Architecting resilience for enterprise ai: preventing data reconstruction, exfiltration, and unauthorized consequence in compromised ai environments
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/IB2026/057198
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2026-07-06
- Filing Date
- 2026-07-12
- Publication Date
- 2026-08-27
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Abstract
Description
[0001] TITLE :
[0002] Architecting Resilience for Enterprise Al: Preventing Data Reconstruction, Exfiltration, and Unauthorized Consequence in Compromised Al Environments
[0003] Relationship with the Mothership PCT — DAS Protocols
[0004] The present invention is a focused enterprise-data and artificial-intelligence embodiment of the broader execution-finality architecture disclosed in International Application No. PCT /
[0005] IB 2026 / 055615, titled “THE DAS PROTOCOLS,” filed on 4 June 2026.
[0006] The Mothership PCT provides the wider architectural framework for separating computation from authorized effectuation through Protected Authorization State, Mandatory Mediation, protected validation evidence, scoped Release Authority, Technical Non-Completability, and verification at a final consequence -bearing boundary.
[0007] The present invention applies and further develops those principles specifically for:
[0008] • independently controlled enterprise-data vaults;
[0009] • separately protected identity, content, relationship-mapping, and optional cryptographicmaterial domains;
[0010] • non-bearer reconstruction authorization;
[0011] • Technical Non-Joinability outside an authorized reconstruction session;
[0012] • session-bound component release;
[0013] • ephemeral minimum- necessary reconstruction;
[0014] • Sealed Candidate Outputs;
[0015] • live output-time verification;
[0016] • Protected Output Validation Receipts;
[0017] • output- specific Release Authority; and
[0018] • Output Release Boundary control for artificial-intelligence processing.
[0019] The present invention is also technically aligned with the Applicant’s broader body of work developed across 32 Indian provisional patent applications, addressing protected data use, artificial-intelligence execution governance, authority separation, mandatory mediation, hardware- or cryptographically rooted enforcement, and prevention of unauthorized digital, financial, communicative, or physical consequence. This statement of technical alignment is provided for architectural context and does not, by itself, alter the priority entitlement, disclosure content, or legal status of any individual application.
[0020] For a detailed explanation of the invention’s major technical importance, including how the disclosed architecture prevents compromise of an artificial-intelligence server from automaticallybecoming an enterprise-wide breach of protected data, strategic intelligence, future product plans, operational relationships, and external consequence, please navigate to page 35, under the heading:
[0021] “Major Technical Importance: Preventing an Al-Server Breach from Becoming a Breach of the Enterprise’s Future.”
[0022] About the Invention
[0023] A Compromised Al Server Must Not Become a Map of the Enterprise’s Future Modern enterprise security is built on a broken assumption:
[0024] The application server is treated as a trusted boundary.
[0025] That assumption may have been manageable when applications performed narrow, predefined operations. It becomes dangerous when an artificial-intelligence workload can retrieve information from databases, vector stores, internal communications, customer systems, research repositories, source-code platforms, financial systems, and external tools — and then infer relationships across all of them.
[0026] A conventional data breach may expose a collection of existing records.
[0027] A compromised enterprise Al server may do something more damaging: it may continuously correlate those records, reconstruct confidential relationships, infer future products and strategies, identify operational weaknesses, and generate a structured map of what the enterprise is likely to do next.
[0028] That intelligence may be transferred, sold, or exploited by competitors, hostile actors, or criminal markets, potentially undermining years of research, investment, negotiation, and commercial planning.
[0029] The security problem is therefore no longer merely:
[0030] “How do we prevent unauthorized access to data?”
[0031] The more important question is:
[0032] “How do we prevent compromised computation from becoming an unauthorized real-world consequence?”
[0033] The disclosed architecture introduces a transition from conventional perimeter-based security to:
[0034] Execution–Consequence Decoupling
[0035] Under this architecture, the ability to compute a result is separated from the authority required to make that result externally usable or effective.An artificial-intelligence workload may process authorized information. It may even be manipulated, prompt injected, altered, or fully compromised and caused to generate a prohibited result.
[0036] However, generation alone does not create authority to:
[0037] • transmit the result;
[0038] • display it;
[0039] • store it;
[0040] • publish it;
[0041] • invoke a tool;
[0042] • update a database;
[0043] • send it to another model;
[0044] • initiate a payment;
[0045] • control a machine; or
[0046] • otherwise make the result externally effective.
[0047] The architecture is organized around three foundational technical principles.
[0048] The Three Architectural Pillars
[0049] 1. Decomposition of Authority
[0050] No single ordinary server holds complete authority over the entire data-to-consequence transaction. Protected enterprise information may be decomposed among independently controlled domains, including:
[0051] • an identity vault;
[0052] • a content vault;
[0053] • a relationship-mapping vault;
[0054] • a cryptographic-material or reconstruction-enablement domain;
[0055] • a Protected Authorization Domain;
[0056] • an Output Verification Stage;
[0057] • a Protected Receipt Store; and
[0058] • an Output Release Boundary.
[0059] The relationship between protected identity and protected content is treated as an independently controlled technical asset.Authority to access an identity does not automatically provide authority to associate that identity with protected content.
[0060] Authority to access protected content does not automatically provide authority to determine the person, account, organization, device, or commercial relationship to which that content belongs. This creates Technical Non-Joinability outside an authorized reconstruction session.
[0061] Protected information may be joined only where a valid, purpose-bound, context-bound, and session-bound reconstruction operation permits the specific fields and associations required for the authorized task.
[0062] A compromised Al server therefore does not automatically become a universal enterpriseknowledge reconstruction engine.
[0063] 2. Mandatory Mediation
[0064] Every consequence-bearing Candidate Output must pass through an independent protected finality path.
[0065] The artificial-intelligence workload does not receive unrestricted authority to release whatever it generates.
[0066] A Candidate Output may include:
[0067] • text;
[0068] • a report;
[0069] • an image;
[0070] • an API request;
[0071] • a database update;
[0072] • a retrieval query;
[0073] • a tool invocation;
[0074] • an email;
[0075] • a payment instruction;
[0076] • an external-model prompt;
[0077] • a memory write;
[0078] • or a physical control signal.
[0079] Before the Candidate Output can become externally usable, the architecture may re-establish: • the current execution context;
[0080] • the current model and agent state;• current policy;
[0081] • current revocation state;
[0082] • the current Session Epoch;
[0083] • the intended destination;
[0084] • the intended recipient;
[0085] • the permitted field set;
[0086] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[0087] • the authorized purpose;
[0088] • the Disclosure Budget;
[0089] • the Inference-Channel Budget; and
[0090] • the identity of the Output Release Boundary.
[0091] The Candidate Output may also be evaluated for:
[0092] • protected fields;
[0093] • unauthorized identity-content associations;
[0094] • inferred associations;
[0095] • cumulative disclosures;
[0096] • prohibited tool arguments;
[0097] • unauthorized memory writes;
[0098] • destination substitution;
[0099] • and other deviations from the original authorization.
[0100] Where a required condition is stale, missing, ambiguous, inconsistent, unavailable, or unverifiable, the output fails closed.
[0101] This extends the established security principle of complete mediation from access control to the complete execution-to-consequence path.
[0102] 3. Technical Non-Completability
[0103] The artificial-intelligence workload may complete computation without acquiring the ability to complete the external consequence.
[0104] The Candidate Output is maintained as:
[0105] • a Sealed Candidate Output;a protected intermediate artifact;
[0106] • a capability-restricted object;
[0107] • protected memory state;
[0108] • or another technically Non-Releasable representation.
[0109] The compromised workload does not possess sufficient key material, capability, protected state, or output-path authority to independently release the result.
[0110] Even successful output verification does not necessarily create Release Authority.
[0111] A Protected Output Validation Receipt may first be generated and committed to protected receipt state.
[0112] Only after successful receipt commitment may an output- specific Output Release Capability be issued.
[0113] The Output Release Capability may be bound to:
[0114] • the exact verified output;
[0115] • the committed receipt;
[0116] • the session;
[0117] • the Session Epoch;
[0118] • the destination;
[0119] • the recipient;
[0120] • the output type;
[0121] • the expiration condition;
[0122] • and the designated Output Release Boundary.
[0123] The Output Release Boundary alone completes the final transition from a Non-Releasable Candidate Output to an externally effective result.
[0124] This establishes the central technical assurance:
[0125] A breach of computation cannot automatically be escalated into a breach of consequence. The Broken Status Quo
[0126] In a conventional architecture, the attack path may be:
[0127] Al -SERVER COMPROMISE
[0128] DATABASE AND TOOL ACCESS
[0129]
[0130] UNRESTRICTED DATA JOININGENTERPRISE STRATEGY RECONSTRUCTION
[0131] OUTPUT GENERATION EXFILTRATION OR EXTERNAL ACTION
[0132] The same compromised server may possess:
[0133] • database credentials;
[0134] • plaintext access;
[0135] • mapping logic;
[0136] • network authority;
[0137] • tool credentials;
[0138] • file-writing authority;
[0139] • and message-transmission privileges.
[0140] Once the server is compromised, the attacker may inherit the complete chain from information access to external effectuation.
[0141] The Proposed Architecture
[0142] Under the disclosed architecture, the same attack encounters independently enforced technical boundaries:
[0143] Al -SERVER COMPROMISE
[0144] LIMITED SESSION-BOUND DATA VIEW TECHNICAL NON- JOINABILITY RESTRICTS RECONSTRUCTION MALICIOUS CANDIDATE OUTPUT SEALED OR OTHERWISE NON-RELEASABLE STATE
[0145] LIVE EXECUTION AND POLICY RE -VERIFICATION PROVENANCE AND ASSOCIATION- SCOPE EVALUATION PROTECTED RECEIPT COMMITMENT REQUIRED OUTPUT-SPECIFIC RELEASE CAPABILITY REQUIRED
[0146] OUTPUT RELEASE BOUNDARY
[0147]
[0148] EXTERNAL EFFECTUATION ONLY IF ALL CONDITIONS SUCCEED
[0149] The attacker may control the workload while remaining unable to control:the complete data association;
[0150] • the independent validation state;
[0151] • the constitutive receipt commitment;
[0152] • the output- specific Release Authority;
[0153] • or the final effectuation boundary.
[0154] The attack path is therefore interrupted before the prohibited result becomes externally effective.
[0155] Illustrative Threat Scenario
[0156] Consider an enterprise Al assistant connected to customer- support records, product-development repositories, engineering communications, financial systems, and internal planning tools.
[0157] An attacker compromises the Al workload and attempts to:
[0158] 1. identify strategically important customers;
[0159] 2. associate their complaints with unreleased technical defects;
[0160] 3. correlate those defects with internal engineering work;
[0161] 4. infer the enterprise’ s future product roadmap;
[0162] 5. determine intended markets and launch priorities;
[0163] 6. generate a competitive-intelligence report; and
[0164] 7. transmit the report to an attacker-controlled destination.
[0165] In a conventional architecture, the Al server may already possess the credentials and network authority required to complete the attack.
[0166] Under the disclosed architecture:
[0167] • identity, content, and relationship-mapping authority remain independently controlled; • any reconstruction is limited to a particular session and purpose;
[0168] • the attacker cannot freely reuse released components;
[0169] • unauthorized associations fall outside the Permitted Association Scope;
[0170] • the generated report remains a Candidate Output rather than an authorized disclosure; • the Candidate Output is sealed or capability restricted;
[0171] • output-time verification evaluates the changed execution state and prohibited associations;
[0172] • no successful Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed;
[0173] • no valid Output Release Capability is issued; andthe Output Release Boundary refuses transmission.
[0174] The attacker may succeed in making the Al compute the report while failing to make the report externally effective.
[0175] Alignment with Established Security Principles
[0176] The architecture does not replace established security principles. It extends them into Al execution and output finality.
[0177] Zero Trust
[0178] The architecture does not grant continuing trust merely because a workload was authorized at the beginning of a session.
[0179] Execution context, policy, revocation state, destination, recipient, and session state may be reestablished immediately before effectuation.
[0180] Least Privilege
[0181] The artificial-intelligence workload receives only the fields, associations, processing authority, and output authority required for the specific task.
[0182] Permission to access two fields does not automatically become permission to associate them. Permission to compute does not automatically become permission to release.
[0183] Complete Mediation
[0184] Protected operations are mediated not only when data is accessed, but also during:
[0185] • reconstruction;
[0186] • association;
[0187] • output formation;
[0188] • receipt commitment;
[0189] • capability issuance; and
[0190] • external effectuation.
[0191] Separation of Duties
[0192] Storage authority, association authority, verification authority, receipt authority, and final release authority may be distributed among separate technical domains.
[0193] Fail-Safe Defaults
[0194] Absence, ambiguity, staleness, or unavailability of required protected state results in denial rather than permissive release.
[0195] Secure by DesignThe architecture does not rely solely on detecting misuse after disclosure.
[0196] It makes completion of the unauthorized output path technically unavailable before the consequence occurs.
[0197] The Architectural Shift
[0198] The disclosed architecture changes the traditional security question.
[0199] Instead of asking only:
[0200] “Was the workload allowed to access this data?”
[0201] the architecture also asks:
[0202] “Was this specific execution context authorized to form this specific association, for this purpose, in this session, and make this exact result effective at this destination?”
[0203] The invention therefore divides three powers commonly concentrated in one application server: 1. the power to access protected components;
[0204] 2. the power to join those components into meaningful enterprise intelligence; and 3. the power to externalize the resulting intelligence or operation.
[0205] Compromise of one power does not automatically become compromise of all three.
[0206] Central Proposition
[0207] The attacker may compromise the Al workload, but does not thereby obtain unrestricted authority to reconstruct the enterprise’s protected knowledge or externalize the enterprise’s future.
[0208] The invention is not based on the assumption that artificial-intelligence workloads will always remain trustworthy.
[0209] It is based on the opposite assumption:
[0210] The workload may fail, be manipulated, or be compromised — and the architecture must still prevent unauthorized computation from automatically becoming an authorized consequence.
[0211] That is the purpose of Execution–Consequence Decoupling, Technical Non-Joinability, Mandatory Mediation, and Technical Non-Completability.BACKGROUND OF INVENTION
[0212] 1. Technical Field
[0213] The present disclosure relates generally to computer security, enterprise data storage, artificial-intelligence infrastructure, confidential computing, protected data reconstruction, information-flow
[0214] control, authorization systems, provenance enforcement, and control of computer-generated outputs.
[0215] More particularly, the disclosure relates to technical architectures for:
[0216] • separating semantically different components of an enterprise record among independently controlled protected domains;
[0217] • authorizing temporary reconstruction of selected fields and selected associations for a defined artificial-intelligence processing purpose;
[0218] • binding reconstruction authority to an attested execution context and protected session state;
[0219] • maintaining protected source and association information through artificial-intelligence processing;
[0220] • preventing an artificial-intelligence workload from independently releasing a generated result;
[0221] • verifying a generated Candidate Output against current authorization, provenance, association, destination, recipient, and disclosure conditions;
[0222] • committing protected validation evidence before release authority exists; and
[0223] • permitting an output or operation to become externally effective only at a protected Output Release Boundary.
[0224] The disclosure addresses not merely whether an artificial-intelligence workload may read data, but whether computation performed using protected data may be converted into an externally usable or consequence-bearing result.
[0225] 2. Technical Context
[0226] Modern enterprise computing systems increasingly connect artificial-intelligence models, agents, retrieval systems, databases, vector stores, communication services, external tools, application programming interfaces, and automated decision systems.
[0227] An artificial-intelligence workload may retrieve information from several systems, associate information originating from different records, infer relationships not expressly stored in one source, generate human-readable content, invoke tools, update databases, communicate with external systems, or initiate physical or financial operations.
[0228] Consequently, the relevant security problem is no longer limited to protecting a static record from unauthorized reading.
[0229] The technical problem extends across a processing chain that may include:
[0230] 11
[0231] STORAGECOMPONENT RETRIEVAL
[0232] ASSOCIATION OR RECONSTRUCTION ARTIFICIAL- INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING
[0233] INTERMEDIATE DERIVATION OUTPUT GENERATION
[0234]
[0235] TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, INVOCATION, OR EFFECTUATION
[0236] A security decision performed at the beginning of this chain may not remain sufficient at the end of the chain.
[0237] Data that was initially accessed for a permitted purpose may later be:
[0238] • associated with an identity outside the permitted scope;
[0239] • transformed into a new representation;
[0240] • combined with information from another vault or system;
[0241] • inserted into a prompt or tool request;
[0242] • written into persistent agent memory;
[0243] • submitted to a downstream model;
[0244] • included in a generated communication;
[0245] • released to a different recipient;
[0246] • sent to a different jurisdiction;
[0247] • used after authorization has been revoked;
[0248] • or converted into an external action.
[0249] The present technical environment therefore creates a gap between authority to access data and authority to make the result of processing externally effective.
[0250] 3. Persistent Enterprise-Record Exposure
[0251] Many enterprise systems persist identity information, substantive content, and the relationships between them in a directly queryable record, table, document, object, graph, or joined database structure.
[0252] Even where data is encrypted at rest, an application or privileged service may receive authority to retrieve the complete joined record after decryption.
[0253] This creates several technical risks.
[0254] First, compromise of one application credential, ’ tabase interface, privileged account, or administrative plane may expose both the protected content and the identity-content relationship.Second, a workload granted access to selected fields may be able to query, infer, or reconstruct relationships outside the intended purpose.
[0255] Third, once a complete or substantially complete record has been delivered to an artificialintelligence workload, later controls must attempt to govern a workload that already possesses the semantically usable information.
[0256] Fourth, conventional storage permissions may distinguish tables, rows, columns, objects, or files but may not independently control whether two individually accessible values may be associated with one another.
[0257] For example, a system may permit access to an identity value and separately permit access to an event value while lacking a distinct technical control over whether the identity may be associated with that event for a particular purpose, destination, or output.
[0258] The technical problem is therefore not solved merely by splitting a record into multiple database columns or storage locations if one credential, one query interface, one administrator, or one application process can rejoin the separated values without independent authorization.
[0259] 4. Artificial-Intelligence Reconstruction and Correlation Risk
[0260] Artificial-intelligence workloads can derive or regenerate relationships even where direct identifiers have been removed.
[0261] A workload may associate protected information using:
[0262] names;
[0263] aliases;
[0264] contact information;
[0265] account identifiers;
[0266] employee identifiers;
[0267] device identifiers;
[0268] location data;
[0269] temporal patterns;
[0270] behavioural characteristics;
[0271] quasi-identifier combinations;
[0272] vector similarity;
[0273] semantic similarity;
[0274] retrieval context;
[0275] prior conversation state;
[0276] tool responses;
[0277] or model inference. 13Accordingly, conventional field-level redaction or pseudonymization may not prevent reconstruction of an identity-content association.
[0278] A data item may appear non-identifying in isolation while becoming identifying when combined with another data item.
[0279] Similarly, several individually permissible output fragments may cumulatively disclose a prohibited relationship.
[0280] This risk is increased in agentic systems because a workload may:
[0281] • make repeated queries;
[0282] • call several tools;
[0283] • maintain memory;
[0284] • pass information to another agent;
[0285] • retrieve from a vector store;
[0286] • encode information in structured arguments;
[0287] • or distribute disclosure across several output channels.
[0288] The security architecture must therefore govern not only individual fields, but also protected associations, cumulative disclosure, provenance, and downstream effectuation.
[0289] 5. Separation Between Processing Authority and Output Authority
[0290] Existing systems commonly make access decisions when data is requested.
[0291] After access is granted, the workload may receive plaintext, a decrypted object, a database result, a model context, or an application-visible representation.
[0292] The workload may then possess sufficient practical control to:
[0293] • copy the information;
[0294] • encode the information;
[0295] • paraphrase the information;
[0296] • generate a derived disclosure;
[0297] • place the information in a tool argument;
[0298] • write the information to memory;
[0299] • store the information in another system;
[0300] • or transmit the information through an available output interface.
[0301] A later output policy may attempt to inspect the generated result, but the workload may already possess an independently releasable representation or may have access to an alternate path.This creates a structural weakness: the system attempts to regulate release after the workload has already acquired the technical ability to release.
[0302] A need therefore exists for an architecture in which:
[0303] • computation may proceed;
[0304] • a Candidate Output may be generated;
[0305] • but the workload does not thereby acquire Release Authority.
[0306] 6. Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Risk
[0307] An artificial-intelligence execution context may change after reconstruction authorization is granted.
[0308] For example:
[0309] • model weights may be changed;
[0310] • agent code may be updated;
[0311] • a tool may be substituted;
[0312] • a runtime may be migrated;
[0313] • a container or virtual machine may be cloned;
[0314] • the workload may move to another cloud region;
[0315] • a policy may be updated;
[0316] • authorization may be revoked;
[0317] • a use count may be exhausted;
[0318] • a destination may change;
[0319] • a recipient may change;
[0320] • or a session may have expired or been poisoned.
[0321] An authorization decision made when data was reconstructed may therefore be stale when an output is later transmitted, rendered, committed, or invoked.
[0322] A system that verifies execution state only once at the beginning of processing may permit a later output under conditions different from those originally approved.
[0323] The technical problem includes closing the interval between:
[0324] INITIAL AUTHORIZATION PROCESSING DELAY OR STATE CHANGE EXTERNAL EFFECTUATION7. Prompt Injection and Compromised-Workload Risk
[0325] Artificial-intelligence workloads may be influenced by malicious prompts, retrieved content, external tools, compromised model weights, altered agent code, or adversarial instructions.
[0326] Such a workload may produce a Candidate Output that violates the intended policy even though the original enterprise request was legitimate.
[0327] Examples include:
[0328] • disclosure of protected identity information;
[0329] • generation of an unauthorized identity-content association;
[0330] • transmission of protected values through tool parameters;
[0331] • creation of an unauthorized database write;
[0332] • inclusion of protected information in a retrieval query;
[0333] • submission of enterprise data to an external model;
[0334] • use of filenames, headers, metadata, or encodings as an exfiltration path;
[0335] • or initiation of an unauthorized external action.
[0336] A sandbox or secure execution environment may contain the workload during computation, but containment during computation does not necessarily establish whether a later output is authorized for a specific destination and purpose.
[0337] The architecture must therefore tolerate the possibility that the workload itself generates a noncompliant result.
[0338] 8. Streaming and Cumulative-Disclosure Risk
[0339] Many artificial-intelligence systems generate output incrementally.
[0340] A token, audio segment, image region, structured field, partial tool argument, or partial application programming interface payload may become externally usable before the complete output has been generated.
[0341] If verification occurs only after completion, earlier portions may already have crossed the output boundary.
[0342] Additionally, several segments that appear permissible individually may cumulatively disclose: • an identity;
[0343] • a protected association;
[0344] • a prohibited event;
[0345] • a sensitive category;• or information exceeding a disclosure limit.
[0346] The technical problem therefore includes controlling:
[0347] • per-segment release;
[0348] • cumulative semantic disclosure;
[0349] • rolling association state;
[0350] • and final whole-output effectuation.
[0351] 9. Replay, Rollback, and Partial-Session Risk
[0352] A protected session may terminate after some operations have already occurred.
[0353] For example:
[0354] • one or more vaults may have released components;
[0355] • reconstruction may have partially completed;
[0356] • temporary keys may have been generated;
[0357] • a Candidate Output may have been formed;
[0358] • a validation receipt may have been prepared;
[0359] • or a provisional capability may have been created.
[0360] An attacker may attempt to reuse captured components, authorization objects, receipts, keys, capabilities, snapshots, or stale session state to resume or complete the interrupted operation. Virtual-machine snapshots, storage backups, container restoration, process restart, and distributed failover may also restore stale authorization state.
[0361] A technical need exists to prevent a terminated session from being resumed or reconstructed from captured partial artifacts while still permitting a later legitimate request to begin under fresh authorization.
[0362] LIMITATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES
[0363] The following discussion identifies representative categories of conventional technology for explaining the technical context. It is not an admission that any particular reference, system, or combination constitutes prior art against any claim, or that any identified feature was necessarily known or conventional at any relevant date.
[0364] 10. Conventional Access-Control SystemsRole-based access control, attribute-based access control, database permissions, file permissions, and policy engines may determine whether a requester can access a resource.
[0365] Such systems may be useful for controlling access to:
[0366] • a database;
[0367] • a table;
[0368] • a field;
[0369] • a file;
[0370] • an object;
[0371] • an application programming interface;
[0372] • or another resource.
[0373] However, conventional access control commonly terminates its principal decision at resource access.
[0374] Once data is released to an authorized process, the access-control system may not technically control:
[0375] • which associations the process later forms;
[0376] • which intermediate values are created;
[0377] • which outputs are generated;
[0378] • whether authorization remains current at output time;
[0379] • or whether the generated result becomes externally effective.
[0380] The present disclosure distinguishes access authority from reconstruction authority, processing authority, and output Release Authority.
[0381] 11. Bearer Tokens, API Keys, OAuth Credentials, and Similar Artifacts
[0382] Bearer tokens, session cookies, application programming interface keys, delegated-authorization tokens, and similar credentials may carry identity, role, resource, or scope information.
[0383] Such mechanisms commonly authorize a request when the presented credential is valid.
[0384] A copied bearer credential may, however, be exercised by a possessor unless additional contextbinding mechanisms are imposed.
[0385] Descriptive fields stating a purpose, destination, or scope do not necessarily make the credential non-bearer where the enforcing service does not verify correspondence with:
[0386] a particular measured execution context;
[0387] a protected session;a Session Epoch;
[0388] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[0389] • a permitted association scope;
[0390] • and current protected state.
[0391] The disclosed Reconstruction Authorization Object is not merely a token describing access rights. Its exercise is conditioned on correspondence with protected execution and session state, and possession alone is insufficient.
[0392] 12. Database Sharding, Data Vaulting, Tokenization, and Pseudonymization
[0393] Database partitioning, data vaulting, sharding, tokenization, masking, and pseudonymization may reduce exposure of directly identifying values.
[0394] However, a storage arrangement does not provide independent association control where:
[0395] • one query engine can rejoin all components;
[0396] • one privileged credential controls all domains;
[0397] • mapping information is available through the same authority;
[0398] • or the application may freely reuse retrieved components.
[0399] The disclosed architecture treats relationship-mapping information as an independently controlled protection domain and distinguishes authority to retrieve components from authority to associate those components.
[0400] Released components are further session bound or restricted to a Mandatory Mediation Path rather than converted into generally reusable data objects.
[0401] 13. Trusted Execution Environments and Confidential Computing
[0402] Trusted execution environments, secure enclaves, confidential virtual machines, and secure coprocessors may protect code and data from selected external attackers while computation occurs. Such technologies may provide:
[0403] • memory isolation;
[0404] • measurement;
[0405] • attestation;
[0406] • key protection;
[0407] • or confidential execution.
[0408] A trusted execution environment alone, however, does not necessarily define:
[0409] • which enterprise fields may be reconstructed;which identity-content associations are permitted;
[0410] • which purpose governs processing;
[0411] • which destination may receive the result;
[0412] • whether authorization remains current at output time;
[0413] • whether a validation receipt must be committed before release;
[0414] • or whether the generated result remains non-effective until boundary verification.
[0415] The disclosed architecture may use a trusted execution environment as one protected implementation substrate, but the claimed technical relationship is not merely execution inside a trusted environment.
[0416] The architecture controls the transition from independently protected components to an externally effective result.
[0417] 14. Sandboxes and Application Containment
[0418] A sandbox may restrict files, devices, network interfaces, system calls, or other resources available to a workload.
[0419] Containment may reduce the workload’s ability to communicate directly with external systems. However, a sandbox does not necessarily establish a purpose-bound reconstruction architecture or a receipt-backed output-finality process.
[0420] A sandbox may permit an approved output channel without determining whether a particular Candidate Output:
[0421] • contains an unauthorized association;
[0422] • exceeds a disclosure budget;
[0423] • is directed to the authorized recipient;
[0424] • corresponds to current policy and revocation state;
[0425] • or is bound to a committed validation receipt.
[0426] The disclosed architecture may employ sandboxing, but adds protected authorization continuity and output-finality conditions not supplied merely by containment.
[0427] 15. Data-Loss-Prevention and Output-Filtering Systems
[0428] Data-loss-prevention systems, content filters, moderation classifiers, and output gateways may inspect data before or during transmission.
[0429] Such systems may detect:
[0430] • keywords;patterns;
[0431] • data categories;
[0432] • personal information;
[0433] • or policy violations.
[0434] However, an ordinary filter may operate on plaintext that is already available to the workload or to an untrusted application process.
[0435] It may also operate as:
[0436] • an advisory classifier;
[0437] • a monitor;
[0438] • a post-release detector;
[0439] • or one optional output route.
[0440] Such a filter does not provide Technical Non-Completability where the workload retains another path capable of transmitting, storing, rendering, or invoking the result.
[0441] Further, an ordinary filter may lack protected continuity with:
[0442] • the source vaults;
[0443] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object;
[0444] • the permitted field set;
[0445] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[0446] • the original processing purpose;
[0447] • the current execution context;
[0448] • and the current Protected Session State.
[0449] The disclosed Output Verification Stage participates in a Mandatory Mediation Path and operates before Release Authority exists.
[0450] 16. Provenance, Logging, and Audit Systems
[0451] Provenance systems, event logs, security logs, blockchains, and audit records may provide evidence that a data access or output event occurred.
[0452] Such evidence may be useful for investigation, accountability, or compliance.
[0453] A post-event log, however, does not prevent the event from occurring.
[0454] Similarly, creation of a receipt after release does not make receipt creation a technical prerequisite to release.In the disclosed architecture, commitment of a Protected Output Validation Receipt may be constitutive rather than merely evidentiary.
[0455] The Output Release Capability is not issued or activated unless the required receipt commitment succeeds.
[0456] The protected receipt therefore participates directly in creation of Release Authority.
[0457] 17. Digital-Rights-Management and Encryption Systems
[0458] Encryption and digital-rights-management systems may restrict access to encrypted content or control selected uses of a protected file.
[0459] Such systems generally protect a pre-existing content object and may release a decryption key when specified conditions are met.
[0460] The present architecture addresses a different technical sequence in which:
[0461] • protected components are selectively reconstructed;
[0462] • an artificial-intelligence workload derives a new Candidate Output;
[0463] • the generated Candidate Output is itself rendered Non-Releasable;
[0464] • current authorization and protected association conditions are evaluated;
[0465] • validation evidence is committed;
[0466] • and a capability is issued for that specific verified output or operation.
[0467] The disclosed Output Release Capability is therefore not merely a general decryption licence for pre-existing content.
[0468] 18. Data Clean Rooms and Controlled Query Environments
[0469] Data clean rooms and controlled analytics environments may permit approved computations over protected datasets while limiting raw-data export.
[0470] Such environments can reduce direct exposure of source records.
[0471] However, a clean room does not necessarily provide the complete disclosed chain of:
[0472] • independently controlled semantic vaults;
[0473] • independently controlled relationship-mapping authority;
[0474] • non-bearer execution-context-bound reconstruction authority;
[0475] • session-bound component release;
[0476] • protected provenance through artificial-intelligence processing;
[0477] • Sealed Candidate Output;
[0478] • live output-time re-verification;constitutive Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment;
[0479] • output- specific Release Authority; and
[0480] • Output Release Boundary verification.
[0481] The disclosed architecture may be deployed within or around a data clean room, but is not limited to a controlled analytics room.
[0482] 19. Information-Flow-Control Systems
[0483] Mandatory information-flow-control systems may label data and restrict movement between security domains.
[0484] Such systems may provide an enforcement substrate for selected embodiments.
[0485] However, generic labels do not necessarily represent:
[0486] • the permitted association between two fields;
[0487] • a purpose-bound reconstruction session;
[0488] • current execution-context attestation;
[0489] • output- specific receipt commitment;
[0490] • or an output capability bound to a destination and boundary.
[0491] The present disclosure may use tagged memory or information-flow control while adding the protected authorization and finality state required for the disclosed architecture.
[0492] 20. Agent Tool Permissions and Orchestration Policies
[0493] Agent platforms may limit which tools an artificial-intelligence agent can invoke.
[0494] A tool permission may prevent access to an unauthorized application programming interface or operation.
[0495] However, permission to invoke a tool does not necessarily determine whether the specific arguments generated by the workload are within the authorized data, association, purpose, recipient, jurisdiction, and disclosure scope.
[0496] The disclosed architecture treats a tool invocation and its arguments as a Candidate Output and may prevent invocation until output-finality conditions have been satisfied.
[0497] TECHNICAL PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED
[0498] 21. Composite Technical Problem
[0499] There remains a need for a computer architecture capable of maintaining technical control over the complete transition from enterprise data storage to externally effective artificial-intelligence output. The architecture should address, in combination, the following technical problems:1. preventing one storage authority from automatically obtaining a complete semantically usable enterprise record;
[0500] 2. independently controlling identity information, substantive content, relationship-mapping information, and reconstruction-enablement material;
[0501] 3. distinguishing permission to access fields from permission to associate those fields; 4. binding reconstruction authority to an attested artificial-intelligence execution context and protected session;
[0502] 5. preventing copied authorization artifacts from functioning as freely transferable bearer authority;
[0503] 6. preventing released components from being reused outside the authorized reconstruction session;
[0504] 7. creating only a purpose-limited and association-limited reconstructed view;
[0505] 8. maintaining protected correspondence between source components, derived values, and Candidate Outputs;
[0506] 9. tolerating a compromised or prompt-injected workload that may generate a prohibited Candidate Output;
[0507] 10. preventing the workload from independently releasing that Candidate Output;
[0508] 11. re-establishing current authorization immediately before external effectuation;
[0509] 12. detecting direct, indirect, inferred, and cumulative unauthorized associations;
[0510] 13. making protected validation commitment a technical prerequisite to Release Authority; 14. binding Release Authority to the exact verified output, destination, recipient, session, and Output Release Boundary;
[0511] 15. rejecting stale, ambiguous, unavailable, inconsistent, or unverifiable protected state; 16. controlling streamed and fragmented outputs before each externally usable release; and 17. preventing replay or completion of interrupted sessions using captured stale artifacts. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SOLUTION
[0512] 22. Semantically Heterogeneous Protected Storage
[0513] The proposed architecture decomposes an enterprise record into semantically different protected components.
[0514] In one embodiment:
[0515] • identity components are maintained in an identity vault;
[0516] • substantive content components are maintained in a content vault;• association information is maintained in an independently controlled relationship-mapping vault; and
[0517] • cryptographic or reconstruction-enablement material is maintained in a cryptographic-material vault or another protected domain.
[0518] Opaque references may replace direct persistent associations.
[0519] The relationship-mapping vault is treated as an independent authority rather than as a passive table automatically accessible with the identity or content data.
[0520] Accordingly, possession of identity components and content components does not necessarily provide authority to reconstruct the protected relationship between them.
[0521] 23. Non-Bearer Reconstruction Authorization
[0522] A Protected Authorization Domain evaluates a data-use request and generates a Reconstruction Authorization Object.
[0523] The Reconstruction Authorization Object may bind:
[0524] • the requester;
[0525] • the tenant;
[0526] • an attested execution-context measurement;
[0527] • an identified artificial-intelligence workload;
[0528] • a session identifier;
[0529] • a session nonce;
[0530] • a Session Epoch;
[0531] • a Policy Epoch;
[0532] • a permitted field set;
[0533] • a Permitted Association Scope;
[0534] • an authorized processing purpose;
[0535] • permitted output types;
[0536] • permitted destinations;
[0537] • permitted recipients;
[0538] • jurisdiction conditions;
[0539] • validity conditions;
[0540] use-count conditions;Disclosure Budget state;
[0541] • Inference-Channel Budget state;
[0542] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[0543] • and an Output Release Boundary.
[0544] The Reconstruction Authorization Object is non-bearer because possession alone does not enable exercise.
[0545] Exercise additionally requires correspondence with current protected execution, session, domain, epoch, and policy conditions.
[0546] 24. Independent Vault-Local Release
[0547] The Reconstruction Authorization Object or a protected derivative is presented independently to each required vault.
[0548] Each vault applies its own Vault- Local Release Conditions.
[0549] Approved components are converted into Session-Bound Components or made accessible only through a Mandatory Mediation Path.
[0550] Each vault may generate a Vault- Local Release Receipt binding the released components to:
[0551] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object;
[0552] • the session;
[0553] • the Session Epoch;
[0554] • the releasing vault;
[0555] • and the Protected Reconstruction Domain.
[0556] This prevents a released component from becoming a general reusable bearer object.
[0557] 25. Protected Reconstruction
[0558] A Protected Reconstruction Domain obtains approved Session-Bound Components and reconstructs only the fields and associations permitted for the authorized purpose.
[0559] The Protected Reconstruction Domain creates an Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View or another Minimum-Necessary Representation.
[0560] The complete semantically usable enterprise record is prevented from being persistently exported outside the Protected Processing Span unless separately authorized.
[0561] The artificial-intelligence workload receives the permitted view through a Restricted Processing Interface and does not receive unrestricted vault credentials.
[0562] 26. Provenance and Association ContinuityProtected Provenance State is maintained for:
[0563] • source components;
[0564] • reconstructed fields;
[0565] • permitted associations;
[0566] • intermediate values;
[0567] • Protected Derivatives;
[0568] • generated fragments;
[0569] • tool arguments;
[0570] • retrieval queries;
[0571] • and Candidate Output portions.
