Anti-quantum satellite-ground convergence network access authentication method based on block chain

Abstract

The invention discloses an anti-quantum satellite-ground fusion network access authentication method based on a block chain, and the method comprises the specific steps: S1, a system initialization stage: generating a root PKG, extracting and generating a sub-PKG based on the root PKG, carrying out the key distribution of an AP layer through the root PKG, managing the key distribution of a user on a corresponding AP chain through the sub-PKG, and carrying out the key distribution of the user on the AP chain through the sub-PKG; the public parameters of the sub-PKG and the root PKG and blockchain information managed by the sub-PKG and the root PKG are uploaded to a system control chain; each of the root PKG and the sub PKG comprises a corresponding main public key, a main private key, a pseudo identity generation key, a revocation key and a verification key; the whole system has a unified key architecture, a key PSK for pseudo identity generation, a trap door key RK in a revocation mechanism and a public key VK for revocation verification are conveniently and safely initialized, deployed and expanded, and the system can support a complete authentication and revocation function module in the initialization stage.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of blockchain and cryptography, and in particular to a quantum-resistant access authentication method for a star-ground fusion network based on a blockchain. BACKGROUND

[0002] Traditional access authentication mechanisms rely on centralized public key infrastructures (PKI). Although this architecture is widely used in current communication networks, it has some unavoidable defects. On the one hand, the centralized architecture is prone to single-point failure, making the system unavailable, and it is difficult to cope with highly distributed and dynamic application scenarios in the network. On the other hand, authentication methods based on traditional public key cryptography are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, especially in the context of the gradual maturity of quantum computing capabilities. These methods may no longer be reliable. In addition, user privacy protection is also a major shortcoming of traditional authentication methods. Attackers can launch targeted attacks through the disclosure of identity information, seriously threatening the security of the network and the personal rights and interests of users. In this context, it is a key issue to design a distributed, efficient, quantum-resistant, and privacy-protected access authentication mechanism to ensure the security of star-ground fusion networks.

[0003] Blockchain technology has gradually become a potential tool for solving the problems of traditional network authentication mechanisms due to its characteristics of decentralization, data immutability, and transparency. CCAP and other schemes propose access authentication mechanisms combined with blockchains, achieving higher reliability and data security through distributed ledgers. However, these schemes are still insufficient in resisting quantum attacks. On the other hand, lattice-based cryptography (Lattice-based Cryptography) is attracting attention due to its ability to resist quantum computing attacks and has become one of the mainstream directions for building quantum-resistant authentication mechanisms. However, existing authentication mechanisms based on lattice cryptography mostly focus on single scenarios, such as the lightweight lattice-based authentication scheme proposed by Samed et al., which lacks systematic support for complex star-ground fusion networks.

[0004] Therefore, this paper combines the advantages of blockchains and lattice-based cryptography to propose a quantum-resistant access authentication mechanism suitable for star-ground fusion networks. This mechanism adopts a hierarchical identity-based signature framework, not only solving the single-point failure problem in the architecture, but also protecting user privacy through pseudo-identity technology and chameleon hash, and achieving flexible management of dynamic revocation and recovery. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application aims to provide a quantum-resistant access authentication method for a star-ground fusion network based on a blockchain to solve the problem of poor protection performance mentioned in the background.

[0006] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application provides the following technical solutions: A blockchain-based anti-quantum star-ground fusion network access authentication method, comprising a system initialization stage, a registration stage, an access stage and a revocation stage, A blockchain-based anti-quantum star-ground fusion network access authentication method, the specific steps of which are as follows: S1, system initialization stage: generating a root PKG, extracting a sub-PKG based on the root PKG, the root PKG performing key distribution of the AP layer, the sub-PKG managing key distribution of users on its corresponding AP chain, and uploading the sub-PKG and the public parameters of the root PKG and the blockchain information managed by each sub-PKG to the system control chain; the root PKG and the sub-PKG each include a corresponding master public key, a master private key, a pseudo-identity generation key, a revocation key and a verification key; S2, registration stage: the user / satellite sends a registration request containing the real identity and the timestamp to the corresponding root PKG or sub-PKG in step S1, the root PKG or sub-PKG verifies the real identity and the timestamp, generates a registration certificate after verifying the real identity, and uploads the public parameters of the real identity identification to the system blockchain; the public parameters include a hash commitment value; S3, access stage: the user / satellite broadcasts the signature of its own pseudo-identity generation key and timestamp to the target blockchain, the target blockchain verifies the signature and the legality of the corresponding real identity, reaches access consensus to allow it to access the target blockchain of the system.

