Isolated cyber security system for multilayered biometric smart cards
The Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture with Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Cards and CBAP protocol addresses vulnerabilities in manual and digital signature systems by ensuring secure, real-time, and flexible biometric authentication, creating a Single Digital Instance for tamper-proof transactions.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/IB2026/057196
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-07-12
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-12
AI Technical Summary
Existing manual and digital signature systems suffer from vulnerabilities such as multiple copy discrepancies, reliance on subjective human evaluation, lack of instantaneous authentication, biometric spoofing, and public health risks, especially in high-trust transactions like international treaties.
A Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA) with Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Cards (MBSC) and Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP) ensures real-time liveness detection and composite biometric authentication, integrating biometric scanning paths with isolated terminals to create a Single Digital Instance, secured by a global cloud root, preventing spoofing, forgery, and infection transmission.
Provides an impenetrable, legal, and sanitary environment for secure digital signing, ensuring absolute security against spoofing, forgery, and counterfeiting, with flexible verification options and real-time authentication.
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Figure IB2026057196_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] 1. Title of the Invention
[0002] Isolated Cyber Security System for Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Cards (MBSC) Supported by a Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA) Governed by Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP) for Executing Legally Binding Digital Signatures on Digital Documents Including International Treaties, Protecting Against Spoofing, Repudiation, Forgery, Counterfeiting, and Infectious Diseases.
[0003] 2. Technical Field
[0004] This invention generally relates to the field of cybersecurity, secure cyber-physical systems engineering, cryptography systems, and sovereign identity management.
[0005] More specifically, the invention is based on multi-layered biometric smart cards (MBSC), supported by a six-layer sovereign cyber architecture (SSCA), governed by an innovative communication and transport protocol: the "Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP)." This cyber architecture is designed to execute and manage formal, in-person sessions for legally binding digital signatures and digital certification on documents and international treaties via nationally and globally cloud-linked nodes through encrypted communication channels.
[0006] Furthermore, this invention falls within the joint engineering scope that relies on MultiFactor Authentication (MFA). It uses advanced techniques that integrate innovative physical and cryptographic multi-layered biometric smart cards (MBSC) containing integrated biometric scanning paths with stationary and wireless isolated terminals operating within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to ensure real-time liveness detection of an accurate fingerprint. It relies on the authentication protocol (CBAP) to bind a document hash with the composite digital identity (MBSC) by signing the hash of the same document stored in the cloud by all concerned parties. The objective is to provide an absolute cyber security system that completely prevents and thwarts spoofing, counterfeiting, forgery, repudiation operations, and infection transmission.
[0007] 3. Background of the Invention
[0008] Traditionally, the execution of contracts, major commercial deals, and sensitive legal transactions conducted in person relies on manual (paper) signatures. Despite the longstanding nature of this method, it suffers from severe security and legal vulnerabilities that hinder the high-trust requirements of the modern era, the most prominent of which include:
[0009] • The Vulnerability of Multiple Paper Copies and Counterpart Discrepancy: In traditional paper-based systems for procedures and contracts, parties are oftenrequired to sign multiple physical copies so each party can retain their own copy. This physical multiplicity of the document creates a severe security flaw; one of the parties or a compromised external entity could later forge or falsify the content of one of these copies by altering numbers, erasing, or adding conditions, and presenting it to official bodies or courts to execute false procedures. Given the slowness of traditional procedures and the difficulty of recalling other copies for immediate matching, this falsified document might successfully pass undetected.
[0010] • Reliance on Subjective Human Evaluation and Signature Forgery Susceptibility:
[0011] Manual signing often requires visual matching performed by employees or witnesses who are not experts in forgery detection. This fundamental reliance on the "human factor" opens a wide avenue for error, collusion, or the passing of sophisticated forgeries that can only be detected later by forensic experts — a path that is complex, slow, and costly.
[0012] • Spatial Limitation and Content Forgery Susceptibility: Traditional manual signing is confined to a specific spatial area, usually at the end of the document or bottom of the pages, leaving the document's body and clauses vulnerable to tampering, erasure, or modification without altering the physical signature itself.
