Secure computation device, secure computation method, and program
The secure computing device uses cryptographic techniques for difference calculation and order manipulation to determine matching candidate values efficiently, addressing the high calculation costs of conventional methods by leveraging cryptographic secrecy and reducing comparison operations.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/JP2023/019026
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-22
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-28
AI Technical Summary
Conventional secure computing methods require high calculation costs when determining which candidate values match an input value through secret calculations, as they necessitate comparisons with each candidate value, leading to inefficient processing.
A secure computing device employs difference calculation, random number multiplication, order permutation, and inverse operations to efficiently determine matching candidate values without revealing the input value, utilizing cryptographic techniques to maintain secrecy and reduce computational overhead.
This approach enables efficient calculation of matching candidate values while keeping the input value secret, reducing the need for costly comparison operations and enhancing processing efficiency.
Smart Images

Figure JP2023019026_28112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Secure computing device, secure computing method and program
[0001] The present disclosure relates to a secure computing device, a secure computing method, and a program.
[0002] A method called secure computation is known as a method for obtaining specific computation results without restoring numerical values that have been concealed by encryption techniques or the like (for example, Non-Patent Document 1). Non-Patent Document 1 describes a method for concealing numerical values by distributing fragments of the numerical values among three secure computing devices, and for obtaining specific computation results such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and logical operations without restoring the original numerical values by having the three secure computing devices perform collaborative computations.
[0003] Koji Senda, Hiroki Hamada, Dai Igarashi, Katsumi Takahashi. Rethinking Lightweight Verifiable 3-Party Secret Function Computation. In CSS, 2010.
[0004] However, when using secure computation to calculate information indicating which of the candidate values an input value matches, conventional methods require a secure computation to compare the input value with each candidate value separately. Therefore, for example, if the number of candidate values is n, the secure computation to compare the input value with each candidate value must be performed n times, resulting in a problem of high computational cost.
[0005] The present disclosure has been made in consideration of the above points, and provides a technology that can efficiently calculate, by secure computation, information indicating which of the candidate values an input value matches.
[0006] a value permutation unit that, for a sequence of values obtained by decrypting the sequence of secret values after permutation by the order permutation unit, replaces the value with a predetermined first value if the value is 0, or with a predetermined second value if the value is other than 0; and an order inverse permutation unit that, for a sequence of values obtained by decrypting the sequence of secret values after permutation by the order permutation unit, replaces the value with a predetermined first value if the value is 0, or with a predetermined second value if the value is other than 0; and an order inverse permutation unit that, for a sequence of values obtained by permutation by the value permutation unit, replaces the value with a predetermined first value if the value is 0, or with a predetermined second value if the value is other than 0, using an inverse permutation of the permutation to permutate the order of the sequence of values after permutation by the value permutation unit, using an inverse permutation of the permutation.
[0007] A technology is provided that can efficiently calculate, by secure computation, information indicating which of the candidate values an input value matches.
[0008] 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware configuration of a secure computing device according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of a secure computing device according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an example of a process executed by a secure computing device according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0009] An embodiment of the present invention will be described below, which is a secure computing device 10 that, when given an input value and its candidate values that are anonymized by cryptography or the like, can efficiently compute, by secure computation, information indicating which of the candidate values the input value matches.
[0010] <Notation> A value obtained by concealing a value a through encryption, secret sharing, or the like is called the secret value of a, and is expressed by the following equation 1. When the concealment is by secret sharing, [[a]] refers to a set of secret sharing fragments held by multiple secret sharing apparatuses including the secure computing apparatus 10.
[0011] Hereinafter, in the text of this specification, the secret value shown in the above equation 1 will be written as [[a]].
[0012] A vector having n elements is expressed by the following equation 2.
[0013] Hereinafter, in the text of this specification, the arrows will be omitted and the vector shown in Equation 2 above will be written as a = (a[1], a[2], ..., a[n]). Note that the i-th element of vector a will be referred to as a[i].
