safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree. The safety measurement data is used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
[0070] Specifically, the above step S204 may include:
[0071] Step S2041 : determining a transient fault event set that causes a first fault event based on a circuit failure fault tree, where the transient fault event set includes one or more second fault events.
[0072] Based on the above, each event in the circuit failure fault tree has been replaced by a second fault event for event logic expression, so the first fault event can be logically expressed by multiple second fault events, and these multiple second fault events constitute the fault event set of the first fault event.
[0073] Furthermore, the second fault event in the fault event set is a transient fault event that may cause the first fault event to occur, but it does not necessarily cause the first fault event to occur. In this case, the computer device can use Boolean operations to simplify the fault event set until removing any transient fault event will result in the first fault event not necessarily occurring. The resulting second fault event set is the simplest combination of transient faults, i.e., the transient fault event set.
[0074] In some optional embodiments, step S2041 includes:
[0075] Step b1: identifying multiple second fault events corresponding to the first fault event based on the circuit failure fault tree.
[0076] Step b2: sequentially detecting the occurrence signal value of the first fault event when each second fault event occurs.
[0077] Step b3: When the occurrence signal value of the first fault event is a preset value, a minimum second fault event set that triggers the occurrence of the first fault event is determined, and the minimum second fault event set is determined as a transient fault event set.
[0078] Since the first fault event can be fully represented by the second fault event, and the second fault event is a transient fault event, which is a single point fault, the logic of the first fault event represented by the second fault event is either an AND gate or an OR gate.
[0079] Based on the circuit failure fault tree, all second fault events representing the first fault event have been determined. Each second fault event can then be detected in sequence to determine the occurrence signal value corresponding to the first fault event when the second fault event occurs. The occurrence signal value is the logical value of the first fault event, and the occurrence signal value includes 0 and 1.
[0080] The preset value is a pre-set value used to indicate that the occurrence of the first fault event has caused chip failure. The computer device can compare the occurrence signal value with the preset value to determine whether the occurrence signal value is consistent with the preset value. If the occurrence signal value is determined to be the preset value, it indicates that the occurrence of the second fault event will trigger the occurrence of the first fault event. Each second fault event is sequentially traversed to find an event combination in which the occurrence of the second fault event will cause the occurrence of the first fault event. The second fault events included in this event combination constitute a minimum second fault event set, namely, a transient fault event set.
[0081] For example, based on a certain safety goal, when the occurrence signal value of the first fault event is 0, it is considered that the occurrence of the first fault event causes chip failure. Then, through event logic expression, it can be known which second fault events will cause the occurrence signal value of the first fault event to be 0. The combination of these second fault events that cause the first fault event to occur is the transient fault event set.
[0082] Here, combined with the relationship between the occurrence signal value of the first fault event and the occurrence of the second fault event, the minimum set of second fault events that can trigger the first fault event is screened out, thereby achieving a qualitative analysis of the quantitative analysis of transient faults on chip safety and determining the most direct transient fault that triggers the first fault event.
[0083] Step S2042: determining the failure probability corresponding to each transient fault event in the transient fault event set.
[0084] A fault probability calculation model is stored in the computer device, and the fault probability model is used to analyze whether a transient fault event will be affected by circuit shielding effects and shielded, such as logic shielding, time window shielding, and electrical shielding.
[0085] When each transient fault event that will not be shielded is determined, it is input into the fault calculation model to calculate the fault probability, thereby obtaining the corresponding fault probability of each transient fault event. The fault probability model is pre-trained based on circuit shielding effect experiments and Boolean calculation models.
[0086] Step S2043: Obtain safety metric information based on each failure probability.
[0087] Safety metric information is represented by the probability of the first fault event occurring. Based on the failure probabilities corresponding to each transient fault event and the logical representation of each transient fault event and the first fault event, the probability of the first fault event occurring due to the transient fault event can be calculated.
[0088] In some optional embodiments, when the first fault event is equal to the logical AND of each transient fault event, the above step S2043 may include: accumulating each fault probability to obtain safety metric information.
[0089] The circuit failure fault tree includes n second fault events (x1, x2, ... x n ), then the function expression of the circuit failure fault tree is: Φ(X)=Φ(x1,x2,...,x n )
[0090] F S (t) represents the probability of the first fault event, and its function expression is: F S (t) = E[Φ(x)]
[0091] When the first fault event is equal to the logical AND of each transient fault event, that is, when the first fault event is an AND gate structure, its occurrence probability can be expressed as:
[0092] Among them, F i (t) represents the unavailability of the i-th transient fault, i is equal to {1, 2, 3…}, F i (t) is the probability that a transient fault occurs in logic unit i during the time [0, t].
