Authentication method, and device

By pre-sharing challenge information between zero-power devices and the network side, the authentication process is simplified, solving the problem of high computational complexity in A-IoT device authentication and achieving low-complexity authentication processing.

WO2024234268A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-21GUANGDONG OPPO MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/CN2023/094372
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-15
Publication Date
2024-11-21

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, zero-power devices (A-IoT devices) have high computational complexity when authenticating with the network side, making it difficult to achieve efficient authentication.

Method used

By pre-sharing challenge information between devices as pre-shared information, the authentication process can be simplified and the computational complexity of the devices can be reduced by only transmitting authentication parameters to allow the devices to calculate authentication information.

Benefits of technology

It achieves the goal of reducing the computational complexity of devices while ensuring authentication, making it suitable for authentication processing of low-power, zero-energy devices.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present application relates to an authentication method, a device, a computer-readable storage medium, a computer program product and a computer program. The method comprises: a first device receiving a first message from a core network side device, wherein the first message carries an authentication parameter; the first device sending a second message to a second device, wherein the second message carries the authentication parameter; the first device receiving a third message from the second device, wherein the third message carries first authentication information, the first authentication information is calculated by the second device on the basis of the authentication parameter and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information comprises challenge information; and the first device authenticating the second device on the basis of the first authentication information.
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Description

Authentication methods and equipment Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communications, and more particularly, to an authentication method, device, computer-readable storage medium, computer program product, and computer program. Background Art

[0002] In related technologies, the authentication and key negotiation processes between UE (User Equipment) and the core network use highly complex computational functions and key architectures. However, zero-power devices, such as A-IoT devices, also need to access networks such as the core network. Therefore, how to enable A-IoT devices to authenticate with the network while reducing their computational complexity becomes a challenge.

[0003] Summary of the Invention

[0004] Embodiments of the present application provide an authentication method, device, computer-readable storage medium, computer program product, and computer program.

[0005] This embodiment of the present application provides an authentication method, including:

[0006] The first device receives a first message from the core network side device, where the first message carries an authentication parameter;

[0007] The first device sends a second message to the second device, where the second message carries the authentication parameter;

[0008] The first device receives a third message from the second device, where the third message carries first authentication information, where the first authentication information is calculated by the second device based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information;

[0009] The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information.

[0010] This embodiment of the present application provides an authentication method, including:

[0011] The second device receives a second message from the first device, where the second message carries the authentication parameter;

[0012] The second device calculates first authentication information based on the authentication parameter and pre-shared information, where the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device / or a core network side device, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device;

[0013] The second device sends a third message to the first device, where the third message carries the first authentication information.

[0014] This embodiment of the present application provides an authentication method, including:

[0015] The core network side device sends a first message to the first device, and the first message carries authentication parameters. The authentication parameters are used by the second device to calculate first authentication information based on pre-shared information. The pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device. The pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0016] An embodiment of the present application provides a first device, including:

[0017] A first communication unit is configured to receive a first message from a core network side device, the first message carrying authentication parameters; send a second message to a second device, the second message carrying the authentication parameters; receive a third message from the second device, the third message carrying first authentication information, the first authentication information being calculated by the second device based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information being shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, the pre-shared information including challenge information;

[0018] A first processing unit is configured to authenticate the second device based on the first authentication information.

[0019] This embodiment of the present application provides a second device, including:

[0020] a second communication unit, configured to receive a second message from the first device, the second message carrying authentication parameters; and send a third message to the first device, the third message carrying first authentication information;

[0021] The second processing unit is used to calculate the first authentication information based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, where the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0022] An embodiment of the present application provides a core network side device, including:

[0023] A third communication unit is used to send a first message to a first device, where the first message carries authentication parameters, and the authentication parameters are used by the second device to calculate first authentication information based on pre-shared information. The pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0024] An embodiment of the present application provides a first device, comprising a transceiver, a processor, and a memory. The memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so that the first device performs the above method.

[0025] An embodiment of the present application provides a second device, comprising a transceiver, a processor, and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so that the second device performs the above method.

[0026] An embodiment of the present application provides a core network side device, comprising a transceiver, a processor, and a memory. The memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so that the core network side device performs the above method.

[0027] By adopting the solution provided in this embodiment, challenge information can be pre-stored as pre-shared information in the first device and / or the core network side device and the second device, so that in the authentication process, the authentication parameters can be transmitted to the second device only by the first device, so that the second device can calculate the authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the pre-shared information. The first device can authenticate the second device based on the authentication information. In this way, while ensuring the authentication processing of the second device, the second device can avoid adopting a more complex authentication process, and the authentication can be completed without the second device performing complex and large-scale calculation processing. It is particularly suitable for devices with lower capabilities. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0029] 2-4 are various schematic flow charts of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0030] 5-17 are various exemplary flow charts of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0031] Figures 18 and 19 are schematic diagrams of two scenarios in which the intrinsic characteristics of the authentication method according to an embodiment of the present application are applied to key storage and security authentication modes.

[0032] FIG20 is a schematic diagram of the AKA authentication process.

[0033] FIG21 is a schematic block diagram of a first device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0034] FIG22 is a schematic block diagram of a second device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0035] Figure 23 is a schematic block diagram of a core network side device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0036] Figure 24 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0037] Figure 25 is a schematic block diagram of a chip according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0038] Figure 26 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as LTE, LTE-A, NR, NR evolution, WLAN, WiFi, or other communication systems.

[0040] The embodiments of the present application describe various embodiments in conjunction with network devices and terminals. The terminals can be mobile or fixed, and can also be referred to as mobile stations, user units, etc. The terminal can be a site in a WLAN, and can be a smart terminal, wireless modem, laptop computer, tablet computer, or other terminal. In the embodiments of the present application, the terminal can be a VR terminal / AR terminal, an industrial control terminal, an unmanned driving terminal, a telemedicine terminal, a smart grid terminal, a transportation safety terminal, a smart city terminal, or a wireless terminal for a smart home, etc. As an example and not a limitation, in the embodiments of the present application, the terminal can also be a wearable device.

[0041] In the embodiment of the present application, the network device may be a device for communicating with a terminal, and the network device may be an access point in a WLAN, an evolved base station in an LTE, or a relay station, or a network device (gNB) in an in-vehicle device, a wearable device, and an NR network, or a network device in a future evolved PLMN network or a network device in a non-terrestrial network. As an example and not a limitation, in the embodiment of the present application, the network device may have a mobile feature, for example, the network device may be a mobile device.

[0042] It should be understood that the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably in this article. The term "and / or" in this article is merely a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships may exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / " in this article generally indicates that the objects associated before and after are in an "or" relationship. It should be understood that the "indication" mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be a direct indication, an indirect indication, or an indication of an association relationship. For example, A indicates B, which can mean that A directly indicates B, for example, B can be obtained through A; it can also mean that A indirectly indicates B, for example, A indicates C, and B can be obtained through C; it can also mean that there is an association relationship between A and B. In the description of the embodiments of this application, the term "corresponding" can mean that there is a direct or indirect correspondence between the two, or it can mean that there is an association relationship between the two, or it can mean a relationship between indication and indication, configuration and configuration, etc.

[0043] To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the relevant technologies of the embodiments of the present application are described below. The following relevant technologies can be arbitrarily combined with the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application as optional solutions, and they all fall within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present application.

[0044] Figure 1 exemplarily illustrates a communication system 100. The communication system includes a network device 110 and two terminals 120. In one possible implementation, the communication system 100 may include multiple network devices 110, and each network device 110 may include a different number of terminals 120 within its coverage area, although this embodiment of the present application does not limit this. In one possible implementation, the communication system 100 may also include a mobility management entity, access and mobility management functions, and other network entities, although this embodiment of the present application does not limit this. The network devices may include access network devices and core network devices. That is, the communication system may also include multiple core networks for communicating with the access network devices. The access network devices may be base stations of LTE, LTE-A, or NR systems. Taking the communication system shown in Figure 1 as an example, the communication devices may include network devices and terminals with communication functions. The communication devices may also include other devices in the communication system, such as network controllers, mobility management entities, and other network entities, although this embodiment of the present application does not limit this.

[0045] To facilitate understanding of the embodiments of the present application, the following briefly describes the basic processes and basic concepts involved in the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the basic processes and basic concepts introduced below do not limit the embodiments of the present application.

[0046] Ambient IoT (AIoT) devices are IoT devices powered by energy harvesting. They require no batteries or have limited energy storage capabilities (e.g., using capacitors). They utilize backscattering and low-power computing technologies, resulting in terminals with extremely simple RF and baseband circuitry, significantly reducing terminal cost, size, and circuit power consumption. Compared to existing cellular IoT technologies (such as NB-IoT, LTE-M, and RedCap), AIoT-enabled IoT services enable battery-free terminals, meeting the demands of ultra-low power, extremely small size, and extremely low cost IoT communications. These devices can meet the following requirements: operate in extreme environmental conditions, such as high voltage, extremely high / low temperatures, and humid environments; have ultra-low complexity and very small device size / form factor (e.g., millimeter thickness); be maintenance-free (e.g., devices do not require traditional battery replacement) and have a long lifespan (e.g., 20 years); have no batteries or only limited energy storage; and do not require dedicated RFID tag readers.

[0047] Figure 2 is a schematic flow chart of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present application. The method includes at least part of the following contents.

[0048] S210. The first device receives a first message from a core network side device, where the first message carries an authentication parameter.

[0049] S220. The first device sends a second message to the second device, where the second message carries the authentication parameter.

[0050] S230. The first device receives a third message from the second device, where the third message carries first authentication information. The first authentication information is calculated by the second device based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information. The pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and includes challenge information.

[0051] S240. The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information.

[0052] Figure 3 is a schematic flow chart of an authentication method according to another embodiment of the present application. The method includes at least part of the following contents.

[0053] S310. The second device receives a second message from the first device, where the second message carries authentication parameters.

[0054] S320. The second device calculates first authentication information based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, where the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device / or a core network side device, and includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0055] S330. The second device sends a third message to the first device, where the third message carries the first authentication information.

[0056] Figure 4 is a schematic flow chart of an authentication method according to another embodiment of the present application. The method includes at least part of the following contents.

[0057] S410. The core network side device sends a first message to the first device. The first message carries authentication parameters. The authentication parameters are used by the second device to calculate first authentication information based on pre-shared information. The pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device. The pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0058] The first device is one of the following: a terminal device, an access network device. The second device is one of the following: an ambient power-enabled IoT (AIoT) device, a zero-power device.

[0059] Exemplarily, the second device can be called a tag, and the second device can be a zero-power device, such as an active zero-power device, a passive zero-power device, or a semi-passive zero-power device, etc. Exemplarily, the second device can be a terminal with low computing power. All possible names or possible devices of the second device are not exhaustive here. Exemplarily, the above-mentioned second device can be connected to the core network through indirect mode. In this mode, the second device is connected to the core network through a terminal device and an access network device corresponding to the terminal device. In this case, the above-mentioned first device is a terminal device, or the first device can be an access network device corresponding to the above-mentioned terminal device. Exemplarily, the above-mentioned second device can be connected to the core network through direct mode. In this mode, the second device is connected to the core network through a corresponding access network device. In this case, the above-mentioned first device is an access network device. In addition, when the above-mentioned first device is a terminal device, the first device can be a proxy UE or a relay UE, etc.

[0060] The core network side device may include one or more core network devices. In some possible examples, the core network side device includes at least one of the following: an authentication server function (AUSF), a unified data management function (UDM), and an AIoT network element. In some other examples, in addition to the above-mentioned AUSF, UDM and AIoT network elements, the one or more core network devices may also include at least one of the following: ARPF (Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function), AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function), UPF (User Plane Function), SEAF (Security Anchor Function), etc. It should be understood that this is only an exemplary explanation. In actual processing, the core network side device may also include other devices of the core network, but they are not exhaustive here. Exemplarily, the above-mentioned AIOT network element may refer to a network element with AIOT function; the network element with AIoT function may be a core network network element with AIOT function, or a core network network element serving AIOT function, or a core network network element with at least AIoT certification function, or a network element with at least AIoT certification function, etc. It should be understood that the AIOT network element may be a separately set network element specifically used to serve the AIOT function (such as a core network network element), or it may be an existing core network network element with AIOT function added (or at least AIoT certification function added, or AIoT-related function added). This embodiment does not enumerate all possible situations.

[0061] In some possible implementations, the pre-shared information at least includes challenge information.

[0062] Optionally, in addition to the challenge information, the pre-shared information may also include response information, and the response information is related to the challenge information. The challenge information and the response information may be collectively referred to as a Challenge Response Pair (CRP). That is, the CRP may be pre-saved on the first device and the second device as pre-shared information, or the CRP may be pre-saved on the second device and the core network device as pre-shared information, or the CRP may be pre-saved on the first device, the second device, and the core network device as pre-shared information.

[0063] For example, if the pre-shared information is stored on the first device side, the pre-shared information may be stored in association with the identifier of the second device and / or the pseudonym of the second device. If the pre-shared information is stored on the core network side, the pre-shared information may also be stored in association with the identifier of the second device and / or the pseudonym of the second device.

[0064] The identifier of the second device may be an identity (ID) and / or a network identifier of the second device. The ID may include, but is not limited to, at least one of the following: SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier), SUCI (Subscription Concealed Identifier), PEI (Permanent Equipment Identifier), 5G-GUTI (5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier), Internal-Group Identifier (IGI), GPSI (Generic Public Subscription Identifier), etc.; the above-mentioned network identifier may include: at least one of an IP address (Internet Protocol Address), a MAC (Media Access Control) address, etc. Exemplarily, the identifier of the second device may be represented as IDt of the second device. All possible contents and representation methods of the identifier of the second device are not exhaustively listed here.

[0065] The pseudonym of the second device can be called a random pseudonym of the second device, or a pseudo identification of the second device, or a pseudo identification of the second device, etc. Exemplarily, the pseudonym of the second device can be expressed as the PIDt of the second device. All possible alternative names and representations of the pseudonym of the second device are not enumerated here. As long as the pseudonym of the second device is different from the identification of the second device, it is within the protection scope of this embodiment.

[0066] Optionally, the pre-shared information only includes challenge information.

[0067] In this case, if the pre-shared information is shared by the first device and the second device, the response information may be pre-configured on the first device side, where the response information is related to the challenge information. Alternatively, if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the core network side device, the response information may be pre-configured on the core network side device. Alternatively, if the pre-shared information is shared by the first device, the second device, and the core network side device, the response information may be pre-configured on both the core network side device and the first device side.

[0068] For example, the response information on the first device side is related to the challenge information, which may mean that the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device and / or the pseudonym of the second device are associated and saved on the first device side, and the first device can query the response information related to the challenge information saved by itself based on the relevant information of the second device; the response information of the core network side device is related to the challenge information, which is similar to the relevant description of the first device mentioned above and will not be repeated.

[0069] The processing on the second device side may further include: the second device generating response information based on the challenge information in the pre-shared information. Exemplarily, the second device may generate the response information based on the challenge information in the pre-shared information after receiving the second message from the first device and before calculating the first authentication information.

[0070] To further explain in conjunction with the above example, if the pre-shared information is shared by the first device and the second device, the first device may pre-save the response information, the challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device). If the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the core network side device, the core network side device may pre-save the response information, the challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device). If the pre-shared information is shared by the first device, the second device and the core network side device, both the first device and the core network side device pre-save the response information, the challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device).

[0071] Next, the process of pre-saving the response information, the challenge information, and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) by the first device and / or the core network side device will be described.

[0072] The second device can send a first request message to the third device, which can carry the second device's identifier. The second device receives the challenge information and the second device's pseudonym from the third device. The second device inputs the challenge information into the key processing unit and obtains the response information output by the key processing unit. The second device saves the challenge information and sends the response information to the third device. Accordingly, the third device receives the first request message from the second device, which carries the second device's identifier. The third device generates a random pseudonym as the second device's pseudonym based on the second device's identifier, and generates a random challenge as the challenge information. The third device sends the challenge information and the second device's pseudonym to the second device. The third device receives the response information from the second device.

[0073] Furthermore, in the case where the third device is a core network side device, if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the core network side device, the third device may associate and save the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device); if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device, the third device may send the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) to the first device, and the first device will associate and save them; if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device, the first device and the core network side device, the third device may associate and save the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device), and send the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) to the first device, and the first device will associate and save the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device).

[0074] In the case that the third device is not a core network side device (for example, the third device is a server), if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the core network side device, the third device can send the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) to the core network side device, which will be associated and stored by the core network side device; if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device, the third device can send the response information, challenge information and the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) to the first device, which will be associated and stored by the first device; if the pre-shared information is shared by the second device, the first device and the core network side device, the third device can associate the response information, challenge information with the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) and save it to the first device and the core network side device respectively, and the first device and the core network side device will associate and save the response information, challenge information with the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device) respectively.

[0075] The key processing unit may be a hardware unit or / and software unit of the second device. In one example, the key processing unit is a hardware unit of the second device and may be a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) of the second device. In other examples, the key processing unit may be hardware and / or software that can output unique and unchanging response information based on input challenge information, which is not limited in this embodiment.

[0076] On the second device side, the process of saving the challenge information may include: the second device saves the challenge information as pre-shared information, in association with the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device); or the second device saves the challenge information and the response information together as pre-shared information, in association with the identifier of the second device (and / or the pseudonym of the second device). The different situations in which the second device saves the challenge information as pre-shared information or saves the challenge information and the response information together as pre-shared information are the same in the aforementioned embodiments and will not be repeated.

[0077] The interaction between the second device and the third device may be an offline interaction, that is, the second device and the third device are in a secure communication environment. This embodiment does not limit the method of establishing a secure channel between the second device and the third device.

[0078] In conjunction with FIG5 , taking the second device as a tag and the third device as a UDM as an example, the processing of the pre-configured challenge information and response information is exemplarily described:

[0079] Step 501: The tag sends a registration request message to the network (i.e., UDM) via a secure channel. This message contains the tag's identity IDt. The registration request message in this step is the first request message in the aforementioned embodiment. It should be understood that this registration request message is merely an example. In actual processing, the registration request message can also be replaced with other NAS (Non-Access Stratum) messages, which are not exhaustive here. Furthermore, in this example, the tag and UDM preconfiguration process is performed offline, meaning that both the tag and the network (i.e., UDM) are in a secure communication environment.

[0080] Step 502: After receiving the Tag registration request message, the network (i.e., UDM) generates a random pseudonym PIDt and a random challenge Ct, and uses the random pseudonym PIDt as the tag's PIDt, and sends the tag's PIDt and challenge Ct to the tag. In this step, the random challenge is represented by Ct, which is the challenge information of this embodiment. Unless otherwise specified below, the meanings of random challenge, Ct, challenge information, and challenge are the same and will not be repeated. Unless otherwise specified below, the meanings of random challenge, pseudonym, and PIDt are the same and will not be repeated.

