A tamper-proof method for smart electric energy meters based on blockchain technology

By adopting a combination of data preparation layer, storage proxy layer and proof-of-proof-of-proof-of-work mechanism in smart power meters, the problem of data tampering before uploading in blockchain technology is solved, and the computing cost is allocated by supporting machines , realize efficient and safe measurement data storage, and reduce capital and energy consumption costs.

CN114036578BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-12ZHEJIANG WELLSUN INTELLIGENT TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111352096.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-11-16
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2041-11-16

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

When the existing technology uses blockchain technology to provide evidence for smart power meters, it cannot effectively prevent data from being tampered with before uploading, and frequent uploading of data to the blockchain will bring high capital costs.

Method used

Using a smart power meter tamper-proof method based on blockchain technology, the data preparation layer, storage proxy layer and proof-keeping fixed layer are used to periodically upload metered data to the blockchain, and the proof-of-work mechanism is used to improve data. The difficulty and security of tampering are also used to share computing power costs by supporting the machine to reduce computing consumption.

Benefits of technology

Effectively prevent tampering of metrological data before uploading, ensure that the data is formed on the blockchain anchor point, reduce malicious tampering, improve data security, and reduce the energy consumption of proof of work by sharing computing power costs.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of blockchain technology, and specifically to a smart electric energy meter anti-tampering method based on blockchain technology, comprising the following steps: reading metering readings in a first cycle; constructing a data preparation layer, taking out metering readings from a cache area in a first cycle, and establishing disk data; establishing a storage agent layer, periodically providing a preset number of random codes to the data preparation layer; the storage agent layer receives the disk data, and stores the disk data in the storage block address corresponding to the specified storage address; constructing a fixed evidence layer, in a second cycle, the newly stored disk data in the storage area is included in the set to be fixed, and the hash value is extracted from the time set and the hash set together as a fixed hash value, and the fixed hash value is uploaded to the blockchain for storage; in a third cycle, the metering readings in the latest disk data are uploaded to the power metering and billing center. The beneficial effect of the present invention is that the credibility of the metering data is improved by periodically uploading the metering data to the blockchain for storage.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to a smart electric energy meter tamper-proof method based on blockchain technology. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of my country's economy, the demand for electricity in all walks of life is increasing. The accurate collection and measurement of electricity consumption data involves the direct interests of power supply companies and power users, and is an important link in ensuring the healthy operation of the power supply market. In the power system, there is a need to measure not only the amount of electricity used by users, but also the power factor of the electricity used by users. A low power factor of the user's load will put pressure on the operation of the power grid and increase the cost of power grid operation. Therefore, users with large electricity consumption, such as factories, are usually required to equip capacitors in the factory area so that the overall power factor is not lower than the preset value, otherwise they will need to pay a higher penalty. With the development of electronic technology and communication technology, power systems use a large number of smart meters for the collection and measurement of electricity consumption. Smart meters have richer functions, lower power consumption and higher accuracy, but they also bring risks. The energy meter is set at the user's place. If the controller of the energy meter is hijacked or the communication of the energy meter is hijacked, the metering data will be tampered with, causing losses to the power supply company. Accurate measurement of electricity consumption data is the basis for ensuring fairness in electricity market transactions, and the safety and accuracy of electricity meter data is the guarantee for accurate measurement. The performance and safety of electricity meters have always been an important research direction for power companies.

[0003] Blockchain technology is a distributed shared ledger technology with the characteristics of being unforgeable, leaving traces throughout the process, traceable, open and transparent, and collectively maintained. It can naturally provide a solid foundation of trust from a technical perspective. Blockchain is a combination of computer technologies such as distributed data storage, point-to-point transmission, consensus mechanism, and encryption algorithm. It is essentially a decentralized database, a string of data blocks generated by cryptographic methods. Each data block contains a batch of network transaction information, which is used to verify the validity of its information and generate the next block. Combining smart electricity meters with blockchain technology can greatly improve the authenticity and credibility of electricity meter data and provide unquestionable credible data for settlement of all participants in the power market. However, there are still two problems in directly applying blockchain technology to the storage of power metering data: First, blockchain can verify the authenticity of data uploaded to the blockchain and avoid tampering, but it cannot guarantee that the data has not been tampered with before uploading to the blockchain. Second, uploading data to the blockchain requires funds. Increasing the frequency of uploading to the blockchain can increase the difficulty of data tampering, thereby improving the credibility of the data, but it will also bring higher capital costs.

