A DCS architecture for a nuclear power reactor

Abstract

The present invention discloses a DCS architecture for a nuclear power reactor, which includes a safety-class DCS and a non-safety-class DCS; the non-safety-class DCS includes non-safety-class monitoring devices on the operation station, a monitoring network, a non-safety-class gateway, a real-time server, a system network, a first control station, a diversity drive system, etc.; the non-safety-class monitoring devices, the monitoring network, the real-time server, the system network, and the first control station are connected in sequence; the safety-class DCS includes several protection groups, a dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, a data transmission cabinet, a safety-class bus, a safety-class gateway, an equipment interface cabinet, safety-class monitoring devices on the backup panel, etc.; the safety-class bus, the safety-class gateway, the non-safety-class gateway, and the monitoring network are connected in sequence. Implementing the present invention can construct a compact main control room layout scheme on the premise of ensuring the basic functions of the main control room.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power plants, and particularly to a DCS architecture for a nuclear power reactor. Background Art

[0002] The digital distributed control system (DCS) is an integrated control system that emerged with the continuous rise of modern large-scale industrial production automation and the increasing complexity of process control requirements. It has extremely strong data processing and communication capabilities and is a modern device for completing process control and management, and improving the operation safety, reliability, and management efficiency of nuclear power plants. Currently, the main reference for the digital nuclear power main control room architecture solution based on DCS is the main control room architecture solution of land-based commercial nuclear power plants. As Figure 1 shown, it is divided into a safety-class DCS and a non-safety-class DCS, which are implemented on different platforms. The safety-class DCS mainly completes the monitoring of safety-class equipment information, and the non-safety-class DCS mainly completes the monitoring of non-safety-class equipment information. The two can transmit information through a gateway. There is a non-safety-class monitoring device (NC-VDU) on the operator workstation (OWP) in the main control room. The signal goes to the server through the monitoring network (MNET), and then is connected to the control cabinet on the first floor through the system network (SNET) to monitor the in-situ non-safety-class actuators through the control cabinet; at the same time, the NC-VDU also has a control means for performing a screen adjustment operation on the safety-class equipment. It calls the safety-class monitoring device S-VDU on the OWP through the MNET and the gateway to the human-machine interface bus (HMDataBus), and then monitors the safety-class information on the S-VDU. The S-VDU monitors the safety-class actuators through the safety-class bus (SafetyBus) to the equipment interface cabinet (CIC). Among them, there are the following several ways to operate the safety-class equipment:

[0003] 1. Non-safety-class monitoring device in the main control room → monitoring network → non-safety-class gateway → safety-class gateway → human-machine interface bus → safety-class monitoring device in the main control room → safety-class bus → CIC cabinet → equipment;

[0004] 2. Safety-class monitoring device in the main control room → safety-class bus → CIC cabinet → equipment;

[0005] 3. Diverse drive system monitoring device in the main control room → diverse drive system terminal bus → diverse drive system server → diverse drive system control bus → diverse drive system second control station → CIC cabinet → equipment.

[0006] The above digital nuclear power plant DCS architecture is for the main control room of onshore nuclear power plants, where there is sufficient space and a relatively large scale to ensure that the equipment has sufficient redundancy and diversity. However, for the main control room of a nuclear power plant with a compact layout, due to limited building space, the requirements cannot be met. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The object of the present invention is to provide a DCS architecture for nuclear power reactors to meet the compactness requirements of the main control room of nuclear power plants.

[0008] To achieve the object of the present invention, an embodiment of the present invention provides a DCS architecture for nuclear power reactors, which is characterized by including a safety-class DCS and a non-safety-class DCS; different platforms are adopted for the safety-class DCS and the non-safety-class DCS.

[0009] The non-safety-class DCS includes non-safety-class monitoring devices (NC-VDU) on the operator station, a monitoring network, a non-safety-class gateway, a real-time server, a system network, a first control station, and a diversity drive system; the non-safety-class monitoring devices, the monitoring network, the real-time server, the system network, and the first control station are connected in sequence;

[0010] The non-safety-class monitoring devices on the operator station can monitor the information of both safety-class and non-safety-class devices simultaneously, and the non-safety-class monitoring devices are communicatively connected to the monitoring network;

[0011] The diversity drive system includes a diversity drive system monitoring panel, a terminal bus, a server, a control bus, and a second control station; among them, the diversity drive system monitoring panel is provided with non-safety-class monitoring devices (NC-VDU), is connected to the server through the terminal bus, the server is connected to the second control station through the control bus, and the second control station is connected to the equipment interface cabinet and the first control station.

