System and method for password authentication of contactless cards

Through key diversification and NFC technology in contactless card systems, the problems of data security and card activation complexity in electronic transactions are solved, and more efficient data protection and simplified activation process are achieved.

CN112805757BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-05CAPITAL ONE SERVICES LLC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN201980064942.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2018-11-29
Filing Date
2019-10-02
Publication Date
2024-11-05
Estimated Expiration
2039-10-02

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is difficult to effectively protect data security and transaction integrity in electronic transactions, especially email and short message services are vulnerable to attacks, the traditional card activation process is cumbersome and login credentials leak may lead to account access risks.

Method used

Using contactless card system, through the key diversification process between the sending device and the receiving device, the cryptographic algorithm is used to generate and verify diversified keys to ensure the security of data transmission, and to realize the security between the card and the device through NFC technology. wireless communication simplifies activation and authentication processes.

Benefits of technology

Improves the data security and authentication verification process of contactless cards, reduces the complexity of card activation and the risk of account access, and enhances the protection of electronic transactions.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

An example embodiment of a system and method for data transmission between a sending device and a receiving device is provided. In an embodiment, each of the sending device and the receiving device can include a master key. The sending device can use the master key to generate a diversified key, protect a counter value, and encrypt data before sending to the receiving device. The receiving device can generate a diversified key based on the master key, and can use the diversified key to decrypt the data and verify the protected counter value.
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Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. Patent Application No. 16 / 205,119, filed on November 29, 2018, and claims priority from U.S. Provisional Application No. 62 / 740,352, filed on October 2, 2018, and U.S. Patent Application No. 16 / 591,309, filed on October 2, 2019, the entire disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] The present disclosure relates to cryptography, and more particularly, to systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards. Background Art

[0004] Data security and transaction integrity are critical to businesses and consumers, and as electronic transactions become a larger share of business activity, this need continues to grow.

[0005] Email can be used as a tool to verify transactions, but email is vulnerable and can be easily hacked or otherwise accessed without authorization. Short Message Service (SMS) messages can also be used, but this is also easily compromised. Moreover, even data encryption algorithms, such as the Triple DES algorithm, have similar vulnerabilities.

[0006] Activating many cards, including, for example, financial cards (e.g., credit cards and other payment cards) involves a time-consuming process in which the cardholder dials a phone number or visits a website and enters or otherwise provides card information. In addition, while the increasing use of chip-based financial cards provides more secure functionality for personal purchases than previous technologies (e.g., magnetic stripe cards), account access may still rely on login credentials (e.g., username and password) to confirm the cardholder's identity. However, if the login credentials are compromised, others may be able to access the user's account.

[0007] These and other deficiencies exist. Therefore, there is a need to provide users with appropriate solutions that overcome these deficiencies to provide data security, authentication and verification for contactless cards. In addition, there is a need for an improved method of activating cards, and an improved authentication for account access. Summary of the invention

[0008] Aspects of the disclosed technology include systems and methods for cryptographic authentication of contactless cards. Various embodiments describe systems and methods for implementing and managing cryptographic authentication of contactless cards.

[0009] A data transmission system may include, for example, a sending device having a sending device processor and a sending device memory, the sending device memory containing a first master key, transmission data and a counter value; and a receiving device having a receiving device processor and a receiving device memory, the receiving device memory containing a second master key; wherein the sending device is configured to: generate a first diversified key using the first master key and one or more first cryptographic algorithms, and store the first diversified key in the sending device memory, wherein the first master key is a secret key; protect the counter value using one or more second cryptographic algorithms and the first diversified key to produce a cryptographic result including the counter value; encrypt the transmission data using one or more third cryptographic algorithms and the first diversified key to produce encrypted transmission data; and send the protected counter value and the encrypted transmission data to the receiving device, and wherein the receiving device is configured to: generate a second diversified key based on the second master key and the counter value, and store the second diversified key in the receiving device memory, wherein the second master key is a public key; and decrypt the encrypted transmission data and verify the protected counter value using one or more fourth cryptographic algorithms and the second diversified key.

[0010] In some exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure, the first, second, third and fourth cryptographic algorithms may each include (i) an asymmetric encryption algorithm, (ii) a digital signature algorithm, (iii) an ElGamal encryption algorithm, (iv) an elliptic curve algorithm, or (v) a Paillier cryptographic algorithm. The counter value may include a one-time password. The sending device may be further configured to: sign the counter value using a secret key; and encrypt the signed counter value using a further public key. The receiving device may be further configured to decrypt the signed counter value using a further private key. For each transmission between the sending device and the receiving device, a first diversified key or a second diversified key may be generated. The counter value or a portion of the counter value may be used to generate the first diversified key or the second diversified key.

[0011] In some exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure, the sending device may be further configured to send a public key to the receiving device. The public key may include a signature certificate to authenticate the issuer of the public key. The transmission data may be activation data of a smart card.

[0012] Additionally, an exemplary system, method, and computer-accessible medium for transmitting encrypted data via a contactless card having a processor and a memory containing two master keys, an identification number, a serial number, and a counter, the method may include generating a first diversified key using a secret encryption key and one or more first cryptographic algorithms, encrypting a counter value using one or more second cryptographic algorithms and the secret encryption key, encrypting transmission data using one or more third cryptographic algorithms and the first diversified key, and sending the encrypted counter value and the encrypted transmission data to a receiving device.

[0013] In some exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure, a second diversified key may be generated based on a public encryption key and a counter value; the encrypted transmission data and the encrypted counter value may be decrypted using one or more cryptographic algorithms and the public encryption key. The first, second, and third cryptographic algorithms may each include (i) an asymmetric encryption algorithm, (ii) a digital signature algorithm, (iii) an ElGamal encryption algorithm, (iv) an elliptic curve algorithm, or (v) a Paillier cryptographic algorithm. The counter value may include a one-time password.

[0014] In certain exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure, a counter value may be signed using a secret encryption key, and the signed counter value may be encrypted using a public encryption key. The signed counter value may be decrypted using a further secret encryption key. The transmission data may be activation data of a smart card. For each transmission between a sending device and a receiving device, a first diversified key or a second diversified key may be generated. The counter value or a portion of the counter value may be used to generate the first diversified key or the second diversified key.

[0015] The data transmission system may include a sending device having a sending device processor and a sending device memory, the sending device memory containing a first private key and a first public key, transmission data and a counter value; a receiving device having a receiving device processor and a receiving device memory, the receiving device memory containing a second private key and a second public key, the sending device being configured to: protect the counter value using one or more first cryptographic algorithms and the first private key to produce a cryptographic result including the counter value; encrypt the transmission data and the protected counter value using one or more second cryptographic algorithms and the first public key to produce encrypted transmission data; and send the encrypted transmission data to the receiving device, and the receiving device may be configured to decrypt the encrypted transmission data using the second private key, and decrypt and verify the protected counter value using the second public key.

[0016] Other features of the disclosed design and advantages provided thereby are explained in more detail hereinafter with reference to specific example embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein like elements are denoted by like reference numerals. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] Figure 1A is a diagram of a data transmission system according to an example embodiment.

[0018] Figure 1B is a diagram illustrating a sequence for providing authenticated access according to an example embodiment.

[0019] Figure 2 is a diagram of a data transmission system according to an example embodiment.

[0020] Figure 3 is a diagram of a system using a contactless card according to an example embodiment.

[0021] Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating a method of key diversification according to an example embodiment.

[0022] Figure 5A is a diagram of a contactless card according to an example embodiment.

[0023] Figure 5B is a diagram of a contact pad of a contactless card according to an example embodiment.

[0024] Figure 6 is a diagram depicting messages communicated with a device according to an example embodiment.

[0025] Figure 7 is a diagram depicting messages and message formats according to an example embodiment.

[0026] Figure 8 is a flowchart illustrating key operations according to an exemplary embodiment.

[0027] Fig. 9 is a diagram of a key system according to an example embodiment.

[0028] Fig.10 is a flow chart of a method of generating a password according to an example embodiment.

[0029] Fig.11 is a flow chart illustrating a process of key diversification according to an example embodiment.

[0030] Fig.12 is a flow chart illustrating a method for card activation according to an example embodiment.

[0031] Fig.13A and 13Bis a flow chart illustrating the use of asymmetric encryption according to an example embodiment.

[0032] Fig.14A and 14B is an additional flow chart illustrating the use of asymmetric encryption according to an example embodiment.

[0033] Fig.15 is another flow chart illustrating the use of asymmetric encryption according to an example embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] The following description of the embodiments provides non-limiting representative examples of reference numbers to particularly describe the features and teachings of different aspects of the present invention. From the description of the embodiments, it should be appreciated that the described embodiments can be implemented separately or in combination with other embodiments. Those of ordinary skill in the art who review the description of the embodiments should be able to learn and understand the different described aspects of the present invention. The description of the embodiments should facilitate understanding of the present invention to some extent, so that other implementations that are not specifically covered but within the knowledge of those skilled in the art who have read the description of the embodiments will be understood to be consistent with the application of the present invention.

[0035] An object of some embodiments of the present disclosure is to build one or more keys into one or more contactless cards. In these embodiments, the contactless card can perform authentication and many other functions that might otherwise require the user to carry a separate physical token in addition to the contactless card. By employing a contactless interface, a method can be provided for the contactless card to interact and communicate between the user's device (e.g., a mobile phone) and the card itself. For example, the EMV protocol that underlies many credit card transactions includes the following authentication process that satisfies operating system requirements, but given This brings challenges - it is more restrictive to the use of near field communication (NFC) because it can only be used in a read-only manner. The exemplary embodiment of the contactless card described herein utilizes NFC technology.

[0036] Figure 1A 1 shows a data transmission system according to an example embodiment. As discussed further below, system 100 may include contactless card 105, client device 110, network 115, and server 120. Figure 1A A single instance of a component is shown, but system 100 may include any number of components.

[0037] The system 100 may include one or more contactless cards 105, which will be referred to below. Figure 5A-5B Further explanation: In some embodiments, the contactless card 105 can wirelessly communicate with the client device 110 using NFC, for example.

[0038] System 100 may include client device 110, which may be a network-enabled computer. As referred to herein, a network-enabled computer may include, but is not limited to, a computer device or a communication device, including, for example, a server, a network appliance, a personal computer, a workstation, a phone, a handheld PC, a personal digital assistant, a thin client, a fat client, an Internet browser, or other device. Client device 110 may also be a mobile device. For example, a mobile device may include a computer from iPhone, iPod, iPad or other device running Apple Any other mobile device running Microsoft's Any device running Google's Mobile operating system operating system, and / or any other smartphone, tablet or similar wearable mobile device.

[0039] The client device 110 device may include a processor and memory, and it should be understood that the processing circuit may contain additional components, including a processor, memory, error and parity check / CRC checker, data encoder, anti-collision algorithm, controller, command decoder, security primitives and anti-tampering hardware, as required to perform the functions described herein. The client device 110 may also include a display and an input device. The display may be any type of device for presenting visual information, such as a computer monitor, a flat panel display, and a mobile device screen, including: a liquid crystal display, a light emitting diode display, a plasma panel, and a cathode ray tube display. The input device may include any device for inputting information into a user device to be available and supported by the user device, such as a touch screen, a keyboard, a mouse, a cursor control device, a touch screen, a microphone, a digital camera, a video recorder, or a portable camera. These devices can be used to input information and interact with the software and other devices described herein.