[0013] • Temporal Shortcomings in Proactive Authentication: Manual signatures, and even some forms of traditional systems, suffer from a fundamental inability to provide instantaneous and definitive identity authentication "before" initiating timesensitive procedures, making it extremely difficult to rectify the disastrous consequences of forgery or falsification if discovered later.
[0014] With the shift towards the modern digital era, most institutions and governments have relied on Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) systems via consumer devices to verify identities. However, current-generation technologies still suffer from serious structural and security vulnerabilities that hinder high-trust requirements, especially when used in sensitive contracts or sovereign international treaties. These vulnerabilities include:
[0015] • First: Shortcomings and Risks of Authentication Systems via Consumer Devices: Current digital signatures often rely on physical storage devices (such as USB Tokens) or smartphone applications (Soft Tokens) that are not isolated. These systems authenticate the "token" or the "device," not the actual "person." Furthermore, mobile phones connect to open networks, making them vulnerable to malware, which widely opens the door to device theft and password sharing. These vulnerabilities facilitate repudiation operations, where the signatory can later claim their device was hacked ortheir identity was impersonated.• Second: The Weakness of Biometric Systems Against Spoofing & Deepfakes: With the advancement of Al and deepfake technologies, traditional and commercial fingerprint and facial sensors embedded in consumer devices are prone to spoofing using fake silicone fingerprints or high-resolution images due to their lack of accurate liveness detection algorithms. Moreover, in traditional systems, biometric templates are stored and transmitted separately from the signed document, allowing hackers to intercept biometric data (Man-in-the-Middle) or inject fake templates.
[0016] • Third: The Dilemma of Counterpart Discrepancy and the Absence of a Trusted Root: Even with the use of consumer devices and current digital platforms, transactions still suffer from the circulation of "multiple and independent digital copies" (such as distributed PDF files among parties), which are often stored on disparate commercial servers lacking a global sovereign reference (Global Root). This digital fragmentation and the absence of a "Single Digital Instance" create a severe security flaw; one of the parties or a compromised external entity could tamper with the content of their locally saved digital copy and present it to official bodies as an approved copy. Due to the lack of real-time synchronization between these independent platforms, complex international and local legal disputes arise regarding the original and approved copy.
[0017] • Fourth: Field Challenges, Social Privacy, and Health Risks: In addition to the above, specific challenges arise in field situations requiring privacy, such as verifying the identity of women at checkpoints or concluding marriage contracts, where certain social constraints hinder direct visual facial verification, or there may be human resemblance making it difficult to distinguish between individuals visually. Furthermore, the reliance on shared public biometric sensors poses a significant public health risk regarding the transmission of infectious diseases. Finally, a user forgetting their physical ID card in the field disrupts procedures relying on current systems due to the lack of secure alternative verification options.
[0018] Technical Need and the Innovative Solution of the Invention: Based on the foregoing, there is a pressingtechnical and security need to invent an isolated and hardened cyber security architecture that eliminates all these vulnerabilities. This invention addresses these challenges fundamentally by providing the "Composite Biometric Identity Authentication System," which enforces in-person sessions and physically and cryptographically integrates the user's live composite biometric characteristics at the moment of signing using innovative Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Cards (MBSC), isolated terminals, and video cameras to record the digital signing session. All these procedures aregoverned by an innovative Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA) and supported by an innovative protocol (CBAP) to ensure real-time liveness detection (whether the card is available or not) and composite biometric identity authentication.
[0019] The invention also provides an unprecedented solution to the multi-copy dilemma by creating a "Single Digital Instance" and organically linking it to the innovative composite biometric identity of the signatories in a "live signing session" through the mechanism of Document Hash Binding. This single document is preserved in a unified national or global cloud (Single Source of Truth). This architecture ensures the impossibility of "conflicting copies," as altering a single bit in the signed document will instantly invalidate the signatures of all parties, thus providing a definitive instant legal reference and authority in office, field, sovereign, global, and public health-conscious environments alike.