[0014] <Setting> Hereinafter, the input value will be represented by x, and its secret value will be [[x]]. Furthermore, the number of candidate values will be n, and a vector with n candidate values as elements will be called a candidate value vector, and c = (c[1], c[2], ..., c[n]). However, for any i, j∈[1,n] where i≠j, c[i]≠c[j], and x will match any of c[i] (i∈[1,n]). Hereinafter, k will be the (only) integer that satisfies x = c[k].
[0015] Also, let y be a vector of length n such that y[k]=1 if and only if j=k, and y[j]=0 for other j∈[1,n]. Furthermore, let its secret value be [[y]]. Note that this vector y is information indicating which of the candidate values c[i] (i∈[1,n]) the input value x matches.
[0016] In this case, in the following embodiment, when a secret value [[x]] and a candidate value vector c are given, a case will be described in which [y]] is calculated while keeping [[x]] secret. That is, a case will be described in which information indicating which of the candidate values c[i] (i∈[1, n]) the input value x matches is calculated without revealing the input [[x]] and the output [[y]]. Note that, as an example, the candidate value vector c is not anonymized below, but the following embodiment can also be applied to a case in which the candidate value vector c is anonymized (i.e., when it is [[c]]).
[0017] <Example of Hardware Configuration of Secure Computing Apparatus 10> An example of the hardware configuration of the secure computing apparatus 10 according to this embodiment is shown in Fig. 1. As shown in Fig. 1, the secure computing apparatus 10 according to this embodiment includes an input device 101, a display device 102, an external I / F 103, a communication I / F 104, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 105, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 106, an auxiliary storage device 107, and a processor 108. Furthermore, each of these pieces of hardware is connected to each other via a bus 109 so as to be able to communicate with each other.
[0018] The input device 101 is, for example, a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, a physical button, etc. The display device 102 is, for example, a display, a display panel, etc. Note that the secure computing device 10 does not necessarily have to have at least one of the input device 101 and the display device 102, for example.
[0019] The external I / F 103 is an interface with an external device such as a recording medium 103a. The secure computing device 10 can read from and write to the recording medium 103a via the external I / F 103. Examples of the recording medium 103a include a flexible disk, a CD (Compact Disc), a DVD (Digital Versatile Disk), an SD memory card (Secure Digital memory card), and a USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory card.
[0020] The communication I / F 104 is an interface for connecting the secure computing device 10 to a communication network. The RAM 105 is a volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that temporarily stores programs and data. The ROM 106 is a non-volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that can store programs and data even when the power is turned off. The auxiliary storage device 107 is a storage device (storage device) such as an HDD (Hard Disk Drive), an SSD (Solid State Drive), or a flash memory. The processor 108 is an arithmetic device such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit).
[0021] The secure computing device 10 according to this embodiment has the hardware configuration shown in Fig. 1 and is therefore capable of implementing various processes described below. However, the hardware configuration shown in Fig. 1 is merely an example, and the hardware configuration of the secure computing device 10 is not limited to this. For example, the secure computing device 10 may have multiple auxiliary storage devices 107 or multiple processors 108, may not have some of the hardware shown in the figure, or may have various hardware other than the hardware shown in the figure.
[0022] <Example of Functional Configuration of Secure Computing Apparatus 10> An example of the functional configuration of the secure computing apparatus 10 according to this embodiment is shown in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2, the secure computing apparatus 10 according to this embodiment has a difference calculation unit 201, a random number multiplication calculation unit 202, a permutation unit 203, a restoration unit 204, an element permutation unit 205, a permutation reverse unit 206, and an output unit 207. Each of these units is realized, for example, by a process in which one or more programs installed in the secure computing apparatus 10 are executed by the processor 108 or the like. The secure computing apparatus 10 according to this embodiment also has a storage unit 208. The storage unit 208 is realized, for example, by the auxiliary storage device 107 or the like.
[0023] The difference calculation unit 201 calculates the difference between c[i] and the secret value [[x]], [[a[i]]]:=c[i]-[[x]], for i=1,...,n, using secure computation. Hereinafter, [[a]]=([[a[1]]], [[a[2]]],...,[[a[n]]]).