[0004] Chinese patent CN111626718A, published on September 4, 2020, discloses a smart energy meter with blockchain function support, including a blockchain support module based on an embedded system. The functions completed by the blockchain support module include: generation of accounting nodes, generation of information, recording of block information, verification of block information, dispute resolution mechanism, and replacement of accounting nodes. The smart energy meters under a substation constitute a system, and blockchain technology is used to manage electricity consumption information. Its technical solution realizes the application of blockchain with the support of an embedded system, but the blockchain it establishes is a private blockchain with low credibility. Therefore, its technical solution cannot solve the above two problems. Summary of the invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is that there is currently a lack of technical solutions suitable for storing metering data of electric energy meters with the help of blockchain. A tamper-proof method for smart electric energy meters based on blockchain technology is proposed, which can increase the difficulty of tampering with metering data and thus improve the credibility of metering data.

[0006] In order to solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a smart electric energy meter anti-tampering method based on blockchain technology, comprising the following steps: reading metering readings in a first cycle and writing the metering readings into a designated cache area; constructing a data preparation layer, wherein the data preparation layer takes out metering readings from the cache area in a first cycle and establishes disk data, wherein the disk data includes metering readings, timestamps, electric energy meter numbers and designated storage addresses, and the metering readings are padded with zeros so that the length reaches a preset value; establishing a storage agent layer, wherein the storage agent layer opens up several storage areas on a storage medium, wherein the storage areas adopt a sequential storage structure, and storage blocks matching the size of the disk data are generated on the storage areas, and storage blocks are addressed, wherein the storage agent layer establishes an association table, wherein the association table records the storage block addresses and associated random codes, and periodically provides a preset number of random codes to the data preparation layer for use as designated storage addresses; the storage agent layer receives the disk data, The association table is queried according to the designated storage address therein; if the designated storage address exists in the association table, the stored data is stored in the storage block address corresponding to the designated storage address, and the random code is deleted from the association table; if the designated storage address does not exist in the association table, the stored data is discarded; a fixed evidence layer is constructed, wherein the newly stored data in the storage area is included in the set to be fixed in the second cycle, and the timestamps of all the stored data in the set to be fixed are extracted as the time set, and the hash value of each structure in the set to be fixed is extracted as the hash set, and the hash value of the time set and the hash set are extracted together as the fixed hash value, and the fixed hash value is uploaded to the blockchain storage to obtain the corresponding block height and block hash value, and the block height, block hash value, fixed hash value, time set and hash set are associated and stored as a storage data packet; and the metering readings and timestamps contained in the latest stored data are uploaded to the power metering and billing center in the third cycle.

[0007] Preferably, the stored data also includes an exhaustive number and a matching number, and the exhaustive number, matching number, meter reading and timestamp meet the proof-of-work condition, and the proof-of-work condition is: extracting the hash value of the meter reading and timestamp, the last N bits of the matching number are the same as the hash value, the first M bits of the hash value extracted together with the exhaustive number and the matching number are 0, and the matching number comes from a matching number set, which is generated and issued by the electricity metering and billing center and replaced periodically.

[0008] Preferably, the electric energy meter uploads the stored disk data and evidence data packet to the electric energy metering and billing center in the fourth cycle; the electric energy metering and billing center verifies the integrity of the disk data, searches the time set where the timestamp is located according to the timestamp in the disk data, and finds the evidence data packet corresponding to the disk data evidence according to the time set; obtains the evidence hash value, block hash value and block height in the evidence data packet, accesses the blockchain for verification, and if the evidence hash value does not exist in the corresponding block, the electric energy meter is determined to be abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement; if the evidence hash value exists in the corresponding block, the hash value of the disk data is extracted, and the hash value is searched in the hash set. If it exists, the verification is passed, and the next electric energy meter is verified. If it does not exist, the electric energy meter is determined to be abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement.

[0009] Preferably, a support machine is constructed, which is communicatively connected with several electric energy meters and an electric energy metering and billing center. The support machine receives a set of matching numbers, and searches for an exhaustive number for each matching number in the set of matching numbers. The hash value extracted from the exhaustive number and the matching number together satisfies a preset proof-of-work condition, and the found exhaustive number and matching number are associated and stored. When the electric energy meter constructs the stored data, it extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, establishes communication with the support machine, requests the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number that are the same as the last N digits of the hash value, and stores the obtained matching number and exhaustive number in the stored data.

[0010] Preferably, the method for finding an exhaustive number for each matching number in a matching number set includes: randomly generating 16 N-power matching numbers, the last N digits of the matching numbers all have different values, and sending all matching numbers associated with timestamps to an electricity metering and billing center for storage; finding an exhaustive number for each randomly generated matching number so that a preset proof-of-work condition is satisfied; when the first cycle ends, discarding all exhaustive numbers and re-executing the method.