[0007] As a preferred, the authentication method comprises the following steps: S4, revocation stage: when the user / satellite voluntarily logs out, sends a revocation request to the corresponding root PKG or sub-PKG, the root PKG or sub-PKG generates a revocation marker containing revocation key information through the verified revocation request, broadcasts the revocation request to the system blockchain, and the system blockchain judges whether to execute the revocation by verifying the revocation key and the hash commitment value.

[0008] As a preferred, the root PKG includes a master public key mpk, a master private key msk, a pseudo-identity generation key PSK, a revocation key RK and a verification key VK, and the sub-PKG includes a master public key smpk, a master private key smsk, a pseudo-identity generation key sPSK, a revocation key sRK and a verification key sVK; The root PKG or the sub-PKG verifies the real identity and the timestamp, generates a master public key mpk, a master private key msk, a pseudo-identity generation key PSK, or a master public key smpk, a master private key smsk, a pseudo-identity generation key sPSK, and sends a registration subject after verifying the real identity, generates a registration certificate through a signature algorithm, and uploads the public parameters of the real identity identification to the system blockchain.

[0009] Preferably, in step S1, the root PKG is generated by a Setup algorithm, which generates system security parameters based on the ring SIS problem in the lattice cryptography system, and generates root PKG key material.

[0010] Preferably, in step S1, the sub-PKG is extracted based on the root PKG by an ExtractForPKG algorithm, which uses a lattice trapdoor function to construct a sub-PKG key material with a trapdoor, and promotes the independence of the sub-PKG through a hierarchical identity structure.

[0011] Preferably, step S2 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S21, the user queries the sub-PKG corresponding to the target chain to which the user accesses through the control chain, and the satellite does not need to query the root PKG; S22, the user / satellite sends a registration request to the sub-PKG in step S21, and the registration request contains a real identity ID and timestamp information; the sub-PKG / the root PKG performs validity check on the timestamp contained in the received registration request, and judges whether the timestamp is within the preset effective time of 5 minutes; S23, the sub-PKG / the root PKG respectively checks the state of the real identity ID contained in the received registration request, which specifically includes: querying whether the real identity ID has been in a registered effective state, or has been marked as a revoked state; if the checking result is that the real identity has been in a registered effective state, the current registration process is terminated and the registration request is rejected; S24, if the real identity has not been marked as a registered state, the sub-PKG / the root PKG calls the DelegateKeys algorithm and the ChameleonHash algorithm to jointly generate a pseudo-identity, a public key, a private key and a hash commitment value of the bound pseudo-identity uniquely associated with the real identity; if the real identity has been marked as a revoked state, the sub-PKG / the root PKG queries its revoked attribute information; S25, when the revoked attribute is an unrecoverable revocation caused by malicious behavior, the registration process is terminated; when the revoked attribute is a recoverable revocation caused by non-malicious behavior, only a new hash commitment value matching the current state of the real identity is generated; S26, the sub-PKG / the root PKG sends a secure channel to the user or satellite, and generates a registration proof through a signature algorithm, and uploads the registration proof together with the public parameters of the real identity to the blockchain of the system.

[0012] As preferred, the Chameleon Hash algorithm introduces a controllable collision Chameleon Hash structure, so that the PKG can generate a unique and revocable tracking hash commitment value for each registered entity.

[0013] More preferably, the Chameleon Hash algorithm is Algorithm 3: Chameleon Hash Input: Pidnode, VK Output: h, r, v function ChameleonHash r← v←H(Pidnode) h←VK* (v, r) return h, r, v endfunction.