[0024] The random number multiplication calculation unit 202 uses non-zero random secret values [[r[1]]], ..., [[r[n]]] to calculate [[b[i]]]:=[[a[i]]] x [[r[i]]] by secure computation for i = 1, ..., n. Hereinafter, [[b]] = ([[b[1]]], [[b[2]]], ..., [[b[n]]]).
[0025] The order permutation unit 203 computes a random permutation or a random cyclic shift of the order of elements of [[b]] by secure computation. That is, the order permutation unit 203 computes a secret value [[c]] of a vector c = (c[1], c[2], ..., c[n]) such that c[i] = b[π(i)] (i∈[1, n]) for a certain permutation π representing a random permutation or a random cyclic shift.
[0026] The restoration unit 204 restores the secret value [[c]] to the vector c.
[0027] The element replacement unit 205 calculates a vector d = (d[1], d[2], ..., d[n]) in which each element c[i] (i∈[1, n]) of the vector c is replaced with 1 if the value of that element is 0, and with 1 otherwise.
[0028] The order-reverse permutation unit 206 performs a secure computation to perform an inverse random permutation or an inverse random cyclic shift of the order of the elements of the vector d. That is, the order-reverse permutation unit 206 performs a secure computation to perform an inverse permutation of the permutation π used in the order permutation unit 203 as π -1 Then, y[i] = d[π -1 , y[n]) where [i](i) (i∈[1, n]) is calculated by secure computation.
[0029] The output unit 207 outputs the secret value [[y]] to a predetermined output destination.
[0030] The storage unit 208 stores the given secret value [[x]] and the candidate value vector c. The storage unit 208 may also store the secret value [[y]] or temporarily store calculation results along the way until the secret value [[y]] is calculated.
[0031] <Processing Executed by the Secure Computing Apparatus 10> The processing executed by the secure computing apparatus 10 according to this embodiment will be described below with reference to Fig. 3. Note that the execution of the following processing is initiated by, for example, inputting the secret value [[x]] and the candidate value vector c stored in the storage unit 208.
[0032] The difference calculation unit 201 of the secure computing device 10 calculates the difference [[a[i]]]:=c[i]-[[x]] between c[i] and the secret value [[x]] for i = 1, ..., n by secure computation (step S101). Here, the difference calculation unit 201 may calculate the secret value [[a]] = ([[a[1]]], [[a[2]]], ..., [[a[n]]]) by any secure computation that can calculate the difference. Examples of secure computation that can calculate the difference include the method described in Non-Patent Document 1. Note that the method described in Non-Patent Document 1 is a method based on multi-party computation, and realizes secure computation by collaborative computation with one or more other secure computing devices.
[0033] Next, the random number multiplication calculation unit 202 of the secure computing device 10 securely calculates [[b[i]]]:=[[a[i]]]×[[r[i]]] for i = 1, ..., n using secret values [[r[1]]], ..., [[r[n]]] of non-zero (mutually independent) random numbers (step S102). Here, the random number multiplication calculation unit 202 may calculate the secret value [[b]] = ([[b[1]]], [[b[2]]], ..., [[b[n]]]) using any secret calculation capable of calculating multiplication. Examples of secure calculation capable of calculating multiplication include the techniques described in Non-Patent Document 1 and the like. Note that the non-zero, mutually independent random numbers r[1], r[2], ..., [n] can be generated, for example, by using a remainder of a certain prime number.
[0034] Next, the order permutation unit 203 of the secure computing device 10 calculates a random permutation or a random cyclic shift of the order of the elements of [b] by secure computation (step S103). That is, the order permutation unit 203 calculates a secret value [[c]] of a vector c = (c[1], c[2], ..., c[n]) such that c[i] = b[π(i)] (i∈[1, n]) using a certain predetermined permutation π representing the random permutation or the random cyclic shift. Here, the order permutation unit 203 may calculate the secret value [[c]] = ([[c[1]]], [[c[2]]], ..., [[c[n]]]) by any secure computation capable of calculating the random permutation or the random cyclic shift. Examples of secure computation capable of calculating this include the technique described in Reference 1. The technique described in Reference 1 is based on multi-party computation, and secure computation is realized by collaborative computation with one or more other secure computing devices.
