Intrusion kernel detection method and device based on target range, computing equipment, and computer storage medium
By building a shooting range in the device, simulating the attack on preset vulnerable codes by the intruder process, evaluating the detection effect of the intruder kernel detection system, solving the problem that the intruder kernel detection effect cannot be guaranteed in the existing technology, and realizing the intruder kernel detection system Improved effectiveness evaluation and detection effect.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201910691025.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2019-07-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-07-29
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology cannot effectively detect whether the process intruding the kernel attacks the ROOT permissions, and cannot guarantee the accuracy of the detection effect.
Implant preset vulnerability code into a device equipped with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a shooting range, simulate the process of running an intrusion kernel attacking the preset vulnerability code, and obtain the detection results of the intrusion kernel detection system to evaluate the effectiveness of the detection system .
By building a shooting range on real devices and simulating the process of running the intruding kernel, it can effectively detect the detection effect of the intruding kernel detection system and ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of the intruding kernel detection system.
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Figure CN112307482B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of software, and in particular to a method and device for detecting an intrusion kernel based on a target range, a computing device, and a computer storage medium. Background Art
[0002] The goal of an attacker invading the kernel is to obtain the ROOT privileges of the device so that they can use the ROOT privileges to control the entire device. Based on kernel security considerations, the process that invades the kernel is detected to quickly and timely find out whether the process is attacking the ROOT.
[0003] As for whether the detection of kernel intrusion is effective and whether it can detect the attack of the process on ROOT, it is only verified in the actual device, which cannot guarantee the detection effect. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a target range for kernel intrusion detection to evaluate the detection effect of kernel intrusion detection. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of the above problems, the present invention is proposed to provide a target range-based intrusion kernel detection method and apparatus, computing equipment, and computer storage medium that overcome the above problems or at least partially solve the above problems.
[0005] According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for detecting an intrusion kernel based on a target range is provided, which comprises:
[0006] Implant preset vulnerability codes into devices equipped with intrusion kernel detection systems to build a target range;
[0007] Simulate the process of invading the kernel in the shooting range to attack the preset vulnerability code;
[0008] The detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process is obtained, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result.
[0009] According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a target range-based intrusion kernel detection device, which comprises:
[0010] An implantation module, suitable for implanting preset vulnerability codes into a device provided with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a target range;
[0011] The simulation module is suitable for simulating the process of running the intrusion kernel in the target range to attack the preset vulnerability code;
[0012] The acquisition module is adapted to acquire the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result.
[0013] According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computing device, comprising: a processor, a memory, a communication interface and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the memory and the communication interface communicate with each other via the communication bus;
[0014] The memory is used to store at least one executable instruction, and the executable instruction enables the processor to execute operations corresponding to the above-mentioned target range-based intrusion kernel detection method.
[0015] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer storage medium is provided, in which at least one executable instruction is stored, and the executable instruction enables a processor to perform operations corresponding to the above-mentioned target range-based intrusion kernel detection method.
[0016] According to the target range-based intrusion kernel detection method and device, computing equipment, and computer storage medium provided by the present invention, a preset vulnerability code is implanted in a device provided with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a target range; the process of intrusion kernel is simulated to run in the target range to attack the preset vulnerability code; the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process is obtained, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result. By building a target range on a real device and simulating the process of intrusion kernel, it is possible to detect whether the intrusion kernel detection system is effective and evaluate the detection effect of the intrusion kernel detection system.
[0017] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of the present invention. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the present invention, it can be implemented according to the contents of the specification. In order to make the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are listed below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0018] Various other advantages and benefits will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art by reading the detailed description of the preferred embodiments below. The accompanying drawings are only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments and are not to be considered as limiting the present invention. Moreover, the same reference symbols are used throughout the accompanying drawings to represent the same components. In the accompanying drawings:
[0019] Figure 1 A flow chart of a method for detecting an intrusion kernel based on a target range according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0020] Figure 2 A flowchart of a process detection system for intrusion kernel detection according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0021] Figure 3 A functional block diagram of a target range-based intrusion kernel detection device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;
[0022] Figure 4A schematic diagram of the structure of a computing device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0023] The exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Although the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure are shown in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the present disclosure can be implemented in various forms and should not be limited by the embodiments set forth herein. On the contrary, these embodiments are provided to enable a more thorough understanding of the present disclosure and to fully convey the scope of the present disclosure to those skilled in the art.
