Session establishment method and related apparatus

Abstract

The present application provides a session establishment method and a related apparatus. In the method, an application function network element can receive a connection establishment request message from a terminal device, the connection establishment request message being used for requesting to establish an end-to-end secure connection, the connection establishment request message comprising a ciphertext, and the ciphertext being obtained after an authentication and key management for applications anchor function network element uses a public key PKAF of the application function network element to encrypt an identifier of the terminal device and a key KCONN used during the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection; the application function network element can use its own private key SKAF to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key KCONN; and a connection establishment response message is sent to the terminal device. Hence, the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal can carry the key KCONN used during the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection, eliminating the need for interaction between the application function network element and a core network to obtain the secure connection key, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the application function network element and the core network.

Description

Session establishment method and related device

[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application with application number 202310968481.4 filed with the State Intellectual Property Office of China on July 31, 2023, and priority to the Chinese patent application with the invention name “Session Establishment Method and Related Devices”, all contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a session establishment method and related devices. Background Art

[0003] In mobile communication networks, the application layer needs to authenticate user equipment (UE). Only UEs authenticated by the application provider can access the (Network) Application Function (AF / NAF). To ensure secure communication between the UE and the AF / NAF, authentication between the AF / NAF and the UE is typically based on credentials known only to both parties, such as a session key.

[0004] In Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) and Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) technologies, when a UE establishes a new secure connection with an AF / NAF, the AF / NAF must interact with the core network to obtain the security connection key between the UE and AF / NAF. Therefore, reducing the complexity of the interaction between the AF and the core network when establishing a secure connection between the UE and AF is an urgent issue.

[0005] Summary of the Invention

[0006] The present application provides a session establishment method and related devices, which can reduce the complexity of the interaction between the AF network element and the core network when the terminal device and the application function network element establish a secure connection for the first time.

[0007] In the first aspect, the present application provides a session establishment method, which can be applied to an application function network element or a related device of the application function network element, and can also be applied to a related device that performs some or all functions of the application function network element. The present application uses the application function network element as an example to illustrate the method. In this method, the application function network element can receive a connection establishment request message from a terminal device, and the connection establishment request message is used to request the establishment of an end-to-end secure connection. The connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, and the ciphertext is the public key PK of the application's identity authentication and key management anchor function network element using the application function network element. AF The identifier of the terminal device and the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection CONN Encrypted; using its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN ; Send a connection establishment response message to the terminal device.

[0008] It can be seen that in this application, the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device can carry the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection. CONN When a terminal device and an application function network element establish a secure connection, there is no need for the application function network element to interact with the core network to obtain a secure connection key, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the application function network element and the core network.

[0009] In an optional implementation manner, the connection establishment request message further includes signature content, and the signature content is the identity authentication and key management anchor function element of the application using the private key SK AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed; accordingly, the session establishment method further includes: the application function network element uses the public key PK of the application's identity authentication and key management anchor function network element AAnF Verify the signature content; if the signature content is verified, execute the above using its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN steps.

[0010] Optionally, if the signature content verification fails, a connection establishment response message may be sent in advance, which may be used to inform the terminal device that the connection establishment has failed, or to inform the terminal device of the connection establishment failure and the reason for the failure. AF The ciphertext is decrypted. If the decryption fails, a connection establishment response message may be sent to the terminal device to inform the terminal device that the connection establishment has failed, or information such as the connection establishment failure and the reason for the failure.

[0011] Optionally, the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application AAnF It is pre-stored.

[0012] In an optional implementation manner, the connection establishment request message also includes a public key PK for identifying the public key AF Public key identification, used to identify the public key PK AAnF The public key identifier and the timestamp of the terminal device initiating the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection. It can be seen that this embodiment can enable the method to be applied to scenarios of multi-application functional network elements and / or authentication and key management anchor functional network elements for multiple applications.

[0013] In an optional implementation, the connection establishment request message further includes a message verification code, which is a message verification code generated by the identity authentication and key management anchor function element of the application using a shared key K EE The ciphertext is calculated; accordingly, the method further includes: using the shared key K EE Verify the message authentication code; if the message authentication code is verified, execute the method using its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN steps.

[0014] Optionally, if the message verification code fails to be verified, a connection establishment response message may be sent in advance, which may be used to inform the terminal device that the connection establishment has failed, or that the connection establishment has failed and the reason for the failure. AF The ciphertext is decrypted. If the decryption fails, a connection establishment response message may be sent to the terminal device to inform the terminal device that the connection establishment has failed, or information such as the connection establishment failure and the reason for the failure.

[0015] Optionally, the connection establishment request message also includes a message for identifying the public key PK AF The public key identifier is used to identify the shared key K EE The shared key identifier and the timestamp of the terminal device initiating the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection are one or more of them. It can be seen that this embodiment can enable the method to be applied to the scenario of a multi-application function network element.

[0016] On the second aspect, the present application also provides a session establishment method, which can be applied to the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application or the related device in the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application, or can also be applied to the related device that performs part or all of the functions of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application. The present application uses the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application as an example to illustrate the method. In this method, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application can create a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN ; Use the public key PK of the application function network element AF Identification of the terminal device, key K CONN Send a connection key message to the terminal device, the connection key message includes the key K CONN and the ciphertext.

[0017] It can be seen that in this application, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application can create and send to the terminal device the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN This is beneficial for establishing a secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element, without the need for the application function network element and the core network to interact to obtain the secure connection key, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the application function network element and the core network.

[0018] In an optional implementation, the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element can also use its own private key SK AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed to obtain the signature content. Accordingly, the connection key message also includes the signature content. It can be seen that this embodiment is conducive to enabling a third party, such as an application function network element, to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device based on the signature content.

[0019] In another optional implementation, the application authentication and key management anchor function network element can also use the shared key K EE The ciphertext is calculated to obtain a message verification code, which is also included in the connection key message. As can be seen, this embodiment is conducive to enabling a third party, such as an application function network element, to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device based on the message verification code.

[0020] In an optional embodiment, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application creates a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN Previously, the method also includes: the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application receives a connection key request message from the terminal device, the connection key request message is used to request the key KCONN It can be seen that in this embodiment, the application authentication and key management anchor function network element can respond to the connection key request message from the terminal device and create the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN .

[0021] In an optional implementation, the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element checks whether the terminal device has permission to use the end-to-end security protection service; if the terminal device has permission to use the end-to-end security protection service, the key K used to establish the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element is executed. CONN steps.

[0022] In an optional implementation, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application checks whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, including: sending a query request message to the unified data management network element, the query request message is used to request whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; receiving a query response message from the unified data management network element, the query response message is used to indicate whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service.

[0023] In an optional implementation, the connection key request message includes the identification of the application function network element and the identification of the terminal device; the connection key message includes a public key PK for identifying the application function network element. AF It can be seen that this implementation method uses the public key PK of the application function network element AF Public key identification, distinguishing the public key PK of different application function network elements AF , so that this method can be applied to scenarios with multiple application function network elements.

[0024] In an optional implementation, the network element uses its own private key SK for the authentication and key management anchor function of the application AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed to obtain the signature content, and the connection key message also includes a public key PK for identifying itself AAnF It can be seen that this implementation method can be implemented by the public key PK of the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element AAnF Public key identification, distinguishing the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of different applications AAnF , making this method applicable to scenarios of multi-application authentication and key management anchor function network elements.

[0025] In another optional embodiment, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application uses a shared key K EEThe ciphertext is calculated to obtain the message authentication code. The connection key message also includes the key used to identify the shared key K EE It can be seen that this implementation method can be implemented by identifying the shared key K EE Shared key identifier, distinguishing different shared keys K EE .