[0014] As preferred, the step S3 specifically comprises the following sub-steps: S31, the user / satellite signs the pseudo-identity generation key and the timestamp by the Sign algorithm to generate signature information; S32, the pseudo-identity generation key and the signature information in step S31 are packaged and broadcast to the target blockchain; S33, the target blockchain in step S32 verifies the legality of the received pseudo-identity generation key and signature information by the Verify algorithm, and after verification and confirmation of the legality of the entity identity corresponding to the pseudo-identity generation key, access consensus is reached to allow the registered subject to access the blockchain of the system.

[0015] As preferred, step S4 specifically comprises the following sub-steps: S41, when the user initiates active revocation, sends a revocation request one to the corresponding sub-PKG; when the satellite initiates active revocation, sends a revocation request two to the root PKG, the revocation request one and the revocation request two contain the pseudo-identity, the hash commitment value, the timestamp and the signature of these information at the same time; S42, according to the validity of the timestamp and the signature verified by the sub-PKG or the root PKG in step S41, the revocation Revoke algorithm is called, the revocation marker is generated by using the corresponding revocation key RK and the revocation key sRK, and the pseudo-identity PID, the revocation marker, the timestamp and the signature of these contents are broadcast to the blockchain of the system; S43, the blockchain of the system uses a verification key VK / verification key sVK to verify whether the authentication consistency equation is established, when the equation is established, the pseudo-identity, revocation mark and timestamp are stored in the revocation list, at this time the commitment value of the identity is invalid, and the revocation is completed; if the equation is not established, the revocation fails; S44, passive revocation, no request needs to be sent.

[0016] More preferably, the authentication consistency equation is the equation A'm + Ar = A'm' + Ar', wherein the verification key VK is composed of A' and A, m and m' respectively correspond to the core parameters of the original hash commitment and the hash commitment after revocation, and r and r' are respectively an original random number generated by the ChameleonHash algorithm and a random number generated by the Revoke algorithm after revocation.

[0017] More preferably, the Revoke is specifically as follows: Algorithm 4: Revoke Input: Pidnode, RK, VK, v, r Output: v’, r’ function Revoke If (Pidnode is not a malicious user and actively requests revocation) v’=H(Pidnode |0) If (Pidnode is a malicious user) v’=H(Pidnode |1) u ← VK[1]tv - VK[1]tv’ + VK[0]tr r’ ← SamplePre(VK[0],RK, u) return v’, r’ end function。

[0018] Advantages of the present application: 1.The Setup algorithm used in the present application generates system security parameters based on the ring SIS problem in the lattice cryptography system, which is still difficult to solve for quantum computing, ensuring that the mechanism has the ability to resist quantum attacks, and generating root PKG key material, so that the entire system has a unified key architecture, facilitating secure initialization and deployment of keys PSK for pseudo-identity generation, trapdoor keys RK in the revocation mechanism, and public keys VK for revocation verification, ensuring that the system can support complete authentication and revocation function modules in the initialization phase. This design improves the consistency of system initialization and the integration of security functions.

[0019] 2.The ExtractForPKG algorithm of the present application uses a lattice trapdoor function to construct a sub-PKG key material with a trapdoor, and improves the independence of the sub-PKG through a hierarchical identity structure. Its greatest advantage is to support the permission isolation management of multi-level key distribution and revocation operations, which can effectively solve the single-point bottleneck problem caused by centralized key update in large-scale networks, and also increase the output modules of pseudo-identity generation keys, revocation keys, and verification keys, so that each sub-PKG can independently undertake user authentication and revocation tasks, further enhancing the decentralization characteristics and dynamic expansion capability of the system.

[0020] 3.The DelegateKeys algorithm of the present application introduces a controllable collision chameleon hash structure, so that the PKG can generate a unique and revocable hash commitment value (h, r, v) for each registered entity, and at the same time of generating user public and private keys, a pseudo-identity generation process based on a hash function is added to replace the real identity ID identifier used in the original algorithm. Through the mapping of "real identity ID→pseudo identity", the risk of user privacy leakage is effectively avoided, while maintaining the uniqueness of authentication, and supporting the anonymity of user access, the uniqueness of authentication credentials, and the traceability of the revocation mechanism, providing key support for subsequent authentication and security incident tracing, and the traditional hash is irreversible, making it difficult to realize identity binding with traceability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0021] Figure 1 is a hierarchical framework diagram of an embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 is a system diagram of an embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 is a comparison chart of experimental results of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0022] With reference to the drawings of the embodiments of the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described, obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work belong to the protection scope of the present application.