[0024] Figure 1 FIG. 4 is a flow chart showing a method for detecting an intrusion kernel based on a target range according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the intrusion kernel detection method based on the target range specifically includes the following steps:
[0025] Step S101, implanting a preset vulnerability code into a device provided with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a target range.
[0026] In order to detect the effectiveness of the intrusion kernel detection system and to ensure that the intrusion kernel detection system can accurately and timely detect the process of intrusion kernel, this embodiment builds a shooting range in a real device, and uses the shooting range to simulate various attack operations of the intrusion kernel process, thereby obtaining the detection effect of the intrusion kernel detection system.
[0027] The target range is built in a real device equipped with an intrusion kernel detection system, so as to simulate the detection effect of the intrusion kernel detection system under the real device. The target range construction requires the implantation of preset vulnerability codes in the device to provide objects that the process of intrusion kernel can attack. The preset vulnerability codes are set for various vulnerability types of intrusion kernel, including stack overflow vulnerability codes, heap overflow vulnerability codes, use after free (UFA), arbitrary write vulnerability codes, 1 day vulnerability codes, etc. When the preset vulnerability code is implanted into the device, the preset vulnerability code can be directly implanted into the native code of the device, or the repair patch corresponding to the vulnerability can be shielded or removed, so that the repair patch cannot take effect, and the corresponding vulnerability exists in the device.
[0028] Step S102, simulating running a kernel-invading process in a target range to attack a preset vulnerability code.
[0029] After setting up the shooting range, the running of the process that invades the kernel is simulated so that it can attack the preset vulnerability code, and realize the operation of invading the kernel by simulating the process in the shooting range to exploit the vulnerability.
[0030] Step S103: obtaining the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result.
[0031] The intrusion kernel detection system in the device can detect the process of intrusion kernel. When the process of the target range simulation runs an attack on ROOT, the detection result of the process by the intrusion kernel detection system is obtained. The detection result is judged. If the detection result shows that the process is a process of intrusion kernel, it means that the intrusion kernel detection system can correctly detect the process of intrusion kernel, and the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is determined to be effective. Furthermore, if the detection result shows that the process is not a process of intrusion kernel, it means that the intrusion kernel detection system cannot correctly detect the process of intrusion kernel, and the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is determined to be invalid, and the intrusion kernel detection system needs to be corrected, etc., to improve the detection accuracy of the intrusion kernel detection system.
[0032] According to the intrusion kernel detection method based on the target range provided by the present invention, a preset vulnerability code is implanted in a device provided with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a target range; the process of intrusion kernel is simulated to run in the target range to attack the preset vulnerability code; the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process is obtained, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result. By building a target range on a real device and simulating the process of intrusion kernel, it is possible to detect whether the intrusion kernel detection system is effective and evaluate the detection effect of the intrusion kernel detection system.
[0033] Figure 2 FIG. 2 shows a flow chart of the detection process of the intrusion kernel detection system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the intrusion kernel detection system detection process specifically includes the following steps:
[0034] Step S201, setting up multi-level detection at different module layers of the device to detect the process.
[0035] Since the device needs to limit the access capabilities between different programs to prevent programs from obtaining the memory data of other programs or the data of hardware devices, etc., which may lead to data leakage and other problems. Different module layers are divided in the device: user mode layer and kernel mode layer. Different module layers have different operating conditions and operating permissions. The intrusion kernel detection system sets different detection conditions in different module layers of the device according to the characteristics of each module layer, realizing multi-level detection of processes.
[0036] Among them, the detection conditions need to pre-extract the characteristic information of the process invading the kernel on the ROOT attack behavior and determine the corresponding detection conditions. The process invading the kernel is different from the normal process. By extracting the characteristic information of the process invading the kernel on the ROOT attack behavior, the corresponding detection can be performed according to the characteristic information to determine whether the process has carried out a ROOT attack. The attack behavior of the process invading the kernel on the ROOT is analyzed, and the characteristic information extracted includes the following contents: 1. Read system information, find system vulnerabilities, and carry out preliminary preparations; 2. Trigger vulnerabilities by means of competition between processes, special system calls, etc.; 3. Use special functions such as heap spray heap spray functions to carry out vulnerability attacks, etc., to control PC registers; 4. Through attack methods based on code reuse technology, such as return-oriented programming (ROP) method, bypass PAN / PXN / CFI and other security mechanisms to obtain the permission to execute arbitrary code; 5. Modify process information to elevate its own permissions to ROOT permissions.