[0026] In an optional implementation, the public key PK of the application function network element AF It is pre-stored. That is, the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the terminal device is used to identify the key K CONN Encryption is performed using the public key PK of the application function network element AF It is pre-stored.

[0027] On the third aspect, the present application also provides a session establishment method, which can be applied to a terminal device or a related device of the terminal device, such as a chip or a chip module, etc. The present application is described by taking the terminal device as an example. In this method, the terminal device can send a connection establishment request message to the application function network element, and the connection establishment request message is used to request the establishment of an end-to-end secure connection with the application function network element. The connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, which is the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application using the public key PK of the application function network element. AF The key K used to identify the terminal device and establish an end-to-end secure connection CONN Receive a connection establishment response message from the application function network element.

[0028] It can be seen that in this application, the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device already carries the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN , there is no need for the application function network element to interact with the core network to obtain the security connection key, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the application function network element and the core network.

[0029] In an optional implementation, the connection establishment request message also includes signature content, which is the signature of the application's identity authentication and key management anchor function network element using the private key SK AAnF This implementation enables the application function network element to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device based on the signature content.

[0030] In another optional implementation, the connection establishment request message also includes a message verification code, which is an authentication code used by the application's identity verification and key management anchor function network element using the shared key K EE It can be seen that this embodiment enables the application function network element to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device according to the message authentication code.

[0031] In an optional embodiment, before the terminal device sends a connection establishment request message to the application function network element, the method further includes: sending a connection key request message to the application authentication and key management anchor function network element, the connection key request message is used to request the key K CONN Furthermore, the terminal device receives a connection key message from the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element, the connection key message includes the key K CONN Optionally, the connection key message may further include signature content or a message verification code.

[0032] In an optional embodiment, the connection key request message includes the identification of the application function network element and the identification of the terminal device. Accordingly, the connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a method for identifying the public key PK AF It can be seen that this implementation method uses the public key PK of the application function network element AF Public key identification, distinguishing the public key PK of different application function network elements AF , so that this method can be applied to scenarios with multiple application function network elements.

[0033] In an optional implementation, the network element uses its own private key SK for the authentication and key management anchor function of the application AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed to obtain the signature content. The connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include the public key PK used to identify the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application. AAnF It can be seen that this implementation method can be implemented by the public key PK of the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element AAnF Public key identification, distinguishing the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of different applications AAnF , making this method applicable to scenarios of multi-application authentication and key management anchor function network elements.

[0034] In another optional embodiment, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application uses a shared key K EE The ciphertext is calculated to obtain the message authentication code. The connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a method for identifying the shared key K EE It can be seen that this implementation can be achieved by identifying the shared key K EE Shared key identifier, distinguishing different shared keys K EE .

[0035] In an optional implementation, the connection establishment request message further includes a timestamp when the terminal device initiates the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection.

[0036] In an optional implementation, the ciphertext is the identifier of the terminal device and the key K CONN In another optional embodiment, the ciphertext is the terminal device's identifier and key K CONN The ciphertext is combined into two tuples and then encrypted.

[0037] In the fourth aspect, the present application also provides a session establishment method, which is explained from the perspective of the interaction between the application function network element, the terminal device and the application's identity authentication and key management anchor function network element. In this method, the terminal device sends a connection establishment request message to the application function network element, and the connection establishment request message is used to request the establishment of an end-to-end secure connection with the application function network element. The connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, which is the public key PK of the application's identity authentication and key management anchor function network element using the application function network element. AF The key K used to identify the terminal device and establish an end-to-end secure connection CONN The application function network element can receive the connection establishment request message and use its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the key K CONN ; Furthermore, the application function network element can send a connection establishment response message to the terminal device, and accordingly, the terminal device can receive the connection establishment response message.

[0038] It can be seen that in this application, the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device already carries the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN , there is no need for the application function network element to interact with the core network to obtain the security connection key, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the application function network element and the core network.

[0039] In an optional embodiment, before the terminal device sends a connection establishment request message to the application function network element, the method further includes: the application authentication and key management anchor function network element creates a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN ; and use the public key PK of the application function network element AF The identification of the terminal device, the key K CONN Encrypt to obtain ciphertext; send a connection key message to the terminal device, which includes the key K CONN It can be seen that in this embodiment, the connection key message sent by the application authentication and key management anchor function network element to the terminal device may include the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONNand its ciphertext, so that the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device can carry the key K CONN There is no need for interaction between the application function network element and the core network to obtain the security connection key.

[0040] In an optional implementation, the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element can use its own private key SK AAnF Digitally sign the ciphertext to obtain the signature content. Correspondingly, the connection key message also includes the signature content, and the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device also includes the signature content. Then, the application function network element can use the public key PK of the application's identity authentication and key management anchor function network element AAnF Verify the signature content; if the signature content is verified, the application function network element executes the above using its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the key K CONN It can be seen that this implementation enables the application function network element to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device based on the signature content.

[0041] In an optional implementation, the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function element applied in the application function network element AAnF In an optional implementation, the public key PK of the application function network element in the application authentication and key management anchor function network element is pre-stored. AF It is pre-stored.

[0042] In an optional implementation, the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application can use the shared key K EE The ciphertext is calculated to obtain a message verification code, which is also included in the connection key message. Correspondingly, the connection key message also includes the message verification code, and the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device also includes the message verification code. Then, the application function network element can use the shared key K EE Verify the message verification code; if the message verification code is verified, execute the above using your own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the key K CONN It can be seen that this embodiment enables the application function network element to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device according to the message verification code.

[0043] In an optional implementation, the terminal device may send a connection key request message to the authentication and key management anchor function element of the application, wherein the connection key request message is used to request the key K CONN; Accordingly, the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element receives a connection key request message from the terminal device; further, the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element executes the key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element CONN .

[0044] In an optional implementation, the connection key request message includes the identification of the application function network element and the identification of the terminal device. Accordingly, the connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a public key PK for identifying AF It can be seen that this implementation method uses the public key PK of the application function network element AF Public key identification, distinguishing the public key PK of different application function network elements AF , so that this method can be applied to scenarios with multiple application function network elements.

[0045] In an optional implementation, the connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a public key PK for identifying the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application. AAnF It can be seen that this implementation method can be implemented by the public key PK of the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element AAnF Public key identification, distinguishing the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of different applications AAnF , so that the method can be applied to the scenario of multi-application authentication and key management anchor function network element. Or, in an optional implementation, the connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a message for identifying the shared key K EE It can be seen that this implementation can be achieved by identifying the shared key K EE Shared key identifier, distinguishing different shared keys K EE .

[0046] In an optional implementation, the connection establishment request message further includes a timestamp of when the terminal device initiates the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection.

[0047] In an optional implementation, after receiving the connection key request message from the terminal device, the application authentication and key management anchor function network element may also check whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; if the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, the key K used to establish the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element is executed. CONN steps.

[0048] In an optional implementation, the application's authentication and key management anchor function network element checks whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, including: sending a query request message to the unified data management network element, the query request message is used to request whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; receiving a query response message from the unified data management network element, the query response message is used to indicate whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service.

[0049] Optional, public key PK of the application function network element in the application authentication and key management anchor function network element AF It is pre-stored; the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function element applied in the application function network element AAnF It is pre-stored.