[0572] The provenance mechanism allows the Output Verification Stage to determine whether a Candidate Output derives from:
[0573] • an unauthorized field;
[0574] • an unauthorized identity-content association;
[0575] • an unauthorized transformation;
[0576] • or a source outside the authorized reconstruction.
[0577] Where explicit provenance labels are not used, equivalent protected source-control state may be maintained using structured intermediates, deterministic schemas, protected references, information-flow state, or confined processing paths.
[0578] 27. Sealed Candidate Output
[0579] The artificial-intelligence workload generates a Candidate Output inside protected memory, a Protected Output Buffer, or another mandatory protected output path.
[0580] Before the Candidate Output becomes available to an untrusted process or external channel, it is:
[0581] • encrypted;
[0582] • sealed;
[0583] • capability restricted;
[0584] • retained in protected memory;
[0585] • placed under protected state-machine control;
[0586] or otherwise rendered Non-Releasable.The workload does not possess sufficient key material, capability, protected state, interface authority, or release path to independently make the Candidate Output Externally Usable or Externally Effective.
[0587] Generation therefore completes computation but does not complete the output path.
[0588] 28. Live Output-Time Re-Verification
[0589] Before Release Authority is formed, the Output Verification Stage re-establishes current Protected Authorization State.
[0590] The Output Verification Stage may verify:
[0591] • a fresh execution-context attestation;
[0592] • current revocation state;
[0593] • current Policy Epoch;
[0594] • current Session Epoch;
[0595] • current use count;
[0596] • destination authorization;
[0597] • recipient authorization;
[0598] • jurisdiction conditions;
[0599] • current Permitted Association Scope;
[0600] • current disclosure state;
[0601] • and Output Release Boundary identity.
[0602] Where continuity can be established within a Bounded Freshness Window, protected continuity evidence may be used. Otherwise, fresh attestation is required.
[0603] 29. Protected Output and Association Evaluation
[0604] The Output Verification Stage evaluates the Candidate Output or a protected representation thereof. The evaluation may identify:
[0605] • protected fields;
[0606] • identity-bearing entities;
[0607] • content-bearing entities;
[0608] • explicit associations;
[0609] • inferred associations;
[0610] • prohibited quasi-identifier combinations;cumulative disclosures;
[0611] • tool arguments;
[0612] • database operations;
[0613] • downstream model prompts;
[0614] • or other consequence-bearing content.
[0615] Candidate associations are compared with the Permitted Association Scope.
[0616] The system may use:
[0617] • protected entity extraction;
[0618] • structured parsing;
[0619] • graph comparison;
[0620] • protected identity indices;
[0621] • embedding similarity;
[0622] • provenance correspondence;
[0623] • symbolic policy;
[0624] • information-flow analysis;
[0625] • or combinations thereof.
[0626] Uncertainty does not create Release Authority.
[0627] A noncompliant output may remain sealed, be denied, or be transformed inside a protected domain and re-verified.
[0628] 30. Constitutive Protected Validation Commitment
[0629] After successful verification, the Output Verification Stage generates a Protected Output Validation Receipt.
[0630] The receipt may bind:
[0631] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[0632] • the original Candidate Output digest;
[0633] • the verified output digest;
[0634] • the Provenance State digest;
[0635] • the execution-context measurement;
[0636] the Session Epoch;the Policy Epoch;
[0637] the destination;
[0638] the recipient;
[0639] the output type;
[0640] the Permitted Association Scope;
[0641] the Output Release Boundary;
[0642] and the verification result.
[0643] The receipt is committed to a Protected Receipt Store before Release Authority exists.
[0644] Receipt commitment is constitutive rather than merely evidentiary.
[0645] Failure to commit the receipt prevents Output Release Capability issuance.
[0646] 31. Atomic Output Finality
[0647] Output verification, Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment, protected state advancement, and Output Release Capability issuance may be performed as an Atomic Output Finality Transaction.
[0648] The transaction either:
[0649] • completes in a protected success state; or
[0650] • fails without leaving usable partial Release Authority.
[0651] The Output Release Capability is bound to the verified output and its authorized effectuation context.
[0652] A capability presented with another output, destination, recipient, session, Session Epoch, or Output Release Boundary is rejected.
[0653] 32. Output Release Boundary
[0654] The Output Release Boundary is positioned at the point where the Candidate Output first becomes Externally Usable or Externally Effective.
[0655] The boundary may control:
[0656] • decryption;
[0657] • transmission;
[0658] • display;
[0659] • rendering;
[0660] • file writing;database commitment;
[0661] message publication;
[0662] tool invocation;
[0663] memory persistence;
[0664] payment initiation;
[0665] workflow transition;
[0666] or actuator operation.
[0667] Only after successful verification of the Output Release Capability and corresponding committed receipt does the boundary complete effectuation.
[0668] The capability is then consumed, invalidated, or advanced to a non-reusable state.
[0669] 33. Fail-Closed and Session-Poisoning Controls
[0670] Where a required condition is:
[0671] • absent;
[0672] • stale;
[0673] • ambiguous;
[0674] • unavailable;
[0675] • inconsistent;
[0676] • expired;
[0677] • revoked;
[0678] • or unverifiable,
[0679] the corresponding operation is denied.
[0680] No default gateway rule, timeout, cached bearer credential, unavailable security service, or legacy fallback path causes permissive release.
[0681] Where a session terminates before valid completion, the system may poison the session by:
[0682] • advancing the Session Epoch;
[0683] • destroying temporary keys;
[0684] • invalidating Session-Bound Components;
[0685] • revoking provisional capabilities;
[0686] • closing Vault- Local Release State;• and rejecting captured stale artifacts.
[0687] ARCHITECTURAL DIFFERENTIATION
[0688] 34. Difference from Conventional Storage Separation
[0689] The proposed architecture does not merely place fields in different tables or databases.
[0690] It establishes independently controlled semantic domains and separately governs the relationship required to reconstruct a usable record.
[0691] The relationship-mapping function is a first-class protected authority.
[0692] 35. Difference from Ordinary Access Control
[0693] The proposed architecture does not terminate authorization when data is retrieved.
[0694] It maintains protected authority across:
[0695] • vault release;
[0696] • reconstruction;
[0697] • artificial-intelligence processing;
[0698] • Candidate Output formation;
[0699] • validation;
[0700] • receipt commitment;
[0701] • capability issuance;
[0702] • and external effectuation.
[0703] 36. Difference from Bearer Authorization Tokens
[0704] The Reconstruction Authorization Object and Output Release Capability are not intended to operate as freely transferable bearer credentials.
[0705] Their exercise depends on protected correspondence with execution context, session state, epoch, destination, boundary, and other bound conditions.
[0706] 37. Difference from Trusted Execution Alone
[0707] A trusted environment may protect processing, but the proposed architecture additionally determines:
[0708] • which associations may be reconstructed;
[0709] • which outputs may be released;
[0710] whether authorization remains current;whether validation evidence has been committed;
[0711] • and where external effectuation may occur.
[0712] The trusted environment is an implementation substrate, not the complete inventive architecture.
[0713] 38. Difference from Output Filtering and Data-Loss Prevention
[0714] A conventional filter may inspect an already releasable output.
[0715] In the proposed architecture, the Candidate Output remains technically Non-Releasable before and during verification.
[0716] The workload lacks an alternate unverified release path.
[0717] Verification is therefore a technical prerequisite to effectuation rather than an advisory or postgeneration check.
[0718] 39. Difference from Audit and Ledger Systems
[0719] A conventional ledger may record an event after it occurs.
[0720] In the proposed architecture, protected receipt commitment may be required before Release Authority exists.
[0721] The ledger, hash chain, or protected journal therefore participates in the authorization state transition rather than serving only as evidence.
[0722] 40. Difference from Digital-Rights Management
[0723] Digital-rights -management systems commonly govern access to an existing protected content object.
[0724] The proposed architecture governs a newly generated Candidate Output derived from temporarily reconstructed enterprise components and binds release to current provenance, association, destination, session, and output-finality conditions.
[0725] 41. Difference from Data Clean Rooms
[0726] A data clean room may prevent raw-data export.
[0727] The proposed architecture additionally provides:
[0728] • non-bearer execution-context-bound reconstruction authority;
[0729] • independent relationship-mapping control;
[0730] • session-bound component release;
[0731] • protected output sealing;
[0732] • live output-time re-verification;
[0733] • constitutive receipt commitment;and boundary-specific output Release Authority.
[0734] 42. Difference from Sandboxes
[0735] A sandbox restricts where a workload may execute or communicate.
[0736] The proposed architecture governs whether a specific output or operation is authorized according to the complete protected state associated with the data, purpose, association, recipient, destination, and session.
[0737] 43. Difference from Tool Permissions
[0738] A tool permission determines whether a tool may generally be invoked.
[0739] The proposed architecture may treat each tool call and its generated arguments as a Candidate Output and prevent invocation unless the specific operation satisfies current output-finality conditions.
[0740] 44. Difference from Post-Hoc Remediation
[0741] The proposed architecture does not rely on detecting misuse and compensating after release.
[0742] Its principal technical effect is pre-effectuation control.
[0743] A prohibited Candidate Output may be fully computed internally but cannot become externally effective unless the protected finality process succeeds.
[0744] SUMMARY OF THE TECHNICAL ADVANCE
[0745] The disclosed architecture introduces a protected execution and output-finality layer between enterprise-data access and external consequence.
[0746] The architecture establishes that:
[0747] • access does not equal association authority;
[0748] • association authority does not equal unrestricted processing authority;
[0749] • processing authority does not equal output authority;
[0750] • successful computation does not equal Release Authority;
[0751] • successful verification does not equal Release Authority until required protected validation state has been committed; and
[0752] • possession of a release artifact does not authorize effectuation outside the bound output, destination, session, epoch, and Output Release Boundary.
[0753] The resulting technical property is Technical Non-Completability.
[0754] An artificial-intelligence workload may retrieve permitted data, perform an authorized computation, and generate a Candidate Output, but the output path remains technically incomplete until the required protected state transitions, validation commitment, Release Authority formation, and Output Release Boundary verification have successfully occurred.Major Technical Importance: Preventing an Al-Server Breach from Becoming a Breach of the Enterprise’s Future
[0755] A conventional data breach and compromise of an enterprise artificial-intelligence server may present materially different technical and commercial risks.
[0756] A conventional breach may expose a defined collection of existing records, such as names, account details, documents, transactions, or communications. Although such disclosure may be severe, the compromised dataset may remain limited to the records directly reached by the attacker.
[0757] Compromise of an artificial-intelligence server connected to enterprise databases, vector stores, internal communications, customer systems, research repositories, source-code systems, financial platforms, operational tools, and agent memory can create a broader and continuing threat.
[0758] The compromised artificial-intelligence workload may be capable not merely of copying stored records, but of:
[0759] • correlating information originating from multiple enterprise domains;
[0760] • reconstructing relationships that were not stored in one record;
[0761] • identifying patterns across customers, products, personnel, suppliers, and transactions; • inferring confidential commercial priorities;
[0762] • reconstructing research and development direction;
[0763] • identifying product-development trajectories;
[0764] • inferring pricing, market-entry, acquisition, investment, or competitive strategies;
[0765] • mapping operational weaknesses and dependency chains;
[0766] • predicting future business decisions;
[0767] • generating structured summaries of confidential enterprise knowledge;
[0768] • continuously querying changing enterprise systems;
[0769] • and transferring the resulting intelligence through tools, files, messages, databases, external models, or network interfaces.
[0770] Accordingly, compromise of an artificial-intelligence workload may expose more than a historical dataset.
[0771] It may enable an attacker to construct a continuously updated model of the enterprise itself, including its present operations and probable future direction.
[0772] Such reconstructed intelligence may include:
[0773] • future product features;unreleased technology;
[0774] • research priorities;
[0775] • customer and supplier relationships;
[0776] • strategic commercial plans;
[0777] • internal risk assessments;
[0778] • competitive positioning;
[0779] • expected market movements;
[0780] • planned investments;
[0781] • pricing intentions;
[0782] • operational vulnerabilities;
[0783] • and other information capable of materially affecting the enterprise’s future commercial position.
[0784] The resulting information may be copied, aggregated, transferred, sold, or offered to competitors, hostile actors, criminal markets, or other unauthorized recipients.
[0785] Where sufficiently complete and current, the information may permit another party to anticipate the enterprise’s decisions, imitate its development direction, target its customers, undermine negotiations, exploit operational weaknesses, or neutralize investments before the enterprise can obtain their intended benefit.
[0786] The technical danger is therefore not limited to disclosure of what the enterprise has already done.
[0787] The compromised artificial-intelligence server may be used to reconstruct and disclose what the enterprise is likely to do next.
[0788] This can convert a server compromise into a continuing extraction of enterprise intelligence capable of causing severe and potentially irreversible commercial harm.
[0789] The present disclosure addresses that risk by preventing one compromised server from automatically obtaining the complete authority required to:
[0790] 1. join protected identity and content information;
[0791] 2. reconstruct unrestricted enterprise relationships;
[0792] 3. generate a prohibited result;
[0793] 4. convert that result into a releasable output; and
[0794] 5. make the result Externally Usable or Externally Effective.
[0795] The architecture introduces two mutually supporting technical properties:
[0796] Technical Non-Joinability outside authorized reconstruction; andTechnical Non-Completability of unauthorized external consequence.
[0797] Technical Non- Joinability Outside an Authorized Reconstruction Session In many conventional systems, data is nominally separated among tables, services, databases, tenants, or storage locations, but remains practically joinable through:
[0798] • one privileged credential;
[0799] • one application server;
[0800] • one database engine;
[0801] • one query interface;
[0802] • one mapping table;
[0803] • one administrator;
[0804] • or one common control plane.
[0805] Such storage separation does not prevent an attacker controlling the application or artificialintelligence server from reconstructing a complete semantically usable record.
[0806] The present architecture establishes a stronger relationship referred to herein as Technical NonJoinability.
[0807] Technical Non- Joinability does not mean that protected information can never be associated. Rather, it means that protected identity components, protected content components, and the relationship information required to associate them cannot be joined into a semantically usable enterprise representation outside a technically authorized reconstruction operation.
[0808] In one embodiment:
[0809] • identity components are controlled by an identity vault;
[0810] • content components are controlled by a content vault;
[0811] • relationship or association information is controlled by an independently protected relationship-mapping vault;
[0812] • reconstruction-enablement material is controlled by a cryptographic-material vault or another protected domain;
[0813] • each required vault applies its own Vault-Local Release Conditions;
[0814] • released components are bound to an authorized session;
[0815] • and association occurs only inside a Protected Reconstruction Domain under a valid Reconstruction Authorization Object.
[0816] The relationship-mapping function is therefore not merely a database table available to the compromised workload.It is an independently controlled source of association authority.
[0817] Authority to access an identity component does not, by itself, provide authority to associate that identity with protected content.
[0818] Authority to access protected content does not, by itself, provide authority to identify the person, organization, device, account, or enterprise relationship to which that content relates.
[0819] Authority to access both components does not necessarily provide authority to establish or disclose the relationship between them.
[0820] The association may be formed only where the applicable protected operation corresponds to: • the attested execution context;
[0821] • the authorized artificial-intelligence workload;
[0822] • the protected session;
[0823] • the Session Epoch;
[0824] • the permitted field set;
[0825] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[0826] • the authorized processing purpose;
[0827] • the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[0828] • the use-count condition;
[0829] • and other applicable Protected Authorization State.
[0830] A copied component, authorization object, reference, or mapping fragment does not become unrestricted join authority.
[0831] The result is not merely data separation.
[0832] It is the technical prevention of unauthorized semantic recombination.
[0833] Illustrative Al-Server Compromise
[0834] Consider an enterprise artificial-intelligence assistant connected to customer-support data, productdevelopment records, financial information, internal communications, technical documentation, and operational tools.
[0835] An attacker compromises the artificial-intelligence workload server through:
[0836] • remote exploitation;
[0837] • credential theft;
[0838] • malicious code;
[0839] • prompt injection;model substitution;
[0840] • agent-code alteration;
[0841] • tool poisoning;
[0842] • or another attack.
[0843] The attacker attempts to instruct the compromised workload to:
[0844] 1. identify strategically important customers;
[0845] 2. associate customer complaints with unreleased product defects;
[0846] 3. correlate those defects with engineering discussions and planned corrective work;
[0847] 4. infer the enterprise’ s future product roadmap;
[0848] 5. identify which customers or markets will receive the future product;
[0849] 6. generate a structured competitive-intelligence report; and
[0850] 7. transmit that report to an attacker-controlled destination.
[0851] In a conventional integrated architecture, the same compromised server may possess:
[0852] • credentials for multiple databases;
[0853] • access to joined enterprise records;
[0854] • access to vector stores and internal search;
[0855] • unrestricted plaintext processing;
[0856] • authority to invoke retrieval tools;
[0857] • permission to write files;
[0858] • permission to send messages;
[0859] • and direct network-transmission authority.
[0860] The attacker may therefore move directly from server compromise to enterprise-wide correlation and external disclosure.
[0861] The attack chain may be represented as:
[0862] AI-SERVER COMPROMISE
[0863] MULTI-SYSTEM DATA ACCESS
[0864] UNRESTRICTED IDENTITY-CONTENT JOINING
[0865]
[0866] RECONSTRUCTION OF ENTERPRISE STRATEGYGENERATION OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
[0867] EXTERNAL SALE, TRANSFER, OR DISCLOSURE
[0868] POTENTIAL LOSS OF FUTURE COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE
[0869] Under the disclosed architecture, compromise of the workload server does not automatically provide the authority required to complete this chain.
[0870] First Protected Dead End: The Data Is Not Universally Joinable
[0871] The compromised workload does not possess one unrestricted credential capable of retrieving and joining all protected enterprise information.
[0872] Identity, substantive content, association information, and reconstruction-enablement material remain under independently controlled protected authority.
[0873] The attacker may compromise the artificial-intelligence server but still lack:
[0874] • the required identity-vault authority;
[0875] • the required content-vault authority;
[0876] • the relationship-mapping authority;
[0877] • the cryptographic reconstruction state;
[0878] • the necessary vault-local approvals;
[0879] • or the Protected Reconstruction Domain required to form the complete relationship. The attacker therefore cannot automatically convert access to separated data components into a complete semantic map of the enterprise.
[0880] Second Protected Dead End: Authorization Is Non-Bearer
[0881] A Reconstruction Authorization Object does not operate as a general database credential.
[0882] Its exercise may require correspondence with:
[0883] • a measured execution context;
[0884] • an identified model or agent;
[0885] • a protected session;
[0886] • a session nonce;
[0887] a Session Epoch;
[0888] a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[0889] a permitted field set;a Permitted Association Scope;
[0890] • an authorized purpose;
[0891] • and current policy and revocation state.
[0892] Where the attacker modifies the workload, adds an unauthorized tool, moves the workload, changes its environment, or attempts to reuse the authorization in another session, the represented authority is not exercisable.
[0893] Third Protected Dead End: Authorized Reconstruction Is Scope Limited Even where the legitimate session originally permitted reconstruction of selected customer- support information, that authority does not necessarily permit reconstruction of:
[0894] • the customer’s identity together with unreleased product defects;
[0895] • engineering plans;
[0896] • future product features;
[0897] • strategic market decisions;
[0898] • or another association outside the permitted purpose.
[0899] The Protected Reconstruction Domain reconstructs only the permitted fields and permitted relationships.
[0900] It does not provide the compromised workload with a permanently joined enterprise record.
[0901] Fourth Protected Dead End: Malicious Computation Does Not Equal Release The compromised workload may nevertheless infer part of the prohibited relationship or generate a report describing the enterprise’s expected future strategy.
[0902] That report is only a Candidate Output.
[0903] Before the report becomes accessible to an ordinary application process, external tool, file system, communication interface, or network path, it is:
[0904] • captured in a Protected Output Buffer;
[0905] • maintained in protected memory;
[0906] • encrypted;
[0907] • sealed;
[0908] • capability restricted;
[0909] • placed under protected state-machine control;
[0910] • or otherwise rendered Non-Releasable.The workload lacks the output-unsealing key, valid Output Release Capability, protected receipt state, and boundary authority required to release the report.
[0911] The attacker may succeed in forcing the artificial-intelligence workload to compute the report while remaining unable to transmit, persist, display, invoke, or otherwise effectuate it.
[0912] Fifth Protected Dead End: Live Re- Verification Detects the Changed Threat State
[0913] Before output authority is created, the Output Verification Stage re-establishes the current state of:
[0914] • the artificial-intelligence workload;
[0915] • the model;
[0916] • the agent code;
[0917] • the runtime;
[0918] • the tools;
[0919] • the tenant;
[0920] • the session;
[0921] • the policy;
[0922] • revocation state;
[0923] • the intended recipient;
[0924] • the intended destination;
[0925] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[0926] • and the Output Release Boundary.
[0927] Where the attacker has changed the workload, added an unauthorized tool, redirected the output, migrated the server, or otherwise altered the protected execution context, live re- verification fails.
[0928] Sixth Protected Dead End: The Competitive-Intelligence Mapping Is Itself Evaluated
[0929] Even where the attacker has not altered a measured component, the generated report is evaluated for unauthorized fields and associations.
[0930] The Output Verification Stage may determine that the Candidate Output associates:
[0931] • identified customers;
[0932] • confidential complaints;
[0933] unreleased technical defects;• engineering plans;
[0934] • future product features;
[0935] • financial projections;
[0936] • and intended markets
[0937] in a manner outside the Permitted Association Scope.
[0938] Protected Provenance State may identify the enterprise components and transformations from which the report was derived.
[0939] The report is then denied, redacted, generalized, transformed, quarantined, or retained in a Non-Releasable state.
[0940] Uncertainty does not create Release Authority.
[0941] Seventh Protected Dead End: No Receipt Means No Release Authority
[0942] A permitted output must be bound to a Protected Output Validation Receipt committed before Release Authority exists.
[0943] Where the generated strategic report is prohibited:
[0944] • no successful validation result is produced;
[0945] • no successful Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed;
[0946] • no valid Output Release Capability is issued;
[0947] • and the Output Release Boundary has no authority to complete the transmission.
[0948] The receipt is therefore not a post-breach audit record.
[0949] Its successful protected commitment is part of the technical precondition to release.
[0950] Eighth Protected Dead End: The Output Release Boundary Controls Consequence
[0951] Only the Output Release Boundary can complete the transition from a Non-Releasable Candidate Output to an Externally Usable or Externally Effective result.
[0952] The Output Release Boundary verifies correspondence with:
[0953] • the exact verified output;
[0954] • the committed receipt;
[0955] • the intended destination;
[0956] • the intended recipient;
[0957] the current session;the Session Epoch;
[0958] • the output type;
[0959] • the boundary identifier;
[0960] • the expiration condition;
[0961] • and the one-time use state.
[0962] The attacker cannot substitute another report, redirect the output to another destination, or reuse a capability from another session.
[0963] Resulting Security Effect
[0964] The attack chain is transformed into:
[0965] AI-SERVER COMPROMISE
[0966] I ATTEMPTED MULTI-DOMAIN RECONSTRUCTION
[0967] I TECHNICAL NON-JOINABILITY LIMITS UNAUTHORIZED ASSOCIATION I MALICIOUS OR INFERRED CANDIDATE OUTPUT I SEALED OR OTHERWISE NON-RELEASABLE STATE
[0968] I LIVE RE-VERIFICATION AND ASSOCIATION EVALUATION
[0969] I NO SUCCESSFUL PROTECTED RECEIPT COMMITMENT I NO OUTPUT RELEASE CAPABILITY I NO
[0970]
[0971] EXTERNAL EFFECTUATION
[0972] The architecture therefore protects not only stored records, but also the enterprise relationships, inferences, strategies, and forward-looking intelligence that an artificial-intelligence workload might otherwise reconstruct from those records.
[0973] Central Technical Importance
[0974] The central technical importance of the invention is that it divides and technically constrains three powers that are frequently concentrated in one conventional server:
[0975] 1. the power to access protected components;
[0976] 2. the power to join those components into meaningful enterprise intelligence; and 3. the power to make the resulting intelligence externally effective.The disclosed architecture prevents compromise of one power from automatically becoming compromise of all three.
[0977] Accordingly:
[0978] The attacker may compromise the artificial-intelligence computation, but does not thereby obtain unrestricted authority to join the enterprise’s protected knowledge or externalize the enterprise’s future.
[0979] This architecture does not assert absolute protection where the attacker simultaneously controls every protected vault, every association authority, every key authority, the Protected Reconstruction Domain, the Output Verification Stage, the Protected Receipt Store, the Output Release Boundary, and every alternate output path.
[0980] Rather, its technical advance is the prevention of one compromised artificial-intelligence or application server from automatically becoming a universal reconstruction and external-effectuation authority, provided that the remaining independently protected domains and Mandatory Mediation Paths remain uncompromised under the applicable threat model.
[0981] Terminology and Interpretation
[0982] Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the following terms have the meanings set forth below.
[0983] These definitions are provided to support consistent interpretation of the disclosed architecture and are not intended to restrict the invention to a particular implementation, industry, data type, artificial-intelligence model, hardware platform, cryptographic mechanism, or physical arrangement.
[0984] A function described as being performed by one domain, component, stage, boundary, object, or mechanism may be distributed among several protected components. Conversely, functions described separately may be combined within one protected implementation where the claimed technical relationships, protected- state transitions, Mandatory Mediation Path, and fail-closed effect remain preserved.
[0985] Terms such as “protected,” “bound,” “verified,” “authorized,” and “non-releasable” refer to technically enforced conditions and not merely to contractual restrictions, organizational policies, descriptive metadata, advisory classifications, or post-event logging.
[0986] Administrative or organizational separation may supplement technical protection but does not, standing alone, provide the protected properties described herein unless it is implemented through mandatory, non-bypassable technical controls. \Externally Effective
[0987] Externally Effective means that a Candidate Act, Candidate Output, instruction, transaction, control signal, state transition, or other result has crossed the applicable protected finality boundary and has caused, or has acquired sufficient technical authority to cause, a consequence outside the Protected Processing Span.
[0988] A Candidate Act may become Externally Effective through one or more of:
[0989] • transmission to a recipient, destination, service, device, or network;
[0990] • publication, display, rendering, printing, or communication;
[0991] • persistent storage or commitment to a database, file system, vector store, model memory, ledger, or other external state;
[0992] • execution of an API request, tool invocation, function call, workflow instruction, or software operation;
[0993] • initiation or completion of a payment, settlement, transfer, trade, or other financial operation;
[0994] • modification of access rights, credentials, configuration, policy, or protected state;
[0995] • delivery of an instruction to another artificial-intelligence model, agent, application, or downstream system;
[0996] • radio-frequency emission, telecommunications transmission, routing change, or satellite operation;
[0997] • activation of an actuator, robot, machine, vehicle, medical device, industrial controller, or other cyber-physical system;
[0998] • creation of a legal, financial, operational, communicative, digital, or physical consequence;
[0999] or
[1000] • another operation through which the result becomes actionable or produces an effect outside the protected processing context.
[1001] A Candidate Act may be Externally Effective even where it is not directly visible or intelligible to a human. For example, a database commit, payment instruction, machine-control command, memory write, or tool invocation may become Externally Effective upon successful execution.
[1002] A Candidate Act does not become Externally Effective merely because:
[1003] • computation has completed;
[1004] • the act has been selected or generated;
[1005] • an internal command or transaction has been prepared;
[1006] • the result exists in protected memory;
[1007] • a Candidate Output has been sealed;verification has begun;
[1008] • a receipt has been prepared but not validly committed;
[1009] • an Output Release Capability has been provisionally formed but is not validly exercisable;
[1010] or
[1011] • an unprotected component has attempted to initiate the act.
[1012] Where the architecture requires protected verification, receipt commitment, Release Authority, capability issuance, key application, quorum approval, or Output Release Boundary verification, the act remains in a Non-Effective State until those required technical conditions have been successfully completed.
[1013] Externally Effective is distinct from Externally Usable. Information may become Externally Usable when it becomes available outside the Protected Processing Span for observation, interpretation, storage, reuse, or further action. It becomes Externally Effective when it causes, commits, authorizes, or technically enables the intended external consequence.
[1014] 1. Reconstruction Authorization Object
[1015] A Reconstruction Authorization Object, or RAO, is a protected authorization object generated, derived, maintained, or validated by a Protected Authorization Domain to govern one or more reconstruction sessions.
[1016] The RAO defines the protected conditions under which enterprise-data components may be:
[1017] • requested;
[1018] • released from one or more protected storage domains;
[1019] • associated;
[1020] • reconstructed;
[1021] • transformed;
[1022] • processed by an artificial-intelligence workload;
[1023] • used to form a Candidate Act;
[1024] • verified; and
[1025] • made externally usable or externally effective.
[1026] The RAO may bind one or more of:
[1027] an execution context;
[1028] an artificial-intelligence workload;
[1029] a workload identity;• a model, agent, runtime, tool, or service identity;
[1030] • an attested execution-context measurement;
[1031] • a tenant;
[1032] • a requester;
[1033] • a protected session identifier;
[1034] • a Session Epoch;
[1035] • a Policy Epoch;
[1036] • a revocation epoch;
[1037] • an authorized purpose;
[1038] • a permitted field set;
[1039] • a Permitted Association Scope;
[1040] • a permitted reconstruction operation;
[1041] • a permitted Candidate Act type;
[1042] • an output scope;
[1043] • a destination;
[1044] • a recipient;
[1045] • an Output Release Boundary;
[1046] • a jurisdiction;
[1047] • a validity interval;
[1048] • a use count;
[1049] • a Disclosure Budget;
[1050] • an Inference-Channel Budget;
[1051] • a provenance condition;
[1052] • a protected storage-domain manifest;
[1053] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[1054] • a latency or risk class;
[1055] • a quorum requirement; or
[1056] • other Protected Authorization State.The RAO may be represented as one object, several coordinated objects, a protected state-machine entry, a cryptographic structure, a capability-restricted reference, or a technically constrained derivative.
[1057] Unless expressly stated otherwise, possession, observation, copying, presentation, or replay of an RAO is insufficient, by itself, to authorize component release, reconstruction, Candidate Act formation, or external effectuation outside the protected conditions to which the RAO is bound.
[1058] 2. Protected Authorization State
[1059] Protected Authorization State means security-relevant state that governs whether a protected operation is permitted to begin, continue, complete, or become externally effective.
[1060] Protected Authorization State may comprise:
[1061] • an RAO;
[1062] • a technically or cryptographically constrained derivative of an RAO;
[1063] • protected session state;
[1064] • Session Epoch state;
[1065] • Policy Epoch state;
[1066] • revocation state;
[1067] • protected workload state;
[1068] • protected provenance state;
[1069] • protected receipt state;
[1070] • capability state;
[1071] • key state;
[1072] • quorum state;
[1073] • use-count state;
[1074] • disclosure-budget state;
[1075] • destination state;
[1076] • recipient state;
[1077] • continuity state;
[1078] • or a combination thereof.
[1079] Protected Authorization State need not be represented as a single data structure.Different protected components may maintain different portions or derivatives of the state, provided that their combined operation preserves the protected relationships required for reconstruction, verification, Release Authority, and effectuation.
[1080] 3. Protected Authorization Domain
[1081] A Protected Authorization Domain, or PAD, is a protected processing or control domain configured to generate, validate, maintain, derive, narrow, revoke, consume, or otherwise manage Protected Authorization State.
[1082] The PAD is configured to prevent an artificial-intelligence workload, ordinary application process, compromised server, unauthorized administrator, or unprotected component from independently:
[1083] • creating Protected Authorization State;
[1084] • enlarging its scope;
[1085] • extending its validity;
[1086] • modifying its purpose;
[1087] • changing its destination;
[1088] • changing its permitted association scope;
[1089] • transferring its authority;
[1090] • replaying consumed state;
[1091] • substituting another execution context;
[1092] • resetting protected use counts;
[1093] • rolling back protected epochs; or
[1094] • deriving Release Authority outside authorized conditions.
[1095] The PAD may be implemented using:
[1096] • a secure enclave;
[1097] • a confidential virtual machine;
[1098] • a hardware security module;
[1099] • a trusted platform module;
[1100] • a secure coprocessor;
[1101] • a protected operating- system service;
[1102] • a mandatory reference monitor;
[1103] • a capability system;a cryptographically protected service;
[1104] • a distributed quorum of protected authorities;
[1105] • or another mandatory and non-bypassable protected mechanism.
[1106] Administrative separation may be used as an additional governance measure but does not substitute for technical enforcement where a technically protected domain is required.
[1107] 4. Protected Reconstruction Domain
[1108] A Protected Reconstruction Domain, or PRD, is a protected processing domain within which selected protected components may be:
[1109] • released;
[1110] • decrypted;
[1111] • resolved;
[1112] • associated;
[1113] • transformed;
[1114] • reconstructed;
[1115] • compared;
[1116] • reduced;
[1117] • or otherwise combined
[1118] under applicable Protected Authorization State.
[1119] The PRD is configured so that:
[1120] 1. only approved components are accepted;
[1121] 2. component correspondence with the applicable protected session is verified;
[1122] 3. only fields within the permitted field set are reconstructed;
[1123] 4. only associations within the Permitted Association Scope are resolved;
[1124] 5. reconstructed information remains confined to the Protected Processing Span;
[1125] 6. persistent storage of a complete semantically usable enterprise representation outside the Protected Processing Span is prevented unless separately authorized; and
[1126] 7. no reconstructed view or derived Candidate Act becomes externally effective except through the applicable protected finality path.
[1127] The PRD may comprise one or more protected hardware, software, cryptographic, capability-enforced, distributed, or hybrid domains.The PRD need not be physically colocated with every protected storage domain.
[1128] 5. Protected Processing Span
[1129] A Protected Processing Span, or PPS, means the protected sequence of operations beginning with authorized release of one or more protected components and extending through some or all of: • component verification;
[1130] • protected association;
[1131] • reconstruction;
[1132] • transformation;
[1133] • artificial-intelligence processing;
[1134] • intermediate-state formation;
[1135] • Candidate Act formation;
[1136] • Candidate Output formation;
[1137] • sealing or confinement;
[1138] • provenance propagation;
[1139] • output or act verification;
[1140] • protected receipt commitment;
[1141] • Release Authority formation;
[1142] • effectuation; and
[1143] • release, denial, transformation, quarantine, or session invalidation.
[1144] The PPS preserves continuity of applicable Protected Authorization State across the protected workflow.
[1145] Completion of one stage within the PPS does not independently authorize completion of a later stage.
[1146] For example:
[1147] • component release does not independently authorize association;
[1148] • association does not independently authorize reconstruction;
[1149] • reconstruction does not independently authorize processing;
[1150] • processing does not independently authorize Candidate Act effectuation;successful verification does not independently authorize release where protected receipt commitment is required; and
[1151] • capability issuance does not independently authorize effectuation at an unauthorized boundary.
[1152] 6. Candidate Act
[1153] A Candidate Act is any proposed, selected, computed, generated, inferred, assembled, scheduled, encoded, initiated, requested, or otherwise formed operation, result, consequence, or state transition that has not yet completed the protected verification and effectuation conditions required to make the act externally usable or externally effective.
[1154] A Candidate Act may comprise or relate to:
[1155] • a data output;
[1156] • a textual response;
[1157] • an image, audio, video, or multimodal representation;
[1158] • a communication;
[1159] • a message;
[1160] • an email;
[1161] • a notification;
[1162] • a network transmission;
[1163] • an API request;
[1164] • a tool invocation;
[1165] • a function call;
[1166] • a database query;
[1167] • a database write, update, deletion, or commit;
[1168] • a file-system operation;
[1169] • a memory write;
[1170] • a vector-store update;
[1171] • a model-memory modification;
[1172] • an external-model prompt;
[1173] • a retrieval request;
[1174] • a credential operation;a key-use request;
[1175] • a capability request;
[1176] • a workflow transition;
[1177] • a software-deployment instruction;
[1178] • a configuration change;
[1179] • a financial instruction;
[1180] • a payment instruction;
[1181] • a settlement instruction;
[1182] • a trading instruction;
[1183] • a contractual or approval operation;
[1184] • an access-control change;
[1185] • a telecommunications operation;
[1186] • a radio-frequency transmission;
[1187] • a spectrum-use operation;
[1188] • a routing instruction;
[1189] • a satellite instruction;
[1190] • an industrial-control command;
[1191] • an actuator instruction;
[1192] • a robotic operation;
[1193] • a vehicle-control instruction;
[1194] • a medical-device command;
[1195] • a physical-world control signal;
[1196] • a security response;
[1197] • a denial or revocation operation;
[1198] • or another digital, communicative, financial, logical, cyber-physical, or physical consequence.
[1199] A Candidate Act may be:
[1200] human readable or machine readable;• deterministic or probabilistic;
[1201] • generated by one workload or several cooperating workloads;
[1202] • generated by an artificial-intelligence model, autonomous agent, software process, rules engine, human-machine workflow, or combination thereof;
[1203] • represented as a complete act, partial act, fragment, segment, batch, sequence, plan, transaction, compound transaction, or stream;
[1204] • directed to an immediate or delayed consequence; or
[1205] • internally complete as computation while remaining externally non-effective.