[0020] 4. Summary of the Invention
[0021] This invention overcomes the severe shortcomings in manual signing, digital signature systems, and current commercial biometric authentication by inventing a "Composite Biometric Identity Authentication System"; a fully isolated cyber-physical architecture operating within a Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA). The invention aims to provide an impenetrable technical, legal, and sanitary environment for concluding contracts and signing international treaties, based on the following innovative pillars:
[0022] • Composite Biometric Identity via Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Cards (MBSC):
[0023] The invention provides an innovative smart card (MBSC) carried by the user (MFA). The card features a technical-security engineering innovation represented by a "Transparent FPS Window" that is composite and integrated into the card's body. During the scanning process, the fingerprint reading path is formed of three layers:
[0024] o First Layer (Sanitary Insulating Layer): Integrated into the MBSC, it prevents leaving replicable biological traces and separates direct contact with public reading surfaces to prevent infection transmission.
[0025] o Second Layer (Physical Cryptographic Micro-Pattern Layer): An i n novative layer embedded in the MBSC, containing semi-transparent cryptographic symbols designed securely to highlight the biometric determinants of the fingerprint itself. These cryptographic symbols are digitally combined with the read fingerprint to generate a "Hybrid Biometric Template," preventing circumvention via substitution or removal, and adding high strength to the biometric authentication accuracy.
[0026] o Third Layer (Sensing and Liveness Layer): This is the surface of the transparent biometric sensor embedded in the isolated verification device,which adheres to the card's transparency to detect blood flow and ensure the human tissue is live (Liveness Detection), thereby closing the security loop of the biometric authentication.
[0027] • Isolated and Hardened Terminals (Stationary and Portable): The invention eliminates reliance on compromised consumer devices (like smartphones to obtain signatures) and replaces them with custom-designed hardware devices independent of open commercial operating systems, equipped with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). These devices capture the composite biometric characteristics and verify fingerprint liveness (for a living person), documenting the session via integrated security cameras to ensure actual Physical Presence and thwart repudiation attempts. The terminals are divided into:
[0028] o Institutional Terminals: Designated for contract signing halls, they secure in-person signing sessions by documenting them with visual transmission (camera).
[0029] o Portable Terminals: Designated for field identity verification by security personnel. These devices include a system for identity verification via fingerprinting on the FPS (104) screen in the MBSC (100). The portable device provides flexible verification options including a Card-based path, and an alternative Cardless direct fingerprinting path to retrieve user data in case they are not carrying the card.
[0030] • Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA): A comprehensive framework organizing the physical and cloud entities into six isolated layers (L1 -L6) to govern data flow, secure physical presence, and enforce absolute sovereign security protocols across all institutional and cross-border transactions.
[0031] • Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP): The system invents a customized communication and transport protocolthat acts as an isolated and encrypted layer (L3) connecting the terminals to the cloud. The protocol verifies each signatory's fingerprint via national government entities, then encrypts the signatory's hybrid biometric template alongwith the document's cryptographic hash into a single data packet encrypted with the signatory's private key before transmission, thereby preventing Man-in-the-Middle data interception attacks.
[0032] • Single Source of Truth and Sovereign Root: The invention provides a radical solution to the multi-copy dilemma by hosting "only one digital instance" of the document or treaty saved in national or global cloud nodes (Global Root Cloud). The identities of all signatories are cryptographically linked to this single instance, suchthat modifying a single bit in its content causes the hash function to collapse and immediately invalidates all signatures.
[0033] • Field Flexibility, Social Privacy, and Health Safety: The system allows flexible verification options including contact-free verification (via the MBSC) or direct biometric verification (Cardless) via the secure wireless connection of field devices to the national cloud, which solves social privacy challenges (eliminatingthe need forfacial recognition) and mitigates the transmission of infectious diseases in public settings.
[0034] In summary, this invention presents a comprehensive sovereign system starting from physical hardware (the MBSC and terminals), through layered cyber-security architecture and transport protocols, up to national and international governance and secure cloud storage, to generate verified digital signatures with absolute legal authority that are entirely immune against spoofing, repudiation, forgery, counterfeiting, and public health risks.