[0037] Based on the feature information extracted above, the attack behaviors of the process invading the kernel on ROOT can be divided into suspicious attack behaviors and confirmed attack behaviors, and different detection conditions are set for different attack behaviors. The suspicious attack detection conditions corresponding to the suspicious attack behaviors are mainly used to detect the preparations of the process before attacking ROOT, whether the process is looking for system vulnerabilities, triggering system vulnerabilities, etc. in order to attack ROOT. The confirmed attack detection conditions corresponding to the confirmed attack behaviors are mainly used to detect the specific behaviors of the process invading the kernel attacking ROOT.
[0038] Specific suspicious attack detection conditions include: detecting whether the number of processes created within the time window is greater than the preset threshold and whether there is conditional competition between them. The number of normal processes in the time window generally does not exceed the preset threshold. When the number of processes is greater than the preset threshold, it may cause problems such as slow device operation, large memory usage, and downtime. And when there is conditional competition between processes, such as mutual resource grabbing, it is very easy to cause deadlock and other problems, which can easily trigger system vulnerabilities and cause ROOT attacks. Alternatively, detect whether the process binds the thread to the specified CPU for execution. When the thread is bound to the specified special CPU for execution, the thread can read the system information, which is convenient for ROOT attacks. Or, detect whether the process reads the kernel version, that is, whether the process reads the system information to prepare for the ROOT attack, etc.; or, detect whether the process causes the system to crash and restart in order to carry out the ROOT attack, etc.; or, detect whether the process triggers the kernel warning information to attack the kernel, etc.; or, detect whether the process calls the specified system call to trigger the system vulnerability, etc.; or, detect whether the process causes the system call parameter to be abnormal; carry out the vulnerability attack, etc.; or, detect whether the process calls the specified system function to perform the heap spray and memory layout, carry out the vulnerability attack, etc.; or, detect whether the process creates a number of specified ports greater than the preset threshold within the time window, carry out the vulnerability attack, etc. The above various suspicious attack detection conditions can detect the process before it carries out specific attack behavior on the ROOT, and more effectively detect the process that invades the kernel. Further, corresponding weight values can be set for the above various suspicious attack detection conditions. When the accumulated weight value meets the suspicious attack detection condition, such as reaching the suspicious attack threshold, it is more certain that the process has carried out suspicious attack behavior on the ROOT.
[0039] Determining attack detection conditions includes: detecting whether the process modifies the data structure related to the process permissions; detecting whether the process modifies the process access address range; detecting whether the process uses the pipe system call feature to read and write to any address; detecting whether the process modifies the kernel memory attributes; detecting whether the process calls to register malicious nodes; detecting whether the process modifies a specific pointer to point to a non-read-only segment; detecting whether the process modifies the security policy configuration file, etc. In the above determined attack detection conditions, the process maliciously modifies the system kernel, access address, node, etc. of the device, resulting in a determined attack on ROOT.
[0040] The kernel state layer is a lightweight engine. For performance reasons, high real-time detection can be performed in the kernel state layer, which is suitable for more quickly determining the determined attack behavior of the process on the ROOT. In this embodiment, the determined attack detection condition is set in the kernel state layer to detect the determined attack behavior in high real-time and promptly find out whether the process is a process of determined attack behavior.
[0041] When a process executes its own code, it is generally in the user state layer. Compared with the kernel state layer, the user state layer can perform more accurate and complex detection on the process itself. This embodiment sets a suspicious attack detection condition in the user state layer, which is based on the process itself to detect whether the process has suspicious attack behavior.
[0042] Step S202, determining whether the process is a kernel-invading process based on the detection result of the multi-level detection.