[0050] In a fifth aspect, the present application also provides a communication device, which may include a processor and an interface circuit, wherein the interface circuit is used to receive signals from other communication devices outside the communication device and transmit them to the processor or send signals from the processor to other communication devices outside the communication device, and the processor is used to implement the method shown in any one of the first to third aspects or any possible implementation methods thereof through a logic circuit or executing code instructions.

[0051] In a sixth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores instructions. When the computer program or instructions are executed by a communication device, the method shown in any one of the first to third aspects or any possible implementation thereof is implemented.

[0052] In a seventh aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising computer instructions, which, when read and executed by a computer, enables the computer to perform the method as shown in any one of the first to third aspects or any possible implementation thereof.

[0053] In an eighth aspect, the present application provides a communication system comprising at least one communication device for executing the method described in the first aspect above, at least one communication device for executing the method described in the second aspect above, and at least one communication device for executing the method described in the third aspect above.

[0054] In a ninth aspect, the present application provides a circuit coupled to a memory, the circuit being used to execute the method as described in any one of the first to third aspects or any possible implementation thereof. Optionally, the circuit may include a chip circuit.

[0055] In a tenth aspect, the present application provides a device comprising a module or unit for implementing the method as shown in any one of the first to third aspects or any possible implementation thereof. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0056] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an AKMA introduced in an embodiment of the present application;

[0057] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a simplified GBA architecture introduced in an embodiment of the present application;

[0058] FIG3 is a flow chart of a method for establishing a session according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] FIG4 is a flow chart of another session establishment method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] FIG5 is a flow chart of another session establishment method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] FIG6 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] FIG7 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, unless otherwise specified, “ / ” means or, for example, A / B can mean A or B; “and / or” in the text is merely a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that three relationships may exist, for example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, in the description of the embodiments of the present application, “multiple” refers to two or more than two.

[0064] In the following, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood to imply or suggest relative importance or implicitly indicate the number of the technical features indicated. Therefore, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise specified, "plurality" means two or more.

[0065] This application introduces a session establishment method, in which the connection establishment request message sent by the terminal device can carry a key K CONN , the key K CONN It can be used to establish a secure connection between a terminal device and an application function network element. In this way, the application function network element does not need to interact with the core network to obtain a secure connection key, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the application function network element and the core network.

[0066] First, this application introduces an architectural diagram of Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA). As shown in Figure 1, the AKMA architecture introduces the AKMA Anchor Function (AAnF) into the fifth generation (5G) communication system. The role of AAnF is to generate and manage session keys provided to the application function network element. The session key is used to protect the communication between the terminal device and the application server. AKMA is an operator service that utilizes home network security materials. AAnF belongs to the home public land mobile network and maintains the context of the AKMA service for each user equipment (UE).

[0067] The 5G communication system is divided into an access network and a core network. The access network implements wireless access-related functions through access network equipment. Network functions are modularly disassembled, and decoupled network functions (NFs) can be independently expanded, evolved, and deployed on demand. Service-based interfaces are used between all NFs on the control plane. The same service can be called by multiple NFs, reducing the coupling between the interface definitions of NFs, ultimately achieving on-demand customization of the entire network functions and flexibly supporting different business scenarios and requirements. As shown in Figure 1, the interfaces between the service-based NF network elements are service-based interfaces, and the interactive messages are service-based messages. Optionally, the architecture can also include UEs.

[0068] A UE is a device with wireless transceiver capabilities that can be deployed on land, indoors or outdoors, as a handheld, wearable, or vehicle-mounted device; on water (such as ships); or in the air (for example, on airplanes, balloons, and satellites). A UE can be a mobile phone, tablet, computer with wireless transceiver capabilities, virtual reality (VR) terminal device, augmented reality (AR) terminal device, wireless terminal for industrial control, vehicle-mounted terminal device, wireless terminal for self-driving, wireless terminal for remote medical care, wireless terminal for smart grids, wireless terminal for transportation safety, wireless terminal for smart cities, wireless terminal for smart homes, wearable terminal device, and so on. A UE is sometimes also referred to as a terminal, terminal device, access terminal device, vehicle-mounted terminal, industrial control terminal, UE unit, UE station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal device, mobile device, UE agent, or UE device. The UE may also be fixed or mobile.

[0069] The access network implements access-related functions, providing network access to authorized users in a specific area and enabling the use of different quality transmission tunnels for user data based on user level and service requirements. The access network forwards control signals and user data between terminal devices and the core network. The access network can include access network equipment. For example, in this application, information exchanged between tag devices and core network elements can be forwarded via access network equipment.

[0070] Access network equipment provides access to UEs and can include radio access network (RAN) equipment and AN equipment. (R)AN equipment is primarily responsible for air interface functions such as radio resource management, quality of service (QoS) management, data compression and encryption, etc. RAN equipment can include various base stations, such as macro base stations, micro base stations (also known as small base stations), relay stations, access points, and balloon stations. In systems using different radio access technologies, the names of devices with base station functions may vary. For example, in long-term evolution (LTE) systems, fifth-generation (5G), sixth-generation (6G), and even seventh-generation (7G) systems, network devices may be called: RAN or next-generation Node basestation (gNB), evolved NodeB (eNB or eNodeB), base station controller (BSC), base transceiver station (BTS), home network device (e.g., home evolved Node B or home Node B, HNB), baseband unit (BBU), access point (AP) in wireless fidelity (WIFI) systems, wireless relay node, wireless backhaul node, transmission and reception point (TRP), transmission point (TP) point, TP), etc.; or one or a group of (including multiple antenna panels) antenna panels of a network device in a 5G system, or it can also be a network node constituting a gNB or transmission point, such as a baseband unit (BBU), or a distributed unit (DU), or a road side unit (RSU) in a vehicle to everything (V2X) or intelligent driving scenario.

[0071] In some deployments, a gNB or transmission point may include a centralized unit (CU) and a DU. A gNB or transmission point may also include a radio unit (RU). The CU implements some of the gNB or transmission point's functions, while the DU implements some of the gNB or transmission point's functions. For example, the CU implements radio resource control (RRC) and packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer functions, while the DU implements radio link control (RLC), media access control (MAC), and physical (PHY) layer functions. Because RRC layer information ultimately becomes physical layer information, or is converted from physical layer information, in this architecture, higher-layer signaling, such as RRC layer signaling or PDCP layer signaling, can also be considered to be sent by the DU, or by both the DU and the RU. It is understood that a network device can be a CU node, a DU node, or a device that includes both a CU node and a DU node. Optionally, the network device can also be an auxiliary communication device, such as a satellite.

[0072] The core network is responsible for maintaining mobile network subscription data and providing terminal devices with session management, mobility management, policy management, and security authentication. As shown in Figure 1, the core network can include the following network elements: authentication server function (AUSF), access and mobility management function (AMF), unified data management (UDM), and application function (AF).

[0073] The AUSF network element is used to perform security authentication of the UE. The NSSF network element is used to select network slices for the UE. The NEF network element is mainly used to support the opening of capabilities and events. The AMF network element is mainly responsible for mobility management in mobile networks, such as user location update, user registration network, user switching, etc. The UDM network element is used to store user data, such as subscription data, authentication / authorization data, etc. The AF network element or application server (NAF, Network Application Function) mainly supports interaction with the 3GPP core network to provide services, such as influencing data routing decisions, policy control functions, or providing some third-party services to the network side.

[0074] In addition, as shown in Figure 1, the UE and AMF network elements can interact via the N1 interface. Similar interactions occur between other network function network elements, such as the AN and AMF network elements, which can interact via the N2 interface. All NF network elements on the control plane can interact using service-based interfaces. UDM network elements and AUSF network elements can interact via the service-based interface N13. AF network elements and AAnf network elements can interact via the service-based interface N62. AUSF network elements and AMF network elements can interact via the service-based interface N12. AAnf network elements and AUSF network elements can interact via the service-based interface N61.