[0040] In some examples, client device 110 of system 100 may execute one or more applications, such as software applications, that enable, for example, network communications with one or more components of system 100 and sending and / or receiving data.

[0041] The client device 110 may communicate with one or more servers 120 via one or more networks 115 and may operate as a respective front-end to back-end pairing with the server 120. The client device 110 may send one or more requests to the server 120, for example, from a mobile device application executing on the client device 110. The one or more requests may be associated with retrieving data from the server 120. The server 120 may receive the one or more requests from the client device 110. Based on the one or more requests from the client device 110, the server 120 may be configured to retrieve the requested data from one or more databases (not shown). Based on receiving the requested data from the one or more databases, the server 120 may be configured to send the received data to the client device 110, wherein the received data is responsive to the one or more requests.

[0042] The system 100 may include one or more networks 115. In some examples, the network 115 may be one or more of a wireless network, a wired network, or any combination of a wireless network and a wired network, and may be configured to connect the client device 110 to the server 120. For example, the network 115 may include one or more of: a fiber optic network, a passive optical network, a cable network, an Internet network, a satellite network, a wireless local area network (LAN), a global system for mobile communications, a personal communications service, a personal area network, a wireless application protocol, a multimedia messaging service, an enhanced messaging service, a short message service, a system based on time division multiplexing, a system based on code division multiple access, D-AMPS, Wi-Fi, fixed wireless data, IEEE 802.11b, 802.15.1, 802.11n, and 802.11g, Bluetooth, NFC, radio frequency identification (RFID), Wi-Fi, and the like.

[0043] In addition, the network 115 may include, but is not limited to, telephone lines, optical fibers, IEEE Ethernet 902.3, wide area networks, wireless personal area networks, LANs, or global networks such as the Internet. In addition, the network 115 may support an Internet network, a wireless communication network, a cellular network, the like, or any combination thereof. The network 115 may further include a network, or any number of the exemplary types of networks described above, operating as independent networks or in collaboration with one another. The network 115 may utilize one or more protocols of one or more network elements to which they are communicatively coupled. The network 115 may convert to one or more protocols of a network device or convert from other protocols to one or more protocols of a network device. Although the network 115 is depicted as a single network, it should be understood that, according to one or more examples, the network 115 may include multiple interconnected networks, such as the Internet, a service provider's network, a cable television network, a corporate network (e.g., a credit card associated network), and a home network.

[0044] System 100 may include one or more servers 120. In some examples, server 120 may include one or more processors coupled to a memory. Server 120 may be configured as a central system, server, or platform to control and call various data at different times to perform multiple workflow actions. Server 120 may be configured to connect to one or more databases. Server 120 may be connected to at least one client device 110.

[0045] Figure 1B is a timing diagram illustrating an example sequence for providing authenticated access according to one or more embodiments of the present disclosure. System 100 may include contactless card 105 and client device 110 , which may include application 122 and processor 124 . Figure 1B The components in the Figure 1B Similar components as shown in .

[0046] At step 102, application 122 communicates with contactless card 105 (e.g., after being brought into proximity with contactless card 105). Communication between application 122 and contactless card 105 may include contactless card 105 being sufficiently close to a card reader (not shown) of client device 110 to enable NFC data transfer between application 122 and contactless card 105.

[0047] At step 104, after communication is established between the client device 110 and the contactless card 105, the contactless card 105 generates a message authentication code (MAC) password. In some examples, this may occur when the application 122 reads the contactless card 105. In particular, this may occur when reading (e.g., NFC reading) a near field data exchange (NDEF) tag, which may be created according to the NFC data exchange format. For example, a reader such as the application 122 may send a message such as an applet selection message, which has the applet ID of the applet that generates the NDEF. After confirming the selection, a sequence of a select file message followed by a read file message may be sent. For example, the sequence may include "select function file", "read function file", and "select NDEF file". At this point, a counter value maintained by the contactless card 105 may be updated or incremented, which may be followed by "read NDEF file". At this point, a message that may include a header and a shared secret may be generated. A session key may then be generated. A MAC password may be created from the message, which may include a header and a shared secret. The MAC password can then be concatenated with one or more random data blocks, and the MAC password and random number (RND) can then be encrypted with the session key. Thereafter, the password and header can be concatenated and encoded as ASCII hexadecimal and returned in the NDEF message format (in response to the "Read NDEF File" message).

[0048] In some examples, the MAC password may be sent as an NDEF tag, and in other examples, the MAC password may be included in a uniform resource indicator (eg, as a formatted string).

[0049] In some examples, application 122 may be configured to send a request to contactless card 105 that includes instructions for generating a MAC password.

[0050] In step 106, the contactless card 105 sends the MAC password to the application 122. In some examples, the transmission of the MAC password occurs via NFC, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto. In other examples, the communication can occur via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or other wireless data communication methods.

[0051] At step 108 , application 122 transmits the MAC password to processor 124 .

[0052] At step 112, processor 124 verifies the MAC password according to instructions from application 122. For example, the MAC password may be verified as described below.

[0053] In some examples, the operation of verifying the MAC password may be performed by a device other than the client device 110 (such as a server 120 in data communication with the client device 110). Figure 1A For example, the processor 124 may output the MAC password for transmission to the server 120, and the server 120 may verify the MAC password.

[0054] In some examples, the MAC password can be used as a digital signature for verification purposes. Other digital signature algorithms such as public key asymmetric algorithms, such as the Digital Signature Algorithm and the RSA algorithm, or zero-knowledge protocols, can be used to perform the verification.

[0055] Figure 2 2 shows a data transmission system according to an example embodiment. The system 200 may include a transmission or sending device 205, a receiving or receiver device 210, and one or more servers 220 in communication via a network 215. The transmission or sending device 205 may be similar to the above-referenced Figure 1A The receiving or recipient device 210 may be the same as or similar to the client device 110 discussed above. Figure 1A The client device 110 discussed above may be the same or similar. The network 215 may be similar to the client device 110 discussed above. Figure 1A The network 115 discussed above. The server 220 may be similar to Figure 1A Server 120 of discussion. Although Figure 2 A single instance of a component of system 200 is shown, but system 200 may include any number of the shown components.

[0056] When using symmetric cryptographic algorithms, such as the cryptographic algorithm, the hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) algorithm, and the ciphertext-based message authentication code (CMAC) algorithm, it is important that the keys remain between the party that initially processes the data protected by the symmetric algorithm and key, and the party that receives and processes the data using the same cryptographic algorithm and the same key.

[0057] It is also important that the same key is not used too many times. If a key is used or reused too frequently, it can be compromised. Each time a key is used, it provides an attacker with an additional sample of data that has been processed by the cryptographic algorithm using the same key. The more data an attacker has that has been processed using the same key, the greater the chance that the attacker can discover the value of the key. A key that is used frequently can be included in a variety of different attacks.

[0058] Additionally, each time a symmetric cryptographic algorithm is executed, it may reveal information about the key used during the symmetric cryptographic operation, such as side-channel data. Side-channel data may include tiny power fluctuations that occur when the cryptographic algorithm is executed while using the key. Sufficient measurements may be made on the side-channel data to reveal enough information about the key to enable it to be recovered by an attacker. Exchanging data using the same key will repeatedly reveal data processed by the same key.

[0059] However, by limiting the number of times a particular key will be used, the amount of side channel data that an attacker can collect is limited, thereby reducing exposure to this and other types of attacks. As further described herein, the parties participating in a cryptographic information exchange (e.g., a sender and a receiver) can independently generate keys from an initial shared master symmetric key in combination with a counter value, thereby periodically replacing the shared symmetric keys in use, along with the need to rely on any form of key exchange to keep the parties synchronized. By periodically changing the shared secret symmetric key used by the sender and receiver, the above-described attacks are made impossible.

[0060] As described above, public key encryption methods can be used. Public key cryptography or asymmetric cryptography uses pairs of keys, for example, a public key that can be freely provided and a private key that is known only to the key owner. Various exemplary cryptographic algorithms can be used to generate these keys. In such a system, only the secret key needs to be kept private. The public key can be freely provided without compromising security. For example, anyone can encrypt a message using the recipient's public key, but the encrypted message can only be decrypted using the recipient's private key.

[0061] Back to Figure 2 , the system 200 can be configured to implement key diversification. For example, the sender and the receiver may wish to exchange data (e.g., original sensitive data) via their respective devices 205 and 210. As described above, although a single instance of a sending device 205 and a receiving device 210 may be included, it should be understood that one or more sending devices 205 and one or more receiving devices 210 may be involved, as long as each party shares the same shared secret symmetric key, or one party has a private key and one party has a corresponding public key. In some examples, the same master symmetric key may be provided to the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210. In addition, it should be understood that any party or device having the same secret symmetric key can perform the functions of the sending device 205, and similarly, any party having the same secret symmetric key can perform the functions of the receiving device 210. Alternatively, if public / private key encryption is used, the sending device may have a public key, and the receiving device may have a private key.

[0062] In some examples, the symmetric key may include a shared secret symmetric key that is kept secret from all other parties except the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 involved in exchanging secure data. It should also be understood that both the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 may be provided with the same master symmetric key, and further, the portion of the data exchanged between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 includes at least a portion of the data that may be referred to as a counter value. The counter value may include a number that changes each time data is exchanged between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210.

[0063] In some examples, where asymmetric encryption is used, a public key may be provided to the sending device, and a private key may be provided to the receiving device. Alternatively, a private key may be provided to the sending device, and a public key may be provided to the receiving device.

[0064] The system 200 may include one or more networks 215. In some examples, the network 215 may be one or more of the following: a wireless network, a wired network, or any combination of a wireless network and a wired network, and may be configured to connect one or more sending devices 205 and one or more receiving devices 210 to a server 220. For example, the network 215 may include one or more of the following: a fiber optic network, a passive optical network, a cable network, an Internet network, a satellite network, a wireless LAN, a global system for mobile communications, a personal communication service, a personal area network, a wireless application protocol, a multimedia messaging service, an enhanced messaging service, a short message service, a system based on time division multiplexing, a system based on code division multiple access, D-AMPS, Wi-Fi, fixed wireless data, IEEE802.11b, 802.15.1, 802.11n and 802.11g, Bluetooth, NFC, RFID, Wi-Fi, etc.

[0065] In addition, the network 215 may include, but is not limited to, telephone lines, optical fibers, IEEE Ethernet 902.3, wide area networks, wireless personal area networks, LANs, or global networks such as the Internet. In addition, the network 215 may support an Internet network, a wireless communication network, a cellular network, or the like, or any combination thereof. The network 215 may further include a network, or any number of exemplary types of networks described above, which operate as independent networks or collaborate with each other. The network 215 may utilize one or more protocols of one or more network elements to which they are communicatively coupled. The network 215 may be converted to one or more protocols of a network device or converted from other protocols to one or more protocols of a network device. Although the network 215 is depicted as a single network, it should be understood that, according to one or more examples, the network 215 may include multiple interconnected networks, such as the Internet, a service provider's network, a cable television network, a corporate network (e.g., a credit card associated network), and a home network.

[0066] In some examples, the one or more transmitting devices 205 and the one or more receiving devices 210 may be configured to communicate data, send and receive data between each other without going through the network 215. For example, the communication between the one or more transmitting devices 205 and the one or more receiving devices 210 may occur via at least one of NFC, Bluetooth, RFID, Wi-Fi, etc.