[0043] When a process is running in the device, specifically, when the process is executed in the user state layer, the intrusion kernel detection system detects the process according to the suspicious attack detection conditions preset in the user state layer. If the process meets the suspicious attack detection conditions, such as setting corresponding weight values for various suspicious attack detection conditions, the weight values of the suspicious attack detection conditions met by the process are accumulated and calculated, and the accumulated weight values meet the suspicious attack detection conditions, such as reaching the suspicious attack threshold, the process is determined to be a suspicious process that invades the kernel. For the suspicious process, first stop the process by sending a SIGSTOP signal, and then prompt the user that the process is a suspicious process. For example, prompt the user by popping up a dialog box, and the user chooses whether to continue executing the process or stop executing the process. If the user chooses to continue executing the process, the subsequent execution of the process is monitored and the subsequent system calls of the process are recorded. When the process is executed in the kernel state layer, the intrusion kernel detection system detects the process according to the determined attack detection conditions preset in the kernel state layer. If the process meets any of the determined attack detection conditions, the process is determined to be a determined process that invades the kernel. For the identified process, it is necessary to stop the process immediately and prevent the process from attacking, such as stopping the process by sending a SIGSTOP signal and preventing the process from modifying kernel memory, addresses, nodes, files, etc.
[0044] Furthermore, this embodiment also includes the following steps:
[0045] Step S203: reporting the process event information of the process to the server, and obtaining the processing strategy for the process issued by the server to update the detection condition.
[0046] After detecting a suspicious process that invades the kernel, the user state layer monitors it, records the suspicious system call sequence during the process execution, the suspicious information of the process, the process name, the device version information and other process event information, and after detecting a confirmed process that invades the kernel, the kernel state layer sends to the user state layer the rules triggered by the process, the process-related pid / uid / tgid and other process event information. The user state layer reports the above process event information to the server. Specifically, the user state layer can report the process event information to the server through a third-party program such as a cloud interface, and the server analyzes the process event information and determines the corresponding processing strategy. According to the processing strategy for the process issued by the server, the suspicious attack detection conditions and the confirmed attack detection conditions in the detection conditions are further updated, and the detection conditions are continuously updated to provide detection accuracy and respond to the attack behavior of the process that invades the kernel.
[0047] Furthermore, when the behavior of the process is not included in the above detection conditions and it is impossible to determine whether the behavior is a ROOT attack, or when the process has invaded the kernel for a ROOT attack but has not been detected, the user state layer collects the process event information such as the system call sequence, device version, and application list of the process, and reports it to the server. The server analyzes and obtains the corresponding process processing strategy for the next step, and updates the detection conditions according to the process processing strategy to ensure real-time update of the detection conditions to respond to different attack behaviors of the process that invades the kernel.
[0048] According to the intrusion kernel detection system provided by the present invention, the process is detected, the characteristic information of the process intruding the kernel on the ROOT attack behavior is extracted, and the detection conditions corresponding thereto are determined; wherein the detection conditions include suspicious attack detection conditions and determined attack detection conditions; multi-level detection is set at different module layers of the device to detect the process, wherein each level of detection corresponds to different detection conditions; and whether the process is a process intruding the kernel is determined according to the detection results of the multi-level detection. By extracting the characteristic information of the process intruding the kernel and determining the corresponding detection conditions, and by setting up multi-level detection at different module layers of the device to detect the process in a targeted manner, the attack behavior of the process can be effectively detected before or during the process attacks the ROOT, thereby preventing the process from executing and avoiding the process from intruding the kernel.
[0049] Figure 3 FIG. 4 shows a functional block diagram of a target range-based intrusion kernel detection device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 As shown, the intrusion kernel detection device based on the target range includes the following modules:
[0050] The implantation module 310 is suitable for: implanting a preset vulnerability code in a device provided with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a target range.
[0051] The simulation module 320 is suitable for: simulating the process of running the intrusion kernel in the shooting range to attack the preset vulnerability code.
[0052] The acquisition module 330 is adapted to: acquire the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result.
[0053] Optionally, the acquisition module 330 is further adapted to: acquire a detection result of the process by the intrusion kernel detection system; if the detection result is that the process is a process that intrudes the kernel, determine that the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective.
[0054] Optionally, the intrusion kernel detection system includes the following modules: an extraction module 340 , a multi-level detection module 350 , and a determination module 360 .
[0055] The extraction module 340 is adapted to extract characteristic information of the ROOT attack behavior of the process invading the kernel and determine the detection conditions corresponding thereto; wherein the detection conditions include suspicious attack detection conditions and determined attack detection conditions.
[0056] The multi-level detection module 350 is suitable for: setting up multi-level detection at different module layers of the device to detect the process, wherein each level of detection corresponds to different detection conditions.
[0057] The determination module 360 is adapted to determine whether the process is a kernel-invading process according to the detection results of the multi-level detection.
[0058] Optionally, the multi-level detection module 350 is further adapted to: set suspicious attack detection conditions for the user state layer, and set determined attack detection conditions for the kernel state layer.
