System for controlling network access, and method therefor

The system and method for network access control using protection information tokens address vulnerabilities in existing technologies by ensuring secure communication flows, preventing session hijacking, and enhancing network security by managing identification information within the gateway and service server sections.

WO2024228524A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-07PRIBIT TECH INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/KR2024/005727
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-04
Filing Date
2024-04-26
Publication Date
2024-11-07

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing network access control methods using IP-based filtering and authentication technologies are vulnerable to session hijacking and malware attacks, as identification information is exposed during communication, allowing unauthorized access and hijacking of services.

Method used

A system and method that utilizes a gateway and controller to manage network access by generating and processing protection information tokens, ensuring that identification information is not exposed, and using a protection information token to authenticate and authorize nodes, thereby preventing session hijacking and maintaining secure communication.

Benefits of technology

The solution effectively controls network access by ensuring that identification information is not transmitted to unauthorized nodes, thereby preventing session hijacking and enhancing network security by maintaining secure communication flows between authorized targets and service servers.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A gateway according to an embodiment disclosed in the present document may comprise a communication circuit, a memory, and a processor operatively connected to the communication circuit and the memory, wherein the processor is configured to: receive a service request from a node; identify the existence of a data flow which corresponds to the service request and is authorized from an external server; identify whether a protection information token included in the service request corresponds to the data flow; when the protection information token corresponds to the data flow, generate, on the basis of the data flow, protection information which corresponds to the protection information token and is to be inserted into the service request; and insert, into the service request, the protection information to be inserted into the service request, and forward same to a service server, and the protection information token is configured to be identification information processed by the gateway to maintain a flow of information to be protected between the service server and an authorized subject.
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Description

System for controlling network access and method therefor

[0001] Cross-citation with related applications

[0002] This invention claims the benefit of priority from Korean Patent Application No. 10-2023-0058708, filed on May 4, 2023, and all contents of the document in that Korean Patent Application are incorporated herein by reference.

[0003] Technology field

[0004] The embodiments disclosed in this document relate to a system and method for controlling network access.

[0005] Multiple devices can communicate data over a network. For example, a terminal can transmit or receive data to or from a server via the Internet. The network can include a public network, such as the Internet, as well as a private network, such as an intranet.

[0006] Nodes connected to the gateway based on connectivity control such as logical connections, tunnels, and secure sessions are only allowed to connect to the network if they are authorized through various authentication, permission, and security verification procedures, and nodes that are not authorized through various checks are not granted access, so unspecified targets of network boundary technology using existing IP-based filtering technology can always be connected.

[0007] Nodes can form a mutual trust relationship between the gateway and the controller, and can access services connected to the gateway through the granted connection, but service servers (e.g., Web Server, Web Application Server, etc.) existing in Layer 7 (Application Layer) can still only identify the source IP address of Layer 3 (Network Layer), so there may be a problem in that they cannot identify detailed information about whether the target is authorized and which target is connecting.

[0008] To solve the above problem, the service server performs a separate authentication procedure (e.g., user ID and password input-based authentication or Multi Factor Authentication, OAuth authentication, etc.) to identify the user, generate unique identification information, and insert it into the protocol of Layer 7. Then, when requesting a service, the inserted identification information is used to maintain mutual authentication between the node and the service, and to identify the target.

[0009] However, this authentication method based on insertion of identification information between nodes and services exposes identification information in the communication section of the two communication targets, and in particular, nodes with blind spots that cannot be controlled by the IP network stack (OSI 7 Layer) may be vulnerable to malware infection or if an intentional hacker steals identification information received from a service and inserts the stolen identification information into another node to request a service, the service can be used by receiving authentication and related authority from the hijacked node.

[0010] To address the above vulnerabilities, the service uses a random token method rather than fixed identification information. However, as theft and attack methods become more sophisticated, identification information using random tokens may also have the same vulnerabilities.

[0011] The various embodiments disclosed in this document are intended to provide a system and method thereof for solving the above-described problems in a network environment.

[0012] According to one embodiment disclosed in the present document, a gateway includes a communication circuit, a memory, and a processor operatively connected to the communication circuit and the memory, wherein the processor is configured to receive a service request from a node, confirm the existence of a data flow corresponding to the service request and authorized from the external server, confirm whether a protection information token included in the service request corresponds to the data flow, and if the protection information token corresponds to the data flow, generate protection information corresponding to the protection information token and to be inserted into the service request based on the data flow, and insert the protection information to be inserted into the service request into the service request and forward it to a service server, wherein the protection information token may be configured as identification information processed by the gateway to maintain a flow of information to be protected between an authorized target and the service server.

[0013] According to one embodiment of the present invention, a server comprises a communication circuit, a memory storing a database, and a processor operatively connected to the memory and the communication circuit, wherein the processor is configured to receive a network connection request from a node, wherein the network connection request includes identification information of a destination network of the node, determine whether the node can connect to the destination network based on the database, and if connection is possible, determine a connection method of the node based on the database, whether the node performs a logical connection authentication-based connection or an authorized channel or session-based connection to connect to the destination network, determine whether at least one of a logical connection, a channel, or a session can be created between the gateway and the node, generate a data flow for the node to connect to the destination network, and transmit the data flow to the gateway and the node, wherein the data flow includes authentication information and protection information that the gateway must remove and return when returning a service request result to the node, which must be updated in the data flow, and information related to generation of a protection information token to be generated by the gateway, and the protection information token is configured to store information that must be protected between an authorized subject and a service server. It may consist of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information.

[0014] A method of operating a gateway according to an embodiment disclosed in the present document includes an operation of receiving a service request from a node, an operation of confirming the existence of a data flow corresponding to the service request and authorized from the external server, an operation of confirming whether a protection information token included in the service request corresponds to the data flow, an operation of generating protection information corresponding to the protection information token and to be inserted into the service request based on the data flow if the protection information token corresponds to the data flow, and an operation of inserting the protection information to be inserted into the service request into the service request and forwarding the service request to a service server, wherein the protection information token may be configured as identification information processed by the gateway to maintain a flow of information to be protected between an authorized target and the service server.

[0015] According to the embodiments disclosed in this document, network access can be controlled so that session hijacking is impossible because there is no identification information provided by the service in the service request and return information received or transmitted by the node, and thus no information can be stolen.

[0016] In addition, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, a method can be provided in which node information identified and authenticated through a control flow (flow of control data packets) connected between a node and a controller, a controller and a gateway, and connection and data flow (flow of data packets between a node and a service) information connected and granted between a node and a gateway through a controller are identified and mutually matched, and identification and authentication information or protection information of a node that can be recognized by a service is inserted by the gateway and transmitted to the service, thereby allowing the service to identify a node by querying the controller for the received identification information without a separate node and authentication procedure.

[0017] According to the embodiments disclosed in this document, if the information returned by the service to the node includes important identification and authentication information, the information is removed from the gateway and transmitted to the node, so that the actual identification and authentication information exists only in the gateway and service section where the node communicates with the service, and the information does not exist in the node and gateway section, so that the vulnerability of network access can be resolved.

[0018] In addition, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, logical separation between the node and the gateway, and between the gateway and the service server may be possible by removing important information that should not be transmitted to the node through the connection structure between the node, the controller, and the gateway, and managing (and storing, inserting, etc.) related information through the gateway and the controller or a third-party server.

[0019] In addition, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, the controller inserts the information in the gateway corresponding to the service request of the node, such as previously identified information (e.g., user and node, application identification information) and protected information (e.g., node type, compliance information, etc.), and information that the node identifies or is issued by performing authentication from a third-party certification authority (e.g., Access Token, etc.), and transmits the information to the service, so that the service performs its own authentication and authorization processing based on the inserted information without a separate controller linkage, or performs authentication through linkage with a third-party certification authority, and instead, the information is deleted and transmitted when the service request is returned and passes through the gateway, so that the node can provide a state in which it cannot obtain and manipulate important information.

[0020] In addition, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, the gateway stores authentication and protection information commonly used within an area identified by the domain or IP address and port information of the node and the service server at the time of return after the node makes a service request to the service server, deletes and transmits the authentication and protection information to the node, and when the node makes a service request to the service server again, inserts and transmits information previously stored in response to the identified domain or IP address, port information and node identification information, thereby allowing the service server to provide a network access method in which authentication and important information are not exposed to the node in the same service environment as before.

[0021] In addition, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, when processing information that needs to be protected only in the continuous flow of a specific function of a service (e.g., adding to shopping cart -> entering shipping information -> payment -> completion step), and during the processing, the service adds, updates, and removes important information, in this case, when processing the information to be protected based on the service classification target, it is possible to manage a large amount of information at the gateway and prevent the problem of unnecessary information being transmitted to the service.

[0022] Additionally, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, the gateway can assign unique and temporarily available identification information to a node to manage the protected information processed in a continuous flow between the node and the service server, and can manage the protected information in the identification information separately from the protected information that should be managed in common.

[0023] In addition, according to the embodiments disclosed in this document, in the case of authentication and transaction processing based on redirection included in authentication technologies or payment protocols such as SSO (Single Sign On), SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language), OAuth, etc., even when transmission and exchange of identification information occurs between two different domains, the protected information occurring in a continuous flow based on the granted identification information can be processed to more precisely protect authentication and important information between different domains.

[0024] In addition, various effects may be provided, either directly or indirectly, through this document.

[0025] Figure 1 illustrates an environment including multiple networks.

[0026] Figure 2 illustrates an architecture within a network environment according to various embodiments.

[0027] FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram illustrating a database stored in a controller according to various embodiments.

[0028] Figure 4 illustrates a functional block diagram of a node according to various embodiments.

[0029] FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a structure for inserting protection information of an authorized target when forwarding service request information according to various embodiments.

[0030] Figure 6 illustrates a signal flow diagram for controller connection according to various embodiments.