[0011] Preferably, the electricity metering and billing center verifies the exhaustive number and the matching number of the stored data, extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp to verify whether they are the same as the last N digits of the matching number, and verifies whether the hash value of the exhaustive number and the matching number meet the preset proof-of-work conditions. If they all meet the requirements, the verification is passed. If there is any discrepancy, the electricity meter is determined to be abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement.

[0012] Preferably, the method for finding an exhaustive number for each matching number in a matching number set includes: randomly generating 16 N matching numbers, the last N bits of the matching numbers are all different, extracting a hash value for each matching number, and storing the hash value in association with a timestamp; finding an exhaustive number for each randomly generated matching number so as to satisfy a preset proof-of-work condition; when the first cycle ends, discarding all exhaustive numbers and re-executing the method.

[0013] Preferably, the method for the electric energy meter to request the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number includes: the electric energy meter and the support machine agree on a binary function; the support machine associates an identification number for each matching number, and makes the matching number and the identification number public; the electric energy meter extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, finds the identification number associated with the matching data that is the same as the last N bits of the hash value, and records it as the target identification number; selects the electric energy meter other than itself as the relay table, the relay table establishes a storage relay layer, the storage relay layer opens up a number of relay storage areas, associates random numbers with the addressing of the relay storage area, establishes an address table, the address table stores the addressing of the relay storage area and the corresponding random number, the electric energy meter applies for a random number from the relay table, the identification number and the random number are both hexadecimal numbers, the random number is deleted from the address table after the data is stored and retrieved once, and the relay table generates a new random number for the addressing of the relay storage area; the electric energy meter generates The conversion number is selected so that the result obtained by substituting the conversion number and the target identification number into the binary function is exactly the random number; the electric energy meter sends the conversion number and the relay table identification to the support machine; the support machine substitutes each identification number and the received conversion number into the binary function to obtain 16 to the power of N output values, and the output value is used as the designated address; the matching number and the exhaustive number are encrypted, and the encryption key is agreed upon in advance by the electric energy meter and the support machine, and the encrypted matching number and the exhaustive number are associated with the designated address obtained by the corresponding identification number as a relay body, and sent to the relay table; the relay table transfers the received relay body to the storage agent layer for storage, among which only the designated address contained in one relay body can be queried in the association table of the relay table, and is therefore stored; after waiting for a preset period of time, the electric energy meter asks the relay table for the data stored in the designated storage address, and decrypts it using the predetermined key to obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number.

[0014] As an alternative, the method for the electric energy meter to request the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number includes: the electric energy meter and the support machine agree on a binary function; the support machine associates an identification number for each matching number, and makes the matching number and the identification number public; the electric energy meter extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, finds the identification number associated with the matching data that is the same as the last N bits of the hash value, and records it as the target identification number; selects electric energy meters other than itself as relay tables, and the relay table establishes a storage relay layer, and the storage relay layer opens up a number of relay storage areas, which are addressing associated address codes for the relay storage areas, and the address The code is a continuous integer, and an address table is established. The address table stores the relay storage area addressing and the corresponding address code. The identification number and the address code are both hexadecimal numbers. After the address code is stored and retrieved once, it is deleted from the address table. The relay table generates a new address code interval for the relay storage area addressing. The relay table sends the address code starting value to the electric energy meter; the electric energy meter sends the relay table identification to the support machine, and the support machine communicates with the relay table and agrees on a hidden number; the electric energy meter randomly selects an address code from the address code interval as the target address code, and the electric energy meter generates The conversion number is converted into a conversion number, so that the conversion number and the target identification number are substituted into the binary function to obtain the result of the target address code, and the electric energy meter sends the conversion number to the support machine; the support machine substitutes each identification number and the received conversion number into the binary function to obtain 16 N-th power output values, and the output values ​​are used as the designated address; the matching number and the exhaustive number are encrypted, and the encryption key is agreed in advance by the electric energy meter and the support machine, and the encrypted matching number and the exhaustive number are associated with the designated address obtained by the corresponding identification number as a relay body, and sent to the relay table; the relay table converts the designated address in the relay body into a corresponding address. After the address is divided by 2 and regularized, it is added to the implicit number to obtain a corrected designated address. The relay table transfers the received relay body to the storage agent layer for storage, and the storage agent layer stores the relay body in the corrected designated address; after the electric energy meter waits for a preset period of time, it sends the selected target address code to the relay table, and the relay table divides the target address code by 2 and regularizes it, and adds it to the implicit number to obtain a corrected target address code, and sends the data stored in the addressing corresponding to the corrected target address code to the electric energy meter, and the electric energy meter uses the secret key agreed with the support machine to decrypt and obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number.