[0093] In some optional embodiments, when the first fault event is equal to the logical sum of the transient fault events, step S2043 may include:
[0094] Step c1, determining the opposition probability corresponding to each transient fault event, where the opposition probability is the difference between 1 and the fault probability;
[0095] Step c2: obtaining security metric information based on the cumulative results of the opposing probabilities.
[0096] F i (t) represents the probability of transient failure of the i-th logic unit, then the opposite probability of transient failure of the i-th logic unit is 1-F i (t).
[0097] When the first fault event is equal to the logical sum of all transient fault events, that is, when the first fault event is an OR gate structure, the probability of the first fault event under the OR gate structure can be obtained by accumulating all opposing probabilities and subtracting the accumulated result from 1. The specific probability of the first fault event under the OR gate structure can be expressed as:
[0098] Among them, F S (t) represents the probability of occurrence of the first failure event.
[0099] Here, based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the transient fault event, the safety metric information is determined, which enables a quantitative analysis of the impact of transient faults on chip safety and facilitates accurate calculation of the probability metric value of the impact of transient faults on chip safety.
[0100] This embodiment provides a safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips. The constructed circuit failure fault tree clearly defines the propagation path of transient faults, facilitating the effective identification of safety issues caused by transient faults. By analyzing the set of transient fault events that trigger the first fault event and combining the failure probabilities of each transient fault event with the top level of the circuit failure fault tree, safety metrics are generated. This measures the impact of transient faults on chip safety violations, providing data support for subsequent chip optimization iterations and safety assessments.
[0101] The embodiment of the present invention uses the MCU chip as an example to test and verify the above method. First, the top-level security goal of the chip is obtained based on the SEooC method; secondly, under the top-level security goal, a circuit failure fault tree is established for the ALU module in the MCU, as shown in Figure 4; then, the weak logic unit (i.e., security weakness) is located in combination with the circuit failure fault tree, and the event of a transient fault in the weak logic unit is the second fault event; then, the VCS simulation tool is used to simulate the injection of faults into these security vulnerability units to verify whether the security goal is violated, as shown in Figure 5. The experimental results show that injecting transient faults into the security vulnerabilities located by the above method during the simulation stage does indeed lead to a deviation from the chip security goal, and the experiment proves the feasibility of the method.
[0102] In this embodiment, a security analysis device for an automotive-grade chip is also provided, which is used to implement the above-mentioned embodiments and preferred implementation methods, and the details that have been explained will not be repeated. As used below, the term "module" can be a combination of software and / or hardware that implements a predetermined function. Although the devices described in the following embodiments are preferably implemented in software, the implementation of hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, is also possible and conceivable.
[0103] This embodiment provides a security analysis device for automotive-grade chips, as shown in FIG6 , including:
[0104] The data acquisition module 301 is used to obtain the security attribute data and circuit netlist data of the automotive-grade chip, wherein the security attribute data includes the security target.
[0105] The fault event determination module 302 is configured to determine, from the circuit netlist data, a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip. The first fault event is an event that deviates from the safety target, and the second fault event is an event that triggers a transient fault in the chip.
[0106] The fault tree generating module 303 is configured to generate a circuit failure fault tree based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event.
[0107] The safety measurement module 304 is used to determine the safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree. The safety measurement data is used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
[0108] In some optional embodiments, the fault tree generation module 303 may include:
[0109] The hierarchy determination unit is configured to determine a hierarchy between the first fault event and the second fault event based on a logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event.
[0110] The logic expression unit is used to determine the event logic expression at each level in sequence according to the hierarchical structure.
[0111] Fault tree generation unit, used to generate circuit failure fault tree based on the event logic expression corresponding to each level
[0112] In some optional embodiments, the logic expression unit may include:
[0113] The logic relationship determination subunit is used to determine the circuit logic relationship between adjacent levels from top to bottom according to the hierarchical structure, taking the first fault event as the top event and the second fault time as the bottom event.
[0114] The logic representation subunit is used to logically represent events at each level using events at the next level based on the circuit logic relationship, thereby obtaining a logical expression of events at each level.