[0031] FIG. 7 illustrates a signal flow diagram for user authentication according to various embodiments.

[0032] FIG. 8 illustrates a signal flow diagram for network connection according to various embodiments.

[0033] FIG. 9 illustrates a signal flow diagram for processing a service request according to various embodiments.

[0034] FIG. 10 illustrates an operational flowchart for processing service request results according to various embodiments.

[0035] FIG. 11 illustrates a signal flow diagram for control flow update according to various embodiments.

[0036] FIG. 12 illustrates a signal flow diagram for network disconnection according to various embodiments.

[0037] FIG. 13 illustrates a signal flow diagram for terminating application execution according to various embodiments.

[0038] FIG. 14 illustrates a flowchart for explaining a method of operating a gateway according to various embodiments.

[0039] Hereinafter, various embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, this is not intended to limit the present invention to specific embodiments, and it should be understood that various modifications, equivalents, and / or alternatives of the embodiments of the present invention are included.

[0040] In this document, the singular form of a noun corresponding to an item may include one or more of said items, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. In this document, phrases such as "A or B," "at least one of A and B," "at least one of A or B," "A, B, or C," "at least one of A, B, and C," and "at least one of A, B, or C" may each include any one of the items listed together in that phrase, or all possible combinations thereof. Terms such as "first," "second," or "first" or "second" may be used merely to distinguish the corresponding element from other corresponding elements, and do not limit the corresponding elements in any other respect (e.g., importance or order). When a component (e.g., a first component) is referred to as being “coupled” or “connected” to another component (e.g., a second component), with or without the terms “functionally” or “communicatively,” it means that the component can be connected to the other component directly (e.g., wired), wirelessly, or through a third component.

[0041] Each component (e.g., a module or a program) described in this document may include one or more entities. According to various embodiments, one or more components or operations of the components may be omitted, or one or more other components or operations may be added. Alternatively or additionally, a plurality of components (e.g., a module or a program) may be integrated into a single component. In such a case, the integrated component may perform one or more functions of each of the plurality of components identically or similarly to those performed by the corresponding component among the plurality of components prior to integration. According to various embodiments, the operations performed by a module, program, or other component may be executed sequentially, in parallel, iteratively, or heuristically, or one or more of the operations may be executed in a different order, omitted, or one or more other operations may be added.

[0042] The term "module" as used herein may include a unit implemented in hardware, software, or firmware, and may be used interchangeably with terms such as logic, logic block, component, or circuit. A module may be an integrally formed component, or a minimum unit of such components that performs one or more functions, or a single unit thereof. For example, according to one embodiment, a module may be implemented in the form of an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC).

[0043] Various embodiments of the present document may be implemented as software (e.g., a program or an application) including one or more instructions stored in a machine-readable storage medium (e.g., memory). For example, a processor of the device may call at least one instruction among the one or more instructions stored from the storage medium and execute it. This enables the device to operate to perform at least one function according to the at least one instruction called. The one or more instructions may include code generated by a compiler or code executable by an interpreter. The machine-readable storage medium may be provided in the form of a non-transitory storage medium. Here, "non-transitory" only means that the storage medium is a tangible device and does not contain a signal (e.g., electromagnetic waves), and this term does not distinguish between cases where data is stored semi-permanently and cases where it is stored temporarily in the storage medium.

[0044] The methods according to various embodiments disclosed in this document may be provided as a computer program product. The computer program product may be traded as a commodity between a seller and a buyer. The computer program product may be distributed in the form of a machine-readable storage medium (e.g., compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM)), or may be distributed online (e.g., downloaded or uploaded) through an application store or directly between two user devices (e.g., smartphones). In the case of online distribution, at least a portion of the computer program product may be temporarily stored or temporarily generated in a machine-readable storage medium, such as the memory of a manufacturer's server, an application store's server, or an intermediary server.

[0045] Figure 1 illustrates an environment including multiple networks.

[0046] Referring to FIG. 1, the first network (10) and the second network (20) may be different networks. For example, the first network (10) may be a public network such as the Internet, and the second network (20) may be a private network such as an intranet or VPN.

[0047] The first network (10) may include a source node (101). In the embodiments illustrated in FIG. 1 and described below, the "source node" may be any of various types of devices capable of performing data communication. For example, the source node (101) may include a portable device such as a smartphone or tablet, a computer device such as a desktop or laptop, a multimedia device, a medical device, a camera, a wearable device, a virtual reality (VR) device, or a home appliance, but is not limited to the aforementioned devices. For example, the source node (101) may include a server or communication device capable of transmitting data packets via an application. The source node (101) may also be referred to as an "electronic device" or a "terminal." Meanwhile, the destination node (102) may include a device identical to or similar to the aforementioned source node (101). For another example, the destination node (102) may be substantially identical to the destination network.

[0048] The source node (101) may attempt to access the second network (20) and transmit data to the destination node (102) included in the second network (20). The source node (101) may transmit data to the destination node (102) via a communication device (103). According to an embodiment, the communication device (103) may be a component included in the source node (101).

[0049] When the access of the source node (101) to the first network (10) is approved, the source node (101) can communicate with all servers included in the first network (10), and thus, the source node (101) may be exposed to attacks by malicious programs. For example, the source node (101) may receive data not only from trusted and / or secure applications, such as an Internet web browser (110a) and a business application (110b), but also from untrusted or insecure applications, such as malicious code (110c) and infected business applications (110d).

[0050] A source node (101) infected with a malicious program may attempt to connect to and / or transmit data to a second network (20). If the second network (20) is formed based on IP, such as a VPN, it may be difficult to individually monitor multiple devices included in the second network (20), and the second network (20) may be vulnerable to security issues in the application layer or transport layer at the OSI layer. In addition, if the source node (101) includes a malicious application after a channel has already been created, data of the malicious application may be transmitted to other electronic devices (e.g., the destination node (102)) within the second network (20).

[0051] Figure 2 illustrates an architecture within a network environment according to various embodiments.

[0052] Referring to FIG. 2, the node may include a first node (201) and a second node (207). For example, the first node (201) may be a node on which an access control application (211) is installed, and the second node (207) may be a node on which an access control application is not installed. Below, the first node (201) is described as node (201).

[0053] Node (201) may be a variety of devices capable of performing data communication. For example, node (201) may include a portable device such as a smartphone or tablet, a computer device such as a desktop or laptop, a multimedia device, a medical device, a camera, a wearable device, a virtual reality (VR) device, or a home appliance, but is not limited to the aforementioned devices. For example, node (201) may include a server or gateway capable of transmitting data packets via an application. Node (201) may also be referred to as an "electronic device" or a "terminal."

[0054] Node (201) can store a first target application (212), a second target application (213), and a connection control application (211). The target application (212) is controlled by the connection control application (211) and can transmit data packets to the destination network (205) or, conversely, receive data packets via the gateway (203). Some of the first target application (212) and the second target application (213) may be trusted and / or secure applications, such as web browsers or business applications, while others may be untrusted or insecure malicious programs. Therefore, the network access system according to the embodiments can block access to the destination network (205) of unauthorized programs (applications) through network access control of the connection control application (211) and isolate the programs. For example, before the target application (212) according to the embodiments communicates with the destination network (205), the connection control application (211) can check whether connection is possible from the controller (202). If connection is possible, the access control application (211) can control the transmission of data packets of the first target application (212) and the second target application (213). That is, in order for the first target application (212) and the second target application (213) to connect to the network, they must go through the access control application (211), the access control application (211) must be authorized by the controller (202), and the access control application (211) can transmit the data packets of the first target application (212) and the second target application (213) based on a data flow based on the policy of the controller (202).According to an embodiment, a first target application (212) may have network access controlled by creating a channel or session between gateways (203), and a second target application (213) may have network access controlled through a logical connection.

[0055] According to the embodiment, the second node (207) is a node on which an access control application is not installed, and network access can be controlled through the gateway (203).

[0056] The controller (202) may be, for example, a server (or a cloud server). The controller (202) can ensure reliable data transmission within a network environment by managing data transmission between the node (201), the gateway (203), and the destination network (205). For example, the controller (202) can allow network access to an authorized node (201) (or an access control application (211)) through policy information or blacklist information. The controller (202) can provide information that enables a channel to be created between the node (201) and the gateway (203). Accordingly, the access control application (211) of the node (201) can prevent an unauthorized application from transmitting data packets for unauthorized purposes, and can provide a structure in which only authorized data packets can be transmitted to the destination network (205) through the channel created with the gateway (203).

[0057] In an embodiment, the controller (202) may communicate with the authentication server (207) to perform additional authentication. For example, when an authentication request is received, the controller (202) may check with the authentication server (207) whether to perform additional authentication, and if additional authentication is to be performed, the controller (202) may request authentication from the authentication server (207) to receive authentication-related information. In an embodiment, the authentication server (207) may include at least one of authentication-related technologies such as OAuth, SAML, LDAP, and Active Directory.

[0058] According to an embodiment, the network access of the first target application (212) and the second target application (213) may be blocked by the access control application (211), the controller (202), or the gateway (203). According to one embodiment, the controller (202) may transmit and receive control data packets with the access control application (211) to perform various operations (e.g., registration, approval, authentication, renewal, termination) associated with the network access of the node (201) or the access control application (211). The flow (e.g., 220) in which the control data packets are transmitted may be referred to as a 'control flow'. According to an embodiment, the controller (202) may maintain a secure network state at all times by immediately reclaiming a channel according to a security event received from an interworking system (e.g., the node (201), the gateway (203), or the destination network (205)).

[0059] The gateway (203) may be located at the boundary of the network to which the node (201) belongs or at the boundary of the network to which the destination network (205) belongs. In one embodiment, the gateway (203) may be connected to the controller (202) in a cloud-based manner. In one embodiment, the flow of data packets transmitted between the access control application (211) and the gateway (203) may be referred to as a 'data flow'. The data flow may be generated not only at the node or IP level but also at a more detailed level (e.g., application level).