[0075] The Ua* reference point transports application protocols, similar to the Ua* reference point defined by the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA). This reference point supports interactions between the UE and AF during the AKMA process and is subsequently protected by AKMA application keys based on specific application protocols over Ua*. The Ua* reference point defined by GBA represents application protocols protected by key material (where key material is the parameters used to create keys) agreed upon between the UE and AF network elements, with the support of the Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF).

[0076] In mobile communication systems, authentication and key agreement use the AKA protocol, an authentication and key agreement process defined by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The AKA protocol implements access authentication and session key agreement for mobile communication systems by using a symmetric key shared between the operator network and the (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM card. After the UE successfully runs the AKA protocol and successfully accesses the operator network (also known as successful primary authentication between the UE and the 3GPP network element), the UE and the operator share security keys. These shared keys are further used to establish a secure communication channel between the UE and the application server.

[0077] In the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) technology and GBA technology, when the UE establishes a new secure connection with the AF / NAF, the AF / NAF needs to interact with the core network to obtain the security connection key between the UE and the AF / NAF.

[0078] For example, in the AKMA architecture shown in FIG1 , the process of establishing a connection between the UE and the AF network element may include: (1) before the UE initiates communication with the AF network element, the UE uses the key K of the AUSF network element to AUSF Generate AKMA anchor key K AKMA and AKMA anchor key identifier A-KID; when the UE initiates communication with the AF network element, the UE sends a session establishment request message to the AF network element, wherein the session establishment request message includes the derived A-KID; the UE may derive the security connection key K before or after sending the session establishment request message AF (2) If the AF network element does not have an active context associated with the A-KID, the AF network element selects the AAnF network element with the A-KID and sends an AKMA application key acquisition request (Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get) request to the AAnF network element to request the UE's security connection key K AF ; (3) If the AAnF network element does not have K AF , then AAnF network element from K AKMA Export the AKMA application key K AF ; (4) AAnF network element sends Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get response to AF network element, which includes K AF and K AF (5) The AF network element sends an application session establishment response to the UE. If the information in the Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get response in step (4) indicates that the AKMA key request failed, the AF network element in step (5) may reject the UE's application session establishment by including the failure reason in the application session establishment response.

[0079] For example, Figure 2 shows a simplified GBA architecture diagram. The BSF is defined as an independent network element responsible for authenticating the UE, maintaining security context, and deriving keys for subsequent UE use. In the GBA process, authentication between the UE and BSF is achieved through a separate AKA procedure, separate from the primary authentication process. This separate AKA procedure allows the UE to access the operator's network. GBA enables independent access (independent of primary authentication), meaning it can operate in Wi-Fi and wired environments without the need for a cellular connection. In this architecture diagram, the Ub reference point between the UE and BSF is based on the HTTP protocol to support the bootstrapping process. The Ua reference point between the UE and the AF network element or NAF represents an application protocol protected by key material agreed upon between the UE and the AF network element or NAF, supported by the BSF. The Zh reference point between the BSF and the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is used to access the authentication vector and subscription credentials used in the bootstrapping process. The Zn reference point between the BSF and the AF network element or NAF is used by the AF network element or NAF to request key material from the BSF to ensure communication between the UE and the NAF.

[0080] In the GBA architecture shown in FIG2 , the process of establishing a connection between the UE and the AF network element may include: (1) the UE communicates with the NAF via the reference point Ua, and the communication request carries the UE identifier B-TID; (2) the NAF communicates with the BSF via the reference point Zn, and the communication request carries the AF network element identifier NAF-ID and the UE identifier B-TID; (3) the BSF derives the key required to protect the protocol used on the reference point Ua from the key Ks and the key derivation parameter, and provides the NAF with the requested key Ks_NAF and the boot time and lifetime of the key Ks_NAF. In addition, if the key identified by the UE identifier B-TID provided by the NAF is not available at the BSF, the BSF may indicate this in its reply to the NAF, and the NAF may then indicate a bootstrap renegotiation request to the UE; (4) the NAF responds to the UE, at which point the secure connection between the UE and the AF network element is established. It can be seen that when the UE establishes a secure connection with the AF / NAF, the NAF needs to interact with the core network to obtain the security connection key Ks_NAF between the UE and the AF network element.

[0081] It should be noted that the above only lists the 5G communication systems to which the session establishment method provided in the embodiment of the present application is applicable. The session establishment method provided in the embodiment of the present application can also be applied to future communication systems such as 4G, sixth generation (6G) and even seventh generation (7G) systems. The functions of the core network control plane network elements and the core network user plane network elements in the 4G communication system are similar to those in the 5G communication system, and this application will not list them one by one here. The network architecture and business scenarios described in the embodiment of the present application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiment of the present application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided in the embodiment of the present application. It is known to those skilled in the art that with the evolution of the communication network architecture and the emergence of new business scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiment of the present application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0082] The session establishment method is described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0083] Please refer to Figure 3, which is a flow chart of a session establishment method provided by an embodiment of the present application. The method is described from the perspective of the interaction between the UE, the AAnF network element, and the AF network element. Part or all of the steps performed by the AAnF network element can be performed by other network elements in the core network. Figure 3 illustrates the execution of the AAnF network element as an example. As shown in Figure 3, the method may include but is not limited to the following steps:

[0084] S101. The AAnF network element creates a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element. CONN , AAnF network element uses the public key PK of AF network element AF The UE's identity and the key K CONN Encrypt and obtain ciphertext.

[0085] Optional, the public key PK of the AF network element in the AAnF network element AF It is pre-stored. Optionally, during the encryption process, the AAnF network element can store the key K CONN and UE identification separately to obtain the corresponding ciphertext; or, the AAnF network element can use the key K CONN and the UE identifier into a two-tuple. For example, if the UE identifier is UE_ID, then the two-tuple can be (K CONN , UE_ID), then the AAnF network element encrypts the two-tuple to obtain the ciphertext.

[0086] In an optional embodiment, the method further includes: the UE may send a connection key request message to the AAnF network element, the connection key request message being used to request the key K CONNAccordingly, the AAnF network element receives a connection key request message from the terminal device, and executes the key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element. CONN Optionally, the UE may send a connection key request message to the AAnF network element via the AMF network element and the AUSF network element. Optionally, the connection key message sent by the AAnF network element to the UE may be referred to as a connection key response message. In an optional implementation, after the AAnF network element receives the connection key request message from the UE, the method further includes: the AAnF network element may check whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; if the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, then the key K used to establish the end-to-end security connection between the UE and the AF network element is created. CONN Optionally, the AAnF network element checks whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, including: the AAnF network element sends a query request message to the UDM network element, where the query request message is used to request (or query) whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; the AAnF network element receives a query response message from the UDM network element, where the query response message is used to indicate whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service.

[0087] S102, the AAnF network element sends a connection key message to the UE, the connection key message includes the key K CONN and the ciphertext; accordingly, the UE receives the connection key message.

[0088] S103, the UE sends a connection establishment request message to the AF network element, the connection establishment request message is used to request to establish an end-to-end secure connection with the AF network element, the connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, the ciphertext is the AAnF network element using the AF network element's public key PK AF The key K used to identify the UE and establish an end-to-end secure connection CONN correspondingly, the AF network element can receive the connection establishment request message.