[0015] Preferably, the support machine records the identifier of the electric energy meter requesting the exhaustive number, verifies whether the electric energy meter requests the exhaustive number for the first time in the current first cycle, and if so, continues to execute, otherwise, stops executing.

[0016] Preferably, the electricity metering and billing center verifies the exhaustive number and the matching number of the stored data, and performs the following verification: extracting the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp to verify whether they match the last N digits of the matching number; verifying whether the hash value of the exhaustive number and the matching number matches the preset proof-of-work conditions; verifying whether the matching number and the timestamp respectively match the matching number and the timestamp uploaded by the support machine; if all match, the verification passes, if there is a discrepancy, the electricity meter is determined to be abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement.

[0017] Preferably, the storage agent layer also opens up several backup storage areas, and several backup storage areas correspond to one storage area. When the storage area is full of saved data, the stored saved data is randomly distributed to several backup storage areas to make the backup storage areas full. The backup storage areas are associated with the identifiers of the corresponding storage areas.

[0018] As a preferred method, the order of the data stored in the memory storage disk of the backup storage area is randomly adjusted, and then the hash value is extracted as the backup hash value, and the backup hash values ​​of the backup storage areas corresponding to the same storage area have the same value at the end. If the order cannot be adjusted to make the backup hash values ​​have the same value at the end, the disk data in all the backup storage areas are split into several parts of equal length, and then sorted again, and then the backup hash value is extracted.

[0019] The substantial effects of the present invention are: 1) by periodically uploading metering data to the blockchain for storage, an anchor point stored on the blockchain is formed. The metering data uploaded to the blockchain cannot be tampered with afterwards. The metering data between two anchor points is restricted by the metering data in the anchor point, and the tampering space is very limited, which effectively reduces the enthusiasm of malicious users to tamper with the metering data and avoids attacks on smart electric energy meters;

[0020] 2) Embed a data preparation layer and a storage agent layer in the smart energy meter to periodically and directly store the detection values ​​of the sensors in the smart energy meter, and use an improved proof of work to effectively increase the difficulty of erasing traces after tampering with the data, thereby ensuring data security;

[0021] 3) A support machine is used to provide proof of work assistance for multiple smart electricity meters, reducing the consumption of computing power of smart electricity meters. At the same time, the large number of smart electricity meters dilutes the computing power cost of the support machine, effectively reducing the average computing power consumed to establish the proof of work, and solving the problem of high energy consumption of proof of work. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] Figure 1 The figure is a flow chart of a method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter according to the first embodiment.

[0023] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the tamper-proof storage structure of a smart electric energy meter in Example 1.

[0024] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the data structure saved in the first embodiment.

[0025] Figure 4 The figure is a flowchart of a method for verifying saved data according to the first embodiment.

[0026] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the connection of the support machine of Example 2.

[0027] Figure 6 This is a flow chart of a method for finding an exhaustive number according to Embodiment 2.

[0028] Figure 7 This is a flow chart of a method for requesting an exhaustive number of electric energy meters according to Embodiment 2.

[0029] Figure 8 This is a flow chart of a method for requesting an exhaustive number of electric energy meters according to Embodiment 3.

[0030] Among them: 10, buffer zone, 20, data preparation layer, 21, disk storage data, 30, storage agent layer, 40, storage medium, 50, evidence fixing layer, 60, blockchain, 70, power metering and billing center, 80, support machine, 90, electric energy meter. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0031] The specific implementation of the present invention will be further described below through specific examples in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Example

[0032] A tamper-proof method for smart electric energy meters based on blockchain technology, please refer to the attached Figure 1 , the method comprises the following steps:

[0033] Step A01) reads the metering readings in a first cycle and writes the metering readings into a designated buffer area.

[0034] Step A02) constructs a data preparation layer 20. The data preparation layer 20 takes out the metering readings from the cache area in the first cycle and establishes the disk storage data 21. The disk storage data 21 includes the metering readings, timestamp, the number of the electric energy meter 90 and the specified storage address. The metering readings are padded with zeros to make the length reach the preset value.

[0035] Preferably, in step A01) of this embodiment, the voltmeter reading of the electric energy meter 90 can be read in the fifth cycle and stored in the buffer 10 until the first cycle is reached, and the power consumption reading and power factor of the smart electric energy meter 90 are read. The voltage of each phase of the three phases provided by the smart electric energy meter 90 is not saved. The smart electric energy meter 90 usually stores a correction coefficient internally to correct the current measurement deviation caused by the difference in sampling resistance. When reading the voltmeter reading, the corresponding correction coefficient is read and associated at the same time and stored in the buffer 10. In step A02), the content contained in the disk data 21 is correspondingly increased.