[0023] Please refer to Figures 1-2 The present application provides a kind of based on anti quantum star ground fusion network access authentication method of block chain, and the specific steps of the authentication method are as follows: S1, system initialization phase: generating root PKG, generating sub-PKG based on the root PKG, the root PKG carries out the key distribution of AP layer, the sub-PKG manages the key distribution of user on its corresponding AP chain, and the sub-PKG and the public parameter of root PKG and the block chain information managed by each sub-PKG and root PKG are uploaded to system control chain;The root PKG and sub-PKG include corresponding main public key, main private key, pseudo identity generation key, revocation key and verification key; S2, registration phase: user / satellite sends registration request containing real identity and time stamp to corresponding root PKG or sub-PKG in step S1, and the root PKG or the sub-PKG verifies real identity and time stamp, generates registration certificate after verifying real identity and uploads to system block chain with the public parameter of real identity identification;The public parameter includes hash commitment value; S3, access phase: user / satellite broadcasts to target block chain after signing own pseudo identity generation key and time stamp, and the target block chain verifies the legality of signature and corresponding real identity, reaches access consensus to allow it to access the target block chain of system.

[0024] Specifically, the authentication method comprises the following steps: S4, revocation phase: when user / satellite voluntarily cancels, sends revocation request to corresponding root PKG or sub-PKG, and the root PKG or the sub-PKG generates revocation mark containing revocation key information through verified revocation request, broadcasts revocation request to system block chain, and the system block chain judges whether to execute revocation by verifying revocation key and hash commitment value.

[0025] Specifically, the root PKG includes main public key mpk, main private key msk, pseudo identity generation key PSK, revocation key RK and verification key VK, and the sub-PKG includes main public key smpk, main private key smsk, pseudo identity generation key sPSK, revocation key sRK and verification key sVK; The root PKG or the sub-PKG verifies the real identity and the timestamp, generates a master public key mpk, a master private key msk, a pseudo-identity generation key PSK or a master public key smpk, a master private key smsk, a pseudo-identity generation key sPSK after verifying the real identity, sends a registration subject, generates a registration certificate through a signature algorithm, and uploads the registration certificate and the public parameter of the real identity to a system block chain.

[0026] Specifically, in step S1, a root PKG is generated through a Setup algorithm, the Setup algorithm generates system security parameters based on a ring SIS problem in a lattice cryptography system, the complexity of the system security parameters is still difficult to solve for quantum computing, the mechanism has anti-quantum attack capability, and the root PKG key material is generated, so that the whole system has a unified key architecture, and security initialization and deployment are facilitated.

[0027] Specifically, in step S1, a sub-PKG is extracted and generated based on the root PKG through an ExtractForPKG algorithm, the ExtractForPKG algorithm uses a lattice trapdoor function to construct a sub-PKG key material with a trapdoor, and the independence of the sub-PKG is improved through a hierarchical identity structure. The biggest advantage is that it supports multi-level key distribution and permission isolation management of revocation operations, which can effectively solve the single-point bottleneck problem caused by centralized key update in a large-scale network.

[0028] Specifically, step S2 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S21, a user queries a sub-PKG corresponding to a target chain to which the user accesses through a control chain; and a satellite does not need to query and is responsible for by a root PKG; S22, a user / satellite sends a registration request to the sub-PKG in step S21, and the registration request contains a real identity ID and timestamp information; the sub-PKG / the root PKG performs validity check on the timestamp contained in the received registration request, and judges whether the timestamp is within a preset valid time of 5 minutes; S23, the sub-PKG / the root PKG respectively checks the state of the real identity ID contained in the received registration request, specifically including: querying whether the real identity ID is in a registered effective state or has been marked as a revoked state; if the checking result is that the real identity is in the registered effective state, the current registration process is terminated and the registration request is rejected; S24, if the real identity is not marked as a registered state, the sub-PKG / the root PKG calls a DelegateKeys algorithm and a ChameleonHash algorithm to jointly generate a pseudo-identity, a public key, a private key and a hash commitment value of the bound pseudo-identity uniquely associated with the real identity; if the real identity has been marked as a revoked state, the sub-PKG / the root PKG queries the revocation attribute information thereof; S25, when the revocation attribute is non-recoverable revocation caused by malicious behavior, terminate the registration process; when the revocation attribute is recoverable revocation caused by non-malicious behavior, only regenerate a new hash commitment value matching the current state of the real identity; S26, the sub-PKG / the root PKG sends a secure channel to the user or satellite, and generates a registration certificate through a signature algorithm, and uploads it to the blockchain of the system together with the public parameters of the real identity.