[0067] At block 225, the sender may update the counter when the sending device 205 is preparing to use a cryptographic operation (e.g., a symmetric cryptographic operation or an asymmetric cryptographic operation) to process sensitive data. In addition, the sending device 205 may select an appropriate symmetric cryptographic algorithm, which may include at least one of a symmetric encryption algorithm, an HMAC algorithm, and a CMAC algorithm. Alternatively, the sending device 205 may select an appropriate asymmetric encryption algorithm, a digital signature algorithm, an ElGamal encryption algorithm, an elliptic curve algorithm, a Paillier cryptographic system algorithm, or the like.

[0068] In some examples, the symmetric algorithm or asymmetric algorithm for processing the diversified value may include: any symmetric cryptographic algorithm for generating a desired length diversified symmetric key as needed. Non-limiting examples of symmetric algorithms may include: symmetric encryption algorithms such as 3DES or AES128; symmetric HMAC algorithms such as HMAC-SHA-256; and symmetric CMAC algorithms such as AES-CMAC. It should be understood that if the output of the selected symmetric algorithm does not generate a sufficiently long key, techniques such as processing multiple iterations of the symmetric algorithm with different input data and the same master key may produce multiple outputs, which can be combined as needed to produce a sufficiently long key. Non-limiting examples of asymmetric algorithms may include the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, DSS (Digital Signature Standard) in combination with a digital signature algorithm, ElGamal, various elliptic curve techniques, various cryptographically authenticated key agreement techniques, the Paillier cryptographic system, the RSA cryptographic algorithm, the Cramer–Shoup cryptographic system, and the YAK authenticated key agreement protocol.

[0069] At block 230, the sending device 205 may employ the selected cryptographic algorithm and process the counter value using the master symmetric or asymmetric key. For example, the sender may select a symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithm and use a counter that is updated with each conversation between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210. The sending device 205 may then encrypt the counter value using the selected symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithm using the master symmetric key to create a diversified symmetric key.

[0070] In some examples, the counter value may not be encrypted. In these examples, the counter value may be sent between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 at block 230 without encryption.

[0071] At block 235, the sensitive data may be processed using a diversified symmetric or asymmetric key before the result is sent to the receiving device 210. For example, the sending device 205 may encrypt the sensitive data using a symmetric encryption algorithm that utilizes a diversified symmetric key or using an asymmetric algorithm, where the output includes the protected encrypted data. The sending device 205 may then send the protected encrypted data and the counter value to the receiving device 210 for processing.

[0072] At block 240, the receiving device 210 may first obtain the counter value and then perform the same symmetric or asymmetric encryption using the counter value as input to the encryption and using the master symmetric key or asymmetric key as the key for encryption. The output of the encryption may be the same diversified symmetric key value created by the sender.

[0073] At block 245 , the receiving device 210 may then obtain the protected encrypted data and decrypt the protected encrypted data using a symmetric or asymmetric decryption algorithm and a diversified symmetric key or an asymmetric key (eg, a private key).

[0074] At block 250 , as a result of decrypting the protected encrypted data, the original sensitive data may be revealed.

[0075] The next time sensitive data needs to be sent from the sender to the receiver via the corresponding sending device 205 and receiving device 210, different counter values ​​can be selected to generate different diversified symmetric keys. By processing the counter value using the master symmetric key and the same symmetric cryptographic algorithm, both the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 can independently generate the same diversified symmetric key. This diversified symmetric key is used to protect sensitive data instead of the master symmetric key.

[0076] As described above, both the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 initially have a shared master symmetric key or a corresponding asymmetric key (e.g., a public key and a private key). The shared master symmetric key is not used to encrypt the original sensitive data. Since the diversified symmetric key is independently created by the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210, it will never be transmitted between the two parties. Therefore, an attacker cannot intercept the diversified symmetric key, and the attacker will never see any data processed using the master symmetric key. Only counter values, not sensitive data, are processed using the master symmetric key. As a result, reduced side channel data about the master symmetric key is revealed. Moreover, the operation of the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 can be controlled by the symmetry requirements of how often a new diversified value is created and thus a new diversified symmetric key. In one embodiment, a new diversified value can be created for each exchange between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210, and thus a new diversified symmetric key is created.

[0077] In some examples, the key diversification value may include a counter value. Other non-limiting examples of key diversification values ​​include: a random nonce generated each time a new diversified key is needed and sent from the sending device 205 to the receiving device 210; the full value of the counter value sent from the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210; a portion of the counter value sent from the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210; a counter maintained independently by the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 but not sent between the two devices; a one-time password exchanged between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210; and a cryptographic hash of sensitive data. In some examples, the parties may use one or more portions of the key diversification value to create multiple diversified keys. For example, a counter may be used as a key diversification value. In addition, a combination of one or more of the above exemplary key diversification values ​​may be used.

[0078] In another example, a portion of the counter can be used as a key diversification value. If multiple master key values ​​are shared between the parties, multiple diversified key values ​​can be obtained through the systems and processes described herein. New diversified values, and therefore new diversified symmetric keys, can be created as often as needed. In the most secure case, a new diversified value can be created for each sensitive data exchange between the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210. In practice, this can create a one-time use key, such as a one-time session key.

[0079] Figure 3 A system 300 using a contactless card is shown. The system 300 may include a contactless card 305, one or more client devices 310, a network 315, servers 320, 325, one or more hardware security modules 330, and a database 335. Figure 3 A single instance of a component is shown, but system 300 may include any number of components.

[0080] System 300 may include one or more contactless cards 305, as described below with respect to Figure 5A-5BFurther explanation. In some examples, the contactless card 305 can communicate wirelessly with the client device 310, such as NFC communication. For example, the contactless card 305 may include one or more chips such as a radio frequency identification chip, which is configured to communicate via NFC or other short-range protocols. In other embodiments, the contactless card 305 can communicate with the client device 310 in other ways, including but not limited to: Bluetooth, satellite, Wi-Fi, wired communication and / or any combination of wireless and wired connections. According to some embodiments, the contactless card 305 can be configured to communicate with the card reader 313 of the client device 310 via NFC when the contactless card 305 is within the range of the card reader 313. In other examples, communication with the contactless card 305 can be achieved through a physical interface (e.g., a universal serial bus interface or a card swipe interface).

[0081] System 300 may include client devices 310, which may be network-enabled computers. As referred to herein, network-enabled computers may include, but are not limited to, for example, computer devices, or communication devices, including, for example, servers, network appliances, personal computers, workstations, mobile devices, phones, handheld PCs, personal digital assistants, thin clients, fat clients, Internet browsers, or other devices. One or more client devices 310 may also be mobile devices. For example, a mobile device may include iPhone, iPod, iPad or other device running Apple Any other mobile device running Microsoft's Any device running Google's Mobile operating system Any device running a 320 operating system, and / or any other smartphone or similar wearable mobile device. In some examples, client device 310 may communicate with reference Figure 1A or Figure 1B The client devices 110 described are the same or similar.

[0082] The client device 310 can communicate with one or more servers 320 and 325 via one or more networks 315. The client device 310 can send one or more requests to the one or more servers 320 and 325, for example, from an application 311 executed on the client device 310. The one or more requests can be associated with retrieving data from the one or more servers 320 and 325. The servers 320 and 325 can receive the one or more requests from the client device 310. Based on the one or more requests from the client device 310, the one or more servers 320 and 325 can be configured to retrieve the requested data from the one or more databases 335. Based on receiving the requested data from the one or more databases 335, the one or more servers 320 and 325 can be configured to send the received data to the client device 310, the received data being responsive to the one or more requests.

[0083] The system 300 may include one or more hardware security modules (HSM) 330. For example, one or more HSM 330 may be configured to perform one or more cryptographic operations, as disclosed herein. In some examples, one or more HSM 330 may be configured as a dedicated security device that is configured to perform one or more cryptographic operations. The HSM 330 may be configured so that the key is never leaked outside the HSM 330, but is kept within the HSM 330. For example, one or more HSM 330 may be configured to perform at least one of key derivation, decryption, and MAC operations. One or more HSM 330 may be included in the servers 320 and 325 or may be in data communication with the servers 320 and 325.

[0084] The system 300 may include one or more networks 315. In some examples, the network 315 may be one or more of a wireless network, a wired network, or any combination of a wireless network and a wired network, and may be configured to connect the client device 315 to the servers 320 and 325. For example, the network 315 may include one or more of: a fiber optic network, a passive optical network, a cable network, a cellular network, an Internet network, a satellite network, a wireless LAN, a global system for mobile communications, a personal communications service, a personal area network, a wireless application protocol, a multimedia messaging service, an enhanced messaging service, a short message service, a system based on time division multiplexing, a system based on code division multiple access, D-AMPS, Wi-Fi, fixed wireless data, IEEE 802.11b, 802.15.1, 802.11n and 802.11g, Bluetooth, NFC, RFID, Wi-Fi, and / or any combination of networks thereof. As non-limiting examples, communications from contactless card 305 and client device 310 may include: NFC communications, a cellular network between client device 310 and the operator, and the Internet between the operator and the backend.

[0085] In addition, the network 315 may include, but is not limited to: telephone lines, optical fibers, IEEE Ethernet 902.3, wide area networks, wireless personal area networks, local area networks, or global networks such as the Internet. In addition, the network 315 may support an Internet network, a wireless communication network, a cellular network, the like, or any combination thereof. The network 315 may further include a network, or any number of the exemplary types of networks described above, operating as independent networks or in collaboration with each other. The network 315 may utilize one or more protocols of one or more network elements to which they are communicatively coupled. The network 315 may convert to one or more protocols of a network device or convert from other protocols to one or more protocols of a network device. Although the network 315 is depicted as a single network, it should be understood that according to one or more examples, the network 315 may include multiple interconnected networks, such as the Internet, a service provider's network, a cable television network, a corporate network (e.g., a credit card associated network), and a home network.

[0086] In various examples according to the present disclosure, the client device 310 of the system 300 can execute one or more applications 311 and include one or more processors 312 and one or more card readers 313. For example, the one or more applications 311 (e.g., software applications) can be configured to enable network communications with one or more components of the system 300, and to send and / or receive data. It should be understood that although in Figure 3Only a single example of the components of client device 310 is shown in FIG, but any number of devices 310 may be used. Card reader 313 may be configured to read from and / or communicate with contactless card 305. In conjunction with one or more applications 311, card reader 313 may communicate with contactless card 305.

[0087] Application 311 of any of client devices 310 may communicate with contactless card 305 using short-range wireless communication (e.g., NFC). Application 311 may be configured to interface with card reader 313 of client device 310, which is configured to communicate with contactless card 305. It should be noted that a person skilled in the art will appreciate that a distance of less than twenty centimeters is consistent with the NFC range.

[0088] In some embodiments, application 311 communicates with contactless card 305 through an associated reader (eg, card reader 313).

[0089] In some embodiments, card activation can occur without user authentication. For example, contactless card 305 can communicate with application 311 through card reader 313 of client device 310 via NFC. Communication (e.g., tapping of card close to card reader 313 of client device 310) allows application 311 to read data associated with the card and perform activation. In some cases, tapping can activate or start application 311, and then initiate one or more actions or communications with account server 325 to activate the card for subsequent use. In some cases, if application 311 is not installed on client device 310, tapping against card reader 313 can initiate download of application 311 (e.g., navigating to application download page). After installation, tapping can activate or start application 311, and then initiate activation of card (e.g., via application or other back-end communication). After activation, the card can be used for various transactions, including commercial transactions.

