Control device and takeover control method
By introducing physical circuit breaker switches and write-protected memory into the control device of networked vehicles, the availability problem under the threat of usurpation is solved, ensuring the safe operation of the vehicle, and the potential is achieved by overwriting malware and independent communication connections Quick response to usurpation and restore of security state.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202080015338.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2019-02-19
- Filing Date
- 2020-02-17
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-02-17
AI Technical Summary
The control devices of existing connected vehicles are difficult to maintain availability in the face of usurpation threats, especially when encryption technology is constantly developing and quantum computing emerges. Traditional cryptography methods are ineffective and cannot effectively prevent hackers from communicating with external servers and vehicles. Unauthorized access results in potential security risks.
A control device for a vehicle is designed, including a physically disconnected circuit switch and a write-protected memory, which is used to disconnect the received communication when the communication is intruded, overwrite the software in the control module, and ensure the original software of the software. The version is replaced to prevent the execution of malware and remotely trigger the circuit breaker via a separate communication connection, ensuring quick response in the unmanned system.
Effectively prevent the execution of malware and ensure the safe traffic state of the vehicle. By overwriting potentially infected software, the original function of the control device is restored, the risk of usurpation is reduced, and through write-protected memory and emergency control modules, Ensure the safe operation of the vehicle.
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Figure CN113474739B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention relates to a control device for a vehicle of the type defined in detail in the preamble to claim 1. The invention also relates to a control takeover method for a control device that could be manipulated, of the type defined in detail in the preamble to claim 8. Background Art
[0002] Currently, networked vehicle control devices are known from the prior art, which communicate with an off-board server, the so-called backend server, via a communication module. This subject will be used more and more in the future, for example for navigation systems or driver assistance systems, which control a manually driven vehicle or a vehicle that is at least sometimes controlled by a vehicle user. In addition to functions that are also referred to below as partially autonomous driving functions, networked control devices will also be used in the future, in particular, for autonomously driven vehicles.
[0003] Here, safety plays an important role not only in the case of partially autonomous driving functions, but also in autonomous driving in particular. For example, the functional safety of each sensor can be achieved by providing redundancy by other sensors or sensor groups and / or monitoring of each sensor or sensor group. In this regard, reference can be made to DE 10 2017 126 877 A1. Now, in the case of networked vehicles or their control devices, another aspect plays an important role in terms of safety. The communication between the external server and the vehicle communication module involves the safety of the driving function. For this reason, the communication system is encrypted. Therefore, on the one hand, anti-tampering security can be guaranteed, and on the other hand, it can be verified whether the communication partners originally provided for this communicate with each other. Therefore, encryption is used to maintain data integrity and at the same time maintain the authenticity of the sender and receiver using this encryption method.
[0004] Typical methods are currently, for example, asymmetric public key methods. However, the fact is that this cannot be based on a static security architecture, because encryption and decryption technology is constantly developing. Therefore, the security architecture once selected will soon become obsolete due to technological progress, thus giving hackers the opportunity to penetrate the communication between the backend server and the vehicle, for example. He can implant corresponding malware or malicious commands into the vehicle, which can, for example, cause an accident, guide the autonomous truck to the wrong destination to steal the goods, etc. This is a terrible situation for both car manufacturers and car users. But this cannot be prevented to a certain extent, because the encrypted content that cannot be decrypted at reasonable cost today may be decrypted in the near future, especially when using so-called quantum computers, which use completely new computing methods and make the known cryptographic methods that are currently considered safe invalid. Of course, cryptographic methods are also developing now. But there is a fear that this method will have loopholes again and again, so that despite all the security technology, hackers will still try to gain unauthorized access to the communication between the external server and the vehicle in order to tamper with the vehicle in an undesirable and dangerous way.
[0005] DE 10 2017 126 877 A1 discloses a control system for an autonomous vehicle, which has at least one controller. The controller receives a first sensor value from a first set of sensors for identifying a first state of a detected object near the vehicle, and receives a second sensor value from a second set of sensors for identifying a second state of the detected object. Based on the comparison of these states, an actuator of the vehicle is automatically activated, which is designed to control the steering, acceleration, deceleration or gear shifting of the vehicle.