[0035] Next, the restoration unit 204 of the secure computing device 10 restores the secret value [[c]] to the vector c (step S104). Note that if the secret value [[c]] is a secret sharing value, the restoration unit 204 restores the secret value [[c]] through collaborative computation with one or more other secure computing devices.
[0036] Next, the element substitution unit 205 of the secure computing apparatus 10 calculates a vector d=(d[1], d[2], ..., d[n]) in which, for each element c[i] (iε[1, n]) of the vector c, if the value of that element is 0, it is replaced with 1, and otherwise it is replaced with 1 (step S105). That is, the element substitution unit 205 calculates a vector d=(d[1], d[2], ..., d[n]) in which d[i]=1 if c[i]=0, and d[i]=0 if c[i]≠0.
[0037] Note that if c[i]=0, then d[i]=1, and if c[i]≠0, then d[i]=0. This is just an example. For example, two predetermined values B 1 , B 2 (However, B 1 ≠B 2 ) If c[i] = 0, then d[i] = B 1 , if c[i]≠0, then d[i]=B 2It may also be possible to use the following.
[0038] Next, the order-reverse permutation unit 206 of the secure computing apparatus 10 performs secure computation to perform an inverse random permutation or an inverse random cyclic shift of the order of the elements of the vector d (step S106). That is, the order-reverse permutation unit 206 performs an inverse permutation of the permutation π used in step S103 above by π -1 Then, y[i] = d[π -1 , y[n]) where [i](i∈[1, n]) is a vector y = (y[1], y[2], ..., y[n]), and the secret value [[y]] is calculated by secure computation. This can be calculated by the same method as in step S103 above.
[0039] Then, the output unit 207 of the secure computing apparatus 10 outputs the secret value [[y]] calculated in step S106 to a predetermined output destination (step S107). The output destination may be, for example, the storage unit 208, or another device, equipment, or terminal connected to the secure computing apparatus 10 via a communication network. This provides the secret value [[y]] of information indicating which of the candidate values c[i] (i∈[1, n]) the input value x matches.
[0040] Here, the above [[y]] is the secret value of vector y in which only the k-th element y[k] (i.e., integer k that satisfies c[k]=x) is 1 and the other elements y[i] (i≠k) are 0. The secure computing device 10 can obtain this secret value [[y]] without revealing the input [[x]] and the output [[y]]. The reason is as follows.
[0041] a[i] is 0 only when c[i] = x. Also, since each r[i] is not 0, each b[i] is also 0 only when c[i] = x. Because r[1], r[2], ..., r[n] are mutually independent random numbers, for example, if each value is calculated modulo prime number p, each element of vector b will appear uniformly random except for 0. Therefore, when vector c is restored, the position of 0 (which always exists as a single 0) can be significant information, but because vector c has been randomly permuted or randomly cyclically shifted, the positions of 0 also appear uniformly random. Therefore, by rearranging a vector in reverse order by secret computation, in which 1 is inserted only in the positions that were 0 and 0 is inserted in the other positions, a secret value [[y]] of vector y in which only the kth digit is 1 and the rest are 0 can be obtained without revealing which of the candidate values c[i] (i∈[1, n]) the input value x matches.
[0042] <Example> As an example of the above embodiment, an example will be described in which c = (0, 1, 2, ..., n-1), x∈[0, n). In this case, the output is a secret value [[y]] of a vector y whose length is n, the x+1th element is 1, and the other elements are 0. For example, when n = 5 and x = 3, c = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4), and the secret value of y = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0) is calculated.
[0043] <Summary> As described above, the secure computing device 10 according to this embodiment can realize secure computation, in which when it is known that a concealed input value matches one of the candidate values included in a candidate value sequence, a special value (e.g., 1) is assigned only to the matching candidate value, without using costly secure computation of comparison (equality test). This is because the secure computing device 10 according to this embodiment performs a computation equivalent to comparison (equality test) using public values by multiplying non-zero random numbers and random substitution, so that even if the position of an element where the difference between the input value and the candidate value is 0 is made public, that information will not be leaked. As a result, the secure computing device 10 according to this embodiment can efficiently calculate information indicating which of the candidate values the input value matches, without revealing the input and output.