[0090] According to some embodiments, contactless card 305 may include a virtual payment card. In those embodiments, application 311 may retrieve information associated with contactless card 305 by accessing a digital wallet implemented on client device 310, wherein the digital wallet includes the virtual payment card. In some examples, the virtual payment card data may include one or more statically or dynamically generated virtual card numbers.

[0091] Server 320 may include a network server in communication with database 335. Server 325 may include an account server. In some examples, server 320 may be configured to verify one or more certificates from contactless card 305 and / or client device 310 by comparing with one or more certificates in database 335. Server 325 may be configured to authorize one or more requests from contactless card 305 and / or client device 310, such as payments and transactions.

[0092] Figure 4 A method 400 of key diversification according to an example of the present disclosure is shown. The method 400 may include Figure 2 A sending device and a receiving device similar to the sending device 205 and the receiving device 210 referred to in .

[0093] For example, a sender and a receiver may wish to exchange data (e.g., original sensitive data) via a sending device and a receiving device. As described above, although these two parties may be included, it should be understood that one or more sending devices and one or more receiving devices may be involved, as long as each party shares the same shared secret symmetric key. In some examples, the same master symmetric key may be provided to a sending device and a receiving device. In addition, it should be understood that any party or device holding the same secret symmetric key may perform the function of a sending device, and similarly, any party holding the same secret symmetric key may perform the function of a receiving device. In some examples, a symmetric key may include a shared secret symmetric key that is kept secret from all other parties except the sending device and the receiving device involved in exchanging secure data. It should also be understood that both the sending device and the receiving device may be provided with the same master symmetric key, and further, a portion of the data exchanged between the sending device and the receiving device includes at least a portion of the data that may be referred to as a counter value. The counter value may include a number that changes each time data is exchanged between the sending device and the receiving device.

[0094] At block 410, the same master key, such as the same master symmetric key, may be provided to the sending device and the receiving device. When the sending device is ready to process sensitive data using a symmetric cryptographic operation, the sender may update the counter. In addition, the sending device may select an appropriate symmetric cryptographic algorithm, which may include at least one of a symmetric encryption algorithm, an HMAC algorithm, and a CMAC algorithm. In some examples, the symmetric algorithm for processing the diversified value may include any symmetric cryptographic algorithm for generating a diversified symmetric key of a desired length as needed. Non-limiting examples of symmetric algorithms may include: a symmetric encryption algorithm such as 3DES or AES128; a symmetric HMAC algorithm such as HMAC-SHA-256; and a symmetric CMAC algorithm such as AES-CMAC. It should be understood that if the output of the selected symmetric algorithm does not generate a sufficiently long key, techniques such as processing multiple iterations of the symmetric algorithm with different input data and the same master key may produce multiple outputs, which may be combined as needed to produce a sufficiently long key.

[0095] The sending device may employ the selected cryptographic algorithm and use the master symmetric key to process the counter value. For example, the sender may select a symmetric encryption algorithm and use a counter that is updated with each conversation between the sending device and the receiving device.

[0096] At block 420, the sending device may then use the master symmetric key to encrypt the counter value using the selected symmetric encryption algorithm, thereby creating a diversified symmetric key. The diversified symmetric key may be used to process sensitive data before the result is sent to the receiving device. For example, the sending device may encrypt sensitive data using a symmetric encryption algorithm using a diversified symmetric key, where the output includes protected encrypted data. The sending device may then send the protected encrypted data and the counter value to the receiving device for processing. In some examples, cryptographic operations other than encryption may be performed, and multiple cryptographic operations may be performed using the diversified symmetric key before the protected data is transmitted.

[0097] In some examples, the counter value may not be encrypted. In these examples, the counter value may be sent between the sending device and the receiving device without encryption at block 420 .

[0098] At block 430, one or more cryptographic algorithms and diversified keys may be used to protect sensitive data. A diversified session key that may be created by key diversification using a counter may be used with one or more cryptographic algorithms to protect sensitive data. For example, data may be processed by a MAC using a first diversified session key, and the resulting output may be encrypted using a second diversified session key that produces protected data.

[0099] At block 440, the receiving device may perform the same symmetric encryption using the counter value as an input to the encryption and using the master symmetric key as the key for encryption. The output of the encryption may be the same symmetric key value as created by the sender. For example, the receiving device may independently create its own copy of the first and second diversified session keys using the counter. The receiving device may then decrypt the protected data using the second diversified session key to reveal the output of the MAC created by the sending device. The receiving device may then process the resulting data using the first diversified session key through a MAC operation.

[0100] At block 450 , the receiving device may use the diversified key with one or more cryptographic algorithms to authenticate the protected data.

[0101] The original data may be verified at block 460. If the output of a MAC operation (via the receiving device using the first diversified session key) matches the MAC output revealed by the decryption, then the data may be deemed valid.

[0102] The next time sensitive data needs to be sent from the sending device to the receiving device, a different counter value can be selected, which will produce a different diversified symmetric key. By processing the counter value with the master symmetric key and the same symmetric cryptographic algorithm, both the sending device and the receiving device can independently produce the same diversified symmetric key. This diversified symmetric key, rather than the master symmetric key, is used to protect sensitive data.

[0103] As described above, both the sending device and the receiving device initially have a shared master symmetric key. The shared master symmetric key is not used to encrypt the original sensitive data. Since the diversified symmetric key is independently created by the sending device and the receiving device, it is never transmitted between the two parties. Therefore, an attacker cannot intercept the diversified symmetric key, and the attacker will never see any data processed using the master symmetric key. Only small counter values, not sensitive data, are processed using the master symmetric key. As a result, reduced side channel data about the master symmetric key is revealed. Moreover, the sender and the receiver can agree, for example, by previous arrangements or other means, how often to create new diversified values, and therefore new diversified symmetric keys. In one embodiment, a new diversified value, and therefore a new diversified symmetric key, can be created for each exchange between the sending device and the receiving device.

[0104] In some examples, the key diversification value may include a counter value. Other non-limiting examples of the key diversification value include: a random number generated each time a new diversified key is needed, the random number being sent from the sending device to the receiving device; the full value of the counter value sent from the sending device and the receiving device; a portion of the counter value sent from the sending device and the receiving device; a counter maintained independently by the sending device and the receiving device but not sent between the two; a one-time password exchanged between the sending device and the receiving device; a cryptographic hash of sensitive data. In some examples, the parties may use one or more portions of the key diversification value to create multiple diversified keys. For example, a counter may be used as a key diversification value.

[0105] In another example, a portion of the counter can be used as a key diversification value. If multiple master key values ​​are shared between the parties, multiple diversified key values ​​can be obtained through the systems and processes described herein. New diversified values, and therefore new diversified symmetric keys, can be created as often as needed. In the most secure case, a new diversified value can be created for each sensitive data exchange between the sending device and the receiving device. In practice, this can create a one-time use key, such as a single session key.

[0106] In other examples, for example, to limit the number of uses of the master symmetric key, it may be agreed by the sender of the sending device and the receiver of the receiving device that new diversified values, and therefore new diversified symmetric keys, will only occur periodically. In one example, this may be after a predetermined number of uses, such as after every ten transmissions between the sending device and the receiving device. In another example, this may be after a certain period of time, after a specific period of time after a transmission, or periodically (e.g., every day at a specified time; every week at a specified time on a specified date). In another example, this may be every time the receiving device signals to the sending device that it wishes to change the key in the next communication. This may be controlled in policy and may change due to, for example, the current risk level perceived by the receiver of the receiving device.

[0107] Figure 5AOne or more contactless cards 500 are shown, which may include payment cards such as credit cards, debit cards, or gift cards issued by a service provider 505 displayed on the front or back of the card 500. In some examples, the contactless card 500 is not related to a payment card and may include, but is not limited to, an identification card. In some examples, the payment card may include a dual-interface contactless payment card. The contactless card 500 may include a substrate 510, which may include a single layer or one or more laminated layers of plastic, metal, and other materials. Exemplary substrate materials include: polyvinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride acetate, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, polycarbonate, polyester, anodized titanium, palladium, gold, carbon, paper, and biodegradable materials. In some examples, the contactless card 500 may have physical characteristics that conform to the ID-1 format of the ISO / IEC 7810 standard, and the contactless card may otherwise conform to the ISO / IEC 14443 standard. However, it should be understood that the contactless card 500 according to the present disclosure may have different characteristics, and the present disclosure does not require the implementation of the contactless card in the payment card.

[0108] The contactless card 500 may also include identification information 515 displayed on the front and / or back of the card, and a contact sheet 520. The contact sheet 520 may be configured to establish contact with another communication device, such as a user device, a smart phone, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, or a tablet computer. The contactless card 500 may also include processing circuits, an antenna, and other components. Figure 5A Components not shown in the figure. These components may be located behind the contact sheet 520 or at other locations on the substrate 510. The contactless card 500 may also include a magnetic stripe or magnetic tape, which may be located on the back of the card ( Figure 5A not shown).

[0109] like Figure 5B As shown, Figure 5A The contact sheet 520 may include: processing circuitry 525 for storing and processing information, including a microprocessor 530 and a memory 535. It should be understood that the processing circuitry 525 may contain additional components, including processors, memories, error and parity / CRC checkers, data encoders, anti-collision algorithms, controllers, command decoders, security primitives, and anti-tampering hardware to perform the functions described herein as needed.

[0110] The memory 535 can be a read-only memory, a write-once read-many memory or a read / write memory, such as a RAM, a ROM and an EEPROM, and the contactless card 500 can include one or more of these memories. The read-only memory can be programmed to be read-only or one-time programmable at the factory. The one-time programming function provides an opportunity to write once and then read multiple times. The write-once / read-many memory can be programmed at a certain point in time after the memory chip leaves the factory. Once the memory is programmed, it may not be rewritten, but it can be read multiple times. The read / write memory can be programmed and reprogrammed multiple times after leaving the factory. It can also be read multiple times.

[0111] Memory 535 can be configured to store one or more applet 540, one or more counters 545 and customer identifier 550. One or more applet 540 can include one or more software applications configured to be executed on one or more contactless cards, such as Java Card applet. However, it should be understood that applet 540 is not limited to Java Card applet, but can be any software application that can operate on contactless card or other equipment with limited memory. One or more counters 545 can include digital counters that are enough to store integers. Customer identifier 550 can include a unique alphanumeric identifier assigned to the user of contactless card 500, and the identifier can distinguish the user of contactless card from other contactless card users. In some examples, customer identifier 550 can identify the customer and the account assigned to the customer, and can further identify the contactless card associated with the customer's account.

[0112] The processor and storage elements of the aforementioned exemplary embodiments are described with reference to the contact sheet, but the present disclosure is not limited thereto. It should be understood that these elements can be implemented outside the sheet 520 or completely separated from the sheet 520, or implemented as other elements other than the processor 530 and the memory 535 located within the contact sheet 520.

[0113] In some examples, the contactless card 500 may include one or more antennas 555. The one or more antennas 555 may be placed within the contactless card 500 and around the processing circuit 525 of the contact sheet 520. For example, the one or more antennas 555 may be integrally formed with the processing circuit 525, and the one or more antennas 555 may be used with an external booster coil. As another example, the one or more antennas 555 may be external to the contact sheet 520 and the processing circuit 525.

[0114] In one embodiment, the coil of the contactless card 500 can be used as the secondary of an air-core transformer. The terminal can communicate with the contactless card 500 by cutting off power or amplitude modulation. The contactless card 500 can use the gap in the power connection of the contactless card to infer the data sent from the terminal, which can be functionally maintained by one or more capacitors. The contactless card 500 can be backhauled by switching the load or load modulation on the coil of the contactless card. Load modulation can be detected in the coil of the terminal by interference.