[0035] 5. Brief Description of the Drawings
[0036] To further clarify the features and advantages of the present invention, a more specific description of the invention will be provided by reference to the embodiments illustrated in the accompanying illustrative drawings, which are considered an integral part of these specifications, namely:
[0037] • Figure (1): Illustrates the physical architecture of the Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Card (MBSC) (100) in its various views, highlighting the front view (1 A View), the rear view (1 B View), and the magnified cross-section (1 C View) showing the contiguous physical layers of the transparent fingerprinting window (FPS) (104) and the integrated scanning path.
[0038] • Figure (2): Illustrates the engineering design and the physical hardware portion of the isolated and hardened biometric verification device (200) for stationary office and institutional environments, showingthe interaction mechanism and physical in- person alignment with the MBSC (100).
[0039] • Figure (3): Illustrates the block diagram and external design of the portable biometric verification device (300) intended for field use and auditing by security personnel.
[0040] • Figure (4): Illustrates the Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA) for the overall system, showing the network interconnection and the data packet flow paths of the Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP) between the terminals and the national and global clouds.• Figure (5): Represents a workflow diagram for the first path (Phase 1) concerning the initialization of the document digital signing session and the initial “Mutual Authentication” between the institutional entity and the national cloud.
[0041] • Figure (6): Represents a workflow diagram for the second path (Phase 2) concerning the execution of the in-person digital signature of the signatory, and the path for capturing the evaluated fingerprint via the multi-layered integrated scan and encrypting the document hash with the signatory's private key and generating the final signed document.
[0042] • Figure (7): Illustrates a workflow diagram for the dual encrypted field verification mechanism in two paths; a Card-based matching path usingthe MBSC (100), and a direct Cardless verification path using the portable verification device in mobile situations.
[0043] • Figure (8): Illustrates the Cross-Border Sovereign Architecture designated for connecting independent national cloud nodes to a global authentication cloud and root for signing international treaties and agreements in person between multiple countries.
[0044] • Figure (9): Represents a comprehensive and protocol workflow diagram for managing multi-party international signing sessions on sovereign treaties, culminating in the creation, signing, and distribution of the Single Source of Truth digital copy and its storage in impenetrable repositories.
[0045] 6. Detailed Description of the Invention
[0046] The features and advantages of the present invention will be understood more clearly through the following detailed description, referring to the accompanying illustrative drawings from Figure (1 ) to Figure (9), where similar reference numerals indicate identical elements in all drawings:
[0047] • Figure (1): Illustrates the physical architecture of the Multi-Layered Biometric Smart Card (MBSC) (100) in its various views.
[0048] o The front view (1 A View) shows the MBSC body (100) including the issuing entity data (101 ), the user's official personal photo (102), the barcode or serial number (103), and the transparent fingerprinting window (FPS) for reading the composite fingerprint (104).
[0049] o The rearview (1 B View) shows the back of the MBSC (110) which contains the traditional magnetic stripe (111), the citizen's textual data area (112), the hardened smart chip with the cryptographic coprocessor (113) that handlessecure storage and prevents the extraction of private encryption keys, and the rear side of the transparent window (115).
[0050] o The magnified cross-section (1 C View) highlights the innovative integrated biometric scanning path (123), which illustrates the contiguous physical layers of the window, namely: the transparent sanitary insulating layer (120) that prevents leaving biological traces and protects against infection transmission, and the physical semi-transparent cryptographic micropattern layer (121 ) containing the unique cryptographic determinants of the card; both of which connect together to the transparent biometric sensor surface (122) present in stationary and mobile authentication devices to create a unified reading path.
[0051] • Figure (2): Illustrates the engineering design of the isolated biometric verification device (200) for stationary office and institutional environments.
[0052] o The hardened device casing (200) includes an integrated security camera (201 ) to visually document signing sessions and prevent spoofing, and a digital touch display screen (202) for displaying signing documents and controlling session data and procedures.