[1206] A Candidate Act does not become authoritative or effective merely because:
[1207] • computation has completed;
[1208] • the artificial-intelligence workload has selected the act;
[1209] • an internal representation exists;
[1210] • a command has been formed;
[1211] • a transaction has been prepared;
[1212] • an output has been rendered inside protected memory;
[1213] • or an application has attempted to invoke an external interface.
[1214] Where a Candidate Act comprises several dependent operations, each operation, the compound operation, or both may be subject to protected verification and effectuation control.
[1215] A Candidate Output is one category of Candidate Act.
[1216] 7. Candidate Output
[1217] A Candidate Output is a Candidate Act whose proposed consequence includes presenting, exposing, communicating, transmitting, rendering, storing, committing, publishing, returning, or otherwise making information, an instruction, a representation, or a derived result available outside the protected processing context.
[1218] A Candidate Output may include:
[1219] • text;
[1220] • structured data;
[1221] • model-generated content;
[1222] • a report;
[1223] a summary;a recommendation;
[1224] • a classification;
[1225] • an inference;
[1226] • a prediction;
[1227] • a software object;
[1228] • executable code;
[1229] • a database payload;
[1230] • a tool argument;
[1231] • a model prompt;
[1232] • a persistent-memory entry;
[1233] • an API payload;
[1234] • a file;
[1235] • a communication;
[1236] • or another informational or instruction-bearing representation.
[1237] A Candidate Output may itself cause a further consequence. For example, an API payload, payment instruction, database command, tool call, or actuator instruction may simultaneously constitute a Candidate Output and a broader Candidate Act.
[1238] A Candidate Output remains non- authoritative and Non-Releasable with respect to external use until the required protected output-finality conditions have been satisfied.
[1239] 8. Non-Effective State
[1240] A Non-Effective State means a protected state in which a Candidate Act or Candidate Output may have been computed, selected, generated, encoded, or internally represented but has not acquired the protected authority, key material, capability, state-machine transition, verified path, or boundary approval required to produce its intended external consequence.
[1241] A Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State may be:
[1242] • stored in protected memory;
[1243] • sealed;
[1244] • encrypted;
[1245] • capability restricted;
[1246] • held in a protected queue;represented as an uncommitted transaction;
[1247] • maintained as a provisional control instruction;
[1248] • confined to a protected processing domain;
[1249] • or otherwise technically prevented from effectuation.
[1250] Non-Effective State is not merely a descriptive label.
[1251] The state is technically enforced so that the Candidate Act cannot become externally effective through completion of computation alone.
[1252] 9. Sealed Candidate Output
[1253] A Sealed Candidate Output, or SCO, is a Candidate Output maintained in:
[1254] • encrypted form;
[1255] • hardware-sealed form;
[1256] • capability-restricted form;
[1257] • protected-memory-confined form;
[1258] • authenticated form;
[1259] • boundary-specific form;
[1260] • or another technically Non-Releasable representation.
[1261] An SCO is maintained so that the artificial-intelligence workload does not possess sufficient: • key material;
[1262] • Release Authority;
[1263] • output capability;
[1264] • interface authority;
[1265] • protected state;
[1266] • destination authority;
[1267] • or boundary authority
[1268] to independently convert the Candidate Output into an externally usable or externally effective form.
[1269] The term “sealed” does not require one particular encryption algorithm or hardware mechanism. Different implementations may preserve sealing through:encryption;
[1270] • non-exportable keys;
[1271] • protected memory;
[1272] • capability confinement;
[1273] • tagged information-flow state;
[1274] • mandatory reference monitoring;
[1275] • protocol state;
[1276] • protected channels;
[1277] • secure buffers;
[1278] • destination-bound wrapping;
[1279] • or combinations thereof.
[1280] Where transient plaintext exists inside a protected verification or release domain, the Candidate Output may remain sealed for purposes of this disclosure where no unprotected process or output path can obtain or effectuate that plaintext before successful protected verification.
[1281] 10. Output Verification Stage
[1282] An Output Verification Stage, or OVS, is a mandatory protected verification function positioned before an Output Release Boundary.
[1283] The OVS determines whether a Candidate Output, or another Candidate Act subject to output-finality control, satisfies applicable Protected Authorization State before Release Authority exists or becomes exercisable.
[1284] The OVS may evaluate one or more of:
[1285] • current execution-context correspondence;
[1286] • workload identity;
[1287] • model identity;
[1288] • runtime identity;
[1289] • session status;
[1290] • Session Epoch;
[1291] • Policy Epoch;
[1292] • revocation state;
[1293] • Protected Continuity Proof;provenance state;
[1294] • permitted field scope;
[1295] • Permitted Association Scope;
[1296] • destination;
[1297] • recipient;
[1298] • jurisdiction;
[1299] • output type;
[1300] • Candidate Act type;
[1301] • Disclosure Budget;
[1302] • Inference-Channel Budget;
[1303] • cumulative streaming state;
[1304] • receipt state;
[1305] • quorum state;
[1306] • output digest;
[1307] • Candidate Act digest;
[1308] • or another protected release or effectuation condition.
[1309] Failure, uncertainty, timeout, unavailability, stale state, inconsistent state, or unverifiable state for a required condition causes:
[1310] • denial;
[1311] • protected transformation;
[1312] • redaction;
[1313] • aggregation;
[1314] • quarantine;
[1315] • protected review;
[1316] • session invalidation;
[1317] • or another fail-closed outcome.
[1318] The OVS is not merely advisory.An affirmative result does not independently cause effectuation where receipt commitment, capability issuance, key application, quorum approval, or Output Release Boundary verification remains required.
[1319] 11. Output Release Boundary
[1320] An Output Release Boundary is the protected final boundary at which a Candidate Output or other Candidate Act first becomes externally usable or externally effective.
[1321] The Output Release Boundary is defined by its technical function rather than by:
[1322] • its component name;
[1323] • its software layer;
[1324] • its physical location;
[1325] • whether it is implemented in hardware or software;
[1326] • or whether an implementation refers to it as a gateway, sink, broker, adapter, driver, controller, commit service, renderer, or another name.
[1327] The Output Release Boundary may correspond to the point immediately before:
[1328] • network transmission;
[1329] • API delivery;
[1330] • rendering;
[1331] • display;
[1332] • printing;
[1333] • publication;
[1334] • file release;
[1335] • persistent storage;
[1336] • database commitment;
[1337] • memory commitment;
[1338] • external model invocation;
[1339] • tool execution;
[1340] • payment initiation;
[1341] • financial settlement;
[1342] message delivery;radio-frequency emission;
[1343] • actuator activation;
[1344] • workflow transition;
[1345] • software deployment;
[1346] • access-right modification;
[1347] • or another externally effective operation.
[1348] Where several technically distinct boundaries are capable of making the same Candidate Act effective, each such boundary is either:
[1349] • subject to the required protected verification; or
[1350] • technically disabled, confined, or rendered insufficient to bypass the protected path.
[1351] The presence of one verified boundary does not establish Mandatory Mediation where an unverified alternative path remains available.
[1352] 12. Externally Usable or Externally Effective
[1353] Externally Usable means that information, an instruction, a capability, a result, or another Candidate Act has become available outside the Protected Processing Span in a form capable of being observed, interpreted, reused, transferred, stored, or acted upon.
[1354] Externally Effective means that a Candidate Act has caused, or has acquired sufficient authority to cause, a consequence outside the Protected Processing Span.
[1355] External effect may include:
[1356] • disclosure;
[1357] • transmission;
[1358] • persistence;
[1359] • commitment;
[1360] • invocation;
[1361] • control;
[1362] • transfer;
[1363] • payment;
[1364] • communication;
[1365] • modification of a protected or external state;
[1366] • creation of a legal, financial, digital, or physical consequence;or another effectuation.
[1367] An act may become externally usable before it becomes externally effective, or may become externally effective without being directly human readable.
[1368] 13. Release Authority
[1369] Release Authority means protected authority required to permit a Candidate Output or other Candidate Act to cross the applicable Output Release Boundary and become externally usable or externally effective.
[1370] Release Authority may comprise one or more of:
[1371] • an Output Release Capability;
[1372] • protected key access;
[1373] • a protected decryption operation;
[1374] • protected approval state;
[1375] • a state-machine transition;
[1376] • quorum approval;
[1377] • a threshold authorization;
[1378] • protected receipt correspondence;
[1379] • destination-bound authority;
[1380] • recipient-bound authority;
[1381] • capability state;
[1382] • protected protocol state;
[1383] • or another technically enforced effectuation condition.
[1384] Release Authority does not arise merely because:
[1385] • the Candidate Act exists;
[1386] • computation has completed;
[1387] • the workload possesses an access credential;
[1388] • a user requested an operation;
[1389] • a policy engine returned an advisory result;
[1390] • or a receipt was prepared but not committed.14. Output Release Capability
[1391] An Output Release Capability, or ORC, is a protected, scoped, non-bearer or context-bound release artifact representing Release Authority for a verified Candidate Output or other verified Candidate Act.
[1392] The ORC may be bound to one or more of:
[1393] • a verified-output digest;
[1394] • a Candidate Act digest;
[1395] • a final transformed-output digest;
[1396] • an RAO;
[1397] • a Protected Authorization State digest;
[1398] • a Protected Output Validation Receipt digest;
[1399] • a session identifier;
[1400] • a Session Epoch;
[1401] • a Policy Epoch;
[1402] • an execution context;
[1403] • a destination;
[1404] • a recipient;
[1405] • an Output Release Boundary;
[1406] • an output type;
[1407] • a Candidate Act type;
[1408] • a validity interval;
[1409] • a use count;
[1410] • a sequence number;
[1411] • a streaming-segment number;
[1412] • a quorum state;
[1413] • or another protected condition.
[1414] Possession, interception, copying, or presentation of an ORC is insufficient to authorize release where the current output, session, execution context, destination, boundary, receipt, epoch, or other bound condition does not correspond.
[1415] An ORC may be:single use;
[1416] consumable;
[1417] sequence restricted;
[1418] destination restricted;
[1419] non-transferable;
[1420] non-replayable;
[1421] short lived;
[1422] or invalidated by advancement of protected state.
[1423] Constitutive Receipt Commitment and Boundary-Controlled Effectuation
[1424] A Protected Output Validation Receipt is protected validation evidence generated for a Candidate Output or Candidate Act after successful completion of the required output- verification conditions. The receipt may bind the verified result to applicable Protected Authorization State, including the Reconstruction Authorization Object, session identifier, Session Epoch, Policy Epoch, execution context, provenance state, destination, recipient, output type, Output Release Boundary, and one or more digests identifying the original or transformed result.
[1425] The Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed when it is durably entered into a Protected Receipt Store, protected journal, protected state machine, hardware-backed log, cryptographically chained record, quorum-controlled store, or another protected commitment mechanism in a manner that prevents unauthorized alteration, substitution, rollback, truncation, or replay.
[1426] Where receipt commitment is constitutive, preparation or generation of the receipt alone is insufficient. Successful protected commitment must occur before Release Authority is created or activated.
[1427] An output-specific Output Release Capability is a protected release artifact generated, derived, issued, or activated only after successful commitment of the corresponding Protected Output Validation Receipt. The capability is output specific because it is bound to the particular verified result, or to a protected digest or equivalent identifier of that result, rather than providing general authority to release any output produced by the workload.
[1428] The Output Release Capability may additionally be bound to one or more of:
[1429] • the Protected Output Validation Receipt or its digest;
[1430] • the applicable Reconstruction Authorization Object;
[1431] • a protected session identifier;
[1432] • a Session Epoch;
[1433] • a Policy Epoch;
[1434] • an execution context;
[1435] • a destination;
[1436] • a recipient;
[1437] • an output type;
[1438] • a Candidate Act type;
[1439] • a validity interval; 64• a use count;
[1440] • a sequence number;
[1441] • and a designated Output Release Boundary.
[1442] Possession, copying, interception, transfer, or presentation of the Output Release Capability is insufficient to authorize effectuation where the verified result, receipt, session, epoch, destination, recipient, boundary, or other bound condition does not correspond.
[1443] The designated Output Release Boundary is the mandatory protected boundary at which the verified result first becomes Externally Usable or Externally Effective. The boundary may perform, control, mediate, enable, or authorize the protected transition required for:
[1444] • rendering;
[1445] • display;
[1446] • transmission;
[1447] • publication;
[1448] • storage;
[1449] • database commitment;
[1450] • memory persistence;
[1451] • file writing;
[1452] • tool invocation;
[1453] • API execution;
[1454] • workflow transition;
[1455] • payment initiation;
[1456] • external-model invocation;
[1457] • actuator operation;
[1458] • or another externally effective consequence.
[1459] Accordingly, the verified result cannot be rendered, transmitted, invoked, stored, committed, executed, or otherwise effectuated except through a designated Output Release Boundary that verifies the applicable Output Release Capability and its correspondence with the committed Protected Output Validation Receipt and the current protected effectuation context.
[1460] The protected sequence is therefore:
[1461] successful output verification → protected receipt commitment → output-specific Release Capability generation or activation → Output Release Boundary verification → external effectuation.
[1462] Failure of any required stage leaves the Candidate Output or Candidate Act in a Non-Effective and technically Non-Releasable state.
[1463] 15. Protected Receipt Store
[1464] A Protected Receipt Store, or PRS, is a protected storage, journal, state machine, ledger, or commitment mechanism configured to maintain POVRs and related protected finality state.
[1465] The PRS may provide one or more of:
[1466] append-only operation;
[1467] digest chaining;
[1468] anti-rollback protection; 65monotonic-state advancement;
[1469] • protected signatures;
[1470] • protected timestamps;
[1471] • sequence enforcement;
[1472] • quorum commitment;
[1473] • replication;
[1474] • durable local commitment;
[1475] • external anchoring;
[1476] • or recovery- state correspondence.
[1477] Where receipt commitment is constitutive, inability to complete the required protected commitment causes denial of release.
[1478] External anchoring, archival, replication, analytics, or compliance reporting may occur after local constitutive commitment, provided that deferred operations do not retroactively create Release Authority for an act whose required local commitment failed.
[1479] 16. Atomic Output Finality Transaction
[1480] An Atomic Output Finality Transaction, or AOFT, is a protected all-or-nothing state transition comprising two or more of:
[1481] • final Candidate Act verification;
[1482] • final Candidate Output verification;
[1483] • protected transformation;
[1484] • POVR generation;
[1485] • POVR commitment;
[1486] • Release Authority formation;
[1487] • ORC issuance;
[1488] • protected key derivation;
[1489] • protected state advancement;
[1490] • and preparation of a boundary- specific releasable representation.The AOFT is configured so that failure of a required operation does not leave usable partial Release Authority.
[1491] For example:
[1492] • successful verification without receipt commitment does not authorize release;
[1493] • receipt preparation without durable commitment does not authorize release;
[1494] • provisional capability creation without successful transaction completion does not authorize release; and
[1495] • a capability not corresponding to the committed receipt and verified act is invalid.
[1496] 17. Technical Non-Completability
[1497] Technical Non-Completability means a system property under which completion of computation, selection of an action, generation of a Candidate Act, or formation of a Candidate Output is insufficient to produce an externally usable or externally effective consequence.
[1498] One or more technically enforced operations remain unavailable until required Protected Authorization State has been satisfied.
[1499] Such operations may include:
[1500] • current-state verification;
[1501] • execution-context correspondence;
[1502] • provenance verification;
[1503] • association-scope verification;
[1504] • protected receipt commitment;
[1505] • quorum approval;Release Authority formation;
[1506] • ORC issuance;
[1507] • protected key application;
[1508] • state-machine advancement;
[1509] • Output Release Boundary verification;
[1510] • or another protected effectuation operation.
[1511] Technical Non-Completability is achieved through technical enforcement and not merely through:
[1512] • policy statements;
[1513] • contractual obligations;
[1514] • organizational procedures;
[1515] • user instructions;
[1516] • advisory warnings;
[1517] • retrospective logging;
[1518] • compliance reporting;
[1519] • or post-release detection.
[1520] The particular enforcement mechanism may differ among embodiments, provided that computation or Candidate Act generation alone cannot produce the external consequence.
[1521] 18. Technical Non-Joinability
[1522] Technical Non-Joinability means a protected system property under which separately maintained identity, content, relationship, provenance, cryptographic, or other protected components cannot be combined into a semantically usable enterprise representation outside an authorized reconstruction operation.
[1523] Technical Non-Joinability does not require that protected components be incapable of association under all circumstances.
[1524] Instead, it requires that association authority remain unavailable outside the applicable:
[1525] • protected session;
[1526] • execution context;
[1527] • purpose;
[1528] • Permitted Association Scope;
[1529] Protected Reconstruction Domain;Protected Authorization State;
[1530] • and Mandatory Mediation Path.
[1531] Authority to access two or more protected values does not, by itself, provide authority to establish, persist, or externalize the semantic relationship among those values.
[1532] Technical Non-Joinability may be enforced through:
[1533] • independent protection domains;
[1534] • opaque references;
[1535] • protected relationship mapping;
[1536] • context-bound decryption;
[1537] • session-bound components;
[1538] • capability restrictions;
[1539] • protected information-flow controls;
[1540] • mandatory reconstruction interfaces;
[1541] • or combinations thereof.
[1542] 19. Permitted Association Scope
[1543] A Permitted Association Scope means the protected specification of which identities, content items, fields, records, entities, events, relationships, categories, or inferred relationships may be associated during a particular protected reconstruction or processing operation.
[1544] The Permitted Association Scope is distinct from a permitted field set.
[1545] A field may be individually authorized for access while its association with another authorized field, identity, record, tenant, or content item remains prohibited.
[1546] The Permitted Association Scope may be represented using:
[1547] • explicit relationship rules;
[1548] • permitted-association graphs;
[1549] • prohibited- association graphs;
[1550] • entity classes;
[1551] • relationship classes;
[1552] • protected predicates;
[1553] • purpose limitations;destination limitations;
[1554] or another protected semantic constraint.
[1555] 20. Session-Bound Component
[1556] A Session-Bound Component is a protected data component released from a protected storage domain in a form usable only within, or in verified correspondence with, a specified protected session.
[1557] A Session-Bound Component may be bound to:
[1558] • a session identifier;
[1559] • a Session Epoch;
[1560] • an RAO;
[1561] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[1562] • an execution context;
[1563] • a use count;
[1564] • a validity interval;
[1565] • a permitted operation;
[1566] • or another protected condition.
[1567] Session binding may be implemented through:
[1568] • encryption;
[1569] • key derivation;
[1570] • capability restriction;
[1571] • protected labels;
[1572] • protected state;
[1573] • secure channels;
[1574] • non-exportable references;
[1575] • or combinations thereof.
[1576] A Session-Bound Component does not become unrestricted bearer data merely because its source vault authorized release.
[1577] 21. Mandatory Mediation PathA Mandatory Mediation Path is a technically enforced path through which every protected reconstruction, Candidate Act effectuation, Candidate Output release, or other controlled operation must pass.
[1578] The mediation path is mandatory where an artificial-intelligence workload or ordinary application cannot bypass it through:
[1579] • an alternate API;
[1580] • a direct vault credential;
[1581] • a legacy service credential;
[1582] • an unmonitored network channel;
[1583] • a file-system path;
[1584] • a database connection;
[1585] • a debugging interface;
[1586] • an administrative override;
[1587] • an error-handling path;
[1588] • a recovery path;
[1589] • a model tool;
[1590] • a plug-in;
[1591] • a side channel;
[1592] • or another unverified interface.
[1593] A policy instructing a workload to use a verification gateway does not establish a Mandatory Mediation Path where an alternative technically usable release route remains available.
[1594] 22. Protected Precomputation
[1595] Protected Precomputation means generation, before a latency-sensitive reconstruction, verification, or effectuation operation, of one or more protected computational artifacts encapsulating security-relevant determinations in a form that can be efficiently verified during the Hot Path.
[1596] Protected precomputed artifacts may include:
[1597] • compiled policy predicates;
[1598] • permitted-association graphs;
[1599] • prohibited- association graphs;
[1600] • destination-authority manifests;recipient- authority manifests;
[1601] workload-registration measurements;
[1602] model or agent enrollment records;
[1603] protected provenance structures;
[1604] identity-resolution indices;
[1605] protected identity indices;
[1606] disclosure-budget state;
[1607] Inference-Channel Budget state;
[1608] attestation- validation artifacts;
[1609] revocation snapshots;
[1610] policy derivatives;
[1611] RAO derivatives;
[1612] authorization templates;
[1613] capability templates;
[1614] or other protected decision- support structures.
[1615] A protected precomputed artifact is not merely a generic cache entry, temporary value, or stored intermediate result maintained solely for performance.
[1616] The artifact is a protected security object having:
[1617] • a defined scope;
[1618] • a validity condition;
[1619] • provenance;
[1620] • integrity protection;
[1621] • freshness semantics;
[1622] • revocation semantics;
[1623] • and verification requirements.
[1624] A protected precomputed artifact may be:
[1625] • cryptographically signed;
[1626] authenticated;sealed;
[1627] • hardware protected;
[1628] • capability bound;
[1629] • maintained within protected state;
[1630] • digest chained;
[1631] • epoch bound;
[1632] • or otherwise technically protected against unauthorized modification, substitution, replay, rollback, enlargement of scope, or reuse outside its authorized context.
[1633] The artifact may be bound to one or more of:
[1634] • a Policy Epoch;
[1635] • a Session Epoch;
[1636] • a session class;
[1637] • a workload identity;
[1638] • an execution-context measurement;
[1639] • a model identity;
[1640] • an agent identity;
[1641] • a tenant;
[1642] • a jurisdiction;
[1643] • a destination class;
[1644] • a recipient class;
[1645] • a disclosure policy;
[1646] • a validity interval;
[1647] • a revocation state;
[1648] • a provenance state;
[1649] • a risk class;
[1650] • or another Protected Authorization State condition.
[1651] Before the artifact is relied upon during a Hot Path operation, the system verifies that the artifact: 1. is authentic;2. remains within its authorized scope;
[1652] 3. corresponds to the current protected context;
[1653] 4. remains within its validity and freshness conditions;
[1654] 5. corresponds to the current applicable epoch state;
[1655] 6. has not been revoked, superseded, rolled back, or substituted; and
[1656] 7. remains applicable to the present Candidate Act, destination, recipient, or reconstruction operation.
[1657] Protected Precomputation does not eliminate or replace live authorization, current- state verification, live provenance evaluation, output verification, or another mandatory security decision.
[1658] It transfers computationally expensive preparation into a protected earlier phase while preserving live verification of the resulting protected artifact before reconstruction, Release Authority formation, or external effectuation.
[1659] A protected precomputed artifact does not independently create Release Authority.
[1660] Its existence, possession, or presentation is insufficient where its current protected correspondence cannot be affirmatively verified.
[1661] 23. Hot Path
[1662] A Hot Path means the latency- sensitive protected sequence containing the operations that must successfully complete before a particular Candidate Act or Candidate Output may become externally usable or externally effective.
[1663] The Hot Path may include:
[1664] • current session verification;
[1665] • epoch verification;
[1666] • RAO correspondence;
[1667] • continuity or attestation verification;
[1668] • current revocation verification;
[1669] • provenance evaluation;
[1670] • field-scope evaluation;
[1671] • association-scope evaluation;
[1672] • destination and recipient verification;
[1673] • disclosure-budget evaluation;
[1674] • POVR commitment;ORC issuance;
[1675] • protected key application;
[1676] • and Output Release Boundary verification.
[1677] The Hot Path is defined functionally.
[1678] An operation is a Hot-Path operation where omission of that operation would permit an unverified or unauthorized Candidate Act to become externally effective.
[1679] A system cannot convert a mandatory Hot-Path operation into a non-mandatory operation merely by labelling it asynchronous, cached, preparatory, or external.
[1680] 24. Cold Path
[1681] A Cold Path means a preparatory, archival, analytical, replication, or lower- frequency processing path containing operations that need not complete during the immediate effectuation decision. Cold-Path operations may include:
[1682] • policy authoring;
[1683] • policy compilation;
[1684] • association-graph generation;
[1685] • workload enrollment;
[1686] • attestation-collateral retrieval;
[1687] • identity-index generation;
[1688] • destination-manifest generation;
[1689] • external receipt anchoring;
[1690] • remote replication;
[1691] • long-term archival;
[1692] • historical analytics;
[1693] • compliance reporting;
[1694] • model-risk analysis;
[1695] • and recovery- state preparation.
[1696] Cold-Path operations may improve performance, scalability, or assurance but do not independently authorize reconstruction, create Release Authority, or convert a Candidate Act into an externally effective act.Where a Cold-Path result is used during the Hot Path, it is used as a protected precomputed artifact subject to current protected verification.
[1697] 25. Protected Continuity Proof
[1698] A Protected Continuity Proof means protected evidence establishing that one or more previously verified security-relevant conditions have remained unchanged or within an authorized state during a defined Bounded Freshness Window.
[1699] The continuity proof may cover:
[1700] • workload identity;
[1701] • model identity;
[1702] • agent identity;
[1703] • runtime identity;
[1704] • tool configuration;
[1705] • session keys;
[1706] • Session Epoch;
[1707] • Policy Epoch;
[1708] • revocation state;
[1709] • infrastructure region;
[1710] • destination state;
[1711] • or another protected execution condition.
[1712] Protected continuity may be established through:
[1713] • protected heartbeats;
[1714] • monotonic counters;
[1715] • challenge-response state;
[1716] • hardware measurements;
[1717] • protected event logs;
[1718] • sequence values;
[1719] • attested runtime telemetry;
[1720] • or another tamper-resistant continuity mechanism.A missing, expired, inconsistent, interrupted, or unverifiable continuity proof does not establish continued validity.
[1721] Where current verification is required and continuity cannot be established, the system performs fresh verification or denies the protected operation.
[1722] 26. Interpretation of Functional Equivalents
[1723] A component, object, domain, boundary, capability, receipt, or protected state described herein is not avoided merely by:
[1724] • changing its name;
[1725] • combining it with another component;
[1726] • dividing it among several components;
[1727] • moving it to another software or hardware layer;
[1728] • placing it in a remote service;
[1729] • generating it dynamically;
[1730] • implementing it through protocol state rather than a stored object;
[1731] • using threshold or distributed authority;
[1732] • or replacing cryptographic enforcement with another technically mandatory mechanism. Functional correspondence exists where the alternative implementation preserves the same relevant protected relationship and technical effect.
[1733] However, a merely advisory, administrative, contractual, descriptive, or post-hoc mechanism is not treated as functionally equivalent to a technically enforced protected mechanism.
[1734] Additional Standalone Definitions
[1735] Enterprise Record
[1736] An Enterprise Record comprises two or more data components whose association, interpretation, or combined use produces information having enterprise meaning.
[1737] An Enterprise Record may include one or more of:
[1738] • an identity component;
[1739] • a customer, employee, supplier, patient, subscriber, account, organization, credential, asset, or device component;
[1740] • a transaction or event component;• a financial, operational, technical, legal, medical, communications, location, security, or behavioural component;
[1741] • an association component identifying or enabling resolution of a relationship between separately maintained components;
[1742] • cryptographic material required to decrypt, authenticate, interpret, resolve, or verify a protected component;
[1743] • provenance information;
[1744] • consent information;
[1745] • policy information;
[1746] • purpose information;
[1747] • jurisdiction information;
[1748] • retention information;
[1749] • or another data or authority component relevant to enterprise processing.
[1750] A complete Enterprise Record need not correspond to a single database row, document, file, account, or persistent object.
[1751] An Enterprise Record may comprise:
[1752] • a graph;
[1753] • a collection of records;
[1754] • a time series;
[1755] • a multimodal object;
[1756] • a relational join;
[1757] • a vector representation;
[1758] • an embedding;
[1759] • a derived feature set;
[1760] • a sequence of events;
[1761] • a dynamically resolved association;
[1762] • or a combination of information maintained across different enterprise systems or protection domains.
[1763] An Enterprise Record may be complete or incomplete, persistent or ephemeral, directly stored or dynamically reconstructed.Semantically Usable Enterprise Record
[1764] A Semantically Usable Enterprise Record means an Enterprise Record, reconstructed representation, or protected derivative containing sufficient content and association information to identify, infer, resolve, interpret, correlate, or operationally use a protected enterprise relationship. Data may be syntactically readable while remaining semantically incomplete.
[1765] For example:
[1766] • a transaction amount may be readable while the associated customer or account remains unresolved;
[1767] • a medical observation may be readable while the patient relationship remains unavailable;
[1768] • a technical defect description may be readable while the affected unreleased product remains unidentified;
[1769] • a communication may be readable while the sender, recipient, project, or strategic context remains unavailable; or
[1770] • a content component may be available while the relationship required to attribute that content to a protected entity remains independently controlled.
[1771] A representation may become semantically usable through:
[1772] • direct identifiers;
[1773] • indirect identifiers;
[1774] • relationship mappings;
[1775] • graph edges;
[1776] • token resolution;
[1777] • inference;
[1778] • correlation;
[1779] • contextual association;
[1780] • provenance correspondence;
[1781] • or combinations thereof.
[1782] A representation need not reveal a conventional plaintext identity to constitute a Semantically Usable Enterprise Record where it provides sufficient information to distinguish, track, infer, target, classify, or operationally act upon the protected entity or relationship.
[1783] Storage VaultA Storage Vault is a protected storage or storage-control domain configured to maintain one or more protected components under Vault- Local Release Conditions.
[1784] A Storage Vault need not comprise a separate physical appliance or complete database.
[1785] Different Storage Vaults may be implemented:
[1786] • on separate physical devices;
[1787] • in separate secure enclaves;
[1788] • in separate confidential virtual machines;
[1789] • in separate hardware partitions;
[1790] • in separate database partitions;
[1791] • in separate cloud accounts, regions, subscriptions, or tenants;
[1792] • under different cryptographic key hierarchies;
[1793] • through independently authenticated services;
[1794] • under separate capability domains;
[1795] • through separate mandatory access-control domains;
[1796] • through different administrative authorities supplemented by technical enforcement; • within one physical device having hardware-enforced isolation;
[1797] • or through combinations thereof.
[1798] A Storage Vault may store:
[1799] • plaintext within a protected domain;
[1800] • ciphertext;
[1801] • opaque references;
[1802] • cryptographic shares;
[1803] • protected mappings;
[1804] • protected metadata;
[1805] • sealed components;
[1806] • capability-restricted objects;
[1807] • or other protected representations.
[1808] The protected character of a Storage Vault arises from technically enforced release conditions and not merely from its name, database location, organizational owner, or administrative designation.Independently Controlled
[1809] Independently Controlled means that authority sufficient to access, modify, release, resolve, decrypt, or otherwise operate upon protected information in one domain is insufficient, by itself, to perform the corresponding protected operation in another domain.
[1810] Domains may be Independently Controlled where they use one or more of:
[1811] • different credentials;
[1812] • separate key hierarchies;
[1813] • separate hardware-protected domains;
[1814] • separate capability authorities;
[1815] • separate policy authorities;
[1816] • separate release services;
[1817] • threshold or quorum authorization;
[1818] • independent attestation conditions;
[1819] • separate administrative authorities enforced through technical controls;
[1820] • or separate protected state machines.
[1821] Independent control does not require complete physical separation.
[1822] Several independently controlled domains may exist within one physical system where the applicable technical isolation prevents authority applicable to one domain from being exercised against another.
[1823] Administrative separation, contractual allocation, access-control documentation, or organizational policy alone does not establish independent control where a common credential, administrator, application process, key, or bypass path remains technically sufficient to obtain the protected contents or authority of all relevant domains.
[1824] For purposes of the disclosed architecture, independent control may require that compromise of one domain does not, without compromise or authorized participation of one or more additional domains, provide all information or authority necessary to:
[1825] • construct a Semantically Usable Enterprise Record;
[1826] • resolve a protected association;
[1827] • complete an unauthorized reconstruction;
[1828] • or effectuate a protected Candidate Act.
[1829] Attested Execution-Context MeasurementAn Attested Execution-Context Measurement is a protected and verifiable representation of one or more security-relevant characteristics of an artificial-intelligence processing context. The measurement may represent one or more of:
[1830] model identity;
[1831] model version;
[1832] model weights;
[1833] model configuration;
[1834] inference graph;
[1835] agent identity;
[1836] agent code;
[1837] runtime binary state;
[1838] application code;
[1839] control-flow state;
[1840] tool configuration;
[1841] loaded tools;
[1842] plugin or extension state;
[1843] retrieval configuration;
[1844] memory configuration;
[1845] protected system prompt or instruction state;
[1846] policy configuration;
[1847] tenant identity;
[1848] requester identity;
[1849] session identifier;
[1850] container identity;
[1851] virtual-machine identity;
[1852] secure-enclave measurement;
[1853] confidential-computing measurement;
[1854] accelerator identity;• processor identity;
[1855] • hardware identity;
[1856] • operating-system state;
[1857] • hypervisor state;
[1858] • code-integrity state;
[1859] • memory-integrity state;
[1860] • execution-domain identity;
[1861] • geographic or infrastructure region;
[1862] • or combinations thereof.
[1863] The measurement may comprise:
[1864] • a digest;
[1865] • a signed attestation report;
[1866] • a hardware quote;
[1867] • a protected certificate;
[1868] • a compound measurement;
[1869] • an authenticated runtime manifest;
[1870] • a measured-boot record;
[1871] • a protected behavioural identifier;
[1872] • or another verifiable representation of the operative execution context.
[1873] An Attested Execution-Context Measurement may represent the artificial-intelligence workload itself, an enclosing protected execution environment, or a combination thereof.
[1874] Where an enclosing environment is measured instead of each internal workload component, the enclosing measurement is sufficient only to the extent that modification, substitution, escape, or unauthorized extension of the workload invalidates or changes the measured state.
[1875] Identity Vault
[1876] An Identity Vault is a Storage Vault configured to maintain protected identity components or identity-resolution information.
[1877] Identity components may include:
[1878] names;• contact information;
[1879] • account identifiers;
[1880] • customer identifiers;
[1881] • employee identifiers;
[1882] • patient identifiers;
[1883] • subscriber identifiers;
[1884] • organization identifiers;
[1885] • credential identifiers;
[1886] • device identities;
[1887] • biometric references;
[1888] • government-issued identifiers;
[1889] • pseudonymous identifiers;
[1890] • protected entity-resolution features;
[1891] • or other information capable of directly or indirectly resolving an entity.
[1892] An Identity Vault may replace externally visible identity values with:
[1893] • opaque identity-component references;
[1894] • pseudonymous identifiers;
[1895] • protected tokens;
[1896] • commitments;
[1897] • encrypted representations;
[1898] • or capability-restricted references.
[1899] The Identity Vault need not independently maintain the content associated with an identity and need not independently possess authority to resolve the relationship between the identity component and a protected content component.
[1900] Content Vault
[1901] A Content Vault is a Storage Vault configured to maintain protected enterprise content separately from at least part of the identity or relationship information associated with that content.
[1902] Protected content may include:
[1903] transactions;financial information;
[1904] enterprise documents;
[1905] medical information;
[1906] communications;
[1907] source code;
[1908] research information;
[1909] product-development information;
[1910] engineering information;
[1911] support interactions;
[1912] operational events;
[1913] legal records;
[1914] behavioural information;
[1915] location information;
[1916] security information;
[1917] account activity;
[1918] sensor information;
[1919] model inputs;
[1920] model outputs;
[1921] or other enterprise content.
[1922] A Content Vault may store an opaque content-component reference without storing or exposing the identity relationship required to attribute the content to a particular person, organization, account, device, project, product, or other protected entity.
[1923] Authority to access a Content Vault does not, by itself, provide authority to obtain corresponding identity information or independently resolve a protected association.
[1924] Relationship-Mapping Vault or Relationship-Mapping Protection Domain
[1925] A Relationship-Mapping Vault, also referred to as a Relationship-Mapping Protection Domain, is an independently controlled protected domain configured to maintain, generate, resolve, validate, or release association information required to relate selected protected components.
[1926] The association information may comprise:
[1927] linkage tables;reference-resolution mappings;
[1928] • join keys;
[1929] • graph edges;
[1930] • relationship graphs;
[1931] • association matrices;
[1932] • correlation indices;
[1933] • pointer structures;
[1934] • token-resolution relationships;
[1935] • component-pair commitments;
[1936] • protected association descriptors;
[1937] • encrypted association records;
[1938] • dynamically generated relationship state;
[1939] • or other information capable of establishing a protected semantic relationship.
[1940] The relationship information may be persistently stored, dynamically derived, distributed across several protected domains, generated only for an authorized session, or represented through protected protocol state.
[1941] The Relationship-Mapping Protection Domain maintains its own release or resolution conditions. It is not merely an ordinary metadata table colocated with an Identity Vault or Content Vault where authority applicable to those vaults is also sufficient to retrieve or derive the relationship.
[1942] Authority to access identity components and authority to access content components do not, individually or collectively, provide authority to establish the protected relationship unless the applicable association conditions are independently satisfied.