[0115] As described above, the contactless card 500 can be built on a software platform that can operate on a smart card or other device with limited memory (e.g., JavaCard), and can securely execute one or more applications or applets. In various mobile application-based use cases, applets can be added to contactless cards to provide a one-time password (OTP) for multi-factor authentication (MFA). The applet can be configured to respond to one or more requests (e.g., near field data exchange requests) from a reader (e.g., a mobile NFC reader) and generate an NDEF message that includes a cryptographically secure OTP encoded as an NDEF text tag.

[0116] Figure 6 An NDEF short record layout (SR=1) 600 is shown according to an example embodiment. One or more applets can be configured to encode the OTP as an NDEF type 4, which is a well-known type of text tag. In some examples, the NDEF message can include one or more records. The applet can be configured to add one or more static tag records in addition to the OTP record. Exemplary tags include, but are not limited to, Tag Type: Well-known type, text, encoded English (en); Applet ID: D2760000850101; Functionality: Read-only access; Encoding: The authentication message can be encoded as ASCII hexadecimal; Type-length-value (TLV) data can be provided as personalized parameters that can be used to generate NDEF messages. In one embodiment, the authentication template can include a first record with a well-known index for providing the actual dynamic authentication data.

[0117] Figure 7A message 710 and a message format 720 are shown according to an example embodiment. In one example, if additional tags are to be added, the first byte may be changed to indicate the start of a message instead of the end, and subsequent records may be added. Because the ID length is zero, the ID length field and the ID are omitted from the record. The message example may include: UDK AUT Key; Derived AUT Session Key (using 0x00000050); Version 1.0; pATC = 0x00000050; RND = 4838FB7DC171B89E; MAC = <eight calculated bytes>.

[0118] In some examples, data can be stored in the contactless card at personalization time by implementing STORE DATA (E2) under the secure channel protocol 2. One or more values ​​can be read from the EMBOSS file (in the section specified by the AppletID) by the personalization office, and one or more store data commands can be sent to the contactless card after authentication and secure channel establishment.

[0119] The pUID may contain a 16-bit BCD-encoded number. In some examples, the pUID may include 14 digits.

[0120]

[0121]

[0122] In some examples, one or more applets may be configured to maintain their personalized state to allow personalization only after being unlocked and authenticated. Other states may include pre-personalization of a standard state. Upon entering a terminated state, one or more applets may be configured to remove personalized data. In a terminated state, one or more applets may be configured to stop responding to all application protocol data unit (APDU) requests.

[0123] One or more applets may be configured to maintain an applet version (2 bytes) which may be used in authentication messages. In some examples, this may be interpreted as most significant byte major version, least significant byte minor version. The rules for each version are configured to interpret the authentication message: For example, with respect to major versions, this may include: Each major version includes a specific authentication message layout and a specific algorithm. For minor versions, this may include: No changes to the authentication message or cryptographic algorithm, and changes to static tag content other than bug fixes, security enhancements, etc.

[0124] In some examples, one or more applets can be configured to emulate an RFID tag. The RFID tag can include one or more polymorphic tags. In some examples, each time the tag is read, different cryptographic data is presented that can indicate the authenticity of the contactless card. Based on the one or more applications, the NFC read of the tag can be processed, the token can be sent to a server, such as a backend server, and the token can be verified on the server.

[0125] In some examples, the contactless card and the server may include certain data so that the card can be correctly identified. The contactless card may include one or more unique identifiers. The counter may be configured to update each time a read operation occurs. In some examples, each time a card is read, it is sent to the server for verification and to determine if the counter is equal (as part of the verification).

[0126] One or more counters may be configured to prevent replay attacks. For example, if a password has been obtained and replayed, the password will be immediately rejected if the counter has been read or used or otherwise passed. If the counter has not been used, it can be replayed. In some examples, the counter updated on the card is different from the counter updated for the transaction. In some examples, the contactless card may include a first applet and a second applet, and the first applet may be a transaction applet. Each applet may include a counter.

[0127] In some examples, the counter may be out of sync between the contactless card and one or more servers. For example, the contactless card may be activated to cause the counter to be updated and the contactless card to generate a new communication, but the communication may not be sent for processing at one or more servers. This may cause the counter of the contactless card to be out of sync with the counter maintained on one or more servers. For example, this may happen unintentionally, including: for example, when the card is stored adjacent to the device (for example, in a pocket with the device), and when the contactless card is read at a certain angle, it may include that the card is not aligned or positioned, so that the contactless card is powered by the NFC field, but cannot be read. If the contactless card is placed adjacent to the device, the NFC field of the device may be turned on to power the contactless card, resulting in the counter therein being updated, but no application on the device receives the communication.

[0128] In order to keep the counter synchronized, an application such as a background application can be executed, which will be configured to detect when the mobile device wakes up and synchronize with one or more servers to indicate that a read occurs due to detection and then move the counter forward. Since the counter of the contactless card and the one or more servers may not be synchronized, the one or more servers can be configured to allow the counter of the contactless card to be updated a threshold or predetermined number of times before it is read by the one or more servers and still be considered valid. For example, if the counter is configured to increment (or decrement) by one for each occurrence indicating the activation of the contactless card, the one or more servers can allow any counter value read from the contactless card to be valid, or any counter value within a threshold range (e.g., from 1 to 10) to be valid. Moreover, the one or more servers can be configured to request a gesture associated with the contactless card, such as a user's tap, if it reads that the counter value has exceeded 10 but is below another threshold range value (e.g., 1000). Through the user's tap, if the counter value is within the expected or accepted range, the verification is successful.

[0129] Figure 8 8 is a flow chart showing key operations 800 according to an exemplary embodiment. Figure 8 As shown, at block 810, two bank identifier number (BIN) level master keys may be used in conjunction with the account identifier and the card serial number to generate two unique derived keys (UDKs) per card. In some examples, the bank identifier number may include a number or a combination of one or more numbers, such as an account number or an unpredictable number provided by one or more servers, which may be used for session key generation and / or diversification. The UDKs (AUTKEY and ENCKEY) may be stored on the card during the personalization process.

[0130] At box 820, the counter can be used as diversification data because it changes with each use and provides a different session key each time, which is contrary to the master key derivation, in which a unique set of keys is generated for each card. In some examples, it is best to use a 4-byte method for both operations. Therefore, at box 820, two session keys can be created for each transaction from the ETDK, i.e., one session key from AEGTKEU and one session key from ENCKEY. In the card, for the MAC key (i.e., the session key created from AGTEKEU), the lower two bytes of the OTP counter can be used for diversification. For the ENC key (i.e., the session key created from ENCKEY), the full length of the OTP counter can be used for the ENC key.

[0131] At block 830, the MAC key may be used to prepare the MAC cipher, and the ENC key may be used to encrypt the cipher. For example, the MAC session key may be used to prepare the cipher, and the result may be encrypted with the ENC key before being sent to one or more servers.

[0132] At block 840, verification and processing of the MAC is simplified because 2-byte diversification is directly supported in the MAC authentication function of the payment HSM. Decryption of the password is performed before verification of the MAC. The session key is independently derived on one or more servers, resulting in a first session key (ENC session key) and a second session key (MAC session key). The second derived key (i.e., the ENC session key) can be used to decrypt the data, and the first derived key (i.e., the MAC session key) can be used to verify the decrypted data.

[0133] For contactless cards, different unique identifiers are derived, which may be related to the application master account number (PAN) and PAN serial number encoded in the card. Key diversification can be configured to receive an identifier as an input with a master key, so that one or more keys can be created for each contactless card. In some examples, these diversified keys may include a first key and a second key. The first key may include an authentication master key (Card Crypotogram Generation / Authentication Key—Card-Key-Auth), and may be further diversified to create a MAC session key used when generating and verifying a MAC password. The second key may include an encryption master key (Card Data Encryption Key—Card-Key-DEK), and may be further diversified to create an ENC session key used when encrypting and decrypting encrypted data. In some examples, the issuer master key may be diversified by combining the issuer master key with the unique ID number (pUTD) and PAN serial number (PSN) of the card of the payment applet to create a first key and a second key. The pUID may include a 16-bit digital value. As described above, the pUID may include a 16-bit BCD-encoded number. In some examples, pUTD may include a 14-bit digital value.

[0134] In some examples, since the EMV session key derivation method may wrap when used with 2^16, a counter (eg, a full 32-bit counter) may be added to the initialization array of the diversification method.

[0135] In other examples, such as credit cards, one or more server-provided numbers (eg, account numbers or unpredictable numbers) may be used for session key generation and / or diversification.

[0136] Fig. 9 A diagram of a system 900 configured to implement one or more embodiments of the present disclosure is shown. As described below, during the contactless card creation process, two cryptographic keys may be uniquely assigned to each card. The cryptographic keys may include symmetric keys that may be used in the encryption and decryption of data. EMV may use a triple DES (3DES) algorithm, and the algorithm is implemented by hardware in the contactless card. By using a key diversification process, one or more keys may be derived from a master key based on uniquely identifiable information for each entity that requires a key.

[0137] With respect to master key management, two issuer master keys 905, 910 may be required for each portion of a layout that issues one or more applets. For example, the first master key 905 may include an issuer password generation / authentication key (Iss-Key-Auth), while the second master key 910 may include an issuer data encryption key (Iss-Key-DEK). As further explained herein, the two issuer master keys 905, 910 are diversified into card master keys 925, 930, which are unique to each card. In some examples, a network profile record ID (pNPR) 915 and a derived key index (pDKI) 920 as background data may be used to identify which issuer master key 905, 910 is used for authentication during the encryption process. The system performing the authentication may be configured to retrieve the values ​​of the pNPR 915 and pDKI 920 of the contactless card at the time of authentication.

[0138] In some examples, to improve the security of the solution, session keys (e.g., keys unique to each session) may be derived, but instead of using a master key, keys derived from a unique card and a counter may be used as diversified data, as described above. For example, each time a card is used in an operation, a different key may be used to create a message authentication code (MAC) and perform encryption. With respect to session key generation, the keys used to generate passwords and encrypt data in one or more applets may include session keys based on card unique keys (Card-Key-Auth 925 and Card-Key-Dek 930). Session keys (Aut-Session-Key 935 and DEK-Session-Key 940) may be generated by one or more applets and may be derived using an application transaction counter (pATC) 945 by one or more algorithms. In order to make the data suitable for one or more algorithms, only the 2 low-order bytes of the 4-byte pATC 945 are used. In some examples, a four-byte session key derivation method may include: F1: =PATC(lower 2 bytes)||'F0'||00'||PATC(four bytes) Fl: =PATC(lower 2 bytes)||0F'||00'||PATC(four bytes) SK: ={(ALG(MK)[Fl])||ALG(MK)[F2]}, where ALG may contain 3DES ECB and MK may contain a card-uniquely derived master key.

[0139] As described herein, the lower two bytes of the pATC 945 counter may be used to derive one or more MAC session keys. At each tap of a contactless card, the pATC 945 is configured to be updated, and the card master keys Card-Key-AEiTH 925 and Card-Key-DEK 930 are further diversified into session keys Aut-Session-Key 935 and DEK-Session-Key 940. The pATC 945 may be initialized to zero at personalization or at applet initialization time. In some examples, the pATC counter 945 may be initialized at or prior to personalization and may be configured to increase by 1 at each NDEF read.

