Comprehensive energy system distribution robust game method, system, device and medium
Through the distributed robust game method, the interactive trading model of the product and consumers is constructed in the integrated energy system, and combined with Stackelberg-Nash and Nash negotiation theory, the problem of difficulty in applying the traditional method is solved, and the optimal trading power between the product and consumers is achieved. The determination of electricity trading prices has improved the system's risk resistance and the consumption safety of renewable energy.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411065891.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-05
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
In an integrated energy system, the traditional Stackelberg theory is difficult to apply to interactive transactions between multiple subjects, especially when there are uncertainties, it is difficult to determine the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between manufacturers and consumers. The bar optimization method will make the optimization results too conservative and increase the difficulty of modeling and model solving.
By obtaining the structural information of the comprehensive energy system, a distributed robust game model for IES that considers the interactive transactions of manufacturers and consumers is constructed. Combined with Stackelberg-Nash game and Nash negotiation theory, it is solved based on ADMM distributed algorithm to obtain production Optimal trading power and electricity trading price between consumers.
Effectively manage interactive transactions of manufacturers and consumers in extreme scenarios, improve the system's ability to resist uncertain risks, achieve balance of interests of different entities, and promote the safe consumption of renewable energy.
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Figure CN119026737A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of optimized scheduling of integrated energy systems, and relates to a distributed robust game method, system, equipment and medium for integrated energy systems. Background Art
[0002] With the reform of the energy market and the development of the low-carbon economy, IES has gradually shown a trend of complex and diverse operating entities and an increasing proportion of renewable energy. In this context, consumers in the traditional sense of the integrated energy system have gradually transformed into prosumers with both energy production and consumption capabilities. Their independent autonomous decision-making and differences in interest demands have put forward higher requirements on the integrated energy operator's ability to optimize the allocation of energy resources. At the same time, the development of advanced communication technology has also made local energy transactions possible, enabling adjacent prosumers to have the ability to conduct bilateral transactions, and the interaction of interests between multiple entities has become more complex. However, traditional optimization theory can usually only solve the decision optimization problem of a single entity, and there are great difficulties in facing multi-agent decision-making. Therefore, for IES, how to coordinate the interests of various entities to achieve the optimal allocation of energy resources is a problem that needs to be solved.
[0003] In order to achieve coordination among different stakeholders in IES, the Stackelberg game theory that balances the interests of multiple subjects has attracted the attention of scholars. Using the Stackelberg theory, the interaction process between multiple subjects can be constructed as a leader-follower or leader-muti-follower model, so as to coordinate and manage different stakeholders. It is worth noting that in the above model, the lower-level subjects adjust their own strategies after receiving the incentive signal from the leader, and there is no energy interaction between them. In reality, in some small-scale IES, prosumers with production and consumption capabilities usually trade energy with neighboring prosumers in the form of bilateral transactions to achieve local consumption of distributed resources. However, for IES, when there are interactive transactions between prosumers, the energy management plan formulated using the traditional Stackelberg theory will be difficult to apply. In order to solve this problem, some studies use a nested Stackelberg-Nash game model to describe the interest behavior between multiple subjects, which is described vertically as a Stackelberg game between leaders and followers, and horizontally as a cooperative game based on Nash negotiation between lower-level prosumers.
[0004] However, in the actual operation of IES, there will be some uncertain factors, which may increase the risk of the transaction process and threaten the safe operation of IES in serious cases. In order to effectively deal with the uncertain risks in the process of multi-subject interest interaction, stochastic optimization (SO) and robust optimization (RO) are commonly used mathematical methods to solve uncertainty problems, and relevant studies have applied the above methods to game optimization. It is noted that the stochastic optimization method can accurately describe uncertainty information, but it is difficult to obtain the precise probability distribution characteristics of renewable energy in the modeling process. Robust optimization can deal with extreme scenarios, but it will make the optimization results too conservative. In recent years, the distributionally robust optimization (DRO) method, which combines the advantages of stochastic optimization and robust optimization, has attracted the attention of scholars and is more suitable for dealing with uncertainty disturbances in the operation of IES. However, when the system includes a local energy market, the interest interaction between multiple subjects will become more complicated. On this basis, applying DRO to deal with uncertainty will further increase the difficulty of modeling and model solving, and it is difficult to determine the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between producers and consumers. Summary of the invention
[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the shortcomings of the above-mentioned prior art and to provide a method, system, device and medium for distributed robust game in an integrated energy system, which determines the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between producers and consumers.
[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme:
[0007] In one aspect of the present invention, the comprehensive energy system distribution blue stick game method of the present invention comprises:
[0008] Obtain structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0009] According to the structural information of the integrated energy system, an IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers is constructed;
[0010] Solve the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers, and obtain the optimal transaction power between producers and consumers.
[0011] The integrated energy system distribution blue stick game method of the present invention is further improved in that:
[0012] Furthermore, the process of constructing the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system is as follows:
[0013] Constructing an IES optimization operation model according to the structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0014] Constructing an optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game based on the IES optimization operation model;
[0015] Solve the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game to obtain the power interaction power between the lower prosumers;
[0016] A payment bargaining model among lower-level prosumers is constructed based on the interaction power among them.