[0036] Step A03) establishes a storage agent layer 30, which opens several storage areas on the storage medium 40. The storage areas adopt a sequential storage structure and generate storage blocks on the storage areas that match the size of the stored data 21. The number of storage blocks opened in each storage area is fixed. When a storage area is full, a new storage area is opened and storage blocks are opened accordingly.

[0037] Step A04) Addresses the storage block, and the storage agent layer 30 establishes an association table. The association table records the storage block address and the associated random code, and periodically provides a preset number of random codes to the data preparation layer 20 for use as a designated storage address. As shown in Table 1, this is an association table established for a certain period of time for a certain smart electric energy meter 90 in this embodiment. @56Z represents the 56th storage area, and 5DCE is the 5DCE storage block on the 56th storage area, where the random code is an 8-bit hexadecimal number. Each time, it is randomly generated by the storage agent layer 30 and sent to the data preparation layer 20. The data preparation layer 20 uses the random code as a condition for storing the disk data 21. If the data preparation layer 20 does not provide a random code, or the random code does not exist in the association table, the storage agent layer 30 will not store the disk data 21, but will discard it. For example, if the random code 66F05994 corresponds to a storage block address of 5DCE@56Z, when the random code in the received saved data is 66F05994, the association table is queried to obtain the storage block address associated with 66F05994 as 5DCE@56Z, and the saved data is stored in the storage block of 5DCE@56Z. If the random code in the saved data is 69F00000, it cannot be found in the association table, so the sent saved data is directly discarded.

[0038] Table 1 A correlation table established in this embodiment

[0039]

[0040]

[0041] Step A05) The storage agent layer 30 receives the stored data 21 and searches the association table according to the designated storage address therein.

[0042] Step A06) If the specified storage address exists in the association table, the saved data 21 is stored in the storage block address corresponding to the specified storage address, and the random code is deleted from the association table. If the specified storage address does not exist in the association table, the saved data 21 is discarded. A random code is only used once. When the storage agent layer 30 finds that the random code exists in the association table and decides to store the saved data 21, the random code and the corresponding storage block address are deleted from the association table. The storage block address associated with the random code is found, and the received saved data 21 is stored in the storage block corresponding to the address.

[0043] Step A07) constructs a fixed evidence layer 50, and the fixed evidence layer 50 incorporates the newly stored disk data 21 in the storage area into the set to be fixed in the second cycle.

[0044] Step A08) extract the timestamps of all the stored data 21 in the set to be fixed as the time set, extract the hash value of each structure in the set to be fixed as the hash set, and this embodiment uses the SHA256 hash algorithm to extract the hash value of the time set and the hash set together as the fixed hash value, upload the fixed hash value to the blockchain 60 for storage, obtain the corresponding block height and block hash value, and associate the block height, block hash value, time set and hash set as the evidence data package for storage.

[0045] Step A09) Upload the metering readings and timestamps contained in the latest stored data 21 to the power metering and billing center 70 in the third cycle. Figure 2 The buffer 10 is connected to the storage medium 40 through the data preparation layer 20 and the storage agent layer 30 in sequence, the evidence fixing layer 50 is connected to the storage medium 40 and the blockchain 60, and the storage medium 40 is connected to the power metering and billing center 70 through the communication module of the smart power meter 90.

[0046] If the power metering and billing center 70 has doubts about the metering reading of the smart energy meter 90, it retrieves the stored data 21 and the evidence data package stored in the storage medium 40 of the smart energy meter 90, verifies whether the stored data 21 matches the evidence data package, and then verifies whether the stored data 21 matches the metering result. If both match, it means that the metering of the smart energy meter 90 is accurate.

[0047] Please refer to the attached Figure 3The disk data 21 includes metering readings, timestamps, energy meter 90 numbers, designated storage addresses, exhaustive numbers and matching numbers. The exhaustive numbers, matching numbers, metering readings and timestamps meet the proof-of-work conditions. The proof-of-work conditions are: extract the hash values ​​of metering readings and timestamps, the last N bits of the matching number are the same as the hash value, the first M bits of the hash value extracted from the exhaustive number and the matching number are 0, and the matching number comes from the matching number set, which is generated and issued by the power metering and billing center 70 and is periodically changed. In this embodiment, N is 3, and the hash values ​​of the metering readings and timestamps are: D91EE2C9…F099DDF4CDE6BB411B7D38DC49

[0048] , then the last 3 digits of the matching number must also be C49. The value of M is determined by the computing power of the smart energy meter 90. As long as the stored hash value is uploaded to the blockchain 60, it can provide a strong proof of the authenticity of the data, and there is no possibility of tampering with the data without leaving any trace.