[0006] DE 10 2017 220 845 A1 relates to a controller network for a vehicle having a plurality of controllers for transferring or migrating a function or an application or a program from a first controller of the controller network to a second controller. The controller network is provided for, in particular, identifying the function or application or program to be migrated on the first controller and selecting a suitable second controller, if necessary.
[0007] DE 696 02 693 T2 discloses a control device for a machine, the control program or data of which can be controllably overwritten after the machine has stopped.
[0008] DE 11 2014 000 623 T5 describes an access restriction device, an in-vehicle communication system and a communication restriction method, which are intended to prevent information leakage due to unauthorized access to an in-vehicle network by malicious programs. Summary of the invention
[0009] Against this background, it is an object of the present invention to provide an improved control device and a control takeover method for a control device that could be manipulated, in order to maintain availability even in the event of a compromise of the control system.
[0010] According to the invention, this object is achieved by a control device for a vehicle having the features of claim 1, in particular the characterizing features of claim 1. Advantageous refinements and improvements are derived from the dependent claims. Furthermore, this object is achieved by a method having the features of claim 7, in particular the characterizing features of claim 7. Advantageous refinements and improvements of the method are derived from the dependent claims.
[0011] The control device for a vehicle according to the invention comprises a communication module for establishing a transmission communication and a reception communication with an off-board server and a control module for driving functions connected thereto, which receives data from at least one sensor and triggers at least one actuator to at least partially autonomously control the driving functions in the vehicle. This is common in partially or fully autonomously driven vehicles or manually driven vehicles with networked assistance systems. Now, the control device according to the invention provides for a disconnect switch for physically disconnecting at least the reception communication and a write-protected memory / read-only memory, in which the software contained and stored is used to overwrite the software in the communication module and the control module and perhaps in other modules of the vehicle control device.
[0012] In the case of a communication intrusion being detected or suspected, it should be assumed that malware has penetrated the vehicle control unit via the communication channel. The vehicle driver or monitoring personnel can now at least physically disconnect the received communication via a disconnect switch to prevent information and / or control instructions that may contain malware from continuing to enter the vehicle control unit and / or being executed by it. Then, through a write-protected memory in which the corresponding software is stored in an unchangeable and tamper-proof manner, the software can overwrite the malware in all modules of the control unit. Thus, potential malware is replaced by the original version of the control software from the unprotected memory. The memory should of course be designed to be tamper-proof so that the software it contains cannot be tampered with. The process should be controlled in such a way that all software in the control module is completely deleted in order to also overwrite any malware. Then the software from the write-protected memory is loaded, and the control unit has its original function again. Depending on the software version in the write-protected memory, some functions, some adjustments made by the user, etc. may be lost at this time, but the basic functions of the control unit are always present. The updated version in the write-protected memory can be implemented on the vehicle side by replacing the memory during maintenance intervals, for example.
[0013] According to a very simple and effective embodiment of the control device according to the invention, it is provided that the disconnect switch can be triggered mechanically. Thus, in its simplest variant, the disconnect switch can be triggered directly mechanically. It can be a simple switch or button, which disconnects, for example, an autonomous or semi-autonomous driving function in the form of an emergency switch and can be manually operated easily, efficiently and quickly by a person, for example in the event of suspected tampering of the control device.
[0014] As an alternative, of course, the disconnect switch can also be activated by remote triggering, for which purpose it can be triggered according to an advantageous development of the invention by at least one further communication connection, bypassing the communication module. This further communication connection should be designed to be completely independent of the communication with the backend server, so that it is not affected by malware in the event of an intrusion. It can then be used to trigger the disconnect switch by remote triggering and activate the above-mentioned scenario. This can be used in particular in unmanned systems, such as unmanned buses or unmanned trucks, for example when a monitoring system for an unmanned vehicle determines that it is traveling on a route that it should not be traveling on, and thus it can be assumed that the control device has been tampered with.