[0059] Optionally, the determination module 360 is further adapted to: detect the process according to the suspicious attack detection condition at the user state layer; if the process meets the suspicious attack detection condition, determine that the process is a suspicious process that invades the kernel; stop the process, and prompt the user that the process is a suspicious process.
[0060] Optionally, the determination module 360 is further adapted to: detect the process in the kernel state layer according to the determined attack detection condition; if the process meets the determined attack detection condition, determine the process as a determined process that invades the kernel; stop the process and prevent the attack behavior of the process.
[0061] Optionally, the intrusion kernel detection system further includes: a reporting module 370 .
[0062] The reporting module 370 is adapted to report the process event information of the process to the server, and obtain the processing strategy for the process issued by the server to update the detection condition.
[0063] The description of each module above refers to the corresponding description in the method embodiment and will not be repeated here.
[0064] The present application also provides a non-volatile computer storage medium, wherein the computer storage medium stores at least one executable instruction, and the computer executable instruction can execute the target range-based intrusion kernel detection method in any of the above method embodiments.
[0065] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of a computing device according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. The specific embodiment of the present invention does not limit the specific implementation of the computing device.
[0066] like Figure 4 As shown, the computing device may include: a processor (processor) 402 , a communications interface (Communications Interface) 404 , a memory (memory) 406 , and a communication bus 408 .
[0067] in:
[0068] The processor 402 , the communication interface 404 , and the memory 406 communicate with each other via a communication bus 408 .
[0069] The communication interface 404 is used to communicate with other devices such as clients or other servers.
[0070] The processor 402 is used to execute the program 410, and specifically can execute the relevant steps in the above-mentioned target range-based intrusion kernel detection method embodiment.
[0071] Specifically, the program 410 may include program codes, which include computer operation instructions.
[0072] The processor 402 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of the present invention. The one or more processors included in the computing device may be processors of the same type, such as one or more CPUs; or processors of different types, such as one or more CPUs and one or more ASICs.
[0073] The memory 406 is used to store the program 410. The memory 406 may include a high-speed RAM memory, and may also include a non-volatile memory (non-volatile memory), such as at least one disk memory.
[0074] Program 410 can be specifically used to enable processor 402 to execute the target range-based intrusion kernel detection method in any of the above-mentioned method embodiments. The specific implementation of each step in program 410 can refer to the corresponding descriptions in the corresponding steps and units in the above-mentioned target range-based intrusion kernel detection embodiment, which will not be repeated here. Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and simplicity of description, the specific working process of the above-described devices and modules can refer to the corresponding process description in the aforementioned method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
[0075] The algorithm and display provided herein are not inherently related to any particular computer, virtual system or other device. Various general purpose systems can also be used together with the teachings based on this. According to the above description, it is obvious that the structure required for constructing such systems. In addition, the present invention is not directed to any specific programming language either. It should be understood that various programming languages can be utilized to realize the content of the present invention described herein, and the description of the above specific languages is for disclosing the best mode of the present invention.
[0076] In the description provided herein, a large number of specific details are described. However, it is understood that embodiments of the present invention can be practiced without these specific details. In some instances, well-known methods, structures and techniques are not shown in detail so as not to obscure the understanding of this description.
[0077] Similarly, it should be understood that in order to streamline the present disclosure and aid in understanding one or more of the various inventive aspects, in the above description of exemplary embodiments of the present invention, various features of the present invention are sometimes grouped together into a single embodiment, figure, or description thereof. However, this disclosed method should not be interpreted as reflecting the intention that the claimed invention requires more features than those expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as reflected in the claims, inventive aspects lie in less than all of the features of the individual embodiments previously disclosed. Therefore, the claims that follow the detailed description are hereby expressly incorporated into the detailed description, with each claim itself serving as a separate embodiment of the present invention.
[0078] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the modules in the devices in the embodiments may be adaptively changed and arranged in one or more devices different from the embodiments. The modules or units or components in the embodiments may be combined into one module or unit or component, and in addition they may be divided into a plurality of submodules or subunits or subcomponents. Except that at least some of such features and / or processes or units are mutually exclusive, all features disclosed in this specification (including the accompanying claims, abstracts and drawings) and all processes or units of any method or device disclosed in this manner may be combined in any combination. Unless otherwise expressly stated, each feature disclosed in this specification (including the accompanying claims, abstracts and drawings) may be replaced by an alternative feature providing the same, equivalent or similar purpose.