[0049] The period between the last time the evidence hash value was uploaded to the chain and the current time before the evidence hash value is uploaded to the chain is an opportunity to tamper with the data and erase the traces. By frequently generating evidence hash values ​​and uploading them to the blockchain 60 for storage in a timely manner, the time span of this opportunity can be shortened. However, frequently uploading the evidence hash value to the blockchain 60 will consume a high amount of funds. In this embodiment, after the last time the evidence hash value was uploaded to the chain and before the current time the evidence hash value was uploaded to the chain, a proof of work is established, which increases the time required to erase the tampering traces after tampering with the data. As long as it can be guaranteed from a probabilistic point of view that the tamperer does not have time to generate a new proof of work before uploading the evidence hash value to the blockchain 60 next time, it can be guaranteed that there is no opportunity to tamper with the data between the two times the evidence hash value is uploaded to the blockchain 60. As long as the difficulty of the proof of work is increased, the time required to establish the preset workload conditions will be increased from a probabilistic point of view. Thereby, the time span between uploading the evidence hash value to the blockchain 60 twice can be extended, and the capital consumption of uploading the evidence hash value to the blockchain 60 can be reduced.

[0050] Please refer to the attached Figure 4 , step B01) the smart electric energy meter 90 uploads the stored disk data 21 and the evidence data packet to the electric power metering and billing center 70 in the fourth cycle.

[0051] Step B02) The electricity metering and billing center 70 verifies the integrity of the stored data 21, searches for the time set where the timestamp is located based on the timestamp in the stored data 21, and finds the evidence data packet corresponding to the stored data 21 based on the time set.

[0052] Step B03) obtains the evidence hash value, block hash value and block height in the evidence data packet, accesses the blockchain 60 for verification, and if the corresponding block does not have the evidence hash value, it is determined that the electric energy meter 90 is abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement.

[0053] Step B04) If the corresponding block has a stored hash value, extract the hash value of the stored data 21 and search for the hash value in the hash set. If it exists, the verification is successful and the next electric energy meter 90 is verified.

[0054] Step B05) If it does not exist, it is determined that the electric energy meter 90 is abnormal and needs to be manually inspected or replaced. By comparing the stored data 21 with the evidence data packet and accessing the blockchain 60 to query whether the evidence hash value in the evidence data packet exists on the corresponding block, it is possible to verify whether the stored data 21 has been tampered with afterwards.

[0055] The beneficial technical effects of this embodiment are as follows: by periodically uploading the metering data to the blockchain 60 for storage, an anchor point stored on the blockchain 60 is formed, and the metering data uploaded to the blockchain 60 cannot be tampered with afterwards. The metering data between two anchor points is restricted by the metering data in the anchor point, and the tampering space is very limited, which effectively reduces the enthusiasm of malicious users to tamper with the metering data and prevents the smart power meter 90 from being attacked. The data preparation layer 20 and the storage agent layer 30 are embedded in the smart power meter 90, and the detection values ​​of the sensors in the smart power meter 90 are directly stored periodically, and the improved proof of work is adopted to effectively increase the difficulty of erasing traces after tampering with the data, thereby ensuring data security. Example

[0056] A method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter based on blockchain technology. Compared with the first embodiment, which occupies the computing power of the smart electric energy meter 90, this embodiment specially constructs a support machine 80 to complete the proof of work required to be established when storing the disk data 21, thereby reducing the computing pressure of the smart electric energy meter 90. Please refer to the attached Figure 5In this embodiment, a support machine 80 is constructed. The support machine 80 is connected to a plurality of electric energy meters 90 and an electric energy metering and billing center 70. The support machine 80 receives a set of matching numbers, and searches for an exhaustive number for each matching number in the set of matching numbers. The hash value extracted from the exhaustive number and the matching number satisfies the preset proof-of-work condition. The exhaustive number and the matching number found are stored in association. When the electric energy meter 90 constructs the stored data 21, it extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, establishes communication with the support machine 80, and requests the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number that are the same as the last N digits of the hash value, and stores the obtained matching number and exhaustive number in the stored data 21. The support machine 80 is specifically used to establish proof of work. Each support machine 80 can be connected to a large number of smart electric energy meters 90. The computing power cost of the support machine 80 is allocated to each smart electric energy meter 90, which will be relatively low, thereby solving the problem of excessive computing power consumption in proof of work.