[0089] The AAnF network element encrypts the UE's identity to prevent attackers from intercepting the connection establishment request message and identifying the UE initiating the connection, thereby protecting the confidentiality of data or information during transmission. Optionally, the connection establishment request message sent by the UE to the AF network element also includes a timestamp when the UE initiates the end-to-end secure connection establishment.

[0090] S104, AF network element uses its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the key K CONN .

[0091] S105. The AF network element may send a connection establishment response message to the UE. Correspondingly, the UE may receive the connection establishment response message.

[0092] Optionally, if the AF network element cannot decrypt the ciphertext, obtain the key K CONN , the UE may be informed of the connection establishment failure, or the connection establishment failure and the reason for the failure, etc., through a connection establishment response message. Optionally, the UE may initiate a connection establishment request message again.

[0093] It can be seen that in the session establishment method shown in FIG3 , the connection establishment request message sent by the UE may carry the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection. CONN When the UE and the AF network element first establish a secure connection, or when the key K on the UE side CONN In the event of failure or update, there is no need for the AF network element to interact with the core network to obtain the security connection key K CONN , thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between AF network elements and the core network.

[0094] The following describes optional implementations of the session establishment method.

[0095] In an optional implementation, the method further includes: the AAnF network element uses its own private key SK AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed to obtain the signature content. Accordingly, the connection key message sent by the AAnF network element to the UE also includes the signature content. In this way, the connection establishment request message sent by the UE to the AF network element also includes the signature content; the AF network element uses the public key PK of the AAnF network element to AAnF Verify the signature content. If the signature content is verified, execute the above-mentioned method using its own private key SK AF It can be seen that this implementation enables the AF network element to determine the legitimacy of the UE based on the signature content. In other words, if the signature content is verified, it means that the core network believes that the UE is a legitimate UE and the UE has the right to use the end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element to establish services.

[0096] Optionally, the AF network element uses the public key PK of the AAnF network element AAnF Verify the signature content. If the signature content verification fails, the AF network element may send a connection establishment response message in advance. The connection establishment response message may be used to inform the UE that the connection establishment failed, or to inform the UE of the connection establishment failure and the reason for the failure. Optionally, the AF network element uses the public key PK of the AAnF network element. AAnF It is pre-stored. Optional, if the AAnF network element stores the key K CONNThe AAnF network element uses its own private key SK to encrypt the UE identity separately. AAnF The ciphertext can be digitally signed by signing each ciphertext separately. If the AAnF network element encrypts the above two tuples, then the AAnF network element uses its own private key SK AAnF The ciphertext may be digitally signed by signing the ciphertext after the binary tuple is encrypted.

[0097] In another optional embodiment, the method further includes: the AAnF network element can use the shared key K EE The ciphertext is calculated to obtain the message authentication code. Accordingly, the connection key message sent by the AAnF network element to the UE also includes the message authentication code. In this way, the connection establishment request message sent by the UE to the AF network element also includes the message authentication code. Then, the AF network element can use the shared key K EE Verify the message verification code. If the message verification code passes the verification, execute the above-mentioned method using its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the key K CONN It can be seen that this implementation enables the application function network element to determine the legitimacy of the terminal device based on the message verification code. In other words, if the message verification code is verified, it means that the core network believes that the UE is a legitimate UE and the UE has the right to use the end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element to establish services.

[0098] Optionally, the AF network element uses the shared key K EE Verify the message authentication code. If the message authentication code fails to be verified, the AF network element may send a connection establishment response message in advance. The connection establishment response message may be used to inform the UE that the connection establishment has failed, or to inform the UE of the connection establishment failure and the reason for the failure. Optionally, the shared key K used by the AF network element EE It is pre-stored. Optional, if the AAnF network element stores the key K CONN The AAnF network element uses the shared key K EE The process of calculating the ciphertext to obtain the message authentication code can be to calculate the message authentication code separately. If the AAnF network element encrypts the above two tuples, then the AAnF network element uses the shared key K EE The process of calculating the ciphertext to obtain the message authentication code may be to calculate the message authentication code together with the ciphertext encrypted with the binary.

[0099] Optionally, the connection key request message sent by the UE to the AAnF network element includes or carries the identifier of the AF network element, such as AF_ID, and the identifier of the UE. In this way, after receiving the connection key request message, the AAnF network element can use the identifier of the AF network element, such as AF_ID, to find the public key PK of the AF network element from the stored keys. AF , thus, executing step S101 using the public key PK AF The UE's identity and the key K CONN In addition, the connection key response message sent by the AAnF network element to the UE may include the public key PK AF Public key identifier PK AF _ID, the connection establishment request message sent by the UE to the AF network element may also include the public key PK AF Public key identifier PK AF _ID, so that the AF network element can identify PK based on the public key AF _ID, find the corresponding private key SK AF , to perform the decryption of the ciphertext and obtain the key K CONN It can be seen that this implementation method uses the public key PK of the AF network element AF Public key identifier PK AF _ID, public key PK to distinguish different AF network elements AF , so that this method can be applied to scenarios with multiple application function network elements.

[0100] Optionally, the AAnF network element uses its own private key to SK AAnF In the implementation method of digitally signing the ciphertext, the connection key message sent by the AAnF network element to the UE and the connection establishment request message sent by the UE to the AF network element also include the public key PK of the AAnF network element. AAnF In this way, the AF network element can identify the public key PK AAnF _ID, retrieve the pre-stored public key PK of the AAnF network element AAnF , to verify the signature content. It can be seen that this implementation method can be implemented by the public key PK of the AAnF network element AAnF Public key identifier PK AAnF _ID, distinguishing the public key PK of different AAnF network elements AAnF , making this method applicable to scenarios of multi-application authentication and key management anchor function network elements.

[0101] Optionally, for AAnF network elements, use the shared key K EE For the implementation method of calculating the message authentication code of the ciphertext, the connection key message sent by the AAnF network element to the UE and the connection establishment request message sent by the UE to the AF network element also include the shared key KEE Shared key identifier K EE _ID. Then, the AF network element can identify K according to the shared key EE _ID, retrieve the pre-stored shared key K EE , to use the shared key K EE Verify the message verification code.

[0102] Optional, the public key PK of the AF network element in the AAnF network element AF It is pre-stored. Optional, the public key PK of the AAnF network element in the AF network element AAnF It is pre-stored. Optionally, the shared key K in the AAnF network element and the AF network element EE Optionally, these pre-stored public keys or shared keys may also be interactively obtained in advance, which is not limited in the present embodiment.

[0103] Please refer to Figure 4, which is a flow chart of another session establishment method provided by an embodiment of the present application. This method is mainly explained from the perspective of the interaction between the AAnF network element, the UE, and the AF network element. The session establishment method shown in Figure 4 uses the method of verifying the legitimacy of the UE using the signature content as an example. As shown in Figure 4, the session establishment method may include but is not limited to the following steps:

[0104] S201a, AAnF network element pre-stores the public key PK of AF network element AF , S201b, AF network element pre-stores the public key PK of AAnF network element AAnF .

[0105] S202: The UE accesses the network and completes the main authentication process.

[0106] Optionally, the main authentication process can be defined in 6.1.3.1 or 6.1.3.2 of TS 33.501. For example, the UE initiates an authentication request, the UDM network element creates an authentication vector for the UE, and the UE creates a response message RES* based on the authentication parameters RAND and AUTH fields in the authentication vector. The AUSF verifies that the RES* returned by the UE is consistent with the locally pre-calculated expected response information XRES*. If the two are consistent, the verification passes. After the verification passes, the UE returns the authentication pass or authentication failure result to the AMF network element.