[0079] In addition, those skilled in the art will appreciate that, although some embodiments described herein include certain features included in other embodiments but not other features, the combination of features of different embodiments is meant to be within the scope of the present invention and form different embodiments. For example, in the claims, any one of the claimed embodiments may be used in any combination.
[0080] The various component embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in hardware, or in software modules running on one or more processors, or in a combination thereof. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that a microprocessor or a digital signal processor (DSP) may be used in practice to implement some or all of the functions of some or all of the components in the target range-based intrusion kernel detection device according to an embodiment of the present invention. The present invention may also be implemented as a device or device program (e.g., a computer program and a computer program product) for executing part or all of the methods described herein. Such a program implementing the present invention may be stored on a computer-readable medium, or may be in the form of one or more signals. Such a signal may be downloaded from an Internet website, or provided on a carrier signal, or provided in any other form.
[0081] It should be noted that the above embodiments illustrate the present invention rather than limit it, and that those skilled in the art may devise alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the appended claims. In the claims, any reference symbol between brackets shall not be construed as a limitation on the claims. The word "comprising" does not exclude the presence of elements or steps not listed in the claims. The word "one" or "an" preceding an element does not exclude the presence of a plurality of such elements. The present invention may be implemented by means of hardware comprising a number of different elements and by means of a suitably programmed computer. In a unit claim enumerating a number of devices, several of these devices may be embodied by the same hardware item. The use of the words first, second, and third, etc., does not indicate any order. These words may be interpreted as names.
Claims
1. A range-based intrusion kernel detection method, comprising: Implant preset vulnerability codes into devices equipped with intrusion kernel detection systems to build a target range; Simulate running a kernel-invading process in the shooting range to attack the preset vulnerability code; Acquire a detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result; The obtaining of the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process includes: Obtaining the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process according to the detection conditions corresponding to each level of detection, wherein the detection conditions are determined according to the feature information of the process intruding the kernel on the ROOT attack behavior; The detection conditions include suspicious attack detection conditions and determined attack detection conditions, and the suspicious attack detection conditions include one or more of the following detections: Whether the number of processes created within the time window is greater than a preset threshold and whether they compete with each other; whether the process binds the thread to the specified CPU for execution; whether the process reads the kernel version; whether the process causes the system to crash and restart; whether the process triggers a kernel warning message; whether the process calls a specified system call; whether the process causes a system call parameter abnormality; whether the process calls a specified system function for heap spraying and memory layout; and / or, within the time window, whether the process creates a number of specified ports greater than a preset threshold; The determination of attack detection conditions includes one or more of the following detections: whether the process modifies permission-related data structures; whether the process modifies the access address range; whether the process uses the pipeline system call feature to read and write arbitrary addresses; whether the process modifies kernel memory attributes; whether the process calls to register malicious nodes; whether the process modifies a specific pointer to point to a non-read-only segment; and / or whether the process modifies a security policy configuration file.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The preset vulnerability codes include stack overflow vulnerability codes, heap overflow vulnerability codes, reusable after free vulnerability codes, arbitrary write vulnerability codes and / or 1-day vulnerability codes.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The obtaining of the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result further comprises: Obtaining a detection result of the process by the intrusion kernel detection system; If the detection result is that the process is a kernel-invading process, it is determined that the detection of the kernel-invading detection system is effective.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The step of obtaining the detection result of the process by the intrusion kernel detection system according to the detection conditions corresponding to each level of detection further includes: Multi-level detection is set up at different module layers of the device to detect the process, where each level of detection corresponds to different detection conditions; Determine whether the process is a kernel-invading process based on the detection results of the multi-level detection.
5. The method according to claim 4, wherein: The different module layers of the device include a user mode layer and a kernel mode layer; The step of setting up multi-level detection at different module layers of the device to detect the process further includes: The suspicious attack detection condition is set for the user state layer, and the determined attack detection condition is set for the kernel state layer.
6. The method according to claim 5, wherein: Determining whether a process is a kernel-invading process according to the detection results of the multi-level detection further includes: Detecting the process at the user state layer according to the suspicious attack detection condition; If the process meets the suspicious attack detection condition, determining that the process is a suspicious process that invades the kernel; The process is stopped, and the user is prompted that the process is a suspicious process.