[0140] Additionally, updates for each card may be unique and may be assigned either by personalization or algorithmically via a PETID or other identifying information. For example, odd-numbered cards may be incremented or decremented by 2, while even-numbered cards may be incremented or decremented by 5. In some examples, updates may also vary in sequential reads, such that a card may be incremented in a repeating sequence of 1, 3, 5, 2, 2, ... The specific sequence or algorithmic sequence may be defined at personalization, or based on one or more processes derived from a unique identifier. This may make it more difficult for a replay attacker to generalize from a small number of card instances.

[0141] The authentication message can be delivered as the content of a text NDEF recorded in hexadecimal ASCII format. In some examples, only an 8-byte random number may be included after the authentication data and the MAC of the authentication data. In some examples, the random number may precede the password A and may be one block long. In other examples, there may be no limit on the length of the random number. In further examples, the total data (i.e., the random number plus the password) may be a multiple of the block size. In these examples, additional 8-byte blocks may be added to match the blocks generated by the MAC algorithm. As another example, if the algorithm used uses 16-byte blocks, even multiples of that block size may be used, or the output may be automatically or manually padded to a multiple of that block size.

[0142] The MAC may be performed by a function key (AUT-Session-Key) 935. The data specified in the cipher may be processed with the javacard.signature method: ALG_DES_MAC8_IS09797_1_M2_ALG3 to correlate with the EMV ARQC authentication method. As described above, the key used for this calculation may include the session key AUT-Session-Key 935. As described above, the lower two bytes of the counter may be used to diversify one or more MAC session keys. As described below, the AUT-Session-Key 935 may be used to MAC data 950, and the resulting data or cipher A 955 and random number RND may be encrypted using the DEK-Session-Key 940 to create cipher B or output 960 sent in a message.

[0143] In some examples, one or more HSM commands may be processed for decryption such that the final 16 (binary, 32 hex) bytes may include a 3DES symmetric encryption using CBC mode with a random zero IV followed by the MAC authentication data. The key used for this encryption may include a session key DEK-Session-Key 940 derived from Card-Key-DEK 930. In this case, the ATC value used for session key derivation is the least significant byte of the counter pATC 945.

[0144] The following format represents a binary version example embodiment. Additionally, in some examples, the first byte may be set to ASCII 'A'.

[0145]

[0146]

[0147]

[0148] Another exemplary format is shown below. In this example, the tag may be encoded in hexadecimal format.

[0149]

[0150]

[0151] The UID field of the received message can be extracted to derive the card master keys (Card-Key-Auth 925 and Card-Key-DEK 930) for that particular card from the master keys Iss-Key-AUTH 905 and Iss-Key-DEK 910. The counter (pATC) field of the received message can be used to derive the session keys (Aut-Session-Key 935 and DEK-Session-Key 940) for that particular card using the card master keys (Card-Key-Auth 925 and Card-Key-DEK 930). Cipher B 960 can be decrypted using the DEK-Session-KEY, which produces Cipher A 955 and RND, and the RND can be discarded. The UID field can be used to look up the shared secret of the contactless card, which, along with the Ver, LTD, and pATC fields of the message, can be processed through a cryptographic MAC using the recreated Aut-Session-Key to create a MAC output, such as MAC'. If MAC' is the same as the cryptographic A 955, then both the message decryption and the MAC check have passed. The pATC can then be read to determine if it is valid.

[0152] During the authentication session, one or more applications may generate one or more passwords. For example, one or more passwords may be generated as 3DES MACs using ISO 9797-1 algorithm 3 with method 2 padding via one or more session keys (e.g., Aut-Session-Key 935). Input data 950 may take the following form: version (2), pETID (8), pATC (4), shared secret (4). In some examples, the number in brackets may include a length in bytes. In some examples, the shared secret may be generated by one or more random number generators that may be configured to ensure that the random number is unpredictable through one or more security processes. In some examples, the shared secret may include a random 4-byte binary number injected into the card at a personalization time known to the authentication service. During the authentication session, the shared secret may not be provided to the mobile application from one or more applets. Method 2 padding may include adding a mandatory 0x'80' byte and a 0x'00' byte at the end of the input data, which may be added to the end of the result data until an 8-byte boundary. The resulting password may include a length of 8 bytes.

[0153] In some examples, one benefit of encrypting an unshared random number as the first block using a MAC cipher is that it acts as an initialization vector when using the CBC (block chaining) mode of a symmetric encryption algorithm. This allows "scrambling" between blocks without having to pre-establish a fixed or dynamic IV.

[0154] By including an application transaction counter (pATC) as part of the data contained in the MAC password, the authentication service can be configured to determine whether the value conveyed in the clear data has been tampered with. In addition, by including the version in one or more passwords, it is difficult for an attacker to intentionally tamper with the application version in a way that attempts to reduce the strength of the password solution. In some examples, pATC can start from zero and be updated by 1 each time one or more applications generate authentication data. The authentication service can be configured to track the pATC used during the authentication session. In some examples, when the authentication data uses a pATC that is equal to or less than a previous value received by the authentication service, this can be interpreted as an attempt to replay an old message, and the authenticated can be rejected. In some examples, if pATC is greater than the previously received value, it can be evaluated to determine whether it is within an acceptable range or threshold, and if it exceeds the range or threshold or is outside it, the verification can be considered to have failed or is unreliable. In MAC operation 936, the data 950 is processed by MAC using Aut-Session-Key 935 to produce an encrypted MAC output (password A) 955.

[0155] To provide additional protection against brute force attacks on keys exposed on the card, it is desirable to encrypt the MAC password 955. In some examples, the data or password A 955 to be included in the ciphertext may include: random number (8), password (8). In some examples, the number in brackets may include a length in bytes. In some examples, the random number may be generated by one or more random number generators, which may be configured to ensure that the random number is unpredictable through one or more security processes. The key used to encrypt the data may include a session key. For example, the session key may include a DEK-Session-Key 940. In an encryption operation 941, the data or password A 955 and RND are processed using the DEK-Session-Key 940 to generate encrypted data, password B 960. The data 955 may be encrypted using 3DES in a cipher block chaining mode to ensure that an attacker must perform any attack on all ciphertexts. As a non-limiting example, other algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) may be used. In some examples, an initialization vector of 0x'0000000000000000' may be used. Any attacker attempting to brute force the key used to encrypt this data will not be able to determine when the correct key was used because correctly decrypted data will be indistinguishable from incorrectly decrypted data regions due to its random appearance.

[0156] In order for the authentication service to verify one or more passwords provided by one or more applets, the following data must be delivered in the clear from the one or more applets to the mobile device during the authentication session: a version number, which is used to determine the encryption method and message format used to verify the password, which allows the method to be changed in the future; a pUID, which is used to retrieve the password asset and derive the card key; and a pATC, which is used to derive the session key for the password.

[0157] Fig.10 A method 1000 for generating a cryptogram is shown. For example, at block 1010, a network profile record ID (pNPR) and a derived key index (pDKI) may be used to identify which issuer master key to use for authentication during encryption. In some examples, the method may include performing authentication to retrieve the values ​​of the pNPR and pDKI of the contactless card at the time of authentication.

[0158] At block 1020, the issuer master key may be diversified by combining the issuer master key with the card's unique ID number (pUID) and a PAN serial number (PSN) of one or more applets (eg, a payment applet).

[0159] At block 1030, Card-Key-Auth and Card-Key-DEK (unique card keys) may be created by diversifying the issuer master key to generate a session key that may be used to generate a MAC password.

[0160] At block 1040, the keys used to generate the password and encrypt the data in one or more applets may include: the session keys of block 1030 based on the card unique keys (Card-Key-Auth and Card-Key-DEK). In some examples, these session keys may be generated by one or more applets and derived using pATC, resulting in the session keys Aut-Session-Key and DEK-Session-Key.

[0161] Fig.11 An exemplary process 1100 showing key diversification according to one example is depicted. Initially, two different master keys may be provided to a sender and a receiver. For example, a first master key may include a data encryption master key and a second master key may include a data integrity master key. The sender has a counter value, which may be updated at block 1110, and other data, such as data to be protected, which may be ensured to be shared with the receiver.

[0162] At block 1120, the counter value may be encrypted by the sender using the data encryption master key to produce a data encryption derived session key, and the counter value may also be encrypted by the sender using the data integrity master key to produce a data integrity derived session key. In some examples, the entire counter value or a portion of the counter value may be used during both encryptions.

[0163] In some examples, the counter value may not be encrypted. In these examples, the counter may be sent between the sender and the receiver in plain text, i.e., without encryption.

[0164] The sender processes the data to be protected using a cryptographic MAC operation using the data integrity session key and the cryptographic MAC algorithm at block 1130. The protected data (including plain text and shared secret) may be used to generate a MAC using one of the session keys (AUT-Session-Key).

[0165] The data to be protected may be encrypted by the sender using a session key derived from data encryption in conjunction with a symmetric encryption algorithm at block 1140. In some examples, the MAC is combined with an equal amount of random data (e.g., each 8 bytes long) and then encrypted using a second session key (DEK-Session-Key).

[0166] At block 1150, the encrypted MAC is sent from the sender to the receiver, which has sufficient information to identify additional confidential information (eg, a shared secret, a master key, etc.) to verify the password.

[0167] At block 1160, the recipient uses the received counter value to independently derive two derived session keys from the two master keys, as described above.

[0168] At block 1170, the session key derived from the data encryption is used in conjunction with a symmetric decryption operation to decrypt the protected data. Additional processing of the exchanged data will then occur. In some examples, after the MAC is extracted, it is desirable to reproduce and match the MAC. For example, when verifying a password, it can be decrypted using a properly generated session key. The protected data can be reconstructed for verification. A MAC operation can be performed using a properly generated session key to determine if it matches the decrypted MAC. Since the MAC operation is an irreversible process, the only way to verify is to attempt to recreate it from the source data.

[0169] At block 1180, the data integrity derived session key is used in conjunction with a cryptographic MAC operation to verify that the protected data has not been modified.

[0170] Some examples of the methods described herein can advantageously confirm when a successful authentication is determined when the following conditions are met. First, the ability to verify the MAC indicates that the derived session key is correct. The MAC is correct only when the decryption is successful and produces the correct MAC value. Successful decryption can indicate that the correctly derived encryption key has been used to decrypt the encrypted MAC. Since the derived session key is created using a master key known only to the sender (e.g., a sending device) and the receiver (e.g., a receiving device), it can be believed that the contactless card that originally created the MAC and encrypted the MAC is indeed credible. Moreover, the counter value used to derive the first session key and the second session key can be shown as valid and can be used to perform the authentication operation.

[0171] Thereafter, the two derived session keys may be discarded, and the next iteration of the data exchange will update the counter value (returning to block 1110), and a new set of session keys may be created (at block 1120). In some examples, the combined random data may be discarded.

[0172] Example embodiments of the systems and methods described herein may be configured to provide security factor authentication. Security factor authentication may include multiple processes. As part of security factor authentication, a first process may include logging in and authenticating a user via one or more applications executed on a device. As a second process, in response to successful login and authentication of the first process via one or more applications, the user may engage in one or more behaviors associated with one or more contactless cards. In practice, security factor authentication may include securely proving the identity of the user and engaging in one or more types of behaviors associated with a contactless card, including but not limited to one or more tap gestures. In some examples, one or more tap gestures may include a user tapping a contactless card of a device. In some examples, the device may include a mobile device, a kiosk, a terminal, a tablet computer, or any other device configured to process a received tap gesture.