[0017] Furthermore, the integrated energy system includes a cogeneration unit, an electric energy storage device, a wind power device, a photovoltaic device, a gas boiler, a thermal energy storage device, a power-to-gas device and a carbon capture system.
[0018] Furthermore, the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game is:
[0019]
[0020] C gas =λ gas (V gas_CHP +V gas_GB -V gas_P2G )
[0021]
[0022] Among them, C upper is the interaction cost between the operator and the upper grid, p buy (t) is the time-of-use electricity price, p sell (t) is the on-grid electricity price, P buy (t) is the electric energy purchased by the operator from the upper power grid at time t, P sell (t) is the electric energy sold by the operator from the upper power grid at time t, C gas is the gas cost, λ gas is the gas price, V Gas_CHP is the volume of natural gas consumed by the CHP unit, V Gas_GB is the volume of natural gas consumed by the gas boiler, V Gas_P2G is the volume of natural gas consumed by the P2G equipment, C ESS is the operation and maintenance cost of the operator’s internal energy storage equipment, ESS is the energy storage equipment maintenance cost coefficient, P e_ch (t) is the charge amount of the energy storage at time t, P e_dis(t) is the discharge amount of the energy storage at time t, P h_ch (t) is the heat storage capacity of thermal energy at time t, P h_dis (t) is the heat released by the thermal energy storage at time t, is the carbon storage capacity of carbon energy storage at time t, is the carbon release of carbon storage at time t, C RES is the cost of wind and solar power curtailment, λ RES is the cost coefficient of wind and solar power abandonment, P WT_cut (t) is the amount of wind and solar power abandoned by the wind turbine at time t, P PV_cut (t) is the amount of wind and solar power abandoned by the photovoltaic unit at time t, is the carbon trading cost, is the carbon trading cost coefficient, is the actual carbon emissions of the operator at time t, represents the carbon emission quota allocated by the government to the operator, D is the carbon emission quota per unit of electricity produced by the operator, and E pro is the revenue of the operator from selling energy to prosumers, N represents the number of prosumers, and p ri_e,i is the price at which the operator sells electricity to the i-th prosumer, p ri_h,i is the price at which the operator sells heat to the i-th prosumer, P load,i is the amount of electricity purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator, H load,i is the amount of heat purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator.
[0023] Furthermore, the payment bargaining model between the lower-level producers and consumers is:
[0024]
[0025] in, is the operating cost of producer-consumer i when not participating in the cooperative alliance, C i is the operating cost of prosumer i after joining the cooperative alliance, and I is the number of prosumers.
[0026] Furthermore, the process of solving the payment bargaining model between the lower-level producers and consumers is:
[0027] Based on the ADMM distributed algorithm, the payment bargaining model between the lower-level prosumers is solved to obtain the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between the prosumers.
[0028] In a second aspect of the present invention, the comprehensive energy system distribution blue stick game system of the present invention comprises:
[0029] An acquisition module, used to obtain structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0030] The first building module is used to build an IES distributed robust game model considering interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0031] The first solution module is used to solve the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers, and obtain the optimal transaction power between producers and consumers.
[0032] The integrated energy system distribution blue stick game system of the present invention is further improved in that:
[0033] Furthermore, the first building block includes:
[0034] Establishing a module for constructing an IES optimization operation model according to the structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0035] The second building module is used to build an optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game based on the IES optimization operation model;
[0036] The second solution module is used to solve the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game to obtain the interaction power between the lower-level producers and consumers;
[0037] The third building module is used to build a payment bargaining model between lower-level prosumers according to the interaction power between the lower-level prosumers.
[0038] In the third aspect of the present invention, the computer device described in the present invention includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and is characterized in that the processor implements the steps of the distributed robust game method for the integrated energy system when executing the computer program.
[0039] In the fourth aspect of the present invention, the computer-readable storage medium of the present invention stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed robust game method of the integrated energy system are implemented.
[0040] The present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0041] During specific operation, the IES fractional robust game method, system, device and medium for the integrated energy system described in the present invention construct an IES fractional robust game model considering interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system, and based on game theory, achieve effective management of producers and consumers with interactive transactions in extreme scenarios, thereby improving the system's ability to resist uncertainty risks. Then, the IES fractional robust game model considering interactive transactions between producers and consumers is solved to obtain the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between producers and consumers, thereby achieving a balance of interests among different entities and effectively promoting the safe consumption of renewable energy. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0042] The accompanying drawings constituting a part of the present invention are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the present invention. In the accompanying drawings:
[0043] Figure 1 It is a structural diagram of the integrated energy system;
[0044] Figure 2 It is the principle diagram of the present invention;
[0045] Figure 3 A flowchart of solving the IES distributed blue stick game model considering interactive transactions between producers and consumers in the present invention;
[0046] Figure 4 It is a system structure diagram of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0047] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiment of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiment is only an embodiment of a part of the present invention, not all embodiments, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. In addition, in the following description, the description of well-known structures and technologies is omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion of the concepts disclosed in the present invention. Based on the embodiments in the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0048] The accompanying drawings show schematic diagrams of structures according to embodiments disclosed in the present invention. These figures are not drawn to scale, and some details are magnified and some details may be omitted for the purpose of clear expression. The shapes of various regions and layers shown in the figures and the relative sizes and positional relationships therebetween are only exemplary, and may deviate in practice due to manufacturing tolerances or technical limitations, and those skilled in the art may additionally design regions / layers with different shapes, sizes, and relative positions according to actual needs.