[0057] Similarly, since the support machine 80 can distribute the cost to a large number of smart energy meters 90, the support machine 80 can use computing equipment with higher computing power and cost. To complete the proof of work condition with higher difficulty, the first M bits of the hash value extracted from the exhaustive number and the matching number are 0, and the larger the value of M, the higher the difficulty of the proof of work.

[0058] Please refer to the attached Figure 6 The method for finding an exhaustive number for each matching number in the matching number set includes: randomly generating 16 N-power matching numbers, the last N bits of the matching numbers are all different, and sending all matching numbers associated with timestamps to the power metering and billing center 70 for storage; finding an exhaustive number for each randomly generated matching number so that a preset proof of work condition is satisfied; when the first cycle ends, discarding all exhaustive numbers and re-executing the method.

[0059] The electricity metering and billing center 70 verifies the exhaustive number and the matching number of the stored data 21, extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp to verify whether they are the same as the last N digits of the matching number, and verifies whether the hash value of the exhaustive number and the matching number meet the preset proof-of-work conditions. If they all meet the requirements, the verification is passed. If there is any discrepancy, the electricity meter 90 is judged to be abnormal and needs manual inspection or replacement.

[0060] The method for finding an exhaustive number for each matching number in a matching number set includes: step C01) randomly generating 16 N-th power matching numbers, and the last N bits of the matching numbers are all different; step C02) extracting the hash value of each matching number, and storing the hash value in association with the timestamp; step C03) finding an exhaustive number for each randomly generated matching number so as to meet the preset proof of work condition; step C04) when the first cycle ends, discarding all exhaustive numbers and re-executing the method. In this embodiment, when N is 2, the support machine 80 needs to generate 16 squared matching numbers and exhaustive numbers, that is, 256 sets of matching numbers and exhaustive numbers.

[0061] When the stored data 21 of the smart power meter 90 is tampered, the hash values ​​of the metering reading and the timestamp will inevitably change. Among them, the probability that the last two digits do not change is 1 / 256. Preferably, the smart power meter 90 downloads the exhaustive number and the matching number twice from the support machine 80 in each first cycle, and the last two digits of the first matching number are the same as the last two digits of the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, and the last two digits of the other matching number are the same as the starting two digits of the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp. When the stored data 21 of the smart power meter 90 is tampered, the probability that both the last two digits and the starting two digits do not change is 1 / 65536, that is, about one in 65,000, which is a relatively small probability and can provide a higher degree of credibility. If another two digits are further specified, and the smart power meter 90 is allowed to download the exhaustive number and the matching number three times from the support machine 80 in a first cycle, the probability that the new exhaustive number and the matching number do not need to be downloaded when the stored data 21 is tampered can be further reduced to about one in 17 million, and only one additional download is required.

[0062] In this embodiment, the storage proxy layer also opens up several backup storage areas, and several backup storage areas correspond to one storage area. When the storage area is full of saved data, the stored saved data is randomly assigned to several backup storage areas, so that the backup storage area is full, and the backup storage area is associated with the identification of the corresponding storage area. The use of the backup storage area can provide a backup of the saved data, avoiding data loss or accidental damage, resulting in the inability to provide authenticity proof of the metering data.

[0063] Randomly adjust the order of the data in the memory storage disk of the backup storage area, and then extract the hash value as the backup hash value. The last several digits of the backup hash value of the backup storage area corresponding to the same storage area are the same. In this embodiment, the last 3 digits of the backup hash value are the same, and the probability of the last 3 digits being the same is 1 / 4096. From a probabilistic point of view, the backup hash value that meets the conditions can be obtained by adjusting the order about 4,000 times. If the order cannot be adjusted to make the last several digits of the backup hash value the same, then the stored data in all the backup storage areas are split into several parts of equal length, and then sorted again, and then the backup hash value is extracted. After the stored data is split, more combinations can be combined to obtain a backup hash value that meets the conditions.

[0064] Please refer to the attached Figure 7 The method for the electric energy meter 90 to request the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number includes: step D01) the electric energy meter 90 and the support machine 80 agree on a binary function.

[0065] Step D02) The support machine 80 associates an identification number with each matching number, and makes the matching number and the identification number public.

[0066] Step D03) The electric energy meter 90 extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, finds the identification number associated with the matching data with the same N digits at the end of the hash value, and records it as the target identification number.

[0067] Step D04) Select an electric energy meter 90 other than itself as a relay table, and the relay table establishes a storage relay layer. The storage relay layer has several relay storage areas, and the addressing of the relay storage area is associated with a random number. An address table is established to store the addressing of the relay storage area and the corresponding random number. The electric energy meter 90 applies for a random number from the relay table. The identification number and the random number are both hexadecimal numbers. After the random number is stored and retrieved once, it is deleted from the address table. The relay table generates a new random number for the addressing of the relay storage area.