[0053] o The figure highlights the in-person hardware interaction mechanism; where the MBSC (100) is inserted into the designated slot (206), so that the transparent card window (104) perfectly aligns over the slot designated for the user's finger placement (203) attached to the liveness sensor. The device contains independent LED light indicators to showthe success (204) or failure (205) of the biometric identity matching.
[0054] • Figure (3): Illustrates the block diagram of the portable biometric verification device (300) intended for field identity verification.
[0055] o The body of the portable device (300), engineered for security personnel for field verification, contains a dedicated touch screen (301 ) allowing the selection of field verification modes (with or without the card), a dedicated slot for card insertion (306), and a fingerprint reading slot (203) corresponding to the transparent card window (104).
[0056] o The user is guided in the field for the card insertion process via physical guiding arrows (302), and the final matching result is displayed via the integrated light indicators for success and failure (204 and 205), in addition to displaying the full identity data with the photo.• Figure (4): Illustrates the Six-Layer Sovereign Cyber Architecture (SSCA) that connects all components of the invention and its data flows via the innovative CBAP protocol.
[0057] o The architecture is distributed across six structurally isolated software and hardware layers, namely: the Global Cloud Core Layer (L1 ), the National Cloud Layer (L2), the insulating CBAP Protocol Layer (L3), the Institutional Entities Layer (L4), the Stationary Terminal Execution Layer (L5), and the Wireless Terminal Execution Layer (L6).
[0058] o The architecture centers around the national security authentication cloud (400) which includes the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and authentication servers (401), and an isolated encrypted repositoryfor digitally signed documents (402). The national cloud (400) connects to the upper global layer (L1 ) comprising the global sovereign authentication cloud (440) and the international governance entity (450). The national cloud connects to the terminal layers of the requesting institutions (404) and stationary isolated verification devices (405) via encrypted wired communication networks (403), while connecting via an encrypted wireless network (407) to portable verification devices (408).
[0059] o The figure illustrates the flow of the encrypted data packet of the innovative CBAP protocol (409) carrying the encrypted hybrid templates passing through the protocol layer (L3) to authenticate the identity using the composite biometric card (406).
[0060] • Figure (5): Illustrates a workflow diagram for the first path (Phase 1 ) concerning the initialization of the document digital signing session and the initial Mutual Authentication.
[0061] o The sequential steps start from (S1) to (S8): where the terminal of the requesting institution (404) sends a signing session request encrypted with its private key to the national cloud (400) via the secure channel (403), including the original document to be signed (500).
[0062] o The cloud (400) verifies the institution's identity and generates a unique bitlevel cryptographic hash representing the document's footprint (501) and retrieves the credentials and identities of the signatories (502) from secure government databases (503).
[0063] o The national cloud (400) generates an encrypted and time-stamped "Signed Token" containing the session ID and document hash, digitally signed withthe national cloud's private key (504) which is sent to the institution (404), simultaneously with the initialization of the isolated verification device (405) and activation of the security recording camera (505) to video the signing parties in person.
[0064] • Figure (6): Illustrates a workflow diagram for the second path (Phase 2) (after inviting all the signers) concerning the execution of the in-person digital signature of the signatory and the hybrid fingerprinting CBAP by cryptographically linking the signatory's private key to the document hash.
[0065] o The in-person session begins with the initialization of the isolated device (405) and activation of the visual recording camera (505) to document actual physical presence. The signatory presents their digital identity by inserting their composite smart card MBSC (406) into the device, with the signatory placingtheirfinger on the fingerprint slot.
[0066] o Block (S4) highlights the liveness detection and evaluated fingerprint capture mechanism (123) (CBAP); where the fingerprint characteristics are combined with the cryptographic pattern of the card through the fusion of the sanitary layer (120), the physical cryptographic layer (121), and the liveness sensor surface (122) to generate the hybrid biometric template.