[0015] As already mentioned, in principle, it is sufficient for the disconnect switch to disconnect the receive communication. The damage that can be caused by the transmit communication is relatively small. However, it may also make sense to disconnect the transmit communication accordingly, so that according to an advantageous development, the concept is provided that the disconnect switch is designed in such a way that it also disconnects the transmit communication. This disconnection can also preferably be carried out in the form of a physical disconnection.
[0016] Another very advantageous embodiment of the invention provides that the disconnect switch also disconnects connected user-specific software modules. Such user-specific software modules, also referred to as third-party modules, can be interconnected with the vehicle, for example connected to the vehicle by plugging. Since the possibility cannot be excluded that an attack on the vehicle is carried out via the software modules or that malicious software is stored in one of the software modules during an attack, it should be ensured that they are also physically separated from the system. This can be done by means of the disconnect switch or another disconnect switch, or if the vehicle is driven by a person or a person is on board, he can also unplug the corresponding module before the control software is copied again from the write-protected memory into the control module.
[0017] In order to be able to overwrite the software in all modules of the control device, all driving functions should be temporarily deactivated. This usually presupposes a safe traffic state of the vehicle, such as a parking state. In order to be able to do this without the risk of possible tampering that would prevent this state, it can be provided according to a very advantageous preferred design of the control device of the invention that the disconnect switch is also designed to deactivate the control module and activate the write-protected emergency control module. According to a very advantageous refinement of this concept, the write-protected emergency control module then accesses the individual sensors and actuators required for its function in order to place the vehicle into a safe traffic state, in particular a parking state, by the emergency control module when it is activated. Thus, for example, the vehicle can be stopped and driven to the shoulder of the road, while flashing warning lights, etc. are activated. As soon as the vehicle subsequently reaches a safe traffic state, in particular a parking traffic state, the potentially infected software of all modules of the control device can be overwritten by the software stored in the write-protected memory.
[0018] The method according to claim 8 once again discusses the method sequence described above in detail. Regardless of the structural design of the control device, at least the receiving communication is physically disconnected and then a check is made as to whether the vehicle is in a safe traffic state, in particular a safe parking state. If this is the case, the software in all modules of the control device can be overwritten by the software stored in the write-protected memory. If this is not the case, the write-protected emergency control module must first be activated, which puts the vehicle into a safe traffic state, in particular a parking state, and then the software in the other modules of the control device is correspondingly overwritten and thus replaced by software that is not infected by malware.
[0019] In principle, it is also conceivable here that the transmission channel can be opened, but can also be optionally disconnected, as described above. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0020] Further advantageous embodiments of the control device according to the invention and of the method according to the invention also emerge from the remaining dependent claims and from the exemplary embodiments which are described in more detail below with reference to the drawings, in which:
[0021] Figure 1 A possible structure of a control device according to the invention in a vehicle is shown,
[0022] Figure 2 Demonstrating the basis for being in a state of being invaded Figure 1 control device,
[0023] Figure 3 Shows the following after activating the disconnect switch Figure 1 control device,
[0024] Figure 4 Shows the basis for re-establishing a safe state Figure 1 control device,
[0025] Figure 5 Shows the basis after reaching a safe state Figure 1 control device.
[0026] Figure 6 Shows something like Figure 1 A possible alternative implementation of a control device. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0027] exist Figure 1 In the diagram of FIG. , a vehicle 1 with a control device is shown in principle. The control device includes at least one communication module 2 and a control module 3. The communication module 2 is used to enable the networked vehicle 1 to communicate with an external server 5 by means of a transmitter and a receiver 4, which is also called a backend server and is shown here only in the form of a cloud by way of example. The communication module 2 can establish a sending communication indicated by 6 and a receiving communication indicated by 7 between the external server 5 and the communication module 2. The communication module 2 is also connected to the control module 3. The control module 3 receives data from the communication module 2 and forwards information to it. The control module 3 is also associated with the environmental sensor 8 shown here by way of example. The environmental sensor 8 can be, for example, an optical sensor, a radar sensor, a lidar sensor, an ultrasonic sensor, etc. They are used to implement autonomous driving functions so that the vehicle can be fully autonomously driven or semi-autonomously driven. However, they are also used to support driver assistance systems, which belong to semi-autonomous driving functions in the sense described here.