[0081] Step 503: The Tag inputs the received challenge Ct into the PUF, obtaining a response Rt = PUF(Ct). Rt is sent to the network, and the Tag stores IDt, PIDt, and Ct. In this step, PUF refers to the aforementioned key processing unit, PUF() indicates that the PUF performs the response calculation, and Rt represents the response information. Unless otherwise specified, the meanings of response, Rt, and response information are synonymous and are not repeated here.

[0082] Step 504: The network side stores the received response Rt, challenge Ct, tag IDt, and tag PIDt in the UDM. In Figure 5 , for simplicity, the network side is shown as the UDM. Therefore, this step can be the UDM storing the received response Rt, challenge Ct, tag IDt, and tag PIDt together.

[0083] In some possible implementations, the first device authenticating the second device based on the first authentication information includes: the first device authenticating the second device based on the first authentication information and first expected information.

[0084] Specifically, the first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information and the first expected information, which may include one of the following: the first device determines that the authentication of the second device is successful when the first authentication information and the first expected information are the same; the first device determines that the authentication of the second device fails when the first authentication information and the first expected information are different.

[0085] On the first device side, the third message carries a first random number; the method also includes: the first device calculates the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and a first generation parameter, wherein the first generation parameter includes at least one of the following: response information, the challenge information, the identification of the first device, and the authentication parameter.

[0086] On the second device side, the third message carries a first random number; the second device calculates the first authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the pre-shared information, including: the second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters; the second device generates the first random number; the second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key and the first random number.

[0087] The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key and the first random number, including: the second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and a first generation parameter, wherein the first generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the response information, the challenge information, the identification of the first device, and the authentication parameter.

[0088] In some possible embodiments, the aforementioned pre-shared information may be shared by the first device and the second device. The content that the pre-shared information may include is the same as that in the aforementioned embodiment and will not be repeated. It should be understood that regardless of which of the aforementioned cases the pre-shared information is, before the first device calculates the first expected information, the first device can save or pre-configure the challenge information and response information corresponding to the second device; similarly, before the second device calculates the first authentication information, the second device can obtain the challenge information and response information, which will not be repeated.

[0089] The first intermediate key on the first device side may be calculated by the first device. The processing by the first device may include: the first device calculating the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter.

[0090] Exemplarily, the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters, which may include: the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters using a third calculation method. The third calculation method may include at least one of the following: KDF (Key derivation function), a first authentication function, a second authentication function, a third authentication function, a hash algorithm, an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), SNOW 3G (Snow Third Generation), ZUC (ZUChongzhi), XOR calculation, and direct connection calculation. Among them, the first authentication function can be expressed as f1(), and the second authentication function can be expressed as f2(); the hash algorithm can be expressed as HASH(), and the hash algorithm can include HMAC-SHA-256 (Hash based Message Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm-256, a secure hash algorithm based on a hashed message authentication code 256), or other hash algorithms can be used, which are not exhaustive in this embodiment. It should be understood that this is only an exemplary explanation. In actual processing, the third calculation method can also include more possibilities, such as a third key generation function (such as f3), a fourth key generation function (such as f4), a fifth key generation function (such as f5), etc. At least one, all possible calculation functions (or algorithms) of the third calculation method are not exhaustively listed here.

[0091] The authentication parameter may include an anonymity key (AK) or a second random number.

[0092] The relevant information of the second device may include an identifier of the second device or a pseudonym of the second device.

[0093] For example, assuming that the third calculation method includes KDF and direct calculation, taking the authentication parameters including the anonymous key and the relevant information of the second device as the pseudonym of the second device as an example, the above-mentioned calculation of the first intermediate key can be expressed by the following formula: SK1 = KDF(Ct||Rt,AK,PIDt), where SK1 is the first intermediate key in this embodiment, KDF() represents the KDF function, "||" represents direct calculation, Ct represents challenge information, Rt represents response information, AK represents the anonymous key, and PIDt represents the pseudonym of the second device. It should be understood that this is only an exemplary explanation. In actual processing, the KDF and direct calculation in the above formula can be replaced by one or more other algorithms or functions in the third calculation method. For example, the above KDF can be replaced by the first authentication function, the direct calculation can be replaced by the XOR calculation, and the authentication parameter can also be replaced by the second random number (for example, it can be expressed as Nn). All possible situations are not enumerated here.

[0094] Accordingly, the second device calculating the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters may include: the second device calculating the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters using a third calculation method. It should be noted that the method by which the first device calculates the first intermediate key should be the same as the method by which the second device calculates the first intermediate key, and the first intermediate key obtained by the first device and the second device should also be the same, which is not further described.

[0095] The first device calculates the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter, which may include: the first device uses a fourth calculation method to calculate the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter.

[0096] The fourth calculation method may include at least one of the following: KDF, first authentication function, second authentication function, third authentication function, hash algorithm, AES, SNOW 3G, ZUC, third key generation function, fourth key generation function, fifth key generation function, etc.

[0097] The first expected information may include a first expected response (XRES, Expected Response).

[0098] Optionally, the first generation parameter may include response information and the identifier of the first device. That is, the aforementioned method for calculating the first authentication information may be: the first device calculates the first expected information using the fourth calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information about the second device, the response information, and the identifier of the first device. For example, when the first device is a terminal device, this example may use the following formula to calculate the first expected information: XRES2 = f(SK1, PIDt, Nt, Rt, IDu), where XRES2 is the first expected information, i.e., the first XRES, f() is any one of the fourth calculation methods, SK1 is the first intermediate key, PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device, Nt is the first random number, Rt is the response information, and IDu is the identifier of the terminal device. When the first device is an access network device (such as a gNB), this example may use the following formula to calculate the first authentication information: XRES2 = f(SK1, PIDt, Nt, Rt, gNBu), where gNBu is the identifier of the gNB. The remaining meanings are the same as in the aforementioned embodiment and are not further described. It should be noted that the above f() can be any algorithm or function in the aforementioned fourth calculation method, and they are not exhaustively listed here.

[0099] Optionally, the first generation parameter may include an identifier of the first device, and the identifier of the first device may be the ID and / or network identifier of the first device. The relevant descriptions about the ID and network identifier are the same as those in the aforementioned embodiment and are not repeated here. That is, the aforementioned method of calculating the first expected information may be: the first device adopts a fourth calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device and the identifier of the first device to calculate the first expected information. Optionally, the first generation parameter may include response information. That is, the aforementioned method of calculating the first expected information may be: the first device adopts a fourth calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device and the response information to calculate the first expected information. It should be understood that the above is only an exemplary description. In actual processing, the first generation parameter may include one or more of the response information, the challenge information, the identifier of the first device, and the authentication parameter, but they are not exhaustive here.

[0100] The processing by which the second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter may include: the second device calculating the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter using a fourth calculation method. The first authentication information may include a first response (RES).

[0101] The first generation parameter used by the second device to calculate the first authentication information should be the same as the first generation parameter used by the first device to calculate the first expected information; and the fourth calculation method used by the second device should also be the same as the fourth calculation method used by the first device. Taking the example of the first generation parameter including the response information and the first device's identifier as an example, the second device calculates the first authentication information using the fourth calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information about the second device, the response information, and the first device's identifier. For example, if the first device is a terminal device, the second device can calculate the first authentication information using the following formula: RES2 = f(SK1, PIDt, Nt, Rt, IDu), where RES2 is the first authentication information, i.e., the first RES. The remaining meanings are the same as in the previous embodiment and are not further described. The above is merely illustrative. In actual processing, various methods used by the first device to calculate the first expected information can also be used by the second device to calculate the first authentication information; however, they are not detailed here.

[0102] In some possible embodiments, the first message carries a first message authentication code and / or a fifth message authentication code, the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device, the fifth message authentication code is used by the first device to authenticate the core network side device, the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device, and the fifth message authentication code is used by the first device to authenticate the core network side device.

[0103] In this embodiment, the first message also carries at least a first message authentication code, and the second message carries a first message authentication code, wherein the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device.

[0104] The processing by the core network device may further include: the core network device calculating a first message authentication code based on the authentication parameter and a first shared key, where the first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network device. Then, the core network device sends the first message authentication code to the first device in a first message.

[0105] The processing on the second device side also includes: the second device calculates a second message authentication code based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key, the first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network side device; the second device authenticates the core network side device based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code. Specifically, the second device authenticates the core network side device based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code, which may include at least one of the following: the second device determines that the authentication of the core network side device is successful when the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are the same; the second device determines that the authentication of the core network side device fails when the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are different.

[0106] The above-mentioned second device may calculate the second message authentication code before executing the calculation of the first authentication information, that is, the second device may calculate the first authentication information after determining that the authentication on the core network side is successful.

[0107] The first shared key may be shared by the second device and the core network side device. The first shared key may be at least one of a pre-shared key (PSK), a pre-distributed key, a private network key, an application layer key, and a physical layer key. In a preferred example, the first shared key may be a PSK between the second device and the core network side device, such as a root key.

[0108] The authentication parameters may include AK or a second random number. Taking the example of an authentication parameter including AK and the first shared key being the root key, the second device calculating the second message authentication code based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key may include: the second device calculating the second message authentication code based on AK and the root key using a fifth calculation method; the fifth calculation method may include at least one of the following: a first authentication function, a second authentication function, a third authentication function, a hash algorithm, AES, SNOW 3G, ZUC, a third key generation function, a fourth key generation function, a fifth key generation function, and the like. Exemplarily, the process of calculating the second message authentication code by the second device may be expressed as: f(Kr, AK), where f() represents the fifth calculation method, Kr is the root key, and AK is the anonymity key. Taking the example of an authentication parameter including a second random number and the first shared key being the root key, the second device calculating the second message authentication code based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key may include: the second device calculating AK based on an exclusive OR of the second random number and the root key, and then calculating the second message authentication code based on AK and the root key using the fifth calculation method. The fifth calculation method and the formula for calculating the second message authentication code by the second device can be the same as those in the above embodiment and will not be described in detail. The second device calculates AK based on the second random number and the root key XOR, which can be expressed as Wherein, Nn represents the second random number, Represents an exclusive OR operation.

[0109] It should be pointed out that the above description is only based on the example of the second device calculating the second message authentication code. In fact, the process of calculating the first message authentication code and the process of calculating the second message authentication code on the core network side device should be the same. For example, the core network side device also uses f(Kr, AK) to calculate the first message authentication code. In order to distinguish the message authentication codes obtained by different devices, this embodiment adopts different ways of representing message authentication codes. In the following examples, the first message authentication code can be represented as MAC (Message Authentication Code), and the second message authentication code can also be represented as MAC'; in some other examples, the first message authentication code can also be represented as MAC1, and the second message authentication code can also be represented as MAC1'. Here, we do not exhaustively enumerate the various possible representations of the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

[0110] It should also be pointed out that the core network side device may include multiple core network devices (or core network network elements). If the first core network device on the core network side interacts with the first device and the first core network device itself calculates the first message authentication code, the first core network device may perform the aforementioned processing. If the first core network device on the core network side interacts with the first device and the first core network device itself does not calculate the first message authentication code, the first core network device receives an eighth message from the second core network device, and the eighth message carries at least one of the following: the authentication parameter, the first message authentication code, the second message authentication code, the second expected information, and the third expected information; for example, the first core network device may be an AUSF and the second core network device may include an UDM.

[0111] In some embodiments, the third message carries second authentication information, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device.

[0112] The processing on the first device side may also include: the first device sending a fourth message to the core network side device, where the fourth message carries the second authentication information.

[0113] The processing of the second device may also include: the second device calculates the second authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key, the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device, and the first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network side device.

[0114] The processing of the core network side device may also include: the core network side device receives a fourth message from the first device, the fourth message carries at least one of the following: second authentication information, third authentication information, and a third random number, the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device, and the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device.

[0115] The method further includes at least one of the following: the core network side device authenticates the second device based on the second authentication information and second expected information; the core network side device authenticates the first device based on the third authentication information and third expected information.

[0116] Specifically, the core network side device authenticates the second device based on the second authentication information and the second expected information, which may include at least one of the following: the core network side device determines that the authentication of the second device is successful when the second authentication information is the same as the second expected information; the core network side device determines that the authentication of the second device has failed when the second authentication information is different from the second expected information. And / or, the core network side device authenticates the first device based on the third authentication information and the third expected information, which may include at least one of the following: the core network side device determines that the authentication of the first device is successful when the third authentication information is the same as the third expected information; the core network side device determines that the authentication of the first device has failed when the third authentication information is different from the third expected information.

[0117] In this embodiment, the processing on the core network side may further include: the core network side device calculating the second expected information based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key. For example, the processing on the core network side device may include: the core network side device receiving a fourth message from the first device, the fourth message carrying second authentication information; the core network side device calculating the second expected information based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key; and the core network side device determining that authentication of the second device is successful if the second authentication information is identical to the second expected information.

[0118] The description of the authentication parameters and the first shared key is the same as that of the aforementioned embodiment. It should be noted that although the second device uses the authentication parameters and the first shared key to calculate the second message authentication code and the second authentication information, the second device uses different methods when calculating the second authentication information and the second message authentication code. Similarly, the core network side device uses the authentication parameters and the first shared key to calculate the first message authentication code and the second expected information, but uses different methods. Here, the different methods may refer to at least one of different calculation methods, different calculation processes, etc.; different calculation methods may refer to different algorithms and / or functions, and different calculation processes may refer to different intermediate calculation processes performed using the same parameters.

[0119] For example, if the authentication parameters include AK, the first shared key is the root key, and the second device uses the fifth calculation method to calculate the second message authentication code based on AK and the root key, then the second device calculates the second authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key as follows: The second device calculates the second random number based on the XOR of AK and the root key, and uses the sixth calculation method to calculate the second authentication information based on the second random number and the root key. The sixth calculation method may include at least one of the following: a first authentication function, a second authentication function, a third authentication function, a hash algorithm, AES, SNOW 3G, ZUC, a third key generation function, a fourth key generation function, a fifth key generation function, and the like. The sixth calculation method may be the same as or different from the fifth calculation method. For example, the calculation of the second random number based on the XOR of AK and the root key may be expressed as: The second authentication information calculated based on the second random number and the root key using the sixth calculation method can be expressed as: RES1 = f(Kr, Nn), where RES1 represents the second authentication information, f() represents the sixth calculation method, and in this example, the sixth calculation method can be the same as the fifth calculation method, Kr represents the root key, and Nn represents the second random number.

[0120] For example, if the authentication parameters include a second random number, the first shared key is a root key, the second device calculates AK based on the second random number and the root key using an exclusive OR operation, and the second message authentication code is calculated based on the AK and the root key using the fifth calculation method, then the second device can calculate the second authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key as follows: The second device can calculate the second authentication information based on the second random number and the root key using the sixth calculation method. The sixth calculation method and the calculation formula for the second authentication information are the same as those in the previous embodiment and are not repeated here.

[0121] The specific method for calculating the second expected information by the core network side device should be the same as the method for calculating the second authentication information by the second device, for example, both use the method f(Kr, Nn). The difference is that because they are calculated by different devices, this embodiment distinguishes between the two. For example, the second expected information on the core network side can be represented as XRES1 to distinguish it from RES1 of the second authentication information.

[0122] In some possible embodiments, key negotiation is further performed between the first device and the second device.

[0123] The processing by the first device further includes at least one of the following: the first device calculates an integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; the first device calculates an encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key.

[0124] The processing by the second device may further include at least one of the following: the second device calculates an integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; the second device calculates an encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key.

[0125] The integrity protection key on the first device can be used to calculate an integrity check code for a message sent from the first device to the second device and include it in the message, and / or perform integrity verification on messages received by the first device from the second device. The encryption key is used to encrypt information sent from the first device to the second device and / or decrypt information received by the first device from the second device. The second device is similar to the first device and is not further described.

[0126] Calculating the integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key may include: performing an exclusive OR operation on the first random number and the first intermediate key to obtain the integrity protection key; for example, it may be expressed as: Among them, Nt is the first random number, SK1 is the first intermediate key, and Ki is the integrity protection key. The process of calculating the integrity protection key for the first device and the second device is the same and will not be repeated here. In some possible examples, the integrity protection keys generated by the first device and the second device respectively can both be represented as Ki; in some possible examples, since the first device and the second device have different entities, the integrity protection key of the second device can also be represented as any one of Ki', Ki-t, Ki-tag, etc., and the integrity protection key of the first device can also be represented as any one of Ki, Ki-u, Ki-gNB, etc., and the various possible representations of the integrity protection key are not exhaustively listed here.

[0127] The first device calculating the encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key may include: the first device performing an exclusive OR calculation on the third random number and the first intermediate key to obtain the encryption key; for example, it may be expressed as: Among them, Nu is the third random number, SK1 is the first intermediate key, and Kc is the encryption key. The way in which the second device calculates the encryption key is the same as that of the first device, and will not be repeated here. In some possible examples, the encryption keys generated by the first device and the second device respectively can both be represented as Kc; in some possible examples, since the first device and the second device have different subjects, the encryption key of the second device can also be represented as any one of Kc', Kc-t, Kc-tag, etc., and the encryption key of the first device can also be represented as any one of Kc, Kc-u (for example, the first device is a terminal device), Kc-gNB (for example, the first device is an access network device), etc., and all possible representations of the encryption key are not exhaustively listed here.

[0128] In some possible examples, the second message carries a third random number; or, the method further includes: the first device sends a fifth message to the second device, the fifth message responds to the third message, and the fifth message carries a third random number.

[0129] The second message carries a third random number; or, the method further includes: the second device receiving a fifth message from the first device, the fifth message responding to the third message, and the fifth message carrying a third random number.

[0130] Optionally, after receiving the second message and before calculating the first authentication information, the second device may generate a first random number; before or after calculating the first authentication information, the second device may also calculate the integrity protection key. Correspondingly, after receiving the third message, the first device may obtain the first random number from the third message and calculate the integrity protection key.

[0131] Regarding the process of using the integrity protection key, for example, when the second device sends a third message, the third message may also carry an integrity check code for the third message. The integrity check code for the third message is calculated based on the integrity protection key and the original content of the third message. This embodiment does not limit the specific integrity protection calculation method used; as long as the second device and the first device use the same integrity protection calculation method, it is within the scope of protection of this embodiment. The original content of the third message can refer to all possible content carried by the third message, excluding the integrity check code, and this list is not exhaustive. If the third message carries the integrity check code, upon receiving the third message, the first device first verifies the integrity check code of the third message using the integrity protection key. If the integrity check of the third message passes, the first device performs subsequent processing. Verifying the integrity check code of the third message using the integrity protection key can include calculating a verification code for the third message based on the original content of the third message using the integrity protection key. If the verification code and integrity check code of the third message match, the first device determines that the integrity check of the third message passes.

[0132] This embodiment does not limit the timing and specific message when the second device and the first device use the integrity protection key.