[0067] o The hybrid biometric template is combined with the document Hash and the session token and the signatory's private key registered in the card's chip is invoked to encrypt the document's Hash in the payload (604), resulting in a unique, non-repudiable digital signature for each individual signatory, passing via the CBAP protocol to the national cloud (400). Once the cloud successfully matches the identity of the signer by decrypting the payload with the public key from the signatory's public key certificate and verifies the document hash match, if matched then the cloud (400) approves the document. The diagram concludes with generating the approved and finalized sovereign digital copy of the document (605) and distributing it to all concerned parties as a unified digital reference.
[0068] • Figure (7): Illustrates a workflow diagram for the dual encrypted field verification mechanism (in two paths) using the portable verification device (408) in mobile situations.
[0069] o At step (S2), the diagram highlights the security officer (700) activating the verification request via the screen of the portable device (408), whichbranches the system programmatically into two security paths to solve issues of forgotten cards or social constraints:
[0070] ■ Path (A) (S3(A), S4(A)) Card-based Verification: The user inserts their composite biometric card (406), initiatingthe joint scanning and liveness verification path (123) through the three layers (120, 121, 122) (CBAP) to generate the encrypted packet and send it via a secure wireless channel (702).
[0071] ■ Path (B) (S3(B), S4(B)) Direct Cardless Verification: In case of not possessingthe card orthe inability to perform visual facial verification for social reasons, the user places their finger directly (701 ) as a bare biometric input and a direct scan (703) is transmitted encrypted to the national cloud (400).
[0072] o The two paths converge at step (S5(A,B)) for cloud processing and cryptographic matching with central databases to proactively verify identity and liveness. The process concludes by sending the cryptographic result and displaying the official personal photo and documented data of the user on the screen of the portable device (408), enabling the security officer (700) to perform final visual matching and issue an allow or deny order.
[0073] • Figure (8): Illustrates the Cross-Border Sovereign Architecture designated for signing international sovereign treaties and agreements in person between multiple countries.
[0074] o The block diagram highlights the symmetry and interconnection of several independent and hardened national cloud nodes (400) representing the state parties to the treaty, where each national cloud (400) is connected to its institutional terminals (404), isolated devices (405), and the MBSC of its diplomats (406).
[0075] o The national clouds (400) connect with each other in absolute security symmetry via an "encrypted and hardened cross-border communication channel" (803) pouring into the global sovereign authentication cloud node (440) subject to the legislation and provisions of the international governance entity (450).
[0076] o The diagram illustrates the internal components of the upper global core represented by the Global Root Authentication and Verification Servers (802) and the secure global cloud repository for digitally signed documents andtreaties (801 ), acting as the unified digital reference and the Global Root of Trust for all state parties.
[0077] • Figure (9): Represents a comprehensive and protocol workflow diagram for managing multi-party international signing sessions on sovereign treaties to create and secure the Single Source of Truth.
[0078] o The flowchart illustrates the executive and programmatic steps from (S1 ) to (S8) to finalize the treaty internationally: The process begins with the global cloud (440) initializingthe international session, calculating the cryptographic Hash (Treaty Hash) for the original treaty, and creating the Signed Global Token signed with the private root key of the global layer. o This global token is passed in parallel to all national clouds (400) participating in the agreement, which in turn initialize theirterminals and isolated devices (405) and activate recording cameras (505) to receive the diplomats concerned with signing.
[0079] o The capture of the composite fingerprint and liveness verification are executed via the multi-layer scanning paths of the cards (120, 121 , 122, 123) (CBAP) at the national level, and then each diplomat performs the digital signing usingthe private keyto encrypt the globaltreaty hash as an irreversible sovereign digital signature step.
[0080] o The encrypted signatures, along with the treaty hash and hybrid templates (604), transmit across cross-border communication channels to the global cloud (440), the global cloud verifies the signers by decrypting each signature with its public key (from its certificate) to match the treaty hash, if matched, the matching engine merges and binds all signatures with the treaty hash by encrypting them with the global cloud's private key, generating the unified and finalized sovereign digital copy document of the treaty (900) definitively sealed with the Global Root Private Key, to be stored in the global document repository (801) and distribute identical, tamper-protected copies to the national clouds of the state parties (400) for storage in their impenetrable repositories (402) and handing them over to the concerned sovereign institutional entities (404) to preserve as an international treaty.