[0044] The present invention is not limited to the above-described specifically disclosed embodiments, and various modifications, changes, and combinations with known technologies are possible without departing from the scope of the claims.
[0045] [References] Reference 1: Koji Chida, Koki Hamada, Dai Ikarashi, Ryo Kikuchi, Naoto Kiribuchi, and Benny Pinkas. An efficient secure three-party sorting protocol with an honest majority. Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2019.
[0046] REFERENCE SIGNS LIST 10 Secure computing device 101 Input device 102 Display device 103 External I / F 103a Recording medium 104 Communication I / F 105 RAM 106 ROM 107 Auxiliary storage device 108 Processor 109 Bus 201 Difference calculation unit 202 Random number multiplication calculation unit 203 Order permutation unit 204 Restoration unit 205 Element permutation unit 206 Order inverse permutation unit 207 Output unit 208 Storage unit
Claims
1. A secure computing device having: an input unit that inputs a secret value of an input value and a sequence of multiple candidate values, any one of which matches the input value and is mutually distinct; a difference calculation unit that calculates, by secret computation, a difference between the secret value of the input value and each of the multiple candidate values; a multiplication calculation unit that uses multiple non-zero, mutually independent random number secret values to secretly calculate multiplications of each of the calculation results of the differences by each of the multiple random number secret values, by secret computation; an order permutation unit that permutes, by secret computation, an order of the sequence of secret values representing the results of the multiplication, by a predetermined permutation; a value permutation unit that, with respect to a sequence of values obtained by decrypting the sequence of secret values after permutation by the order permutation unit, replaces the value with a predetermined first value if the value is 0, and replaces the value with a predetermined second value if the value is other than 0; and an order inverse permutation unit that permutes, by secret computation, the order of the sequence of values after permutation by the value permutation unit.
2. The secure computing device according to claim 1, wherein the permutation is a random permutation or a random cyclic shift.
3. The secure computing device according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the value substitution unit substitutes, for a sequence of values obtained by decrypting the sequence of secret values after substitution by the order substitution unit, a value of 1 if the value is 0, and a value of 0 if the value is other than 0.
4. A secure computation method performed by a computer, comprising: an input step of inputting a secret value of an input value and a sequence of multiple candidate values, any one of which matches the input value and is mutually distinct; a difference calculation step of secretly calculating, by secret computation, a difference between the secret value of the input value and each of the multiple candidate values; a multiplication calculation step of secretly calculating, by secret computation, a plurality of non-zero, mutually independent random number secret values, each of which is multiplied by each of the calculation results of the difference by each of the multiple random number secret values; an order permutation step of secretly permuting, by a predetermined permutation, the order of the sequence of secret values representing the results of the multiplication; a value permutation step of decrypting the sequence of secret values after the permutation by the order permutation step, replacing the value by a predetermined first value if the value is 0, or by a predetermined second value if the value is other than 0; and an order reverse permutation step of secretly permuting, by a reverse permutation of the permutation, the order of the sequence of values after the permutation by the value permutation step, by secret computation.
5. A program causing a computer to execute the following steps: an input step of inputting a secret value of an input value and a sequence of multiple candidate values, any one of which matches the input value and is mutually distinct; a difference calculation step of secretly calculating a difference between the secret value of the input value and each of the multiple candidate values; a multiplication calculation step of secretly calculating, by means of secret calculation, a plurality of non-zero, mutually independent random number secret values, and multiplying each of the calculation results of the difference by each of the multiple random number secret values, by means of secret calculation; an order permutation step of secretly permuting, by means of a predetermined permutation, the order of the sequence of secret values representing the results of the multiplication; a value permutation step of decrypting the sequence of secret values after the permutation by the order permutation step, by replacing the value by a predetermined first value if the value is 0, or by a predetermined second value if the value is other than 0; and an order reverse permutation step of secretly permuting, by means of a reverse permutation of the permutation, the order of the sequence of values after the permutation by the value permutation step, by means of secret calculation.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Secret equality determination system, secret equality determination method and secret equality determination program recording medium
WO2019111319A1
Information processing device, secret calculation method, and program
WO2020075273A1