[0049] Embodiment 1
[0050] refer to Figure 2 The integrated energy system distribution and robust game method of the present invention comprises the following steps:
[0051] 1) Based on the structural information of the integrated energy system, an IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers is constructed.
[0052] The specific process of step 1) is:
[0053] 11) Construct IES optimization operation model based on the information of integrated energy system;
[0054] refer to Figure 1 The integrated energy system (IES) includes a combined heat and power unit (Combination of electrical and heat, CHP), electrical energy storage (Electrical energy storage, ESS), wind turbine (Wind turbine, WT), photovoltaic (Photovoltaic, PV), gas boilers (gas boilers, GB), thermal energy storage (Thermal energy storage, TES), power-to-gas equipment (Power-to-gas, P2G) and a carbon capture system (Carbon capture system, CCS), wherein the power-to-gas equipment (Power-to-gas, P2G) and the carbon capture system (Carbon capture system, CCS) are used to reduce the carbon emissions of the system.
[0055] The IES optimization operation model includes a CHP unit row model coupled with CCS-P2G and other equipment models in IES.
[0056] The construction process of the CHP unit line model coupled with CCS-P2G is as follows:
[0057] As the main energy supply component, the gas turbine generates electricity and heat by burning natural gas, while releasing CO2. The relationship between the gas turbine's power generation, calorific value, natural gas consumption, and the amount of CO2 generated is:
[0058] P e_CHP =η e_CHP Q CH4 V Gas_CHP
[0059] P h_CHP =η h_CHP Q CH4 V Gas_CHP
[0060] P e_CHP_min ≤P e_CHP ≤P e_CHP_max
[0061] P h_CHP_min ≤P h_CHP ≤P h_CHP_max
[0062]
[0063] Among them, η e_CHP and η h_CHP are the power generation efficiency and heating efficiency of the CHP unit, is the calorific value of natural gas, V Gas_CHP is the amount of natural gas consumed by the CHP unit, P e_CHP and P h_CHP is the power generation and heating power of the CHP unit, P e_CHP_max , P e_CHP_min , P h_CHP_max and P h_CHP_min The upper and lower limits of the CHP unit's power generation and the upper and lower limits of its heating power. The amount of CO2 released by the combustion of natural gas in the CHP unit, is the carbon emission conversion factor of the CHP unit.
[0064] In order to effectively reduce carbon emissions, the present invention adds CCS and P2G devices to the CHP unit, and realizes the recycling of energy in the system through the coupled operation of P2G-CCS, specifically:
[0065] CCS captures CO2:
[0066]
[0067] P CCS =P WT_CCS +P PV_CCS
[0068] in, is the amount of CO2 captured by the CCS system, α represents the conversion coefficient between the electric power consumed by CCS and the amount of CO2 captured by CCS, and is the amount of CO2 delivered to the P2G device and the carbon energy storage device by the CCS system, P CCS The electrical power consumed by the CCS system to capture CO2, P WT_CCS and P PV_CCS Provides electric power from wind power and photovoltaic power to the CCS system.
[0069] P2G devices absorb and convert CO2:
[0070]
[0071] V Gas_P2G =γP P2G
[0072] P P2G =P WT_P2G +P PV_P2G
[0073] in, is the amount of CO2 required for P2G equipment to generate CH4, β represents the conversion coefficient between the amount of CO2 required for P2G equipment to produce CH4 and the electrical power consumed by P2G, and γ represents the electrical conversion efficiency of P2G to generate CH4. is the carbon release of carbon energy storage, P P2G is the power consumed by the P2G device, V Gas_P2G The amount of natural gas generated for the P2G device, P WT_P2G and P PV_P2G Provides electric power from wind power and photovoltaic power to P2G equipment.
[0074] The actual carbon emissions of the CHP unit after P2G-CCS absorption and conversion and the total carbon emissions of the microgrid They are:
[0075]
[0076] Among them, V Gas_GB is the natural gas consumption of gas boilers, is the actual carbon emission of the CHP unit. Since the current power system is still dominated by thermal power, in the present invention, when the microgrid purchases electricity from the superior, the electricity comes from the coal-fired units in the thermal power plant that burn fossil fuels to generate electricity. is the carbon emission of the microgrid, P buy is the power purchased by the microgrid from the upper grid, ε GB and κ buy is the carbon emission factor.