[0107] S203, UE sends a connection key request message to AAnF network element via AMF network element and AUSF network element. The connection key request message is used to request the key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between UE and AF network element. CONN The connection key request message carries the UE identifier and the AF network element identifier AF_ID.

[0108] S204. The AAnF network element checks whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service. If it has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, step S205 is executed. Otherwise, the AAnF network element refuses to respond to the connection key request message of the UE, or sends a connection key response message to inform the UE of the failure of the connection key request and the reason for the failure.

[0109] As mentioned above, the AAnF network element checks whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service. This can be achieved by the AAnF network element querying the UDM network element for subscription data; alternatively, the AAnF network element checks whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service by querying the local configuration policy.

[0110] S205. The AAnF network element creates a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element. CONN ; The AAnF network element uses the AF network element's identifier AF_ID to retrieve the AF network element's public key PK from the pre-stored key AF Then, use the public key PK AF Encryption K CONN and UE's identity, obtain the ciphertext, and then use AAnF's private key SK AAnF Sign the ciphertext and obtain the signature content.

[0111] Among them, the AAnF network element creates the key K CONN The method can be derived from the master authentication key (such as K AUSF ), or it can be obtained by the AAnF network element using a random number generated by itself.

[0112] S206. The AAnF network element sends a connection key response message to the UE. Correspondingly, the UE receives the connection key response message.

[0113] As described above in each optional embodiment, the connection key response message may optionally include the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element. CONN , ciphertext, signature content, AAnF network element public key identifier PK AAnF _ID and AF network element's public key identifier PK AF _ID. The AAnF network element may send the connection key response message to the UE via the AUSF network element and the AMF network element. For example, if the AAnF network element receives the UE's identifier and key K CONN Separate encryption and separate signature, the connection key response message can carry the key K CONN , Use public key PK AF Encryption K CONN The ciphertext (Enc(K CONN )PK AF), using the private key SK AAnF Encryption (Enc(K CONN )PK AF )Signature content obtained by signing (Sig(Enc(K CONN )PK AF )SK AAnF ), using public key PK AF Encrypted UE ID ciphertext (Enc(UE_ID)PK AF ), using the private key SK AAnF Encrypted text (Enc (UE_ID) PK AF )Signature content obtained (Sig(Enc(UE_ID)PK AF )SK AAnF ), AAnF network element public key identifier PK AAnF _ID and AF network element's public key identifier PK AF _ID.

[0114] Among them, the relevant contents of the ciphertext and signature content can be referred to the implementation method described above and will not be described in detail here.

[0115] S207. When the UE needs to initiate communication with the AF network element, the UE initiates a secure connection establishment request, such as sending a connection establishment request message to the AF network element; correspondingly, the AF network element receives the connection establishment request message.

[0116] As described above in each optional implementation mode, optionally, the connection establishment request message carries the ciphertext, signature content, and the public key identifier PK of the AAnF network element. AAnF _ID, AF network element public key identifier PK AF _ID, and the timestamp of initiating the security connection establishment request. For example, if the AAnF network element has the UE's identity and key K CONN Separate encryption and separate signature, the connection establishment request message can carry Enc(K CONN )PK AF 、Sig(Enc(K CONN )PK AF )SK AAnF 、Enc(UE_ID)PK AF 、Sig(Enc(UE_ID)PK AF )SK AAnF PK AAnF _ID, PK AF _ID, and timestamp.

[0117] S208, the AF network element uses the pre-stored public key PK of the AAnF network element AAnFVerify the signature content. If the signature content is verified, use your own private key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the key K used when the UE and the AF network element establish a secure connection CONN .

[0118] S209, the AF network element replies to the UE with a connection establishment response message, completing the secure connection establishment process between the UE and the AF network element. CONN Protect.

[0119] It can be seen that the session establishment method shown in FIG4 pre-sets a key (such as their respective public keys PK) between the AAnF network element and the AF network element so that the key K CONN Generated by the core network and sent to the UE, so that the UE can directly carry the security connection key K between the UE and the AF network element during the secure connection establishment request process CONN , so that the AF network element no longer needs to communicate with the core network to obtain the security connection key between the UE and the AF network element, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the AF network element and the core network.

[0120] Please refer to Figure 5, which is a flow chart of another session establishment method provided by an embodiment of the present application. This method is mainly explained from the perspective of the interaction between the AAnF network element, the UE, and the AF network element. The session establishment method shown in Figure 5 uses the message authentication code to verify the legitimacy of the UE as an example. As shown in Figure 5, the session establishment method may include but is not limited to the following steps:

[0121] S301a, AAnF network element pre-stores the public key PK of AF network element AF and the shared key K EE , S301b, AF network element pre-stores shared key K EE .

[0122] Optionally, the AAnF network element and the AF network element can also pre-store the shared key K EE Shared key identifier K EE _ID.

[0123] S302: The UE accesses the network and completes the main authentication process.

[0124] Optionally, the main authentication process may be defined in 6.1.3.1 or 6.1.3.2 of TS 33.501, as described in the above step S202, and will not be described in detail here.

[0125] S303, UE sends a connection key request message to AAnF network element via AMF network element and AUSF network element. The connection key request message is used to request the key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between UE and AF network element. CONN The connection key request message carries the UE identifier and the AF network element identifier AF_ID.

[0126] S304. The AAnF network element checks whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service. If it has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service, step S305 is executed. Otherwise, the AAnF network element refuses to respond to the connection key request message of the UE, or sends a connection key response message to inform the UE of the failure of the connection key request and the reason for the failure.

[0127] The manner in which the AAnF network element checks whether the UE has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service is as described above and will not be described in detail here.

[0128] S305. The AAnF network element creates a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element. CONN ; The AAnF network element uses the AF network element's identifier AF_ID to retrieve the AF network element's public key PK from the pre-stored key AF , and then use the public key PK AF Encryption K CONN and UE's identity to obtain the ciphertext; then use the shared key K EE Compute a message authentication code (MAC) or hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) on the ciphertext.

[0129] Among them, the AAnF network element creates the key K CONN The method is as described above and will not be described in detail here.

[0130] S306. The AAnF network element sends a connection key response message to the UE. Correspondingly, the UE receives the connection key response message.

[0131] As described above in each optional embodiment, the connection key response message may optionally include the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection between the UE and the AF network element. CONN , ciphertext, message authentication code, AF network element public key identification PK AF _ID, and the shared key K pre-stored by the AAnF network element and the AF network element EE Shared key identifier K EE_ID. The AAnF network element may send the connection key response message to the UE via the AUSF network element and the AMF network element.

[0132] The relevant contents of the ciphertext and the message verification code may refer to the implementation method described above and will not be described in detail here.

[0133] S307. When the UE needs to initiate communication with the AF network element, the UE initiates a secure connection establishment request, such as sending a connection establishment request message to the AF network element; correspondingly, the AF network element receives the connection establishment request message.

[0134] As described above in each optional implementation mode, optionally, the connection establishment request message carries the ciphertext, the message verification code, and the public key identifier PK of the AF network element. AF _ID, shared key identifier K EE _ID and the timestamp of the secure connection establishment request.

[0135] S308. The AF network element uses the shared key identifier K EE _ID retrieves the pre-stored shared key K EE , verify the message authentication code, if the verification is passed, use your own private key to decrypt the ciphertext, and obtain the key K used when the UE and the AF network element establish a secure connection CONN .

[0136] S309, the AF network element replies to the UE with a connection establishment response message, completing the secure connection establishment process between the UE and the AF network element. The AF network element uses the key K to respond to the connection establishment response message. CONN Protect.