[0029] As a preferred, the Chameleon Hash algorithm introduces a controllable collision Chameleon Hash structure, so that the PKG can generate a unique and revocable tracking hash commitment value for each registered entity.

[0030] Specifically, the Chameleon Hash algorithm generates a commitment value of the pseudo-identity, realizes identity verification and controllable revocation, and the DelegateKeys algorithm adds a pseudo-identity generation process based on the hash function while generating user public and private keys, replacing the real identity ID identifier used in the original algorithm. Through the mapping of "real identity ID→pseudo identity", the risk of user privacy leakage is effectively avoided while maintaining the uniqueness of authentication. And support for user access anonymity, authentication credential uniqueness and revocation mechanism traceability provides key support for subsequent authentication and security incident tracing.

[0031] Specifically, the ChameleonHash algorithm is Algorithm 3: ChameleonHash Input: Pidnode, VK Output: h, r, v function ChameleonHash r← v←H(Pidnode) h←VK* (v, r) return h, r, v endfunction.

[0032] Therefore, the Chameleon Hash algorithm introduces a controllable collision Chameleon Hash structure, so that the PKG can generate a unique and revocable tracking hash commitment value (h, r, v) for each registered entity.

[0033] Specifically, the step S3 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S31, the user / satellite signs the key and timestamp of the pseudo-identity by the Sign algorithm to generate signature information; S32, the pseudo-identity generation key in step S31 is packaged with the signature information and broadcast to the target blockchain; S33, the target blockchain in step S32 verifies the received pseudo-identity generation key and signature information for legality by the Verify algorithm, and after verification and confirmation that the entity identity corresponding to the pseudo-identity generation key is legal, access consensus is reached to allow the registered subject to access the system's blockchain.

[0034] The signature and verification algorithm is built on the hierarchical identity-based signature system based on the polynomial ring lattice password, supports efficient and short signature length identity authentication, and essentially has quantum security. The hierarchical design combined with the pseudo-identity structure supports dynamic access while maintaining clear system authentication logic, low latency, and low bandwidth, suitable for resource-constrained scenarios in star-ground integrated networks.

[0035] Specifically, step S4 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S41, when the user initiates active revocation, sends a revocation request one to the corresponding sub-PKG; when the satellite initiates active revocation, sends a revocation request two to the root-PKG, the revocation request one and the revocation request two contain the pseudo-identity identifier, the hash commitment value, the timestamp and the signature of these information at the same time; S42, according to the validity of the timestamp and the signature in step S41, the sub-PKG or the root-PKG calls the revocation Revoke algorithm, generates a revocation marker using the corresponding revocation key RK and the revocation key sRK, and broadcasts the pseudo-identity identifier PID, the revocation marker, the timestamp and the signature of these contents to the blockchain of the system; S43, the blockchain of the system uses the verification key VK / verification key sVK to verify whether the authentication consistency equation is established, when the equation is established, the pseudo-identity identifier, the revocation marker and the timestamp are stored in the revocation list, at this time the commitment value of the identity is invalid, and the revocation is completed; if the equation is not established, the revocation fails; S44, passive revocation does not need to send a request.

[0036] Using the Revoke algorithm can realize a key-level identity freezing mechanism and support fine-grained access control. The algorithm can prevent the problem of replacing the pseudo-identity of the revoked user to re-register, and ensure the full life cycle validity of the revocation and the identity unforgeability.

[0037] Specifically, the authentication consistency equation is the equation A'm + Ar = A'm' + Ar', wherein the verification key VK is composed of A' and A, m and m' respectively correspond to the core parameters of the original hash commitment and the hash commitment after revocation, and r and r' are respectively the original random number generated by the ChameleonHash algorithm and the random number generated by the Revoke algorithm after revocation.