[0133] Optionally, if the second message carries a third random number, the second device obtains the third random number carried in the second message after receiving the second message, and the second device can calculate the encryption key before sending the third message.

[0134] The first device may generate a third random number before sending the second message, and carry the third random number in the second message; after successfully authenticating the second device, the first device calculates the encryption key based on the third random number.

[0135] For example, when the second device sends the third message, the second device can use the encryption key to encrypt the third message, or the second device can first save the third message and use the encryption key in subsequent communications between the second device and the first device. This embodiment does not limit the use of the encryption key by the first device and the second device and the timing of the encryption key.

[0136] Optionally, after successfully authenticating the second device, the first device may generate a third random number and include the third random number in the fifth message. The first device may calculate the encryption key after generating the third random number. After receiving the fifth message, the second device may obtain the third random number included in the fifth message and then calculate the encryption key.

[0137] This embodiment does not limit the timing when the first device and the second device use the encryption key.

[0138] In some possible examples, the first device may further send a first intermediate key to a key management device. The key management device may be at least one of the following: a key management center (KMF), an AMF, a network element with a key management function, or a network element with a key management function related to an AIoT device. The key management device may store the first intermediate key for mobility management of the first device and / or the second device.

[0139] In some possible examples, the processing by the second device may further include: the second device sending a sixth message to the first device, where the sixth message is used to request authentication, and the sixth message carries relevant information of the second device.

[0140] Correspondingly, the processing of the first device may also include: the first device receives a sixth message from the second device, the sixth message is used to request authentication, and the sixth message carries relevant information of the second device; the first device sends a seventh message to the core network side device, the seventh message is used to request authentication, and the seventh message carries relevant information of the second device and the identifier of the first device.

[0141] The processing of the core network side device may also include: the core network side device receives a seventh message from the first device, the seventh message is used to request authentication, and the seventh message carries relevant information of the second device and an identifier of the first device.

[0142] Before the second device sends the sixth message to the first device, it may also include: the second device receives a trigger message, which can be used to activate the second device; the trigger message can be sent by the fifth device, and the fifth device can be the aforementioned first device, that is, the fifth device can be a terminal device or an access network device, or, the fifth device can be different from the aforementioned first device, for example, it can be other terminals or other access network devices, or, the fifth device can be a core network side device, and the fifth device can be any device on the core network side, which is not limited here.

[0143] After the core network side device receives the seventh message from the first device, it may also include: the core network side device checks whether the first device and the second device are authorized based on the relevant information of the second device and the identifier of the first device carried in the seventh message. If the authorization is successful, the core network side device performs the processing of calculating the first message authentication code and / or calculating the second expected information. Then, the core network side device can send the first message to the first device, and the subsequent processing will not be repeated.

[0144] Checking whether the first device and the second device are authorized may include: obtaining subscription data of the first device and subscription data of the second device, checking whether the first device is authorized to act as a communication agent for the second device and / or detecting whether the second device is authorized to use the communication service. Correspondingly, determining that the authorization is successful may include: determining that the first device is authorized to act as a communication agent for the second device and / or that the second device is authorized to use the communication service.

[0145] For example, the subscription data of each of the first device and the second device may be stored in the UDM, and the content, acquisition method, and storage method thereof are not limited in this embodiment.

[0146] For another example, the core network side device may include multiple core network devices, the device receiving the seventh message may be a first core network device (such as AUSF), and the device performing the aforementioned check may be a second core network device (such as UDM); the processing of calculating the aforementioned first message authentication code and calculating the second expected information may be performed by the second core network device; and the processing of sending the first message may be performed by the first core network device. That is, the second core network device may send the first message authentication code, the second expected information, and the authentication parameters to the first core network device, and then the first core network device may send the first message carrying the authentication parameters and the first message authentication code to the first device.

[0147] In some possible examples, after generating the second authentication information, the second device may further include: updating the pseudonym of the second device based on the second random number, obtaining and saving the updated pseudonym of the second device. For example, the following formula may be used for calculation: PIDt* is the updated pseudonym of the second device. Accordingly, after the core network device successfully authenticates the second device, the following steps may also be performed: updating the pseudonym of the second device based on the second random number, obtaining and saving the updated pseudonym of the second device. The specific calculation method is the same as that for the second device and is not repeated here. The updated pseudonym of the second device is used for the next authentication or other interaction with the core network device.

[0148] Optionally, after the core network side device generates the updated pseudonym for the second device, the process may further include: the core network side device sending an eighth message to the first device, where the eighth message is used to indicate successful authentication of the second device and carries the updated pseudonym for the second device. Accordingly, the first device may also receive the eighth message from the core network side device.

[0149] 6, the first device is a UE (or referred to as a proxy UE, UE and ProxyUE have the same meaning hereinafter, and no repeated description is given), the second device is a tag, and the core network side device includes AUSF and UDM as an example. The authentication method provided in the aforementioned embodiment is exemplarily described:

[0150] Step 600: The tag and the UE pre-share Ct, and the tag and the core network side device share the root key Kr. Here, the tag and the UE pre-share Ct, that is, the aforementioned pre-shared information includes the challenge information. Furthermore, the UE can also associate and save the pre-shared information [Ct] with the tag's Rt, IDt, and PIDt, that is, as shown in Figure 6, the UE pre-saves [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]; the tag can pre-share Ct and associate Ct with IDt and PIDt, that is, as shown in Figure 6, the tag pre-saves [IDt, PIDt, Ct]. It should be understood that this is only an example. In some other possible examples, the pre-shared information may include Ct and Rt, that is, the UE and the tag both pre-save [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]. It should be noted that in this example, the UE can also be replaced by a base station.

[0151] Step 601: The UE (or network) sends a trigger message to activate the Tag.

[0152] Step 602: The Tag sends an authentication request message to the UE, which carries the pseudonym PIDt of the Tag. Here, the authentication request message is the sixth message in the above embodiment.

[0153] Step 603: The UE acts as a proxy and sends an authentication request message to the core network side device (denoted as AUSF / UDM in FIG6 ). The message includes the pseudonym PIDt of the tag and the UE ID (IDu). The authentication request message in this step may be the seventh message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0154] Step 604: The UDM generates a second random number Nn and calculates MAC (ie, the first message authentication code) and XRES1 (ie, the second expected information).

[0155] Specifically, step 604a: UDM (indicated as AUSF / UDM in Figure 6) queries the subscription data of UE and Tag based on UE ID and Tag PIDt, and checks whether UE is authorized to act as the communication agent of A-IoT and whether Tag has the right to use A-IoT communication services. Step 604b: If the authorization is successful, UDM generates a second random number Nn, and UDM calculates MAC = f(Kr, AK) and XRES 1 = f(Kr, Nn).

[0156] The device that receives the authentication request message in step 603 may be AUSF, and the device that performs the authorization check and calculates MAC and XRES1 in step 604 may be UDM. After UDM calculates MAC and XRES1, UDM may send the above AK, MAC and XRES1 to AUSF.

[0157] Step 605: The AUSF sends an authentication response message to the proxy UE, which includes [AK, MAC]. In this step, the AUSF can save the received XRES1 locally and only send the AK (i.e., an example of the authentication parameters of the aforementioned embodiment) and the MAC (i.e., the first message authentication code). The above authentication response message is the first message of the aforementioned embodiment.

[0158] Step 606: The proxy UE sends an authentication response message to the Tag, the message including [AK, MAC]. The authentication response message in this step is the second message in the above embodiment.

[0159] Step 607: Tag calculates MAC' (ie, the second message authentication code) based on AK. If MAC and MAC' are the same, the core network side device is authenticated successfully, and then calculates RES2 (ie, the first authentication information).

[0160] Specifically, as shown in FIG6 , the process may include step 607a: Tag utilizes the PSK shared with the network side to calculate RES1=f(Kr, Nn); wherein PSK is the first shared key in the aforementioned embodiment, and in this example, the first shared key is specifically the root key Kr, and RES1 is the second authentication information, which is used for the core network side device to authenticate the Tag.

[0161] Step 607b: Tag uses AK and the root key to calculate MAC'=f(Kr,AK). Tag verifies whether MAC', i.e., f(Kr,AK), and MAC are consistent. If they are inconsistent, Tag authentication of the network (core network side device) fails. If they are consistent, Tag authentication of the network (core network side device) succeeds.

[0162] Step 607c: The tag uses the locally stored Ct to input the PUF, obtains the corresponding Rt = PUF (Ct), calculates the first intermediate key SK1 = KDF (Ct || Rt, PIDt, AK), and calculates RES2 = f (SK1, PIDt, Nt, Rt, IDu). RES2 is the first authentication information used by the UE to authenticate the tag; wherein Nt is the first random number generated by the tag.

[0163] Step 607d: Tag generates integrity protection key

[0164] Step 607e: Tag updates pseudonym For use in the next round of certification.

[0165] Step 608: Tag returns an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [Nt, RES1, RES2]. The authentication response message may be the third message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0166] Step 609: The UE uses the CRP pre-shared with the Tag to calculate the first intermediate key SK1 = KDF(Ct||Rt,PIDt,AK) and XRES2 = f(SK1,PIDt,Nt,Rt,IDu), and verifies whether XRES2 is consistent with RES2. If they are inconsistent, the UE fails to authenticate the Tag. If they are consistent, the UE successfully authenticates the Tag. The UE uses SK1 (i.e., the first intermediate key) and Nt to generate the integrity protection key.

[0167] Step 610: The UE sends an authentication response message to the UDM / AUSF, the message including RES1. The authentication response message may be the fourth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0168] Step 611: UDM / AUSF verifies whether RES1 is consistent with XRES1. If not, the network authentication Tag fails. If consistent, the network authentication Tag succeeds. UDM / AUSF updates the Tag pseudonym. For next authentication.

[0169] Step 612: The UDM / AUSF returns a success response to the UE, which includes the updated pseudonym PIDt*. The success response may be the eighth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0170] Step 613: UE generates a third random number Nu and calculates the encryption key The third random number is sent to the Tag. The message carrying the third random number here may be the fifth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0171] Step 614: Tag receives the third random number Nu and calculates the encryption key And store Ki and Kc.

[0172] Step 615: The UE sends SK1 to the key management center KMF for use in mobility management.

[0173] In conjunction with Figure 7, an exemplary description of the key architecture of the scenario provided in Figure 6 is given. In Figure 7, it can be seen that: on the network side, specifically, the AUSF on the core network side shares the root key Kr with the tag, and AK can be derived based on the root key Kr and the second random number Nn; the UE and the tag can derive the first intermediate key (ie, SK1 in Figure 7) based on AK and CRP (that is, (Ct, Rt)); the UE and the tag can derive the integrity protection key Ki based on the first intermediate key SK1 and the first random number Nt (the calculation method used is Based on SK1 and the third random number Nu, the encryption key Kc can be derived (the calculation method used is ); and the UE will also send SK1 to KMF for sharing.

[0174] In some possible embodiments, the pre-shared information may be shared by the core network side device and the second device. The content that the pre-shared information may include is the same as that in the above embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0175] The first intermediate key on the first device side may be sent by the core network side device to the first device, that is, the first message carries the first intermediate key. The process of the core network side device calculating the first intermediate key may include: the core network side device calculating the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameter.

[0176] Optionally, the core network side device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters, including: the core network side device calculates the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters; the core network side device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key. Correspondingly, the second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters, including: the second device calculates the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters; the second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key.

[0177] Among them, the second device calculates the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters, which can be: the second device calculates the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters using a third calculation method. The third calculation method is the same as the aforementioned embodiment and is not described in detail. The authentication parameters may include an anonymous key (AK) or a second random number. The relevant information of the second device may include an identifier of the second device or a pseudonym for the second device.

[0178] For example, assuming that the third calculation method includes KDF and direct calculation, taking the authentication parameters including the second random number Nn and the relevant information of the second device as the pseudonym of the second device as an example, the aforementioned process of calculating the second intermediate key can be expressed by the following formula: SK1 = H(PIDt, Nn, Ct, Rt), where SK1 is the second intermediate key in this embodiment, H() represents the function used in the third calculation method, Ct represents the challenge information, Rt represents the response information, Nn represents the second random number, and PIDt represents the pseudonym of the second device. Alternatively, the aforementioned process of calculating the second intermediate key can be expressed as: SK1 = KDF(Ct||Rt, PIDt, Nn), where KDF() represents the KDF function, "||" represents direct calculation, and the meaning of other contents in the formula is the same as the aforementioned formula and will not be repeated. It should be understood that this is only an exemplary explanation. In actual processing, the KDF and direct calculation in the above formula can be replaced by one or more other algorithms or functions in the third calculation method. For example, the above KDF can be replaced by the first authentication function, the direct calculation can be replaced by the XOR calculation, and the authentication parameter can also be replaced by AK. All possible situations are not enumerated here.

[0179] The second device calculating the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key may include: the second device calculating the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key, the pseudonym of the second device, and a second random number using a seventh calculation method; or calculating the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and the pseudonym of the second device using the seventh calculation method; or calculating the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and a second random number using the seventh calculation method; or calculating the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key using the seventh calculation method. The seventh calculation method may include at least one of the following: KDF, first authentication function, second authentication function, third authentication function, hash algorithm, Advanced Encryption Standard, SNOW 3G, ZUC, XOR calculation, and direct calculation. The seventh calculation method may be the same as or different from the aforementioned third calculation method.

[0180] For example, assuming the seventh calculation method includes KDF, the first intermediate key is calculated using the seventh calculation method based on the second intermediate key, the pseudonym of the second device, and the second random number. This can be expressed using the following formula: SK2 = KDF(SK1, PIDt, Nn), where SK2 is the first intermediate key in this embodiment, KDF() represents the KDF function, Nn represents the second random number, and PIDt represents the pseudonym of the second device. It should be understood that this is merely an example. In actual processing, the KDF in the above formula can be replaced with the first authentication function, etc., and the above calculation can also use only PIDt, such as SK2 = KDF(SK1, PIDt). This does not exhaust all possible situations.

[0181] It should be pointed out that the way in which the core network side device calculates the first intermediate key should be the same as the way in which the second device calculates the first intermediate key, and the first intermediate key obtained by the core network side device should also be the same as the first intermediate key obtained by the second device; and, the way in which the core network side device calculates the second intermediate key should be the same as the way in which the second device calculates the second intermediate key, and the second intermediate key obtained by the core network side device should also be the same as the second intermediate key obtained by the second device, so no repetition will be given here.

[0182] The first device calculating the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter may include: the first device using a fourth calculation method to calculate the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter. The description of the fourth calculation method is the same as that of the above embodiment and is not repeated here. The first expected information may include a first expected response (XRES).

[0183] Optionally, the first generation parameter may include an identifier and authentication parameters of the first device. The first device calculates the first expected information using the fourth calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information about the second device, the identifier of the first device, and the authentication parameters. For example, if the first device is a terminal device and the authentication parameters include a second random number, in this example, the first expected information may be calculated using the following formula: XRES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, IDu), where XRES2 is the first expected information, i.e., the first XRES, f() represents the fourth calculation method, SK2 is the first intermediate key of this embodiment, PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device, Nn is the second random number, Nt is the first random number, and IDu is the identifier of the terminal device. If the first device is an access network device (e.g., a gNB), in this example, the first authentication information may be calculated using the following formula: XRES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, gNBu), where gNBu is the identifier of the gNB. The remaining meanings are the same as in the previous embodiment and are not further described. It should be noted that the above f() can be any algorithm or function in the aforementioned fourth calculation method, and they are not exhaustively listed here.

[0184] Optionally, the first generation parameter may include an identifier of the first device, response information, and authentication parameters. The first device calculates the first expected information using a fourth calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device, the identifier of the first device, the response information, and the authentication parameters. For example, if the first device is a terminal device and the authentication parameters include the second random number, in this example, the first expected information may be calculated using the following formula: XRES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, Rt, IDu), where Rt is the response information, and the remaining contents have the same meaning as in the previous embodiment and are not further described. If the first device is an access network device (such as a gNB), in this example, the first authentication information may be calculated using the following formula: XRES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, Rt, gNBu), where gNBu is the identifier of the gNB, and the remaining contents have the same meaning as in the previous embodiment and are not further described.

[0185] Optionally, the first generation parameter may include an identifier of the first device. This processing method is the same as the aforementioned embodiment and will not be described in detail. Optionally, the first generation parameter may include response information. This processing method is the same as the aforementioned embodiment and will not be described in detail. Optionally, the first generation parameter may include response information and an identifier of the first device. This processing method is the same as the aforementioned embodiment and will not be described in detail. It should be understood that the above is only an exemplary description of the use of one or more combinations of the first generation parameters. In actual processing, the various parameters in the first generation parameters can also be used in other combinations to calculate the first expected information, but this embodiment does not list them one by one.

[0186] The processing by which the second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter may include: the second device uses a fourth calculation method to calculate the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter.

[0187] The first generation parameter used by the second device to calculate the first authentication information should be the same as the first generation parameter used by the first device to calculate the first expected information; and the fourth calculation method used by the second device should also be the same as the fourth calculation method used by the first device. For example, when the first device is a terminal device, the second device can use the following formula to calculate the first authentication information: RES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, IDu), where RES2 is the first authentication information, i.e., the first RES, and SK2 is the first intermediate key of this embodiment. The meaning of the remaining content is the same as that of the aforementioned embodiment and will not be repeated. The above is only an exemplary explanation. In actual processing, the various methods for the first device to calculate the first expected information can be used by the second device to calculate the first authentication information, but they will not be repeated one by one.

[0188] In some embodiments, the third message carries second authentication information, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device.

[0189] The processing on the first device side may also include: the first device sending a fourth message to the core network side device, where the fourth message carries the second authentication information.

[0190] The processing of the second device may also include: the second device uses the first calculation method to calculate the second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the second generation parameter, the second generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device.

[0191] In this embodiment, the processing by the core network device may further include: the core network device receiving a fourth message from the first device, the fourth message carrying second authentication information, the second authentication information being used by the core network device to authenticate the second device. The method may also include: the core network device authenticating the second device based on the second authentication information and the second expected information. The authentication method for the core network device authenticating the second device based on the second authentication information and the second expected information is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not further described.

[0192] The processing of the core network side device may also include at least one of the following: the core network side device calculates a first message authentication code based on the authentication parameter and a first shared key, and the first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network side device; the core network side device calculates the second expected information based on the authentication parameter and the first shared key; the core network side device adopts a first calculation method to calculate the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the second generation parameter, and the second generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information; the core network side device adopts a second calculation method to calculate the first message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the third generation parameter, and the third generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information, the first calculation method and the second calculation method are different, and / or the second generation parameter and the third generation parameter are at least partially different; the core network side device calculates the second expected information based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information information, calculates a first message authentication code; the core network side device calculates the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, the relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter, and the first generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the response information, the challenge information, the identification of the first device, and the authentication parameter; the core network side device calculates the third expected information based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, the third random number, and the fifth generation parameter, and the fifth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the identification of the first device, the relevant information of the second device, the response information, the challenge information, and the authentication parameter; the core network side device calculates the third expected information based on the group key, the identification of the device group where the second device is located, the authentication parameter, the third random number, and the identification of the first device; the core network side device calculates the fifth message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the relevant information of the second device, the authentication parameter, the challenge information, and the identification of the first device.