[1943] Cryptographic-Material Vault
[1944] A Cryptographic-Material Vault is an optional independently controlled protected domain configured to maintain or apply cryptographic material used to decrypt, authenticate, resolve, reconstruct, validate, or otherwise enable protected processing.
[1945] Cryptographic material may include:
[1946] • encryption keys;
[1947] • decryption keys;
[1948] • key shares;
[1949] • derivation material;• protected salts;
[1950] • token-resolution secrets;
[1951] • message-authentication keys;
[1952] • signature keys;
[1953] • integrity-verification material;
[1954] • component-decryption material;
[1955] • wrapping keys;
[1956] • unsealing material;
[1957] • threshold shares;
[1958] • capability-derivation secrets;
[1959] • or other reconstruction-enablement material.
[1960] The Cryptographic-Material Vault may:
[1961] • release protected material;
[1962] • perform a protected cryptographic operation without releasing the material;
[1963] • derive session-specific material;
[1964] • participate in threshold reconstruction;
[1965] • or condition key use upon current Protected Authorization State.
[1966] A separate Cryptographic-Material Vault is not required where the relevant functions are performed within another independently controlled hardware, enclave, key-management, or protected processing domain.
[1967] Semantically Heterogeneous Protected Components
[1968] Semantically Heterogeneous Protected Components are protected components that perform different semantic or authorization roles and are not merely interchangeable mathematical shares of one undifferentiated data object.
[1969] For example:
[1970] • an identity component may identify or resolve an entity;
[1971] • a content component may describe an event, transaction, communication, condition, or enterprise activity;
[1972] an association component may establish whether and how the identity and content components are related;a provenance component may identify the origin or permitted use of a value;
[1973] • and a cryptographic component may enable decryption, authentication, interpretation, or protected reconstruction.
[1974] Reconstruction of Semantically Heterogeneous Protected Components requires controlled semantic association and not merely mathematical recombination of interchangeable fragments.
[1975] The components may each remain individually readable or technically valid while remaining insufficient to form a Semantically Usable Enterprise Record without the protected relationship or authority supplied by another component or domain.
[1976] The term does not exclude embodiments in which cryptographic secret sharing is also used. It clarifies that the disclosed architecture may divide protected enterprise meaning and authority across non-interchangeable semantic roles in addition to, or instead of, dividing one value into threshold shares.
[1977] Vault-Local Release Receipt
[1978] A Vault-Local Release Receipt is a Protected Receipt generated by or on behalf of a Storage Vault in response to an authorized component-release decision.
[1979] A Vault-Local Release Receipt may bind one or more of:
[1980] • a vault identifier;
[1981] • a digest or reference of the RAO;
[1982] • a protected authorization-state identifier;
[1983] • a protected session identifier;
[1984] • a session nonce;
[1985] • a Session Epoch;
[1986] • an execution-context measurement;
[1987] • one or more released-component identifiers;
[1988] • release constraints;
[1989] • a permitted field set;
[1990] • a Permitted Association Scope;
[1991] • a validity condition;
[1992] • a use condition;
[1993] • a release time;
[1994] • a receipt nonce;• a vault-local policy state;
[1995] • or another vault-specific release condition.
[1996] The receipt may be:
[1997] • signed;
[1998] • message-authentication-code protected;
[1999] • hardware sealed;
[2000] • digest chained;
[2001] • capability bound;
[2002] • or otherwise protected against unauthorized modification, substitution, replay, or cross-session use.
[2003] A Protected Reconstruction Domain may verify that Vault-Local Release Receipts from several required vaults correspond to:
[2004] • the same RAO or Protected Authorization State;
[2005] • the same protected session;
[2006] • the current Session Epoch;
[2007] • the expected protected domains;
[2008] • and mutually compatible release conditions.
[2009] A Vault-Local Release Receipt evidences or participates in protected component release.
[2010] It does not, by itself, authorize Candidate Output release or substitute for a Protected Output Validation Receipt where output-finality verification is required.
[2011] Restricted Processing Interface
[2012] A Restricted Processing Interface is a technically controlled interface through which an Artificial-Intelligence Workload receives or operates upon an authorized data view, protected derivative, or Minimum-Necessary Representation without receiving unrestricted authority over the underlying Storage Vaults.
[2013] The Restricted Processing Interface may provide:
[2014] • selected fields;
[2015] • a filtered view;
[2016] • a redacted view;
[2017] a structured query result;protected features;
[2018] • an embedding;
[2019] • a derived representation;
[2020] • a constrained retrieval operation;
[2021] • a protected inference operation;
[2022] • a capability-restricted data reference;
[2023] • or another authorized representation.
[2024] The interface may technically restrict or prevent:
[2025] • arbitrary enumeration of vault contents;
[2026] • access outside the permitted field set;
[2027] • associations outside the Permitted Association Scope;
[2028] • persistent copying;
[2029] • creation of unauthorized model or agent memory;
[2030] • export to an unauthorized destination;
[2031] • secondary retrieval using reconstructed identifiers;
[2032] • model training or fine-tuning using protected data;
[2033] • propagation to an unauthorized downstream model, agent, tool, or service;
[2034] • and direct access to vault credentials or key material.
[2035] The Restricted Processing Interface may operate:
[2036] • within the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2037] • through a protected proxy;
[2038] • through an enclave call interface;
[2039] • through a query broker;
[2040] • through a capability-mediated API;
[2041] • through a protected shared-memory mechanism;
[2042] • or through another Mandatory Mediation Path.
[2043] A conventional API is not a Restricted Processing Interface merely because it exposes a limited documented function where the workload retains a technically available bypass route or general vault credential.Provenance State
[2044] Provenance State means protected state identifying, preserving, or enabling verification of the origin, transformation history, authorization context, and permitted use of protected information throughout the Protected Processing Span.
[2045] Provenance State may identify or bind one or more of:
[2046] • a source Storage Vault;
[2047] • a source component;
[2048] • a source record;
[2049] • a source field;
[2050] • a protected association;
[2051] • an RAO or Protected Authorization State;
[2052] • an authorized purpose;
[2053] • a permitted output type;
[2054] • a permitted destination;
[2055] • a recipient;
[2056] • a sensitivity class;
[2057] • a jurisdiction condition;
[2058] • a retention condition;
[2059] • an intermediate value;
[2060] • a derived feature;
[2061] • an embedding;
[2062] • a reconstructed field;
[2063] • an output fragment;
[2064] • a Candidate Output;
[2065] • a Candidate Act;
[2066] • or another relevant protected transformation.
[2067] Provenance State may be represented through:
[2068] • field-level labels;taint tags;
[2069] • information-flow labels;
[2070] • protected metadata;
[2071] • schema annotations;
[2072] • component identifiers;
[2073] • graph-edge identifiers;
[2074] • token-level provenance;
[2075] • feature-level provenance;
[2076] • output-fragment labels;
[2077] • cryptographic commitments;
[2078] • protected inference traces;
[2079] • structured references;
[2080] • or combinations thereof.
[2081] Provenance State need not be visible to or modifiable by the Artificial-Intelligence Workload.
[2082] It may be maintained in:
[2083] • a parallel protected control plane;
[2084] • the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2085] • a protected verification service;
[2086] • a protected runtime;
[2087] • or another mandatory control mechanism.
[2088] Where Provenance State is required for release verification, missing, ambiguous, inconsistent, stale, or unverifiable provenance results in denial, protected transformation, quarantine, or another fail-closed outcome.
[2089] Artificial-Intelligence Workload
[2090] An Artificial-Intelligence Workload means one or more computational components configured to perform artificial-intelligence, machine-learning, inference, agentic, retrieval, generative, classificatory, predictive, decision, optimization, or related processing.
[2091] An Artificial-Intelligence Workload may comprise one or more of:
[2092] • a machine-learning model;a foundation model;
[2093] • a language model;
[2094] • a multimodal model;
[2095] • a vision model;
[2096] • a speech model;
[2097] • an autonomous or semi-autonomous agent;
[2098] • an inference runtime;
[2099] • an orchestration framework;
[2100] • a retrieval-augmented-generation process;
[2101] • a tool-selection process;
[2102] • a planning process;
[2103] • a rules engine operating with a model;
[2104] • a model ensemble;
[2105] • a model router;
[2106] • an external model service;
[2107] • a local model service;
[2108] • a protected model service;
[2109] • a chain of cooperating agents;
[2110] • associated retrieval systems;
[2111] • memory systems;
[2112] • plugins;
[2113] • tools;
[2114] • runtime code;
[2115] • or supporting software processes.
[2116] The Artificial-Intelligence Workload may be centralized, distributed, local, remote, cloud based, edge based, hardware accelerated, or divided among several execution environments.
[2117] The term includes the operative execution context that generates, selects, transforms, retrieves, assembles, or initiates a Candidate Act, and is not limited to the mathematical model alone.Where appropriate, a protected measurement may bind the model, its runtime, agent logic, tools, retrieval configuration, memory configuration, policy state, and surrounding execution environment as one compound Artificial-Intelligence Workload.
[2118] Complete Authorization Span
[2119] A Complete Authorization Span, also referred to as a Complete Protected Authorization Span, means continuity of protected authority across the technical stages beginning with protected component release and extending through reconstruction, processing, Candidate Act formation, verification, Release Authority formation, and external effectuation or denial.
[2120] The Complete Authorization Span may govern one or more of:
[2121] • Vault-Local Release;
[2122] • protected component use;
[2123] • association resolution;
[2124] • reconstruction;
[2125] • artificial-intelligence processing;
[2126] • provenance propagation;
[2127] • Candidate Act formation;
[2128] • Candidate Output formation;
[2129] • destination selection;
[2130] • recipient selection;
[2131] • output verification;
[2132] • protected receipt commitment;
[2133] • ORC issuance;
[2134] • and Output Release Boundary effectuation.
[2135] The Complete Authorization Span does not require the same identical byte sequence or complete RAO to be supplied to every component.
[2136] Different components may receive technically constrained derivatives of the same Protected Authorization State where:
[2137] the derivatives are verifiably linked to the same underlying authority;
[2138] each derivative reveals only the information required by the receiving component;
[2139] no derivative enlarges the original scope;• and the combined protected workflow preserves continuity of purpose, session, field, association, destination, recipient, epoch, and other applicable conditions.
[2140] Completion of one stage does not terminate authorization control over later stages.
[2141] Accordingly, authorization to reconstruct data does not, by itself, authorize Candidate Act effectuation.
[2142] Invalidation Controller
[2143] An Invalidation Controller is a protected controller, distributed protected function, or coordinated state-machine mechanism configured to close, revoke, poison, terminate, supersede, or otherwise invalidate a protected session or protected authority state.
[2144] The Invalidation Controller may act in response to:
[2145] • successful completion;
[2146] • expiration;
[2147] • revocation;
[2148] • policy failure;
[2149] • use-count exhaustion;
[2150] • workload change;
[2151] • model change;
[2152] • agent change;
[2153] • tool substitution;
[2154] • code-integrity change;
[2155] • execution-context change;
[2156] • tenant change;
[2157] • destination change;
[2158] • loss of attestation correspondence;
[2159] • detected compromise;
[2160] • interrupted reconstruction;
[2161] • unauthorized Candidate Act formation;
[2162] • unauthorized output attempt;
[2163] • communication failure;• vault inconsistency;
[2164] • protected-domain failure;
[2165] • receipt-store failure;
[2166] • or another protected termination condition.
[2167] Invalidation may include one or more of:
[2168] • Session Epoch advancement;
[2169] • revocation-state advancement;
[2170] • destruction of ephemeral keys;
[2171] • invalidation of Session-Bound Components;
[2172] • clearing of protected memory;
[2173] • invalidation of temporary mapping state;
[2174] • deletion or invalidation of temporary embeddings;
[2175] • invalidation of cached or precomputed artifacts;
[2176] • closure of a Restricted Processing Interface;
[2177] • revocation of ORCs;
[2178] • invalidation of unconsumed capabilities;
[2179] • closure of a protected stream;
[2180] • poisoning of partial-session state;
[2181] • generation of a protected closure or poisoning receipt;
[2182] • and rejection of further operations under the invalidated state.
[2183] The Invalidation Controller may be implemented within one protected domain or distributed among several vault, authorization, reconstruction, receipt, verification, and release domains.
[2184] A workload or unprotected process cannot independently reset, reverse, or bypass a protected invalidation decision.
[2185] Partial Session
[2186] A Partial Session means a protected reconstruction or output-finality session in which one or more authorized or attempted processing stages have occurred, but the complete protected workflow has not validly reached authorized effectuation or normal completion.
[2187] A Partial Session may arise where:one or more vaults have released protected components while another required vault has denied or failed;
[2188] • components have been released but reconstruction has not completed;
[2189] • reconstruction has occurred but artificial-intelligence processing has not completed; • a Candidate Act has been formed but remains Non-Effective;
[2190] • a Candidate Output has been sealed but not verified;
[2191] • output verification has failed or remains incomplete;
[2192] • a POVR has been prepared but not durably committed;
[2193] • an ORC has been provisionally generated but not validly activated;
[2194] • an Output Release Boundary has not completed effectuation;
[2195] • communication has been interrupted;
[2196] • a protected component has become stale;
[2197] • or a session has otherwise terminated between mandatory protected transitions.
[2198] A Partial Session may contain protected components, temporary keys, mapping state, provenance state, Candidate Acts, receipts, or capabilities that would present a replay or completion risk if allowed to remain usable after termination.
[2199] A Partial Session does not, merely because some earlier operations succeeded, retain authority to complete a later protected stage.
[2200] Partial-Session Poisoning
[2201] Partial-Session Poisoning means protected invalidation of state associated with a Partial Session so that previously released, generated, captured, or derived session material cannot be replayed, resumed, merged, transferred, or otherwise used to complete the terminated session.
[2202] Partial-Session Poisoning may include:
[2203] • advancing a Session Epoch;
[2204] • advancing revocation or monotonic state;
[2205] • destroying a session-specific key;
[2206] • invalidating Session-Bound Components;
[2207] • invalidating temporary association mappings;
[2208] • invalidating protected reconstruction state;
[2209] • revoking unconsumed ORCs;invalidating provisional capability state;
[2210] • marking Vault-Local Release State as consumed, closed, or poisoned;
[2211] • closing a streaming sequence;
[2212] • clearing protected intermediate plaintext;
[2213] • invalidating temporary embeddings or derived features;
[2214] • and committing a protected poisoning or closure record.
[2215] Following poisoning, previously released or captured material may fail to:
[2216] • authenticate;
[2217] • decrypt;
[2218] • resolve;
[2219] • reconstruct;
[2220] • correspond to current protected state;
[2221] • satisfy a current epoch;
[2222] • validate at the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2223] • or pass the Output Release Boundary.
[2224] A poisoned Partial Session cannot validly be:
[2225] • resumed;
[2226] • replayed;
[2227] • completed;
[2228] • combined with another Partial Session;
[2229] • migrated to another workload;
[2230] • transferred to another Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2231] • extended using a captured RAO;
[2232] • or completed using a previously issued but unconsumed capability.
[2233] Partial-Session Poisoning does not require permanent destruction or unavailability of the underlying Enterprise Record.
[2234] A later legitimate operation may begin through:
[2235] • a newly generated or validated RAO;a new session identifier or nonce;
[2236] a current Session Epoch;
[2237] fresh vault-local verification;
[2238] • and newly released Session-Bound Components.
[2239] Protected Receipt
[2240] A Protected Receipt is protected evidence or protected state generated in connection with a security-relevant event, decision, transition, denial, release, reconstruction, verification, invalidation, or effectuation operation.
[2241] A Protected Receipt may relate to:
[2242] • authorization issuance;
[2243] • RAO creation;
[2244] • Vault-Local Release;
[2245] • component denial;
[2246] • reconstruction initiation;
[2247] • reconstruction completion;
[2248] • Candidate Act formation;
[2249] • Candidate Output sealing;
[2250] • output verification;
[2251] • output denial;
[2252] • protected transformation;
[2253] • POVR commitment;
[2254] • ORC issuance;
[2255] • authorized release;
[2256] • session closure;
[2257] • session invalidation;
[2258] • Partial-Session Poisoning;
[2259] • or another protected event.
[2260] A Protected Receipt may bind one or more of:• an event type;
[2261] • a protected-domain identifier;
[2262] • an RAO or Protected Authorization State;
[2263] • a session identifier;
[2264] • a Session Epoch;
[2265] • a Policy Epoch;
[2266] • an execution-context measurement;
[2267] • one or more component identifiers;
[2268] • a Candidate Act identifier;
[2269] • a Candidate Output digest;
[2270] • a provenance digest;
[2271] • a destination;
[2272] • a recipient;
[2273] • a verification result;
[2274] • a denial reason;
[2275] • an applied transformation;
[2276] • a preceding receipt digest;
[2277] • a monotonic value;
[2278] • a protected timestamp;
[2279] • a receipt nonce;
[2280] • or another security-relevant condition.
[2281] A Protected Receipt may be maintained in:
[2282] • a protected append-only journal;
[2283] • a hardware-backed log;
[2284] • a protected database;
[2285] • a digest chain;
[2286] • a protected ledger;
[2287] • a quorum-controlled receipt service;or another tamper-resistant commitment mechanism.
[2288] A Protected Receipt may be:
[2289] • evidentiary;
[2290] • constitutive;
[2291] • or both.
[2292] An evidentiary receipt records or proves that a protected event occurred but does not independently authorize a later operation.
[2293] A constitutive receipt is a required protected state transition whose successful commitment is a technical precondition to creation or exercise of subsequent authority.
[2294] A Vault- Local Release Receipt and a Protected Output Validation Receipt are particular types of Protected Receipt.
[2295] Unless expressly defined as constitutive for a specified transition, generation or possession of a Protected Receipt does not substitute for current execution-time verification or independently create Release Authority.
[2296] Execution–Consequence Decoupling
[2297] Execution-Consequence Decoupling means a protected architectural relationship in which authority to perform computation, inference, generation, planning, selection, transformation, or another internal processing operation is technically separated from the authority required to make the resulting Candidate Act or Candidate Output Externally Usable or Externally Effective.
[2298] Under Execution-Consequence Decoupling, an Artificial-Intelligence Workload may:
[2299] • access an authorized Minimum-Necessary Representation;
[2300] • perform inference or other computation;
[2301] • generate a Candidate Output;
[2302] • select a tool or operation;
[2303] • prepare a transaction;
[2304] • formulate a communication;
[2305] • generate a database or memory operation;
[2306] • or otherwise complete an internal computational result
[2307] without thereby acquiring Release Authority, protected key material, capability state, boundary authority, or another protected condition required to complete the corresponding external consequence. The relationship may be enforced through one or more of:
[2308] • Technical Non-Joinability;
[2309] • a Restricted Processing Interface;
[2310] • Candidate Act confinement;
[2311] • a Sealed Candidate Output;
[2312] • Protected Authorization State;
[2313] • Mandatory Mediation;
[2314] • output-time verification;
[2315] • protected receipt commitment; 101
[2316] • Output Release Capability issuance;
[2317] • key application;• quorum approval;
[2318] • protected state-machine advancement;
[2319] • and Output Release Boundary verification.
[2320] Execution-Consequence Decoupling does not require computation and consequence control to be implemented on different physical devices. The functions may be colocated where they remain independently protected through separate keys, capabilities, enclaves, hardware partitions, protected processes, mandatory reference monitors, distributed authorities, or other technically enforced separation.
[2321] The defining property is that successful completion of computation does not, by itself, provide sufficient authority or technical ability to complete the external consequence.
[2322] Accordingly, compromise, manipulation, prompt injection, substitution, or malfunction of an Artificial-Intelligence Workload does not automatically provide authority to disclose protected information, persist protected state, invoke a tool, transmit a communication, initiate a payment, control a machine, or otherwise effectuate a Candidate Act outside the protected conditions governing that consequence.
[2323] The disclosed architecture establishes Execution-Consequence Decoupling, Mandatory Mediation, Technical Non-Joinability, and Technical Non-Completability, thereby enabling enterprise artificial-intelligence systems to perform authorized computation without independently acquiring authority to disclose protected enterprise relationships or produce unauthorized external consequences. The architecture is applicable to enterprise Al, agentic Al, multi-agent systems, model-serving infrastructure, retrieval-augmented generation, vector databases, cloud and confidential computing, cybersecurity, telecommunications, financial services, healthcare, government systems, industrial automation, critical infrastructure, robotics, autonomous systems, and cyber-physical environments.
[2324] 19. End-to-End Protected State and Authority Workflow - Multi- Vault Enterprise Data Storage with Workload-Bound Non-Bearer Reconstruction Authorization, Provenance-Preserving Processing, and Output-Boundary Verification
[2325] The following workflow illustrates one implementation of the disclosed architecture.
[2326] The workflow is organized according to changes in protected system state and authority.
[2327] Verification operations support those changes but do not, by themselves, define the architecture.The principal progression is:
[2328] ENTERPRISE RECORD SEMANTICALLY DECOMPOSED RECORD INDEPENDENTLY PROTECTED COMPONENTS AUTHORIZED RECONSTRUCTION SESSION SESSION-BOUND COMPONENT RELEASE
[2329] EPHEMERAL AUTHORIZED VIEW RESTRICTED ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING
[2330] SEALED CANDIDATE OUTPUT
[2331] VERIFIED NON-EFFECTIVE OUTPUT
[2332] PROTECTED RECEIPT COMMITMENT OUTPUT RELEASE CAPABILITY EXTERNALLY EFFECTIVE OUTPUT
[2333]
[2334] CLOSED OR POISONED SESSION
[2335] Completion of an earlier state does not automatically authorize transition to a later state.
[2336] In particular:
[2337] • access authority does not constitute reconstruction authority;
[2338] • reconstruction authority does not constitute processing authority beyond the authorized purpose;
[2339] • processing authority does not constitute output authority;
[2340] • successful output verification does not constitute Release Authority until the required Protected Output Validation Receipt has been committed;
[2341] • possession of an Output Release Capability does not authorize release outside its bound output, destination, session, epoch, and Output Release Boundary; and
[2342] • computation of a Candidate Output does not make the Candidate Output Externally Usable or Externally Effective.19.1 Protected Workflow States
[2343] A Protected State Machine may maintain one or more of the following states:
[2344] RECORD_RECE IVED
[2345] RECORD_DECOMPOSED
[2346] COMPONENTS_VAULTED
[2347] RE QUE S T_RE C E I VE D
[2348] AUTHORIZATION_PENDING
[2349] AUTHORIZED VAULT_RELEASE_PENDING
[2350] COMPONENTS_RELEASED
[2351] RECONSTRUCTION_PENDING
[2352] RECONSTRUCTEDPROCESSINGCANDIDATE_CREATED
[2353] CANDIDATE_SEALED
[2354] OUTPUT_REVERIFICATION_PENDING
[2355] OUTPUT_VERIFIED
[2356] R
[2357]
[2358] ECEIPT_PENDING
[2359] RECEIPT_COMMITTED RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED
[2360] OUTPUT_EFFECTUATED
[2361] CLOSED DENIED POISONED
[2362] The state names are illustrative. Equivalent state representations, flags, counters, capability states, protected records, or state-machine transitions may be used.
[2363] A transition is valid only where the conditions required for that transition are satisfied under current Protected Authorization State.
[2364] Skipped, stale, duplicated, inconsistent, replayed, or out-of-order transitions fail closed.
[2365] 19.2 Stage 1: Semantic Decomposition of the Enterprise Record
[2366] Initial state
[2367] RECORD_RECE IVED
[2368] An enterprise record is received, generated, imported, synchronized, or identified for protected storage.
[2369] The enterprise record may include:
[2370] • identity information;
[2371] • enterprise content;
[2372] • relationship or linkage information;
[2373] • cryptographic material;
[2374] • policy information; 104provenance information;
[2375] • retention information;
[2376] • jurisdiction information;
[2377] • consent information; or
[2378] • other protected information.
[2379] The enterprise record is decomposed according to semantic role rather than merely divided into interchangeable fragments.
[2380] The decomposition process identifies at least:
[2381] 1. protected identity components;
[2382] 2. protected content components;
[2383] 3. association information required to selectively associate identity components and content components; and
[2384] 4. where applicable, cryptographic or reconstruction-enablement material.
[2385] The components may be transformed through:
[2386] • tokenization;
[2387] • pseudonymization;
[2388] • encryption;
[2389] • reference substitution;
[2390] • field extraction;
[2391] • graph separation;
[2392] • schema transformation;
[2393] • key separation;
[2394] • record partitioning;
[2395] • protected indexing; or
[2396] • another data-separation technique.
[2397] Direct persistent associations may be replaced by opaque component references.
[2398] Resulting state
[2399] RECORD_DECOMPOSED
[2400] The resulting decomposed record comprises semantically heterogeneous protected componentswhose independent possession does not, by itself, provide the complete authorized enterprise meaning.
[2401] 19.3 Stage 2: Independent Protection-Domain Placement
[2402] The decomposed components are placed under independently controlled protection domains.
[2403] In one embodiment:
[2404] • protected identity components are stored in an identity vault;
[2405] • protected content components are stored in a content vault;
[2406] • association information is stored in a relationship-mapping vault; and
[2407] • cryptographic or interpretation material is stored in a cryptographic-material vault or another independently protected domain.
[2408] Each vault or protection domain maintains its own Vault-Local Release State and Vault-Local Release Conditions.
[2409] Authority applicable to one vault is insufficient, by itself, to compel release from another vault. The domains may be:
[2410] • physically separated;
[2411] • logically isolated;
[2412] • cryptographically separated;
[2413] • hardware isolated;
[2414] • software isolated;
[2415] • administratively independent;
[2416] • operated by different authorities;
[2417] • distributed across regions or cloud providers; or
[2418] • implemented using a combination of these arrangements.
[2419] The architecture does not require exactly four physical vault devices.
[2420] A relationship-mapping function remains an independently controlled protection domain where association information cannot be obtained merely through authority over the identity and content domains.
[2421] Resulting state
[2422] COMPONENTS_VAULTED
[2423] The system now holds independently protected semantic components rather than one persistently joined enterprise record.19.4 Stage 3: Data-Use Request and Session Formation
[2424] A data-use request is received for an artificial-intelligence workload.
[2425] The request identifies or permits determination of:
[2426] • the requesting identity;
[2427] • the tenant;
[2428] • the artificial-intelligence workload;
[2429] • the intended execution context;
[2430] • requested protected fields;
[2431] • requested protected components;
[2432] • requested associations;
[2433] • the authorized processing purpose;
[2434] • the intended output type;
[2435] • the intended destination;
[2436] • the intended recipient;
[2437] • jurisdiction conditions;
[2438] • retention conditions;
[2439] • use-count conditions;
[2440] • disclosure conditions;
[2441] • applicable policy; and
[2442] • other required constraints.
[2443] The request does not directly cause component release.
[2444] The request first enters:
[2445] RE QUE S T_RE C E I VE D
[2446] and then:
[2447] AUTHORIZATION_PENDING
[2448] The Protected Authorization Domain evaluates the request against current enterprise policy, consent state, jurisdiction state, tenant state, workload registration, destination authority, disclosure conditions, and other applicable Protected Authorization State.
[2449] Where the request is denied, the session transitions to:DENIED
[2450] No vault release or reconstruction occurs.
[2451] Where the request is permitted, the Protected Authorization Domain establishes a reconstruction session and creates a Reconstruction Authorization Object.
[2452] 19.5 Stage 4: Reconstruction Authorization Object Issuance
[2453] The Protected Authorization Domain generates a non-bearer Reconstruction Authorization Object. The Reconstruction Authorization Object binds or commits to at least a selected combination of:
[2454] • an authorization identifier;
[2455] • a session identifier;
[2456] • a session nonce;
[2457] • an attested execution-context measurement;
[2458] • an identified artificial-intelligence workload;
[2459] • a tenant;
[2460] • a requester;
[2461] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2462] • a permitted field set;
[2463] • a permitted component set;
[2464] • a Permitted Association Scope;
[2465] • an authorized processing purpose;
[2466] • a permitted output scope;
[2467] • permitted output types;
[2468] • permitted destinations;
[2469] • permitted recipients;
[2470] • jurisdiction conditions;
[2471] • retention conditions;
[2472] • validity conditions;
[2473] a use-count limitation;a Disclosure Budget;
[2474] • an Inference-Channel Budget;
[2475] • a Policy Epoch;
[2476] • a Session Epoch;
[2477] • required vaults;
[2478] • a Protected Processing Span identifier;
[2479] • an Output Release Boundary identifier; and
[2480] • other applicable Protected Authorization State.
[2481] The Reconstruction Authorization Object is non-bearer because possession of the object alone is insufficient to exercise the authority represented by the object.
[2482] Exercise additionally requires correspondence with the bound:
[2483] • execution context;
[2484] • workload;
[2485] • tenant;
[2486] • session;
[2487] • Session Epoch;
[2488] • Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2489] • validity state;
[2490] • use count;
[2491] • destination;
[2492] • or other required condition.
[2493] The Reconstruction Authorization Object may be:
[2494] • cryptographically signed;
[2495] • message-authentication-code protected;
[2496] • hardware sealed;
[2497] • capability constrained;
[2498] • stored in Protected Session State;
[2499] • represented by a protected state-machine entry;or protected by another mandatory technical mechanism.
[2500] Resulting state
[2501] AUTHORIZED
[2502] This state authorizes initiation of controlled vault release. It does not authorize reconstruction, processing, or output release by itself.
[2503] 19.6 Stage 5: Independent Vault- Local Release Decisions
[2504] The Reconstruction Authorization Object, or a protected derivative thereof, is presented independently to each required storage vault.
[2505] Each vault determines whether it will release the requested component under its own Vault- Local Release Conditions.
[2506] The vault may evaluate:
[2507] • authenticity of the Reconstruction Authorization Object;
[2508] • correspondence with the current Session Epoch;
[2509] • the permitted field set;
[2510] • the permitted component set;
[2511] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[2512] • the authorized purpose;
[2513] • the tenant;
[2514] • the execution-context measurement;
[2515] • the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2516] • the current Policy Epoch;
[2517] • the current revocation state;
[2518] • the use count;
[2519] • the jurisdiction condition;
[2520] • vault-specific sensitivity conditions;
[2521] • quorum conditions;
[2522] • or another vault-local policy.A release by one vault does not cause or authorize release by another vault. Before release, an approved component is converted into a Session-Bound Component. A Session-Bound Component may be bound to:
[2523] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[2524] • the session identifier;
[2525] • the session nonce;
[2526] • the Session Epoch;
[2527] • the releasing vault;
[2528] • the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2529] • the attested execution context;
[2530] • a use count;
[2531] • an expiration condition; or
[2532] • another protected session condition.
[2533] The binding may be enforced using:
[2534] • session encryption;
[2535] • authenticated wrapping;
[2536] • sealed references;
[2537] • protected capabilities;
[2538] • tagged memory;
[2539] • mandatory mediation;
[2540] • state-machine constraints;
[2541] • confined channels;
[2542] • or another technical mechanism.
[2543] Each releasing vault generates a Vault-Local Release Receipt.The Vault-Local Release Receipt may bind:
[2544] • the vault identifier;
[2545] • the released component identifiers;
[2546] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[2547] the session identifier; 111the Session Epoch;
[2548] release conditions;
[2549] • release time;
[2550] • a vault-local sequence;
[2551] • and other protected release information.
[2552] Intermediate states
[2553] VAULT_RELEASE_PENDING
[2554] COMPONENTS_RELEASED
[2555] Where any required vault denies release or produces unverifiable state, the reconstruction does not proceed.
[2556] Depending on the stage already reached, the session transitions to:
[2557] DENIED
[2558] or:
[2559] POISONED
[2560] 19.7 Stage 6: Protected Reconstruction and Authorized Association
[2561] The Protected Reconstruction Domain receives:
[2562] • Session-Bound Components;
[2563] • Vault-Local Release Receipts;
[2564] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object or Protected Authorization State derived therefrom;
[2565] • current workload attestation;
[2566] • current Protected Session State; and
[2567] • current policy and revocation state.
[2568] The Protected Reconstruction Domain establishes that the released components belong to the same authorized reconstruction session.
[2569] The Protected Reconstruction Domain then:
[2570] 1. resolves Session-Bound Components;
[2571] 2. decrypts or interprets protected values where required;
[2572] 3. obtains or evaluates protected association information;
[2573] 4. applies the permitted field set;
[2574] 5. applies the Permitted Association Scope;6. excludes unauthorized fields and associations;
[2575] 7. creates or updates Provenance State; and
[2576] 8. constructs an Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View.
[2577] The Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View contains only data and associations required for the authorized processing purpose.
[2578] The complete semantically usable enterprise record is prevented from being persistently written outside the Protected Processing Span unless a separate authorization expressly permits such persistence.
[2579] The reconstructed view may comprise:
[2580] • selected plaintext fields;
[2581] • a redacted record;
[2582] • a structured query result;
[2583] • a protected graph;
[2584] • a feature representation;
[2585] • an embedding;
[2586] • a model-readable representation;
[2587] • a permitted aggregate;
[2588] • a protected derivative;
[2589] • or another Minimum-Necessary Representation.
[2590] Intermediate states
[2591] RECONSTRUCTION_PENDING
[2592] RECONSTRUCTED
[2593] Successful reconstruction does not create authority to export the reconstructed view or any output derived from it.
[2594] 19.8 Stage 7: Provenance-Linked Restricted Artificial-Intelligence Processing
[2595] The artificial-intelligence workload receives only:
[2596] • the Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View;
[2597] • a Protected Derivative;
[2598] • a Minimum-Necessary Representation;
[2599] • a restricted query interface;a protected inference interface;
[2600] • or another authorized input through a Restricted Processing Interface.
[2601] The artificial-intelligence workload does not receive unrestricted credentials for the underlying storage vaults.
[2602] Provenance State is maintained for protected:
[2603] • fields;
[2604] • components;
[2605] • associations;
[2606] • transformations;
[2607] • intermediate values;
[2608] • generated fragments;
[2609] • tool arguments;
[2610] • retrieval requests;
[2611] • model-to-model transfers;
[2612] • and other outputs or intermediate operations.Provenance State may be maintained:
[2613] • within the model runtime;
[2614] • within the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[2615] • through a parallel protected control plane;
[2616] • through labelled memory;
[2617] • through protected metadata;
[2618] • through structured intermediate representations;
[2619] • through component identifiers;
[2620] • through information-flow labels;
[2621] • or through another provenance-preserving mechanism.
[2622] The artificial-intelligence workload may:
[2623] • summarize;
[2624] • classify;
[2625] • infer;
[2626] • generate;
[2627] • retrieve;
[2628] • recommend;
[2629] • transform;
[2630] • select a tool;
[2631] • create an API request;
[2632] • produce a database modification;
[2633] • produce a message;
[2634] • create an external model prompt;
[2635] • or produce another result.
[2636] Processing state
[2637] PROCESSING
[2638] The workload is permitted to compute within the authorized session but is not permitted to independently make the computed result Externally Usable or Externally Effective.19.9 Stage 8: Candidate Output Formation
[2639] The artificial-intelligence workload generates a Candidate Output.
[2640] The Candidate Output may be:
[2641] • text;
[2642] • structured data;
[2643] • a tool invocation;
[2644] • a database update;
[2645] • an API request;
[2646] • an email;
[2647] • a message;
[2648] • an image;
[2649] • an audio output;
[2650] • an embedding;
[2651] • a retrieval query;
[2652] • a training example;
[2653] • a memory write;
[2654] • a control signal;
[2655] • a financial instruction;
[2656] • or another consequence-bearing artifact.
[2657] Resulting state
[2658] CANDIDATE_CREATED
[2659] The Candidate Output is a completed computational result but remains non-authoritative for external release.
[2660] The state CANDIDATE_CREATED does not provide Release Authority.
[2661] 19.10 Stage 9: Sealed Candidate Output and Technical Non-Completability Before exposure to an untrusted process or unverified output path, the Candidate Output is converted into a Sealed Candidate Output.
[2662] The Sealed Candidate Output may be:
[2663] • encrypted;hardware sealed;
[2664] • retained in protected memory;
[2665] • written into a Protected Output Buffer;
[2666] • capability restricted;
[2667] • authenticated and destination bound;
[2668] • maintained as a protected intermediate representation;
[2669] • confined to a mandatory channel;
[2670] • or otherwise rendered Non-Releasable.
[2671] The artificial-intelligence workload lacks sufficient:
[2672] • key material;
[2673] • release authority;
[2674] • output capability;
[2675] • protected state;
[2676] • interface access;
[2677] • or path control
[2678] to independently convert the Sealed Candidate Output into an Externally Usable or Externally Effective result.
[2679] The sealing state may bind:
[2680] • the Candidate Output digest;
[2681] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[2682] • the session identifier;
[2683] • the Session Epoch;
[2684] • the execution-context measurement;
[2685] • the intended destination;
[2686] • the output type;
[2687] • the Output Release Boundary identifier;
[2688] • and other Protected Authorization State.
[2689] Resulting stateCANDIDATE_SEALED
[2690] This state establishes Technical Non-Completability.
[2691] Generation has completed, but the output path remains technically incomplete.
[2692] 19.11 Stage 10: Live Output-Time Re-Establishment of Current Authority
[2693] Authorization established during reconstruction is not conclusively carried forward to output release.