[0028] Furthermore, a GPS module denoted by 9 is shown merely as an example as a further sensor, which is connected to the control module 3. The control module 3 is also connected to actuators 10, which are designed to influence the vehicle 1, such as acceleration, deceleration, steering, etc. They can also be used accordingly for autonomous and semi-autonomous driving, i.e. to assist the driver of the vehicle 1 by means of a driver assistance system.
[0029] The control device in the vehicle 1 now also has a write-protected memory 11 in which the software for the communication module 2 and the control module 3 and any other modules that may be present in the control device is stored. The software is protected in the write-protected memory 11 against any access and possible manipulation. In normal use, the memory is not connected to the modules 2, 3, but rather they are loaded with their own, ideally identical software or perhaps also updated software versions.
[0030] The emergency control module 12, whose function will be described in detail later, is also designed to be tamper-proof and write-protected, so that the function of the emergency control module 12 cannot be changed by the software of the modules 2, 3. It is connected to at least some of the actuators 10 and some of the sensors 8 accordingly, but its function, which will be described later, does not usually require connection to all sensors 8, 9, even if it is conceivable to do so in principle.
[0031] The functions of the vehicle 1 and the communication with the backend server 5 are normal here, so the write-protected memory 11 and the emergency control module 12 are not currently needed. They are therefore represented by dotted lines, because they are not integrated into the working process of the control device. The backend server 5 and modules 2 and 3 are marked with a check mark to symbolically indicate the normal and unintrusive state of the control device 1.
[0032] exist Figure 2 The same structure is shown again in the diagram of FIG. The same components are provided with the same reference numerals, so that they do not need to be described in detail. The problem now is that there is a compromised state of the control device or at least a risk of such a state. This is related, for example, to a compromised server 5 or to communications redirected to a false server 5. Therefore, the server 5 and the two modules 2, 3 are connected in Figure 2 The icon symbolically contains a question mark, which indicates that it is no longer normal and may be invaded.
[0033] There is therefore a risk of, for example, an accident, theft, hijacking, etc. of the vehicle 1 potentially being caused by the malware.
[0034] If a person in vehicle 1 no longer trusts the autonomous driving mode of vehicle 1, for example because he recognizes a hijack or a driving operation that is completely inappropriate for the current situation and perhaps cannot yet take back control of the vehicle, for example by manual driving intervention, then he can assume that the control device has been tampered with. In addition to this assumption based on the experience and observation of the person in vehicle 1, a request can also be made to the corresponding person, for example by the vehicle manufacturer, especially when the server 5 or the communication between the server 5 and the vehicle manufacturer's vehicle 1 has been violated and this has been determined by the vehicle manufacturer, for example. Then, a response request can also be issued to the user of vehicle 1 or the person in vehicle 1. This can be done, for example, via a radio broadcast, a mobile phone or other information channels. The person in vehicle 1 or also an external person who is involved in controlling vehicle 1 (when the vehicle is fully automated, such as a short-distance bus or truck) can now operate the disconnect switch 13. In the figure, the disconnect switch 13 is arranged to physically disconnect the receiving communication 7 between the communication module 2 and the server 5. It can be triggered mechanically by a person in vehicle 1 through the button or key 14 shown, for example. It can also be done as follows Figure 3The remote triggering shown by the double arrow 15 of , wherein this remote triggering is carried out via a separate communication channel, which should run in parallel with the communication with the server 5, so that it cannot be infringed. This is particularly meaningful for self-driving public buses and trucks.
[0035] In order to be able to react accordingly, it is now important that the vehicle 1 is in a safe traffic situation, in particular a stationary traffic situation. If this is the case, a reaction can be carried out immediately after opening the disconnect switch 13. If this is not the case and as is assumed in the scenario described here, the emergency control module 12 as described above is activated by the disconnect switch 13 via the Figure 3 The control line denoted by 16 in FIG. 1 is activated, while the original control module 3 is deactivated via the line denoted by 17. The emergency control module 12, which is now indicated by a solid line because it is now effective in this case, now takes over the control of the vehicle 1, so that a safe traffic situation is sought to be achieved by the emergency control module 12. For example, the vehicle 1 can be slowed down and guided to the shoulder of the road, and a flashing warning system or the like can be activated.