[0193] In this embodiment, the processing on the core network side may include: the core network side device uses a first calculation method to calculate the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter, and the second generation parameter, where the second generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information. The first calculation method may include at least one of the following: a first authentication function, a second authentication function, a third authentication function, a hash algorithm, AES, SNOW 3G, ZUC, a third key generation function, a fourth key generation function, a fifth key generation function, SPECK, SIMON, XOR calculation, direct calculation, etc.

[0194] For example, if the authentication parameter includes a second random number and the second generation parameter includes response information, the second device uses the first calculation method to calculate the second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, the second random number and the response information. For example, it can be expressed by the following formula: RES1 = H (SK1, Nn, Rt), where RES1 is the second authentication information, SK1 is the second intermediate key, Nn is the second random number, and Rt is the response information. Furthermore, in the above process of calculating the second authentication information, the pseudonym of the second device can also be added, for example, it can be expressed by the following formula: RES1 = H (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt), where PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device. The meaning of the remaining contents in the formula is the same as the above example and is not repeated here. In the above formula, only the authentication parameter as the second random number is used as an example for illustrative explanation. In actual processing, the above authentication parameter may include AK. For example, the following formula can be used to calculate RES1 = H (SK1, PIDt, AK, Rt). In the above formula, H() represents the first calculation method, which can be any algorithm or function in the above-mentioned first calculation method, for example, the first authentication function f1.

[0195] The specific method in which the core network side device calculates the second expected information should be the same as the method in which the second device calculates the second authentication information. For example, the core network side device can use the following formula for calculation: XRES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt), where XRES1 is the second expected information, SK1 is the second intermediate key, and the meaning of the remaining contents in the formula is the same as that in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0196] In some possible embodiments, the first message also carries at least a first message authentication code, and the second message carries the first message authentication code; the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device.

[0197] The processing by the core network side device may further include: the core network side device calculating a first message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter, and a third generation parameter using a second calculation method, the third generation parameter including the response information and / or the challenge information, wherein the first calculation method and the second calculation method are different, and / or the second generation parameter and the third generation parameter are at least partially different. The core network device then sends the first message authentication code to the first device in a first message.

[0198] The processing on the second device side also includes: the second device uses a second calculation method to calculate a second message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and a third generation parameter, and the third generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information; the first calculation method and the second calculation method are different, and / or the second generation parameter and the third generation parameter are at least partially different; the second device authenticates the core network side device based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code. The specific processing of the second device authenticating the core network side device based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code is the same as that in the above embodiment and is not repeated here.

[0199] The above authentication parameter may include AK or a second random number.

[0200] Optionally, the second generation parameter is at least partially different from the third generation parameter, which may mean that if the second generation parameter includes response information, the third generation parameter includes challenge information, or vice versa; or the second generation parameter includes response information and challenge information, and the third generation parameter only includes challenge information or response information, or vice versa.

[0201] Optionally, the first calculation method and the second calculation method may each include at least one of the following: a first authentication function, a second authentication function, a third authentication function, a hash algorithm, AES, SNOW 3G, ZUC, a third key generation function, a fourth key generation function, a fifth key generation function, SPECK, SIMON, etc. The first calculation method and the second calculation method are different, which may mean that, in actual calculation, the first calculation method may select at least one of the above algorithms or functions, and the second calculation method may select other algorithms or functions from the above algorithms or functions except the first calculation method; for example, the first calculation method is specifically the first authentication function, and the second calculation method may be a hash algorithm. This is only an exemplary description, and other selection methods may be used in actual processing, which are not exhaustive here.

[0202] Optionally, the second generation parameter and the third generation parameter are different, and / or the first calculation method and the second calculation method are different, which may mean: using the same second generation parameter and the third generation parameter, but using different first calculation methods and the second calculation method; or, using different second generation parameters and the third generation parameter, but using the same first calculation method and the second calculation method; or, using different second generation parameters and the third generation parameter, and using different first calculation methods and the second calculation method.

[0203] It should be pointed out that the parameters and algorithms used by the core network side device and the second device to calculate the second expected information and the second authentication information should be the same, and the parameters and algorithms used by the core network side device and the second device to calculate the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code should also be the same.

[0204] For example, if the authentication parameter includes a second random number, the second generation parameter includes response information, the third generation parameter is different from the second generation parameter, and the third generation parameter can be challenge information, and the first calculation method is the same as the second calculation method, then the second device uses the second calculation method to calculate the second message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter, and the third generation parameter. It can be: the second device uses the second calculation method to calculate the second message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the second random number, and the challenge information. For example, it can be expressed by the following formula: MAC'=H(SK1, Nn, Ct), where MAC' is the second message authentication code, SK1 is the second intermediate key, Nn is the second random number, and Ct is the challenge information. Furthermore, in the above-mentioned process of calculating the second message authentication code, the pseudonym of the second device can also be added, for example, it can be expressed by the following formula: MAC'=H(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct), where PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device. The meaning of the remaining contents in the formula is the same as the above example and is not repeated here. H() in the above formula can be any of the aforementioned algorithms or functions, for example, it can be the first authentication function f1. In this example, the first calculation method and the second calculation method are the same, for example, they can both be the first authentication function.

[0205] For another example, if the authentication parameter includes AK and the second generation parameter includes response information, the second device can calculate the second authentication information using the following formula RES1=H(SK1', PIDt, AK, Rt). The third generation parameter is different from the second generation parameter. The third generation parameter can be challenge information. The first calculation method and the second calculation method are also different. Then the second device can use the following formula to calculate the second message authentication code: MAC'=H'(SK1, PIDt, AK, Ct), where the meaning of the remaining contents in the formula is the same as the above example and is not repeated here. H'() in the above formula can be any algorithm or function in the aforementioned second calculation method. In this example, the first calculation method and the second calculation method are different. For example, the first calculation method H() can specifically be the first authentication function f1(), and the second calculation method H'() can specifically be the third authentication function f3().

[0206] It should be pointed out that the above description is based only on the example of the second device calculating the second message authentication code. In fact, the processing of calculating the first message authentication code and the processing of calculating the second message authentication code on the core network side device should be the same. For example, the core network side device also uses MAC=H'(SK1, PIDt, AK, Ct) to calculate the first message authentication code. In order to distinguish the message authentication codes obtained by different devices, this embodiment adopts different ways of representing the message authentication code; in some other examples, the first message authentication code can also be represented as MAC1, and the second message authentication code can also be represented as MAC1'. Here, we do not exhaustively enumerate the various possible representations of the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

[0207] It should also be pointed out that the core network side device may include multiple core network devices (or core network network elements). In this case, the relevant descriptions of the core network side device calculating the first message authentication code and the device for the second expected information and the device interacting with the first device are the same as those in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0208] In some possible embodiments, key negotiation is further performed between the first device and the second device.

[0209] The processing by the first device further includes at least one of the following: the first device calculates an integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; the first device calculates an encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key.

[0210] The processing by the second device may further include at least one of the following: the second device calculates an integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; the second device calculates an encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key.

[0211] The process of the first device calculating the integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key is the same as that in the previous embodiment. The only difference from the previous embodiment is that this embodiment uses a different method for calculating and expressing the first intermediate key. For example, the first device performs an XOR operation on the first random number and the first intermediate key to obtain the integrity protection key, which can be expressed as: SK2 is the first intermediate key of this embodiment. The calculation and acquisition methods of the first intermediate key of this embodiment have been detailed in the previous embodiment and are not repeated here. The calculation of the integrity protection key by the second device based on the first random number and the first intermediate key is similar to that of the first device and is not repeated here.

[0212] The process of calculating the encryption key by the first device based on the third random number and the first intermediate key is the same as that in the previous embodiment. The only difference from the previous embodiment is that the present embodiment uses a different method for calculating and expressing the first intermediate key. For example, the first device performs an XOR operation on the third random number and the first intermediate key to obtain an encryption key expressed as: Regarding the calculation of the encryption key by the second device based on the third random number and the first intermediate key, the processing that may be included is the same as that of the first device and will not be repeated.

[0213] The transmission method of the third random number in this embodiment is also the same as in the previous embodiment, for example, the second message carries the third random number. Alternatively, the method further includes: the first device sending a fifth message to the second device, the fifth message responding to the third message and carrying the third random number. Accordingly, the second device receives the fifth message from the first device, the fifth message responding to the third message and carrying the third random number. The description of how the first and second devices calculate their respective integrity protection keys, the timing for calculating their respective encryption keys, and the timing for using their respective keys is also the same as in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here.

[0214] In this embodiment, the first device may also send the first intermediate key to the key management device. The specific processing is the same as in the above embodiment and will not be described in detail.

[0215] In this embodiment, the second device sends the sixth message to the first device, the first device sends the seventh message to the core network side device to request authentication, the second device receives a trigger message before sending the sixth message, and the second device updates the pseudonym, which are the same as the previous embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0216] In conjunction with Figure 8, the first device is a UE (or a proxy UE, illustrated as a Proxy UE in Figure 8), the second device is a tag, and the core network side device includes an AUSF and a UDM. As an example, the authentication method provided in the aforementioned embodiment is exemplarily described:

[0217] Step 800: Under the secure channel, the tag and UDM pre-configure [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]. Here, the tag and UDM pre-share Ct, that is, the aforementioned pre-shared information includes challenge information. Furthermore, the UDM can also associate and save the pre-shared information [Ct] with the tag's Rt, as well as IDt and PIDt. That is, as shown in Figure 8, the UDM pre-saves [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]. The tag can pre-share Ct and associate Ct with IDt and PIDt. That is, as shown in Figure 8, the tag pre-saves [IDt, PIDt, Ct]. It should be understood that this is only an example. In some other possible examples, the pre-shared information may include Ct and Rt, that is, the UDM and the tag both pre-save [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt].

[0218] Step 801: The UE (or network) sends a trigger message to activate the Tag.

[0219] Step 802: The Tag sends an authentication request message to the UE, which includes the pseudonym PIDt of the Tag. Here, the authentication request message is the sixth message in the above embodiment.

[0220] Step 803: The UE acts as a proxy to send an authentication request message to the network. The message includes the pseudonym PIDt of the tag and the UE ID (IDu). The authentication request message in this step may be the seventh message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0221] Step 804: The UDM generates a second random number Nn and calculates MAC (ie, the first message authentication code) and XRES1 (ie, the second expected information).

[0222] Specifically, step 804a: UDM verifies the identity of the Tag and the UE, for example, based on the UE IDu and Tag PIDt, queries the subscription data of the UE and the Tag, checks whether the UE is authorized as the communication agent of A-IoT, and whether the Tag has the right to use the A-IoT communication service. Step 804b: If the authorization is successful, the UDM generates a second random number Nn, uses PIDt to retrieve the corresponding Ct and Rt to calculate the second intermediate key SK1=KDF(Ct||Rt,PIDt,Nn), and derives the first intermediate key SK2=KDF(SK1,PIDt,Nn,IDu) based on SK1; Step 804c: UDM calculates MAC=f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Ct) and XRES1=f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Rt). The above KDF function can be

[0223] The HMAC-SHA256 function or other hash function defined by 3GPP; the f function can be the f1-f5 functions, AES function, hash function or other lightweight functions (such as SPECK, SIMON algorithm) defined in 3GPP.

[0224] Step 805: The UDM / AUSF sends an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [MAC, Nn, SK2]. In this step, the AUSF can save the XRES1 sent by the UDM locally, and the AUSF sends Nn (i.e., an example of the authentication parameters of the aforementioned embodiment), MAC (i.e., the first message authentication code), and the first intermediate key SK2 to the UE. The above authentication response message is the first message of the aforementioned embodiment.

[0225] Step 806: The UE stores the key SK2 and sends an authentication response message to the Tag, which includes [MAC, Nn]. The authentication response message in this step is the second message in the above embodiment.

[0226] Step 807: Tag calculates MAC' (ie, the second message authentication code). If MAC and MAC' are the same, the core network side device is authenticated successfully, and then calculates RES2 (ie, the first authentication information).

[0227] Specifically, step 807a: Tag uses the locally stored Ct to input the PUF, obtains the corresponding Rt = PUF (Ct), and calculates the second intermediate key SK1 = KDF (Ct || Rt, PIDt, Nn) and derives the first intermediate key SK2 = KDF (SK1, PIDt, Nn, IDu); step 807b: Tag calculates f (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct), verifies whether the value is consistent with the received MAC, if not, Tag authentication network fails, if consistent, Tag authentication network succeeds; step 807c: Tag calculates response RES1 = f (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt) for the network (core network side equipment) to authenticate the Tag, Tag generates the first random number Nt and calculates RES2 = f (SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, IDu) for UE to authenticate the Tag; step 807d: Tag generates an integrity protection key Step 807e: Tag updates pseudonym For use in the next round of certification.

[0228] Among them, the tag verifies the network by checking the MAC, but the tag authenticates the UE implicitly, that is, the tag provides authentication by successfully using the key generated by authentication and key agreement in the subsequent process; the integrity key Ki and encryption key Kc between the tag and UE are derived from the key SK2, as shown in the subsequent key architecture.

[0229] Step 808: The Tag sends an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [Nt, RES1, RES2]. The authentication response message may be the third message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0230] Step 809: The UE verifies RES2 (first authentication information).

[0231] Specifically, step 809a: UE uses the stored first intermediate key SK2 to calculate f(SK2,PIDt,Nn,Nt,IDu), and verifies whether it is consistent with RES2. If not, UE authentication Tag fails. If consistent, UE authentication Tag succeeds. Step 809b: UE uses the random number Nt to calculate the integrity protection key

[0232] Step 810: The UE sends an authentication response message to the UDM / AUSF, the message including RES1. The authentication response message may be the fourth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0233] Step 811: UDM / AUSF verifies whether RES1 is consistent with XRES1. If not, the network authentication Tag fails. If consistent, the network authentication Tag succeeds. UDM updates the Tag pseudonym. For next authentication.

[0234] Step 812: UDM / AUSF returns a success response to the UE, where the message includes the updated pseudonym PIDt*; the success response may be the eighth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0235] Step 813: UE generates a third random number Nu and calculates the encryption key And send the third random number to the Tag; the message carrying the third random number here may be the fifth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0236] Step 814: Tag uses the third random number Nu to calculate the encryption key And store Ki and Kc.

[0237] Step 815: The UE sends the key SK2 to the KMF for use in mobility management.

[0238] In conjunction with Figure 9, an exemplary description of the key architecture of the scenario provided in Figure 8 is given. It can be seen in Figure 9 that: CRP is a pre-configured challenge-response pair between the UDM / AUSF and the Tag on the network side. The AUSF and the Tag can derive a second intermediate key SK1 (for example, SK1 = KDF (Ct||Rt, PIDt, Nn)) based on the CRP (that is, (Ct, Rt)). That is, the SK1 is based on the key generated by the CRP, that is, SK1 = KDF (Ct||Rt, PIDt, Nn). On the network side, the key will not leave the UDM / AUSF; the AUSF and the tag can derive a first intermediate key SK2 based on the second random number and SK1. The SK2 is a session key derived based on SK1 and used between the UE and the Tag, SK2 = KDF (SK1, PIDt, Nn, IDu); the UE and the tag can derive the integrity protection key Ki based on the first intermediate key SK2 and the first random number Nt (Ki is the integrity protection key for protecting the message transmitted between the Tag and the UE ), based on SK2 and the third random number Nu, the encryption key Kc can be derived (Kc is the encryption key to protect the message transmitted between the Tag and the UE ); and the UE will also send SK2 to KMF for sharing.

[0239] In conjunction with Figure 10, taking the first device as a base station, the second device as a tag, and the core network side devices including AUSF and UDM as an example, the authentication method provided in the above embodiment is exemplarily described:

[0240] Step 1000: Under a secure channel, the tag and the UDM pre-configure [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]. Here, the tag and the UDM pre-share Ct, meaning that the pre-shared information includes challenge information. Furthermore, the UDM can associate and store the pre-shared information [Ct] with the tag's Rt, as well as the IDt and PIDt. As shown in FIG10 , the UDM pre-stores [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]. The tag can pre-share Ct and associate Ct with the IDt and PIDt. As shown in FIG10 , the tag pre-stores [IDt, PIDt, Ct]. It should be understood that this is merely an example. In other possible examples, the pre-shared information may include Ct and Rt, meaning that both the UDM and the tag pre-store [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt].

[0241] Step 1001: The base station sends a trigger message to activate the tag;

[0242] Step 1002: Tag sends an authentication request message to the base station, where the message includes the pseudonym PIDt of Tag; here, the authentication request message is the sixth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0243] Step 1003: The base station sends an authentication request message to the AUSF, which includes PIDt and SN name; the authentication request message in this step may be the seventh message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0244] Step 1004: AUSF sends an authentication request message to UDM, which includes PIDt and SN name;

[0245] Step 1005: The UDM generates a second random number Nn and calculates MAC (ie, the first message authentication code) and XRES1 (ie, the second expected information).

[0246] Specifically, step 1005a: UDM queries the subscription data of the Tag based on the Tag PID and checks whether the Tag is authorized to use the A-IoT communication service; step 1005b: if the authorization is successful, the UDM generates a second random number Nn, uses Ct and Rt corresponding to the Tag PIDt to calculate the second intermediate key SK1 = KDF(Ct||Rt,PIDt,Nn), and derives the first intermediate key SK2 = KDF(SK1,PIDt,Nn) based on SK1; step 1005c: UDM calculates MAC = f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Ct) and XRES1 = f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Rt).

[0247] Step 1006: UDM returns an authentication response message to AUSF, which contains [MAC, Nn, SK2, XRES1].

[0248] Step 1007: AUSF stores XRES1 and returns an authentication response message to the base station, which includes [MAC, SK2, Nn]. The above authentication response message is the first message of the aforementioned embodiment.

[0249] Step 1008: The base station stores SK2 and sends an authentication response message to Tag, where the message includes [MAC, Nn]. The authentication response message in this step is the second message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0250] Step 1009: The same as step 807 in the above example.