[0173] In some examples, the contactless card can be tapped against a device such as one or more computer kiosks or terminals to verify identity in order to receive a transaction item in response to a purchase (such as coffee). By using a contactless card, a secure method of proving identity in a loyalty program can be established. Establishing a secure way to prove identity to, for example, obtain rewards, coupons, offers, etc., or the receipt of benefits in a different way than just scanning a bar card. For example, an encrypted transaction may occur between a contactless card and a device, which can be configured to process one or more tap gestures. As described above, one or more applications can be configured to verify the identity of the user, and then, for example, via one or more tap gestures, the user can act or respond to it. In some examples, data such as consumer points, loyalty points, reward points, health care information, etc. can be written back to the contactless card.

[0174] In some examples, the contactless card can be tapped against a device such as a mobile device. As described above, the user's identity can be verified by one or more applications, which will then grant the user desired benefits based on the verification of the identity.

[0175] In some examples, the contactless card can be activated by tapping a device such as a mobile device. For example, the contactless card can communicate with the application of the device via the card reader of the device through NFC communication. Wherein the communication of tapping the card near the card reader of the device can allow the application of the device to read the data associated with the contactless card and activate the card. In some examples, the activation can authorize the card to perform other functions, such as purchasing, accessing accounts or restricted information or other functions. In some examples, tapping can activate or start the application of the device, and then initiate one or more actions or communications with one or more servers to activate the contactless card. If the application is not installed on the device, tapping the contactless card near the card reader can initiate the download of the application, such as navigating to the download page of the application. After installation, tapping the contactless card can activate or start the application, and then initiate the activation of the contactless card, such as via the application or other back-end communications. After activation, the contactless card can be used for various activities, including but not limited to commercial transactions.

[0176] In some embodiments, a dedicated application may be configured to execute on a client device to perform activation of a contactless card. In other embodiments, a web portal, a web-based application, a small application, etc. may perform activation. Activation may be performed on the client device, or the client device may simply act as a channel between a contactless card and an external device (e.g., an account server). According to some embodiments, when providing activation, the application may indicate to the account server the type of device performing the activation (e.g., a personal computer, a smart phone, a tablet, or a point of sale (POS) device). In addition, depending on the type of device involved, the application may output different and / or additional data to the account server for transmission. For example, such data may include information associated with a merchant, such as a merchant type, a merchant ID, and information associated with the device type itself such as POS data and POS ID.

[0177] In some embodiments, the example authentication communication protocol can mimic the offline dynamic data authentication protocol of the EMV standard, which is typically performed between a transaction card and a point-of-sale device, with some modifications. For example, since the example authentication protocol itself is not used to complete a payment transaction with an issuer / payment processor, certain data values ​​are not required, and authentication can be performed without involving a real-time online connection to the issuer / payment processor. As is known in the art, a point-of-sale (POS) system submits a transaction including a transaction value to a card issuer. Whether the issuer approves or rejects the transaction can be based on whether the card issuer recognizes the transaction value. At the same time, in certain embodiments of the present disclosure, transactions originating from mobile devices lack a transaction value associated with the POS system. Therefore, in some embodiments, a virtual transaction value (i.e., a value that is recognizable by the card issuer and sufficient to allow activation to occur) can be passed as part of the example authentication communication protocol. POS-based transactions can also reject transactions based on the number of transaction attempts (e.g., a transaction counter). The number of attempts exceeding a buffer value may result in a soft decline; the soft decline requires further verification before accepting the transaction. In some implementations, the buffer value of the transaction counter can be modified to avoid rejecting legitimate transactions.

[0178] In some examples, contactless cards can selectively transmit information based on the recipient device. Once tapped, the contactless card can identify the device that the tap is directed to, and based on that identification, the contactless card can provide the appropriate data for that device. Advantageously, this allows the contactless card to send only the information necessary to complete an immediate action or transaction, such as a payment or card authentication. By limiting the transmission of data and avoiding the transmission of unnecessary data, efficiency and data security can be improved. The identification and selective communication of information can be applied in a variety of situations, including card activation, balance transfers, account access attempts, commercial transactions, and fraud reduction.

[0179] If the tap of the contactless card is directed to a computer running Apple If you have a device running the operating system (such as an iPhone, iPod or iPad), the contactless card can be recognized The operating system sends the appropriate data to communicate with this device. For example, a contactless card can use an NDEF tag via, for example, NFC to provide the encrypted identity information required to authenticate the card. Similarly, if the tap of a contactless card is directed to the operating system Operating system devices (such as smartphone or tablet), the contactless card can be recognized The system operates and sends appropriate data to communicate with the device (such as encrypted identity information required for authentication via the methods described herein).

[0180] As another example, the tap of a contactless card can be directed to a POS device, including but not limited to a computer kiosk, a checkout counter, a payment station, or other terminal. When performing the tap, the contactless card can identify the POS device and send only the information required for the action or transaction. For example, after identifying the POS device used to complete a commercial transaction, the contactless card can transmit the payment information required to complete the transaction under the EMV standard.

[0181] In some examples, a POS device participating in a transaction may require or specify additional information to be provided by the contactless card, such as device-specific information, location-specific information, and transaction-specific information. For example, once the POS device receives data communications from a contactless card, the POS device may identify the contactless card and request additional information required to complete the action or transaction.

[0182] In some examples, the POS device may be affiliated with an authorized merchant or other entity that is familiar with certain contactless cards or accustomed to performing certain contactless card transactions. However, it should be understood that such an affiliation is not required to perform the described methods.

[0183] In some examples, such as shopping malls, grocery stores, convenience stores, etc., a contactless card can be tapped against a mobile device without having to open an app to indicate a desire or intent to utilize one or more of reward points, loyalty points, coupons, offers, etc. to cover one or more purchases, thereby providing the intent behind the purchase.

[0184] In some examples, one or more applications may be configured to determine that it was initiated via one or more tap gestures of a contactless card such that the initiation occurred at 3:51 PM and the transaction was processed or occurred at 3:56 PM to verify the user's identity.

[0185] In some examples, one or more applications can be configured to control one or more actions in response to one or more tap gestures. For example, the one or more actions can include collecting rewards, collecting points, determining the most important purchases, determining the lowest cost purchases, and / or reconfiguring to another action in real time.

[0186] In some examples, data about the tapping behavior can be collected as a biometric / gesture authentication. For example, a unique identifier that is cryptographically secure and not easily intercepted can be sent to one or more backend services. The unique identifier can be configured to look up secondary information about the individual. The secondary information can include personally identifiable information about the user. In some examples, the secondary information can be stored within a contactless card.

[0187] In some examples, the device may include an application to split a bill or check payment between multiple individuals. For example, each person may have a contactless card and may be a customer of the same issuing financial institution, but this is not required. Each of these people may receive a push notification on their device through the application to split the purchase. Instead of accepting only one card tap to indicate payment, other contactless cards may be used. In some examples, individuals with different financial institutions may have contactless cards to provide information to initiate one or more payment requests from the individual tapping the card.

[0188] The following example use cases describe examples of specific implementations of the present disclosure. These are for illustrative purposes only and not for limitation. In one case, a first friend (payer) owes a second friend (payee) a sum of money. The payer wants to pay using a contactless card through the payee's smartphone (or other device) instead of going to an ATM or requesting an exchange through a peer-to-peer application. The payee logs into the appropriate application on his smartphone and selects the payment request option. In response, the application requests authentication via the payee's contactless card. For example, the application outputs a display to request the payee to tap his contactless card. Once the payee taps his contactless card on the screen of his smartphone where the application is enabled, the contactless card is read and verified. Next, the application displays a prompt for the payee to tap his contactless card for payment. After the payee taps his contactless card, the application reads the card information and sends the payment request to the payee's card issuer through an associated processor. The card issuer processes the transaction and sends a status indicator of the transaction to the smartphone. Then, the application outputs a status indicator to display the transaction.

[0189] In another example scenario, a credit card customer may receive a new credit card (or debit card, other payment card, or any other card that requires activation) in the mail. Rather than activating the card by calling a provided phone number or visiting a website associated with the card issuer, the customer may decide to activate the card through an app on his or her device (e.g., a mobile device such as a smartphone). The customer may select a card activation function from an app menu displayed on the device display. The app may prompt the customer to tap their credit card on the screen. After tapping the credit card on the device screen, the app may be configured to communicate with a server, such as a card issuer server that activates the customer's card. The app may then display a message indicating that the card was successfully activated. Activation of the card will then be complete.

[0190] Fig.12 A method 1200 for card activation according to an example embodiment is shown. For example, card activation can be accomplished by a system including a card, a device, and one or more servers. The contactless card, the device, and the one or more servers may refer to the above Figure 1A , Figure 1B , Figure 5A and Figure 5B The same or similar components explained previously, such as contactless card 105 , client device 110 , and server 120 .

[0191] At block 1210, the card may be configured to dynamically generate data. In some examples, the data may include information such as an account number, a card identifier, a card verification value, or a phone number, which may be sent from the card to the device. In some examples, one or more portions of the data may be encrypted via the systems and methods disclosed herein.

[0192] At box 1220, one or more portions of the dynamically generated data may be transmitted to an application of the device via NFC or other wireless communication. For example, a tap of the card close to the device may allow an application of the device to read one or more portions of the data associated with the contactless card. In some examples, if the device does not include an application for assisting in the activation of the card, the tap of the card may direct the device or prompt the user to a software application store to download the associated application to activate the card. In some examples, the user may be prompted to fully gesture, place, or orient the card toward the surface of the device, such as placing it at an angle or flat on the surface of the device, near it, or close to it. In response to the full gesture, placement, and / or orientation of the card, the device may continue to send one or more encrypted portions of the data received from the card to one or more servers.

[0193] At block 1230, one or more portions of the data may be transmitted to one or more servers, such as a card issuer server. For example, one or more encrypted portions of the data may be sent from the device to the card issuer server to activate the card.

[0194] At block 1240, one or more servers may decrypt one or more encrypted portions of the data via the systems and methods disclosed herein. For example, one or more servers may receive encrypted data from a device and may decrypt it to compare the received data with recorded data accessible to one or more servers. If the comparison of the one or more decrypted portions of the data by the one or more servers results in a successful match, the card may be activated. If the comparison of the one or more decrypted portions of the data by the one or more servers results in an unsuccessful match, one or more processes may occur. For example, in response to a determination of an unsuccessful match, the user may be prompted to tap, swipe, or wave the card again. In this case, there may be a predetermined threshold that includes the number of attempts to allow the user to activate the card. Alternatively, the user may receive a notification, such as a message on his or her device indicating an unsuccessful attempt at card verification and call, email, or text a related service to assist in activating the card; or another notification, such as a phone call indicating an unsuccessful attempt at card verification on his or her device and call, email, or text a related service to assist in activating the card; or another notification, such as an email indicating an unsuccessful attempt at card verification and call, email, or text a related service to assist in activating the card.

[0195] At block 1250, one or more servers may send a return message based on the successful activation of the card. For example, the device may be configured to receive an output from the one or more servers indicating that the one or more servers successfully activated the card. The device may be configured to display a message indicating that the card was successfully activated. Once the card is activated, the card may be configured to disconnect the dynamically generated data to avoid fraudulent use. In this way, the card may not be activated thereafter, and the one or more servers may be notified that the card has been activated.