[0060] According to various embodiments, a connectivity control technology that allows only authorized objects such as logical connections, channels, and sessions to connect to a gateway can block unauthorized objects from accessing a network where a service exists (e.g., a cloud as a protected network, a business network, the Internet requiring control, etc.), and can control only authorized objects to access the service, and by identifying authorized objects, can improve the problem of existing IP (Internet Protocol) communication in which unspecified objects can always connect and the problem of identifying communication objects based on IP addresses.

[0061] In the case of service protocols based on existing IP communication (e.g., HTTP, FTP, etc.), the service identifies the authorized target, performs additional authentication, or additionally identifies important information of the communication target and maintains the information by recording it in the header (e.g., session, cookie, etc. in the case of HTTP) or body (e.g., information for maintaining POST parameters, parameter information included in URI, etc.) of the service request and return information, so that the information is constantly exposed in the communication section between the node or the node and the service.

[0062] Accordingly, the network access control technology according to the embodiments disclosed in this document can be logically separated into a gateway (203) that exists as a boundary between a node (201) to which the access control technology is applied and a destination network (205), and a region between the node (201) and the gateway (203) is an unreliable or unsafe region (e.g., a region where attacks such as Credential Stuffing, Session Hijacking, and Man In The Middle Attack are bound to occur), whereby node identification information and important information do not exist or are minimized, and a region between the gateway (203) and the destination network (205) is a reliable region (e.g., a region where various vulnerabilities that may occur in an unreliable or unsafe region due to intervention by a third party do not exist or are minimized).

[0063] That is, the gateway (203) can provide a structure for processing service requests and request returns in a state where attacks and vulnerable information that may occur between the node (201) and the gateway (203) section do not exist or are minimized based on a logically separated boundary, and by allowing identification information and important information of the node (201) to exist only in the section between the gateway (203) and the destination network (205), it can resolve vulnerabilities inherent in the service protocol based on existing IP communication, and process services included in the destination network to be able to communicate with authorized targets that are always safe and reliable.

[0064] According to various embodiments, the node (201) may include a connection control application (211) and a network driver (not shown) for managing network connections of target applications (212, 213) stored in the node (201). For example, when a connection event for a destination network (205) of a target application (212, 213) included in the node (201) occurs, the connection control application (211) may determine whether the target application (212, 213) is connectable. If the target application (212, 213) is connectable, the connection control application (211) may transmit a data packet to the gateway (203). The connection control application (211) may control the transmission of the data packet through a kernel including an operating system and a network driver within the node (201).

[0065] According to an embodiment, the destination network (205) may also be referred to as a service server.

[0066] FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram illustrating a database stored in a controller according to various embodiments. Although FIG. 3 only illustrates a memory (330), the controller may further include a communication circuit (e.g., a communication circuit (430) of FIG. 4) for communicating with an external electronic device and a processor (e.g., a processor (410) of FIG. 4) for controlling the overall operation of the controller.

[0067] An administrator can access the controller (202) and set a connection-centric policy to control access between an access control application (211) and a destination network (205), thereby enabling more detailed and secure control of network access than managing sessions at the service level.

[0068] The access policy database (311) may include information about networks and / or services to which an identified network, node, or application can connect. For example, when a network connection request is made by an access control application (211), the controller (202) may determine, based on the policy of the access policy database (311), whether the identified network (e.g., a network to which the node (201) belongs), node, user (e.g., a user of the node (201)), and / or application (e.g., a target application (212) included in the node (201)) can connect to the destination network (205). In an embodiment, the controller (202) may create a whitelist of target applications (212) that can connect to a specific service (e.g., IP and port) based on the access policy database (311).

[0069] The channel and session policy database (312) may include information on a gateway (e.g., gateway (203) of FIG. 2) existing between service servers (e.g., destination networks (205) of FIG. 2) on a connection path according to a policy. According to an embodiment, the channel and session policy database (312) may include at least one of a series of information for creating a channel between a node (201) and a gateway (203) (e.g., authentication and a series of information for creating a tunnel), a series of information for authenticating a logical connection between a node (201) and a gateway (203) (e.g., a method for creating and checking authentication information according to a protocol and a series of information), a series of information for creating a session between a node (201) and a gateway (203) (e.g., a certificate and a series of information for creating a secure session), or a method for removing a session if the session is not an authorized session when its own session is created between the node (201) and the gateway (203). That is, the channel and session policy database (312) can include a series of information and policies required to check whether a node (201) or a communication target is authorized and to control connectivity.

[0070] The blacklist policy database (313) may represent a blacklist registration policy for blocking access to targets (e.g., at least one of a node ID (identifier), an IP address, a MAC (media access control) address, or a user ID) identified through analysis of the risk level, occurrence cycle, and / or behavior of security events periodically collected from a node (201) or a gateway (203). In addition, the blacklist policy database (313) may be used as information for determining the risk level of an application based on the application inspection results and determining whether to temporarily or permanently isolate the application based on the risk level.

[0071] The blacklist database (314) may include a list of objects blocked by the blacklist policy database (313). For example, the controller (202) may isolate a node (201) by denying the network connection request if the identification information of the node (201) requesting network connection is included in the blacklist database (314).

[0072] The control flow table (315) is an example of a session table for managing the flow of control data packets (e.g., control flows) generated between the node (201) and the controller (202). When successfully connecting to the controller (202), control flow information can be generated by the controller (202). The control flow information can include at least one of control flow identification information, an IP address identified when connecting to and authenticating the controller, a node ID, or a user ID. For example, when a connection to a destination network (205) is requested from the node (201), the controller (202) can search for control flow information through the control flow identification information received from the node (201), and map at least one of the IP address, node ID, or user ID included in the searched control flow information to the connection policy database (311), thereby determining (determining) whether the node (201) can connect to the destination network (205) and whether to generate a data flow for data packet transmission.

[0073] In one embodiment, a control flow may have an expiration time. Node (201) must update the expiration time of the control flow, and if the expiration time is not updated within a certain period of time, the control flow (or control flow information) may be removed. Furthermore, if it is determined that immediate access blocking is necessary based on security events collected from node (201), the controller (202) may remove the control flow in response to a connection termination request from node (201). When the control flow is removed, previously generated data flows are also removed, so that the connection of node (201) may be blocked.

[0074] The data flow table (316) is a table for managing the flow (e.g., data flow) of detailed data packets transmitted between the node (201), the gateway (203), and the destination network (205). The data flow can be generated by a TCP session, an application, or a more detailed unit. The data flow table (316) can manage dependent data flows using a data flow ID for identifying the data flow and a control flow ID assigned to the transmission entity.

[0075] According to an embodiment, the data flow table (316) may include processing information (e.g., logical connection authentication information or session creation or confirmation information) corresponding to the type of connectivity control that a node (201) or one or more identification information and applications must process to be connected to one or more gateways (203), connectivity control information for identifying that the gateway (203) is an authorized node (201) (e.g., information for identifying whether a connection is based on logical connection authentication, an authorized channel or session-based connection, and status information), authorized target information for determining whether to forward based on the channel and session information and the destination IP, service port, and service domain information of the data packet and service request of the authorized target based on the channel and session information, and status information including whether the corresponding data flow is valid.

[0076] According to an embodiment, the data flow table (316) may include authentication information. For example, the data flow table (316) may include information related to whether the node (201) needs to perform additional authentication to access the service, and information about the protection of the authorized target to be inserted through the gateway (203) as information previously set by the service provider (e.g., information that cannot be identified through a general service protocol, such as the node's operating system and device type, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from the authentication server). For example, the protection information of the authorized target may include information for confirming whether the target is authorized and thereby a series of information previously identified by the controller, and information for determining whether to insert the series of information previously identified by the controller into the header or the body. For example, the protection information of the authorized target may be generated based on the service policy database (317), and information related to whether to perform additional authentication to access the service may be generated based on the authentication policy database (319).

[0077] According to an embodiment, the data flow table (316) may further include information on protection information to be removed and returned by the gateway (203) when the service server returns a service request result to the node (201), whether the protection information to be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203), if a service request exists in the node (201), protection information to be inserted again among the protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when the service result was returned, protection information to be shared or protected between two different domains identified in the authentication process when checking whether authentication is required through the gateway (203) and redirecting to the authentication server when accessing a service, or when the service server redirects the service request to the authentication server, and information on a protection information token generation method and algorithm. According to an embodiment, the protection information may be generated based on the service policy database (317).

[0078] In an embodiment, the protection information token may consist of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

[0079] The data flow table (316) can be managed based on the control flow ID.

[0080] According to an embodiment, the data flow table (316) can be stored identically in the node (201) and the gateway (203).

[0081] The service policy database (317) may include, according to the access policy (311), destination IP and port information that the access target can access through the proxy, service domain information, protocol information (e.g., HTTP, FTP, IoT-specific protocol), and protection information of the authorized target to be inserted through the gateway (203) as information previously set by the service provider. According to an embodiment, the protection information of the authorized target may include information that cannot be identified through a general service protocol, such as the node's operating system and device type, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from the authentication server. For example, the protection information of the authorized target may further include information for confirming whether the target is authorized and thereby a series of information previously identified by the controller, and information for determining whether to insert the series of information previously identified by the controller into the header or the body.