[0251] Specifically, step 1009a: the tag uses the locally stored Ct to input the PUF, obtains the corresponding Rt = PUF (Ct), and calculates the second intermediate key SK1 = KDF (Ct || Rt, PIDt, Nn) and derives the first intermediate key SK2 = KDF (SK1, PIDt, Nn); step 1009b: the tag calculates f (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct), verifies whether the value is consistent with the received MAC, if not, the tag authentication network fails, if consistent, the tag authentication network succeeds; step 1009c: the tag calculates the response RES1 = f (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt) for the network (core network side equipment) to authenticate the tag, the tag generates the first random number Nt and calculates RES2 = f (SK2, PIDt, Nn, Nt, gNB ID) for the base station to authenticate the tag; step 1009d: the tag generates the integrity protection key Step 1009e: Tag updates pseudonym For use in the next round of certification.

[0252] Step 1010: Tag returns an authentication response message to the base station, which includes [Nt, RES1, RES2]. The authentication response message may be the third message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0253] Step 1011: The base station verifies RES2 (first authentication information).

[0254] Specifically, the base station uses SK2 to calculate f(SK2,PIDt,Nn,Nt,gNB ID) and verifies whether it is consistent with RES2. If not, the base station fails to authenticate the Tag. If consistent, the base station successfully authenticates the Tag. The base station uses SK2 and the random number Nt to calculate the security key.

[0255] Step 1012: The base station sends an authentication response message to the AUSF, which includes RES1; the authentication response message may be the fourth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0256] Step 1013: AUSF verifies whether RES1 is consistent with XRES1. If not, the network authentication Tag fails. If consistent, the network authentication Tag succeeds and AUSF updates the Tag pseudonym. For the next certification;

[0257] Step 1014: AUSF returns a success response to the base station, which includes the updated pseudonym PIDt*; the success response may be the eighth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0258] Step 1015: The base station generates a third random number Nu and calculates the encryption key between the base station and the tag. And send the third random number to the Tag; the message carrying the third random number here may be the fifth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0259] In this step, the base station can also send the SK2 key to the KMF for mobility management;

[0260] Step 1016: Tag uses the received third random number Nu to calculate the encryption key between Tag and UE And store Ki and Kc.

[0261] In conjunction with Figure 11, an exemplary description of the key architecture of the scenario provided in Figure 10 is given. It can be seen in Figure 11 that: CRP is a pre-configured challenge-response pair between the UDM / AUSF and the Tag on the network side. The AUSF and the Tag can derive a second intermediate key SK1 (for example, SK1 = KDF (Ct||Rt, PIDt, Nn)) based on the CRP (that is, (Ct, Rt)). That is, the SK1 is based on the key generated by the CRP, that is, SK1 = KDF (Ct||Rt, PIDt, Nn). On the network side, the key will not leave the UDM / AUSF; the AUSF and the tag can derive a first intermediate key SK2 based on the second random number and SK1. The SK2 is a session key derived based on SK1 and used between the base station and the Tag. SK2 = KDF (SK1, PIDt, Nn); the base station and the tag can derive the integrity protection key Ki based on the first intermediate key SK2 and the first random number Nt (Ki is the integrity protection key for protecting the message transmitted between the Tag and the base station ), based on SK2 and the third random number Nu, the encryption key Kc can be derived (Kc is the encryption key to protect the message transmitted between the Tag and the base station ); and the base station will also send SK2 to KMF for sharing.

[0262] In some possible implementations, the pre-shared information may be shared by the core network side device and the second device. The content that the pre-shared information may include is the same as that in the above embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0263] The first intermediate key on the first device side may be sent by the core network side device to the first device, that is, the first message carries the first intermediate key.

[0264] In this embodiment, the core network side device and the second device also need to calculate the second intermediate key and the first intermediate key. For example, the specific processing of the second device calculating the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters is the same as the above embodiment, for example, it can be calculated using the following formula: SK1 = H (PIDt, Nn, Ct, Rt), where SK1 represents the second intermediate key of this embodiment. The second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key, which is also the same as the above embodiment, for example, it can be expressed as SK2 = KDF (SK1, PIDt, Nn), where SK2 represents the first intermediate key of this embodiment. The various possible ways for the core network side device and the second device side to calculate the second intermediate key and the first intermediate key in this embodiment are the same as those in the above embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0265] The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter, including: the second device calculates the second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device; the second device calculates ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the first intermediate key, the first random number and the second authentication information, and uses the ciphertext information and the verification parameters as the first authentication information.

[0266] Accordingly, the first authentication information includes ciphertext information and verification parameters, and the third message carries a first random number. The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information, including: the first device authenticates the second device based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the ciphertext information, and the verification parameter, and obtains second authentication information. Here, the first device authenticates the second device based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the ciphertext information, and the verification parameter, and obtains the second authentication information, which may include: the first device decrypts the ciphertext information and the verification parameter based on the first intermediate key and the first random number; if the decryption is successful, the first device determines that authentication with the second device is successful, and obtains the second authentication information.

[0267] The second authentication information may include a second response (RES). The definition of the first generation parameter is the same as that in the above embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0268] Optionally, the second device calculating the second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter may be: the second device calculating the second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter using an eighth calculation method. The eighth calculation method may include at least one of the following: a first authentication function, a second authentication function, a third authentication function, a hash algorithm, AES, SNOW 3G, ZUC, a third key generation function, a fourth key generation function, a fifth key generation function, SPECK, SIMON, XOR calculation, direct calculation, and the like.

[0269] In some possible examples, the first generation parameter may include response information, and the second authentication information may be calculated using the following formula: RES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Rt), where RES1 is the second authentication information, i.e., the second RES, H() represents the eighth calculation method, SK1 is the second intermediate key of this embodiment, PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device, and Rt is the response information. It should be noted that H() can be any one or more algorithms or functions in the aforementioned eighth calculation method, and these are not exhaustively listed here. In some possible examples, the first generation parameter includes response information and authentication parameters. For example, if the authentication parameters include a second random number, the second authentication information may be calculated using the following formula: RES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt), where Nn is the second random number. The remaining meanings of the formula are the same as in the aforementioned embodiment and are not further described. In other possible examples, the first generation parameter includes response information and challenge information, and the second authentication information is calculated using the following formula: RES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Rt||Ct). In some possible examples, the first generation parameter includes response information, challenge information, and authentication parameters. For example, the second authentication information is calculated using the following formula: RES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt, Ct). It should be understood that the above is merely an example. In actual processing, various combinations of the first generation parameters are not exhaustive here, and this embodiment does not exhaustively list various possible variations of the second authentication information.

[0270] Optionally, the second device calculates the ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, and the second authentication information. This may mean that the second device calculates the ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, and the second authentication information using a ninth calculation method. The ninth calculation method may be any algorithm that can simultaneously obtain the ciphertext and verification parameters. In a preferred example, the ninth calculation method may be Ascon. For example, the calculation of the ciphertext information and verification parameters may be expressed using the following formula: {C, P} = ACESK2{RES1, Nt}, where C represents the ciphertext information, P represents the verification parameters, ACE{} represents the Ascon encryption algorithm or encryption function, SK2 represents the use of the first intermediate key, RES1 is the aforementioned second authentication information, and Nt is a first random number generated by the second device. Here, the Ascon-AEAD (authenticated encryption with associated data) algorithm integrates an encryption algorithm and a message authentication code to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of data. While ensuring lightweight, the Ascon algorithm uses a more complex initialization and post-processing process, so even if an attacker obtains intermediate state information, he cannot recover the key or forge messages. Therefore, it is very suitable for resource-constrained zero-power devices.

[0271] The first device decrypts the ciphertext information and the verification parameters using the first intermediate key and the first random number. If the decryption is successful, the first device determines that authentication of the second device is successful and obtains the second authentication information. This may include: the first device decrypts the ciphertext information and the verification parameters using the first intermediate key and the first random number using a ninth calculation method. If the decryption fails, the first device determines that authentication of the second device has failed. If the decryption succeeds, the first device determines that authentication of the second device has succeeded and obtains the decrypted second authentication information. This ninth calculation method is the same as the previous embodiment and is not further described. Still using the ninth calculation method as Ascon as an example, the above decryption calculation method can be expressed as: ACDSK2{C, P, Nt}, where ACD{} can represent the Ascon decryption algorithm or decryption function. The remaining contents are the same as the previous embodiment and are not repeated. If the above decryption calculation is successful, the second authentication information can be obtained. For example, the above formula can be expressed as: RES1 = ACDSK2{C, P, Nt}, where RES1 is the second authentication information obtained after decryption. The remaining description of the formula is the same as the previous embodiment and is not repeated.

[0272] Optionally, the second device calculates ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, and the second authentication information, including: the second device calculates an encryption key based on the first intermediate key and the first random number, and calculates the ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the encryption key and the second authentication information. Accordingly, the first device authenticates the second device based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the ciphertext information, and the verification parameters, including: the first device calculates an encryption key based on the first intermediate key and the first random number, and authenticates the second device based on the encryption key, the ciphertext information, and the verification parameters. Specifically, authenticating the second device based on the encryption key, the ciphertext information, and the verification parameters may mean decrypting the ciphertext information and the verification parameters based on the encryption key. If decryption is successful, the first device determines that authentication of the second device is successful. Furthermore, if authentication of the second device is successful, second authentication information may be obtained.

[0273] The first device calculates the encryption key based on the first intermediate key and the first random number. This can be achieved by performing an exclusive-OR operation on the first intermediate key and the first random number to obtain the encryption key. For example, the following formula can be used: Wherein, Kc is the encryption key, and the meanings of other contents in the formula are the same as those in the above embodiment and are not described in detail.

[0274] The calculation of the ciphertext information and the verification parameter based on the encryption key and the second authentication information can be: using the ninth calculation method to calculate the ciphertext information and the verification parameter based on the encryption key and the second authentication information; or using the ninth calculation method to calculate the ciphertext information and the verification parameter based on the encryption key, the second authentication information, and the first random number. The description of the ninth calculation method is the same as that of the aforementioned embodiment and is not repeated here. Taking the ninth calculation method as Ascon as an example, the above calculation of the ciphertext information and the verification parameter can be expressed by the following formula: {C, P} = ACEKc{RES1}, or, {C, P} = ACEKc{RES1, Nt}, where C represents the ciphertext information, P represents the verification parameter, ACE{} represents the Ascon encryption algorithm or encryption function, Kc represents the use of the encryption key, RES1 is the aforementioned second authentication information, and Nt is the first random number.

[0275] The method for calculating the encryption key by the first device is the same as the method for calculating the encryption key by the second device described above and is not further described. Decrypting the ciphertext information and the verification parameters based on the encryption key may include: the first device decrypting the ciphertext information and the verification parameters using the encryption key using a ninth calculation method, determining that authentication of the second device has failed if decryption fails, and determining that authentication of the second device has succeeded if decryption succeeds, and obtaining decrypted second authentication information; or the first device decrypting the ciphertext information and the verification parameters using the encryption key and a first random number using a ninth calculation method, determining that authentication of the second device has failed if decryption fails, and determining that authentication of the second device has succeeded if decryption succeeds, and obtaining decrypted second authentication information. This ninth calculation method is the same as the aforementioned embodiment and is not further described. Still using the ninth calculation method as Ascon as an example, the above decryption calculation method can be expressed as: ACDKc{C, P}, or ACDKc{C, P, Nt}, where ACD{} can represent the Ascon decryption algorithm or decryption function. The remaining contents are the same as the aforementioned embodiment and are not repeated. If the above decryption calculation is successful, the second authentication information can be obtained, for example, the above formula is expressed as: RES1 = ACDKc{C, P}, or RES1 = ACDKc{C, P, Nt}.

[0276] In some embodiments, the processing on the first device side may further include: the first device sending a fourth message to the core network side device, where the fourth message carries the second authentication information.

[0277] The processing by the core network device may further include: the core network device receiving a fourth message from the first device, the fourth message carrying second authentication information, the second authentication information being used by the core network device to authenticate the second device. The method may also include: the core network device authenticating the second device based on the second authentication information and the second expected information. The processing for authenticating the second device on the core network side is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not further described.

[0278] In this embodiment, the core network-side processing may further include: the core network-side device calculating the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter. The first generation parameter is the same as described in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here. Specifically, the core network-side device calculates the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter using an eighth calculation method. Here, the description of the eighth calculation method is the same as that in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here.

[0279] It should be understood that the way in which the core network side device calculates the second expected information should be the same as the way in which the second device calculates the second authentication information. For example, the first generation parameter may include response information, and the second authentication information can be calculated using the following formula: RES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Rt). Correspondingly, the second expected information is calculated as XRES1 = H(SK1, PIDt, Rt). The meaning of each content in the formula is the same as in the aforementioned embodiment and will not be repeated here. Various methods for the second device to generate the second authentication information can be used for the core network side device to generate the second expected information. As long as the two use the same method, they are within the protection scope of this embodiment and will not be listed one by one here.

[0280] In some possible embodiments, the first message also carries at least a first message authentication code, and the second message carries the first message authentication code; the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device.

[0281] The processing of the core network side device may also include: the core network side device uses a second calculation method to calculate a first message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter, and a third generation parameter, and the third generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information. Correspondingly, the processing on the second device side also includes: the second device uses a second calculation method to calculate a second message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter, and a third generation parameter, and the third generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information.

[0282] The above-mentioned processing of calculating the first message authentication code by the core network side device and calculating the second message authentication code by the second device side, as well as the processing of verifying the first message authentication code by the second device, are the same as those in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0283] In some possible embodiments, an encryption key may also be negotiated between the first device and the second device.

[0284] In one possible example, the encryption key (i.e., Kc) can be calculated by the second device in the process of calculating the first authentication information. Correspondingly, the first device also calculates the encryption key in the process of decrypting the first authentication information. The specific method will not be repeated here. In another possible example, in the aforementioned process of calculating the first authentication information, the second device does not calculate the encryption key. In this case, the second device calculates the encryption key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key. Similarly, the first device calculates the encryption key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key. The specific method of calculating the encryption key is the same as that in the aforementioned embodiment and will not be repeated. It should be noted that in this example, the timing for the first device to generate the encryption key may be after the decryption is successful; the timing for the second device to generate the encryption key may be after the first authentication information is generated. This embodiment does not enumerate all possible generation and use times of the encryption key.

[0285] In this embodiment, the first device may also send the first intermediate key to the key management device. The specific processing is the same as in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated here. In this embodiment, the second device sending the sixth message to the first device, the first device sending the seventh message to the core network device to request authentication, the second device receiving a trigger message before sending the sixth message, and the second device updating its pseudonym are all the same as in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0286] In conjunction with Figure 12, the first device is a proxy UE (UE and ProxyUE have the same meaning hereinafter and are not repeated), the second device is a tag, and the core network side device includes AUSF and UDM as an example. The authentication method provided in the aforementioned embodiment is exemplarily described:

[0287] The specific description of steps 1200 to 1206 is the same as that of steps 800 to 806 in the above example of FIG8 , and will not be repeated. It should be noted that in this example, the UE can also be replaced by a base station.

[0288] Step 1207: Tag calculates MAC' (ie, the second message authentication code). If MAC and MAC' are the same, the core network side device is authenticated successfully. Then, the ciphertext information and verification parameters are calculated and used as the first authentication information.

[0289] Specifically, step 1207a: Tag uses the locally stored Ct to input the PUF, obtains the corresponding Rt = PUF (Ct), and uses the obtained Nn to calculate the second intermediate key SK1 = KDF (Ct || Rt, PIDt, Nn) and derive the first intermediate key SK2 = KDF (SK1, PIDt, Nn); step 1207b: Tag calculates f (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct) and verifies whether the value is consistent with the received MAC. If not, the Tag authentication network fails. If consistent, the Tag authentication network (core network side device) succeeds; step 1207c: Tag generates a first random number Nt and calculates RES = f (SK1, PIDt, Nn, Rt) for the network (core network side device) to use to verify the Tag; step 1207d: Tag uses the Ascon authentication encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext, that is, {C, P} = ACE SK2 {Nt, RES}, where C is the ciphertext and P is the verification parameter; Step 1207e: Tag updates the pseudonym For the next round of authentication. Note: In step 1207d, Tag can also derive the encryption key based on SK2 Tag uses Kc to generate Ascon ciphertext, that is, {C, P} = ACEKc{Nt, RES}.

[0290] Step 1208: The Tag sends an authentication response message to the UE, where the message includes [Nt, C, P]. The authentication response message may be the third message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0291] Step 1209: The UE uses the stored first intermediate key SK2 to decrypt the ciphertext C to verify the identity of the tag, i.e., RES = ACD SK2 {Nt, C, P}, if decrypted successfully, UE authenticates Tag successfully. Corresponding to step 1207d note, Tag uses Nt and SK2 to calculate the encryption key And decrypt the ciphertext C to verify the identity of the tag, that is, RES = ACDKc{Nt, C, P}. If the decryption is successful, the UE authenticates the Tag successfully.

[0292] Steps 1210 to 1212 are the same as steps 810 to 812 in the aforementioned example of FIG8 , and are not described again.

[0293] Step 1213: The UE sends the key SK2 to the KMF for use in mobility management.

[0294] The key architecture of this embodiment is illustrated in conjunction with Figure 13. CRP is a challenge-response pair pre-shared between UDM / AUSF and Tag; SK1 is a key generated based on CRP, SK1 = KDF(Ct||Rt,PIDt,Nn), and this key will not leave UDM / AUSF on the network side; SK2 is a session key between UE and Tag derived based on SK1, SK2 = KDF(SK1,PIDt,Nn), and this key is used in the Ascon algorithm to provide encryption and security for UE and Tag.

[0295] In some possible embodiments, the core network side device performs bidirectional authentication with the first device, and the first device performs bidirectional authentication with the second device. In this embodiment, the aforementioned pre-shared information can be shared by the core network side device, the first device, and the second device.

[0296] The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters, including: the first device calculates the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters; the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key.

[0297] Among them, the specific manner in which the first device calculates the second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters, and the various possible processing methods for the second device to calculate the second intermediate key are the same as those in the aforementioned embodiment, and therefore will not be repeated.

[0298] The second message carries a third random number; and the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key, including: the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and the third random number. Here, the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and the third random number by performing an exclusive-OR operation on the second intermediate key and the third random number to obtain the first intermediate key. For example, the following formula can be used to represent this: Among them, SK2 is the first intermediate key, SK1 is the second intermediate key, is an XOR calculation, and Nu is the third random number.

[0299] On the second device, the second message carries the third random number; and the second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key, including: the second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and the third random number. The method for calculating the first intermediate key by the second device is the same as that for the first device, and is not further described.

[0300] The first device calculates the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter, which may include: the first device uses a fourth calculation method to calculate the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter.

[0301] Optionally, the method for calculating the first expected information may be the same as that in the aforementioned embodiment and will not be described repeatedly.