[2694] Before the Sealed Candidate Output can become releasable, the Output Verification Stage reestablishes that current Protected Authorization State still permits the proposed release.
[2695] The Output Verification Stage obtains or verifies:
[2696] • a fresh execution-context attestation;
[2697] • current revocation state;
[2698] • the current Policy Epoch;
[2699] • the current Session Epoch;
[2700] • the current use count;
[2701] • the current Disclosure Budget;
[2702] • the current Inference-Channel Budget;
[2703] • the intended destination;
[2704] • the intended recipient;
[2705] • the intended output type;
[2706] • the current Output Release Boundary identity;
[2707] • current quorum state where required;
[2708] • current jurisdiction state; and
[2709] • continuity with the Reconstruction Authorization Object.
[2710] A prior attestation may be used only within a Bounded Freshness Window and only where Protected Continuity Proof establishes that no relevant state change has occurred.
[2711] Where:
[2712] the workload has changed;
[2713] the model version has changed;
[2714] agent code has changed;tools have changed;
[2715] • the execution environment has changed;
[2716] • the tenant has changed;
[2717] • the session has expired;
[2718] • the policy has changed;
[2719] • revocation state is indeterminate;
[2720] • or another bound condition no longer corresponds,
[2721] the output path remains incomplete.
[2722] Intermediate state
[2723] OUTPUT_REVERIFICATION_PENDING
[2724] 19.12 Stage 11: Output-Scope and Association Evaluation
[2725] The Output Verification Stage evaluates the Sealed Candidate Output or a protected representation thereof.
[2726] The Output Verification Stage determines whether the output:
[2727] • contains protected fields outside the permitted field set;
[2728] • contains or enables an Unauthorized Cross- Vault Correlation;
[2729] • exceeds the Permitted Association Scope;
[2730] • violates the authorized processing purpose;
[2731] • exceeds the permitted output scope;
[2732] • targets an unauthorized destination or recipient;
[2733] • violates a jurisdiction condition;
[2734] • exceeds the Disclosure Budget;
[2735] • exceeds the Inference-Channel Budget;
[2736] • contains unverifiable provenance;
[2737] • represents a tool operation beyond authorized authority;
[2738] • creates unauthorized persistent memory;
[2739] • or otherwise exceeds Protected Authorization State.
[2740] Association-Leak Detection may use:entity extraction;
[2741] • structured-field parsing;
[2742] • protected dictionaries;
[2743] • protected identity indices;
[2744] • graph comparison;
[2745] • pairwise association analysis;
[2746] • provenance labels;
[2747] • embedding similarity;
[2748] • deterministic schema evaluation;
[2749] • information-flow analysis;
[2750] • classifier-based analysis;
[2751] • cumulative output analysis;
[2752] • or combinations thereof.
[2753] Uncertainty does not create authority.
[2754] Where provenance, association, destination, policy, identity resolution, classifier result, or another required condition is ambiguous or unverifiable, the default result is denial, redaction, transformation, quarantine, or another fail-closed action.
[2755] A noncompliant output may be transformed within the protected domain by:
[2756] • redaction;
[2757] • generalization;
[2758] • aggregation;
[2759] • removal of unauthorized associations;
[2760] • destination substitution;
[2761] • precision reduction;
[2762] • pseudonymization;
[2763] • suppression of a tool call;
[2764] • or another authorized transformation.
[2765] A transformed output is re-evaluated before it may proceed.
[2766] Resulting stateWhere successful:
[2767] OUTPUT_VERIFIED
[2768] The output is verified but remains Non-Releasable.
[2769] Output verification alone does not create Release Authority.
[2770] 19.13 Stage 12: Protected Output Validation Receipt Formation
[2771] After successful output verification, the Output Verification Stage generates a Protected Output Validation Receipt.
[2772] The Protected Output Validation Receipt may bind:
[2773] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[2774] • the original Candidate Output digest;
[2775] • the verified or transformed output digest;
[2776] • the Provenance State digest;
[2777] • the execution-context measurement;
[2778] • the session identifier;
[2779] • the Session Epoch;
[2780] • the Policy Epoch;
[2781] • the revocation-state digest;
[2782] • the destination;
[2783] • the recipient;
[2784] • the output type;
[2785] • the Output Release Boundary identifier;
[2786] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[2787] • the applied transformation;
[2788] • the verification result;
[2789] • a receipt sequence;
[2790] • a previous-receipt digest;
[2791] • a protected time value;
[2792] • a monotonic state value;• and other protected validation information.
[2793] Intermediate state
[2794] RECEIPT_PENDING
[2795] The Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed to a Protected Receipt Store.
[2796] The Protected Receipt Store may comprise:
[2797] • a local protected append-only journal;
[2798] • a hardware-backed log;
[2799] • a hash chain;
[2800] • a protected database;
[2801] • a private ledger;
[2802] • a distributed ledger;
[2803] • a Merkle-tree structure;
[2804] • or another tamper-evident commitment mechanism.
[2805] Receipt commitment is constitutive.
[2806] It is not merely a post-release audit event.
[2807] If receipt commitment fails, Release Authority is not created.
[2808] Resulting state
[2809] RECEIPT_COMMITTED
[2810] 19.14 Stage 13: Atomic Output Finality Transaction
[2811] The transition from OUTPUT_VERIFIED to RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED occurs through an Atomic Output Finality Transaction.
[2812] The transaction includes at least:
[2813] 1. confirmation of current output verification;
[2814] 2. confirmation of current Protected Authorization State;
[2815] 3. generation of the Protected Output Validation Receipt;
[2816] 4. successful commitment of the Protected Output Validation Receipt;
[2817] 5. binding of release authority to the committed receipt and verified output; and
[2818] 6. issuance or activation of an Output Release Capability.
[2819] The transaction either:completes in a protected success state; or
[2820] • fails without leaving usable partial Release Authority.
[2821] The Output Release Capability may be bound to:
[2822] • the verified output digest;
[2823] • the Protected Output Validation Receipt digest;
[2824] • the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[2825] • the session identifier;
[2826] • the Session Epoch;
[2827] • the destination;
[2828] • the recipient;
[2829] • the output type;
[2830] • the Output Release Boundary identifier;
[2831] • an expiration condition;
[2832] • a one-time use condition;
[2833] • a disclosure-state value;
[2834] • or another protected release condition.
[2835] Resulting state
[2836] RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED
[2837] The Output Release Capability is scoped, context bound, and non-bearer or otherwise technically constrained.
[2838] Possession outside the bound output, destination, session, epoch, or boundary is insufficient to effectuate release.
[2839] 19.15 Stage 14: Output-Boundary Completion and Effectuation
[2840] The Output Release Boundary receives:
[2841] • the Sealed Candidate Output or a resealed verified output;
[2842] • the Output Release Capability;
[2843] • the committed Protected Output Validation Receipt digest or proof;
[2844] • current Protected Session State;
[2845] • and any boundary-specific release state.The Output Release Boundary verifies correspondence among:
[2846] • the output digest;
[2847] • the Output Release Capability;
[2848] • the Protected Output Validation Receipt;
[2849] • the destination;
[2850] • the Output Release Boundary identifier;
[2851] • the session identifier;
[2852] • the Session Epoch;
[2853] • the expiration condition;
[2854] • the use count;
[2855] • and other required release conditions.
[2856] Only the Output Release Boundary, or a protected component acting on its behalf, possesses the authority required to complete the output path.
[2857] Upon successful verification, the Output Release Boundary may:
[2858] • decrypt;
[2859] • unseal;
[2860] • render;
[2861] • transmit;
[2862] • commit;
[2863] • invoke;
[2864] • write;
[2865] • display;
[2866] • store;
[2867] • actuate;
[2868] • initiate;
[2869] • or otherwise effectuate the verified output.
[2870] Resulting state
[2871] OUTPUT_EFFECTUATED
[2872] At this point, and not before, the output becomes Externally Usable or Externally Effective.19.16 Stage 15: Capability Consumption and Protected-State Advancement
[2873] After successful effectuation:
[2874] • the Output Release Capability is consumed, invalidated, or advanced to a non-reusable state;
[2875] • the use count is updated;
[2876] • the Disclosure Budget is updated;
[2877] • the Inference-Channel Budget is updated;
[2878] • the Vault-Local Release States may be marked completed;
[2879] • the Protected Session State is advanced;
[2880] • and a release or closure receipt may be generated.
[2881] A one-time Output Release Capability cannot be replayed for:
[2882] • another output;
[2883] • another destination;
[2884] • another recipient;
[2885] • another session;
[2886] • another Session Epoch;
[2887] • another Output Release Boundary;
[2888] • or another effectuation operation.
[2889] 19.17 Stage 16: Successful Session Closure
[2890] Upon completion of the authorized processing:
[2891] • the Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View is deleted or rendered inaccessible;
[2892] • temporary keys are destroyed or invalidated;
[2893] • temporary mapping state is destroyed or invalidated;
[2894] • plaintext intermediates are cleared;
[2895] • temporary embeddings are cleared;
[2896] • temporary Provenance State is closed or archived in protected form;
[2897] • Protected Output Buffer contents are cleared;
[2898] • unused release authority is revoked;and the Protected Session State is transitioned to a closed state.
[2899] Resulting state
[2900] CLOSED
[2901] The underlying enterprise data may remain available for a later separately authorized request.
[2902] 19.18 Stage 17: Interrupted or Failed Session Poisoning
[2903] A Partial Session exists where one or more protected actions have occurred but authorized reconstruction, output finality, effectuation, or valid closure has not completed.
[2904] A Partial Session may arise from:
[2905] • vault release followed by reconstruction failure;
[2906] • reconstruction followed by workload failure;
[2907] • Candidate Output generation followed by verification failure;
[2908] • receipt commitment failure;
[2909] • Output Release Capability issuance failure;
[2910] • communication interruption;
[2911] • attestation mismatch;
[2912] • policy change;
[2913] • revocation;
[2914] • destination change;
[2915] • output-boundary failure;
[2916] • or another interrupted state.
[2917] The invalidation controller poisons the Partial Session.
[2918] Poisoning may include:
[2919] • advancing the Session Epoch;
[2920] • closing the session identifier;
[2921] • destroying session keys;
[2922] • invalidating Session-Bound Components;
[2923] • invalidating temporary mapping state;
[2924] • revoking Output Release Capabilities;marking Vault-Local Release States consumed or poisoned;
[2925] • recording a session-poisoning receipt;
[2926] • and rejecting future transitions under the stale session state.
[2927] Resulting state
[2928] POISONED
[2929] Captured components, authorization objects, receipts, capabilities, or stale state cannot be used to resume, replay, merge, or complete the poisoned session.
[2930] A later legitimate request requires:
[2931] • a new Reconstruction Authorization Object;
[2932] • a new session identifier or nonce;
[2933] • a current Session Epoch;
[2934] • fresh vault-local release;
[2935] • and new Protected Session State.
[2936] 19.19 Fail-Closed State-Transition Invariant
[2937] The Protected State Machine denies transition where any required condition is:
[2938] • absent;
[2939] • stale;
[2940] • expired;
[2941] • revoked;
[2942] • ambiguous;
[2943] • inconsistent;
[2944] • unavailable;
[2945] • unverifiable;
[2946] • out of order;
[2947] • replayed;
[2948] • duplicated;
[2949] • or outside the applicable scope.
[2950] The following conditions do not cause permissive fallback:attestation timeout;
[2951] • policy service unavailability;
[2952] • revocation service unavailability;
[2953] • Protected Receipt Store unavailability;
[2954] • ambiguous Provenance State;
[2955] • classifier uncertainty;
[2956] • stale Policy Epoch;
[2957] • stale Session Epoch;
[2958] • missing Vault- Local Release Receipt;
[2959] • missing component correspondence;
[2960] • unknown destination;
[2961] • unverified recipient;
[2962] • failed output sealing;
[2963] • failed receipt commitment;
[2964] • failed capability issuance;
[2965] • or failed Output Release Boundary verification.
[2966] No direct legacy route, alternate communication channel, default allow rule, cached bearer credential, or ordinary application permission substitutes for completion of the protected workflow.
[2967] 19.20 Hot- Path and Cold-Path Application
[2968] The workflow may divide operations into a hot path and a cold path.
[2969] The cold path may prepare:
[2970] • compiled policy predicates;
[2971] • permitted-association graphs;
[2972] • protected identity indices;
[2973] • registered workload measurements;
[2974] • destination manifests;
[2975] • attestation collateral;
[2976] • protected revocation snapshots;disclosure rules;
[2977] • provenance schemas;
[2978] • and other Protected Precomputation artifacts.
[2979] The hot path performs the current operations required before reconstruction or output effectuation, including:
[2980] • current session verification;
[2981] • current epoch verification;
[2982] • live or bounded-freshness attestation;
[2983] • current revocation verification;
[2984] • current output-scope evaluation;
[2985] • current provenance evaluation;
[2986] • current association evaluation;
[2987] • protected receipt commitment;
[2988] • Output Release Capability issuance;
[2989] • and Output Release Boundary verification.
[2990] Protected Precomputation reduces latency but does not replace current authorization or current finality conditions.
[2991] A generic cached value is not treated as Protected Precomputation merely because it was computed earlier.
[2992] 19.21 Legacy-System Application
[2993] A legacy database, application, artificial-intelligence workload, tool, or communication service may participate in the workflow through a mandatory protected:
[2994] • proxy;
[2995] • wrapper;
[2996] • broker;
[2997] • gateway;
[2998] • adapter;
[2999] • storage filter;
[3000] • operating- system service;model-serving layer;
[3001] • or output controller.
[3002] A legacy component need not natively understand every protected object where the surrounding architecture:
[3003] • prevents direct vault access;
[3004] • provides only a restricted view;
[3005] • captures Candidate Outputs;
[3006] • seals Candidate Outputs before release;
[3007] • maintains Provenance State;
[3008] • performs output finality;
[3009] • and prevents bypass through alternate output channels.
[3010] Observe-only monitoring is not equivalent to the enforced embodiment.
[3011] Technical Non-Completability requires that the legacy component cannot independently bypass the protected output path.
[3012] 20. Enablement Pseudocode
[3013] The following pseudocode illustrates one implementation of the protected workflow.
[3014] The functions are illustrative and may be distributed across multiple protected domains.
[3015] 20.1 Canonical Protected State Definitions
[3016] enum SessionStatus {
[3017] REQUESTED,
[3018] AUTHORIZED,
[3019] VAULT_RELEASE_PENDING,
[3020] COMPONENTS_RELEASED,
[3021] RECONSTRUCTED,
[3022] PROCESSING,
[3023] CANDIDATE_CREATED,
[3024] CANDIDATE_SEALED,
[3025] OUTPUT_REVERIFICATION_PENDING,
[3026] OUTPUT_VERIFIED,
[3027] R
[3028]
[3029] ECEIPT_PENDING,
[3030] RECEIPT_COMMITTED,
[3031] RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED,
[3032] OUTPUT_EFFECTUATED,
[3033] CLOSED,
[3034] DENIED,
[3035] POISONEDprotected_session_state = {
[3036] session_id,
[3037] authorization_digest,
[3038] status,
[3039] session_epoch,
[3040] policy_epoch,
[3041] execution_context_measurement,
[3042] use_count,
[3043] maximum_use_count,
[3044] disclosure_budget,
[3045] inference_channel_budget,
[3046] releasing_vaults,
[3047] released_component_ids,
[3048] receipt_state,
[3049] release_capability_state,
[3050] revocation_state
[3051] }
[3052] 20.2 Record Decomposition and Vault Placement
[3053] function decompose_and_store_enterprise_record ( record):
[3054] identity_components = extract_identity_components ( record) content_components =
[3055] extract_content_components (record) association_information = derive_association_information(identity_components,
[3056] content_components,
[3057] record. relationships
[3058] cryptographic_material = derive_or_allocate_cryptographic_material( identity_components,
[3059] content_components,
[3060] association_information
[3061] opaque_identity_ref s =
[3062] identity_vault. store (
[3063] protect ( identity_components )
[3064] opaque_content_ref s =
[3065] content_vault. store (
[3066] protect ( content_components )relationship_mapping_vault. store (
[3067] protect ( {
[3068] "identity_ref s": opaque_identity_ref s, "content_ref s ": opaque_content_ref s, "association_information":
[3069] association_inf ormation
[3070] } )
[3071] if cryptographic_material is not empty:
[3072] cryptographic_material_vault. store (
[3073] cryptographic_material
[3074] remove_direct_persistent_associations(record) return {
[3075] " identity_ref s ": opaque_identity_ref s, "content_ref s": opaque_content_ref s, "state": " COMPONENTS_VAULTED"
[3076] }
[3077] 20.3 Reconstruction Authorization Object Generation
[3078] function create_reconstruction_authorization ( request,
[3079] workload_attestation
[3080] if not verif y_enterprise_requester (
[3081] request. requester
[3082] return DENY ( " REQUESTER_NOT_VERIFIED" )
[3083] if not verif y_workload_attestation ( workload_attestation
[3084] return DENY ( " WORKLOAD_NOT_ATTESTED" ) execution_context_measurement = derive_execution_context_measurement ( { "model_digest ":
[3085] workload_attestation.model_digest, "agent_code_digest ":
[3086] workload_attestation.agent_code_digest, "runtime_digest ":
[3087] workload_attestation.runtime_digest, "tool_state_digest ":
[3088] workload_attestation.tool_state_digest, "environment_id":
[3089] workload_attestation.environment_id," tenant_id":
[3090] workload_attestation.tenant_id
[3091] } )
[3092] policy_result =
[3093] evaluate_enterprise_policy ( {
[3094] "requester":
[3095] request. requester,
[3096] "tenant":
[3097] workload_attestation.tenant_id, "purpose":
[3098] request.purpose,
[3099] "requested_f ields ":
[3100] request. fields, "requested_associations ":
[3101] request. associations, "output_type":
[3102] request. output_type,
[3103] "destination":
[3104] request. destination,
[3105] "recipient":
[3106] request. recipient,
[3107] "jurisdiction":
[3108] request.jurisdiction
[3109] } )
[3110] if policy_result. denied:
[3111] return DENY ( " POLICY_DENIED" )
[3112] session_id = random_identifier()
[3113] session_nonce = secure_random ( )
[3114] session_epoch = monotonic_session_state. current ( ) policy_epoch = current_policy_epoch ( ) reconstruction_authorization_obj ect = { "authorization_id":
[3115] random_identifier(),
[3116] "session_id":
[3117] session_id,
[3118] "session_nonce":
[3119] session_nonce, "execution_context_measurement":
[3120] execution_context_measurement, "requester":
[3121] request. requester,
[3122] "tenant":
[3123] workload_attestation.tenant_id,
[3124] "protected_reconstruction_domain_id":
[3125] policy_result. reconstruction_domain_id, "permitted_components ":
[3126] policy_result.permitted_components, "permitted_f ields ":policy_result.permitted_f ields, "permitted_associations ":
[3127] policy_result.permitted_associations, "authorized_purpose":
[3128] policy_result.authorized_purpose, "permitted_output_types ":
[3129] policy_result.permitted_output_types, "permitted_destinations ":
[3130] policy_result.permitted_destinations, "permitted_recipients ":
[3131] policy_result.permitted_recipients, " jurisdiction_conditions":
[3132] policy_result.jurisdiction_conditions, "valid_from":
[3133] current_time ( ),
[3134] "valid_until ":
[3135] policy_result. expiration, "maximum_use_count":
[3136] policy_result.maximum_use_count, "disclosure_budget ":
[3137] policy_result. disclosure_budget,
[3138] "inference_channel_budget ":
[3139] policy_result. inference_channel_budget, "session_epoch":
[3140] session_epoch,
[3141] "policy_epoch":
[3142] policy_epoch,
[3143] "required_vaults":
[3144] policy_result. required_vaults, "output_release_boundary_id":
[3145] policy_result. output_release_boundary_id, "attestation_freshness_window":
[3146] policy_result.attestation_freshness_window, "policy_digest ":
[3147] hash (policy_result.policy)
[3148] }
[3149] reconstruction_authorization_obj ect. signature = protected_authorization_key. sign (
[3150] hash ( reconstruction_authorization_obj ect)
[3151] persist_protected_session_state ( {
[3152] "session_id":
[3153] session_id,
[3154] "authorization_digest ":
[3155] hash ( reconstruction_authorization_obj ect), "status":
[3156] AUTHORIZED,
[3157] "session_epoch":
[3158] session_epoch,
[3159] "policy_epoch":policy_epoch, "execution_context_measurement":
[3160] execution_context_measurement,
[3161] "use_count ":
[3162] 0,
[3163] "maximum_use_count":
[3164] policy_result.maximum_use_count, "disclosure_budget ":
[3165] policy_result. disclosure_budget, "inference_channel_budget ":
[3166] policy_result. inference_channel_budget, "releasing_vaults ":
[3167] empty_set ( ),
[3168] "released_component_ids ":
[3169] empty_set ( ),
[3170] "receipt_state":
[3171] NONE,
[3172] "release_capability_state":
[3173] NONE,
[3174] "revocation_state":
[3175] NOT_REVOKED
[3176] } )
[3177] return reconstruction_authorization_ob j ect
[3178] 20.4 Independent Vault-Local Release
[3179] function vault_local_release (
[3180] vault,
[3181] reconstruction_authorization_object, component_request,
[3182] workload_attestation,
[3183] session_proof
[3184] session =
[3185] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3186] if session. status not in {
[3187] AUTHORIZED,
[3188] VAULT_RELEASE_PENDING
[3189] }:
[3190] return DENY("INVALID_SESSION_STATE")
[3191] if not verif y_authorization_signature (
[3192] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3193] return DENY ( " INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SIGNATURE" ) if vault. identifier not inreconstruction_authorization_ob j ect. required_vaults: return DENY ( " VAULT_NOT_AUTHORIZED" )
[3194] if current_time ( ) not within
[3195] reconstruction_authorization_object. validity_interval: return DENY ( " AUTHORIZATION_EXPIRED" )
[3196] if not verif y_session_proof ( session_proof ):
[3197] return DENY ( " INVALID_SESSION_PROOF" )
[3198] if session_proof. session_epoch! =
[3199] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_epoch: return DENY ( " STALE_SESSION_EPOCH" ) measured_context = derive_execution_context_measurement ( workload_attestation
[3200] if measured_context! =
[3201] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3202] . execution_context_measurement:
[3203]
[3204] return DENY("EXECUTION_CONTEXT_MISMATCH")
[3205] if not component_request. fields subset_of
[3206] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3207] .permitted_fields:
[3208] return DENY ( " FIELD_SCOPE_EXCEEDED" )
[3209] if not component_request. associations subset_of reconstruction_authorization_object.permitted_associations:
[3210] return DENY ( " ASSOCIATION_SCOPE_EXCEEDED" )
[3211] if not vault. local_policy_allows ( {
[3212] "component_request ":
[3213] component_request,
[3214] "authorized_purpose":
[3215] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3216] .authorized_purpose,
[3217] "tenant":
[3218] reconstruction_authorization_obj ect. tenant, "session_epoch":
[3219] session. session_epoch,
[3220] "policy_epoch":
[3221] session. policy_epoch
[3222] } ):
[3223] return DENY ( " VAULT_LOCAL_POLICY_DENIED" ) protected_components =
[3224] vault. retrieve (
[3225] component_request. component_idssession_component_key =
[3226] derive_session_component_key ( {
[3227] "authorization_digest ":
[3228] hash(reconstruction_authorization_object),"session_id":
[3229] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id, "session_nonce":
[3230] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_nonce, "session_epoch":
[3231] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_epoch, "vault_id":
[3232] vault. identifier,
[3233] "protected_reconstruction_domain_id":
[3234] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3235] .protected_reconstruction_domain_id
[3236] } )
[3237] session_bound_components =
[3238] protect_for_session (
[3239] protected_components,
[3240] session_component_key
[3241] vault_local_release_receipt =
[3242] vault. sign_receipt ( {
[3243] "vault_id":
[3244] vault. identifier,
[3245] "authorization_digest ":
[3246] hash(reconstruction_authorization_object),"session_id":
[3247] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id, "session_epoch":
[3248] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_epoch, "component_ids":
[3249] component_request. component_ids, "release_constraints":
[3250] component_request.release_constraints, "release_time":
[3251] current_time ( )
[3252] } )
[3253] vault.mark_release_state ( {
[3254] "session_id":
[3255] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id, "component_ids":
[3256] component_request. component_ids,
[3257] "status":
[3258] " RELEASED",
[3259] "session_epoch":
[3260] reconstruction_authorization_object.session_epoch} )
[3261] session. status = COMPONENTS_RELEASED
[3262] session. releasing_vaults. add (
[3263] vault. identifier
[3264] session. released_component_ids. add_all ( component_request. component_ids
[3265] persist_protected_session_state (session)
[3266] return {
[3267] "session_bound_components":
[3268] session_bound_components, "vault_local_release_receipt ":
[3269] vault_local_release_receipt
[3270] }
[3271] 20.5 Protected Reconstruction
[3272] function reconstruct_ephemeral_view (
[3273] reconstruction_authorization_object,
[3274] workload_attestation,
[3275] component_packages,
[3276] vault_local_release_receipts
[3277] session =
[3278] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3279] if session.status != COMPONENTS_RELEASED:
[3280] return DENY ( " COMPONENT_RELEASE_NOT_COMPLETE" ) if not verif y_authorization_signature (
[3281] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3282] return DENY ( " INVALID_AUTHORIZATION" )
[3283] if not verif y_f resh_attestation (
[3284] workload_attestation,
[3285] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3286] .attestation_freshness_window
[3287] return DENY ( " ATTESTATION_NOT_FRESH" )
[3288] if derive_execution_context_measurement ( workload_attestation
[3289] ) != reconstruction_authorization_object
[3290] . execution_context_measurement:return DENY("EXECUTION_CONTEXT_MISMATCH") verif ied_receipts = [ ]
[3291] for receipt in vault_local_release_receipts:
[3292] if not verif y_vault_local_release_receipt (
[3293] receipt
[3294] return poison_and_deny (
[3295] session.session_id,
[3296] "INVALID_VAULT_RECEIPT"
[3297] if receipt. authorization_digest! =
[3298] hash ( reconstruction_authorization_obj ect): return poison_and_deny (
[3299] session.session_id, " AUTHORIZATION_RECEIPT_MISMATCH"
[3300] if receipt. session_id! = session. session_id:
[3301] return poison_and_deny (
[3302] session.session_id, " SESSION_RECEIPT_MISMATCH"
[3303] if receipt. session_epoch! =
[3304] session. session_epoch:
[3305] return poison_and_deny (
[3306] session.session_id,
[3307] " STALE_RECEIPT_EPOCH"
[3308] verif ied_receipts. append (receipt) resolved_components = [ ]
[3309] for package in component_packages:
[3310] component =
[3311] decrypt_and_validate_session_package ( { "package":
[3312] package,
[3313] "authorization_digest ":
[3314] hash(reconstruction_authorization_object),"session_id":
[3315] session.session_id,
[3316] "session_nonce":
[3317] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3318] . session_nonce,
[3319] "session_epoch":session. session_epoch, "protected_reconstruction_domain_id":
[3320] this_domain. identifier
[3321] } )
[3322] if component invalid:
[3323] return poison_and_deny (
[3324] session.session_id, " SESSION_COMPONENT_INVALID"
[3325] resolved_components. append (component) identity_components = select_identity_components (
[3326] resol ved_components
[3327] content_components =
[3328] select_content_components (
[3329] resol ved_components
[3330] mapping_components =
[3331] select_mapping_components (
[3332] resol ved_components
[3333] requested_associations = derive_requested_associations ( mapping_components
[3334] if not requested_associations subset_of
[3335] reconstruction_authorization_object.permitted_associations:
[3336] return poison_and_deny (
[3337] session.session_id, " UNAUTHORIZED_ASSOCIATION_REQUEST"
[3338] ephemeral_reconstructed_data_view = resolve_authorized_associations ( { "identity_components":
[3339] identity_components, "content_components ":
[3340] content_components, "mapping_components ":
[3341] mapping_components,
[3342] "permitted_f ields ":
[3343] reconstruction_authorization_object. permitted_f ields,"permitted_associations ":
[3344] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3345] . permitted_associations
[3346] } )
[3347] provenance_state =
[3348] create_provenance_state ( {
[3349] "ephemeral_view":
[3350] ephemeral_reconstructed_data_view, "source_components":
[3351] resolved_components, "authorization_digest ":
[3352] hash ( reconstruction_authorization_obj ect), "vault_receipts ":
[3353] verified_receipts,
[3354] "permitted_f ields ":
[3355] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3356] . permitted_f ields, "permitted_associations ":
[3357] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3358] . permitted_associations
[3359] } )
[3360] mark_memory_non_persistent ( ephemeral_reconstructed_data_view
[3361] prohibit_general_purpose_export ( ephemeral_reconstructed_data_view
[3362] session. status = RECONSTRUCTED persist_protected_session_state (session)
[3363] return {
[3364] "restricted_view":
[3365] restricted_view ( ephemeral_reconstructed_data_view "provenance_state":
[3366] provenance_state
[3367] }
[3368] 20.6 Restricted Artificial-Intelligence Processing and Candidate Creation function process_authorized_view (
[3369] artificial_intelligence_workload,
[3370] restricted_view,
[3371] provenance_state,
[3372] reconstruction_authorization_objectsession =
[3373] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3374] if session. status! = RECONSTRUCTED:
[3375] return DENY ( " RECONSTRUCTION_NOT_COMPLETE" ) session. status = PROCESSING persist_protected_session_state (session) candidate_output =
[3376] artificial_intelligence_workload.process ( { "input":
[3377] restricted_view, "restricted_processing_interf ace":
[3378] protected_restricted_interface, "provenance_control ":
[3379] provenance_state
[3380] } )
[3381] session. status = CANDIDATE_CREATED persist_protected_session_state (session)
[3382] return candidate_output
[3383] 20.7 Sealed Candidate Output Creation
[3384] function seal_candidate_output (
[3385] candidate_output,
[3386] provenance_state,
[3387] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3388] session =
[3389] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3390] if session. status! = CANDIDATE_CREATED:
[3391] return DENY ( " CANDIDATE_NOT_IN_EXPECTED_STATE" ) candidate_output_digest =
[3392] hash (candidate_output )
[3393] output_sealing_key = derive_non_exportable_output_key({"authorization_digest":
[3394] session.authorization_digest, "session_id":
[3395] session.session_id,
[3396] "session_epoch":session.session_epoch,"candidate_output_digest":
[3397] candidate_output_digest, "output_release_boundary_id":
[3398] reconstruction_authorization_object. output_release_boundary_id
[3399] } )
[3400] sealed_candidate_output =
[3401] seal({
[3402] "plaintext":
[3403] candidate_output,
[3404] "key":
[3405] output_sealing_key, "associated_data": { "authorization_digest ":
[3406] session.authorization_digest, "session_id":
[3407] session.session_id, "session_epoch":
[3408] session.session_epoch,"candidate_output_digest":
[3409] candidate_output_digest, "provenance_digest ":
[3410] hash(provenance_state),"output_release_boundary_id":
[3411] reconstruction_authorization_object. output_release_boundary_id }
[3412] } )
[3413] clear_plaintext_from_untrusted_access ( candidate_output
[3414] session.status = CANDIDATE_SEALEDpersist_protected_session_state(session)
[3415] return {
[3416] "sealed_candidate_output":
[3417] sealed_candidate_output, "candidate_output_digest ":
[3418] candidate_output_digest, "provenance_state":
[3419] provenance_state
[3420] }
[3421] 20.8 Live Output-Time Re-Verification
[3422] function reestablish_current_output_authority ( reconstruction_authorization_object, fresh_workload_attestation,intended_destination,
[3423] intended_recipient,
[3424] intended_output_type
[3425] session =
[3426] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3427] if session. status! = CANDIDATE_SEALED:
[3428] return DENY ( " SEALED_CANDIDATE_NOT_AVAILABLE" ) session. status =
[3429] OUTPUT_REVERIFICATION_PENDING persist_protected_session_state (session)
[3430] if not verify_fresh_challenge_attestation ( { "attestation":
[3431] fresh_workload_attestation, "expected_context ":
[3432] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3433] .execution_context_measurement, "maximum_age":
[3434] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3435] .attestation_freshness_window } ):
[3436] return poison_and_deny (
[3437] session.session_id,
[3438] "LIVE_ATTESTATION_FAILED"
[3439] if current_revocation_status (
[3440] reconstruction_authorization_object
[3441] )! = NOT_REVOKED:
[3442] return poison_and_deny (
[3443] session.session_id,
[3444] "AUTHORIZATION_REVOKED"
[3445] if current_policy_epoch ( )! =
[3446] reconstruction_authorization_object.policy_epoch:
[3447] return DENY (
[3448] " POL
[3449]
[3450] I CY_EPOCH_CHANGED "
[3451] if current_session_epoch (
[3452] session. session_id
[3453] )! = session. session_epoch:
[3454] return poison_and_deny (session.session_id,
[3455] " SESSION EPOCH CHANGED"
[3456] if intended_destination not in reconstruction_authorization_object.permitted_destinations: return DENY (
[3457] " DESTINATION NOT PERMITTED"
[3458] if intended_recipient not in
[3459] reconstruction_authorization_object.permitted_recipients:
[3460] return DENY (
[3461] " RECIPIENT NOT PERMITTED"
[3462] if intended_output_type not in reconstruction_authorization_object. permit ted_output_types: return DENY (
[3463] " OUTPUT_TYPE_NOT_PERMITTED"
[3464] if session. use_count >=
[3465] session. maximum_use_count:
[3466] return poison_and_deny (
[3467] session.session_id,
[3468] " USE COUNT EXHAUSTED"
[3469] return VALID
[3470] 20.9 Association-Leak and Output-Scope Evaluation function evaluate_candidate_output_scope ( protected_plaintext_output, provenance_state,
[3471] reconstruction_authorization_object, protected_identity_index
[3472] extracted_entities =
[3473] protected_entity_extraction (
[3474] protected_plaintext_output
[3475] identity_entities =
[3476] select_identity_bearing_entities ( extracted entitiescontent_entities = select_content_bearing_entities (
[3477] ext racted_enti ties
[3478] candidate_association_pairs = construct_candidate_association_pairs ( { "identity_entities":
[3479] identity_entities,
[3480] "content_entities ":
[3481] cont ent_enti ties,
[3482] "output_structure":
[3483] protected_plaintext_output. structure } )
[3484] violations = [ ]
[3485] uncertain_pairs = [ ]
[3486] for pair in candidate_association_pairs:
[3487] identity_resolution =
[3488] resolve_against_protected_identity_index(pair.identity_entity,protected_identity_index
[3489] similarity =
[3490] protected_similarity (
[3491] pair. identity_entity,
[3492] identity_resolution
[3493] provenance_correspondence = resolve_pair_provenance (
[3494] pair,
[3495] provenance_state
[3496] association_permitted =
[3497] reconstruction_authorization_object.permitted_associations
[3498] . allows ( {
[3499] " identity":
[3500] identity_resolution.identifier, "content_category":
[3501] pair. content_entity. category, "relationship_type":
[3502] pair. relationship_type
[3503] } )
[3504] uncertainpair. identity_conf idence <
[3505] MIN_IDENTITY_CONFIDENCE
[3506] or pair. relationship_conf idence < MIN_RELATIONSHIP_CONFIDENCE or provenance_correspondence ==
[3507] AMBIGUOUS
[3508] if not association_permitted:
[3509] violations. append (pair)
[3510] else if similarity >=
[3511] protected_identity_threshold and provenance_correspondence indicates prohibited_link: violations. append (pair)
[3512] else if uncertain:
[3513] uncertain_pairs. append (pair) disclosed_f ields =
[3514] derive_disclosed_fields (
[3515] protected_plaintext_output, provenance_state
[3516] unauthorized_f ields =
[3517] disclosed_f ields - reconstruction_authorization_object.permitted_f ields
[3518] if uncertain_pairs not empty:
[3519] return {
[3520] "result":
[3521] UNCERTAIN,
[3522] "violations":
[3523] violations,
[3524] "uncertain_pairs":
[3525] uncertain_pairs, "unauthorized_f ields":
[3526] unauthorized_fields
[3527] }
[3528] if violations not empty
[3529] or unauthorized_fields not empty:
[3530] return {
[3531] "result":
[3532] NONCOMPLIANT,
[3533] "v
[3534]
[3535] iolations":
[3536] violations,
[3537] "unauthorized_fields":
[3538] unauthorized_fields
[3539] }return {
[3540] "result":
[3541] COMPLIANT,
[3542] "violations":
[3543] empty_set ( ),
[3544] "unauthorized_f ields":
[3545] empty_set ( )
[3546] }
[3547] 20.10 Atomic Output Finality Transaction
[3548] function atomic_output_finality_transaction(sealed_candidate_output,
[3549] candidate_output_digest,
[3550] provenance_state,
[3551] reconstruction_authorization_object, fresh_workload_attestation,
[3552] intended_destination,
[3553] intended_recipient,
[3554] intended_output_type
[3555] session =
[3556] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3557] begin_protected_transaction ( )
[3558] try:
[3559] live_authority_result = reestablish_current_output_authority ( reconstruction_authorization_object, fresh_workload_attestation, intended_destination, intended_recipient, intended_output_type
[3560] if live_authority_result! = VALID:
[3561] raise FailClosed (
[3562] " LIVE AUTHORITY NOT ESTABLISHED"
[3563] protected_plaintext_output =open_inside_output_verification_stage(sealed_candidate_output
[3564] output_scope_result =evaluate_candidate_output_scope ( protected_plaintext_output, provenance_state,
[3565] reconstruction_authorization_object, protected_identity_index
[3566] if output_scope_result. result ==
[3567] UNCERTAIN:
[3568] raise FailClosed (
[3569] " OUTPUT SCOPE UNCERTAIN"
[3570] if output_scope_result. result ==
[3571] NONCOMPLIANT:
[3572] protected_plaintext_output = apply_protected_transformations ( { "output":
[3573] protected_plaintext_output, "unauthorized_fields": output_scope_result
[3574] . unauthorized_fields, "unauthorized_associations":
[3575] output_scope_result
[3576] . violations
[3577] } )
[3578] second_scope_result = evaluate_candidate_output_scope ( protected_plaintext_output, provenance_state,
[3579] reconstruction_authorization_object, protected_identity_index
[3580] if second_scope_result. result! = COMPLIANT:
[3581] raise FailClosed (
[3582] " OUTPUT REMAINS NONCOMPLIANT"
[3583] disclosure_cost =
[3584] calculate_disclosure_cost ( {
[3585] "output":
[3586] protected_plaintext_output, "provenance_state":
[3587] provenance_state, "prior_disclosure_state":
[3588] session. disclosure_budget, "prior_inf erence_state":
[3589] session. inference_channel_budget} )
[3590] if not disclosure_budget_allows (
[3591] session. disclosure_budget,
[3592] disclosure_cost
[3593] raise FailClosed ( " DISCLOSURE_BUDGET_EXCEEDED"