[0077] The process of establishing other equipment models in IES is as follows:
[0078] The remaining equipment models in the IES include an energy storage equipment model and a gas boiler model, wherein the construction process of the energy storage equipment model is as follows:
[0079] The IES includes energy storage elements such as electrical energy storage, thermal energy storage and carbon energy storage. Here, the three types of energy storage devices are modeled uniformly, and the operating constraints of the energy storage devices and the charge state at any time during the charging / discharging process are expressed as:
[0080]
[0081] S0=η s *S max
[0082] S min ≤S t ≤S max
[0083] 0≤P ch ≤u ch *P ch,max
[0084] 0≤P dis ≤u dis *P dis,max
[0085] u ch +u dis ≤1
[0086] Among them, S t Represents the capacity of the energy storage device at any time, S max and S min is the maximum and minimum capacity of the energy storage device, S0 represents the initial capacity of the energy storage device, and its value is η s *S max , where η s Represents the capacity factor of the energy storage device, P ch and P dis is the charging power and discharging power of the energy storage device, and Represents the charging efficiency and discharging efficiency of energy storage equipment, μ ch and μ dis Represents a 0-1 state variable that represents the charging state and the discharging state.
[0087] The construction process of the gas boiler model is:
[0088] As one of the main heat sources in IES, gas boilers generate heat energy by consuming natural gas. The relationship between the generated heat energy and the consumed natural gas is expressed as:
[0089]
[0090] P h_GB_min ≤P h_GB ≤P h_GB_max
[0091] Among them, η GB is the heating efficiency of the gas boiler, is the calorific value of natural gas, V Gas_GB is the natural gas consumption of the gas boiler, P h_GB is the heating power of the gas boiler, Ph_GB_min and P h_GB_max They are the upper and lower limits of the heating power of the gas boiler respectively.
[0092] 12) Establishing an optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game based on the IES optimization operation model;
[0093] The process of step 12) is:
[0094] For IES operators, as the leader of the master-slave game, the main responsibility is to coordinate the coupling relationship between multiple energy sources and formulate the transaction electricity price with the lower-level prosumers to control them. The present invention takes the minimum operating cost of operators as the goal and constructs the optimization model of the upper-level leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game as follows:
[0095]
[0096] C gas =λ gas (V gas_CHP +V gas_GB -V gas_P2G )
[0097]
[0098] Among them, C upper is the interaction cost between the operator and the upper grid, p buy (t) and p sell (t) are time-of-use electricity price and on-grid electricity price, P buy (t) and P sell (t) are the electricity purchased and sold by the operator from the upper power grid at time t; C gas is the gas cost, λ gas is the gas price, V Gas_CHP is the volume of natural gas consumed by the CHP unit, V Gas_GB is the volume of natural gas consumed by the gas boiler, V Gas_P2G is the volume of natural gas consumed by the P2G equipment, C ESS is the operation and maintenance cost of the operator’s internal energy storage equipment, ESS is the energy storage equipment maintenance cost coefficient, P e_ch (t) and P e_dis (t) are the charge and discharge of the energy storage at time t, P h_ch (t) and P h_dis (t) are the heat storage and heat release of thermal energy at time t, and are the carbon storage and carbon release of carbon energy at time t; C RES is the cost of wind and solar power curtailment, λRES is the cost coefficient of wind and solar power abandonment, P WT_cut (t) and P PV_cut (t) are the wind and solar curtailment amounts of wind turbines and photovoltaic units at time t, is the carbon trading cost, is the carbon trading cost coefficient, is the actual carbon emissions of the operator at time t, It represents the carbon emission quota allocated by the government to the operator, which is given by the formula Calculated, D is the carbon emission quota per unit of electricity produced by the operator, E pro is the revenue of the operator from selling energy to prosumers, N represents the number of prosumers, and p ri_e,i is the price at which the operator sells electricity to the i-th prosumer, p ri_h,i is the price at which the operator sells heat to the i-th prosumer, P load,i and H load,i The electricity and heat purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator respectively.
[0099] In order to prevent prosumers from trading directly with the upper power grid, the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game adds a constraint to encourage prosumers to give priority to using local resources, namely:
[0100] p buy (t)≤p ri_e,i (t)≤p sell (t)
[0101]
[0102] Among them, p ri_e,i is the price at which the operator sells electricity to the i-th prosumer, p buy (t) and p sell (t) are time-of-use electricity price and on-grid electricity price respectively, represents the average value of electricity price, The value is 0.6.
[0103] The optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game adds constraints on the heat price set by the operator, namely:
[0104] p ri_h,min ≤p ri_h,i (t)≤p ri_h,max
[0105]
[0106] Among them, p ri_h,min and p ri_h,max are the minimum and maximum values of the heat price, represents the average value of the heat price, The value is 0.5.
[0107] At the same time, to ensure the normal operation of the operator, at any time, the operator must meet the electrical power balance, thermal power balance and system power constraints.