[0082] According to an embodiment, the service policy database (317) may include protection information to be removed and returned by the gateway (203) when the service server returns a service request result to the node (201), and whether the protection information to be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203). In addition, the service policy database (317) may further include protection information to be inserted again among the protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when the service result was returned when a service request exists in the node (201), protection information to be shared or protected between two different domains identified during the authentication process when checking whether authentication is required through the gateway (203) and redirecting to the authentication server when accessing a service, or when the service server redirects the service request to the authentication server, and information on a method and algorithm for generating a protection information token. According to an embodiment, the protection information token may be configured as identification information to be processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

[0083] The channel and session table (318) may be a table for managing channels or sessions created between a node (201), a connection control application (211), or a target application (212, 213) and a gateway (203). For example, when a channel or session is created between a node (201), a connection control application (211), or a target application (212, 213) and a gateway (203), information related to the created channel or session may be updated in the channel and session table (318). For another example, when a channel or session between a node (201), a connection control application (211), or a target application (212, 213) and a gateway (203) is removed, information related to the removed channel or session may be updated in the channel and session table (318).

[0084] The authentication policy database (319) may include information for determining whether additional authentication is required for identification of a node, identification of a user, or identification of a target identified at the time of service access according to the access policy (311) to an authentication server other than the controller (202) (e.g., authentication-related technologies such as OAuth, SAML, LDAP, Active Directory, etc.). According to an embodiment, the authentication policy database (319) may include a series of information, such as an authentication server and an authentication method, when additional authentication is required.

[0085] Figure 4 illustrates a functional block diagram of a node according to various embodiments.

[0086] Referring to FIG. 4, the node may include a processor (410), a memory (420), and a communication circuit (430). According to one embodiment, the node may further include a display (440) to interface with a user.

[0087] The processor (410) can control the overall operation of the node. In various embodiments, the processor (410) may include a single processor core or multiple processor cores. For example, the processor (410) may include multi-cores such as dual-core, quad-core, or hexa-core. According to embodiments, the processor (410) may further include cache memory located internally or externally. According to embodiments, the processor (410) may be configured with one or more processors. For example, the processor (410) may include at least one of an application processor, a communication processor, or a graphical processing unit (GPU).

[0088] All or part of the processor (410) may be electrically or operatively coupled with or connected to other components within the node (e.g., memory (420), communication circuitry (430), or display (440). The processor (410) may receive commands from other components of the node, interpret the received commands, and perform calculations or process data according to the interpreted commands. The processor (410) may interpret and process messages, data, commands, or signals received from the memory (420), communication circuitry (430), or display (440). The processor (410) may generate new messages, data, commands, or signals based on the received messages, data, commands, or signals. The processor (410) may provide the processed or generated messages, data, commands, or signals to the memory (420), communication circuitry (430), or display (440).

[0089] The processor (410) can process data or signals generated or produced by a program. For example, the processor (410) can request instructions, data, or signals from the memory (420) to execute or control the program. The processor (410) can record (or store) or update instructions, data, or signals in the memory (420) to execute or control the program.

[0090] The memory (420) may store commands for controlling the node, control command codes, control data, or user data. For example, the memory (420) may include at least one of an application program, an operating system (OS), middleware, or a device driver.

[0091] The memory (420) may include one or more of volatile memory or non-volatile memory. The volatile memory may include dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static RAM (SRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), phase-change RAM (PRAM), magnetic RAM (MRAM), resistive RAM (RRAM), ferroelectric RAM (FeRAM), etc. The non-volatile memory may include read only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), flash memory, etc.

[0092] The memory (420) may further include a non-volatile medium such as a hard disk drive (HDD), a solid state disk (SSD), an embedded multi media card (eMMC), or a universal flash storage (UFS).

[0093] According to one embodiment, the memory (420) may store the target applications (212, 213) and the access control application (211) of FIG. 2. The access control application (211) may perform control flow generation and update functions with the controller (202). For this purpose, the access control application (211) may include one or more security modules.

[0094] According to one embodiment, the memory (420) may store some of the information contained in the memory of the controller (e.g., the memory (330) of FIG. 3). For example, the memory (420) may store the data flow table (316) described in FIG. 3.

[0095] The communication circuit (430) can support the establishment of a wired or wireless communication connection between a node and an external electronic device (e.g., the controller (202), the gateway (203), or the destination network (205) of FIG. 2), and the performance of communication through the established connection. According to one embodiment, the communication circuit (430) includes a wireless communication circuit (e.g., a cellular communication circuit, a short-range wireless communication circuit, or a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) communication circuit) or a wired communication circuit (e.g., a local area network (LAN) communication circuit, or a power line communication circuit), and can communicate with an external electronic device through a short-range communication network such as Bluetooth, WiFi direct, or IrDA (infrared data association), or a long-range communication network such as a cellular network, the Internet, or a computer network using the corresponding communication circuit. The various types of communication circuits (430) described above can be implemented as one chip or can be implemented as separate chips.

[0096] The display (440) can output content, data, or signals. In various embodiments, the display (440) can display image data processed by the processor (410). According to embodiments, the display (440) may be configured with an integrated touch screen by being combined with a plurality of touch sensors (not shown) that can receive touch inputs, etc. When the display (440) is configured with a touch screen, the plurality of touch sensors may be arranged above the display (440) or below the display (440).

[0097] A server (e.g., a controller) according to one embodiment may include a processor (410), a memory (420), and a communication circuit (430). The processor (410), the memory (420), and the communication circuit (430) included in the server may be substantially the same as the processor (410), the memory (420), and the communication circuit (430) described above.

[0098] A gateway according to one embodiment (e.g., gateway (203) of FIG. 2) may include a processor (410), a memory (420), and a communication circuit (430). The processor (410), the memory (420), and the communication circuit (430) included in the gateway may be substantially the same as the processor (410), the memory (420), and the communication circuit (430) described above.

[0099] FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a structure for inserting protection information of an authorized target when forwarding service request information according to various embodiments.

[0100] Referring to FIG. 5, HTTP-based service request information (505) may include an HTTP header (510) and an HTTP body (530).

[0101] According to an embodiment, the HTTP header (510) may include an HTTP header (515) added by the gateway, and the HTTP header (515) added by the gateway (203) may include a data flow header (520) and protection information (525) of the authorized target. That is, the gateway (203) may add the data flow header (520) and protection information (525) of the authorized target to the HTTP header (510) so that a service server existing in the destination network (205) can identify whether the request is from an authorized target through the HTTP header (510).

[0102] According to an embodiment, the HTTP body (530) may include an HTTP body (535) added by the gateway (203), and the HTTP body (535) added by the gateway (203) may include protection information (540) of the authorized target. That is, the gateway (203) may insert or add protection information (540) of the authorized target to the HTTP body (530).

[0103] According to an embodiment, the gateway (203) may include protection information (e.g., information that cannot be identified through general service protocols, such as the operating system and device type of the node, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from the authentication server) of the authorized target discovered based on token information (e.g., the authorized target's protection information token (560)). For example, the protection information of the authorized subject is information on whether to insert into the header or the body by confirming whether the subject is authorized and thereby a series of information previously identified by the controller, a method of inserting a series of information previously identified by the controller, protection information to be removed and returned by the gateway (203) when the service server returns the service request result to the node (201), whether the protection information to be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203), when a service request exists in the node (201), protection information to be inserted again among the protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when returning the service result, protection information to be shared or protected between two different domains identified in the authentication process when confirming whether authentication is required through the gateway (203) and redirecting to the authentication server or when the service server redirects the service request to the authentication server, protection information token generation method and algorithm information) to be identified and processed by the service server in a part suitable for the service protocol (e.g., header and body areas in the case of HTTP). It can perform the role of inserting a series of information that can be retransmitted to the service server and returning the service server's response value for the service request to the node.

[0104] In an embodiment, the protection information token may consist of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

[0105] According to an embodiment, if the gateway (203) includes the protection information of the authorized target as described above in the service request result (reverse direction) received after forwarding the service request information, the gateway (203) removes unnecessary protection information so that the node (201) cannot receive the information, and, so that the node (201) can re-insert the removed protection information at the time of the service request and transmit it, the information that needs to be retransmitted among the information to be removed is updated and stored in the data flow of the gateway (203) so that it corresponds to the issued token information so that the service request and result return can be continuously processed in a series of continuous flows, thereby inserting the token information and forwarding the service request result, thereby protecting important information that the service server maintains with the node (201).

[0106] That is, the gateway (203) according to the embodiments disclosed in this document can be configured to block service requests from unauthorized targets from the gateway (203) or the service server by controlling the node (201) to not transmit or receive protection information from authorized targets.

[0107] In addition, the HTTP-based service request information (545) transmitted from the node (201) may include an HTTP header (550). The gateway (203) may check whether the HTTP header (555) added by the gateway and included in the HTTP header (550) contains a protection information token (560) of the authorized target. When the proxy included in the gateway (203) receives a service request by an authorized connectivity control element, the proxy may identify the connection target and the service requested by the connection target through the data flow table, and may check whether the same information as the protection information token of the authorized target included in the data flow exists as the protection information token of the authorized target in the service request information. That is, the gateway (203) may identify the data flow based on the protection information token of the authorized target, identify protection information corresponding to the protection information token, and insert the protection information into the forwarding when forwarding the service request to the service server.

[0108] Figure 6 illustrates a signal flow diagram for controller connection according to various embodiments.

[0109] Since the node (201) needs to be authorized by the controller (202) to access or receive a network, the access control application (211) of the node (201) may attempt to access the controller of the node (201) by requesting the controller (202) to create a control flow. According to an embodiment, the node (201) may be substantially the same as the node (201) of FIG. 2 in which the access control application (211) is installed.

[0110] Referring to FIG. 6, the node (201) can detect a controller connection event. For example, when a connection control application (211) is installed and executed within the node (201), the node (201) can detect that a connection to the controller (202) is requested.

[0111] In operation 605, the node (201) may request controller connection to the controller (202). For example, the connection control application (211) may transmit identification information of the connection control application (211) to the controller (202).