[3594] if not inference_channel_budget_allows ( session. inference_channel_budget, disclosure_cost
[3595] raise FailClosed (
[3596] " INFERENCE CHANNEL BUDGET EXCEEDED"
[3597] final_output_digest =
[3598] hash (protected_plaintext_output )
[3599] session. status = OUTPUT_VERIFIED persist_protected_session_state (session) protected_output_validation_receipt = create_protected_output_validation_receipt ( { "authorization_digest ":
[3600] session.authorization_digest, "session_id":
[3601] session.session_id,
[3602] "session_epoch":
[3603] session. session_epoch, "policy_epoch":
[3604] session. policy_epoch, "execution_context_measurement": session.execution_context_measurement, "candidate_output_digest ":
[3605] candidate_output_digest,
[3606] "verified_output_digest":
[3607] final_output_digest, "provenance_digest ":
[3608] hash (provenance_state ), "destination":
[3609] intended_destination,
[3610] "recipient":
[3611] intended_recipient,
[3612] "output_type":
[3613] intended_output_type, "output_release_boundary_id":
[3614] reconstruction_authorization_object. output_release_boundary_id, "verif ication_result":" PERMITTED", "previous_receipt_digest ":
[3615] protected_receipt_store
[3616] . last_digest ( )
[3617] } )
[3618] session.status = RECEIPT_PENDINGpersist_protected_session_state(session)committed_receipt_digest =protected_receipt_store.commit(protected_output_validation_receipt
[3619] if committed_receipt_digest is null:
[3620] raise FailClosed (
[3621] " PROTECTED RECEIPT COMMIT FAILED"
[3622] session.status = RECEIPT_COMMITTED
[3623] session. receipt_state = committed_receipt_digest persist_protected_session_state (session) output_release_capability = derive_output_release_capability ( { "verified_output_digest":
[3624] final_output_digest, "protected_receipt_digest ":
[3625] committed_receipt_digest, "authorization_digest ":
[3626] session.authorization_digest, "session_id":
[3627] session.session_id, "session_epoch":
[3628] session. session_epoch, "destination":
[3629] intended_destination, "recipient":
[3630] intended_recipient, "output_type":
[3631] intended_output_type, "output_release_boundary_id":
[3632] reconstruction_authorization_object.output_release_boundary_id, "expiration":
[3633] short_expiration ( ), "maximum_uses ":
[3634] 1
[3635] } )resealed_verified_output = seal_for_output_release_boundary({"plaintext":
[3636] protected_plaintext_output, "output_release_capability":
[3637] output_release_capability, "output_release_boundary_id":
[3638] reconstruction_authorization_object. output_release_boundary_id } )
[3639] session. status =
[3640] RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED
[3641] session. release_capability_state =
[3642] hash (output_release_capability) persist_protected_session_state (session) commit_protected_transaction()
[3643] return {
[3644] "resealed_verified_output ":
[3645] resealed_verified_output, "output_release_capability":
[3646] output_release_capability, "protected_receipt_digest ":
[3647] committed_receipt_digest
[3648] }
[3649] except any_error as error:
[3650] rollback_protected_transaction ( ) revoke_output_release_capabilities (
[3651] session.session_id
[3652] destroy_output_sealing_material(
[3653] session.session_id
[3654] poison_partial_session (
[3655] session.session_id,
[3656] error
[3657] return DENY (error)
[3658] 0.11 Output Release Boundary Effectuation
[3659] function effectuate_at_output_release_boundary(resealed_verified_output, output_release_capability, intended_destination,
[3660] intended_recipient
[3661] if not verify_output_release_capability( output_release_capability
[3662] return DENY ( " INVALID_RELEASE_CAPABILITY" ) if output_release_capability. destination! = intended_destination:
[3663] return DENY ( " DESTINATION_MISMATCH" )
[3664] if output_release_capability. recipient! = intended_recipient:
[3665] return DENY ( " RECIPIENT_MISMATCH" )
[3666] if output_release_capability
[3667] . output_release_boundary_id! = this_boundary. identifier:
[3668] return DENY ( " BOUNDARY_MISMATCH" )
[3669] if output_release_capability. expired:
[3670] return DENY ( " RELEASE_CAPABILITY_EXPIRED" ) if not protected_receipt_store. contains ( output_release_capability.protected_receipt_digest
[3671] return DENY ( " PROTECTED_RECEIPT_NOT_COMMITTED" ) session =
[3672] load_protected_session_state ( output_release_capability. session_id
[3673] if session. status! =
[3674] RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED:
[3675] return DENY ( " RELEASE_STATE_NOT_ACTIVE" ) if session. session_epoch! = output_release_capability. session_epoch: return DENY ( " STALE_RELEASE_CAPABILITY" ) verified_plaintext_output = unseal_inside_output_release_boundary({"resealed_output":
[3676] resealed_verified_output, "output_release_capability":
[3677] output_release_capability} )
[3678] if hash(verified_plaintext_output) != output_release_capability
[3679] .verified_output_digest:
[3680] return DENY ( " OUTPUT_DIGEST_MISMATCH" ) effectuate ( {
[3681] "output":
[3682] verified_plaintext_output, "destination":
[3683] intended_destination,
[3684] "recipient":
[3685] intended_recipient,
[3686] "output_type":
[3687] output_release_capability. output_type } )
[3688] consume_output_release_capability ( output_release_capability
[3689] session. status = OUTPUT_EFFECTUATED
[3690] session. use_count += 1 update_disclosure_state (
[3691] session.session_id,
[3692] verified_plaintext_output
[3693] persist_protected_session_state (session) return RELEASED
[3694] 20.12 Successful Session Closure
[3695] function close_successful_session ( session_id): session =
[3696] load_protected_session_state (
[3697] session id
[3698] if session. status! = OUTPUT_EFFECTUATED:
[3699] return DENY("OUTPUT_NOT_EFFECTUATED") destroy_session_keys ( session_id) clear_ephemeral_reconstructed_view ( session_id) clear_temporary_mapping_state ( session_id) clear_plaintext_intermediates ( session_id) clear_temporary_embeddings ( session_id) clear_protected_output_buffer(session_id)close_temporary_provenance_state ( session_id) revoke_unused_release_authority ( session_id) for vault in session. releasing_vaults:
[3700] vault.mark_release_state ( {
[3701] "session_id":
[3702] session_id,
[3703] "status":
[3704] " COMPLETED",
[3705] "session_epoch":
[3706] session. session_epoch
[3707] } )
[3708] session. status = CLOSED persist_protected_session_state (session) record_session_closure_receipt ( { "session_id":
[3709] session_id,
[3710] "session_epoch":
[3711] session. session_epoch,
[3712] "status":
[3713] CLOSED
[3714] } )
[3715] return CLOSED
[3716] 20.13 Partial-Session Poisoning
[3717] function poison_partial_session (
[3718] session_id,
[3719] failure reason
[3720] session =
[3721] load_protected_session_state (
[3722] session id
[3723] if session. status in {
[3724] CLOSED,
[3725] POISONED
[3726] }:
[3727] return session. status
[3728] closed_epoch =
[3729] monotonic_session_state. advance ( ) destroy_session_keys ( session_id) clear_ephemeral_reconstructed_view ( session_id) clear_temporary_mapping_state ( session_id)clear_plaintext_intermediates ( session_id) clear_temporary_embeddings ( session_id) clear_protected_output_buffer(session_id) invalidate_temporary_provenance_state ( session_id) revoke_output_release_capabilities ( session_id) for vault in session. releasing_vaults:
[3730] vault.mark_release_state ( {
[3731] "session_id":
[3732] session_id, "previous_session_epoch":
[3733] session. session_epoch, "closed_epoch":
[3734] closed_epoch,
[3735] "status":
[3736] " POISONED"
[3737] } )
[3738] session. status = POISONED
[3739] session. closed_epoch = closed_epoch
[3740] session.failure_reason = failure_reason persist_protected_session_state (session) record_session_poisoning_receipt ( { "session_id":
[3741] session_id,
[3742] "previous_session_epoch":
[3743] session. session_epoch,
[3744] "closed_epoch":
[3745] closed_epoch,
[3746] "failure_reason":
[3747] failure_reason
[3748] } )
[3749] return POISONED
[3750] 20.14 Replay Rejection
[3751] function reject_stale_or_poisoned_session_use(session_id,
[3752] presented_session_epoch, presented_authorization_object
[3753] session =
[3754] load_protected_session_state (
[3755] session id
[3756] if session. status in {CLOSED,
[3757] POISONED,
[3758] DENIED
[3759] }:
[3760] return DENY ( " SESSION_NOT_REUSABLE" )
[3761] if presented_session_epoch! =
[3762] session. session_epoch:
[3763] return DENY ( " STALE_SESSION_EPOCH" )
[3764] if hash(presented_authorization_object) != session.authorization_digest:
[3765] return DENY ( " AUTHORIZATION_MISMATCH" )
[3766] return VALID
[3767] 20.15 Streaming Output Variation
[3768] function verify_and_release_stream_segment( sealed_segment,
[3769] segment_number,
[3770] rolling_disclosure_state,
[3771] reconstruction_authorization_object,
[3772] destination
[3773] session =
[3774] load_protected_session_state(reconstruction_authorization_object.session_id
[3775] if session. status not in {
[3776] CANDIDATE_SEALED,
[3777] RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED
[3778] }:
[3779] return DENY ( " STREAM_SESSION_NOT_ACTIVE" ) if segment_number! =
[3780] rolling_disclosure_state. next_segment_n umber: return poison_and_deny (
[3781] session.session_id,
[3782] "OUT_OF_ORDER_STREAM_SEGMENT"
[3783] protected_segment =
[3784] open_inside_output_verification_stage(sealed_segment
[3785] segment_provenance =
[3786] resolve_segment_provenance (
[3787] protected_segment,rolling_disclosure_state
[3788] simulated_state = simulate_cumulative_disclosure ( { "prior_state":
[3789] rolling_disclosure_state, "segment":
[3790] protected_segment, "segment_provenance":
[3791] segment_provenance
[3792] } )
[3793] if simulated_state. provenance_ambiguous:
[3794] return DENY ( " AMBIGUOUS_STREAM_PROVENANCE" ) if simulated_state
[3795] . contains_unauthorized_association: return poison_and_deny ( session.session_id,
[3796]
[3797] "STREAM_ASSOCIATION_VIOLATION"
[3798] if simulated_state
[3799] . disclosure_budget_exceeded:
[3800] return poison_and_deny (
[3801] session.session_id,
[3802] "STREAM_DISCLOSURE_BUDGET_EXCEEDED"
[3803] segment_receipt = create_and_commit_segment_validation_receipt ( { "authorization_digest ":
[3804] session.authorization_digest, "session_id":
[3805] session.session_id,
[3806] "session_epoch":
[3807] session. session_epoch, "segment_number":
[3808] segment_number,
[3809] "segment_digest ":
[3810] hash (protected_segment ), "rolling_state_digest ":
[3811] hash ( simulated_state), "destination":
[3812] destination
[3813] } )
[3814] if segment_receipt failed:
[3815] return DENY ( " SEGMENT_RECEIPT_COMMIT_FAILED" ) segment_release_capability =derive_segment_release_capability ( { "session_id":
[3816] session.session_id, "session_epoch":
[3817] session. session_epoch, "segment_number":
[3818] segment_number, "segment_digest ":
[3819] hash (protected_segment ), "receipt_digest ":
[3820] hash ( segment_receipt ), "destination":
[3821] destination
[3822] } )
[3823] rolling_disclosure_state = simulated_state rolling_disclosure_state
[3824] . next_segment_number += 1
[3825] return {
[3826] "resealed_segment ":
[3827] seal_for_output_release_boundary ( protected_segment, segment_release_capability "segment_release_capability": segment_release_capability, "rolling_disclosure_state":
[3828] rolling_disclosure_state
[3829] }
[3830] 20.16 Fail-Closed Helper
[3831] function fail_closed (
[3832] session_id,
[3833] failure_reason,
[3834] poisoning_required
[3835] record_fail_closed_event({ "session_id":
[3836] session_id,
[3837] "failure_reason":
[3838] failure_reason,
[3839] "time":
[3840] current_time ( )
[3841] } )
[3842] if poisoning_required:
[3843] return poison_partial_session (session_id,
[3844] failure reason
[3845] deny_current_operation(
[3846] session_id,
[3847] failure_reason
[3848] return DENY
[3849] 20.17 Technical Effect of the Workflow
[3850] The workflow establishes that:
[3851] • the enterprise record is not persistently maintained as one universally accessible joined object;
[3852] • association information is independently controlled;
[3853] • reconstruction authority is bound to a particular execution context and session;
[3854] • vault release is independently determined and session bound;
[3855] • reconstruction produces only an Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View;
[3856] • the artificial-intelligence workload receives no general vault authority;
[3857] • the workload may compute a Candidate Output without acquiring Release Authority; • the Candidate Output is sealed before it becomes independently releasable;
[3858] • output-time authority is re-established using current protected state;
[3859] • unauthorized fields and associations are evaluated before release;
[3860] • successful verification alone does not create Release Authority;
[3861] • Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment is a precondition to Output Release Capability issuance;
[3862] • the Output Release Capability is bound to the verified output and effectuation context; • the Output Release Boundary alone completes the transition to an Externally Effective result;
[3863] • failure at any required stage leaves the output Non-Releasable; and
[3864] • interrupted sessions cannot be resumed using captured stale components or authorization artifacts.
[3865] The architecture therefore controls not merely access to enterprise data, but the complete protected transition from independently stored enterprise components to an Externally Effective artificialintelligence output.21. Positioning Variations
[3866] 21.1 Centralized reconstruction controller
[3867] The reconstruction-authorization controller, protected reconstruction domain, provenance-control mechanism, and output-verification stage may be implemented within one protected service. This implementation remains within the architecture where the functions remain logically distinct and an unverified candidate output cannot bypass output verification.
[3868] 21.2 Distributed reconstruction controller
[3869] Authorization generation, vault release, reconstruction, provenance management, and output verification may be performed by separate protected services.
[3870] The services may exchange cryptographically linked derivatives of the reconstruction authorization object.
[3871] No requirement exists that one device perform all functions.
[3872] 21.3 Output-verification stage inside the protected reconstruction domain
[3873] The output-verification stage may execute inside the same protected domain that reconstructs the ephemeral data view.
[3874] The artificial-intelligence workload may also execute within that domain.
[3875] 21.4 Output-verification stage outside the protected reconstruction domain
[3876] The output-verification stage may be implemented in a separate protected enforcement domain downstream of the artificial-intelligence workload.
[3877] In that arrangement, the candidate output and protected provenance state are transmitted to the output-verification stage through an authenticated channel.
[3878] 21.5 Output-verification stage at a gateway
[3879] The output-verification stage may be incorporated into:
[3880] • an API gateway;
[3881] • a data-loss -prevention gateway;
[3882] • a service mesh;
[3883] • a network proxy;
[3884] • an operating-system broker;
[3885] • a hypervisor;
[3886] • a storage controller;a message broker; or
[3887] another mandatory release path.
[3888] Merely calling the component a gateway does not avoid the architecture where the gateway verifies the candidate output against the authorization state that governed reconstruction.
[3889] 21.6 Output-verification stage distributed across multiple boundaries
[3890] Different candidate-output classes may be verified at different boundaries.
[3891] For example:
[3892] • generated text may be verified before display;
[3893] • tool calls may be verified before invocation;
[3894] • database writes may be verified before commit;
[3895] • external model prompts may be verified before transmission;
[3896] • memory writes may be verified before persistence.
[3897] The architecture may therefore include multiple output- verification stages linked to the same reconstruction authorization object.
[3898] 21.7 Relationship -mapping functions divided among domains
[3899] The relationship-mapping vault may be implemented as:
[3900] • one dedicated vault;
[3901] • multiple mapping vaults;
[3902] • separate graph-edge and join-key vaults;
[3903] • tenant- specific mapping vaults;
[3904] • jurisdiction-specific mapping vaults;
[3905] • distributed mapping services; or
[3906] • a protected mapping function that resolves associations without disclosing the complete mapping table.
[3907] A design does not avoid the architecture merely by dividing association information among multiple services.
[3908] 21.8 Functional vault implemented without persistent storage
[3909] A storage vault may generate a protected component dynamically instead of retrieving it from persistent storage.
[3910] For example, a relationship-mapping domain may compute whether an authorized relationship exists and return a protected association derivative.Such a domain functions as a vault where it independently controls release of protected association information.
[3911] 21.9 Artificial-intelligence workload inside or outside the reconstruction domain The artificial-intelligence workload may execute:
[3912] • inside the protected reconstruction domain;
[3913] • in a separate attested domain;
[3914] • in a protected accelerator;
[3915] • in a confidential virtual machine;
[3916] • in a remote verified environment; or
[3917] • in an external environment receiving only a restricted derivative.
[3918] The architecture does not depend on physical co-location of the workload and reconstruction domain.
[3919] 21.10 Inline and sidecar provenance control
[3920] The provenance-control mechanism may operate:
[3921] • inline with the data path;
[3922] • as a sidecar process;
[3923] • through a parallel protected control plane;
[3924] • within the model runtime;
[3925] • within a compiler or intermediate representation;
[3926] • at a structured-output layer;
[3927] • at a protected gateway; or
[3928] • through cryptographically bound source and output receipts.
[3929] 21.11 Same object or linked derivatives
[3930] Different system components may receive different protected derivatives of the reconstruction authorization object.
[3931] For example:
[3932] • a vault may receive only the component scope and session binding;
[3933] • the artificial-intelligence workload may receive only a restricted processing context;
[3934] • the output-verification stage may receive the output scope, destination scope, and association rules.The derivatives remain part of the same authorization span where they are cryptographically linked to one authorization root and cannot independently enlarge authority.
[3935] 21.12 Pre-generation and post-generation output control
[3936] The output-verification stage may control output through:
[3937] • constraints applied before generation;
[3938] • protected decoding restrictions during generation;
[3939] • inspection after generation;
[3940] • transformation before release; or
[3941] • a combination thereof.
[3942] Pre-generation constraints do not remove the requirement for release-boundary verification where a generated candidate output can still contain or imply unauthorized information.
[3943] 21.13 Human approval variation
[3944] A denied or uncertain candidate output may be routed to a human reviewer.
[3945] Human review does not replace the reconstruction authorization object. The reviewed output must remain within the permitted field set, association scope, purpose, and destination conditions or must be authorized under a newly issued object.
[3946] 22. Design- Around Closure Variations
[3947] 22.1 Replacing the relationship-mapping vault with a mapping service
[3948] An implementation may attempt to avoid a “vault” label by storing association information in a protected mapping service.
[3949] The mapping service falls within the disclosed architecture where it independently controls protected association resolution and authority applicable to identity or content storage is insufficient to compel unauthorized mapping.
[3950] 22.2 Storing hashes or tokens instead of explicit mappings
[3951] Association information may comprise hashes, tokens, commitments, graph references, deterministic transformations, or derived indices rather than readable linkage tables.
[3952] The relationship-mapping function remains present where those values permit selective association of identity and content components.
[3953] 22.3 Performing a blind join
[3954] The architecture encompasses a protected domain that produces an authorized joined result without exposing the underlying mapping to the requester.
[3955] A design does not avoid the architecture merely because association occurs through oblivious, encrypted, private- set-intersection, multiparty-computation, or other privacy-preserving processing.22.4 Calling the authorization object a policy token
[3956] A credential, capability, policy object, session manifest, signed request, execution permit, or protected session descriptor falls within the reconstruction authorization object where:
[3957] • possession alone is insufficient;
[3958] • authority is bound to a specific execution context;
[3959] • permitted reconstruction and association are scoped; and
[3960] • the same protected authority remains operative at output release.
[3961] 22.5 Using separate input and output tokens
[3962] An implementation may use one token for reconstruction and a second token for output release. Such an implementation remains within the disclosed authorization span where the second token is cryptographically derived from, committed to, or conditionally issued based on the first authorization state and cannot enlarge the original scope.
[3963] 22.6 Moving output verification upstream
[3964] A system may apply generation constraints before the workload produces a candidate output.
[3965] Such controls remain within the architecture where release still depends on verification that the resulting output corresponds to the authorization state.
[3966] 22.7 Moving output verification downstream
[3967] A system may permit the workload to generate an output in an untrusted application buffer before a protected gateway verifies it.
[3968] The architecture remains present where the buffer contents cannot cross the operative output-release boundary before verification.
[3969] 22.8 Distributing one vault across several services
[3970] A vault function may be distributed across multiple machines, regions, clouds, or administrative services.
[3971] The independent protection domain is defined by release authority and isolation, not by device count.
[3972] 22.9 Combining multiple vaults on one physical machine
[3973] Identity, content, mapping, and cryptographic functions may execute on one physical machine in independently isolated hardware or software domains.
[3974] Physical co-location does not eliminate independent control where compromise or authority applicable to one domain does not automatically grant access to another.
[3975] 22.10 Reconstructing only a derivativeThe system need not reconstruct a human-readable complete record.
[3976] Reconstruction may produce:
[3977] • a feature vector;
[3978] • a model-readable representation;
[3979] • an embedding;
[3980] • a classification input;
[3981] • a temporary graph;
[3982] • a query- specific answer; or
[3983] • another derivative containing an authorized cross-vault association.
[3984] Such reconstruction remains governed by the architecture.
[3985] 22.11 Hiding output through a tool call
[3986] A workload may attempt to disclose protected information by encoding it in:
[3987] • an API parameter;
[3988] • a file name;
[3989] • a tool argument;
[3990] • a retrieval query;
[3991] • an embedding;
[3992] • a model prompt;
[3993] • an error message;
[3994] • a database update;
[3995] • a side-channel field; or
[3996] • another machine-readable artifact.
[3997] Each such artifact may constitute a candidate output and may be subject to output verification.
[3998] 22.12 Delayed output release
[3999] A candidate output may be stored temporarily before later transmission.
[4000] The operative output-release boundary occurs when the output becomes available to an unauthorized destination, recipient, storage domain, or process. Delay does not remove the requirement for verification.
[4001] 22.13 Model memory and training closureWriting reconstructed enterprise data or derived associations into:
[4002] • long-term agent memory;
[4003] • a vector database;
[4004] • a fine-tuning dataset;
[4005] • a model-training corpus;
[4006] • a prompt cache; or
[4007] • a shared retrieval store
[4008] constitutes an output operation and may be verified against the same reconstruction authorization object.
[4009] 22.14 Multi-agent processing
[4010] Where several artificial-intelligence agents participate, the reconstruction authorization object may bind:
[4011] • all participating agents;
[4012] • an approved agent graph;
[4013] • permitted agent-to-agent transfers; and
[4014] • individual output boundaries.
[4015] A transfer from one agent to another may itself constitute a candidate output requiring verification.
[4016] 22.15 Remote artificial-intelligence service
[4017] Where the artificial-intelligence workload is remote, the system may provide only a protected derivative and may bind authorization to a remote attestation, confidential-computing report, verified service identity, or protected session channel.
[4018] 22.16 Non-cryptographic implementation
[4019] Cryptographic protection is preferred but is not the only possible implementation.
[4020] Independent vault control, protected reconstruction, provenance propagation, and output-boundary verification may additionally or alternatively be enforced using hardware isolation, operatingsystem security domains, protected memory, mandatory access control, capability systems, secure processors, or combinations thereof.
[4021] 23. Example Enterprise-AI Use Case
[4022] An enterprise artificial-intelligence assistant receives a request to summarize customer complaints for a product-quality investigation.The identity vault stores customer identities. The content vault stores complaint text and product information. The relationship-mapping vault stores protected associations between customer references and complaint records.
[4023] The reconstruction authorization object permits:
[4024] • access to complaint category and product information;
[4025] • association of complaints with region;
[4026] • no disclosure of customer names;
[4027] • no association between a named customer and complaint text;
[4028] • output only to the internal quality-management system;
[4029] • one use within a twenty-minute validity interval; and
[4030] • processing only by a specified attested enterprise model instance.
[4031] The protected reconstruction domain constructs an ephemeral view containing complaint text, product category, and region while excluding customer identity.
[4032] The model generates a quality report.
[4033] The model also attempts to include the name of a customer inferred from another field. Provenance analysis identifies the identity-content association as outside the permitted association scope. The output-verification stage redacts the name and permits release of the remaining report to the authorized quality-management destination.
[4034] The same report is denied when directed to an external email address because the destination is not permitted by the reconstruction authorization object.
[4035] After release, the ephemeral view, temporary keys, mapping state, and provenance state are invalidated.
[4036] 24. Resulting Technical Operation
[4037] The architecture provides a technical control system in which:
[4038] • semantically related enterprise-record components remain independently protected;
[4039] • association information receives an independent release boundary;
[4040] • reconstruction authority is bound to an attested execution context rather than merely possessed as a bearer credential;
[4041] • reconstruction occurs only within a temporary protected session;
[4042] • provenance of protected fields and associations is maintained through artificial-intelligence processing;
[4043] • a candidate output remains unreleased until checked against the same protected authorization state that governed reconstruction;authorization to read or reconstruct does not automatically authorize disclosure;
[4044] • incomplete sessions cannot be resumed using captured components and stale authorization state; and
[4045] • element placement, physical location, component naming, and distribution across services do not determine whether the protected workflow is present.
[4046] Additional Embodiments and Design-Around Closure Provisions
[4047] 25. Sealed Candidate Output and Technical Non-Completability
[4048] 25.1 General sealed-output embodiment
[4049] In one high-assurance embodiment, an artificial-intelligence workload is permitted to compute a Candidate Output but is not permitted to possess or control an independently releasable representation of that Candidate Output.
[4050] The Candidate Output is generated, captured, or transferred into a protected output path before the Candidate Output becomes available to:
[4051] • an ordinary application process;
[4052] • a general-purpose output buffer;
[4053] • an untrusted orchestration layer;
[4054] • a communication interface;
[4055] • a user-interface renderer;
[4056] • a persistent storage interface;
[4057] • an external tool;
[4058] • a downstream artificial-intelligence workload; or
[4059] • another destination outside the Protected Processing Span.
[4060] The Candidate Output is then maintained as a Sealed Candidate Output.
[4061] The Sealed Candidate Output may be maintained through:
[4062] • encryption;
[4063] • authenticated encryption;
[4064] • hardware-bound sealing;
[4065] • protected-memory confinement;
[4066] • non-exportable key wrapping;
[4067] • capability-controlled access;mandatory information-flow labels;
[4068] protected intermediate representation;
[4069] protected rendering state;
[4070] restricted operation commitment;
[4071] destination-bound encapsulation;
[4072] protected state-machine control;
[4073] or another technical mechanism that prevents independent release.
[4074] The particular sealing mechanism is not controlling. The operative requirement is that completion of Candidate Output generation does not, by itself, provide the artificial-intelligence workload with sufficient key material, protected state, interface authority, capability, or communication path to make the Candidate Output Externally Usable or Externally Effective.
[4075] 25.2 Protected output capture
[4076] In one implementation, the artificial-intelligence workload generates the Candidate Output inside:
[4077] • a Protected Output Buffer;
[4078] • protected memory;
[4079] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[4080] • a confidential virtual machine;
[4081] • a secure enclave;
[4082] • an accelerator-protected memory region;
[4083] • a kernel-mediated output region;
[4084] • a protected language runtime;
[4085] • or another Mandatory Mediation Path.
[4086] The Candidate Output is sealed before exposure to an untrusted output path.
[4087] The phrase “before exposure” means before the Candidate Output is made available in a form that an untrusted process, user, service, device, or downstream system can independently read, copy, transmit, render, store, invoke, or otherwise effectuate.
[4088] Transient plaintext may exist within protected memory during generation, inspection, transformation, or resealing. The disclosed architecture does not require literal absence of plaintext at all times. Rather, it requires that no independently releasable plaintext representation become available outside the protected output path before completion of required output verification and release authorization.
[4089] 25.3 Output-sealing stateThe Sealed Candidate Output may be bound to or associated with protected output- sealing state
[4090] comprising one or more of:
[4091] • a Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[4092] • a session identifier;
[4093] • a session nonce;
[4094] • a Session Epoch;
[4095] • a Policy Epoch;
[4096] • an attested execution-context measurement;
[4097] • a Candidate Output digest;
[4098] • a Provenance State digest;
[4099] • an intended destination;
[4100] • an intended recipient;
[4101] • an intended output type;
[4102] • an Output Release Boundary identifier;
[4103] • a validity interval;
[4104] • a use-count limitation;
[4105] • a disclosure-state value;
[4106] • a jurisdiction condition;
[4107] • a protected sequence value;
[4108] • or another element of Protected Authorization State. Binding may be implemented using:
[4109] • authenticated associated data;
[4110] • key derivation;
[4111] • signed metadata;
[4112] • a protected state-machine record;
[4113] • protected shared state;
[4114] • capability scope;
[4115] • hardware labels;mandatory reference monitoring;
[4116] • confined channels;
[4117] • or another technical correspondence mechanism.
[4118] 25.4 Control of the output-sealing key
[4119] An output-sealing key, unsealing key, capability state, or equivalent release-enablement state may be generated, derived, retained, or controlled by:
[4120] • the Output Verification Stage;
[4121] • the Protected Authorization Domain;
[4122] • the Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[4123] • a separate protected output-finality domain;
[4124] • a hardware security module;
[4125] • a secure enclave;
[4126] • a confidential virtual machine;
[4127] • an attestation-conditioned key-management service;
[4128] • the Output Release Boundary;
[4129] • a threshold key service;
[4130] • or a quorum of protected authorities.
[4131] The artificial-intelligence workload is not provided with the output- sealing key or equivalent release-enablement state in a form permitting it to independently:
[4132] • decrypt;
[4133] • unseal;
[4134] • export;
[4135] • duplicate;
[4136] • transmit;
[4137] • render;
[4138] • commit;
[4139] • invoke;
[4140] • or otherwise effectuate
[4141] the Sealed Candidate Output.Where the artificial-intelligence workload initially generates key material, the key material is immediately:
[4142] • transferred to a protected domain;
[4143] • wrapped under a non-exportable key;
[4144] • split among multiple authorities;
[4145] • revoked from the workload;
[4146] • converted into a capability-controlled state;
[4147] • hardware sealed;
[4148] • or otherwise made unavailable for independent release.
[4149] 25.5 Technical Non-Completability
[4150] The sealed-output embodiment establishes Technical Non-Completability.
[4151] Technical Non-Completability means that completion of computation and production of a Candidate Output remain insufficient to complete the output path because one or more technically enforced operations remain unavailable until required Protected Authorization State is satisfied. The unavailable operation may comprise:
[4152] • decryption;
[4153] • unsealing;
[4154] • protected rendering;
[4155] • database commitment;
[4156] • message transmission;
[4157] • tool invocation;
[4158] • persistent storage;
[4159] • external model invocation;
[4160] • actuator control;
[4161] • payment initiation;
[4162] • release-capability activation;
[4163] • state-machine transition;
[4164] • or another externally effective operation.
[4165] Accordingly, a Candidate Output may be computationally complete while remaining technically incomplete as an externally effective result.25.6 Mandatory path requirement
[4166] Technical Non-Completability requires absence of an alternate unmediated output path.
[4167] The architecture is not satisfied merely because one monitored or protected output path exists while the artificial-intelligence workload retains another path capable of releasing the Candidate Output without verification.
[4168] In the applicable embodiment:
[4169] • direct network transmission is prevented or mediated;
[4170] • direct file output is prevented or mediated;
[4171] • direct user-interface rendering is prevented or mediated;
[4172] • direct tool invocation is prevented or mediated;
[4173] • direct database commitment is prevented or mediated;
[4174] • direct memory persistence is prevented or mediated; and
[4175] • other consequence-bearing paths are prevented, disabled, confined, or subjected to equivalent output-finality control.
[4176] 25.7 Verification outcome
[4177] The Output Verification Stage may evaluate:
[4178] • the Sealed Candidate Output;
[4179] • protected plaintext opened inside the Output Verification Stage;
[4180] • a Protected Derivative;
[4181] • a tagged intermediate representation;
[4182] • Provenance State;
[4183] • encrypted metadata;
[4184] • protected output labels;
[4185] • a structured output representation;
[4186] • or another representation sufficient to establish applicable output conditions.
[4187] Successful verification does not necessarily cause immediate plaintext release.
[4188] Successful verification permits progression toward:
[4189] Protected Output Validation Receipt formation;
[4190] protected receipt commitment;Output Release Capability issuance;
[4191] • resealing for a designated Output Release Boundary;
[4192] • or another protected finality operation.
[4193] Failed, uncertain, or indeterminate verification causes the Candidate Output to remain Non-Releasable.
[4194] The Candidate Output may then be:
[4195] • denied;
[4196] • destroyed;
[4197] • redacted;
[4198] • generalized;
[4199] • transformed;
[4200] • quarantined;
[4201] • retained for authorized human review;
[4202] • or maintained in a sealed state for the remainder of the applicable session.
[4203] Failure need not make the underlying enterprise data or future legitimate requests permanently unusable. The failure may instead invalidate the Candidate Output and the applicable sessionspecific release state.
[4204] 26. Atomic Output Finality Transaction
[4205] 26.1 Atomicity requirement
[4206] In one embodiment, output verification, Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment, and issuance or activation of an Output Release Capability are performed through an Atomic Output Finality Transaction.
[4207] The transaction establishes the protected transition from:
[4208] CANDIDATE_SEALED
[4209] through:
[4210] OUTPUT_VERIFIED
[4211] RECEIPT_COMMITTED
[4212] to:
[4213] RELEASE_CAPABILITY_ISSUED
[4214] The transaction either:
[4215] • completes as a protected success state; or• fails without leaving usable partial Release Authority.
[4216] 26.2 Transaction operations
[4217] The Atomic Output Finality Transaction may comprise:
[4218] 1. verifying that the applicable session remains active;
[4219] 2. verifying that the Candidate Output remains in the expected sealed or protected state;
[4220] 3. verifying current Protected Authorization State;
[4221] 4. verifying a current attested execution context;
[4222] 5. verifying current revocation state;
[4223] 6. verifying the current Policy Epoch;
[4224] 7. verifying the current Session Epoch;
[4225] 8. verifying the permitted field set;
[4226] 9. verifying the Permitted Association Scope;
[4227] 10. verifying destination and recipient conditions;
[4228] 11. verifying output type and purpose conditions;
[4229] 12. evaluating applicable Disclosure Budget or Inference-Channel Budget state;
[4230] 13. determining a protected verification result;
[4231] 14. generating a Protected Output Validation Receipt;
[4232] 15. committing the Protected Output Validation Receipt to a Protected Receipt Store;
[4233] 16. advancing protected session or receipt state;
[4234] 17. deriving Release Authority from the committed receipt state; and
[4235] 18. issuing or activating an Output Release Capability only after successful receipt commitment.
[4236] 26.3 Protected Output Validation Receipt
[4237] The Protected Output Validation Receipt may comprise a Ledger- Anchored Validation Receipt or another protected validation receipt generated and committed before Output Release Capability issuance.