[0108] The electrical power balance is:
[0109] P WT (t)+P PV (t)+P e_CHP (t)+P buy (t)+P e_dis (t) = P e_ch (t)+P sell (t)+P pro_load (t)
[0110] The thermal power balance is:
[0111] P h_CHP (t)+P h_GB (t)+P h_dis (t) = P h_ch (t)+H pro_load (t)
[0112] The system power constraints include the equipment output constraints within the IES and the following power transmission constraints, namely:
[0113] 0≤P buy (t)≤μP buy,max
[0114] 0≤P sell (t)≤(1-μ)P sell,max
[0115] 0≤P WT_cut (t)≤P WT_cut,max
[0116] 0≤P PV_cut (t)≤P PV_cut,max
[0117] Among them, P WT and P PV Respectively represent the power generation of wind power and photovoltaic units, P e_CHP and P h_CHP Indicates the power generation and heating power of the CHP unit, P e_ch and P e_dis Represents the charging power and discharging power of the electric energy storage device, P buy and P sellP represents the power purchased and sold by IES operators from external power grids. buy,max and P sell,max represents the maximum value of the power purchased by the IES operator from the external power grid and the maximum value of the power sold, μ is a 0-1 variable representing the power purchase and sales status of the IES operator, P pro_load and H pro_load Indicates the power of other electrical loads and thermal loads in IES, P h_GB Indicates the heating power of the gas boiler, P h_ch and P h_dis Indicates the charging power and releasing power of the thermal energy storage device, P WT_cut and P PV_cut P represents the abandoned wind and solar power of wind turbines and the abandoned wind and solar power of photovoltaic units, WT_cut,max and P PV_cut,max It indicates the maximum value of the abandoned wind and solar power of the wind turbine and the maximum value of the abandoned wind and solar power of the photovoltaic unit.
[0118] 13) Considering the uncertainty of renewable energy output, a two-stage distributed robust decision model of IES operators considering uncertainty is constructed based on the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game;
[0119] The process of step 13) is:
[0120] The uncertainty of renewable energy output will affect the safety and reliability of the system, so it is necessary to accurately characterize the risks brought by this uncertainty to the system from a mathematical perspective. Here, the present invention adopts a two-stage distributed robust optimization model to deal with the impact of uncertainty in IES. Furthermore, based on the above game framework, a two-stage distributed robust game model is proposed.
[0121] It should be noted that the interaction between IES operators and prosumers is modeled as a two-layer Stackelberg-Nash game model. Based on this, considering the uncertainty factors in the game process, the two-stage distributed robust decision model of IES operators is constructed as follows:
[0122]
[0123] st(1)-(23),(31)-(40)
[0124] In the above objective functions, the first stage objective function is to minimize the interaction cost between the IES operator and the upper power grid and the prosumer, which represents the Stackelberg-Nash game process between the IES operator and the prosumer. The second stage objective function is to minimize the operating cost of the IES operator under the worst scenario probability distribution. The operating cost of the IES operator includes the gas purchase cost C gas 、Energy storage cost C ESS , Cost of curtailing wind and solar power C RES and the cost of carbon emissions The constraints include system operation constraints including the balance constraints of electrical power and thermal power within IES.
[0125] In the above model, the outer max part is the probability distribution of the worst scenario with the largest operating cost. In order to ensure that when the historical data is large enough, p s Converge to the true probability distribution, add a comprehensive norm constraint consisting of the ∞-norm constraint and the 1-norm constraint, the constraint form is:
[0126]
[0127] Where s represents the number of scenes, N s represents the number of typical scenes, p s represents the actual probability value of a typical scenario, represents the empirical probability value of typical scenarios, ψ p represents a set of probability distributions, θ1 and θ ∞ represents the deviation value allowed by the 1-norm and the ∞-norm. At the same time, the scene probability p s The following confidence constraints need to be satisfied:
[0128]
[0129] Where Pr{·} represents the probability that the inequality in {} holds, M is the number of historical data samples, s represents the number of scenarios, and N s represents the number of typical scenes, p s represents the actual probability value of a typical scenario, represents the empirical probability value of typical scenarios, ψ p represents a set of probability distributions, θ1 and θ ∞ Indicates the deviation value allowed for the 1-norm and the ∞-norm.
[0130] Given the confidence parameters γ1 and γ ∞ , then the confidence constraint is converted to:
[0131]
[0132] 14) Construct an IES distributed robust game model for interactive transactions between producers and consumers.
[0133] The specific process of step 14) is:
[0134] The transaction electricity price of the lower-level prosumers is given by the two-stage distributed robust decision model of the IES operator considering uncertainty. The prosumers participate in the upper-level decision-making in a cooperative manner and respond to the strategy of the leader. The present invention is aimed at the lower-level prosumers and constructs an IES distributed robust game model of prosumer interactive transactions based on the Nash negotiation theory. Each prosumer optimizes its own energy consumption behavior according to the price set by the upper layer, and can freely choose to conduct energy transactions with adjacent prosumers. The IES distributed robust game model of prosumer interactive transactions is:
[0135]
[0136] in, is the operating cost of producer-consumer i when not participating in the cooperative alliance, C i is the operating cost of prosumer i after participating in the cooperative alliance. and C i Generally speaking, they are all affected by the prices set by the upper-level operators and will change with the changes in the operators' prices. There is a dynamic balance process between the upper and lower levels.