[0302] Optionally, since the second message in this embodiment carries a third random number, a third random number can also be added to calculate the first expected information. For example, the first device uses the fourth calculation method to calculate the first expected information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device, the first generation parameter, and the third random number. For example, the first generation parameter may include the identification and response information of the first device. The first expected information can then be calculated using the following formula: XRES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Nt, Rt, IDu), where XRES2 is the first expected information, i.e., the first XRES; f() represents the fourth calculation method; SK2 is the first intermediate key in this embodiment; PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device; Nu is the third random number; Nt is the first random number; Rt is the response information; and IDu is the identification of the first device (e.g., the first device is a terminal device). The above f() can be any algorithm or function in the aforementioned fourth calculation method, and they are not exhaustively listed here. For another example, the first generation parameter may include the identification, response information and challenge information of the first device, and the first expected information XRES2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Nt, Ct, Rt, IDu) can be calculated using the following formula, where Ct is the challenge information and the meaning of the remaining content is the same as the above embodiment; in addition, Ct and Rt in the above formula can also add direct connection calculation or XOR calculation, and this embodiment does not enumerate all possible methods.

[0303] The process of the second device calculating the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter may include: the second device calculating the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the relevant information of the second device, and the first generation parameter using a fourth calculation method. The first generation parameter used by the second device to calculate the first authentication information should be the same as the first generation parameter used by the first device to calculate the first expected information; and the fourth calculation method used by the second device should also be the same as the fourth calculation method used by the first device. Therefore, the process of the second device generating the first authentication information is not repeated here.

[0304] In some embodiments, the second message carries a third message authentication code, and the third message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the first device.

[0305] In the processing of the first device, the method also includes: the first device calculates the third message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the identification of the first device and the fourth generation parameter, and the fourth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the challenge information, the response information, and relevant information of the second device.

[0306] During processing by the second device, the method further includes: the second device calculating a fourth message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the identifier of the first device, and a fourth generation parameter, the fourth generation parameter including at least one of the following: the challenge information, the response information, and relevant information of the second device; and the second device authenticating the first device based on the third message authentication code and the fourth message authentication code. Authentication of the first device by the second device based on the third message authentication code and the fourth message authentication code may include at least one of the following: the second device determining that authentication of the first device is successful if the third message authentication code and the fourth message authentication code are identical; and the second device determining that authentication of the first device is unsuccessful if the third message authentication code and the fourth message authentication code are different.

[0307] The first device calculating the third message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the first device's identifier, and the fourth generation parameter may be: the first device calculating the third message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the first device's identifier, and the fourth generation parameter using a second calculation method. The description of the second calculation method is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here.

[0308] Optionally, the fourth generation parameter may include the challenge information Ct and the pseudonym PIDt of the second device, and the third message authentication code may be calculated using the following formula: MAC2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Ct, IDu), where MAC2 is the third message authentication code, SK2 is the first intermediate key, and the meaning of the remaining contents is the same as in the above embodiment and is not repeated here. Optionally, the fourth generation parameter may include the challenge information Ct and the response information Rt, and the third message authentication code may be calculated using the following formula: MAC2 = f(SK2, Rt, Nu, Ct, IDu), where MAC2 is the third message authentication code, SK2 is the first intermediate key, and the meaning of the remaining contents is the same as in the above embodiment and is not repeated here. In the above formula, Ct and Rt can also be XORed or directly calculated, and all possible methods are not exhaustively listed here. The above is only an exemplary explanation. In actual processing, as long as the parameters for calculating the third message authentication code include at least one of the above-mentioned fourth generation parameters, it is within the scope of protection of this embodiment and is not exhaustively listed.

[0309] The specific processing method for the second device to calculate the fourth message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the identifier of the first device, and the fourth generation parameter should be the same as that for the first device to calculate the third message authentication code. For example, the third message authentication code can be calculated using the following formula: MAC2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Ct, IDu). Correspondingly, the fourth message authentication code can be calculated using the formula: MAC2' = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Ct, IDu), where MAC2' represents the fourth message authentication code, and the remaining meanings are the same as those in the aforementioned embodiment. It should be understood that all possible examples for calculating the fourth message authentication code are also the same as those for calculating the third message authentication code, and therefore are not further described.

[0310] In some possible embodiments, the first message carries a fifth message authentication code, and the fifth message authentication code is used by the first device to authenticate the core network side device; the method further includes: the first device calculates a sixth message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device, the authentication parameters, the challenge information, and the identifier of the first device; the first device authenticates the core network side device based on the fifth message authentication code and the sixth message authentication code. The authentication of the core network side device by the first device based on the fifth message authentication code and the sixth message authentication code may include at least one of the following: the first device determines that the authentication of the core network side device is successful when the fifth message authentication code and the sixth message authentication code are the same; the first device determines that the authentication of the core network side device fails when the fifth message authentication code and the sixth message authentication code are different.

[0311] Correspondingly, the processing of the core network side device may include: calculating a fifth message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device, the authentication parameter, the challenge information, and the identifier of the first device.

[0312] For example, the authentication parameters include a second random number, and the relevant information of the second device is the pseudonym of the second device. The first device calculates the sixth message authentication code using the following formula: MAC1'=f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Ct,IDu), where MAC1' is the sixth message authentication code, SK1 is the second intermediate key, PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device, Nn is the second random number, Ct is the challenge information, IDu is the identifier of the first device, and f() can be any algorithm and / or function included in the aforementioned second calculation method. The description of the second calculation method will not be repeated here. The method for calculating the fifth message authentication code by the core network side device should be the same as the method for calculating the sixth message authentication code by the first device mentioned above, for example, using the same formula: MAC1=f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Ct,IDu), where MAC1 is the fifth message authentication code, and the meanings of the remaining formulas are the same as those in the aforementioned embodiment and will not be repeated. For another example, the parameters used in calculating the sixth or fifth message authentication code may include response information in addition to the parameters exemplified above. For example, MAC1 or MAC1' may be calculated using f(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct, Rt, IDu). It should be understood that the above is merely exemplary, and in actual processing, the parameters used in the sixth or fifth message authentication code may be omitted. For example, the identifier of the first device and / or the relevant information of the second device may not be used. For example, MAC1 or MAC1' may be calculated using f(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct), or f(SK1, Nn, Ct), or f(SK1, Nn, Ct, IDu). Alternatively, in actual processing, the parameters used in the sixth or fifth message authentication code may be replaced. For example, Ct may be replaced with Rt, SK1 may be replaced with SK2, and so on. This embodiment does not exhaustively list all possible calculation methods for calculating the sixth or fifth message authentication code.

[0313] In some possible embodiments, the method also includes: the first device calculates third authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, the third random number, and the fifth generation parameter, the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device, and the fifth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the identification of the first device, the relevant information of the second device, the response information, the challenge information, and the authentication parameter; the first device sends a fourth message to the core network side device, and the fourth message carries the third authentication information and the third random number.

[0314] Correspondingly, the core network device receives a fourth message from the first device, the fourth message carrying third authentication information and a third random number. The third authentication information is used by the core network device to authenticate the first device. Furthermore, the core network device authenticates the first device based on the third authentication information and the third expected information. The specific authentication method is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not further described.

[0315] Among them, the way in which the core network side device calculates the third expected information may include: the core network side device calculates the third expected information based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, the third random number, and the fifth generation parameter, and the fifth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the identification of the first device, the relevant information of the second device, the response information, the challenge information, and the authentication parameter.

[0316] Optionally, the fifth generation parameter may include: relevant information of the second device, the identifier of the first device, the response information, and the authentication parameter. The process of calculating the third authentication information may be: the first device uses a first calculation method to calculate the third authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device, the identifier of the first device, the response information, the authentication parameter, and the third random number. The first calculation method is the same as the above embodiment and is not described in detail. For example, the authentication parameter includes the second random number, and the third authentication information can be calculated using the following formula: RES1 = f(SK2||SK1,PIDt,Nu,Nn,Rt,IDu), where RES1 is the third authentication information, f is any algorithm or function in the first calculation method, SK2 is the first intermediate key, SK1 is the second intermediate key, || is the direct connection calculation in the first calculation method, PIDt is the pseudonym of the second device, Nu is the third random number, Nn is the second random number, Rt is the response information, and IDu is the identifier of the first device. Optionally, the fifth generation parameter may include the identifier of the first device. The process of calculating the third authentication information may be as follows: the first device calculates the third authentication information using the first calculation method based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, the identifier of the first device, and the third random number. For example, if the authentication parameters include the second random number, the third authentication information may be calculated using the following formula: RES1 = f(SK2||SK1, Nu, IDu). The meaning of each element in the formula is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not further described. In this example, since the response information, challenge information, pseudonym of the second device, and authentication parameters may be used in the calculation of SK1 and SK2, the above parameters may no longer be used in the calculation of the third authentication information, thereby reducing the amount of computation. It should be understood that the above is merely an example. In actual processing, as long as at least one of the fifth generation parameters is used to calculate the third authentication information for network authentication of the first device, it is within the scope of protection of this embodiment. This embodiment does not provide an exhaustive list of all parameters.

[0317] In the core network side device, the method of calculating the third expected information should be the same as the method of calculating the third authentication information by the first device. In order to represent the information generated by different devices, the third expected information calculated by the core network side device is represented as XRES1 and will not be repeated.

[0318] In this embodiment, after the first device receives the first message, if the core network side device is successfully authenticated based on the fifth message authentication code in the first message, the first device calculates the third authentication information and sends the fourth message to the core network side device; then the first device can receive a response from the core network side device to the successful authentication of the first device, and then send the aforementioned second message to the second device, and perform two-way authentication with the second device, such as the first device sends the third message authentication code to the second device, and receives the second authentication information through the third message. Alternatively, after the first device sends the fourth message, it can start sending the aforementioned second message to the second device without waiting for the core network side device to send a response to the successful authentication of the first device, and perform two-way authentication with the second device. Alternatively, after the first device receives the first message, if the core network side device is successfully authenticated based on the fifth message authentication code in the first message, it sends the second message to the second device, and performs two-way authentication with the second device. After the second device successfully authenticates the first device, it calculates the third authentication information and sends the fourth message to the core network side device. It should be understood that this is only an exemplary description of the timing of each device receiving and sending each message. In actual processing, it is not limited to the above possibilities. As long as messages with the above functions are transmitted between each device, they are within the scope of protection of this embodiment.

[0319] In this embodiment, key negotiation is also performed between the first device and the second device. The specific manner in which the first device and the second device calculate the integrity protection key and the encryption key is the same as in the previous embodiment, and thus will not be described again.

[0320] In this embodiment, the first device may also send the first intermediate key to the key management device. The specific processing is the same as in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, the second device sending the sixth message to the first device, the first device sending the seventh message to the core network device to request authentication, the second device receiving a trigger message before sending the sixth message, and the second device updating its pseudonym are all the same as in the previous embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0321] In conjunction with Figure 14, the first device is a proxy UE (hereinafter, UE, proxy UE, and ProxyUE have the same meaning and are not repeated), the second device is a tag, and the core network side device includes AUSF and UDM. As an example, the authentication method provided in the aforementioned embodiment is exemplarily described:

[0322] Step 1400: In a secure channel, the Tag, UE, and UDM are pre-configured [IDt, PIDt, Ct, Rt]. It should be noted that in this example, the UE can also be replaced by a base station.

[0323] Steps 1401 to 1403 are the same as steps 801 to 803 in FIG. 8 in the aforementioned example, and are not described again.

[0324] Step 1404a: The UDM verifies the identities of the Tag and UE. Specifically, it may query the UE and Tag subscription data based on the UE ID and Tag PID to check whether the UE is authorized as an A-IoT communication agent and whether the Tag has the right to use A-IoT communication services. Step 1404b: If authorization is successful, the UDM generates a second random number Nn and uses the retrieved corresponding Ct and Rt to calculate the second intermediate key SK1 = KDF(Ct||Rt,PIDt,Nn). Step 1404c: The UDM calculates MAC1 = f(SK1,PIDt,Nn,Ct,IDu). MAC1 in this embodiment is the aforementioned fifth message authentication code, which is used by the UE to authenticate the core network side device.

[0325] Step 1405: UDM / AUSF sends an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [MAC1, Nn]. In this step, AUSF can send [MAC1, Nn] sent by UDM to the UE. The above authentication response message is the first message of the above embodiment.

[0326] Step 1406a: The proxy UE generates a third random number Nu, calculates SK1=KDF(Ct||Rt,PIDt,Nn) based on the shared CRP, and derives the first intermediate key based on SK1 For subsequent UE and Tag authentication; Step 1406b: The UE calculates f(SK1, PIDt, Nn, Ct, IDu) and verifies whether the value (i.e., the sixth message authentication code) is consistent with the received MAC1. If they are inconsistent, the UE authentication network (core network side device) fails; if they are consistent, the UE authentication network (core network side device) succeeds; Step 1406c: The UE calculates MAC2 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Ct, IDu) for Tag and UE authentication; wherein MAC2 is the third message authentication code in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0327] Step 1407: The UE sends an authentication response message to the Tag, which includes [MAC2, Nu]. The authentication response message in this step is the second message in the aforementioned embodiment. The message may also include Nn (i.e., the second random number in the authentication parameter).

[0328] Step 1408a: Tag uses the locally stored Ct to input into PUF, obtains the corresponding Rt = PUF (Ct), uses the obtained Nn, calculates the second intermediate key SK1 = KDF (Ct || Rt, PIDt, Nn) and derives the first intermediate key Step 1408b: Tag calculates f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Ct, IDu) and verifies whether the value (i.e., the fourth message authentication code) is consistent with the received MAC2. If not, Tag authentication of UE fails. If consistent, Tag authentication of UE succeeds. Step 1408c: Tag calculates response RES1 = f(SK2, PIDt, Nu, Nt, Rt, IDu). RES1 is the first authentication information used by UE to authenticate Tag. Step 1408d: Tag generates a first random number Nt to generate an integrity protection key. Step 1408e: Tag updates pseudonym For use in the next round of certification.

[0329] Note: Since the Tag, UE, and network share the CRP, and the UE has already authenticated the network (MAC1), Tag authentication of the UE (MAC2) is optional, that is, step 1408b is optional.

[0330] Step 1409: Tag returns an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [Nt, RES1]. The authentication response message may be the third message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0331] Step 1410: UE calculates f(SK2,PIDt,Nn,Nt,IDu) and verifies whether the value is consistent with RES1. If not, UE authentication Tag fails. If consistent, UE authentication Tag succeeds. UE calculates the security key. The UE calculates RES2 = f(SK2||SK1, PIDt, Nu, Nn, Rt, IDu) based on SK1 and SK2 for the network to use to verify the UE. The RES2 is the aforementioned third authentication information.

[0332] Step 1411: The UE sends an authentication response message to the network-side UDM / AUSF, where the message includes RES1; the authentication response message may be the fourth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0333] Step 1412: UDM / AUSF calculates key And f(SK2||SK1,PIDt,Nu,Nn,Rt,IDu), verify whether RES1 is consistent with XRES1 (i.e. the third expected information). If they are inconsistent, the network authentication UE fails. If they are consistent, the network authentication UE succeeds; UDM updates the Tag pseudonym For the next certification;

[0334] Step 1413: The UDM / AUSF returns a success response to the UE, which includes the updated pseudonym PIDt*. The success response may be the eighth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0335] Step 1414: UE generates a third random number Nu and calculates the encryption key And send the third random number to the Tag; the message carrying the third random number here may be the fifth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0336] Step 1415: Tag uses the received third random number Nu to calculate the encryption key between Tag and UE And store Ki and Kc.

[0337] Step 1416: The UE sends the SK2 key to the key management center KMF.

[0338] The key architecture of this embodiment is described in conjunction with Figure 15: CRP is a challenge-response pair pre-shared by the network AUSF, UE and Tag; SK1 is a key generated based on CRP, SK1 = KDF (Ct || Rt, PIDt, Nn), which exists on the network side, UE and Tag; SK2 is a session key derived based on SK1, This key exists on the network side, UE and Tag; Kc is the encryption key to protect the message transmitted between Tag and UE Ki is the key for protecting the integrity of messages transmitted between the tag and the UE They are all derived from SK2.

[0339] In some possible embodiments, the first device can manage multiple electronic devices, that is, the core network side device and the first device can complete two-way authentication with multiple electronic devices. In this embodiment, the second device can be any one of a plurality of electronic devices, and any one of the plurality of electronic devices can be any one of an AIoT device and a zero-power device. The description of the zero-power device is the same as that in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here. In this embodiment, multiple electronic devices form a device group.

[0340] In this embodiment, the aforementioned pre-shared information may be shared by the core network side device, the first device, and the second device. The content that may be included in this pre-shared information is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here. Furthermore, since this embodiment corresponds to multiple electronic devices, the pre-shared information of each electronic device is shared by all electronic devices, the core network side device, and the first device.

[0341] Optionally, the second message carries a group key, where the group key is a key corresponding to the device group to which the second device belongs. The method further includes: the first device sending a key request message to a key management device, where the key request message carries an identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs; and the first device receiving a key response message from the key management device, where the key response message responds to the key request message and carries the group key. The description of the key management device is the same as in the previous embodiment and is not repeated here.

[0342] Optionally, the second message carries group key generation parameters.

[0343] In the processing of the first device, the method also includes: the first device calculates a first intermediate key based on the pre-shared information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; the first device generates a third random number; the first device calculates a group key based on the third random number, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, and the identifier of the first device; the first device calculates the group key generation parameter based on the first intermediate key and the third random number.

[0344] In the processing of the second device, the method also includes: the second device calculates a first intermediate key based on the pre-shared information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameters; the second device calculates a third random number based on the group key generation parameter and the first intermediate key, and calculates the group key based on the third random number, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, and the identifier of the first device.

[0345] In this example, the first intermediate key can be the first intermediate key corresponding to the second device. That is, the second device can be any one of multiple electronic devices, and the first device can calculate the first intermediate key corresponding to each electronic device. For ease of explanation, the following description will continue using the second device as an example.

[0346] The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the pre-shared information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters. Specifically, the first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the pre-shared information, the relevant information of the second device, and the authentication parameters using a third calculation method. For example, the second device is the i-th device among multiple electronic devices, the authentication parameters include a second random number, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information and response information. Then, the following formula can be used to calculate the first intermediate key corresponding to the second device: SKi=KDF(Ci||Ri,PIDi,Nn), where Ski is the first intermediate key corresponding to the second device, KDF is one of the third calculation methods, Ci is the challenge information of the second device, Ri is the response information of the second device, PIDi is the pseudonym of the second device, and Nn is the second random number.

[0347] The first device calculates the group key based on the third random number, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, and the identifier of the first device. This can be done by: the first device calculates the group key using the third calculation method based on the third random number, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, and the identifier of the first device. For example, the following formula can be used: GK = KDF(Nu, GID, IDu), where GK is the group key, KDF is one of the third calculation methods, Nu is the third random number, GID is the identifier of the device group, and IDu is the identifier of the first device.

[0348] The first device calculating the group key generation parameter based on the first intermediate key and the third random number may include: the first device performing an exclusive OR calculation based on the first intermediate key and the third random number to obtain the group key generation parameter. For example, it can be expressed as: Among them, XORi is the group key generation parameter corresponding to the second device, Ski is the first intermediate key corresponding to the second device, and Nu is the third random number.