[4238] The Protected Output Validation Receipt may bind:
[4239] the Reconstruction Authorization Object digest;
[4240] the original Candidate Output digest;
[4241] the verified or transformed output digest;the Provenance State digest;
[4242] • the attested execution-context measurement;
[4243] • the session identifier;
[4244] • the Session Epoch;
[4245] • the Policy Epoch;
[4246] • a revocation-state digest;
[4247] • the intended destination;
[4248] • the intended recipient;
[4249] • the output type;
[4250] • the Permitted Association Scope or a digest thereof;
[4251] • the permitted field set or a digest thereof;
[4252] • the verification result;
[4253] • any redaction, aggregation, generalization, or transformation applied;
[4254] • the Output Release Boundary identifier;
[4255] • the Disclosure Budget state;
[4256] • the Inference-Channel Budget state;
[4257] • a receipt sequence number;
[4258] • a previous-receipt digest;
[4259] • a protected timestamp;
[4260] • a monotonic state value;
[4261] • or another protected finality condition.
[4262] 26.4 Constitutive commitment
[4263] Commitment of the Protected Output Validation Receipt is constitutive rather than merely evidentiary.
[4264] The receipt is not merely generated after release for auditing.
[4265] Release Authority does not exist, and an Output Release Capability is not issued or activated, unless the required receipt commitment succeeds.
[4266] Where the architecture uses a local Protected Receipt Store followed by later remote anchoring, the local commitment is constitutive. Later replication, timestamping, Merkle-root anchoring, ordistributed-ledger anchoring may occur outside the immediate hot path, provided that the initial protected commitment is durable and cannot be silently rolled back or overwritten.
[4267] 26.5 Protected Receipt Store
[4268] The Protected Output Validation Receipt may be committed to:
[4269] • an append-only protected journal;
[4270] • a hardware-backed log;
[4271] • a protected database;
[4272] • a hash chain;
[4273] • a Merkle-tree structure;
[4274] • a private distributed ledger;
[4275] • a remote protected ledger;
[4276] • a protected storage controller;
[4277] • or another tamper-evident protected repository.
[4278] The Protected Receipt Store may enforce:
[4279] • sequence consistency;
[4280] • previous-receipt correspondence;
[4281] • monotonic advancement;
[4282] • protected timestamps;
[4283] • append-only operation;
[4284] • signature verification;
[4285] • write-once state;
[4286] • durable local commitment;
[4287] • or another anti-rollback property.
[4288] 26.6 Failure conditions
[4289] The Atomic Output Finality Transaction fails where, for example:
[4290] • output verification fails;
[4291] • output verification remains uncertain;
[4292] live attestation cannot be established;• revocation state cannot be established;
[4293] • the Policy Epoch is stale;
[4294] • the Session Epoch is stale;
[4295] • Provenance State is missing or ambiguous;
[4296] • the Protected Output V alidation Receipt cannot be generated;
[4297] • the Protected Receipt Store is unavailable;
[4298] • receipt commitment fails;
[4299] • receipt sequence state is inconsistent;
[4300] • the previous-receipt digest cannot be verified;
[4301] • the receipt signature cannot be generated or verified;
[4302] • a protected transaction state cannot be durably advanced;
[4303] • capability derivation fails;
[4304] • the output is modified after verification;
[4305] • the destination changes after verification;
[4306] • the recipient changes after verification;
[4307] • the Output Release Boundary changes after verification;
[4308] • or another required protected correspondence is lost.
[4309] Upon failure:
[4310] • no Output Release Capability is issued or activated;
[4311] • any provisional capability is revoked or rendered unusable;
[4312] • output-sealing material may be destroyed or invalidated;
[4313] • the Candidate Output remains sealed, blocked, quarantined, or Non-Releasable;
[4314] • and the applicable Protected Session State may be denied, closed, or poisoned.
[4315] 26.7 Transaction implementations
[4316] The Atomic Output Finality Transaction may be implemented using:
[4317] • a hardware-backed transaction;
[4318] a protected compare-and-swap operation;
[4319] a protected state machine;a ledger commit followed by capability derivation;
[4320] • a two-phase protected commit;
[4321] • a monotonic-state transition;
[4322] • transactional protected memory;
[4323] • a hardware-security-module-controlled state transition;
[4324] • a quorum-controlled transaction;
[4325] • or another mechanism preventing usable partial Release Authority.
[4326] Atomicity does not require every operation to occur on one physical processor or inside one software process.
[4327] The operations may be distributed across multiple protected services where the capability-issuance function is technically unable to issue or activate Release Authority until it verifies successful receipt commitment and current protected state.
[4328] 26.8 Receipt-bound capability
[4329] The Output Release Capability may be cryptographically or technically bound to the committed Protected Output Validation Receipt.
[4330] The Output Release Boundary may reject the capability unless:
[4331] • the receipt exists in the Protected Receipt Store;
[4332] • the receipt digest corresponds to the capability;
[4333] • the verified output digest corresponds to the capability;
[4334] • the destination corresponds;
[4335] • the recipient corresponds;
[4336] • the Session Epoch corresponds;
[4337] • the Output Release Boundary corresponds;
[4338] • and the capability remains unexpired, unrevoked, and unconsumed.
[4339] 27. Explicit Fail- Closed Architectural Invariant
[4340] 27.1 General invariant
[4341] The system operates according to a fail-closed invariant.
[4342] Where a condition required for protected reconstruction, Candidate Output verification, receipt commitment, Release Authority creation, or Output Release Boundary effectuation is absent, stale,expired, ambiguous, unavailable, unverifiable, inconsistent, indeterminate, or out of order, the applicable protected operation is denied.
[4343] The system does not infer permission merely from absence of a confirmed violation. Positive establishment of the required protected conditions is required.
[4344] 27.2 Representative fail-closed conditions
[4345] The system may default to denial in response to:
[4346] • attestation timeout;
[4347] • stale attestation;
[4348] • missing attestation;
[4349] • failed attestation verification;
[4350] • stale Session Epoch;
[4351] • stale Policy Epoch;
[4352] • unavailable revocation state;
[4353] • indeterminate revocation status;
[4354] • unavailable Protected Receipt Store;
[4355] • failed receipt commitment;
[4356] • unverifiable Protected Output Validation Receipt;
[4357] • inconsistent receipt sequence;
[4358] • invalid previous -receipt digest;
[4359] • ambiguous Provenance State;
[4360] • missing Provenance State;
[4361] • conflicting provenance labels;
[4362] • unresolved output origin;
[4363] • classifier uncertainty;
[4364] • association-resolution uncertainty;
[4365] • unavailable Vault-Local Release State;
[4366] • inconsistent Vault-Local Release Receipts;
[4367] • destination ambiguity;recipient ambiguity;
[4368] • jurisdiction ambiguity;
[4369] • use-count ambiguity;
[4370] • Disclosure Budget ambiguity;
[4371] • Inference-Channel Budget ambiguity;
[4372] • protected time- source failure;
[4373] • Reconstruction Authorization Object verification failure;
[4374] • Output Release Capability verification failure;
[4375] • output-sealing-key unavailability;
[4376] • output-digest mismatch;
[4377] • boundary-identifier mismatch;
[4378] • inability to establish continuity between reconstruction authority and output authority; • or inability to establish continuity between the verified output and the output presented for release.
[4379] 27.3 No permissive fallback
[4380] No:
[4381] • timeout;
[4382] • cached bearer credential;
[4383] • default gateway rule;
[4384] • unavailable security service;
[4385] • policy-engine error;
[4386] • ledger error;
[4387] • logging error;
[4388] • monitoring failure;
[4389] • legacy bypass path;
[4390] • or unverified human override
[4391] causes permissive release in the enforced embodiment.Where an authorized human-review process is used, the Candidate Output remains Non-Releasable until the review process results in valid Protected Authorization State and, where applicable, a new or updated Protected Output Validation Receipt and Output Release Capability.
[4392] 27.4 Uncertainty treatment
[4393] Where the Candidate Output cannot be confidently classified as compliant, the system may:
[4394] • deny the Candidate Output;
[4395] • redact uncertain portions;
[4396] • generalize the Candidate Output;
[4397] • aggregate the Candidate Output;
[4398] • transform the Candidate Output into a lower-disclosure representation;
[4399] • quarantine the Candidate Output;
[4400] • require additional authorization;
[4401] • require a larger anonymity cohort;
[4402] • require another verification stage;
[4403] • or route the Candidate Output for protected human review.
[4404] Uncertainty does not create Release Authority.
[4405] 28. Live Re-Verification and Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Closure
[4406] 28.1 Reconstruction-time authorization is not conclusive
[4407] Authorization established at reconstruction time does not remain conclusively valid at output time. The system distinguishes:
[4408] • authority to release protected components;
[4409] • authority to reconstruct an Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View;
[4410] • authority to process the reconstructed view; and
[4411] • authority to make a Candidate Output Externally Usable or Externally Effective.
[4412] A valid earlier-stage authority does not automatically authorize a later-stage transition.
[4413] 28.2 Output-time re-verification
[4414] Immediately before Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment or Output Release Capability issuance, the Output Verification Stage re-verifies one or more of:the attested execution-context measurement;
[4415] the current model identity;
[4416] the current agent identity;
[4417] the current code-integrity state;
[4418] the current tool configuration;
[4419] the current runtime environment;
[4420] the current tenant;
[4421] the current revocation state;
[4422] the current Policy Epoch;
[4423] the current Session Epoch;
[4424] the current use count;
[4425] the current Disclosure Budget;
[4426] the current Inference-Channel Budget;
[4427] the current destination authorization;
[4428] the current recipient authorization;
[4429] the current jurisdiction condition;
[4430] the current Permitted Association Scope;
[4431] the current output type;
[4432] the current Output Release Boundary identity;
[4433] current quorum approvals;
[4434] and current state of the Reconstruction Authorization Object.
[4435] 28.3 Fresh attestation
[4436] The Output Verification Stage may require a fresh challenge-response attestation. Freshness may be established according to:
[4437] • elapsed time;
[4438] • monotonic counter distance;
[4439] • transaction count;
[4440] session-event count;Policy Epoch;
[4441] • revocation epoch;
[4442] • infrastructure epoch;
[4443] • challenge nonce;
[4444] • protected sequence;
[4445] • or a combination thereof.
[4446] An attestation may be considered fresh where, for example:
[4447] • it includes a challenge nonce generated by the Output Verification Stage;
[4448] • it was generated after Candidate Output formation;
[4449] • it falls within a maximum permitted age;
[4450] • it corresponds to the current Session Epoch;
[4451] • it corresponds to the current Policy Epoch;
[4452] • it corresponds to the current tenant and infrastructure state;
[4453] • and it has not been superseded by a protected state change.
[4454] 28.4 Bounded Freshness Window
[4455] A previously verified attestation may be used within a Bounded Freshness Window where a Protected Continuity Proof establishes that no relevant state change has occurred.
[4456] The continuity proof may establish continuity of:
[4457] • model identity;
[4458] • agent code;
[4459] • runtime state;
[4460] • tool configuration;
[4461] • execution environment;
[4462] • tenant;
[4463] • session;
[4464] • policy;
[4465] • revocation state;
[4466] destination;infrastructure region;
[4467] or another protected condition.
[4468] Where continuity cannot be positively established, fresh attestation is required.
[4469] 28.5 Representative TOCTOU failures
[4470] Output-time re-verification fails where the artificial-intelligence workload has been:
[4471] • modified;
[4472] • substituted;
[4473] • migrated;
[4474] • re-versioned;
[4475] • adversarially fine-tuned;
[4476] • reconfigured;
[4477] • supplied with an unauthorized tool;
[4478] • transferred to a different tenant;
[4479] • transferred to a different jurisdiction;
[4480] • moved to a non-corresponding infrastructure environment;
[4481] • revoked;
[4482] • or otherwise changed after reconstruction authorization.
[4483] The Candidate Output then remains sealed, is denied, or is subjected to a new authorization process.
[4484] 28.6 Release-boundary re- verification
[4485] A further verification may be performed at the Output Release Boundary.
[4486] The Output Release Boundary may verify:
[4487] • the current Session Epoch;
[4488] • the Output Release Capability state;
[4489] • the committed receipt digest;
[4490] • the verified output digest;
[4491] • the destination;
[4492] • the recipient;
[4493] • the boundary identifier;the expiration state;
[4494] and the one-time use state.
[4495] This closes a further time-of-check-to-time-of-use interval between Output Release Capability issuance and actual effectuation.
[4496] 29. Concrete Association-Leak Detection Algorithm
[4497] 29.1 Purpose
[4498] In one embodiment, the Output Verification Stage performs Association-Leak Detection to determine whether a Candidate Output expressly or implicitly reveals, encodes, enables, or materially increases confidence in an association outside the Permitted Association Scope. The operation is not limited to detecting literal reproduction of protected fields.
[4499] The operation may also identify:
[4500] • inferred identity-content relationships;
[4501] • pseudonymous identity resolution;
[4502] • indirect quasi-identifier combinations;
[4503] • encoded disclosures;
[4504] • cumulative disclosures;
[4505] • tool-argument disclosures;
[4506] • statistical disclosures;
[4507] • and relationships distributed across multiple output fragments.
[4508] 29.2 Protected entity extraction
[4509] The Output Verification Stage applies one or more of:
[4510] • named-entity recognition;
[4511] • structured-field parsing;
[4512] • schema extraction;
[4513] • protected dictionary matching;
[4514] • regular-expression matching;
[4515] • graph extraction;
[4516] • token classification;
[4517] • protected embedding analysis;or another entity-identification process to identify Candidate Output elements.
[4518] Identity-bearing elements may include:
[4519] • names;
[4520] • customer identifiers;
[4521] • employee identifiers;
[4522] • patient identifiers;
[4523] • account identifiers;
[4524] • contact details;
[4525] • addresses;
[4526] • subscriber identifiers;
[4527] • device identifiers;
[4528] • biometric references;
[4529] • location combinations;
[4530] • unique quasi-identifier combinations;
[4531] • pseudonyms;
[4532] • protected identity derivatives;
[4533] • or identity-resolving output fragments. Content-bearing elements may include:
[4534] • transaction values;
[4535] • complaint details;
[4536] • medical events;
[4537] • employment actions;
[4538] • legal events;
[4539] • financial status;
[4540] • behavioral events;
[4541] • location history;
[4542] • technical incidents;security events;
[4543] • communications content;
[4544] • or other enterprise information.
[4545] 29.3 Candidate association construction
[4546] The Output Verification Stage forms candidate association pairs or graphs between identity-bearing elements and content-bearing elements.
[4547] Candidate relationships may be determined according to:
[4548] • sentence proximity;
[4549] • paragraph proximity;
[4550] • document- section relationship;
[4551] • structured-field relationship;
[4552] • graph adjacency;
[4553] • a shared reference identifier;
[4554] • pronoun resolution;
[4555] • entity resolution;
[4556] • tool-argument structure;
[4557] • API parameter structure;
[4558] • database-write structure;
[4559] • temporal relationship;
[4560] • causal language;
[4561] • semantic dependence;
[4562] • or another relationship indicator.
[4563] 29.4 Permitted-association comparison
[4564] Each candidate association is compared with the Permitted Association Scope.
[4565] The Permitted Association Scope may be represented by:
[4566] a permitted-association graph;
[4567] an association matrix;
[4568] field-pair rules;component-pair rules;
[4569] • a purpose-bound join schema;
[4570] • prohibited relationship rules;
[4571] • a maximum correlation depth;
[4572] • a category-based association policy;
[4573] • or another protected association representation.
[4574] A candidate association may be treated as unauthorized where:
[4575] • it is absent from the permitted-association graph;
[4576] • it exceeds an authorized relationship depth;
[4577] • it matches a prohibited association rule;
[4578] • it joins permitted fields in a prohibited combination;
[4579] • it identifies an unauthorized person-content relationship;
[4580] • or it cannot be verified as falling within the Permitted Association Scope.
[4581] 29.5 Protected identity resolution
[4582] The Output Verification Stage may compare an output identity representation with a Protected Identity Index.
[4583] The Protected Identity Index may contain:
[4584] • protected names;
[4585] • pseudonyms;
[4586] • protected identifiers;
[4587] • identity embeddings;
[4588] • hashed identity features;
[4589] • tokenized identity values;
[4590] • protected quasi-identifier combinations;
[4591] • or another identity-resolution representation.
[4592] A similarity score may be determined:
[4593] similarity_score =
[4594] compare (
[4595] output_identity_representation,
[4596] protected_identity_representationA similarity score exceeding a protected threshold may indicate correspondence with a protected identity.
[4597] The threshold may vary according to:
[4598] • data sensitivity;
[4599] • identity category;
[4600] • destination;
[4601] • recipient;
[4602] • jurisdiction;
[4603] • tenant policy;
[4604] • association type;
[4605] • confidence calibration;
[4606] • Disclosure Budget;
[4607] • or Inference-Channel Budget.
[4608] The similarity score need not, by itself, determine the result. It may be combined with Provenance State, relationship confidence, structured-field relationships, and other protected evidence.
[4609] 29.6 Provenance correspondence
[4610] The Output Verification Stage resolves Provenance State for the Candidate Output.
[4611] The provenance operation may determine:
[4612] • source vault;
[4613] • source component;
[4614] • source field;
[4615] • source association;
[4616] • transformation history;
[4617] • model-generated derivation;
[4618] • tool-generated derivation;
[4619] • prior output relationship;
[4620] • or another lineage property.
[4621] Provenance State may indicate that a Candidate Output fragment derives from a prohibited identitycontent association even where the output does not literally reproduce the protected source values.29.7 Confidence and uncertainty handling
[4622] An association-confidence value may be determined:
[4623] association_confidence =
[4624] combine (
[4625] entity_extraction_confidence,
[4626] identity_resolution_confidence,
[4627] relationship_confidence,
[4628] identity_similarity,
[4629] provenance_correspondence,
[4630] structural_correspondence
[4631] The Candidate Output may be treated as noncompliant where:
[4632] • the association is not permitted;
[4633] • the similarity score exceeds a protected threshold and the associated content is outside scope;
[4634] • the association-confidence value exceeds a protected violation threshold;
[4635] • Provenance State identifies a prohibited relationship;
[4636] • cumulative disclosure establishes the prohibited relationship;
[4637] • or the Candidate Output otherwise exceeds the Permitted Association Scope.
[4638] The Candidate Output may be treated as uncertain where:
[4639] • entity resolution falls below a minimum confidence;
[4640] • relationship resolution falls below a minimum confidence;
[4641] • Provenance State is ambiguous;
[4642] • output encoding prevents confident inspection;
[4643] • or required protected information is unavailable.
[4644] An uncertain result causes denial, redaction, transformation, quarantine, or protected review rather than release.
[4645] 29.8 Illustrative pseudocode
[4646] function detect_unauthorized_associations (
[4647] candidate_output,
[4648] permit ted_association_graph,
[4649] protected_identity_index,
[4650] provenance_state,
[4651] identity_threshold,
[4652] minimum_entity_confidence,
[4653] minimum_relationship_confidenceentities =
[4654] protected_entity_extraction ( candidate_output
[4655] identity_entities = select_identity_bearing_entities (
[4656] entities
[4657] content_entities = select_content_bearing_entities (
[4658] entities
[4659] candidate_pairs =
[4660] construct_candidate_pairs ( { "identity_entities":
[4661] identity_entities, "content_entities ":
[4662] content_entities, "output_structure":
[4663] candidate_output. structure } )
[4664] violations = [ ]
[4665] uncertain_pairs = [ ]
[4666] for pair in candidate_pairs:
[4667] identity_resolution =
[4668] resolve_against_protected_identity_index(pair.identity_entity,protected_identity_index
[4669] similarity_score =
[4670] protected_similarity (
[4671] pair. identity_entity,
[4672] identity_resolution
[4673] provenance_result = resolve_pair_provenance (
[4674] pair,
[4675] provenance_state
[4676] association_permitted =
[4677] permit ted_association_graph. allows ( { "resolved_identity":identity_resolution.identifier,
[4678] "content_category":
[4679] pair. content_entity. category, "relationship_type":
[4680] pair. relationship_type
[4681] } )
[4682] uncertain =
[4683] pair. identity_entity. confidence
[4684] < minimum_entity_confidence or pair.relationship_confidence
[4685] < minimum_relationship_confidence or identity_resolution.status
[4686] == AMBIGUOUS
[4687] or provenance_result
[4688] == AMBIGUOUS
[4689] if uncertain:
[4690] uncertain_pairs. append (pair) continue
[4691] if not association_permitted:
[4692] violations. append (pair)
[4693] continue
[4694] if similarity_score >= identity_threshold and provenance_result
[4695] indicates prohibited_relationship: violations. append (pair)
[4696] if uncertain_pairs is not empty:
[4697] return {
[4698] "result": UNCERTAIN,
[4699] "violations": violations, "uncertain_pairs ": uncertain_pairs }
[4700] if violations is not empty:
[4701] return {
[4702] "result": NONCOMPLIANT, "violations": violations, "uncertain_pairs ": empty_set ( )
[4703] }
[4704] return {
[4705] "result": COMPLIANT,
[4706] "violations": empty_set ( ), "uncertain_pairs ": empty_set ( )
[4707] }
[4708] 29.9 Protected transformation
[4709] Where a violation is detected, the Output Verification Stage may:remove the identity-bearing element;
[4710] • remove the content-bearing element;
[4711] • remove the association language;
[4712] • substitute a pseudonym;
[4713] • reduce precision;
[4714] • aggregate a cohort;
[4715] • generalize the output;
[4716] • suppress a tool argument;
[4717] • omit a database field;
[4718] • block an operation;
[4719] • or otherwise transform the Candidate Output.
[4720] The transformed output is re-evaluated.
[4721] Transformation does not itself create Release Authority.
[4722] 30. Streaming Candidate Outputs
[4723] 30.1 Streaming problem
[4724] An artificial-intelligence workload may generate output incrementally.
[4725] A token, character sequence, audio segment, video frame, tool argument, partial API payload, incremental database update, or other segment may become Externally Usable before the complete output has been generated.
[4726] Accordingly, output verification cannot be deferred until final completion where earlier segments have already crossed the Output Release Boundary.
[4727] Each segment capable of becoming externally usable may be treated as a Candidate Output or as part of a cumulative Candidate Output.
[4728] 30.2 Buffer-and- verify segmented release
[4729] In one embodiment:
[4730] 1. the artificial-intelligence workload generates a segment into a Protected Output Buffer; 2. the segment is sealed;
[4731] 3. Provenance State is associated with the segment;
[4732] 4. the segment is evaluated against current Protected Authorization State;5. a segment- specific Protected Output Validation Receipt is generated and committed; 6. a segment-specific Output Release Capability is issued; and
[4733] 7. the segment is released only after Output Release Boundary verification.
[4734] A later segment does not retroactively authorize an earlier unverified segment.
[4735] 30.3 Rolling disclosure state
[4736] The Output Verification Stage may maintain Rolling Disclosure State comprising:
[4737] • previously disclosed fields;
[4738] • previously disclosed identities;
[4739] • previously disclosed associations;
[4740] • cumulative semantic content;
[4741] • cumulative quasi-identifiers;
[4742] • Disclosure Budget state;
[4743] • Inference-Channel Budget state;
[4744] • destination;
[4745] • recipient;
[4746] • segment sequence;
[4747] • previous redactions;
[4748] • and prior protected receipt state.
[4749] A segment that appears compliant in isolation may be denied where the segment, combined with prior released segments, would:
[4750] • create an Unauthorized Cross- Vault Correlation;
[4751] • identify a protected person;
[4752] • exceed a permitted association depth;
[4753] • exceed a Disclosure Budget;
[4754] • exceed an Inference-Channel Budget;
[4755] • or otherwise enlarge the authorized output scope.
[4756] 30.4 Context retention
[4757] The Output Verification Stage may retain protected contextual state across segments to detect:• a name disclosed in one segment and a transaction disclosed in a later segment;
[4758] • multiple quasi-identifiers disclosed across separate segments;
[4759] • a prohibited association formed cumulatively;
[4760] • encoded data distributed across fragments;
[4761] • or another multi- segment disclosure.
[4762] 30.5 Constrained decoding
[4763] The system may reduce streaming risk through:
[4764] • prohibited-token masks;
[4765] • structured output schemas;
[4766] • protected decoding rules;
[4767] • permitted entity dictionaries;
[4768] • protected destination- specific vocabularies;
[4769] • association constraints;
[4770] • grammar-constrained generation;
[4771] • policy-conditioned decoding;
[4772] • or another pre-release generation constraint.
[4773] Constrained decoding may reduce the probability of a violation but does not necessarily replace final segment or whole-output verification.
[4774] 30.6 Final whole-output verification
[4775] The system may perform both:
[4776] • segment-level verification before each externally usable release; and
[4777] • final whole-output verification before the output is committed, stored, forwarded, or otherwise made permanently effective.
[4778] A complete stream may remain provisional until final verification succeeds.
[4779] 30.7 Provisional non-exportable display
[4780] A Candidate Output may be provisionally rendered within a protected sandbox or non-exportable interface.
[4781] The provisional interface may technically restrict:
[4782] • copying;downloading;
[4783] printing;
[4784] forwarding;
[4785] storage;
[4786] external API access;
[4787] tool invocation;
[4788] model-to-model transfer;
[4789] or another externally effective operation.
[4790] Screen-capture resistance may be provided where supported by the deployment environment, but the specification does not assume that every display environment can eliminate all optical or physical capture risks.
[4791] The output becomes generally exportable only after successful output verification, Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment, and Output Release Capability issuance.
[4792] 30.8 Streaming failure
[4793] Where a streaming segment fails verification:
[4794] • the segment is not released;
[4795] • subsequent segments may be suspended;
[4796] • the stream may be terminated;
[4797] • Rolling Disclosure State may be closed;
[4798] • provisional capabilities may be revoked;
[4799] • and the applicable session may be denied or poisoned.
[4800] Previously validly released segments need not be retractable. The system instead prevents the violating segment and subsequent unauthorized cumulative disclosure.
[4801] 31. Threat Model and Compromise Analysis
[4802] 31.1 Scope of threat model
[4803] The following examples describe representative threats and the architectural controls intended to reduce or contain them.
[4804] The examples do not assert that every deployment resists every attacker.
[4805] The resulting assurance depends on:
[4806] • which protection domains remain uncompromised;the selected enforcement substrate;
[4807] • key-management architecture;
[4808] • administrative separation;
[4809] • hardware and software assumptions;
[4810] • the completeness of Mandatory Mediation Paths;
[4811] • and the defined threat model.
[4812] 31.2 Identity- vault administrator acting alone
[4813] An administrator controlling only the identity vault may obtain protected identity components. The administrator does not, by virtue of identity-vault authority alone, obtain:
[4814] • protected content components;
[4815] • association information;
[4816] • reconstruction-enablement material;
[4817] • a valid Reconstruction Authorization Object;
[4818] • or output Release Authority.
[4819] Relevant containment mechanisms include:
[4820] • independent content-vault control;
[4821] • independent relationship-mapping-vault control;
[4822] • Vault- Local Release Conditions;
[4823] • the Permitted Association Scope;
[4824] • session-bound component release;
[4825] • and protected reconstruction.
[4826] 31.3 Content- vault administrator acting alone
[4827] An administrator controlling only the content vault may obtain protected content components. The administrator does not, by virtue of content-vault authority alone, obtain protected identity resolution or the protected relationship between content and identity.
[4828] Relevant containment mechanisms include:
[4829] opaque component references;
[4830] independent identity- vault control;independent relationship-mapping-vault control;
[4831] • cryptographic -material separation;
[4832] • and controlled reconstruction.
[4833] 31.4 Relationship -mapping- vault administrator acting alone
[4834] An administrator controlling only the relationship-mapping vault may obtain or infer protected linkage structures.
[4835] The administrator does not, by virtue of mapping- vault authority alone, necessarily obtain the protected identity and content values required to create a complete semantically usable enterprise record.
[4836] Relevant containment mechanisms include:
[4837] • semantic heterogeneity of vault contents;
[4838] • independently controlled identity and content vaults;
[4839] • cryptographic -material separation;
[4840] • Vault- Local Release Conditions;
[4841] • and session-scoped mapping release.
[4842] 31.5 Common privileged administrator
[4843] Where one administrator, credential, or governance plane has unrestricted authority over every vault and the Protected Reconstruction Domain, multi-vault separation may provide limited protection against that administrator.
[4844] Higher-assurance embodiments therefore use one or more of:
[4845] • independent administrative authorities;
[4846] • separate key hierarchies;
[4847] • hardware-rooted protection;
[4848] • threshold approval;
[4849] • quorum release;
[4850] • tenant separation;
[4851] • jurisdictional separation;
[4852] • or mandatory technical controls preventing one credential from compelling all required releases.
[4853] 31.6 Compromised model weights or agent codeA modified model, substituted agent, altered runtime, or unauthorized tool configuration may fail correspondence with the attested execution-context measurement bound into the Reconstruction Authorization Object.
[4854] Relevant controls include:
[4855] • non-bearer execution-context binding;
[4856] • runtime attestation;
[4857] • output-time live re-attestation;
[4858] • Bounded Freshness Windows;
[4859] • Protected Continuity Proof;
[4860] • current Session Epoch verification;
[4861] • and fail-closed denial.
[4862] Where the enclosing attestation mechanism does not measure the changed model, tool, or runtime state, that change may fall outside the assurance of that embodiment. Higher-assurance implementations bind those elements into the attested execution context.
[4863] 31.7 Prompt-injection-induced exfiltration
[4864] A prompt-injection attacker may instruct the artificial-intelligence workload to disclose protected data through:
[4865] • generated text;
[4866] • encoded text;
[4867] • tool arguments;
[4868] • API parameters;
[4869] • file names;
[4870] • retrieval queries;
[4871] • external model prompts;
[4872] • memory writes;
[4873] • database updates;
[4874] • error messages;
[4875] • or indirect identity-content associations.
[4876] The workload may internally follow the malicious instruction and produce a violating Candidate Output.
[4877] Relevant controls include:Restricted Processing Interface;
[4878] • Permitted Association Scope;
[4879] • Provenance State;
[4880] • Association-Leak Detection;
[4881] • Sealed Candidate Output;
[4882] • output-time verification;
[4883] • tool-call treatment as Candidate Output;
[4884] • Output Release Capability;
[4885] • and fail-closed uncertainty handling.
[4886] The architectural security effect is that malicious generation does not itself complete exfiltration.
[4887] 31.8 Replayed Reconstruction Authorization Object
[4888] A captured Reconstruction Authorization Object does not independently authorize reconstruction where the object is bound to:
[4889] • an attested execution context;
[4890] • a session identifier;
[4891] • a session nonce;
[4892] • a Session Epoch;
[4893] • a validity interval;
[4894] • a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
[4895] • a tenant;
[4896] • a destination;
[4897] • or another protected condition.
[4898] Relevant controls include:
[4899] • non-bearer binding;
[4900] • current Protected Session State;
[4901] • monotonic Session Epoch;
[4902] • session-bound component protection;
[4903] Vault-Local Release State;• partial-session poisoning;
[4904] • and fresh vault-local verification.
[4905] 31.9 Replayed Output Release Capability
[4906] A captured Output Release Capability does not authorize another release where the capability is bound to:
[4907] • a verified output digest;
[4908] • a committed Protected Output Validation Receipt digest;
[4909] • a destination;
[4910] • a recipient;
[4911] • an Output Release Boundary;
[4912] • a session identifier;
[4913] • a Session Epoch;
[4914] • an expiration condition;
[4915] • and a one-time use condition.
[4916] The Output Release Boundary rejects a capability that is stale, consumed, mismatched, revoked, or presented with a different output or destination.
[4917] 31.10 Migrated workload
[4918] A workload migrated to another:
[4919] • virtual machine;
[4920] • secure enclave;
[4921] • accelerator;
[4922] • tenant;
[4923] • cloud region;
[4924] • jurisdiction;
[4925] • or hardware environment
[4926] may fail correspondence where migration changes the attested execution-context measurement or protected infrastructure credential.
[4927] Relevant controls include:
[4928] execution-context binding;Protected Reconstruction Domain binding;
[4929] • live re-attestation;
[4930] • infrastructure credentials;
[4931] • jurisdiction conditions;
[4932] • and current policy verification.
[4933] Authorized migration may require issuance of a new Reconstruction Authorization Object or a protected authorization update.
[4934] 31.11 Compromised ordinary output gateway
[4935] A compromised ordinary gateway that receives only a Sealed Candidate Output and lacks:
[4936] • the output-unsealing key;
[4937] • valid Output Release Capability;
[4938] • corresponding committed receipt state;
[4939] • or access to the designated Output Release Boundary operation
[4940] cannot independently produce the authorized plaintext or operation under the high-assurance sealed-output embodiment.
[4941] Relevant controls include:
[4942] • non-exportable output-sealing state;
[4943] • receipt-bound Output Release Capability;
[4944] • candidate-output-digest binding;
[4945] • destination binding;
[4946] • Output Release Boundary binding;
[4947] • and Technical Non-Completability.
[4948] 31.12 Compromised Output Verification Stage
[4949] Compromise of the Output Verification Stage is a more serious threat because the stage may possess protected inspection and approval functions.
[4950] Higher-assurance embodiments reduce this risk through:
[4951] • hardware-rooted isolation;
[4952] measured code;
[4953] independent receipt commitment;quorum approval;
[4954] split verification stages;
[4955] threshold Output Release Capability issuance;
[4956] append-only protected receipt state;
[4957] independent Output Release Boundary verification;
[4958] limited non-exportable keys;
[4959] and attestation of the Output Verification Stage itself.
[4960] A single fully compromised verifier may defeat a single- verifier embodiment. The specification does not assume otherwise.
[4961] 31.13 Compromised Output Release Boundary
[4962] A compromised Output Release Boundary may attempt to release an output without valid authority. Relevant controls may include:
[4963] • a non-exportable boundary key;
[4964] • capability validation inside hardware;
[4965] • one-time capability state;
[4966] • receipt- store correspondence;
[4967] • remote attestation of the boundary;
[4968] • protected state-machine enforcement;
[4969] • destination- side verification;
[4970] • quorum-controlled unsealing;
[4971] • or another independent enforcement mechanism.
[4972] Where the Output Release Boundary is fully compromised and holds unrestricted plaintext and key access, the assurance of that embodiment may be defeated. Higher-assurance embodiments distribute or constrain that authority.
[4973] 31.14 Protected Receipt Store failure or compromise
[4974] An unavailable Protected Receipt Store causes fail-closed denial where receipt commitment is constitutive.
[4975] A compromised receipt store may be mitigated using:
[4976] hash chaining;
[4977] previous-receipt digests;monotonic counters;
[4978] hardware-backed logs;
[4979] remote replication;
[4980] quorum commitment;
[4981] Merkle-root anchoring;
[4982] independent verification;
[4983] or another anti-rollback mechanism.
[4984] 31.15 Collusion among vault administrators
[4985] Collusion among enough vault administrators may expose a complete record.
[4986] Higher-assurance embodiments may reduce collusion risk through:
[4987] • k-of-n authorization;
[4988] • hardware-isolated keys;
[4989] • independent DPO approval;
[4990] • tenant approval;
[4991] • jurisdictional authority;
[4992] • session-bound releases;
[4993] • output verification;
[4994] • and receipt-backed accountability.
[4995] The required collusion threshold depends on the deployment architecture.
[4996] 31.16 Prompt injection through external tools
[4997] A malicious external tool may return protected or manipulated content intended to induce unauthorized disclosure.
[4998] Relevant controls include:
[4999] • input provenance;
[5000] • Restricted Processing Interface;
[5001] • tool identity verification;
[5002] • tool-output labeling;
[5003] current execution-context measurement;Candidate Output sealing;
[5004] • output Association-Leak Detection;
[5005] • destination verification;
[5006] • and treatment of subsequent tool calls as new Candidate Outputs.
[5007] 31.17 Aggregate- query reconstruction
[5008] An attacker may submit repeated individually permissible requests whose combined outputs reconstruct a protected identity or association.
[5009] Relevant controls include:
[5010] • Rolling Disclosure State;
[5011] • Disclosure Budget;
[5012] • Inference-Channel Budget;
[5013] • repeated-query overlap analysis;
[5014] • cohort- size requirements;
[5015] • protected session and cross-session accounting;
[5016] • cumulative association analysis;
[5017] • and output denial or generalization.
[5018] 31.18 Residual endpoint risk
[5019] After a valid output becomes Externally Usable, a permitted recipient or compromised endpoint may misuse the released information.
[5020] The disclosed architecture primarily controls whether and how the output crosses the Output Release Boundary.
[5021] Post-release endpoint protection may additionally use:
[5022] • recipient-bound encryption;
[5023] • secure rendering;
[5024] • digital rights controls;
[5025] • watermarking;
[5026] • downstream policy enforcement;
[5027] • protected display environments;
[5028] or another control.The existence of residual endpoint risk does not eliminate the technical effect of preventing unauthorized release before the boundary, but the architecture does not claim to reverse every consequence after valid plaintext has been released.
[5029] 31.19 Threat-to-control summary
[5030] Representative correspondences include:
[5031] • single- vault compromise: semantic vault separation and independent release authority;
[5032] • credential theft: non-bearer execution-context and session binding;
[5033] • workload substitution: live attestation and execution-context correspondence;
[5034] • prompt-injection exfiltration: Sealed Candidate Output and output-time verification;
[5035] • authorization replay: Session Epoch, nonce, validity, and Protected Session State;
[5036] • partial-session replay: session-bound components and poisoning;
[5037] • gateway bypass: Mandatory Mediation Path and absence of alternate output routes;
[5038] • receipt omission: constitutive Protected Output Validation Receipt commitment;
[5039] • output substitution: verified-output-digest binding;
[5040] • destination substitution: destination-bound Output Release Capability;
[5041] • streaming leakage: segment verification and Rolling Disclosure State;
[5042] • aggregate inference: Disclosure Budget and Inference-Channel Budget;
[5043] • verifier compromise: split verification, quorum, attestation, and independent boundary checks; and
[5044] • boundary compromise: constrained keys, receipt correspondence, and destination-side verification.