[0137] The IES distributed robust game model of the producer-consumer interactive transaction can be converted into:
[0138]
[0139] 3)Reference Figure 3 Based on the ADMM (Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers) distributed algorithm, the IES distributed robust game model of the interactive transaction between the prosumers is solved to obtain the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between the prosumers.
[0140] The process of step 3) is:
[0141] By solving the IES fractional robustness game model of producer-consumer interactive transactions, the optimal solution to the Nash bargaining problem can be obtained. The IES fractional robustness game model of producer-consumer interactive transactions is essentially a non-convex nonlinear optimization problem, and it is difficult to directly obtain its optimal solution. Here, starting from the mean inequality, the present invention converts the IES fractional robustness game model of producer-consumer interactive transactions into two independently solved convex optimization sub-problems, namely, the alliance cost minimization problem P1 and the producer-consumer payment bargaining problem P2, as shown in Figure 2 As shown in . The above problems can be effectively solved by iteratively solving the alliance cost minimization problem P1 and the producer-consumer payment bargaining problem P2.
[0142] 31) Construct the alliance cost minimization problem P1;
[0143] For the lower-level prosumers, they operate in a cooperative manner. At the same time, the prosumers themselves have flexible and adjustable electricity and heat loads, and can make different responses according to prices. The present invention takes the minimum total cost when the lower-level prosumers operate cooperatively as the goal, and constructs the lower-level follower objective function as follows:
[0144]
[0145] Among them, p ri_e,i and p ri_h,i is the price at which the operator sells electricity and heat to the i-th prosumer, P load,i and H load,i is the electricity and heat power purchased by the ith prosumer from the operator, P cut,i and H cut,i represents the electric load power and thermal load power that the prosumer reduces in response to demand, π e and π h Indicates the electricity load reduction cost coefficient and the heat load reduction cost coefficient, and must meet the following requirements:
[0146] 0≤P load,i ≤P load,i,max
[0147] 0≤H load,i ≤H load,i,max
[0148] 0≤P cut,i ≤P cut,i,max
[0149] 0≤H cut,i ≤H cut,i,max
[0150] 0≤P i,j ≤P i,j,max
[0151] Among them, P load,i and H load,i is the electricity and heat power purchased by the ith prosumer from the operator, P load,i,max and H load,i,max P represents the maximum value of the electricity and heat power purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator. cut,i and H cut,i P represents the electricity and heat load power that the prosumer reduces in response to demand, cut,i,max and H cut,i,max It represents the maximum value of the power reduction of electricity and heat load by the prosumer in response to demand, P i,j represents the interaction power between producers and consumers, P i,j,maxRepresents the maximum value of the interaction power between producers and consumers.
[0152] According to the circuit principle, power transmission has directionality. Assuming that the transaction volume is positive electricity sales and the transaction volume is negative electricity purchases, in order to ensure the normal operation between producers and consumers, the following conditions must also be met:
[0153] P load,i =P L,i -P PV,i -P cut,i +P i,j
[0154] P load,j =P L,j -P PV,j -P cut,j -P i,j
[0155] H load,i =H L,i -H cut,i
[0156] Among them, P load,i is the power purchased by the ith prosumer from the operator, P L,i is the electricity load of the ith prosumer, P PV,i is the power generation of the PV on the roof of the i-th prosumer, P cut,i and H cut,i P represents the load power that the prosumer reduces in response to demand, i,j represents the interactive power between prosumers. The first and second formulas limit the balance constraint of the interactive electric power between prosumers. The third formula is the balance constraint of the internal thermal power of the prosumer, H L,i is the initial heat load, H cut,i is the heat load that can be reduced by the i-th prosumer, H load,i is the thermal energy purchased by the i-th prosumer from the upper-level operator.
[0157] 32) Construct the producer-consumer payment bargaining problem P2.
[0158] Based on the alliance cost minimization problem P1, the interactive power between prosumers is obtained, and the transaction power between prosumers P i,j Substituting into the IES distributed blue stick game model of interactive transactions between producers and consumers, the payment bargaining problem model of the i-th producer and consumer user is obtained as follows:
[0159]
[0160] in, is the Nash negotiation breakdown point, i.e., the operating cost of producer-consumer i when not participating in the cooperative alliance, p rice_i,j is the electricity transaction price between producers and consumers, Pi,j,t is the interaction power between prosumers at time t. Since the payment bargaining problem model of the ith prosumer is a nonlinear and non-convex problem, it is difficult to solve directly. In order to solve the payment bargaining problem model of the ith prosumer, the payment bargaining problem model of the ith prosumer is logarithmically calculated, so that the prosumer payment bargaining problem P2 is obtained as follows:
[0161]
[0162] Solve the producer-consumer payment bargaining problem P2 and obtain the transaction electricity price between producers and consumers.