[0038] The DelegateKeys algorithm adds a pseudo-identity generation process based on a hash function while generating user public and private keys, replacing the real identity ID used in the original algorithm. Through the mapping of "real identity ID → pseudo identity", the risk of user privacy leakage is effectively avoided, while maintaining the uniqueness of authentication, supporting the anonymity of user access, the uniqueness of authentication credentials, and the traceability of the revocation mechanism, providing key support for subsequent authentication and security incident tracing. In addition, traditional hash is irreversible, making it difficult to realize identity binding with traceability, so the Chameleon Hash algorithm introduces a controllable collision chameleon hash structure, enabling the PKG to generate a unique and revocable traceable hash commitment value (h, r, v) for each registered entity.

[0039] Specifically, the Revoke is specifically: Algorithm 4: Revoke Input: Pidnode, RK, VK, v, r Output: v’, r’ function Revoke If (Pidnode is not a malicious user and actively requests revocation) v’=H(Pidnode |0) If (Pidnode is a malicious user) v’=H(Pidnode |1) u ← VK[1]tv - VK[1]tv’ + VK[0]tr r’ ← SamplePre(VK[0],RK, u) return v’, r’ end function。

[0040] In order to prove the security and performance of the scheme, the theoretical security analysis of the scheme is carried out, and its performance is tested through experiments. Please refer to Figure 3The results show that the scheme can effectively perform parallel access authentication in the anti-quantum scheme and improve the overall efficiency of the system.

[0041] The above merely describes preferred embodiments of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. Any modification, equivalent replacement or improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based quantum-resistant satellite-ground fusion network access authentication method, characterized in that: The specific steps of the authentication method are as follows: S1. System Initialization Phase: Generate a root PKG, extract and generate sub-PKGs based on the root PKG, distribute keys at the AP layer using the root PKG, manage key distribution for users on their corresponding AP chains using the sub-PKGs, and upload the common parameters of the sub-PKGs and the root PKGs, as well as the blockchain information managed by each sub-PKG and the root PKG, to the system control chain; both the root PKG and the sub-PKGs include corresponding master public key, master private key, pseudo-identity generation key, revocation key, and verification key; S2, Registration Phase: The user / satellite sends a registration request containing real identity and timestamp to the root PKG or sub-PKG corresponding to step S1. The root PKG or sub-PKG verifies the real identity and timestamp. After verifying the real identity, it generates a registration certificate and uploads it to the system blockchain along with the public parameters of the real identity identifier. The public parameters include a hash commitment value. S3. Access Phase: After generating a key and timestamp signature for its pseudo-identity, the user / satellite broadcasts it to the target blockchain. The target blockchain verifies the legitimacy of the signature and the corresponding real entity's identity to reach an access consensus and allow it to access the system's target blockchain.

2. The blockchain-based quantum-resistant satellite-ground fusion network access authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The authentication method includes the following steps: S4. Revocation Phase: When a user / satellite actively deregisters, a revocation request is sent to the corresponding root PKG or sub-PKG. The root PKG or sub-PKG generates a revocation token containing revocation key information for the verified revocation request and broadcasts the revocation request to the system blockchain. The system blockchain determines whether to execute the revocation by verifying the revocation key and the hash commitment value.

3. A blockchain-based quantum-resistant satellite-ground fusion network access authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The root PKG includes the master public key mpk, the master private key msk, the pseudo identity generation key PSK, the revocation key RK, and the verification key VK; the sub-PKG includes the master public key smpk, the master private key smsk, the pseudo identity generation key sPSK, the revocation key sRK, and the verification key sVK. The root PKG or the sub-PKG verifies the real identity and timestamp. After verifying the real identity, it generates a master public key mpk, a master private key msk, and a pseudo identity generation key PSK, or a master public key smpk, a master private key smsk, and a pseudo identity generation key sPSK and sends them to the registration subject. It then generates a registration certificate through a signature algorithm and uploads it to the system blockchain along with the public parameters of the real identity identifier.