[0196] As described above, a symmetric key algorithm may be used / implemented, or an asymmetric key algorithm may be used / implemented. For example, a sending device may have a private key (e.g., stored thereon). A private key may be provided to the sending device, and an associated public key may be generated when the private key is generated. The public key may be accessed by the receiving device (e.g., previously stored thereon or provided by the sending device). If the public key is provided by the sending device, the public key may be encrypted separately. Alternatively or additionally, the public key may be signed by the issuer so that the receiving device can verify the authenticity of the public key.

[0197] In some examples, a private key and a public key for encryption can be provided to the sending device. For example, the sending device can obtain a counter value and / or a user ID and sign it using a private key. The private key can be specific to the sending device, or a global private key can be used. The information can then be encrypted using the public key and sent to the receiving device. The receiving device can then decrypt the information using the private key corresponding to the public key and verify the content (e.g., the counter value and the user ID) using, for example, the public key.

[0198] Fig.13A and Fig. 13B 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method 1300 for card activation according to an example embodiment, and may reference the same or similar components and functions as explained above with respect to any of FIGS. 1-12 . Fig.13A As shown, at box 1305, a first master key and a first cryptographic algorithm may be used to generate a first diversified key. In some examples, the sending device may include a processor and a memory, the memory containing a diversified master key, transmission data, and a counter value. For example, the first diversified key may be generated using the diversified master key. At box 1310, the first diversified key may be stored in the memory of the sending device. At box 1315, the counter value may be protected using a second cryptographic algorithm and the first diversified key. The sending device may generate a cryptographic result including the counter value using the second cryptographic algorithm and the first diversified key. At box 1320, the counter value may be signed using a secret key. At box 1325, the signed counter value may be encrypted using a public key. At box 1330, the transmission data may be encrypted using a third cryptographic algorithm and the first diversified key to produce encrypted transmission data.

[0199] like Fig. 13B As shown, at box 1335, the protected counter value and the encrypted transmission data can be sent to an application including instructions executed on the receiving device. The cryptographic result and the encrypted transmission data can be sent from the sending device to the application of the receiving device. At box 1340, the public key can be sent to the receiving device. At box 1345, a second diversified key can be generated based on the second master key and the counter value. In some examples, the second diversified key can be generated based on the second master key and the unique identifier of the receiving device. At box 1350, the second diversified key can be stored in the receiving device memory. For example, a session key can be generated based on the second diversified key and the received cryptographic result. At box 1355, the encrypted transmission data can be decrypted using a fourth cryptographic algorithm and a session key based on the second diversified key and the cryptographic result can be verified. In some examples, the protected counter value can be verified.

[0200] Fig.14A and Fig. 14B 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method 1400 for using asymmetric encryption according to an example embodiment, and may reference the same or similar components and functions as explained above with respect to any of FIGS. 1-13 . Fig.14A As shown, at box 1405, a first diversified key may be generated using a secret encryption key and a first cryptographic algorithm. In some examples, the sending device may include a processor and a memory, the memory containing the secret encryption key, the transmission data, and the counter value. For example, at box 1410, the counter value may be encrypted using a second cryptographic algorithm and a secret encryption key. At box 1415, the counter value may be signed using the secret encryption key. At box 1420, the signed counter value may be encrypted using a public encryption key. At box 1425, the transmission data may be encrypted using a third cryptographic algorithm and the first diversified key to produce encrypted transmission data.

[0201] like Fig. 14B As shown, at box 1430, the encrypted counter value or the signed encrypted counter value and the encrypted transmission data can be sent to the application of the receiving device. At box 1435, a second diversified key can be generated based on the public encryption key and the counter value. At box 1440, the encrypted transmission data can be decrypted and the encrypted counter value can be verified using a fourth cryptographic algorithm and the public encryption key. In some examples, the cryptographic result can be verified using the fourth cryptographic algorithm and the public encryption key. For example, the cryptographic result that can be sent and received from the sending device at the application can include the counter value using the second cryptographic algorithm and the first diversified key. At box 1445, the signed counter value can be decrypted using a further secret encryption key.

[0202] Fig.15 1-14 is another flow chart illustrating the use of asymmetric encryption according to an example embodiment, and may reference the same or similar components and functions as explained above with respect to any of FIGs. 1-14. Fig.15 As shown, at box 1505, a first cryptographic algorithm and a first private key may be used to generate a cryptographic result including a counter value. In some examples, the sending device may include a processor and a memory, the memory containing the first private key, the transmission data, and the counter value. At box 1510, the transmission data may be encrypted using a second cryptographic algorithm and a first public key to generate encrypted transmission data. At box 1515, the encrypted transmission data and the cryptographic result may be sent to an application of a receiving device. At box 1520, the encrypted transmission data may be decrypted and the cryptographic result may be verified by the application of the receiving device using the second private key. At box 1525, the protected counter value may be decrypted and verified using the second public key.

[0203] In another example scenario, a customer wants to access his financial account on his or her mobile phone. The customer launches an application (e.g., a banking application) on the mobile device and enters a username and password. At this stage, the customer can see first-level account information (e.g., recently purchased items) and is able to perform first-level account options (e.g., pay a credit card). However, if the user attempts to access second-level account information (e.g., spending limits) or perform second-level account options (e.g., transfer to an external system), he must have a second-level authentication. Therefore, the application requests the user to provide a transaction card (e.g., a credit card) for account verification. The user then taps his or her credit card against the mobile device, and the application verifies whether the credit card corresponds to the user's account. Thereafter, the user can view second-level account data and / or perform second-level account functions.

[0204] In some examples, the present disclosure relates to the tapping of a contactless card. However, it should be understood that the present disclosure is not limited to tapping, and the present disclosure includes other gestures (e.g., swiping or other movements of a card).

[0205] Throughout the specification and claims, the following terms have at least the meanings explicitly associated herein unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. The term "or" is intended to mean an inclusive "or". Further, the terms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to mean one or more, unless otherwise specified or clear from context to direct to a singular form.

[0206] In this description, many specific details have been set forth. However, it should be understood that embodiments of the disclosed technology may be practiced without these specific details. In other cases, well-known methods, structures, and techniques are not shown in detail to avoid confusing the understanding of this specification. References to "some examples", "other examples", "one example", "example", "various examples", "one embodiment", "embodiment", "some embodiments", "example embodiments", "various embodiments", "one implementation", "implementation", "exemplary implementation", "various implementations", "some implementations", etc. indicate that the embodiments of the disclosed technology described may include specific features, structures, or characteristics, but not every implementation must include specific features, structures, or characteristics. In addition, although the phrases "in one example", "in one embodiment", or "in one implementation" may be used repeatedly, they do not necessarily refer to the same examples, embodiments, or implementations.

[0207] As used herein, unless otherwise indicated, the use of ordinal adjectives "first," "second," "third," etc., to describe common objects simply indicates that different instances of similar objects are referenced and is not intended to imply that the objects so described are necessarily in a given order in time, space, rank, or in any other manner.

[0208] Although certain embodiments of the disclosed technology have been described in conjunction with what are currently considered to be the most practical and various embodiments, it should be understood that the disclosed technology is not limited to the disclosed embodiments, but rather, the present disclosure is intended to cover various modifications and equivalent arrangements included within the scope of the appended claims. Although specific terms are used herein, they are used in a generic and descriptive sense only and not for purposes of limitation.

[0209] This written description uses examples to disclose certain embodiments of the disclosed technology, including the best mode, and also enables those skilled in the art to practice certain embodiments of the disclosed technology, including making and using any device or system and performing any method included. The patentable scope of certain implementations of the disclosed technology is defined in the claims, and may include other examples that occur to those skilled in the art. Such other examples are intended to be within the scope of the claims if they have structural elements that do not differ from the literal language of the claims, or if they include equivalent structural elements that do not differ substantially from the literal language of the claims.

Claims

1. A contactless card, comprising: processor; and a memory containing a first private key, a first public key, transmission data, and a counter value; Wherein, the contactless card is configured as follows after being wirelessly read by an application executed on a client device: generating a cryptographic result using the first private key, the counter value, and at least one first cryptographic algorithm, wherein the cryptographic result is for a protected counter value, encrypting the transmission data and the protected counter value using at least one second cryptographic algorithm and the first public key to produce encrypted transmission data, and The encrypted transmission data is transmitted to a server via an application executed on the client device.

2. The contactless card according to claim 1, wherein: The at least one first cryptographic algorithm and the second cryptographic algorithm each include at least one selected from the following group: an asymmetric encryption algorithm, a digital signature algorithm, an ElGamal encryption algorithm, an elliptic curve algorithm, and a Paillier cryptographic system algorithm.

3. The contactless card according to claim 1, wherein: The counter value includes a one-time password.

4. The contactless card according to claim 1, wherein: For each transmission between the contactless card and the server, the cryptographic result is generated.

5. The contactless card according to claim 3, wherein: At least one of the counter value or a portion of the counter value is used to generate the cryptographic outcome.

6. The contactless card according to claim 1, wherein: The contactless card is further configured to transmit a second public key associated with the first private key to the server.

7. The contactless card according to claim 6, wherein: The second public key includes a signed certificate to authenticate the issuer of the public key.

8. The contactless card according to claim 6, wherein: The second public key is transmitted to the server via an application executed on the client device.

9. The contactless card according to claim 1, wherein: The transmission data includes activation data for the contactless card.

10. A method for transmitting data via a contactless card, the contactless card having a processor and a memory containing a first private key, a first public key, transmission data, and a counter, the method comprising: generating, by the contactless card after being wirelessly read by an application executed on a client device, a cryptographic result using a first private key, a counter value, and at least one first cryptographic algorithm, the cryptographic result being generated by encrypting the counter value using the at least one first cryptographic algorithm and the first private key; generating encrypted transmission data by encrypting the transmission data and the cryptographic result by the contactless card using at least one second cryptographic algorithm and the first public key; as well as The encrypted transmission data is transmitted to the server via the client device.

11. The method of claim 10, further comprising transmitting a second public key associated with the first private key to the server.

12. The method according to claim 10, wherein: At least one of the counter value or a portion of the counter value is used to generate the cryptographic outcome.

13. A server communicatively coupled to a contactless card via a client device, the server comprising: processor; and a memory containing a second public key associated with a first private key stored on the contactless card and a second private key associated with the first public key stored on the contactless card; Wherein, the server is configured as: receiving from the contactless card an encrypted transmission comprising a protected counter value, decrypting the encrypted transmission data using the second private key to generate the protected counter value, The protected counter value is decrypted and verified using the second public key.

14. The server according to claim 13, wherein: The protected counter value included in the encrypted transmission data received from the contactless card is verified based on the counter value stored on the server after being decrypted using the second public key stored on the server.

15. The server according to claim 14, wherein: The protected counter value is validated based on at least one of the counter value or a portion of the counter value stored on the server.

16. The server according to claim 13, wherein: The protected counter value is signed by a first private key stored on the contactless card and further encrypted by a first public key used by the contactless card to generate the encrypted transmission data.

17. The server according to claim 13, wherein: The encrypted transmission data includes activation data for the contactless card, and The server is further configured to activate the contactless card using the activation data obtained by decrypting the encrypted transmission data.

18. The server according to claim 13, wherein: The server is further configured to receive the second public key from the contactless card.

19. The server according to claim 13, wherein: The protected counter value comprises a one-time password.

20. The server according to claim 13, wherein: The second public key is retrieved by the server via reading of the contactless card by an application executing on a client device communicatively coupled to the server.