[0137] 5, the session establishment method is performed by presetting keys between the AAnF network element and the AF network element (such as the public key PK of the AF network element, and the shared key K pre-stored by the AAnF network element and the AF network element). EE ) method, so that the key K when the UE and the AF network element establish a secure connection CONN Generated by the core network and sent to the UE, so that the UE can directly carry the security connection key K between the UE and the AF network element during the secure connection establishment request process CONN , so that the AF network element no longer needs to communicate with the core network to obtain the security connection key between the UE and the AF network element, thereby reducing the complexity of the interaction between the AF network element and the core network.

[0138] In the embodiments provided above, the communication method solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application are described from the perspectives of each network element or device itself, and from the perspective of the interaction between each network element or device. It is understood that, in order to implement the above functions, each network element and device, such as the aforementioned application authentication and key management anchor function network element, the application function network element, and the UE, includes hardware structures and / or software units corresponding to the respective functions. Optionally, in the above method embodiments, the information sent by the UE to the application authentication and key management anchor function network element may be sent to the access and mobility management function network element, the authentication service function network element, or the network capability exposure function network element. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that, in conjunction with the various exemplary units and algorithm steps described in the embodiments disclosed herein, the present application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is implemented in hardware or by computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professionals and technicians may use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0139] Please refer to FIG6 , which is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in this application. The communication device shown in FIG6 includes a transceiver module 601 and a processing module 602 .

[0140] In one embodiment, in one design, the communication device is an application function network element or a device related to the application function network element:

[0141] Exemplarily, the transceiver module 601 is used to receive a connection establishment request message from a terminal device, the connection establishment request message is used to request the establishment of an end-to-end secure connection, the connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, the ciphertext is the public key PK of the application authentication and key management anchor function network element using the application function network element AF The key K used to identify the terminal device and establish an end-to-end secure connection CONN Processing module 602 is used to use its own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN ; The transceiver module 601 is also used to send a connection establishment response message to the terminal device.

[0142] Optionally, when the communication device is an application function network element or a device related to an application function network element, it is used to implement the functions of the application function network element and optional implementation methods in the embodiments shown in Figures 3 to 5.

[0143] In one design, the communication device is an application authentication and key management anchor function network element or a related device in the application authentication and key management anchor function network element:

[0144] Exemplarily, the processing module 602 is configured to create a key K used when establishing an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. CONN Processing module 602 is also used to use the public key PK of the application function network element AF Identification of the terminal device, key K CONN Encryption is performed to obtain a ciphertext; a transceiver module 601 is configured to send a connection key message to the terminal device, wherein the connection key message includes the key K CONN and the ciphertext.

[0145] Optionally, when the communication device is an access network device, it is used to implement the functions of the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element applied in the embodiments shown in Figures 3 to 5 and the optional implementation methods.

[0146] In one design, the communication device is a terminal device or a device related to the terminal device:

[0147] Exemplarily, the transceiver module 601 sends second information to the session management function network element, where the second information is used to indicate that one or more service flows share bandwidth.

[0148] Optionally, when the communication device is a policy control function network element, it is used to implement the functions of the policy control function network element in the embodiments shown in Figures 3 to 5.

[0149] In one design, the communication device is an application function network element:

[0150] Exemplarily, the transceiver module 601 is used to send a connection establishment request message to the application function network element, the connection establishment request message is used to request to establish an end-to-end secure connection with the application function network element, the connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, the ciphertext is the public key PK of the application authentication and key management anchor function network element using the application function network element AF The key K used to identify the terminal device and establish an end-to-end secure connection CONN The transceiver module 601 is also used to receive a connection establishment response message from the application function network element.

[0151] Optionally, when the communication device is an application function network element, it is used to implement the functions of the application function network element in the embodiments shown in Figures 3 to 5.

[0152] Please refer to Figure 7, which is a schematic diagram of the structure of another communication device provided by the present application. The communication device shown in Figure 7 includes at least one processor 701, a memory 702, and optionally, a transceiver 703. The specific connection medium between the above-mentioned processor 701 and the memory 702 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application. In Figure 7, the connection between the memory 702 and the processor 701 via the bus 704 is taken as an example. The bus 704 is represented by a bold line in the figure. The connection method between other components is only for schematic illustration and is not limited. The bus 704 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of representation, only one bold line is used in Figure 7, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0153] The processor 701 may have a data transceiver function and may communicate with other devices. In the apparatus shown in FIG7 , an independent data transceiver module, such as a transceiver 703, may also be provided for transmitting and receiving data. When the processor 701 communicates with other devices, data may be transmitted through the transceiver 703.

[0154] In one example, when the application function network element adopts the form shown in Figure 7, the processor 701 in Figure 7 can call the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 702 to enable the application function network element to execute the method of application function network element execution in any embodiment of Figures 3 to 5.

[0155] In one example, when the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application adopts the form shown in Figure 7, the processor 701 in Figure 7 can call the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 702 to enable the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application to execute the method executed by the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application in any embodiment of Figures 3 to 5.

[0156] In one example, when the terminal device adopts the form shown in Figure 7, the processor 701 in Figure 7 can call the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 702 to enable the terminal device to execute the method executed by the terminal device in any embodiment of Figures 3 to 5.

[0157] An embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system, which may include the application function network element, the application authentication and key management anchor function network element, and part or all of the terminal equipment in Figures 3 to 5. For details, please refer to the method embodiments described above.

[0158] The solutions described in this application can be implemented in various ways. For example, these technologies can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware. For hardware implementation, the processing module used to execute these technologies at a communication device (e.g., a base station, a terminal, a network entity, a core network element, or a chip) can be implemented in one or more general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor, and optionally, the general-purpose processor can also be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor can also be implemented by a combination of computing devices, such as a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, multiple microprocessors, one or more microprocessors combined with a digital signal processor core, or any other similar configuration.

[0159] It is understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct RAM bus RAM (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0160] The present application also provides a computer-readable medium having instructions stored thereon, which implement the functions of any of the above method embodiments when executed by a computer.

[0161] The present application also provides a computer program product, which implements the functions of any of the above method embodiments when executed by a computer.

[0162] In the above embodiments, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application are generated. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via a wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) method. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated therein. The available medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a high-density digital video disc (DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (eg, a solid state disk (SSD)).

[0163] It is understandable that some optional features in the embodiments of the present application may, in certain scenarios, be implemented independently of other features, such as the solution on which they are currently based, to solve corresponding technical problems and achieve corresponding effects. They may also be combined with other features in certain scenarios as needed. Accordingly, the devices provided in the embodiments of the present application may also implement these features or functions accordingly, which will not be described in detail here.

[0164] Those skilled in the art will also appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks and steps listed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. Whether such functions are implemented by hardware or software depends on the specific application and the design requirements of the entire system. Those skilled in the art may use various methods to implement the described functions for corresponding applications, but such implementation should not be construed as exceeding the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present application.

[0165] It will be understood that the “embodiment” mentioned throughout the specification means that the specific features, structures or characteristics related to the embodiment are included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Therefore, the various embodiments in the entire specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, these specific features, structures or characteristics can be combined in one or more embodiments in any suitable manner. It will be understood that in the various embodiments of the present application, the size of the sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0166] It can be understood that in this application, "when", "if" and "if" all mean that the device will perform corresponding processing under certain objective circumstances, and do not limit the time, nor do they require the device to make judgments when it is implemented, nor do they mean that there are other limitations.