[0012] The safety-class DCS includes several protection groups, a dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, a data transmission cabinet, a safety-class bus, a safety-class gateway, an equipment interface cabinet, safety-class monitoring devices (S-VDU) on the backup panel (BUP), etc.

[0013] The safety-class bus, the safety-class gateway, the non-safety-class gateway, and the monitoring network are connected in sequence;

[0014] Preferably, the safety-class DCS is provided with a data transmission cabinet (DTC), a dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (ESFAC), an equipment interface cabinet (CIC), and safety-class monitoring devices (S-VDU) on the backup panel, and the data transmission cabinet (DTC), the dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (ESFAC), the equipment interface cabinet (CIC), and the safety-class monitoring devices (S-VDU) are all connected to the corresponding safety-class bus.

[0015] Preferably, the non - safety DCS further includes an engineer station, a historical server, and a computing server, and the engineer station, the historical server, and the computing server are respectively connected to the monitoring network.

[0016] Preferably, the non - safety DCS includes a system network and a communication station, and the real - time server, the first control station, and the communication station are respectively connected to the system network.

[0017] Preferably, the first control station is respectively connected to a remote I / O cabinet and a field bus cabinet, and the remote I / O cabinet and the field bus cabinet are connected to field devices.

[0018] Preferably, the communication station is connected to a third - party instrument control system, and the third - party instrument control system is connected to field devices.

[0019] Preferably, field devices include field sensors and actuators.

[0020] Preferably, the DCS architecture further includes a severe accident monitoring system, and the severe accident monitoring system is respectively connected to the CIC cabinet and the system network.

[0021] The embodiments of the present invention have the following beneficial effects:

[0022] 1. The main control room implemented based on the DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor proposed in the embodiments of the present invention reduces the safety - level monitoring devices (S - VDUs) on the operation stations compared to the main control room of on - shore nuclear power plants, simplifies the second - layer monitoring devices, and saves costs; at the same time, it provides a reference for the design of a compactly arranged nuclear power main control room and facilitates the implementation of human - factor designs such as channel and equipment layout.

[0023] 2. The embodiments of the present invention provide a new monitoring path. Non - safety - level monitoring devices (NC - VDUs) that can simultaneously monitor the information of safety - level and non - safety - level devices are set on the operation stations in the main control room. Through the non - safety - level monitoring devices (NC - VDUs), direct control of safety - level devices can be achieved, simplifying the monitoring means, solving the complexity brought by the screen - adjustment operation, and reducing human - factor risks.

[0024] 3. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor in the embodiments of the present invention meets the requirements of the standard for the defense - in - depth system: at least two defense levels are implemented on different platforms and are independent of each other. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0025] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings.

[0026] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the DCS architecture of an existing land-based commercial nuclear power plant.

[0027] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the non-safety-class DCS architecture in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the safety-class DCS architecture in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0029] Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the diversity drive system in the embodiment of the present invention.

[0030] Reference numerals:

[0031] Operator station 1, monitoring network 2, non-safety-class gateway 3, real-time server 4, system network 5, first control station 6, diversity drive system 7, diversity drive system monitoring panel 71, terminal bus 72, diversity drive system server 73, control bus 74, second control station 75, dedicated safety facility drive cabinet 8, data transmission cabinet 9, safety-class bus 10, safety-class gateway 11, equipment interface cabinet 12, engineer station 13, historical server 14, computing server 15, communication station 16, third-party instrument control system 17, remote I / O cabinet 18, field bus cabinet 19, field device 20, severe accident monitoring system 21. Detailed implementation manners

[0032] The following will detail various exemplary embodiments, features, and aspects of the present disclosure with reference to the drawings. The same reference numerals in the drawings denote elements having the same or similar functions. Although various aspects of the embodiments are shown in the drawings, the drawings do not have to be drawn to scale unless otherwise specified.

[0033] In addition, for a better illustration of the present invention, numerous specific details are given in the following specific embodiments. Those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention can also be implemented without some of these specific details. In some instances, means, elements, and circuits well known to those skilled in the art are not described in detail so as to highlight the gist of the present invention.

[0034] The embodiment of the present invention is directed to Figure 1 the DCS architecture shown, and proposes as Figures 2 - 4The shown nuclear power plant DCS architecture includes a safety-class DCS and a non-safety-class DCS; the safety-class DCS and the non-safety-class DCS adopt different platforms.