Claims
7. Claims1. An isolated cyber system for multi-layered biometric smart card (MBSC) identity authentication and the issuance of legally binding digital signatures and the protection of documents and international treaties from spoofing, repudiation, forgery, counterfeiting, and infectious diseases, operating within a six-layer sovereign cyber architecture (SSCA) governed by a Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP), the system comprising:• (a) a multi-layered biometric smart card (MBSC) (100): possessed by a signatory and issued by a national identity management authority, the MBSC (100) containing a transparent fingerprinting window (104) comprising a sanitary insulating layer (120) and a physical cryptographic micro-pattern layer (121), and further containing a secure cryptographic chip (113) configured to securely store a private key of the signatory such that the private key never leaves the secure cryptographic chip (113), wherein a reference composite fingerprint template is securely stored within the secure cryptographic chip (113) for local matching;• (b) stationary isolated and hardened terminals (200): operating as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to capture a fingerprint via the MBSC (100) and locally verify it against the reference composite fingerprint template stored in the secure cryptographic chip (113), to digitally sign a document and document session events using the private key stored in the secure cryptographic chip (113), the stationary isolated and hardened terminals (200) including security cameras (201) for visual documentation of attendance, and an insertion slot (206) associated with a transparent biometric sensor surface (122) configured to physically integrate with the transparent fingerprinting window (104) of the MBSC (100) to create an integrated three-layer biometric scanning path (123) ensuring instantaneous liveness detection and generating a hybrid biometric template;• (c) portable isolated and hardened terminals (300): designated for dual field identity verification, equipped with a touch screen (301) and a reading slot (203), the portable isolated and hardened terminals (300) supporting a card-based path relying on insertion of the MBSC (100) to capture the hybrid biometric template, and a cardless path relying on a bare fingerprint for wireless field verification of a user identity who does not possess their smart card;• (d) a Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP): operating as a transport and encryption mechanism connectingthe terminals to a cloud infrastructure, the CBAP configured to envelop the biometric template along with asession token and document hash into a single encrypted data packet (409) to prevent Man-in-the-Middle data interception attacks during transmission for verification to the cloud; and• (e) a six-layer sovereign cyber architecture (SSCA): configured to organize and manage components (L1) through (L6), the architecture comprising:o (e.1 ) a global cloud root layer (L1): comprising a global sovereign authentication cloud (440) symmetrically linked to national clouds (400) to create and preserve a Single Source of Truth digital copy for official contracts and documents (605) including international treaties (900), wherein signatures of all parties are exclusively linked to a central document hash such that altering a single bit in the document content invalidates signatures of all parties automatically;o (e.2) a national cloud layer (L2): comprising a national security authentication cloud (400) and a document repository (402) encrypted with a private key of the national security authentication cloud (400), the national cloud layer (L2) configured to receive the encrypted data packet from the terminals containing a digital signature executed locally within the terminals, match encrypted packets to verify identity and liveness of the signatory using a public key retrieved from a public key certificate of each signatory, and upon successful matching and verification of a decrypted hash against a hash previously registered in a session packet record, merge received digital signatures from all signatories with the document hash to encrypt the merged signatures and hash with the private key of the national security authentication cloud (400) to generate a composite digital signature tightly bindingthe original document hash to the signatures of all parties (605); o (e.3) an insulating transport protocol layer (L3): representing an insulating network domain through which the CBAP protocol operates to ensure encrypted data transport between terminal layers and the national cloud layer (L2), as in element (d);o (e.4) an institutional entities layer (L4): comprising institutional terminals (404) configured to request initialization of in-person signing sessions and upload original documents to be signed to create a unique cryptographic hash forthe document and document the session with an encrypted session token;o (e.5) a stationary terminal execution layer (L5): representing an operational domain encompassin the stationary isolated and hardened terminals (200) distributed within institutional environments to complete in-person signing operations; ando (e.6) a wireless terminal execution layer (L6): representing an operational and field domain encompassingthe portable isolated and hardened terminals (300) to complete identity verification operations supported by an encrypted wireless communication network (407).