[0163] Embodiment 2
[0164] refer to Figure 4 The integrated energy system distribution blue stick game system of the present invention comprises:
[0165] An acquisition module, used to obtain structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0166] The first building module is used to build an IES distributed robust game model considering interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0167] The first solution module is used to solve the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers, and obtain the optimal transaction power between producers and consumers.
[0168] As an embodiment of the present invention, the first building block includes:
[0169] Establishing a module for constructing an IES optimization operation model according to the structural information of the integrated energy system;
[0170] The second building module is used to build an optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game based on the IES optimization operation model;
[0171] The second solution module is used to solve the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game to obtain the interaction power between the lower-level producers and consumers;
[0172] The third building module is used to build a payment bargaining model between lower-level prosumers according to the interaction power between the lower-level prosumers.
[0173] As an embodiment of the present invention, the integrated energy system includes a cogeneration unit, an electric energy storage device, a wind power device, a photovoltaic device, a gas boiler, a thermal energy storage device, a power-to-gas device and a carbon capture system.
[0174] As an implementation mode of the present invention, the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game is:
[0175]
[0176] C gas =λ gas (V gas_CHP +V gas_GB -V gas_P2G )
[0177]
[0178]
[0179] Among them, C upper is the interaction cost between the operator and the upper grid, p buy (t) is the time-of-use electricity price, p sell (t) is the on-grid electricity price, P buy (t) is the electric energy purchased by the operator from the upper power grid at time t, P sell (t) is the electric energy sold by the operator from the upper power grid at time t, C gas is the gas cost, λ gas is the gas price, V Gas_CHP is the volume of natural gas consumed by the CHP unit, V Gas_GB is the volume of natural gas consumed by the gas boiler, V Gas_P2G is the volume of natural gas consumed by the P2G equipment, C ESS is the operation and maintenance cost of the operator’s internal energy storage equipment, ESS is the energy storage equipment maintenance cost coefficient, P e_ch (t) is the charge amount of the energy storage at time t, P e_dis (t) is the discharge amount of the energy storage at time t, P h_ch (t) is the heat storage capacity of thermal energy at time t, P h_dis (t) is the heat released by the thermal energy storage at time t, is the carbon storage capacity of carbon energy storage at time t, is the carbon release of carbon storage at time t, C RES is the cost of wind and solar power curtailment, λ RES is the cost coefficient of wind and solar power abandonment, P WT_cut (t) is the amount of wind and solar power abandoned by the wind turbine at time t, P PV_cut (t) is the amount of wind and solar power abandoned by the photovoltaic unit at time t, is the carbon trading cost, is the carbon trading cost coefficient, is the actual carbon emissions of the operator at time t, represents the carbon emission quota allocated by the government to the operator, D is the carbon emission quota per unit of electricity produced by the operator, and E pro is the revenue of the operator from selling energy to prosumers, N represents the number of prosumers, and p ri_e,i is the price at which the operator sells electricity to the i-th prosumer, p ri_h,i is the price at which the operator sells heat to the i-th prosumer, P load,i is the amount of electricity purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator, H load,i is the amount of heat purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator.
[0180] As an implementation mode of the present invention, the payment bargaining model between the lower-level producers and consumers is:
[0181]
[0182] Among them, C i 0 is the operating cost of producer-consumer i when not participating in the cooperative alliance, C i is the operating cost of prosumer i after joining the cooperative alliance, and I is the number of prosumers.
[0183] As an implementation mode of the present invention, the process of solving the payment bargaining model between the lower-level producers and consumers is:
[0184] Based on the ADMM distributed algorithm, the payment bargaining model between the lower-level prosumers is solved to obtain the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between the prosumers.
[0185] The division of modules in the embodiments of the present application is schematic and is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. In addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into a processor, or may exist physically separately, or two or more modules may be integrated into one module. The above-mentioned integrated modules may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules.
[0186] Embodiment 3
[0187] A computer device includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of implementing the method for the distributed robust game of the integrated energy system are implemented, for example, including: obtaining the structural information of the integrated energy system; constructing an IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transaction between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system; solving the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transaction between producers and consumers to obtain the optimal transaction power and electric energy transaction price between producers and consumers. Among them, the memory may include a memory, such as a high-speed random access memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk memory, etc.; the processor, the network interface, and the memory are interconnected through an internal bus, and the internal bus may be an industrial standard architecture bus, a peripheral component interconnection standard bus, an extended industrial standard architecture bus, etc. The bus may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. The memory is used to store programs. Specifically, the program may include a program code, and the program code includes computer operation instructions. The memory may include a memory and a non-volatile memory, and provide instructions and data to the processor.
[0188] Embodiment 4
[0189] A computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, wherein when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of implementing the distributed robust game method of the integrated energy system are, for example, including: obtaining the structural information of the integrated energy system; constructing an IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system; solving the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers, and obtaining the optimal transaction power and electricity transaction price between producers and consumers. Specifically, the computer-readable storage medium includes, but is not limited to, for example, volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. The volatile memory may include a random access memory (RAM) and / or a cache memory (cache), etc. The non-volatile memory may include a read-only memory (ROM), a hard disk, a flash memory, an optical disk, a magnetic disk, etc.