[0036] If the vehicle 1 has reached its safe traffic state, such as a safe parking position, the emergency control module 12 is deactivated again, such as Figure 4 As shown in the diagram of . The software in modules 2 and 3 of the control device that is still suspected of being infected may contain any malware at any location. In order to render the malware harmless, the entire software of modules 2, 3 and possibly other modules and / or the transmission protocol between sensors 8, 9 and module 3 or between actuator 10 and module 3 is overwritten. For this purpose, the now effective write-protected memory 11 contains the software unchanged and therefore not tampered with or invaded. This software is now reloaded onto modules 2, 3 and, if required, onto other modules of the control device in vehicle 1, while the receiving channel 7 continues to remain physically disconnected by the disconnect switch 13.
[0037] After reloading the software, the Figure 5. The write-protected memory 11 is deactivated again, and the modules 2 and 3 are equipped with reloaded software and can be operated safely again, as indicated by the tick. The disconnect switch 13 remains open, because the status of the external server 5 is still questionable and cannot be determined from the vehicle 1. But now the driving function of the vehicle 1 has been restored. If the driving function of the vehicle 1 is restored in another autonomously driven vehicle 1, the vehicle 1 can be moved again in principle. If this is not possible in the autonomous driving mode without being connected to the server 5, pedals and / or steering wheels or other control mechanisms that are not necessary in principle in the vehicle 1 can be used here, such as a joystick in the form of a joystick. The components for controlling the vehicle 1 can be carried in the vehicle 1, for example, in a maintenance area such as a trunk, just like a spare tire. If the vehicle 1 has stopped and the software has been overwritten by the software in the write-protected memory 11, the control accessories such as joysticks or steering wheels and / or pedals can be connected to the vehicle 1 or the control module 3 mechanically, wired and / or wirelessly. The vehicle 1 can then be moved manually, for example in order to drive the vehicle 1 to a repair shop.
[0038] However, the vehicle user should not restore the communication connection with the server 5 by closing the disconnect switch 13, because the person or control device in the vehicle 1 is not aware of the extent to which the server 5 has still been tampered with. Therefore, the communication connection between the communication module 2 and the external server 5 can only be reestablished by a professional repair shop, thereby ensuring that at least the receiving communication 7 is reestablished in a safe and no further damage situation.
[0039] The software in the write-protected memory 11 and the software in the emergency control module 12 (which, like the software in the write-protected memory 11, is stored in the control device in a write-protected and tamper-proof manner) cannot be changed by the user of the vehicle 1 either, but can only be changed by replacing the corresponding memory module with a memory module with a newer software version in a repair shop, for example during a maintenance interval. Therefore, the update can only be carried out manually in the repair shop and cannot be initiated by the backend server 5 like the update of other modules 2, 3, so as not to create loopholes in the safety system.
[0040] As has already been mentioned several times, in addition to the disconnection of the receive communication 7, the transmit communication 6 can also be disconnected simultaneously. Figure 6 In the illustration of , this is schematically shown similarly to the illustration of the previous figure. The disconnect switch 13 here includes a second part denoted by 13a, which is triggered and switched together with the disconnect switch 13 and physically disconnects the transmission communication 6 similarly to the reception communication 7. In other respects, Figure 6 The structure shown corresponds to the previously described embodiment.