2. The system according to claim 1, wherein the transparent fingerprinting window (104) of the MBSC (100) physically integrates with the transparent biometric sensor surface (122) of the stationary isolated and hardened terminals (200) upon insertion of the MBSC (100) into the reading slot (206) to form a triple scanning path (123) capturing vital fingerprint characteristics via the sanitary insulating layer (120), a cryptographic pattern via the physical cryptographic micro-pattern layer (121 ), and sensor data via the transparent biometric sensor surface (122) simultaneously in a single continuous scan to generate the hybrid biometric template, thereby preventing circumvention via fingerprint substitution or layer removal, wherein the hybrid biometric template is locally verified against the reference composite fingerprint template stored in the secure cryptographic chip (113), such that a successful match activates a first success indicator (204) and a failed match activates a second failure indicator (205).
3. The system accordin to claim 1, wherein the institutional entities layer (L4) requests session initialization by transmitting a request encrypted with a private key of the institutional terminal (404), and the national cloud layer (L2) verifies the request with a public key of the institutional terminal (404), then responds by issuing a time-stamped signed token carrying the document hash and encrypted with the private key of the national security authentication cloud (400), ensuring mutual authentication priorto initiating an in-person digital signing process.
4. The system accordingto claim 1, wherein the final digital signature is executed exclusively within the stationary isolated and hardened terminals (200) using the private key of the signatory securely stored in the secure cryptographic chip (113) of the MBSC (100) to encrypt the document hash exclusively as the digital signature of the signatory specific to the document, thereby cryptographically binding a composite biometric identity of the signatory to the document hash to prevent non-repudiation or subsequent document modification, wherein digital signatures of all parties are uploaded to the national security authentication cloud (400) for processing accordingto element (e.2).
5. The system accordingto claim 1, wherein the Composite Biometric Authentication Protocol (CBAP) envelops the hybrid biometric template alongside the digital signature with the session token, and encrypts the enveloped template, signatory's digital signature, and token together using the private key of the institutional terminal (404) within the TEE of the terminals as a single data packet (409) priorto transmission to the national security authentication cloud (400), thereby thwarting Man-in-the-Middle data interception attacks.
6. The system accordingto claim 1, wherein the portable isolated and hardened terminals (300) provide a dual field verification system enabling a first path using the MBSC (100) to capture the hybrid biometric template, and a second cardless direct fingerprinting path relying on a bare fingerprint in the absence of the MBSC (100), wherein both paths connect to the national security authentication cloud (400) and an ID Government authority database (503) to retrieve and display an official personal photo and data of a user on the screen of the portable isolated and hardened terminal (300) to complete visual field matching.
7. The system accordingto claim 1, wherein the global cloud root layer (L1) manages multi-party treaty signing sessions by merging digital signatures generated according to claim 4 of all diplomats received from respective national clouds (400) with a treaty hash, generating a final sovereign document (900) sealed with a global root private key of the global sovereign authentication cloud (440), preserved in a secure global cloud repository (801) and distributed to national clouds (400) as a singular reference standard serving as a Single Source of Truth to eliminate cross-border multi-copy discrepancies.
8. The system accordingto claim 1, wherein the transparent biometric sensor surface (122) embedded in the terminals (200, 300) detects blood flow and live tissue characteristics simultaneously with capturing a composite cryptographic pattern of the MBSC (100) to ensure instantaneous detection of liveness and identity concurrently, thereby thwarting spoofing attempts using artificial or printed fingerprints.
9. The system accordingto claim 1, wherein the system is configured to authenticate a user identity exclusively via the multi-layered biometric smart card (MBSC), thereby eliminatingthe necessity for visual facial verification to overcome challenges of social restrictions and human facial similarities, while ensuring protection against spoofing, repudiation, forgery, counterfeiting, and infectious diseases.