[0349] The specific manner in which the second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the pre-shared information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter should be the same as the manner in which the first device calculates the first intermediate key, and is not described in detail.

[0350] The second device calculates the third random number based on the group key generation parameter and the first intermediate key. This can be done by performing an XOR operation on the group key generation parameter and the first intermediate key to obtain the third random number. For example, this can be expressed as: The meanings of the various parameters in the formula are the same as those in the above embodiment and are not described in detail.

[0351] The method for calculating the group key by the second device based on the third random number, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, and the identifier of the first device is the same as the method for calculating the group key by the first device, and will not be repeated.

[0352] The process of the first device calculating the first expected information may include: the first device calculating the first expected information based on the pre-shared information, the group key, the authentication parameter, the relevant information of the second device, and the identifier of the first device. It should be noted that since the first device can act as a proxy for multiple electronic devices, calculating the first expected information in this embodiment may specifically refer to calculating the first expected information corresponding to the second device. The first device may determine that authentication of the second device is successful when the first expected information corresponding to the second device and the first authentication information corresponding to the second device are the same.

[0353] The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, including: the second device calculates the first authentication information based on the pre-shared information, the group key, the authentication parameters, relevant information of the second device and the identifier of the first device.

[0354] Optionally, the pre-shared information corresponding to the second device may include response information and challenge information, and the first device may use a fourth calculation method to calculate the first expected information based on the authentication parameters, the response information, the group key, the relevant information of the second device and the identifier of the first device. The fourth calculation method is the same as the description of the aforementioned embodiment. For example, the authentication parameters may include a second random number, and the above calculation of the first expected information can be expressed as: XRES1i=f(GK,PIDi,Nn,Ri,IDu), where f is any one of the fourth calculation methods, GK is the group key, PIDi is the pseudonym of the second device, Nn is the second random number, Ri is the response information of the second device, and IDu is the identifier of the first device.

[0355] Alternatively, the first device may calculate the first expected information based on the authentication parameters, the response information, the challenge information, the group key, the relevant information of the second device, and the identifier of the first device using a fourth calculation method. For example, it can be expressed as: XRES1i=f(GK,PIDi,Nn,Ci,Ri,IDu), where Ci is the challenge information of the second device. The rest of the content is the same as the previous embodiment and is not repeated here.

[0356] Optionally, the pre-shared information corresponding to the second device may include challenge information. The first device may search for the response information of the second device configured for itself based on the challenge information of the second device, and then calculate the first expected information using a fourth calculation method based on the authentication parameters, the response information, the group key, the relevant information of the second device, and the identifier of the first device. The above calculation of the first expected information can be expressed as: XRES1i = f(GK, PIDi, Nn, Ri, IDu). The various contents in the formula are the same as those in the previous embodiment and are not repeated here.

[0357] Alternatively, the first device can search for the response information of the second device configured for itself based on the challenge information of the second device, and the first device can use a fourth calculation method to calculate the first expected information based on the authentication parameters, the response information, the challenge information, the group key, the relevant information of the second device and the identification of the first device.

[0358] The specific processing method for the second device to calculate the first authentication information should be the same as that for the first device to calculate the first expected information. The difference is that the second device represents the first authentication information as RES1i, which will not be repeated here.

[0359] In some possible embodiments, the second message carries a first message authentication code.

[0360] In the processing of the second device, the method also includes: the second device calculates a second message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information; and the second device determines that the authentication of the core network side device is successful when the second message authentication code is the same as the first message authentication code.

[0361] The processing by the core network side device may include: the core network side device calculating a first message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information.

[0362] Specifically, the second device calculates the second message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information. This can be done by using the second calculation method to calculate the second message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information. Furthermore, the above-mentioned process of calculating the second message authentication code can also add relevant information of the second device, such as the pseudonym of the second device. The process of calculating the second message authentication code can be expressed as: MACi'=f(SKi,PIDi,Nn,Ci), where MACi' is the second message authentication code, f is any one of the second calculation methods, Ski is the first intermediate key, PIDi is the pseudonym of the second device, Nn is the second random number (i.e., authentication parameter), and Ci is the challenge information of the second device. The process of calculating the first message authentication code (e.g., MACi, i.e., the first message authentication code of the second device) by the core network side device should be the same as the process of calculating the second message authentication code by the second device, so it will not be repeated.

[0363] In some possible embodiments, the core network side device further authenticates the first device.

[0364] In the processing of the first device, the method also includes: the first device calculates the third authentication information based on the group key, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, the authentication parameter, the third random number and the identifier of the first device, and the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device; the first device sends a fourth message to the core network side device, and the fourth message carries the third authentication information and the third random number.

[0365] Accordingly, during processing on the core network side device, the core network side device receives a fourth message from the first device, where the fourth message carries at least one of the following: third authentication information and a third random number, and the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device. Furthermore, if the third authentication information is identical to the third expected information, the core network side device determines that authentication of the first device is successful.

[0366] The process of the core network side device calculating the third expected information may include: the core network side device calculating the third expected information based on the group key, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, the authentication parameter, the third random number, and the identifier of the first device. Here, the core network side device may obtain the group key. For example, if the first device obtains the group key from the key management device, the key management device may simultaneously store the group key and the identifier of the device group in the core network side device; if the first device generates the group key, the group key may be carried in the fourth message.

[0367] The first device calculates the third authentication information based on the group key, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, the authentication parameters, the third random number, and the identifier of the first device. This can be done by: the first device calculates the third authentication information using the first calculation method based on the group key, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, the authentication parameters, the third random number, and the identifier of the first device. For example, it can be expressed as: RES2 = f(GK, GID, Nu, Nn, IDu), where RES2 is the third authentication information, f is any one of the first calculation methods, GK is the group key, GID is the identifier of the device group, Nu is the third random number, Nn is the second random number included in the authentication parameters, and IDu is the identifier of the first device. It should be understood that this is merely an example. In some possible examples, RES2 may also include relevant information about each electronic device. For example, the calculation of RES2 may also include the result of a direct calculation or an exclusive OR calculation of the challenge information of each electronic device, and / or the calculation of RES2 may also include the result of a direct calculation or an exclusive OR calculation of the response information of each electronic device, etc. This does not exhaust all possible parameters.

[0368] The way the core network side device calculates the third expected information should be the same as the way the first device calculates the third authentication information, for example, XRES2 = f(GK, GID, Nu, Nn, IDu), where XRES2 is the third expected information. The meaning of other contents in the formula is the same as the previous example and will not be repeated.

[0369] In this embodiment, the second device sends the sixth message to the first device, the first device sends the seventh message to the core network side device to request authentication, the second device receives a trigger message before sending the sixth message, and the second device updates the pseudonym, which are the same as the previous embodiment and will not be repeated.

[0370] In conjunction with Figure 16, the first device is a proxy UE (hereinafter UE, proxy UE, and ProxyUE have the same meaning and are not repeated), the second device is tagi (that is, tag is the i-th electronic device among 1 to n electronic devices as an example, n is an integer greater than or equal to 2, i=1, ..., n, that is, i is an integer greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n), and the core network side device includes AUSF and UDM as an example. The authentication method provided in the aforementioned embodiment is exemplarily described:

[0371] Step 1600: In a secure channel, Tagi, UE, and UDM preconfigure [IDi, PIDi, Ci, Ri]. In this example, the UE may also be a base station.

[0372] Step 1601 is the same as step 801 shown in FIG8 , and description thereof will not be repeated.

[0373] Step 1602: Taggi sends an authentication request message to the UE, which includes the pseudonym PIDi of the tag and the group GID; here, the authentication request message is the sixth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0374] Step 1603: The UE acts as a proxy to send an authentication request message to the network. The message includes PIDi, GID and UE ID (IDu). The authentication request message in this step may be the seventh message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0375] Step 1604a: UDM queries the subscription data of UE and Tagi based on UE ID and Tagi PIDi, checks whether UE is authorized as the communication agent of A-IoT, and whether Tagi has the right to use A-IoT communication services; Step 1604b: If the authorization is successful, UDM generates a random number Nn, and uses the retrieved corresponding Ci and Ri to calculate the key SKi = KDF(Ci||Ri,PIDi,Nn); Step 1604c: UDM calculates MACi = f(SKi,PIDi,Nn,Ci), where MACi is the first message authentication code corresponding to tagi.

[0376] Step 1605: UDM / AUSF sends an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [MACi, Nn]. The authentication response message in this step is the second message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0377] Step 1606a: The UE sends a group key request message to the KMF, where the message includes at least the GID; Step 1606b: The KMF returns the group key GK to the UE.

[0378] Step 1607: The UE stores the group key and sends an authentication response message to Tagi, which includes [MACi, Nn, GK].

[0379] Step 1608a: Tagi uses the locally stored Ci to input the PUF, obtains the corresponding Ri=PUF(Ci), and calculates the first intermediate key SKi=KDF(Ci||Ri,PIDi,Nn); Step 1608b: Tagi calculates f(SKi,PIDi,Nn,Ci), verifies whether the value (i.e., the second message authentication code) is consistent with the received MACi, if not, Tagi fails to authenticate the network, if consistent, Tagi succeeds in authenticating the network; Step 1608c: Tagi calculates the response RES1i=f(GK,PIDi,Nn,Ri,IDu) for UE to authenticate Tagi, and the RES1i is the first authentication information of Tagi; Step 1608d: Tagi updates the pseudonym For use in the next round of certification;

[0380] Step 1609: Tagi returns an authentication response message to the UE, which includes [RES1i]. The authentication response message may be the third message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0381] Step 1610: The UE calculates f(GK, PIDi, Nn, Ri, IDu) and verifies whether the value (i.e., the first expected information) is consistent with RES1i. If they are inconsistent, the UE authentication Tagi fails; if they are consistent, the UE authentication Tagi succeeds; the UE generates a random number Nu and calculates RES2 = f(GK, GID, Nu, Nn, IDu) based on GK for network verification; wherein, RES2 is the aforementioned third authentication information.

[0382] Step 1611: The UE sends an authentication response message to the network-side UDM / AUSF, which includes RES2 and Nu; the authentication response message may be the fourth message in the aforementioned embodiment.

[0383] Step 1612: UDM / AUSF obtains the group key GK, calculates f(GK, GID, Nu, Nn, IDu), and verifies whether the value (i.e., the third expected information) is consistent with the received RES2. If not, the network authentication UE fails. If consistent, the network authentication UE succeeds; UDM updates the Tag pseudonym For next authentication.

[0384] Step 1613: UDM / AUSF returns a success response to the UE, which includes the updated pseudonym PIDt*.

[0385] Step 1614: The UE returns a success response to the Tagi. The UE can forward the received data to all Tagi, and each Tagi can decrypt the corresponding downlink data according to the corresponding group key.

[0386] Optionally, in the process of step 1606a to step 1606b, in addition to generating the group key GK at the KMF as described above, step 1606a to step 1606b can also be replaced by: generating the group key at the UE end, and after the authentication is completed, the UE sends the GK to the KMF. The specific process is as follows: step 1606: the UE generates a random number Nu, calculates SKi = KDF (Ci || Ri, PIDi, Nn) based on the shared CRP, and generates the group key GK = KDF (Nu, GID, IDu) for group tag authentication; the UE calculates To hide the random number Nu. In step 1607, UE sends [MACi, Nn, XORi]; in step 1608a, Tagi also needs to calculate the random number And the group key GK=KDF(Nu, GID, IDu); step 1615 needs to be added: UE sends GK to KMF.

[0387] The key architecture of the above example is explained in conjunction with Figure 17: CRP is a challenge-response pair pre-shared by the network AUSF, UE and Tagi; SKi is a key generated based on CRP, SKi = KDF(Ci||Ri,PIDi, Nn), which exists on the network side, UE and Tagi; GK is the UE group key, GK = KDF(Nu, GID, IDu), which exists on the network side, UE and Tag.

[0388] Finally, in combination with relevant technologies, the beneficial effects of the authentication method provided by this embodiment are described:

[0389] First, we need to explain PUF. PUF is a hardware security technology that uses inherent device variations to produce a unique, unclonable device response to a given input. Due to nanometer-scale manufacturing variations in the integrated circuit manufacturing process, even chips produced on the same wafer and based on the same mask have different physical differences and intrinsic characteristics. These differences may come from a variety of factors, such as random dopant fluctuations (RDF) and nanometer-scale linewidth differences. PUF circuits are sensitive to these manufacturing variations and can extract these unique manufacturing variations in the form of challenge response pairs (CRPs). That is, by inputting a specific challenge, PUF can be mapped to an unpredictable, unique, random, and unclonable response, thereby applying intrinsic characteristics to scenarios such as key storage and secure authentication. As shown in Figure 18, the same stimulus (i.e., challenge information) input into different PUFs with the same design and manufacturing process will result in different responses (i.e., response information). For example, in Figure 18, the response information r1 obtained by the first PUF, the response information r2 obtained by the second PUF, and the response information rn obtained by the nth PUF are all different. The key extraction process of the PUF can be shown in Figure 19. Any challenge information cj is input into the PUF to obtain the response information kj. In the PUF, cj will first be input into the PUF extraction token (Token) to obtain the raw response (Raw Response). The raw response is then input into the fuzzy extractor (FuzzyExtractor) to finally obtain the response information Kj, which can be binary. Compared to traditional security mechanisms, PUFs offer the following security features: These nanoscale manufacturing variations are difficult to predict and control, even by designers and manufacturers. Therefore, PUFs' inherent properties are difficult to predict and control. Even invasive attacks cannot extract these nanoscale manufacturing variations, making PUFs resistant to physical attacks, including reverse engineering, and difficult to clone. PUF-based key storage and authentication mechanisms eliminate the need for key "burning" in the supply chain; instead, keys are extracted from integrated circuit manufacturing variations, ensuring supply chain security. Compared to related storage mechanisms, PUFs can be extracted from general-purpose digital circuits, resulting in lower costs. Traditional NVM-based security mechanisms store keys permanently in NVM, making them easily accessible to attackers through physical attacks. PUF-based keys, on the other hand, are generated only at the time of application, resulting in a smaller security window. Ideally, PUFs are computationally tractable, repeatable, unclonable, unpredictable, and unidirectional. Therefore, PUFs hold significant promise for secure authentication and key storage in lightweight IoT devices.In a preferred example, the second device of this embodiment can also use SRAM as memory. SRAM is commonly used as cache, buffer, and register, and is often integrated into MCU chips. The SRAM's power-on state has a random fingerprint characteristic, which can be extracted through a standard SRAM interface and used in security systems. Therefore, SRAM-based PUF, as an intrinsic PUF, can provide a good solution for A-IoT devices' security requirements such as key generation, security authentication, random number generation, chip counterfeiting, and recycling detection. Furthermore, this embodiment uses PUF to pre-configure Ct and Rt, ensuring processing security.

[0390] Again, let's explain the authentication processing and key architecture of related technologies:

[0391] Security requirements and mechanisms of the 5G system, the main purpose of the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) process is to achieve mutual authentication between the UE and the network side, and to provide keys that can be used between the UE and the serving network in subsequent security processes. The enhanced functions of 5G AKA include the visited network providing proof of successful UE authentication to the home network, which is sent by the visited network selecting the authentication confirmation message. The specific flow of the authentication process of 5G AKA, as shown in Figure 20, may include: S2001, for the received authentication request, UDM / ARPF generates AV (Authentication Vector). That is, UDM / ARPF creates a 5G HE AV (Home Environment Authentication Vector), in which the Authentication Management Field (AMF) separation bit is set to "1". Then, UDM / ARPF should derive KAUSF (Key Authentication Server Function) and calculate XRES* (Expected Response). Finally, the UDM / ARPF shall create a 5G HE AV from RAND (Random number), AUTN (Authentication Token), XRES* and KAUSF. S2002. The UDM shall return the 5G HEAV to the AUSF. S2003. The AUSF shall store XRES* and temporarily store XRES* together with the received SUCI or SUPI. S2004. The AUSF shall generate a 5G HEAV based on the 5G HEAV received from the UDM / ARPF, calculate HXRES* from XRES* and KSEAF from KAUSF, replace XRES* in the 5G HEAV with HXRES*, and replace KAUSF with KSEAF. S2005. The AUSF removes KSEAF and returns the 5G SE AV to the SEAF. S1106. The SEAF sends RAND and AUTN to the UE. S2007. The USIM shall calculate the response RES. The USIM shall return RES, CK, and IK to the ME. The ME shall then calculate RES* from RES. S2008. The UE returns RES* to SEAF. S2009. SEAF calculates HRES* from RES* and compares HRES* with HXRES*. If they match, SEAF considers authentication successful from the serving network's perspective. Otherwise, SEAF considers authentication failed and indicates the failure to the AUSF. S2210. SEAF sends the RES* received from the UE to the AUSF. S2211. AUSF compares the received RES* with the stored XRES*.If RES* and XRES* are equal, the AUSF shall consider the authentication successful. The AUSF shall notify the UDM of the authentication result. S2012. The AUSF shall indicate to the SEAF whether the authentication is successful.

[0392] In the above process, during the authentication vector generation on the network side, the message authentication code is generated by calculating MAC=f1K(SQN||RAND||AMF), the expected response is generated by XRES=f2K(RAND), the encryption key is generated by CK=f3K(RAND), the integrity key is generated by IK=f4K(RAND), and the anonymous key AK=f5K(RAND), where f1 is a MAC function, f2 is a MAC function; f3 is a key derivation function (KDF), f4 is a KDF, and f5 is a KDF. The authentication vector generation process on the UE side includes: once RNAD and AUTN are received, the USIM first calculates the anonymous key AK=f5K(RAND), extracts the serial number The USIM checks to see if the SQN is within the correct range and calculates and verifies XMAC=MAC using the SQN, AMF, and its own key K. If verified, the USIM calculates the response RES and returns RES, CK, and IK to the ME. Finally, the ME calculates RES* from RES and derives KAUSF from CK||IK. As can be seen, the calculation of authentication vectors on both the network and UE sides in related technologies requires a large amount of complex calculations.

[0393] Among related technologies, A-IoT research is in its infancy within 3GPP, and security standards for A-IoT have yet to be determined. AIoT devices have low cost, computing, and storage capabilities, making it difficult to provide strong security protection for stored PSKs. Attackers could potentially obtain PSKs through disassembly, intrusion, and side-channel attacks. This makes it necessary to design a secure, low-cost key storage mechanism, especially for unattended applications. Furthermore, A-IoT devices have low cost, computing, and storage capabilities, making it difficult to support complex authentication and key agreement protocols. As previously explained, the existing 5GAKA security architecture is limited in its use of authentication vector generation, key derivation, and encryption algorithms based on the root key K. Therefore, it is necessary to design a secure, efficient, and lightweight authentication and key agreement mechanism suitable for A-IoT devices.