[0112] In operation 610, the controller (202) can identify whether a target (e.g., a connection control application (211) or a node (201)) that has requested controller connection is accessible. According to one embodiment, the controller (202) can identify whether a target that has requested controller connection is accessible based on at least one of whether information received from the node (201) is included in the connection policy database (311) or whether identification information of the node (201), the network to which the node (201) belongs, and / or the connection control application (211) is included in the blacklist database (314).

[0113] If connection is possible, in operation 615, the controller (202) can check whether the identified node (201) performs additional authentication through an authentication server (207, e.g., an authentication-related technology such as OAuth, SAML, LDAP, or Active Directory) other than the controller (202) based on the authentication policy (319). According to an embodiment, if additional authentication does not need to be performed, the controller (202) can perform operation 625. According to an embodiment, if additional authentication needs to be performed, the controller (202) can request authentication to the authentication server (207) based on the identified information and the information set in the authentication policy (319) and receive an authentication result (operation 620). According to an embodiment, if an authentication failure result is received from the authentication server (207), the controller (202) can transmit connection failure information to the node (201) (operation 635).

[0114] When authentication completion information is received from the authentication server (207), the controller (202) can store authentication-related information received from the authentication server (207) (e.g., a series of information for verifying authentication-related information of the node, such as an authentication token for the service to verify the authentication information of the node through the authentication server and receive related authorization information or protection information).

[0115] If authentication is completed or no additional authentication is required, in operation 625, the controller (202) may generate a control flow between the node (201) (or the access control application (211)) and the controller (202). In this case, the controller (202) may generate control flow identification information in the form of a random number and store identification information of at least one of the node (201), the network to which the node (201) belongs, or the access control application (211) in the control flow table (315). The information stored in the control flow table (315) may be used for user authentication of the node (201), information update of the node (201), policy verification for network access of the node (201), and / or validity check.

[0116] In operation 630, the controller (202) may generate a whitelist of applications that can be connected based on the access policy database (311) and the channel policy database (312) corresponding to the identified information (e.g., node (201), information on the source network to which the node (201) belongs). According to an embodiment, the controller (202) may determine whether there is destination network information to which the node (201) that has currently requested connection can connect by default based on the identified information, the access policy database (311), and the channel and session policy database (312). In one embodiment, the controller (202) may transmit the application whitelist to the access control application (211) in operation 635.

[0117] If connection is possible, the controller (202) can list the types of channels and gateways to which the node (201) can connect. For example, the controller (202) can list the types of channels and gateways to which the node (201) can connect based on at least one or a combination of two or more of the type, location information, environment, and network information of the node (201) included in the control flow for the node (201) to connect to the destination network, identification information (e.g., IP information) of the node (201) identified through the controller (202), and identification information of the node (201) identified in the node (201).

[0118] The controller (202) can check the status of the listed gateways (e.g., throughput, failure status) and identify a channel and gateway (203) optimized for the node (201) among the listed gateways. For example, the controller (202) can identify one channel and gateway (203). In an embodiment, if there is a channel and gateway (203) accessible to the node (201), the controller (202) can transmit channel creation information, such as the gateway (203) and channel authentication information for the node (201) to create a channel to the node (201) (operation 635). In an embodiment, the channel can include at least one of a tunnel and a session.

[0119] According to an embodiment, if the structure is not one in which a channel is created between a node (201) and a gateway (203), but rather one in which a connection is made through a pre-connected channel existing at the destination network boundary with a gateway (203) existing in the network to which the node (201) belongs, or if a connection is made through a different channel technology between the node (201) and the destination network boundary, the controller (202) may not transmit channel creation information to the node (201).

[0120] In operation 635, the controller (202) may transmit control flow identification information to the node (201) in response to the controller connection request. In an embodiment, if the target requesting controller connection is unavailable or included in a blacklist, the controller (202) may transmit unavailable information in operation 635 without generating a control flow. In one embodiment, the controller (202) may transmit the application whitelist generated by performing operation 630 to the connection control application (211).

[0121] When channel creation is required (e.g., when channel creation information is received from the controller (202), the access control application (211) may request channel creation to the gateway (203) at operation 640 based on information for channel creation received from the controller (202) (e.g., a series of information required for channel creation, such as the gateway (203) and channel authentication information). The gateway (203) may create a channel in response to the channel creation request of the node (201). According to an embodiment, when the controller (202) determines that channel creation is unnecessary (e.g., when channel creation information is not received from the controller (202), or when information indicating that channel creation is unnecessary is received from the controller (202), the access control application (211) may perform operation 645 without performing operation 640.

[0122] When a channel is created through operation 640, the access control application (211) can check whether channel creation completion information and a dedicated IP set according to channel creation exist, and transmit the channel creation completion information and dedicated IP information to the controller (202) (operation 650).

[0123] In operation 645, the access control application (211) may perform an inspection on the application. For example, the access control application (211) may perform an inspection on the application based on a whitelist of accessible applications received from the controller (202). According to an embodiment, the access control application (211) may determine whether the application exists (is installed) on the node (201) based on the accessible application information.

[0124] In operation 650, the access control application (211) may transmit the inspection results to the controller (202). For example, the access control application (211) may transmit channel creation completion information and assigned channel identification information (IP information) to the controller (202). As another example, the access control application (211) may transmit the results of a confirmation of whether an application is installed to the controller (202) based on an application whitelist.

[0125] In operation 655, the controller (202) may perform data flow processing. For example, when channel creation completion information is received, the controller (202) may register channel-dedicated IP information and channel creation completion information assigned to the node (201) in a channel and session table (e.g., the channel and session table (318) of FIG. 3), and update the information transmitted from the node (201) in the control flow corresponding to the node (201).

[0126] The controller (202) can check the gateway (203) where the node (201) is located in the access policy (e.g., access policy (311) of FIG. 3) and service policy (317) to allow access of the node (201) connected to the network. In addition, the controller (202) can generate a data flow including destination IP, service port information, and service domain information so that the node (201) can control service processing requests without performing a network access request procedure. According to an embodiment, the data flow may include connectivity control information for identifying the gateway (203) as an authorized node (201) (e.g., information for identifying whether a connection is based on logical connection authentication, an authorized channel or session-based connection, and information for identifying the same, status information), information related to whether the node (201) must perform additional authentication to access the service, and protection information of the authorized target to be inserted through the gateway (203) as information set in advance by the service provider (e.g., information that cannot be identified through a general service protocol, such as the node's operating system and device type, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from an authentication server).For example, the protection information of the authorized subject may include information for confirming whether the subject is authorized and a series of information previously identified by the controller thereby, information for determining whether to insert the series of information previously identified by the controller into the header or the body by means of inserting the information, protection information to be removed and returned by the gateway (203) when the service server returns the service request result to the node (201), whether the protection information to be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203), when a service request exists in the node (201), protection information to be inserted again among the protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when returning the service result, protection information to be shared or protected between two different domains identified during the authentication process when confirming whether authentication is required through the gateway (203) and redirecting to the authentication server or when the service server redirects the service request to the authentication server, and information on the method for generating a protection information token and algorithm. In this case, the controller (202) can transmit the generated data flow to the gateway (203) and the access control application (211) of the node (201) (operations 660, 665).

[0127] At step 670, the access control application (211) may process the result value according to the received response. For example, the access control application (211) may store the received control flow identification information and display a user interface screen indicating that the controller connection is complete to the user. Upon completion of the controller connection, the network connection request of the node (201) to the destination network may be controlled by the controller (202).

[0128] In another embodiment, the controller (202) may determine that the node (201) is unreachable. For example, if the identification information of the node (201) and / or the network to which the node (201) belongs is included in the blacklist database, the controller (202) may determine that the node (201) is unreachable. In this case, the controller (202) may not generate a control flow in operation 625, but may transmit a response indicating that the controller connection is unreachable in operation 635. Furthermore, in this case, operations 640 to 665 may not be performed. In an embodiment, if a retry of the controller connection is required, the connection control application (211) may perform operation 605 again.

[0129] Additionally, the access control application (211) can manage the data flow by updating the data flow of the node (201) when a data flow received from the controller (202) exists, so that data packets can be transmitted based on the data flow previously allowed when connecting to the network. Thereafter, when a request for data packet transmission is detected, the access control application (211) can process the data packet to be transmitted based on the received data flow.

[0130] According to an embodiment, when the connection control application (211) receives network connection release information from the controller (202), it can terminate the application or block all network connections of the application.

[0131] FIG. 7 illustrates a signal flow diagram for user authentication according to various embodiments.

[0132] In order for the node (201) to be granted detailed access rights to the destination network, the access control application (211) of the node (201) can receive authentication for the user of the node (201) from the controller (202). According to an embodiment, the node (201) can be substantially identical to the node (201) of FIG. 2 in which the access control application (211) is installed.

[0133] Referring to FIG. 7, the node (201) may receive input for user authentication. The input for user authentication may be, for example, a user input for entering a user ID and password. In another example, the input for user authentication may be a user input for more enhanced authentication (e.g., biometric information). In this case, in operation 705, the access control application (211) of the node (201) may request user authentication from the controller (202). If a control flow has already been created between the node (201) and the controller (202), the access control application (211) may transmit input information for user authentication along with control flow identification information.

[0134] In operation 710, the controller (202) may authenticate the user based on information received from the node (201). For example, the controller (202) may determine whether the user can access according to the access policy and whether the user is included in the blacklist based on the user ID, password, and / or enhanced authentication information included in the received information and a database (e.g., the access policy database (311) or the blacklist database (314) of FIG. 3) included in the memory of the controller (202).