4. A blockchain-based anti-quantum satellite-ground fusion network access authentication mechanism method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, a root PKG is generated using the Setup algorithm. The Setup algorithm generates system security parameters based on the ring SIS problem in lattice cryptography and generates root PKG key material.

5. A blockchain-based quantum-resistant satellite-ground fusion network access authentication mechanism method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, a sub-PKG is generated based on the root PKG using the ExtractForPKG algorithm. The ExtractForPKG algorithm uses a lattice trapdoor function to construct the sub-PKG key material with trapdoors and improves the independence of the sub-PKG through a hierarchical identity structure.

6. A blockchain-based quantum-resistant satellite-ground fusion network access authentication mechanism method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S2 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S21. Users query the sub-PKG corresponding to their target chain through the control chain; satellites are handled by the root PKG and do not require querying. S22. The user / satellite sends a registration request to the sub-PKG in step S21. The registration request includes a real identity ID and timestamp information. The sub-PKG / the root PKG verifies the validity of the timestamp contained in the received registration request and determines whether the timestamp is within a preset valid time of 5 minutes. S23. The sub-PKG / root PKG respectively perform status verification on the real identity identifier ID contained in the received registration request, specifically including: querying whether the real identity identifier ID is in the registration effective state or whether it has been marked as revoked; if the verification result is that the real identity identifier is in the registration effective state, then terminate the current registration process and reject the registration request. S24. If the real identity is not marked as registered, the sub-PKG / the root PKG calls the DelegateKeys algorithm and the ChameleonHash algorithm to jointly generate a pseudo identity, public key, private key, and hash commitment value bound to the pseudo identity that are uniquely associated with the real identity; if the real identity has been marked as revoked, the sub-PKG / the root PKG queries its revocation attribute information. S25. When the revocation attribute is an irreversible revocation caused by malicious behavior, the registration process is terminated; when the revocation attribute is a recoverable revocation caused by non-malicious behavior, only a new hash commitment value matching the current state of the real identity is regenerated. S26. The sub-PKG / root PKG sends a secure channel to the user or satellite and generates a registration certificate through a signature algorithm, which is then uploaded to the system's blockchain along with the public parameters of the real identity.

7. A blockchain-based anti-quantum satellite-ground fusion network access authentication mechanism method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The Chameleon Hash algorithm introduces a controllable collision chameleon hash structure, enabling PKG to generate a unique and reversible traceable hash commitment value for each registered entity.

8. A blockchain-based anti-quantum satellite-ground fusion network access authentication mechanism method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S3 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S31. The user / satellite uses the Sign algorithm to sign its own pseudo-identity using a key and a timestamp, generating signature information. S32. Package the pseudo-identity generation key and signature information from step S31 and broadcast them to the target blockchain. S33. The target blockchain in step S32 uses the Verify algorithm to verify the legality of the received pseudo-identity generation key and signature information. After the verification is passed and the entity identity corresponding to the pseudo-identity generation key is confirmed to be legal, an access consensus is reached to allow the registered entity to access the blockchain of the system.

9. A blockchain-based quantum-resistant satellite-ground fusion network access authentication mechanism according to claim 2, characterized in that: Step S4 specifically includes the following sub-steps: S41. When a user initiates a voluntary cancellation, a cancellation request 1 is sent to the corresponding sub-PKG; when a satellite initiates a voluntary cancellation, a cancellation request 2 is sent to the root PKG. Both cancellation request 1 and cancellation request 2 contain a pseudo-identity identifier, a hash commitment value, a timestamp, and a signature of these information. S42. After verifying the validity of the timestamp and signature according to the sub-PKG or the root PKG in step S41, the Revoke algorithm is called to generate a revocation mark using the corresponding revocation key RK and revocation key sRK, and the pseudo identity identifier, revocation mark, timestamp and signature of these contents are broadcast to the blockchain of the system. S43. The blockchain of the system uses verification key VK / verification key sVK to verify whether the authentication consistency equation is true. When the equation is true, the pseudo identity identifier, revocation mark and timestamp are stored in the revocation list. At this time, the commitment value of the identity becomes invalid and the revocation is completed. If the equation is false, the cancellation will fail; S44. Passive cancellation, on the other hand, does not require sending a request.

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