[0041] In addition, Figure 6 In the illustration of , two additional user-specific software modules 18a, 18b connected to the control module 3 are shown. They can be connected to the control module 3, for example, at the slot marked with 19. They contain user-specific software and are also referred to as third-party modules 18a, 18b. Since the possibility cannot be excluded that the vehicle 1 is tampered with by one of the software modules 18a, 18b or that malware in the control module 2 has been implanted in one or more of the software modules 18a, 18b, it should be ensured that the software modules 18a, 18b are also separated from the control module 3 accordingly before overwriting the software in the control module 3 and the communication module 2. In principle, this can also be done by the disconnect switch 13 or another disconnect switch not shown here, which is triggered by the disconnect switch 13 accordingly. However, the software modules 18a, 18b can also be separated mechanically by pulling them out of the interface 19. This can be triggered, for example, by a request to the user of the vehicle 1. Just as with the establishment of the connection to the server 5 , the software modules 18 a , 18 b should only be reinstalled or inserted or connected to the control module 3 by a specialist repair shop if it is ensured that the software modules 18 a , 18 b have not been compromised or tampered with.
Claims
1. A control device for a vehicle (1), comprising: a communication module (2) for establishing a sending communication (6) and a receiving communication (7) with an off-vehicle server (5), and a control module (3) for a driving function connected to the communication module, the control module receiving data from at least one sensor (8, 9) and driving at least one actuator (10) to at least partially autonomously control at least one driving function in the vehicle (1), Its characteristics are: A disconnect switch (13, 13a) is provided for physically disconnecting at least the received communication (7) and a write-protected memory in which software is stored for overwriting the software in the communication module (2) and the control module (3) in the event of damage, wherein the disconnect switch (13, 13a) can be remotely triggered via at least one communication link while bypassing the communication module (2), wherein the disconnect switch (13, 13a) is designed to deactivate the control module (3) and activate the write-protected emergency control module (12).
2. The control device according to claim 1, Its characteristics are: The disconnect switch (13, 13a) can be triggered mechanically.
3. The control device according to claim 1 or 2, Its characteristics are: The disconnect switch (13, 13a) additionally disconnects the transmission communication (6).
4. The control device according to claim 1 or 2, Its characteristics are: The disconnect switch (13, 13a) is designed to additionally disconnect a user-specific software module (18a, 18b) connected to the control module (3) and / or the communication module (2).
5. The control device according to claim 1 or 2, It is characterized in that The write-protected emergency control module (12) is connected to at least one sensor (8, 9) and actuator (10) required to place the vehicle (1) in a safe traffic state.
6. The control device according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The safe traffic state is a parking state.
7. A method for taking over control of a control device for a vehicle (1) that may be tampered with, the control device having a communication module (2) for establishing a sending communication (6) and a receiving communication (7) with an off-board server (5) and a control module (3) for a driving function connected to the communication module, the control module receiving data from at least one sensor (8, 9) and driving at least one actuator (10) to at least partially autonomously control at least one driving function in the vehicle (1), Its characteristics are: - physically disconnecting at least the receiving communication (7) by means of a disconnect switch (13, 13a), wherein the disconnect switch (13, 13a) can be remotely triggered via at least one communication link while bypassing the communication module (2), the disconnect switch (13, 13a) being designed to deactivate the control module (3) and to activate the write-protected emergency control module (12), - subsequently checking whether the vehicle (1) is in a safe traffic state, and if not, deactivating the control module (3) and activating the write-protected emergency control module (12) to place the vehicle (1) in a safe traffic state, - Then, with the vehicle (1) in a safe traffic state, the software in the control module (3) and the communication module (2) is overwritten with the software stored in the write-protected memory (11).
8. The method according to claim 7, Its characteristics are: In the event of a suspicion that the control device has been tampered with or the presence of information that the control device has been tampered with, the disconnect switch is mechanically triggered.
9. The method according to claim 7 or 8, Its characteristic is that In the event of suspicion that the control device has been tampered with or information that the control device has been tampered with, the disconnect switch (13, 13a) is triggered remotely via at least one protected communication link parallel to the communication link of the communication module (2).
10. The method according to claim 7 or 8, Its characteristics are: The connection with the connected user-specific software module (18a, 18b) is also disconnected.
11. The method according to claim 7 or 8, Its characteristics are: In addition to the receive communication (7), the transmit communication (6) is also disconnected.
12. The method according to claim 7, It is characterized in that The safe traffic state is a parking state.