[5045] The architecture therefore provides layered containment and protected finality rather than relying on a single access-control decision or a single security component.
[5046] 32. Hardware-Backed Attestation Implementations
[5047] The attested execution-context measurement may be generated using one or more hardware-backed attestation mechanisms.
[5048] Representative implementations include:
[5049] • TPM 2.0 platform-configuration-register measurements and signed PCR quotes;
[5050] Intel SGX enclave measurements and DCAP attestation evidence;• Intel TDX trust-domain measurements and attestation reports;
[5051] • AMD SEV-SNP attestation reports and measured guest state;
[5052] • ARM Confidential Compute Architecture realm measurements and attestation tokens; • AWS Nitro Enclave attestation documents combined with key-management- service condition keys;
[5053] • protected cloud confidential-computing reports;
[5054] • NVIDIA confidential-computing accelerator attestation and protected GPU execution state;
[5055] • hardware security module attestations;
[5056] • secure-boot measurements;
[5057] • measured virtual-machine images;
[5058] • trusted platform certificates; or
[5059] • combinations thereof.
[5060] For an accelerator-backed artificial-intelligence workload, the attested execution-context measurement may bind:
[5061] • host processor state;
[5062] • accelerator state;
[5063] • model-weight digest;
[5064] • runtime binary digest;
[5065] • device firmware state;
[5066] • interconnect-protection state;
[5067] • tenant identity; and
[5068] • protected memory mode.
[5069] The reconstruction authorization object may require correspondence among host attestation, accelerator attestation, and model identity before component release or output release.
[5070] 33. Post-Quantum Cryptographic Variation
[5071] In one embodiment, signatures, receipts, authorization objects, attestation-derived commitments, or vault-local release receipts use post-quantum or hybrid cryptographic mechanisms.
[5072] The protected authorization domain, vaults, reconstruction domain, and output-verification stage may use:
[5073] FIPS 204 digital signatures;FIPS 205 digital signatures;
[5074] • hybrid classical and post-quantum signatures;
[5075] • post-quantum key-establishment mechanisms;
[5076] • hash-based commitments;
[5077] • cryptographic agility supporting algorithm replacement; or
[5078] • combinations thereof.
[5079] A hybrid implementation may require successful verification of both a classical signature and a post-quantum signature before authorization-object acceptance or output-release capability issuance.
[5080] 34. Multi- Authority Quorum for Sensitive Associations
[5081] For a high-sensitivity association, release may require approval by a plurality of independent authorities.
[5082] The reconstruction authorization object may specify a quorum rule such as k-of-n approval. Representative authorities may include:
[5083] • tenant authority;
[5084] • enterprise security authority;
[5085] • data-protection authority;
[5086] • data-protection-officer authority;
[5087] • legal authority;
[5088] • business-unit authority;
[5089] • jurisdictional authority;
[5090] • patient-consent authority;
[5091] • financial-compliance authority; or
[5092] • system-owner authority.
[5093] For example, release from the relationship-mapping vault may require both:
[5094] • tenant-authority approval; and
[5095] • data-protection-officer approval.
[5096] Each authority may issue a protected approval share bound to:
[5097] • the reconstruction authorization object digest;the requested association;
[5098] the authorized purpose;
[5099] the session identifier;
[5100] • the validity interval; and
[5101] • the output scope.
[5102] The relationship-mapping vault releases association information only after verifying the required quorum.
[5103] The quorum may also be re-verified at output time where disclosure of the resulting association remains high sensitivity.
[5104] 35. Quantitative Inference- Channel and Disclosure Budget
[5105] A candidate output may disclose a protected association indirectly, statistically, cumulatively, or through repeated aggregate queries.
[5106] In one embodiment, the output-verification stage enforces a quantitative disclosure condition. The reconstruction authorization object may specify:
[5107] • a minimum cohort size;
[5108] • a k-anonymity threshold;
[5109] • a maximum number of releases;
[5110] • a maximum number of identity-resolving attributes;
[5111] • a cumulative privacy budget;
[5112] • a per-session disclosure score;
[5113] • a maximum association-confidence increase;
[5114] • a maximum query overlap;
[5115] • a permitted aggregation level; or
[5116] • another leakage limitation.
[5117] The system maintains a protected disclosure state for the session.
[5118] Before each release, the output-verification stage calculates a disclosure cost based on:
[5119] • fields disclosed;
[5120] • associations disclosed;
[5121] • cohort size;destination;
[5122] • prior outputs;
[5123] • repeated query overlap;
[5124] • identity-resolution probability;
[5125] • semantic specificity; and
[5126] • protected sensitivity categories.
[5127] The disclosure cost is subtracted from a protected disclosure budget.
[5128] Where the remaining disclosure budget is insufficient, the candidate output is:
[5129] • denied;
[5130] • generalized;
[5131] • aggregated;
[5132] • noise-adjusted;
[5133] • redacted;
[5134] • delayed;
[5135] • combined with a la...
Claims
CLAIMSIndependent System Claim1. A computer-implemented system for controlled artificial-intelligence processing of enterprise data, the system comprising:a first protected storage domain configured to maintain identity components of one or more enterprise records;a second protected storage domain configured to maintain content components of the one or more enterprise records;a relationship-mapping protection domain, independently controlled relative to the first protected storage domain and the second protected storage domain, configured to maintain or generate association information by which selected identity components are associated with selected content components;a protected authorization domain configured to:
1. receive a request for processing by an artificial-intelligence workload;2. verify an execution context associated with the artificial-intelligence workload; and3. generate protected reconstruction-authorization state binding at least:a session identifier,the verified execution context,a permitted field set,a permitted association scope,an authorized processing purpose, andan output condition;a plurality of vault-release interfaces respectively associated with the protected storage domains and configured to:
1. independently evaluate the protected reconstruction-authorization state according to respective vault-local release conditions; and2. release approved identity, content, and association components in a form bound to the session identifier or accessible only through a mandatory mediated path;a protected reconstruction domain configured to:
1. obtain the approved components;2. establish correspondence among the approved components and the protected reconstructionauthorization state;3. resolve only associations falling within the permitted association scope; and4. construct an ephemeral reconstructed data view limited to the permitted field set and the permitted association scope;a restricted processing interface configured to make the ephemeral reconstructed data view, or a protected derivative thereof, available to the artificial-intelligence workload without providing the artificial-intelligence workload with unrestricted credentials to the protected storage domains; a protected output-control mechanism configured to receive a Candidate Output generated by the artificial-intelligence workload and, before the Candidate Output is made available through anunverified output path, maintain the Candidate Output as a Sealed Candidate Output or another technically Non-Releasable representation;an Output Verification Stage configured, after generation of the Candidate Output, to:
1. verify current protected session state;2. verify current execution-context correspondence or protected continuity thereof;3. verify at least one current policy, revocation, epoch, destination, recipient, jurisdiction, fieldscope, association-scope, provenance, or disclosure condition;4. determine whether the Candidate Output complies with the protected reconstructionauthorization state; and5. prevent creation of Release Authority when a required condition is absent, stale, ambiguous, inconsistent, unavailable, expired, revoked, or unverifiable;a Protected Receipt Store configured to commit a Protected Output Validation Receipt binding at least:
1. protected reconstruction-authorization state;2. a verified-output identifier;3. a protected session identifier; and4. a verification result;a capability-issuance function configured to issue or activate an Output Release Capability only after successful commitment of the Protected Output Validation Receipt; andan Output Release Boundary configured to:
1. verify correspondence of the Output Release Capability with the verified Candidate Output, the committed Protected Output Validation Receipt, the protected session, and an authorized output condition; and2. only after said verification, transmit, render, persist, commit, invoke, or otherwise effectuate the verified Candidate Output;wherein completion of computation by the artificial-intelligence workload is insufficient, without completion of the protected output-verification, receipt-commitment, capabilityissuance, and Output Release Boundary operations, to make the Candidate Output externally usable or externally effective.Dependent System Claims2. The system of claim 1, wherein the association information is maintained separately from both the identity components and the content components such that authority to obtain the identity components and authority to obtain the content components do not, individually or collectively, provide authority to establish an association outside the protected reconstruction domain.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the relationship-mapping protection domain dynamically generates at least part of the association information in response to an authorized reconstruction operation rather than persistently storing a complete mapping table.
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the protected reconstruction-authorization state comprises a Reconstruction Authorization Object cryptographically or technically bound to at least the execution context, the session identifier, a Session Epoch, the permitted association scope, and the protected reconstruction domain.
5. The system of claim 4, wherein the Reconstruction Authorization Object is non-bearer such that possession of the Reconstruction Authorization Object is insufficient to cause component release orreconstruction without verified correspondence with the bound execution context and current protected session state.
6. The system of claim 1, wherein each vault-release interface generates a Vault-Local Release Receipt binding released component identifiers to the protected reconstruction-authorization state, the session identifier, a Session Epoch, and the releasing protected storage domain.
7. The system of claim 1, wherein the approved components are encrypted, wrapped, capability restricted, labelled, or otherwise transformed into Session-Bound Components that are unusable outside the protected session or protected reconstruction domain.
8. The system of claim 1, wherein the protected reconstruction domain prevents persistent writing of a complete semantically joined enterprise record outside a Protected Processing Span unless separately authorized.
9. The system of claim 1, further comprising a provenance-control mechanism configured to maintain protected correspondence among source components, reconstructed fields, permitted associations, intermediate values, protected derivatives, and portions of the Candidate Output.
10. The system of claim 1, wherein the Output Verification Stage is configured to detect an unauthorized association by:
1. extracting an identity-bearing element and a content-bearing element from the Candidate Output;2. forming a candidate association between the elements;3. resolving the identity-bearing element against a Protected Identity Index; and4. comparing the candidate association with a permitted-association graph corresponding to the permitted association scope.
11. The system of claim 10, wherein an uncertain identity resolution, uncertain relationship resolution, ambiguous provenance result, or unavailable association state causes denial, protected transformation, quarantine, or protected review while the Candidate Output remains Non-Releasable.
12. The system of claim 1, wherein the protected output-control mechanism comprises a Protected Output Buffer configured to seal the Candidate Output under protected output state unavailable to the artificial-intelligence workload for independent release.
13. The system of claim 12, wherein the protected output state is bound to at least:
1. a digest of the protected reconstruction-authorization state;2. the session identifier;3. a Session Epoch;4. a Candidate Output digest; and5. an Output Release Boundary identifier.
14. The system of claim 1, wherein the Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed before the Output Release Capability exists and is constitutive of Release Authority rather than merely evidentiary of an earlier release.
15. The system of claim 14, wherein verification of the Candidate Output, commitment of the Protected Output Validation Receipt, and issuance of the Output Release Capability are performed through an Atomic Output Finality Transaction that fails without leaving usable partial Release Authority.
16. The system of claim 1, wherein the Output Release Capability is bound to at least:
1. a verified-output digest;2. a committed-receipt digest;3. the session identifier;4. a Session Epoch;5. an intended destination; and6. the Output Release Boundary.
17. The system of claim 16, wherein the Output Release Capability is single use and is consumed, invalidated, or advanced to a non-reusable protected state after successful effectuation.
18. The system of claim 1, further comprising an invalidation controller configured, upon interruption or failure of a protected session, to advance a protected epoch, invalidate session-bound components, revoke unconsumed Output Release Capabilities, and prevent captured state from completing the interrupted session.
19. The system of claim 1, wherein each incrementally generated output segment capable of becoming externally usable is maintained as a Non-Releasable Candidate Output segment until segment-level verification, protected receipt commitment, and segment-specific release authorization have succeeded.
20. The system of claim 19, wherein protected Rolling Disclosure State is maintained across a plurality of segments to detect an unauthorized association or disclosure that arises cumulatively across the plurality of segments.
21. The system of claim 1, wherein release-critical predicates are evaluated through a Hot Path and one or more policy-compilation, indexing, attestation-preparation, archival, replication, or analytics operations are performed through a Cold Path, and wherein no Cold-Path artifact independently creates Release Authority.
22. The system of claim 21, wherein a protected precomputed artifact is relied upon by the Hot Path only after verification of integrity, scope, Policy Epoch, freshness, and revocation state.
23. The system of claim 1, wherein at least one legacy artificial-intelligence workload is enclosed by a protected proxy, wrapper, broker, reference monitor, or output adapter that prevents direct vault access and prevents release through an alternate unverified output channel.
24. The system of claim 1, wherein one or more protected operations are enforced using a secure enclave, confidential virtual machine, hardware security module, trusted platform module, secure coprocessor, protected accelerator, mandatory reference monitor, capability system, tagged-memory system, or a combination thereof.
25. The system of claim 1, wherein release requires a threshold number of approval shares from independently controlled verification, receipt, key, or release authorities.Independent Method Claim26. A computer-implemented method for controlling artificial-intelligence processing of enterprise data, the method comprising:separating an enterprise record into at least identity components, content components, and association information;maintaining the identity components, the content components, and the association information under independently controlled protected authority;receiving a processing request for an artificial-intelligence workload;verifying an execution context of the artificial-intelligence workload;establishing protected reconstruction-authorization state binding at least a protected session, a permitted field set, a permitted association scope, an authorized processing purpose, and an output condition;independently evaluating the protected reconstruction-authorization state at each required protected storage domain;releasing approved components in a session-bound form;within a protected reconstruction domain, reconstructing an ephemeral data view containing only fields and associations permitted by the protected reconstruction-authorization state; providing the ephemeral data view or a protected derivative thereof to the artificial-intelligence workload through a restricted processing interface;receiving a Candidate Output generated by the artificial-intelligence workload;before exposing the Candidate Output through an unverified output path, rendering the Candidate Output sealed, capability restricted, confined to protected state, or otherwise technically Non-Releasable;after generation of the Candidate Output, verifying current execution, session, policy, revocation, provenance, association, destination, recipient, or disclosure state applicable to the Candidate Output;upon successful verification, generating and committing a Protected Output Validation Receipt; only after successful commitment of the Protected Output Validation Receipt, issuing or activating an Output Release Capability bound to the verified Candidate Output and an authorized effectuation context;at an Output Release Boundary, verifying the Output Release Capability; andonly after successful verification at the Output Release Boundary, making the verified Candidate Output externally usable or externally effective.Dependent Method Claims27. The method of claim 26, wherein separating the enterprise record includes replacing a direct persistent association between an identity component and a content component with an opaque reference resolved only by a relationship-mapping protection domain.
28. The method of claim 26, wherein verifying the current execution state includes obtaining a challenge-response attestation generated after Candidate Output formation.
29. The method of claim 26, wherein a prior attestation is used only within a Bounded Freshness Window and only upon verification of Protected Continuity Proof that no relevant execution, policy, revocation, session, destination, or infrastructure state has changed.
30. The method of claim 26, wherein a Candidate Output determined to exceed the permitted field set or permitted association scope is redacted, generalized, aggregated, or otherwise transformed inside a protected verification domain and re-verified before receipt commitment.
31. The method of claim 26, wherein failure to generate or commit the Protected Output Validation Receipt causes the Candidate Output to remain sealed or otherwise Non-Releasable.
32. The method of claim 26, wherein the Candidate Output comprises a tool invocation, database operation, persistent-memory write, communication, payment instruction, downstream model prompt, or cyber-physical control instruction.Independent Claim 3333. A computer-implemented system for governing an agentic artificial-intelligence tool invocation, the system comprising:an Agentic Intent Monitor configured to receive or intercept a Candidate Act generated by an artificial-intelligence workload, the Candidate Act comprising a proposed tool invocation identifying at least an operation, one or more operands, and a target resource, destination, or effectuation interface; a Protected Policy-Evaluation Function configured to:retrieve or derive current Protected Authorization State applicable to the artificial-intelligence workload and the proposed tool invocation;establish correspondence between the proposed tool invocation and an authorized processing purpose; andevaluate a plurality of protected authorization predicates comprising at least:
1. a cumulative-impact condition determined from one or more prior Candidate Acts or effectuated operations associated with a protected session;2. a temporal- velocity condition limiting a frequency, rate, sequence, or concentration of related operations;3. a semantic-purpose condition indicating whether the proposed tool invocation corresponds to the authorized processing purpose; and4. a current target-context condition indicating an attested, authenticated, protected, or otherwise verified state of the target resource, destination, or effectuation interface;a Protected Transformation Function configured, where the proposed tool invocation does not satisfy an originally requested scope but can be converted into a policy-compliant operation, to generate a transformed Candidate Act having a reduced operand scope, reduced data scope, reduced privilege, restricted destination, restricted function set, or other technically constrained effect relative to the proposed tool invocation;a Protected Finality Controller configured to:maintain the proposed tool invocation or the transformed Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State;377generate and commit a Protected Validation at least:
1. the Candidate Act or a digest thereof;2. the applicable Protected Authorization State;3. a protected session identifier;4. the evaluated authorization predicates; and5. the target resource, destination, or effectuation interface;generate or activate, only after successful commitment of the Protected Validation Receipt, an act-specific Release Capability bound to the verified Candidate Act and the target resource, destination, or effectuation interface; andprovide the verified Candidate Act and the act-specific Release Capability to a protected Tool-Invocation Boundary;wherein the protected Tool-Invocation Boundary is configured to verify correspondence among the verified Candidate Act, the committed Protected Validation Receipt, the act- specific Release Capability, the protected session, and the target resource, destination, or effectuation interface before invoking the tool;wherein the artificial-intelligence workload lacks an independently exercisable path sufficient to invoke the tool, access the target resource, or otherwise effectuate the Candidate Act outside the protected Tool-Invocation Boundary; andwherein completion or generation of the proposed tool invocation by the artificial-intelligence workload is insufficient to make the proposed tool invocation externally effective without successful protected policy evaluation, Protected Validation Receipt commitment, act-specific Release Capability generation or activation, and verification at the protected Tool-Invocation Boundary.Independent Claim 34 — Continuous Runtime Behavioral Attestation34. A computer-implemented system for continuous runtime integrity verification of an artificial-intelligence workload, the system comprising:a Runtime Integrity Monitor configured to obtain, during execution of a processing request, a sequence of protected runtime observations associated with an artificial-intelligence workload; wherein the protected runtime observations comprise one or more of:
1. a model, agent, runtime, tool, retrieval, memory, or policy measurement;2. an operative control-flow indicator;3. a tool-selection event;4. a retrieval event;5. an intermediate structured action representation;6. an output-fragment characteristic;7. a protected behavioral descriptor;8. a resource-access pattern;9. a branch, threshold, state-transition, or decision-predicate indicator; or10. another observable execution characteristic generated without requiring disclosure of a private natural-language reasoning chain;a Protected Behavioral Reference Function configured to maintain or derive an authorized behavioral envelope associated with at least an authorized processing purpose, an Artificial-Intelligence Workload, a protected session, and applicable Protected Authorization State;a Runtime Correspondence Analyzer configured to compare the sequence of protected runtime observations with the authorized behavioral envelope and determine whether the current execution remains within one or more permitted behavioral conditions;a Protected Violation Controller configured, upon detecting a deviation satisfying a protected violation condition, to perform one or more of:
1. suspend or terminate the Artificial-Intelligence Workload;2. disable one or more tools, retrieval sources, memory interfaces, network paths, or downstream services;3. advance a Session Epoch or revocation state;4. invalidate protected authorization derivatives;5. quarantine a Candidate Act, Candidate Output, or protected intermediate state;6. require fresh attestation;7. reduce an authorized scope;8. redirect execution to a protected review domain; or9. maintain the Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State;a Runtime Integrity Evidence Generator configured to generate protected runtime-integrity evidence binding at least:
1. a digest or protected identifier of the sequence of protected runtime observations;2. the authorized behavioral envelope or an identifier thereof;3. the protected session;4. the Artificial-Intelligence Workload or execution context;5. a runtime-correspondence result; and6. applicable epoch or revocation state;an Output Verification Stage configured to verify the runtime-integrity evidence before creation of Release Authority for a Candidate Output or other Candidate Act; andan Output Release Boundary configured to deny effectuation where:
1. required runtime-integrity evidence is absent;2. the evidence fails authentication or correspondence verification;3. the evidence indicates a protected violation;4. the evidence is stale, incomplete, inconsistent, revoked, or associated with another workload, session, output, or execution context; or5. continuity of the monitored execution cannot be affirmatively established;wherein successful authorization at initiation of the processing request is insufficient, by itself, to authorize external effectuation of the Candidate Output, and wherein current runtime correspondence must remain established through at least a protected portion of execution preceding Release Authority formation.Dependent Claims for Claim 3434A. The system of claim 34, wherein the protected runtime observations comprise a Runtime Behavioral Descriptor identifying one or more operative branches, tool selections, retrieval sources, decision predicates, threshold states, memory accesses, or action- selection events.34B. The system of claim 34, wherein the authorized behavioral envelope is bound to a Reconstruction Authorization Object, authorized purpose, permitted tool set, Permitted Association Scope, destination class, and output type.37934C. The system of claim 34, wherein the Runtime Correspondence Analyzer performs incremental evaluation during generation of a plurality of Candidate Output segments.34D. The system of claim 34, wherein a deviation is determined from a protected combination of several runtime observations rather than from one observation considered in isolation.34E. The system of claim 34, wherein the protected violation condition comprises one or more of unauthorized tool substitution, retrieval- source substitution, policy change, memory-state change, model substitution, agent-code change, destination redirection, abnormal operation velocity, or divergence from a permitted action sequence.34F. The system of claim 34, wherein the Runtime Integrity Evidence Generator commits the runtimeintegrity evidence to a Protected Receipt Store before issuance or activation of an output- specific Output Release Capability.34G. The system of claim 34, wherein the Runtime Integrity Monitor verifies continuity through protected heartbeats, monotonic counters, event-chain commitments, challenge-response state, attested telemetry, or a Protected Continuity Proof.34H. The system of claim 34, wherein failure of runtime monitoring does not cause permissive release and instead causes fresh attestation, reduced-scope execution, quarantine, or denial.Independent Claim 35 — Cross-Domain Provenance and Lifecycle Governance35. A computer-implemented system for protected provenance and lifecycle governance of artificial-intelligence processing, the system comprising:a Protected Source-Correspondence Store configured to maintain protected provenance state associating a plurality of enterprise-data components with one or more of:
1. a source Storage Vault or source protection domain;2. a source component or source-record identifier;3. a source field or data class;4. an applicable Reconstruction Authorization Object or Protected Authorization State;5. a permitted purpose;6. a sensitivity classification;7. a jurisdiction condition;8. a retention condition;9. a consent or policy condition; or10. another protected use restriction;a Protected Lineage-Propagation Function configured to maintain protected correspondence, during an artificial-intelligence processing session, among:
1. one or more source components;2. one or more reconstructed fields or associations;3. one or more intermediate values, embeddings, features, summaries, classifications, transformations, or protected derivatives; and4. one or more Candidate Output segments or other Candidate Acts;wherein the protected correspondence is maintained using one or more of:
1. protected labels;2. taint state;3. information-flow state;4. component identifiers;5. graph-edge identifiers;6. cryptographic commitments;7. structured references;8. protected transformation receipts;9. a parallel protected control plane; or10. another technically protected provenance representation;a Lifecycle Restriction Function configured to associate one or more downstream-use conditions with the protected provenance state, the downstream-use conditions comprising one or more of:
1. destination restriction;2. recipient restriction;3. jurisdiction restriction;4. retention restriction;5. permitted output type;6. permitted processing purpose;7. disclosure limitation;8. prohibition on model training or fine-tuning;9. prohibition on persistent memory storage;10. prohibition on downstream-model propagation; or11. another protected lifecycle condition;a Provenance Verification Stage configured, before a Candidate Output segment or other Candidate Act becomes externally usable or externally effective, to:
1. resolve protected provenance corresponding to the Candidate Output segment or Candidate Act;2. verify continuity between contributing protected components and the Candidate Output segment or Candidate Act;3. determine whether the proposed destination, recipient, jurisdiction, purpose, retention state, output type, or downstream use is consistent with the associated lifecycle restrictions; and 4. deny, transform, redact, aggregate, quarantine, or otherwise maintain the Candidate Output segment or Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State where required provenance is absent, ambiguous, inconsistent, stale, unauthorized, or unverifiable;a Protected Provenance Receipt Generator configured to generate a Protected Receipt binding at least:
1. the Candidate Output segment or Candidate Act;2. a protected provenance digest or protected source-correspondence identifier;3. the applicable Protected Authorization State;4. a verification result;5. the proposed destination or recipient; and6. one or more applicable lifecycle restrictions;and an Output Release Boundary configured to permit external effectuation only upon verification of protected correspondence between:
1. the Candidate Output segment or Candidate Act;2. the protected provenance receipt;3. the applicable Protected Authorization State; and4. the current destination, recipient, jurisdiction, purpose, or downstream-use condition;wherein an artificial-intelligence transformation does not remove or enlarge the protected restrictions associated with contributing source components merely because the transformed representation differs syntactically, semantically, mathematically, or structurally from the contributing source components.Dependent Claims for Claim 3535A. The system of claim 35, wherein the Protected Lineage-Propagation Function maintains provenance for one or more of an embedding, vector representation, summary, classification, recommendation, model prompt, tool argument, database operation, memory write, or generated report.35B. The system of claim 35, wherein provenance is maintained in a protected control plane separate from content exposed to the Artificial- Intelligence Workload.35C. The system of claim 35, wherein a Candidate Output segment contains a protected reference to corresponding provenance state without containing complete source-identifying metadata.35D. The system of claim 35, wherein the Provenance Verification Stage evaluates aggregated provenance from a plurality of source jurisdictions and denies release where the combination creates an unauthorized cross-jurisdictional transfer.35E. The system of claim 35, wherein a transformation applied to a protected source component produces a Protected Derivative inheriting at least the most restrictive applicable destination, jurisdiction, retention, or downstream-use condition of the contributing source components.35F. The system of claim 35, wherein conflicting lifecycle restrictions are resolved according to a protected precedence rule, quorum decision, policy intersection, or most-restrictive-condition rule.35G. The system of claim 35, wherein missing or uncertain source attribution prevents Release Authority rather than causing attribution to be omitted.35H. The system of claim 35, wherein the Protected Provenance Receipt is committed before issuance or activation of an Output Release Capability.
351. The system of claim 35, wherein the protected provenance state enables an authorized auditor to verify contributing source classes, authorization conditions, transformations, and release conditions without exposing complete source records.35 J. The system of claim 35, wherein the provenance mechanism preserves correspondence through a plurality of cooperating models, agents, retrieval services, tools, memory systems, or downstream processing domains.Independent Claim 36 — Protected Input Mediation and Intent Normalization 36. A computer-implemented system for protected mediation of an input supplied to an artificial-intelligence workload, the system comprising:an Input Integrity Gateway configured to receive or intercept an input directed to an artificialintelligence workload before the input is admitted into a protected processing session, the input comprising one or more of:
1. a user prompt;2. a system instruction;3. retrieved content;4. a document;5. an image, audio, video, or multimodal input;6. a tool response;7. a plugin response;8. an external-model response;9. a memory value;10. a structured data-processing request; or11. another instruction-bearing or data-bearing input;a Protected Input-Decomposition Function configured to derive from the input a plurality of protected representations comprising one or more of:
1. a semantic-purpose representation;2. an instruction- source representation;3. a structural representation;4. a control-directive representation;5. a data-content representation;6. a tool- or destination-selection representation;7. a provenance representation;8. a requested-privilege representation; or9. another security-relevant input characteristic;a Protected Input-Policy Evaluation Function configured to:
1. establish correspondence between the protected representations and Protected Authorization State applicable to the artificial-intelligence workload;2. identify one or more instruction sources within the input;3. determine whether an instruction source is authorized to modify a system instruction, processing purpose, tool authority, destination condition, permitted field set, Permitted Association Scope, or other protected control state;4. evaluate one or more input portions against a protected policy identifying prohibited, unauthorized, conflicting, untrusted, or unresolved control directives; and5. determine whether the input, an input portion, or a derived instruction attempts to enlarge authority beyond the applicable Protected Authorization State;a Protected Intent-Normalization Function configured, where an authorized processing objective can be distinguished from an unauthorized or untrusted control directive, to generate a normalized input representation that:
1. preserves at least a permitted data-processing objective;2. removes, disables, segregates, quotes, labels, or otherwise prevents operative treatment of the unauthorized or untrusted control directive;3. reduces a requested privilege, tool set, field set, association scope, destination, or output scope where required by protected policy; and4. binds the normalized input representation to a protected input-validation state;a Protected Input Disposition Controller configured, where an input portion cannot be affirmatively normalized or verified, to perform one or more of:
1. exclude the input portion from the artificial-intelligence processing context;2. convert the input portion into non-operative quoted data;3. isolate the input portion within a restricted analysis context;4. request a narrower or clarified input;5. deny creation of a reconstruction session;6. deny access to one or more tools, vaults, memory systems, or destinations;7. require protected review; or8. maintain a resulting Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State;anda Restricted Input Interface configured to provide the artificial-intelligence workload with the normalized input representation, or an authorized protected derivative thereof, without providing the artificial-intelligence workload with an unmediated path by which an excluded control directive can independently modify the applicable Protected Authorization State;wherein successful admission of the normalized input representation does not itself authorize reconstruction, tool invocation, Candidate Output release, or external effectuation, and wherein such operations remain subject to the applicable protected reconstruction and output-finality conditions.36A. The system of claim 36, wherein the Input Integrity Gateway maintains an Instruction Provenance Seal identifying whether an instruction originated from a system authority, user, retrieved document, tool, plugin, model memory, external model, or another input source.36B. The system of claim 36, wherein an instruction originating from retrieved content, a document, tool response, webpage, email, image, audio input, or external model is treated as data rather than operative control unless protected authority to issue the instruction is affirmatively established.36C. The system of claim 36, wherein the Protected Input-Policy Evaluation Function detects one or more of instruction-priority manipulation, role substitution, recursive instruction, encoded instruction, delimiter manipulation, prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, tool-redirection instruction, memory-poisoning instruction, or destination-substitution instruction.36D. The system of claim 36, wherein the Protected Input-Decomposition Function recursively evaluates nested, embedded, encoded, linked, retrieved, or transformed input portions according to their respective provenance and instruction authority.36E. The system of claim 36, wherein the normalized input representation comprises a structured purpose object, constrained task representation, authorized query plan, permitted tool manifest, restricted schema, or another machine-enforceable representation.36F. The system of claim 36, wherein a portion of the original input is retained for evidentiary, review, or provenance purposes while being technically prevented from functioning as an operative instruction to the artificial-intelligence workload.36G. The system of claim 36, wherein failure, timeout, uncertainty, or unavailability of a required input- integrity determination results in denial, restriction, isolation, or protected review rather than unrestricted admission of the input.36H. The system of claim 36, wherein protected input-validation evidence is bound to a Reconstruction Authorization Object or Protected Authorization State used during a subsequent reconstruction session.
361. The system of claim 36, wherein the Input Integrity Gateway evaluates cumulative instructions received across several messages, tool responses, retrieval results, or memory entries to detect an authority-enlarging instruction formed only through their combination.36J. The system of claim 36, wherein input mediation is performed before protected component release and again after retrieval, tool use, external-model interaction, or memory access introduces additional instruction-bearing content into the protected processing session.Independent Claim 37 — Distributed Epoch-Bound Enforcement Across Heterogeneous Infrastructure37. A computer-implemented system for distributed enforcement of artificial-intelligence processing constraints across a plurality of infrastructure domains, the system comprising:one or more Protected Policy Authorities configured to generate, approve, sign, commit, or otherwise protect policy state governing artificial-intelligence processing, reconstruction, Candidate Act formation, or external effectuation;a plurality of Distributed Enforcement Nodes, respectively associated with different infrastructure domains, tenants, cloud environments, geographic regions, storage domains, artificial-intelligence workloads, or effectuation interfaces, each Distributed Enforcement Node configured to:
1. obtain protected policy state or a technically constrained derivative thereof;2. verify authenticity, scope, applicability, epoch, freshness, and revocation state of the protected policy state;3. mediate one or more protected reconstruction, tool-invocation, Candidate Output, or Candidate Act operations within its associated infrastructure domain; and4. prevent the mediated operation from becoming externally effective where required protected policy correspondence cannot be established;a Protected Policy Distribution and Synchronization Function configured to distribute policy state, policy derivatives, revocation state, epoch state, or protected policy commitments among the Distributed Enforcement Nodes;an Epoch-Based Policy-State Controller configured to:
1. associate a Policy Epoch or monotonic policy- state value with a policy deployment; 2. identify a current, superseded, revoked, or otherwise invalid policy state;3. prevent a Distributed Enforcement Node from relying on a policy artifact whose required epoch, scope, authenticity, or freshness cannot be affirmatively verified; and4. cause an affected operation to remain denied, restricted, queued in a Non-Effective State, or subjected to a more restrictive protected policy where current policy correspondence is unavailable;a Distributed Event- Correspondence Function configured to maintain protected correspondence for one or more policy-relevant events occurring at the plurality of Distributed Enforcement Nodes, the events comprising one or more of:
1. authorization issuance;2. protected component release;3. policy denial;4. Candidate Act formation;5. tool invocation;6. output verification;7. receipt commitment;8. session invalidation;9. revocation;10. anomaly detection; or11. external effectuation;anda Multi-Authority Finality Function configured, for an operation assigned a protected risk class requiring more than one approval authority, to prevent Release Authority or effectuation unless a required threshold, quorum, or combination of protected approval results is obtained from at least:
1. a Distributed Enforcement Node associated with the operation; and2. one or more additional protected verification, policy, receipt, key, destination, or release authorities;wherein compromise of one Distributed Enforcement Node is insufficient, without satisfaction or compromise of the additional required protected authority, to create Release Authority for the operation; andwherein a policy artifact distributed to a Distributed Enforcement Node does not independently authorize a Candidate Act unless the node verifies current correspondence among the policy artifact, the protected execution context, the applicable tenant or infrastructure domain, the Policy Epoch, and the operation to be effectuated.37A. The system of claim 37, wherein the plurality of infrastructure domains comprises two or more of an on-premises data center, public cloud, private cloud, sovereign cloud, edge environment, telecommunications network, confidential-computing environment, industrial environment, or geographically separated region.37B. The system of claim 37, wherein different Distributed Enforcement Nodes receive different technically constrained derivatives of a common protected policy state according to tenant, jurisdiction, destination, risk class, workload identity, or infrastructure function.37C. The system of claim 37, wherein a policy derivative omits policy information unnecessary for the associated Distributed Enforcement Node while cryptographically or technically linked to the common protected policy state.37D. The system of claim 37, wherein policy distribution is asynchronous and a Distributed Enforcement Node may continue operating only under a protected bounded-validity policy artifact whose epoch, validity interval, revocation state, and permitted operation class remain verifiable.37E. The system of claim 37, wherein inability to contact a remote policy authority does not cause permissive fallback and instead results in denial, use of a verified more-restrictive local policy, or confinement of a Candidate Act in a Non-Effective State.37F. The system of claim 37, wherein the Multi-Authority Finality Function requires separate approval from two or more of:
1. a local policy node;2. a destination-domain node;3. a data-sovereignty node;4. a Protected Receipt Store;5. a key authority;6. an Output Release Boundary;7. a tenant authority; or8. a jurisdiction authority.37G. The system of claim 37, wherein approval shares are bound to an exact Candidate Act digest, session identifier, Policy Epoch, destination, recipient, and effectuation boundary.37H. The system of claim 37, wherein a policy update advancing the Policy Epoch invalidates unconsumed authorization derivatives, protected precomputed artifacts, provisional capabilities, or Candidate Acts relying on a preceding policy epoch.
371. The system of claim 37, wherein the Distributed Event-Correspondence Function generates a protected aggregate, chained receipt, Merkle commitment, or quorum-confirmed state representing events from a plurality of Distributed Enforcement Nodes.37J. The system of claim 37, wherein protected event information is aggregated without requiring each Distributed Enforcement Node to disclose complete tenant data, protected content, or local policy details to a centralized telemetry system.37K. The system of claim 37, wherein a Distributed Enforcement Node operates as one or more of a sidecar, gateway, proxy, service-mesh component, database mediator, confidential-computing service, hardware-backed service, operating-system broker, network controller, storage controller, or Output Release Boundary.37L. The system of claim 37, wherein a tool invocation is treated as a Candidate Act and remains Non-Effective until the local Distributed Enforcement Node and the additional required authority verify the operation, operands, destination, protected session, and applicable Policy Epoch.37M. The system of claim 37, wherein inconsistent policy state among two Distributed Enforcement Nodes is resolved according to a protected precedence rule, policy intersection, most-restrictive-policy rule, quorum decision, or protected conflict-resolution state.37N. The system of claim 37, wherein a tenant- specific policy may further narrow but cannot enlarge a global protected policy unless the enlargement is approved by an authority expressly authorized to modify the global protected policy.