[0167] In this application, elements expressed in the singular are intended to mean "one or more" rather than "one and only one" unless otherwise specified. In this application, unless otherwise specified, "at least one" is intended to mean "one or more" and "a plurality" is intended to mean "two or more."

[0168] Additionally, the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably. The term "and / or" is simply a description of an association between related objects, indicating that three possible relationships exist. For example, "A and / or B" can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, or B exists alone. A can be singular or plural, and B can be singular or plural.

[0169] The predefined in this application may be understood as defined, predefined, stored, pre-stored, pre-negotiated, pre-configured, solidified, or pre-burned.

[0170] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that, for the sake of convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described systems, devices, and units may refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0171] The same or similar parts between the various embodiments in this application can refer to each other. In the various embodiments in this application, and the various implementation methods / implementation methods / implementation methods in each embodiment, if there is no special explanation and logical conflict, the terms and / or descriptions between different embodiments and the various implementation methods / implementation methods / implementation methods in each embodiment are consistent and can be referenced to each other. The technical features in different embodiments and the various implementation methods / implementation methods / implementation methods in each embodiment can be combined to form new embodiments, implementation methods, implementation methods, or implementation methods according to their inherent logical relationships. The above-described implementation methods of this application do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this application.

[0172] The above is only a specific implementation method of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with this technical field can easily think of changes or replacements within the technical scope disclosed in this application, which should be covered by the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A session establishment method, characterized in that: The method comprises: receiving a connection establishment request message from a terminal device, wherein the connection establishment request message is used to request to establish an end-to-end secure connection, and the connection establishment request message includes a ciphertext, The ciphertext is the public key PK of the application function network element using the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element AF The identifier of the terminal device and the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection CONN Encrypted; Using your own private key SK AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN ; Send a connection establishment response message to the terminal device.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The connection establishment request message also includes signature content, and the signature content is the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application using the private key SK AAnF Obtained by digitally signing the ciphertext; The method further comprises: Utilize the public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application AAnF Verifying the signature content; If the signature content is verified, the private key SK is used to execute AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN steps.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The public key PK of the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application AAnF It is pre-stored.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The connection establishment request message also includes a message for identifying the public key PK AF The public key identifier used to identify the public key PK AAnF One or more of the public key identifier and the timestamp of the terminal device initiating the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The connection establishment request message also includes a message verification code, which is a message verification code obtained by the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application using a shared key K EE Obtained by calculating the ciphertext; The method further comprises: Using the shared key K EE Verifying the message verification code; If the message verification code is verified, the private key SK is used to execute the AF Decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the key K CONN steps.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The connection establishment request message also includes a message for identifying the public key PK AF The public key identifier used to identify the shared key K EE One or more of the shared key identifier and the timestamp of the terminal device initiating the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection.

7. A session establishment method, characterized in that: The method comprises: The key K used to establish an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element CONN ; Using the public key PK of the application function network element AF , the identification of the terminal device, the key K CONN Encrypt and obtain ciphertext; Send a connection key message to the terminal device, the connection key message including the key K CONN and the ciphertext.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The method further comprises: Using your own private key SK AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed to obtain the signature content, and the connection key message also includes the signature content.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Using the shared key K EE The ciphertext is calculated to obtain a message verification code, and the connection key message also includes the message verification code.

10. The method according to any one of claims 7 to 9, characterized in that: The key K used to establish an end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element CONN Previously, the method also included: Receive a connection key request message from a terminal device, wherein the connection key request message is used to request the key K CONN .

11. The method according to any one of claims 7 to 10, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Checking whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; If the terminal device has the right to use the end-to-end security protection service, the key K used to establish the end-to-end secure connection between the terminal device and the application function network element is executed. CONN steps.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The checking whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service includes: Sending a query request message to a unified data management network element, wherein the query request message is used to request whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service; A query response message is received from the unified data management network element, where the query response message is used to indicate whether the terminal device has the authority to use the end-to-end security protection service.

13. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The connection key request message includes the identifier of the application function network element and the identifier of the terminal device; the connection key message includes the public key PK used to identify the application function network element AF The public key identifier of the .

14. The method according to claim 8, 9 or 13, characterized in that The connection key message also includes a public key PK for identifying itself AAnF The public key identifier, or, for identifying the shared key K EE The shared key identifier of the 15. The method according to any one of claims 7 to 14, characterized in that The public key PK of the application function network element AF It is pre-stored.

16. A session establishment method, characterized in that: The method comprises: Sending a connection establishment request message to an application function network element, wherein the connection establishment request message is used to request to establish an end-to-end secure connection with the application function network element, and the connection establishment request message includes ciphertext, The ciphertext is the public key PK of the application function network element using the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element AF The identifier of the terminal device and the key K used when establishing the end-to-end secure connection CONN Encrypted; Receive a connection establishment response message from the application function network element.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that The connection establishment request message also includes signature content, and the signature content is the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application using the private key SK AAnF The ciphertext is digitally signed.

18. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that The connection establishment request message also includes a message verification code, which is a message verification code obtained by the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application using a shared key K EE The ciphertext is obtained by calculation.

19. The method according to any one of claims 16 to 18, characterized in that Before sending the connection establishment request message to the application function network element, the method further includes: Send a connection key request message to the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application, the connection key request message is used to request the key K CONN ; Receive a connection key message from the authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application, the connection key message including the key K CONN and the ciphertext; or, the connection key message includes the key K CONN , the ciphertext and the signature content; or, the connection key message includes the key K CONN , the ciphertext and the message verification code.

20. The method according to claim 19, characterized in that The connection key request message includes the identifier of the application function network element and the identifier of the terminal device; The connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a message for identifying the public key PK AF and / or, The connection key message and the connection establishment request message also include a public key PK used to identify the identity authentication and key management anchor function network element of the application AAnF The public key identifier, or also includes a public key for identifying the shared key K EE and / or, The connection establishment request message also includes a timestamp when the terminal device initiates the establishment of the end-to-end secure connection.

21. A communication device, characterized in that: The method comprises a module for executing the method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 6, or comprises a module for executing the method as claimed in any one of claims 7 to 14, or comprises a module for executing the method as claimed in any one of claims 16 to 20.

22. A communication device, characterized in that: The method comprises a processor and an interface circuit, wherein the interface circuit is used to receive signals from other communication devices other than the communication device and transmit them to the processor or send signals from the processor to other communication devices other than the communication device, and the processor is used to implement the method according to claims 1 to 6 through a logic circuit or executes code instructions, or includes the method for implementing any one of claims 7 to 14, or includes the method for implementing any one of claims 16 to 20.

23. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program or instruction. When the computer program or instruction is executed by the communication device, it implements a module of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, or implements the method according to any one of claims 7 to 14, or implements the method according to any one of claims 16 to 20.

24. A communication device, characterized in that: The communication device includes a processor and a transceiver; The transceiver is used to communicate with other communication devices, and the processor is used to run a computer program so that the communication device implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6, or implements the method as described in any one of claims 7 to 14, or implements the method as described in any one of claims 16 to 20.

25. A communication device, characterized in that: The communication device includes a memory, a processor and a transceiver; The transceiver is used to receive signals or send signals, the memory is used to store instructions or computer programs, and the processor is used to execute the computer programs or instructions stored in the memory, so that the communication device performs the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6, or implements the method as described in any one of claims 7 to 14, or implements the method as described in any one of claims 15 to 19.

26. A computer program product, characterized in that The method comprises computer instructions, which, when executed on a computer, enable the computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, or the method according to any one of claims 7 to 14, or the method according to any one of claims 16 to 20.

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