[0035] Among them, the non-safety-class DCS includes non-safety-class monitoring devices (NC-VDU) on the operator station, a monitoring network, a non-safety-class gateway, a real-time server, a system network, a first control station, a diversity drive system, etc.; the non-safety-class monitoring devices, the monitoring network, the real-time server, the system network, and the first control station are connected in sequence;

[0036] Among them, the non-safety-class monitoring device (NC-VDU) on the operator station can monitor the information of both safety-class and non-safety-class devices at the same time, and the non-safety-class monitoring device is communicatively connected to the monitoring network;

[0037] Among them, the diversity drive system includes a diversity drive system monitoring panel, a terminal bus, a server, a control bus, and a second control station; among them, the diversity drive system monitoring panel is provided with a non-safety-class monitoring device (NC-VDU), and is connected to the server through the terminal bus, the server is connected to the second control station through the control bus, and the second control station is connected to the equipment interface cabinet and the first control station.

[0038] Specifically, the monitoring or operation method of the safety-class devices in the embodiments of the present invention is as follows:

[0039] Under normal circumstances: non-safety-class monitoring devices in the main control room → monitoring network → non-safety-class gateway → safety-class gateway → safety-class bus → CIC cabinet → safety-class devices. Among them, → represents the transmission direction of the control instruction.

[0040] Among them, the safety-class devices feedback safety-class device information according to the safety-class device control instruction, which is transmitted to the safety-class bus through the CIC cabinet or other devices, and then sequentially passes through the safety-class gateway, non-safety-class gateway, monitoring network to the non-safety-class monitoring device to complete the monitoring of the safety-class device information.

[0041] As another monitoring method: diversity drive system monitoring devices in the main control room → diversity drive system terminal bus → diversity drive system server → diversity drive system control bus → diversity drive system second control station → CIC cabinet → safety-class devices. Among them, → represents the transmission direction of the control instruction.

[0042] Among them, the safety-class devices feedback safety-class device information according to the safety-class device control instruction, which is transmitted to the diversity drive system monitoring device through the CIC cabinet, diversity drive system second control station, diversity drive system control bus, diversity drive system server, and diversity drive system terminal center to complete the monitoring of the safety-class device information.

[0043] Among them, the safety-class DCS includes several protection groups, dedicated safety facility drive cabinets, data transmission cabinets, safety-class buses, safety-class gateways, equipment interface cabinets (CIC, Component Interface Cabinet), safety-class monitoring devices (S-VDU) on the backup panel (BUP), etc.

[0044] Among them, the CIC cabinet is used to receive multiple control instructions for safety-class equipment, perform priority management on multiple control instructions from different locations, and then the CIC cabinet preferentially executes control instructions with higher priorities. In this embodiment, the CIC cabinet distributes the control instructions to the corresponding safety-class equipment according to the priority information of the control instructions under the operator workstation. It should be noted that the CIC cabinet (Component Interface System) is a general term and varies according to different unit scales.

[0045] Among them, the safety-class bus, safety-class gateway, non-safety-class gateway, and the monitoring network are connected in sequence;

[0046] Specifically, the embodiment of the present invention simplifies the main control room system and equipment scale, not only reduces the cost, but also meets the limited space requirements. On the premise of ensuring the basic functions of the main control room, a compact main control room layout scheme is constructed, providing conditions for the design of a compact nuclear power main control room; in addition, by comparison Figures 1 - 3 , it can be seen that the embodiment of the present invention cancels devices such as the safety-class monitoring device S-VDU and the man-machine interface bus on the workstation, connects the safety-class bus of the safety-class DCS with the monitoring network of the non-safety-class DCS through the safety-class gateway and the non-safety-class gateway, establishes information communication between the safety-class DCS and the non-safety-class DCS, and the non-safety-class monitoring device (NC-VDU) on the workstation (OWP) is connected to the monitoring network. Therefore, the operator can directly monitor the safety-class equipment information through the non-safety-class monitoring device (NC-VDU), optimizing the monitoring means; at the same time, it also meets the requirements of the standard for the defense-in-depth level of nuclear safety.

[0047] Specifically, after the non-safety-class DCS fails in the embodiment of the present invention, the reactor is brought to the safe shutdown state through the backup panel (BUP); when the safety-class DCS fails, the reactor is brought to the safe shutdown state through the diversified drive system.