7. The method according to claim 5, wherein: Determining whether a process is a kernel-invading process according to the detection results of the multi-level detection further includes: Detecting the process in the kernel state layer according to the determined attack detection condition; If the process satisfies the determined attack detection condition, determining that the process is a determined process that invades the kernel; Stop the process and prevent the attack behavior of the process.
8. The method according to claim 6 or 7, wherein: The intrusion kernel detection system also includes the following steps to detect the process: The process event information of the process is reported to the server, and the processing strategy for the process issued by the server is obtained to update the detection condition.
9. A range-based intrusion kernel detection device, comprising: An implantation module, suitable for implanting preset vulnerability codes into a device provided with an intrusion kernel detection system to build a target range; A simulation module, adapted to simulate running a process of invading the kernel in the target range to attack the preset vulnerability code; an acquisition module, adapted to acquire a detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process, so as to determine whether the detection of the intrusion kernel detection system is effective according to the detection result; Among them, the extraction module is suitable for extracting the characteristic information of the process invading the kernel on the ROOT attack behavior and determining the corresponding detection conditions; A multi-level detection module, adapted to obtain the detection result of the intrusion kernel detection system on the process according to the detection conditions corresponding to each level of detection; The detection conditions include suspicious attack detection conditions and determined attack detection conditions, and the suspicious attack detection conditions include one or more of the following detections: Whether the number of processes created within the time window is greater than a preset threshold and whether they compete with each other; whether the process binds the thread to the specified CPU for execution; whether the process reads the kernel version; whether the process causes the system to crash and restart; whether the process triggers a kernel warning message; whether the process calls a specified system call; whether the process causes a system call parameter abnormality; whether the process calls a specified system function for heap spraying and memory layout; and / or, within the time window, whether the process creates a number of specified ports greater than a preset threshold; The determination of attack detection conditions includes one or more of the following detections: whether the process modifies permission-related data structures; whether the process modifies the access address range; whether the process uses the pipeline system call feature to read and write arbitrary addresses; whether the process modifies kernel memory attributes; whether the process calls to register malicious nodes; whether the process modifies a specific pointer to point to a non-read-only segment; and / or whether the process modifies a security policy configuration file.
10. The device according to claim 9, wherein: The preset vulnerability codes include stack overflow vulnerability codes, heap overflow vulnerability codes, reusable after free vulnerability codes, arbitrary write vulnerability codes and / or 1-day vulnerability codes.
11. The device according to claim 9, wherein: The acquisition module is further adapted to: Obtaining a detection result of the process by the intrusion kernel detection system; If the detection result is that the process is a kernel-invading process, it is determined that the detection of the kernel-invading detection system is effective.
12. The device according to claim 9, wherein: The multi-level detection module is suitable for setting up multi-level detection at different module layers of the device to detect the process, wherein each level of detection corresponds to different detection conditions; The determination module is adapted to determine whether a process is a kernel-invading process according to the detection results of the multi-level detection.
13. The device according to claim 12, wherein: The different module layers of the device include a user mode layer and a kernel mode layer; The multi-level detection module is further adapted to: set the suspicious attack detection condition for the user state layer, and set the determined attack detection condition for the kernel state layer.
14. The device according to claim 13, wherein: The determination module is further adapted to: detect the process according to the suspicious attack detection condition at the user state layer; If the process meets the suspicious attack detection condition, determining that the process is a suspicious process that invades the kernel; The process is stopped, and the user is prompted that the process is a suspicious process.
15. The device according to claim 13, wherein: The determination module is further adapted to: detect the process according to the determined attack detection condition at the kernel state layer; If the process satisfies the determined attack detection condition, determining that the process is a determined process that invades the kernel; Stop the process and prevent the attack behavior of the process.
16. The device according to claim 14 or 15, wherein: The intrusion kernel detection system further comprises: The reporting module is adapted to report the process event information of the process to the server, and obtain the processing strategy for the process issued by the server to update the detection condition.
17. A computing device comprising: A processor, a memory, a communication interface and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the memory and the communication interface communicate with each other via the communication bus; The memory is used to store at least one executable instruction, and the executable instruction enables the processor to perform operations corresponding to the target range-based intrusion kernel detection method as described in any one of claims 1-8.
18. A computer storage medium, wherein at least one executable instruction is stored in the storage medium, and wherein the executable instruction enables a processor to execute operations corresponding to the target range-based intrusion kernel detection method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.