[0115] In some optional embodiments, the security metric module 304 may include:
[0116] The fault event set determining unit is configured to determine a transient fault event set that triggers a first fault event based on a circuit failure fault tree, wherein the transient fault event set includes one or more second fault events.
[0117] The fault probability determination unit is used to determine the fault probability corresponding to each transient fault event in the transient fault event set.
[0118] The measurement unit is used to obtain safety measurement information based on various failure probabilities.
[0119] In some optional embodiments, the fault event set determining unit may include:
[0120] The identification subunit is configured to identify a plurality of second fault events corresponding to the first fault event based on the circuit failure fault tree.
[0121] The detection subunit is used to sequentially detect the occurrence signal value of the first fault event when each second fault event occurs.
[0122] The determination subunit is configured to determine a minimum second fault event set that triggers the occurrence of the first fault event when the occurrence signal value of the first fault event is a preset value, and determine the minimum second fault event set as a transient fault event set.
[0123] In some optional embodiments, when the first fault event is equal to the logical AND of the transient fault events, the measurement unit may include:
[0124] The first accumulation subunit is used to accumulate various failure probabilities to obtain safety measurement information.
[0125] In some optional embodiments, when the first fault event is equal to the logical sum of the transient fault events, the measurement unit may further include:
[0126] The opposition probability determination subunit is used to determine the opposition probability corresponding to each transient fault event, where the opposition probability is the difference between 1 and the fault probability.
[0127] The second accumulation subunit is configured to obtain security metric information based on the accumulation results of the opposing probabilities.
[0128] The further functional description of the above modules, units and sub-units is the same as that of the above corresponding embodiments and will not be repeated here.
[0129] The security analysis device of the automotive-grade chip in this embodiment is presented in the form of a functional unit, where the unit refers to an ASIC circuit, a processor and memory that executes one or more software or fixed programs, and / or other devices that can provide the above functions.
[0130] The safety analysis device for automotive-grade chips provided in this embodiment obtains the chip's circuit netlist data and safety attribute data, combines them to determine a first fault event and a second fault event, and constructs a circuit failure fault tree. This allows the device to screen out logic units in the circuit that are prone to transient faults and can cause deviations from safety targets. Subsequently, safety metric data is determined based on the circuit failure fault tree. This comprehensively considers the chip's circuit logic structure to accurately calculate safety metric data related to the impact of transient faults on safety targets, thereby enabling effective safety analysis of automotive-grade chips using this safety metric data.
[0131] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer device having a security analysis device for the automotive-grade chip shown in FIG7 .
[0132] Please refer to Figure 7, which is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided by an optional embodiment of the present invention. As shown in Figure 7, the computer device includes: one or more processors 10, a memory 20, and interfaces for connecting various components, including high-speed interfaces and low-speed interfaces. The various components are connected to each other using different buses and can be installed on a common motherboard or installed in other ways as needed. The processor can process instructions executed within the computer device, including instructions stored in or on the memory to display graphical information of a GUI on an external input / output device (such as a display device coupled to the interface). In some optional embodiments, if necessary, multiple processors and / or multiple buses can be used together with multiple memories and multiple memories. Similarly, multiple computer devices can be connected, with each device providing some of the necessary operations (for example, as a server array, a group of blade servers, or a multi-processor system). Figure 7 takes a processor 10 as an example.
[0133] The processor 10 may be a central processing unit, a network processor, or a combination thereof. The processor 10 may further include a hardware chip. The hardware chip may be an application-specific integrated circuit, a programmable logic device, or a combination thereof. The programmable logic device may be a complex programmable logic device, a field programmable gate array, a general purpose array logic, or any combination thereof.
[0134] The memory 20 stores instructions that can be executed by at least one processor 10, so that the at least one processor 10 executes the method shown in the above embodiment.
[0135] The memory 20 may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store an operating system and application programs required for at least one function; the data storage area may store data created based on the use of the computer device, etc. In addition, the memory 20 may include a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-transient memory, such as at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other non-transient solid-state storage device. In some optional embodiments, the memory 20 may optionally include a memory remotely located relative to the processor 10, and these remote memories may be connected to the computer device via a network. Examples of the above-mentioned network include, but are not limited to, the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network, and combinations thereof.
[0136] The memory 20 may include a volatile memory, such as a random access memory; the memory may also include a non-volatile memory, such as a flash memory, a hard disk or a solid-state drive; the memory 20 may also include a combination of the above types of memory.
[0137] The computer device further includes a communication interface 30 for the computer device to communicate with other devices or a communication network.