[0135] When the user is authenticated, in operation 715, the controller (202) can determine whether the identified node (201) performs additional authentication through an authentication server (207, e.g., an authentication-related technology such as OAuth, SAML, LDAP, or Active Directory) other than the controller (202) based on the authentication policy (319). In an embodiment, if additional authentication does not need to be performed, the controller (202) can perform operation 725. In an embodiment, if additional authentication needs to be performed, the controller (202) can request authentication to the authentication server (207) based on the identified information and the information set in the authentication policy (319) and receive an authentication result (operation 720). In an embodiment, if an authentication failure result is received from the authentication server (207), the controller (202) can transmit access failure information to the node (201) (operation 735).

[0136] When authentication completion information is received from the authentication server (207), the controller (202) can store authentication-related information received from the authentication server (207) (e.g., a series of information for verifying authentication-related information of the node, such as an authentication token for the service to verify the authentication information of the node through the authentication server and receive related authorization information or protection information).

[0137] If authentication is completed or no additional authentication is required, in operation 725, the controller (202) may add user identification information (e.g., user ID) to the identification information of the control flow. The added user identification information may be used for the authenticated user to access the controller or network.

[0138] In operation 730, the controller (202) may generate a whitelist of applications that can be connected from the access policy database (311) and the channel policy database (312) corresponding to the identified information (e.g., node (201), information on the source network to which the node (201) belongs). According to an embodiment, the controller (202) may determine whether there is destination network information to which the node (201) that has currently requested connection can connect by default, based on the identified information, the access policy database (311), and the channel policy database (312). In one embodiment, the controller (202) may transmit the application whitelist to the access control application (211) in operation 735.

[0139] If connection is possible, the controller (202) can list the types of channels and gateways to which the node (201) can connect. For example, the controller (202) can list the types of channels and gateways to which the node (201) can connect based on at least one or a combination of two or more of the type, location information, environment, and network information of the node (201) included in the control flow for the node (201) to connect to the destination network, identification information (e.g., IP information) of the node (201) identified through the controller (202), and identification information of the node (201) identified in the node (201).

[0140] The controller (202) can check the status of the listed gateways (e.g., throughput, failure status) and identify a channel and gateway (203) optimized for the node (201) among the listed gateways. For example, the controller (202) can identify one channel and gateway (203). According to an embodiment, if there is a channel and gateway (203) accessible to the node (201), the controller (202) can transmit channel creation information, such as the gateway (203) and channel authentication information for the node (201) to create a channel to the node (201) (operation 735). According to an embodiment, the channel can include at least one of a tunnel and a session.

[0141] According to an embodiment, if the structure is not one in which a channel is created between a node (201) and a gateway (203), but rather one in which a connection is made through a pre-connected channel existing at the destination network boundary with a gateway (203) existing in the network to which the node (201) belongs, or if a connection is made through a different channel technology between the node (201) and the destination network boundary, the controller (202) may not transmit channel creation information to the node (201).

[0142] In operation 735, the controller (202) may transmit information indicating that the user is authenticated to the node (201) in response to the user authentication request. In one embodiment, the controller (202) may transmit the application whitelist generated through the performance of operation 730 to the access control application (211).

[0143] When channel creation is required (e.g., when channel creation information is received from the controller (202), the access control application (211) may request channel creation to the gateway (203) in operation 740 based on information for channel creation received from the controller (202) (e.g., a series of information required for channel creation, such as the gateway (203) and channel authentication information). The gateway (203) may create a channel in response to the channel creation request of the node (201). According to an embodiment, when the controller (202) determines that channel creation is unnecessary (e.g., when channel creation information is not received from the controller (202), or when information indicating that channel creation is unnecessary is received from the controller (202), the access control application (211) may perform operation 745 without performing operation 740.

[0144] When a channel is created through operation 740, the access control application (211) can check whether channel creation completion information and a dedicated IP set according to channel creation exist. The access control application (211) can transmit channel creation completion information and dedicated IP information to the controller (202) (operation 750).

[0145] In operation 745, the access control application (211) may perform an inspection on the application. For example, the access control application (211) may perform an inspection on the application based on the whitelist of accessible applications received from the controller (202). The access control application (211) may determine whether the application exists (is installed) on the node (201) based on the accessible application information.

[0146] In operation 750, the access control application (211) may transmit the inspection results to the controller (202). For example, the access control application (211) may transmit channel creation completion information and assigned channel identification information (IP information) to the controller (202). As another example, the access control application (211) may transmit the results of a confirmation of whether an application is installed to the controller (202) based on an application whitelist.

[0147] In operation 755, the controller (202) may perform data flow processing. For example, when channel creation completion information is received, the controller (202) may register channel-dedicated IP information and channel creation completion information assigned to the node (201) in a channel and session table (e.g., the channel and session table (318) of FIG. 3), and update the information transmitted from the node (201) in the control flow corresponding to the node (201).

[0148] The controller (202) can check the gateway (203) where the node (201) is located in the access policy (e.g., access policy (311) of FIG. 3) and service policy (317) to allow access of the node (201) connected to the network. In addition, the controller (202) can generate a data flow including destination IP, service port information, and service domain information so that the node (201) can control service processing requests without performing a network access request procedure. According to an embodiment, the data flow may include connectivity control information for identifying the gateway (203) as an authorized node (201) (e.g., information for identifying whether a connection is based on logical connection authentication, an authorized channel or session-based connection, and information for identifying the same, status information), information related to whether the node (201) must perform additional authentication to access the service, and protection information of the authorized target to be inserted through the gateway (203) as information set in advance by the service provider (e.g., information that cannot be identified through a general service protocol, such as the node's operating system and device type, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from an authentication server).For example, the protection information of the authorized subject may include information for confirming whether the subject is authorized and a series of information previously identified by the controller thereby, information for determining whether to insert the series of information previously identified by the controller into the header or the body by means of inserting the information, protection information to be removed and returned by the gateway (203) when the service server returns the service request result to the node (201), whether the protection information to be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203), when a service request exists in the node (201), protection information to be inserted again among the protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when returning the service result, protection information to be shared or protected between two different domains identified during the authentication process when confirming whether authentication is required through the gateway (203) and redirecting to the authentication server or when the service server redirects the service request to the authentication server, and information on the method for generating a protection information token and algorithm. In this case, the controller (202) can transmit the generated data flow to the gateway (203) and the access control application (211) of the node (201) (operations 760, 765).

[0149] At step 770, the access control application (211) may process the result value according to the received response. For example, the access control application (211) may store the received control flow identification information and display a user interface screen indicating that user authentication is complete to the user. Upon completion of user authentication, the network connection request of the node (201) to the destination network may be controlled by the controller (202).

[0150] In another embodiment, the controller (202) may determine that user authentication of the node (201) is impossible. For example, if identification information of the node (201) and / or the network to which the node (201) belongs is included in the blacklist database, the controller (202) may determine that the node (201) is inaccessible and that user authentication is impossible. In this case, the controller (202) may not reflect the user identification information in operation 725 and may transmit a response indicating that controller connection is impossible in operation 735. Furthermore, in this case, operations 740 to 765 may not be performed.

[0151] In addition, the connection control application (211) can update the data flow of the node (201) when there is a data flow received from the controller (202), and manage the data flow so that data packets can be transmitted based on the data flow previously allowed when connecting to the network.

[0152] According to an embodiment, when the connection control application (211) receives network connection release information from the controller (202), it can terminate the application or block all network connections of the application.

[0153] FIG. 8 illustrates a signal flow diagram for network connection according to various embodiments.

[0154] After the node (201) is authorized by the controller (202), the node (201) can ensure reliable data transmission by controlling the network access of other applications stored in the node (201) through the access control application (211) of the node (201). According to an embodiment, the node (201) can be substantially identical to the node (201) of FIG. 2 in which the access control application (211) is installed.

[0155] Referring to FIG. 8, at operation 805, the access control application (211) can detect a network access event of another application (e.g., the target application (212) of FIG. 2) stored within the node (201).

[0156] In operation 810, the access control application (211) may verify the presence of a data flow corresponding to the identification information of the application requesting network access, the destination network identification information, and the port information. In some embodiments, if the data flow exists but is invalid, the access control application (211) may drop the data packet. In other embodiments, if the data flow exists, the access control application (211) may transmit the data packet based on the data flow. In some embodiments, the access control application (211) of the node (201) may perform a network access request in operation 815 without performing operation 810.

[0157] When a data flow needs to be updated, such as when the data flow does not exist or the authentication time has expired and needs to be updated, in operation 815, the access control application (211) may perform a network connection request to the controller (202). For example, the network connection request may include control flow identification information, target application identification information, destination network identification information, and port information.

[0158] In operation 820, the controller (202) may check whether the access policy corresponding to the identified information (e.g., node, user, source network identification information) based on the control flow identification information includes the identification information requested for access (e.g., destination network identification information and port information) and whether the destination network is accessible. In an embodiment, the controller (202) may check whether the target application is accessible to the gateway (203) or the destination network (205). In an embodiment, if the network is accessible, the controller (202) may transmit a result indicating that the access is not possible to the access control application (211) of the node (201) (operation 845).

[0159] If connection is possible, the controller (202) can determine whether the connection is based on logical connection authentication, authorized channel or session based connection as a connectivity control element for an authorized node (201) or target application to connect to the network based on the channel and session policy (312).

[0160] According to an embodiment, when performing logical connection authentication-based connectivity control, the controller (202) may perform a procedure for generating a data flow including information for logical connection authentication.

[0161] In an embodiment, when performing connectivity control based on a channel, the controller (202) can check whether a channel is created between the node (201) and the gateway (203). For example, if the channel is not created, the controller (202) can transmit a connection failure result to the node (201). In another example, if the channel is created, the controller (202) can perform a procedure for creating a data flow.

[0162] According to an embodiment, when performing connectivity control based on a session, the controller (202) may perform a procedure for generating a data flow including information for creating a session.