[0048] In this embodiment, the safety-class DCS is provided with a data transmission cabinet (DTC), a dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (ESFAC), a device interface cabinet (CIC), and safety-class monitoring devices (BUP S-VDU) on the backup panel. The data transmission cabinet (DTC), the dedicated safety facility drive cabinet (ESFAC), the device interface cabinet (CIC), and the safety-class monitoring devices (S-VDU) are all connected to the corresponding safety-class bus. In the figure, the safety-class DCS is divided into four protection groups, and the four protection groups are redundant with each other. Each protection group includes two control stations "Gr1 / Gr2", and Gr1 and Gr2 are redundant with each other; "A1 / A2" means that there are two redundant subgroups in column A.

[0049] Specifically, there are 2 safety-class buses in this embodiment, divided into columns A / B. The first protection group and the third protection group are in column A, and the second protection group and the fourth protection group are in column B. All ESFACs, DTCs, and S-VDUs are not necessarily only 1 on each safety-class bus. Among them, the protection group is used to collect sensor and device status information related to the safety class for participating in the protection function, and at the same time perform logical processing of the automatic control function and send operation instructions to the safety-class devices. Among them, each protection group preferably includes a reactor protection system (RPS), a data transmission cabinet (DTC), a safety facility drive cabinet (ESFAC), and a safety-class monitoring device (S-VDU), etc. It should be noted that the composition of the functional devices of the protection group is specifically configured according to actual technical requirements, and is not specifically limited in this embodiment. The partial composition of the protection groups of different nuclear power reactors may be different.

[0050] In this embodiment, the non-safety DCS includes an engineer station, a historical server, and a computing server. The engineer station, the real-time server, the historical server, and the computing server are respectively connected to the monitoring network.

[0051] Among them, the engineer station is used for DCS device inspection, software change, configuration download, etc.; the real-time server is used to collect process data from the DCS1 layer in real time, send it to the computing server for processing, and at the same time send the operator's commands to the DCS1 layer; the computing server is used to receive all information from the real-time server, organize and save it; at the same time, it also has a global computing function to manage alarms, logs, etc. The historical server is used to receive alarm and log information from the computing server, organize and store historical data for a long time, etc.

[0052] In this embodiment, the non-safety DCS includes a system network and a communication station. The real-time server, the first control station, and the communication station are respectively connected to the system network.

[0053] The real-time server includes a Conventional Island (CI) real-time server and a Nuclear Island (NI) real-time server. The NI real-time server is used to send the relevant information collected and processed by the control cabinet to the main control room for display, and send the operation instructions from the main control room to the control cabinet on the first floor to control the on-site equipment. The CI real-time server has the same function as the NI server. When operating normally, the NI server transmits NI-related information, and the CI server transmits CI-related information; in case of a failure, the NI server and the CI server can be used as backups for each other.

[0054] In this embodiment, the first control station is respectively connected to the remote I / O cabinet and the fieldbus cabinet, and the remote I / O cabinet and the fieldbus cabinet are connected to the on-site equipment (non-safety-class equipment).

[0055] In this embodiment, the communication station is connected to a third-party instrument control system, and the third-party instrument control system is connected to the on-site equipment. The communication station is used for information communication with the third-party system and realizes the monitoring of the third-party system according to the control instructions below the operator workstation. Specifically, the third-party system is a system that realizes logic processing within a non-DCS system.

[0056] In this embodiment, the on-site equipment includes on-site sensors and actuators, etc.

[0057] In this embodiment, the DCS architecture further includes a severe accident monitoring system, and the severe accident monitoring system is respectively connected to the CIC cabinet and the system network. Specifically, the severe accident monitoring system is used for mitigation functions in the severe accident condition of the loss of all alternating current.

[0058] Relative to Figure 1 the existing technology, the embodiment of the present invention cancels the connection between the monitoring network of the non-safety-class DCS and the man-machine interface bus, and instead connects the monitoring network of the non-safety-class DCS to the safety-class bus of the safety-class DCS. This solution cancels the monitoring of the safety-class device information by the safety-class monitoring device (S-VDU) and the man-machine interface bus and other devices on the operator station directly through the non-safety-class monitoring device (NC-VDU).