[0394] In the solution provided by this embodiment, challenge information can be pre-stored as pre-shared information in the first device and / or the core network side device and the second device, so that in the authentication process, the second device can calculate the authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the pre-shared information by only transmitting the authentication parameters to the second device through the first device. The first device can authenticate the second device based on the authentication information. In this way, while ensuring the security of the authentication process for the second device, the second device can avoid adopting a more complex authentication process, and the authentication can be completed without complex and large-scale calculation processing. It is particularly suitable for use in devices with lower capabilities.

[0395] FIG21 is a schematic diagram of the composition structure of a first device according to an embodiment of the present application, including:

[0396] The first communication unit 2101 is configured to receive a first message from a core network side device, the first message carrying authentication parameters; send a second message to a second device, the second message carrying the authentication parameters; receive a third message from the second device, the third message carrying first authentication information, the first authentication information being calculated by the second device based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information being shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information including challenge information;

[0397] The first processing unit 2102 is configured to authenticate the second device based on the first authentication information.

[0398] FIG22 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a second device according to an embodiment of the present application, including:

[0399] The second communication unit 2201 is configured to receive a second message from a first device, the second message carrying authentication parameters; and send a third message to the first device, the third message carrying the first authentication information;

[0400] The second processing unit 2202 is used to calculate the first authentication information based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device / or the core network side device, the pre-shared information includes challenge information, and the first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0401] FIG23 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a core network side device according to an embodiment of the present application, including:

[0402] The third communication unit 2301 is used to send a first message to the first device, where the first message carries authentication parameters, and the authentication parameters are used by the second device to calculate first authentication information based on pre-shared information. The pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

[0403] The core network side device also includes: a third processing unit 2302, used to perform at least one of the following: the core network side device authenticates the second device based on the second authentication information and the second expected information; the core network side device authenticates the first device based on the third authentication information and the third expected information.

[0404] The device of the embodiment of the present application can realize the corresponding functions of each device in the aforementioned authentication method embodiment. The corresponding processes, functions, implementation methods and beneficial effects of each module (sub-module, unit or component, etc.) in the first device, or the second device, or the core network side device can be found in the corresponding description in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here. It should be noted that the functions described in the first device, or the second device, or the core network side device of the embodiment of the application (sub-module, unit or component, etc.) can be implemented by different modules (sub-modules, units or components, etc.) or by the same module (sub-module, unit or component, etc.).

[0405] Figure 24 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 2400 according to an embodiment of the present application. The communication device 2400 includes a processor 2410, which can call and execute a computer program from a memory to enable the communication device 2400 to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0406] In a possible implementation, the communication device 2400 may further include a memory 2420. The processor 2410 may call and execute a computer program from the memory 2420 to enable the communication device 2400 to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0407] The memory 2420 may be a separate device independent of the processor 2410 , or may be integrated into the processor 2410 .

[0408] In one possible implementation, the communication device 2400 may further include a transceiver 2430 , and the processor 2410 may control the transceiver 2430 to communicate with other devices. Specifically, it may send information or data to other devices, or receive information or data sent by other devices.

[0409] The transceiver 2430 may include a transmitter and a receiver. The transceiver 2430 may further include an antenna, and the number of antennas may be one or more.

[0410] In one possible implementation, the communication device 2400 may be the first device, or the second device, or the core network side device of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 2400 can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the first device in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0411] 25 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip 2500 according to an embodiment of the present application. The chip 2500 includes a processor 2510, which can call and execute a computer program from a memory to implement the method according to the embodiment of the present application.

[0412] In one possible implementation, the chip 2500 may further include a memory 2520. The processor 2510 may call and execute a computer program from the memory 2520 to implement the method performed by the access network device or the first core network device in the embodiment of the present application. The memory 2520 may be a separate device independent of the processor 2510 or integrated into the processor 2510.

[0413] In one possible implementation, the chip 2500 may further include an input interface 2530. The processor 2510 may control the input interface 2530 to communicate with other devices or chips, specifically, to obtain information or data sent by other devices or chips. In one possible implementation, the chip 2500 may further include an output interface 2540. The processor 2510 may control the output interface 2540 to communicate with other devices or chips, specifically, to output information or data to other devices or chips.

[0414] In one possible implementation, the chip can be applied to the first device, or the second device, or the core network side device in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the first device, or the second device, or the core network side device in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0415] It should be understood that the chip mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can also be called a system-level chip, a system chip, a chip system or a system-on-chip chip, etc.

[0416] The processor mentioned above can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc.

[0417] The above-mentioned memory may be a volatile memory or a nonvolatile memory, or may include both volatile and nonvolatile memories.

[0418] The memories in the embodiments of the present application are intended to include, but are not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memories.

[0419] Figure 26 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system 2600 according to an embodiment of the present application. Communication system 2600 includes a first device 2610, a core network-side device 2620, and a second device 2630. In the above embodiments, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented using software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When loaded and executed on a computer, the computer program instructions fully or partially perform the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transferred from one computer-readable storage medium to another.

[0420] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of the present application, the size of the serial numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0421] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0422] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any modifications or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present application should be included within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. An authentication method, comprising: The first device receives a first message from a core network side device, where the first message carries an authentication parameter; The first device sends a second message to the second device, where the second message carries the authentication parameter; The first device receives a third message from the second device, where the third message carries first authentication information, where the first authentication information is calculated by the second device based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, where the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and where the pre-shared information includes challenge information; The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information, including: The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information and first expected information.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The third message carries a first random number; the method comprises: The first device calculates the first expected information based on a first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and a first generation parameter, wherein the first generation parameter includes at least one of the following: response information, the challenge information, an identifier of the first device, and the authentication parameter.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The first authentication information includes ciphertext information and verification parameters, and the third message carries a first random number; The first device authenticates the second device based on the first authentication information, including: The first device authenticates the second device based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the ciphertext information and the verification parameter, and obtains second authentication information.

5. The method according to claim 4, wherein: The first device authenticates the second device based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, the ciphertext information and the verification parameter, including: The first device calculates an encryption key based on the first intermediate key and the first random number, and authenticates the second device based on the encryption key, the ciphertext information, and the verification parameter.

6. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 5, wherein: The first message carries the first intermediate key.

7. The method according to claim 3, wherein: The method further comprises: The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein: The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter, including: The first device calculates a second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein: The second message carries a third random number; The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key, including: The first device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and the third random number.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein: The second message carries a third message authentication code, and the third message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the first device; the method further includes: The first device calculates the third message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the identification of the first device and a fourth generation parameter, and the fourth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the challenge information, the response information, and relevant information of the second device.

11. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 10, wherein: The first message carries a fifth message authentication code, and the fifth message authentication code is used by the first device to authenticate the core network side device; the method further includes: The first device calculates a sixth message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device, the authentication parameter, the challenge information, and an identifier of the first device; The first device authenticates the core network side device based on the fifth message authentication code and the sixth message authentication code.

12. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 11, wherein: The method further comprises: The first device calculates third authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, the third random number, and a fifth generation parameter, wherein the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device, and the fifth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the first device, relevant information of the second device, the response information, the challenge information, and the authentication parameter; The first device sends a fourth message to the core network side device, where the fourth message carries the third authentication information and the third random number.

13. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The second message carries a group key, where the group key is a key corresponding to a device group to which the second device belongs; and the method further includes: The first device sends a key request message to a key management device, where the key request message carries an identifier of a device group to which the second device belongs; The first device receives a key response message from the key management device, where the key response message responds to the key request message, and the key response message carries the group key.

14. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The second message carries a group key generation parameter; the method further includes: The first device calculates a first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; The first device generates a third random number; The first device calculates a group key based on the third random number, an identifier of a device group to which the second device belongs, and an identifier of the first device; The first device calculates the group key generation parameter based on the first intermediate key and the third random number.

15. The method according to claim 13 or 14, wherein: The method further comprises: The first device calculates the first expected information based on the authentication parameter, the pre-shared information, the group key, relevant information of the second device, and an identifier of the first device.

16. The method according to any one of claims 13 to 15, wherein: The method further comprises: The first device calculates third authentication information based on the group key, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, the authentication parameter, the third random number, and the identifier of the first device, where the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device; The first device sends a fourth message to the core network side device, where the fourth message carries the third authentication information and the third random number.

17. The method according to any one of claims 1-5, 13-16, wherein: The first message carries a first message authentication code, and the second message carries a first message authentication code, wherein the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device.

18. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein: The third message carries second authentication information, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device.

19. The method according to any one of claims 4, 5 and 18, wherein: The method further comprises: The first device sends a fourth message to the core network side device, where the fourth message carries the second authentication information.

20. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 19, wherein: The pre-shared information also includes response information, or the response information is pre-configured.

21. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 19, wherein: The authentication parameter includes: an anonymous key or a second random number.

22. The method according to any one of claims 3, 4, 7 and 8, wherein: The second message carries a third random number; Alternatively, the method further includes: the first device sending a fifth message to the second device, the fifth message responding to the third message, and the fifth message carrying a third random number.

23. The method according to any one of claims 9, 10 and 22, wherein: The method further comprises at least one of the following: The first device calculates an integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; The first device calculates an encryption key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; The first device calculates an encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key.

24. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 23, wherein: The second device is one of the following: a zero-power device, an ambient-powered Internet of Things (AIoT) device; the first device is one of the following: a terminal device, an access network device; the core network side device includes at least one of the following: an authentication server function AUSF, a unified data management function UDM, and an AIoT network element.

25. An authentication method, comprising: The second device receives a second message from the first device, where the second message carries the authentication parameter; The second device calculates first authentication information based on the authentication parameter and pre-shared information, where the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device / or a core network side device, the pre-shared information includes challenge information, and the first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device; The second device sends a third message to the first device, where the third message carries the first authentication information.

26. The method according to claim 25, wherein: The method further comprises: The second device generates response information based on the challenge information in the pre-shared information.

27. The method according to claim 26, wherein: The pre-shared information also includes response information, where the response information is related to the challenge information.

28. The method according to claim 26 or 27, wherein: The third message carries a first random number; The second device calculates first authentication information based on the authentication parameter and the pre-shared information, including: The second device calculates a first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; The second device generates the first random number; The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key and the first random number.

29. The method according to claim 28, wherein: The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key and the first random number, including: The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and a first generation parameter, wherein the first generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the response information, the challenge information, an identifier of the first device, and the authentication parameter.

30. The method of claim 29, wherein: The second device calculates a first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter, including: The second device calculates a second intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; The second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key.

31. The method according to claim 30, wherein: The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, relevant information of the second device and a first generation parameter, including: The second device calculates second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device and the first generation parameter, where the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device; The second device calculates ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, and the second authentication information, and uses the ciphertext information and the verification parameters as the first authentication information.

32. The method according to claim 31, wherein: The second device calculates ciphertext information and verification parameters based on the first intermediate key, the first random number, and the second authentication information, including: The second device calculates an encryption key based on the first intermediate key and the first random number, and calculates the ciphertext information and the verification parameter based on the encryption key and the second authentication information.

33. The method of claim 30, wherein: The third message carries second authentication information; the method further includes: The second device calculates second authentication information based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the second generation parameter using the first calculation method, the second generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device.

34. The method of claim 33, wherein: The second message carries a first message authentication code; The method further comprises: The second device calculates a second message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and a third generation parameter using a second calculation method, the third generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information, the first calculation method is different from the second calculation method, and / or the second generation parameter is at least partially different from the third generation parameter; The second device authenticates the core network side device based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

35. The method of claim 30, wherein: The second message carries a third random number; The second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key, including: The second device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key and the third random number.

36. The method of claim 35, wherein: The second message carries a third message authentication code, and the third message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the first device; the method further includes: The second device calculates a fourth message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the third random number, the identification of the first device and a fourth generation parameter, wherein the fourth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the challenge information, the response information, and relevant information of the second device; The second device authenticates the first device based on the third message authentication code and the fourth message authentication code.

37. The method according to claim 26 or 27, wherein: The second message carries a group key, where the group key is a key corresponding to a device group to which the second device belongs.

38. The method according to claim 26 or 27, wherein: The second message carries a group key generation parameter; the method further includes: The second device calculates a first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; The second device calculates a third random number based on the group key generation parameter and the first intermediate key, and calculates a group key based on the third random number, an identifier of a device group to which the second device belongs, and an identifier of the first device.

39. The method according to claim 37 or 38, wherein: The second device calculates first authentication information based on the authentication parameter and the pre-shared information, including: The second device calculates the first authentication information based on the authentication parameter, the pre-shared information, the group key, relevant information of the second device, and the identifier of the first device.

40. The method according to any one of claims 37 to 39, wherein: The second message carries a first message authentication code; The method further comprises: The second device calculates a first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter; The second device calculates a second message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information; The second device authenticates the core network side device based on the second message authentication code and the first message authentication code.

41. The method of claim 29, wherein: The second message carries second authentication information; and the method further includes: The second device calculates the second authentication information based on the authentication parameters and the first shared key, and the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device. The first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network side device.

42. The method according to claim 29 or 41, wherein: The second message carries a first message authentication code; the method further includes: The second device calculates a second message authentication code based on the authentication parameter and a first shared key, where the first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network side device; The second device authenticates the core network side device based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

43. The method according to any one of claims 25 to 42, wherein: The authentication parameters include: an anonymous key and / or a second random number.

44. The method according to any one of claims 29-31, 33, and 34, wherein: The second message carries a third random number; Alternatively, the method further includes: the second device receiving a fifth message from the first device, the fifth message responding to the third message, and the fifth message carrying a third random number.

45. The method according to any one of claims 35, 36 and 44, wherein: The method further comprises at least one of the following: The second device calculates an integrity protection key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; The second device calculates an encryption key based on the first random number and the first intermediate key; The second device calculates an encryption key based on the third random number and the first intermediate key.

46. ​​An authentication method, comprising: A core network side device sends a first message to a first device. The first message carries authentication parameters. The authentication parameters are used by the second device to calculate first authentication information based on pre-shared information. The pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device. The pre-shared information includes challenge information. The first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

47. The method of claim 46, wherein: The first message carries a first message authentication code and / or a fifth message authentication code, the first message authentication code is used by the second device to authenticate the core network side device, and the fifth message authentication code is used by the first device to authenticate the core network side device.

48. The method of claim 47, wherein: The method further comprises: The core network side device receives a seventh message from the first device, where the seventh message is used to request authentication and carries relevant information of the second device and an identifier of the first device.

49. The method of claim 48, wherein: The method further comprises: The core network side device receives a fourth message from the first device, and the fourth message carries at least one of the following: second authentication information, third authentication information, and a third random number, the second authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the second device, and the third authentication information is used by the core network side device to authenticate the first device.

50. The method of claim 49, wherein: The method further comprises at least one of the following: The core network side device authenticates the second device based on the second authentication information and the second expected information; The core network side device authenticates the first device based on the third authentication information and the third expected information.

51. The method of claim 50, wherein: The method further comprises: The core network side device calculates a first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter.

52. The method of claim 51, wherein: The core network side device calculates the first intermediate key based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter, including: The core network side device calculates based on the challenge information, the response information, the relevant information of the second device and the authentication parameter a second intermediate key; The core network side device calculates the first intermediate key based on the second intermediate key.

53. The method of claim 52, wherein: The method further comprises at least one of the following: The core network side device calculates a first message authentication code based on the authentication parameter and a first shared key, where the first shared key is shared by the second device and the core network side device; The core network side device calculates the second expected information based on the authentication parameter and the first shared key; The core network side device calculates the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the second generation parameter by using the first calculation method, where the second generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information; The core network side device calculates a first message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, the authentication parameter and a third generation parameter using a second calculation method, the third generation parameter includes the response information and / or the challenge information, the first calculation method is different from the second calculation method, and / or the second generation parameter and the third generation parameter are at least partially different; The core network side device calculates a first message authentication code based on the first intermediate key, the authentication parameter and the challenge information; The core network side device calculates the second expected information based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device and a first generation parameter, where the first generation parameter includes at least one of the following: the response information, the challenge information, the identifier of the first device, and the authentication parameter; The core network side device calculates the third expected information based on the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, the third random number, and a fifth generation parameter, where the fifth generation parameter includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the first device, relevant information of the second device, the response information, the challenge information, and the authentication parameter; The core network side device calculates the third expected information based on the group key, the identifier of the device group to which the second device belongs, the authentication parameter, the third random number and the identifier of the first device; The core network side device calculates a fifth message authentication code based on the second intermediate key, relevant information of the second device, the authentication parameter, the challenge information, and an identifier of the first device.

54. The method of claim 52, wherein: The first message carries the first intermediate key.

55. The method according to any one of claims 46 to 54, wherein: The pre-shared information also includes response information, or the response information is pre-configured.

56. The method according to any one of claims 46 to 55, wherein: The authentication parameter includes: an anonymous key or a second random number.

57. A first device, comprising: A first communication unit, configured to receive a first message from a core network side device, where the first message carries an authentication parameter; Sending a second message to a second device, where the second message carries the authentication parameter; receiving a third message from the second device, the third message carrying first authentication information, the first authentication information being calculated by the second device based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information being shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information including challenge information; The first processing unit is configured to authenticate the second device based on the first authentication information.

58. A second device, comprising: A second communication unit, configured to receive a second message from the first device, wherein the second message carries an authentication parameter; Sending a third message to the first device, where the third message carries first authentication information; The second processing unit is used to calculate the first authentication information based on the authentication parameters and pre-shared information, the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device / or the core network side device, the pre-shared information includes challenge information, and the first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

59. A core network side device, comprising: A third communication unit is used to send a first message to a first device, where the first message carries authentication parameters, and the authentication parameters are used by the second device to calculate first authentication information based on pre-shared information, where the pre-shared information is shared by the second device and the first device and / or the core network side device, and the pre-shared information includes challenge information, and the first authentication information is used by the first device to authenticate the second device.

60. A first device, comprising: A transceiver, a processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a computer program, the processor being used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory, so that the first device executes the method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 24.

61. A second device, comprising: A transceiver, a processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a computer program, the processor being used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory so that the second device executes the method as claimed in any one of claims 25 to 45.

62. A core network side device, comprising: A transceiver, a processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a computer program, the processor being used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory so that the core network side device executes the method as described in any one of claims 46 to 56.

63. A chip, comprising: A processor, configured to call and run a computer program from a memory so that a device equipped with the chip executes a method as described in any one of claims 1 to 24, or claims 25 to 45, or claims 46 to 56.

64. A computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program, which, when executed by a device, causes the device to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 24, or claims 25 to 45, or claims 46 to 56.

65. A computer program product comprising computer program instructions for causing a computer to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 24, or claims 25 to 45, or claims 46 to 56.

66. A computer program causing a computer to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 24, or claims 25 to 45, or claims 46 to 56.

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