[0163] If connection is possible, in operation 825, the controller (202) can check whether the identified node (201) performs additional authentication through an authentication server (207, e.g., authentication-related technology such as OAuth, SAML, LDAP, Active Directory, etc.) other than the controller (202) based on the authentication policy (319). According to an embodiment, if additional authentication does not need to be performed, the controller (202) can perform operation 835. According to an embodiment, if additional authentication needs to be performed, the controller (202) can request authentication to the authentication server (207) based on the identified information and the information set in the authentication policy (319) and receive an authentication result (operation 830). According to an embodiment, if an authentication failure result is received from the authentication server (207), the controller (202) can transmit connection failure information to the node (201) (operation 845).

[0164] When authentication completion information is received from the authentication server (207), the controller (202) can store authentication-related information received from the authentication server (207) (e.g., a series of information for verifying authentication-related information of the node, such as an authentication token for the service to verify the authentication information of the node through the authentication server and receive related authorization information or protection information).

[0165] If authentication is completed or no additional authentication is required, in operation 835, the controller (202) can check whether there is a valid data flow corresponding to the information (destination identification information, port information) requested by the node (201).

[0166] According to an embodiment, if a valid data flow exists, the controller (202) can perform operations 840 and 845 without generating a data flow.

[0167] According to an embodiment, if a valid data flow does not exist, the controller (202) can create a data flow including a source IP, a destination IP, service port information, and service domain information.

[0168] According to an embodiment, the data flow may include connectivity control information for identifying the gateway (203) as an authorized node (201) (e.g., information for identifying whether a connection is based on logical connection authentication, an authorized channel or session-based connection, and information for identifying the same, status information), information related to whether the node (201) must perform additional authentication to access the service, and protection information of the authorized target to be inserted through the gateway (203) as information set in advance by the service provider (e.g., information that cannot be identified through a general service protocol, such as the node's operating system and device type, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from an authentication server). For example, the protection information of the authorized subject may include information for confirming whether the subject is authorized and a series of information previously identified by the controller thereby, information for determining whether to insert the series of information previously identified by the controller into the header or the body by means of inserting the information, protection information to be removed and returned by the gateway (203) when the service server returns the service request result to the node (201), whether the protection information to be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203), when a service request exists in the node (201), protection information to be inserted again among the protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when returning the service result, protection information to be shared or protected between two different domains identified during the authentication process when confirming whether authentication is required through the gateway (203) and redirecting to the authentication server or when the service server redirects the service request to the authentication server, and information on the method for generating a protection information token and algorithm. In this case, the controller (202) can transmit the generated data flow to the gateway (203) and the access control application (211) of the node (201) (operations 840, 845).

[0169] In operation 850, the access control application (211) of the node (201) may process the result value of the response received from the controller (202). For example, if the access control application (211) receives a network connection failure result from the controller (202), the access control application (211) may drop the data packet that the target application wishes to transmit. For another example, if a data flow is received from the controller (202), the access control application (211) may transmit the data packet based on the received data flow. In this case, the access control application (211) may update the existing data flow with the received data flow.

[0170] FIG. 9 illustrates a signal flow diagram for processing a service request according to various embodiments.

[0171] When a service request is received from an authorized target, the gateway (203) can perform network access control to allow a service server existing in the destination network (205) to check whether the service request is a request received from an authorized target by inserting information related to the authorized target and forwarding the service request.

[0172] At operation 905, a proxy included in the gateway (203) can receive a service request.

[0173] In operation 910, the gateway (203) can check whether there is a data flow corresponding to the destination IP and port information included in the received IP header, the destination IP and port information included in the service request, or the service domain information, and the type of connectivity control and identification information (e.g., identification by logical connection, identification by channel, identification by certificate) of the service request. According to an embodiment, the gateway (203) can check whether there is a data flow corresponding to the service domain information of the received service request.

[0174] According to an embodiment, if a data flow does not exist, or a data flow exists but is invalid (e.g., access by unauthorized connectivity control type and identification information, or authorized connectivity control type and identification information but inaccessible destination IP and port information or service domain information), the gateway (203) may reject the service request (operation 925).

[0175] According to an embodiment, if a data flow exists but authentication is required, the gateway (203) may, at operation 930, redirect to an authentication server (207) based on authentication information included in the data flow.

[0176] According to an embodiment, if a data flow exists and authentication is not required, the gateway (203) may perform operation 915.

[0177] In operation 915, the gateway (203) can check whether a protection information token exists in the service request, and if a protection information token exists, can check whether the protection information token is included in the protection information of the corresponding data flow.

[0178] According to an embodiment, when a protection information token is included in the protection information of a data flow, the gateway (203) may insert protection information that can be identified and processed by the service server into a portion suitable for the protocol of the service request information (e.g., in the case where the service server returns a service request result to the node (201), which protection information should be removed and returned by the gateway (203), whether the protection information that should be removed and returned should be updated or stored in the data flow of the gateway (203), in the case where a service request exists in the node (201), which protection information that was removed by the gateway (203) when the service result was returned should be inserted again among the protection information that was stored or updated in the data flow, in the case where authentication is checked through the gateway (203) when accessing a service and redirected to an authentication server, or in the case where the service server redirects a service request to the authentication server, which protection information should be shared or protected between two different domains identified during the authentication process, and information on the protection information token generation method and algorithm).

[0179] According to an embodiment, the gateway (203) may generate authentication information based on an authentication information generation algorithm and protection information included in the authentication information of the data flow. According to an embodiment, the gateway (203) may encrypt the authentication information using an encryption algorithm and encryption key included in the authentication information, and may insert a data flow header combining the encrypted authentication information and data flow identification information into the service request information according to the service protocol specifications.

[0180] According to an embodiment, the gateway (203) may include protection information of an authorized target to be inserted through the gateway (203) as information previously set by the service provider (e.g., information that cannot be identified through a general service protocol, such as an operating system and device type of a node, user identification information, security compliance information, and a series of information received from an authentication server). For example, the protection information of an authorized target may be inserted into the header and body of service request information according to the service protocol specification (information for determining whether the target is authorized and thereby a series of information previously identified by the controller, and whether to insert the series of information previously identified by the controller into the header or the body) and transmit the service request (operation 920).

[0181] In operation 920, the gateway (203) can forward a service request with authentication information and protection information inserted to a service server.

[0182] According to an embodiment, when returning a service request result to a node (201), the gateway (203) may check the protection information updated in the data flow among the protection information removed and returned by the gateway, and insert the protection information updated in the data flow into the service request to transmit the service request (operation 920).

[0183] That is, the gateway (203) according to one embodiment disclosed in this document can provide a structure in which protection information related to a node (201) is updated in a data flow existing in the gateway (203) to protect it, and transmit the protection information to a service server to identify that the node (201) is an authorized target and process the service, and when a service request exists again from the node (201), the network environment can be provided in which the node (201) can receive a service from the service server without transmitting the protection information to the node (201) by reinserting the updated protection information into the data flow and forwarding it to the service server.

[0184] FIG. 10 illustrates an operational flowchart for processing service request results according to various embodiments.

[0185] When a service request result is received, the gateway (203) can safely control the network connection of the node (201) by removing the protection information inserted in the service request and forwarding it to the node (201) so that the protection information is not returned to the node (201).

[0186] In operation 1005, a proxy included in the gateway (203) can receive a service request result.

[0187] In operation 1010, the gateway (203) can verify whether a protection information token exists in the service request result, and if so, whether the protection information token is included in the protection information of the corresponding data flow. According to an embodiment, the protection information token may be configured as identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

[0188] According to an embodiment, when a protection information token is included in the protection information of a data flow, the gateway (203) can identify information that needs to be stored and updated in the data flow among the protection information of the authorized target searched based on the protection information token, and can update and store the protection information of the authorized target of the data flow. According to an embodiment, when the information for storage and update is a result of redirection to an authentication server or protection information that needs to be shared and protected between two different domains, the gateway (203) can also update and store the protection information of the authorized target included in the associated data flow.

[0189] According to an embodiment, if a protection information token does not exist in the service request result, the gateway (203) can generate a new protection information token. In addition, the gateway (203) can identify, based on the data flow, the protection information of the authorized target that needs to be stored and updated in the data flow, and can update and store the protection information of the authorized target of the data flow. According to an embodiment, if the information for storage and update is a result of redirection to the authentication server or protection information that needs to be shared and protected between two different domains, the gateway (203) can also update and store the protection information of the authorized target included in the associated data flow.

[0190] According to an embodiment, when the gateway (203) generates a new protection information token, the gateway (203) may generate the protection information token based on the protection information token generation method and algorithm included in the data flow.

[0191] In operation 1015, the gateway (203) may remove the protection information token from the service request result to prevent the authorized node (201) from reusing a previously used token. In this case, if a new token is generated, the gateway (203) may insert the generated token into the service request result (operation 1020). In another example, the gateway (203) may generate an updated token based on the protection information token generation method and algorithm of the data flow and insert the updated token into the service request result (operation 1020). In an embodiment, the updated token may be a token used by the gateway (203) to identify the protection information to be inserted into the service request when the node (201) performs the service request again.

[0192] Additionally, in operation 1015, if the data flow header information and the protection information of the authorized target that were inserted in the service request result information exist, the gateway (203) can remove the data flow header information and the protection information of the authorized target.

[0193] In operation 1025, the gateway (203) may forward the service request result with the updated (or generated) protection information token inserted to the node (201).

[0194] FIG. 11 illustrates a signal flow diagram for control flow update according to various embodiments.

[0195] Referring to FIG. 11, at operation 1105, the access control application (211) can detect a control flow update event.

[0196] In operation 1110, the access control application (211) may request a control flow update from the controller (202) based on the control flow identification information.