[0059] It should be noted that the DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor in this embodiment mainly improves the monitoring method of safety-class equipment, and thereby simplifies the DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor, enabling the simplified DCS architecture to meet the requirements of compact layout. Among them, the CIC cabinet, the real-time server of the conventional island, the real-time server of the nuclear island, the control station, the communication station, the engineer station, the historical server, the computing server, the severe accident system, the reactor protection system, the data transmission cabinet, the safety facility drive cabinet, the safety-class monitoring equipment, the non-safety-class monitoring equipment, the field equipment, etc. are all conventional configurations in the existing DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor, and different nuclear power plants have different technical requirements and can be selected according to actual technical requirements. Therefore, the functions and specific structures of these functional components are well-known to those skilled in the art, and will not be elaborated in this embodiment.

[0060] From the description of the above embodiments, it can be seen that the embodiments of the present invention have the following advantages:

[0061] 1. The main control room implemented based on the DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor proposed in the embodiments of the present invention has fewer safety-class monitoring devices S-VDU on the operator stations compared to the main control room of land-based nuclear power plants, simplifies the secondary monitoring equipment, saves costs, provides a reference for the design of the main control room of the nuclear power with compact layout, and facilitates the implementation of human factors design such as channels and equipment layout.

[0062] 2. The embodiments of the present invention provide a new monitoring path. Non-safety-class monitoring devices (NC-VDU) capable of simultaneously monitoring the information of safety-class and non-safety-class equipment are provided on the operator stations in the main control room. Through the non-safety-class monitoring devices (NC-VDU), direct control of safety-class equipment can be achieved, which simplifies the monitoring means, solves the cumbersome nature brought by the screen adjustment operation, and reduces the human factor risk.

[0063] 3. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor in the embodiments of the present invention meets the requirements of the standard for the defense-in-depth system: at least two defense levels are implemented using different platforms and are independent of each other.

[0064] The above have described the embodiments of the present invention. The above description is exemplary and not exhaustive, and is not limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and variations are obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in the technical field without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The choice of terms used herein is intended to best explain the principles of the embodiments, practical applications, or improvements to the technology in the market, or to enable other ordinary skilled persons in the technical field to understand the disclosed embodiments.

Claims

1. A DCS architecture for a nuclear power reactor, characterized in that, It includes a safety-class DCS and a non-safety-class DCS; The non-safety-class DCS includes non-safety-class monitoring devices on the operator station, a monitoring network, a non-safety-class gateway, a real-time server, a system network, a first control station, and a diversified drive system; the non-safety-class monitoring devices, the monitoring network, the real-time server, the system network, and the first control station are connected in sequence; The non-safety-class monitoring devices on the operator station are used to monitor both safety-class and non-safety-class device information, and the non-safety-class monitoring devices are communicatively connected to the monitoring network; The diversified drive system includes a diversified drive system monitoring panel, a terminal bus, a server, a control bus, and a second control station; among them, the diversified drive system monitoring panel is provided with non-safety-class monitoring devices, is connected to the server through the terminal bus, the server is connected to the second control station through the control bus, and the second control station is connected to the equipment interface cabinet and the first control station; The safety-class DCS includes several protection groups, a dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, a data transmission cabinet, a safety-class bus, a safety-class gateway, an equipment interface cabinet, and safety-class monitoring devices on the backup panel; The safety-class bus, the safety-class gateway, the non-safety-class gateway, and the monitoring network are connected in sequence.

2. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 1, characterized in that Among them, The safety-class DCS is provided with a data transmission cabinet, a dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, an equipment interface cabinet, and safety-class monitoring devices on the backup panel, and the data transmission cabinet, the dedicated safety facility drive cabinet, the equipment interface cabinet, and the safety-class monitoring devices are all connected to the corresponding safety-class bus.

3. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 2, characterized in that The non-safety DCS further includes an engineer station, a historical server, and a computing server, and the engineer station, the historical server, and the computing server are respectively connected to the monitoring network.

4. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 3, characterized in that, The non-safety DCS includes a system network, a first control station, and a communication station, and the real-time server, the first control station, and the communication station are respectively connected to the system network.

5. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 4, characterized in that The first control station is respectively connected to a remote I / O cabinet and a field bus cabinet, and the remote I / O cabinet and the field bus cabinet are respectively connected to field devices.

6. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 5, characterized in that, The communication station is connected to a third-party instrument control system, and the third-party instrument control system is connected to field devices.

7. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 6, characterized in that, The field devices include field sensors and actuators.

8. The DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor according to claim 7, characterized in that, The DCS architecture further includes a severe accident monitoring system, and the severe accident monitoring system is respectively connected to the equipment interface cabinet and the system network.

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