[0138] The embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium. The above-mentioned method according to the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented in hardware, firmware, or implemented as a computer code that can be recorded in a storage medium, or implemented as a computer code that is originally stored in a remote storage medium or a non-temporary machine-readable storage medium and downloaded through a network and will be stored in a local storage medium, so that the method described herein can be stored in such software processing on a storage medium using a general-purpose computer, a dedicated processor, or programmable or dedicated hardware. Among them, the storage medium can be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only storage memory, a random access memory, a flash memory, a hard disk or a solid-state drive, etc.; further, the storage medium can also include a combination of the above-mentioned types of memory. It can be understood that a computer, a processor, a microprocessor controller or programmable hardware includes a storage component that can store or receive software or computer code. When the software or computer code is accessed and executed by a computer, a processor or hardware, the method shown in the above embodiment is implemented.
[0139] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described with reference to the accompanying drawings, those skilled in the art may make various modifications and variations without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Such modifications and variations are all within the scope defined by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A security analysis method for automotive-grade chips, characterized by: The method comprises: Obtaining security attribute data and circuit netlist data of automotive-grade chips, wherein the security attribute data includes security targets; Determining a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip from the circuit netlist data, wherein the first fault event is an event that deviates from the safety target, and the second fault event is an event that causes a transient fault of the chip; generating a circuit failure fault tree based on a logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event; Based on the circuit failure fault tree, safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip is determined, and the safety measurement data is used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The generating a circuit failure fault tree based on the logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event includes: Determining a hierarchical structure between the first fault event and the second fault event based on a logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event; According to the hierarchical structure, determining the logical expression of events at each level in turn; The circuit failure fault tree is generated based on the event logic expression corresponding to each level.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The step of sequentially determining the event logic expressions at each level according to the hierarchical structure includes: Taking the first fault event as a top event and the second fault time as a bottom event, determining the circuit logic relationship between adjacent levels from top to bottom according to the hierarchical structure; Based on the circuit logic relationship, the events of each level are logically represented by the events of the next level, so as to obtain the logical expression of the events of each level.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein Determining safety metric information of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree includes: determining a transient fault event set causing the first fault event based on the circuit failure fault tree; The transient fault event set includes one or more second fault events; Determining a failure probability corresponding to each transient fault event in the transient fault event set; The safety metric information is obtained based on the respective failure probabilities.
5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Determining a transient fault event set causing the first fault event based on the circuit failure fault tree includes: Based on the circuit failure fault tree, identifying a plurality of second fault events corresponding to the first fault event; sequentially detecting the occurrence signal value of the first fault event when each of the second fault events occurs; When the occurrence signal value of the first fault event is a preset value, a minimum second fault event set that triggers the occurrence of the first fault event is determined, and the minimum second fault event set is determined as the transient fault event set.
6. The method according to claim 4 or 5, characterized in that The obtaining of the safety metric information based on each of the failure probabilities includes: When the first fault event is equal to the logical AND of each of the transient fault events, each of the fault probabilities is accumulated to obtain the safety metric information.
7. The method according to claim 4 or 5, characterized in that The obtaining of the safety metric information based on each of the failure probabilities includes: When the first fault event is equal to the logical sum of the transient fault events, determining the opposite probability corresponding to each transient fault event, where the opposite probability is the difference between 1 and the fault probability; The security metric information is obtained based on the accumulated results of the opposition probabilities.
8. A security analysis device for automotive-grade chips, characterized in that: The device comprises: A data acquisition module, configured to acquire security attribute data and circuit netlist data of automotive-grade chips, wherein the security attribute data includes security targets; A fault event determination module is configured to determine a first fault event and a second fault event for the automotive-grade chip from the circuit netlist data, wherein the first fault event is a deviation from the safety The second fault event is an event that causes a transient fault of the chip; a fault tree generating module, configured to generate a circuit failure fault tree based on a logical relationship between the first fault event and the second fault event; A safety measurement module is used to determine safety measurement data of the automotive-grade chip based on the circuit failure fault tree, and the safety measurement data is used to perform safety analysis on the automotive-grade chip.
9. A computer device, characterized in that: include: A memory and a processor, wherein the memory and the processor are communicatively connected to each other, the memory stores computer instructions, and the processor executes the safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to any one of claims 1 to 7 by executing the computer instructions.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, which are used to enable a computer to execute the safety analysis method for automotive-grade chips according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
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