[0197] In operation 1115, the controller (202) may check whether a control flow exists in a control flow table (e.g., control flow table (315) of FIG. 3) based on the received control flow identification information. According to an embodiment, if a control flow does not exist (e.g., if the connection is disconnected by another security system, if the connection is disconnected due to its own risk detection, etc.), the controller (202) may transmit a connection failure result to the connection control application (211) because the connection of the node (201) is invalid (operation 1120).

[0198] If a control flow exists, the controller (202) can check the data flow corresponding to the control flow.

[0199] According to an embodiment, the controller (202) can update an update time included in a control flow and search for data flow information corresponding to the control flow.

[0200] According to an embodiment, the controller (202) may return data flow information when re-authentication must be performed during a data flow or when there is a data flow that is no longer accessible (operation 1120).

[0201] In operation 1125, the access control application (211) of the node (201) may process the result of the response received from the controller (202). For example, if the result of the control flow update is impossible, the access control application (211) may block all network connections of the application. For another example, if the result of the control flow update is normal and updated data flow information exists, the access control application (211) may update the data flow.

[0202] FIG. 12 illustrates a signal flow diagram for disconnection according to various embodiments.

[0203] Referring to FIG. 12, at operation 1205, the node (201) may detect at least one of termination of the node (201), termination of the access control application (211), termination of the target application, no longer using the network connection, and a connection termination request based on information identified from the linking system. In this case, at operation 1210, the node (201) or the access control application (211) may request the controller (202) to remove the control flow.

[0204] In operation 1215, the controller (202) may remove the identified control flow based on the received control flow identification information.

[0205] At operation 1220, the controller (202) may remove all data flows dependent on the removed control flow. Accordingly, the node (201) can no longer access the destination network based on the removed data flow.

[0206] In operation 1225, the controller (202) may perform a removal request for all data flows dependent on the removed control flow to the gateway (203). The gateway (203) may remove the data flow, and thus, data packets corresponding to the source network, destination network, and port information included in the removed data flow may no longer be transmitted.

[0207] FIG. 13 illustrates a signal flow diagram for terminating application execution according to various embodiments.

[0208] Referring to FIG. 13, in operation 1305, the access control application (211) of the node (201) can check in real time whether the running application has been terminated and can detect an application execution termination event.

[0209] According to an embodiment, the access control application (211) can check whether there is a data flow corresponding to terminated application identification information and PID (Process ID and Child Process ID Tree) information.

[0210] In operation 1310, the access control application (211) may perform a data flow removal request to the controller (202). For example, the access control application (211) may transmit identification information of a terminated application or identification information of a data flow corresponding to a terminated application to the controller (202) and perform the data flow removal request.

[0211] In operation 1315, the controller (202) may delete the data flow for which deletion has been requested. In addition, the controller (202) may perform a deletion request for the deleted data flow to the gateway (203) (operation 1320). The gateway (203) may delete the data flow, and thus, data packets corresponding to the source network, destination network, and port information included in the deleted data flow may no longer be transmitted.

[0212] FIG. 14 illustrates a flowchart for explaining a method of operating a gateway according to various embodiments. The operations illustrated in FIG. 14 may be performed through the gateway (203) of FIG. 2.

[0213] At operation 1405, the gateway (203) may receive a service request from a node.

[0214] In operation 1410, the gateway (203) can confirm the presence of a data flow that corresponds to a service request and is authorized from an external server.

[0215] In operation 1415, the gateway (203) can verify whether the protection information token included in the service request corresponds to the data flow.

[0216] In operation 1420, if a protection information token corresponds to a data flow, the gateway (203) may generate protection information corresponding to the protection information token based on the data flow and to be inserted into the service request. According to an embodiment, the protection information token may be composed of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

[0217] In operation 1425, the gateway (203) can insert protection information to be inserted into the service request into the service request and forward it to the service server.

[0218] The above description is merely an example of the technical idea disclosed in this document, and those skilled in the art to which the embodiments disclosed in this document pertain may make various modifications and variations without departing from the essential characteristics of the embodiments disclosed in this document.

[0219] Accordingly, the embodiments disclosed in this document are intended to illustrate, rather than limit, the technical concepts disclosed in this document, and the scope of the technical concepts disclosed in this document is not limited by these embodiments. The scope of protection of the technical concepts disclosed in this document should be interpreted by the claims below, and all technical concepts within the equivalent scope should be interpreted as being included within the scope of the rights of this document.

Claims

1. At the gateway, Communication circuits; memory; and A processor operatively connected to the communication circuit and the memory, the processor comprising: Receive service requests from nodes, Confirm the existence of a data flow corresponding to the above service request and authorized from the external server, Verify that the protection information token included in the above service request corresponds to the above data flow, If the above protection information token corresponds to the above data flow, protection information corresponding to the protection information token based on the data flow and to be inserted into the service request is generated, It is configured to insert the protection information to be inserted into the above service request and forward it to the service server, The above protection information token is composed of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

2. In the first paragraph, the processor, Based on the above data flow, when returning a service request result to the node, the gateway checks the protection information updated in the data flow among the protection information removed and returned, A gateway configured to further insert the updated protection information into the above data flow into the above service request and forward it to the service server.

3. In the first paragraph, the processor, A gateway configured to redirect to an authentication server based on authentication information contained in the data flow, if the data flow above exists but requires authentication.

4. In the first paragraph, the processor, Verify whether the above service request was received from an external server through at least one of an authorized tunnel, a secure session, or a logical connection, A gateway configured to check whether a data flow corresponding to the identification information or service domain information of the destination network of the above service request exists.

5. In the first paragraph, the processor, Generate authentication information to be inserted into a service request based on the authentication information included in the above data flow, A gateway configured to further insert authentication information and information related to the node into the service request and forward the service request to the service server.

6. In paragraph 5, Information related to the above node is: A gateway comprising at least one of the operating system of the node, the device type of the node, user identification information of the node, security compliance information, or information received from an authentication server.

7. In paragraph 5, Information related to the above node is: A gateway comprising information for verifying whether the node is an authorized target, information identified by the external server in relation to the node, and a method for inserting information related to the node.

8. In the fifth paragraph, the processor, A gateway configured to insert authentication information to be inserted into the above service request, protection information to be inserted into the above service request, and information related to the above node into the header and body of the above service request.

9. In the first paragraph, the processor, Generate authentication information to be inserted into a service request based on the authentication information generation algorithm included in the above data flow, Encrypt the authentication information to be inserted into the above service request based on the above data flow, A gateway configured to insert a data flow header combining encrypted authentication information and identification information of the data flow into the service request.

10. In the first paragraph, the processor, Receive the service request result from the above service server, Check whether the above service request result includes a protection information token, Verify that the protection information token included in the above service request result corresponds to the above data flow, If the protection information token included in the above service request result corresponds to the data flow, the information corresponding to the protection information token included in the above service request result is identified to update the data flow, and the data flow is updated. Remove the protection information token included in the above service request result from the above service request result, generate a new protection information token based on the above data flow, and update the above data flow. A gateway configured to insert the new protection information token into the service request result and forward it to the node.

11. In the 10th paragraph, the processor, Remove the protection information inserted at the time of the service request from the above service request result, A gateway configured to forward the service request results to the above node.

12. In the 10th paragraph, the processor, If the above service request result does not include a protection information token, a new protection information token is generated based on the above data flow and updated in the above data flow, When returning a service request result to the node based on the data flow, the gateway identifies the protection information that needs to be updated in the data flow among the protection information that needs to be removed and returned, and updates the protection information in the data flow. Remove the protection information inserted at the time of the service request from the above service request result, A gateway configured to forward the service request results to the above node.

13. In the 11th or 12th paragraph, the processor, When returning a service request result to the node based on the above data flow, the gateway checks whether the protection information that must be removed and returned and updated in the data flow is protection information that must be shared or protected between different domains. A gateway configured to update the data flow with the protected information included in the associated data flow, if the protected information is to be shared or protected.

14. On the server, A communication circuit; a memory storing a database; and a processor operatively connected to the memory and the communication circuit; wherein the processor comprises: Receive a network connection request from a node, wherein the network connection request includes identification information of a destination network of the node, Based on the above database, it is checked whether the node can connect to the destination network, If connection is possible, the node determines the connection method of the node based on the database, whether to perform a logical connection authentication-based connection, an authorized channel or session-based connection to connect to the destination network, and Check whether at least one of the logical connections, channels or sessions between the gateway and the node can be created, The above node generates a data flow for connecting to the destination network, configured to transmit the above data flow to the gateway and the node, The above data flow includes authentication information and protection information that the gateway must remove and return when returning a service request result to the node, among which the data flow must be updated, and information related to the generation of a protection information token to be generated by the gateway. The above protection information token is composed of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

15. In the 14th paragraph, the processor, Check whether to request additional authentication from the authentication server based on the above database, If additional authentication is required, request authentication from the authentication server and receive authentication results and authentication-related information. Based on the above authentication-related information, update the data flow corresponding to the above data flow identification information, A server configured to transmit the updated data flow to the gateway.

16. In paragraph 15, The above authentication related information is: A server that verifies authentication information for a service request from an authenticated target through the authentication server and includes an authentication token for receiving related authorization information or protection information.

17. In paragraph 14, The data flow further includes information regarding whether the protection information that the gateway must remove and return when returning a service request result to the node, among the protection information that must be updated in the data flow, is protection information that must be shared or protected between different domains.

18. In the method of operation of the gateway, The act of receiving a service request from a node; An action to confirm the existence of a data flow corresponding to the above service request and authorized from the external server; An action to verify whether the protection information token included in the above service request corresponds to the above data flow; If the above protection information token corresponds to the data flow, an operation of generating protection information corresponding to the protection information token and to be inserted into the service request based on the data flow; An operation of inserting protection information to be inserted into the above service request and forwarding it to the service server; including; The above protection information token is composed of identification information processed by the gateway to maintain the flow of information to be protected between the authorized subject and the service server.

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