[0190] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented in one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that include computer-usable program code.
[0191] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0192] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.
[0193] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.
[0194] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the relevant field should understand that the specific implementation methods of the present invention can still be modified or replaced by equivalents. Any modification or equivalent replacement that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A game method for distributed blue stick in integrated energy system, It is characterized in that include: Obtain structural information of the integrated energy system; According to the structural information of the integrated energy system, an integrated energy system (IES) distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers is constructed; Solve the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers, and obtain the optimal transaction power between producers and consumers.
2. The integrated energy system distributed robust game method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The process of constructing the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system is as follows: Constructing an IES optimization operation model according to the structural information of the integrated energy system; Constructing an optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game based on the IES optimization operation model; Solve the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game to obtain the power interaction power between the lower prosumers; A payment bargaining model between lower-level prosumers is constructed based on the electric energy interaction power between them.
3. The integrated energy system distributed robust game method according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The comprehensive energy system includes a cogeneration unit, electric energy storage equipment, wind power equipment, photovoltaic equipment, a gas boiler, thermal energy storage equipment, power-to-gas equipment and a carbon capture system.
4. The method for distributed robust game of integrated energy system according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game is: minC=C upper +C gas +C ESS +C RES +C CO2 -E pro C gas =λ gas (V gas_CHP +V gas_GB -V gas_P2G ) Among them, C upper is the interaction cost between the operator and the upper grid, p buy (t) is the time-of-use electricity price, p sell (t) is the on-grid electricity price, P buy (t) is the electric energy purchased by the operator from the upper power grid at time t, P sell (t) is the electric energy sold by the operator from the upper power grid at time t, C gas is the gas cost, λ gas is the gas price, V Gas_CHP is the volume of natural gas consumed by the CHP unit, V Gas_GB is the volume of natural gas consumed by the gas boiler, V Gas_P2G is the volume of natural gas consumed by the P2G equipment, C ESS is the operation and maintenance cost of the operator’s internal energy storage equipment, ESS is the energy storage equipment maintenance cost coefficient, P e_ch (t) is the charge amount of the energy storage at time t, P e_dis (t) is the discharge amount of the energy storage at time t, P h_ch (t) is the heat storage capacity of thermal energy at time t, P h_dis (t) is the heat released by the thermal energy storage at time t, is the carbon storage capacity of carbon energy storage at time t, is the carbon release of carbon storage at time t, C RES is the cost of wind and solar power curtailment, λ RES is the cost coefficient of wind and solar power abandonment, P WT_cut (t) is the amount of wind and solar power abandoned by the wind turbine at time t, P PV_cut (t) is the amount of wind and solar power abandoned by the photovoltaic unit at time t, is the carbon trading cost, is the carbon trading cost coefficient, is the actual carbon emissions of the operator at time t, represents the carbon emission quota allocated by the government to the operator, D is the carbon emission quota per unit of electricity produced by the operator, and E pro is the revenue of the operator from selling energy to prosumers, N represents the number of prosumers, and p ri_e,i is the price at which the operator sells electricity to the i-th prosumer, p ri_h,i is the price at which the operator sells heat to the i-th prosumer, P load,i is the amount of electricity purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator, H load,i is the amount of heat purchased by the i-th prosumer from the operator.
5. The method for distributed robust game of integrated energy system according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The payment bargaining model between the lower-level producers and consumers is: in, is the operating cost of producer-consumer i when not participating in the cooperative alliance, C i is the operating cost of prosumer i after joining the cooperative alliance, and I is the number of prosumers.
6. The method for distributed robust game of integrated energy system according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The process of solving the payment bargaining model between the lower-level producers and consumers is: Based on the ADMM distributed algorithm, the payment bargaining model between the lower-level prosumers is solved to obtain the electricity transaction price between the prosumers.
7. A comprehensive energy system distribution blue stick game system, It is characterized in that include: An acquisition module, used to obtain structural information of the integrated energy system; The first building module is used to build an IES distributed robust game model considering interactive transactions between producers and consumers according to the structural information of the integrated energy system; The first solution module is used to solve the IES distributed robust game model considering the interactive transactions between producers and consumers, and obtain the optimal transaction power between producers and consumers.
8. The integrated energy system distribution blue stick game system according to claim 7, It is characterized in that The first building block comprises: Establishing a module for constructing an IES optimization operation model according to the structural information of the integrated energy system; The second building module is used to build an optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game based on the IES optimization operation model; The second solving module is used to solve the optimization model of the upper leader of the Stackelberg-Nash game to obtain the electric energy interaction power between the lower-level producers and consumers; The third building module is used to build a payment bargaining model between lower-level prosumers according to the electric energy interaction power between the lower-level prosumers.
9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, It is characterized in that When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the distributed robust game method for the integrated energy system as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.
10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program. It is characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed robust game method for an integrated energy system as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.