[0068] Step D05) The electric energy meter 90 generates a conversion number, so that the conversion number and the target identification number are substituted into the binary function to obtain a result that is exactly a random number.

[0069] Step D06) The electric energy meter 90 sends the conversion number and relay meter identifier to the support machine 80.

[0070] Step D07) The support machine 80 substitutes each identification number and the received conversion number into the binary function to obtain 16 to the power of N output values, and the output values ​​are used as the designated addresses.

[0071] Step D08) Encrypt the matching number and exhaustive number, the encryption key is agreed upon in advance by the electric energy meter 90 and the support machine 80, associate the encrypted matching number and exhaustive number with the designated address obtained by the corresponding identification number as a relay body, and send it to the relay table.

[0072] Step D09) The relay table delivers the received relay bodies to the storage agent layer 30 for storage, wherein only the designated address contained in one relay body can be queried in the association table of the relay table and is therefore stored.

[0073] Step D10) After waiting for a preset time, the electric energy meter 90 requests the data stored in the specified storage address from the relay meter, and decrypts it using the pre-agreed secret key to obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number.

[0074] In this embodiment, N is set to 2. The matching number and identification number disclosed by the support machine in this embodiment are shown in Table 2. The electric energy meter 90 extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, and the last two bits of the hash value are 02. The matching number shown in Table 2 is "831F099DDF4CDE6BB4...7D38D02", and the corresponding identification number is FD4A9379. The smart electric energy meter 90 selects a relay table and requests a specified address from the relay table. The specified address is D6C2A31EB. The calculated conversion number is equal to the specified address D6C2A31EB minus the identification number FD4A9379, which is C6EDF9E72.

[0075] . Send the conversion number C6EDF9E72 to the support machine.

[0076] After receiving the conversion number C6EDF9E72, the support machine adds the identification numbers corresponding to the serial numbers 1 to 256 to the conversion number C6EDF9E72, and obtains the result of 256 identification numbers plus the conversion number, of which only one is exactly equal to the specified address D6C2A31EB.

[0077] The support machine encrypts 256 groups of matching numbers and exhaustive numbers respectively, and associates the encrypted matching numbers and exhaustive numbers with the corresponding identification numbers and the sum of conversion numbers, and sends them to the relay table. After receiving, the relay table discards all encrypted data whose designated address is not D6C2A31EB, receives encrypted data whose designated address is D6C2A31EB, and stores the received encrypted matching numbers and exhaustive numbers in the storage block corresponding to the designated address D6C2A31EB. After waiting for a preset period of time, the smart power meter 90 asks the relay table for the data stored in the designated address D6C2A31EB. After receiving, the relay table sends the content stored in the storage block corresponding to the designated address D6C2A31EB to the smart power meter 90. The smart power meter 90 will receive the matching number 831F099DDF4CDE6BB4…7D38D02 and the corresponding exhaustive number, and store the matching number and the exhaustive number together in the disk data. The last two digits of the matching number are 02, and the last two digits of the hash value of the meter reading and timestamp are also 02, which is a very obvious correlation.

[0078] Table 2 Number of matches and identifications published by the supporting machine

[0079] In this embodiment, the agreed binary function can be addition, that is, the sum of the conversion number and the identification number equals the random number. The support machine 80 records the identification of the electric energy meter 90 requesting the exhaustive number, verifies whether the electric energy meter 90 is requesting the exhaustive number for the first time in the current first cycle, and if so, continues to execute, otherwise, stops executing.

[0080] The electricity metering and billing center 70 verifies the exhaustive number and the matching number of the stored data 21, and performs the following verifications: extracting the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp to verify whether they match the last N digits of the matching number; verifying whether the hash value of the exhaustive number and the matching number matches the preset proof-of-work conditions; verifying whether the matching number and the timestamp respectively match the matching number and the timestamp uploaded by the support machine 80; if both match, the verification passes, and if there is a discrepancy, the electricity meter 90 is judged to be abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement.

[0081] Compared with the first embodiment, this embodiment adopts a support machine 80 to provide proof of work assistance for multiple smart power meters 90, thereby reducing the consumption of computing power of the smart power meters 90. At the same time, the large number of smart power meters 90 dilutes the computing power cost of the support machine 80, effectively reducing the average computing power consumed in establishing the proof of work, and solving the problem of high energy consumption of the proof of work. Example

[0082] A method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter based on blockchain technology. This embodiment provides an alternative to the relay meter based on the second embodiment. Figure 8The method for the electric energy meter 90 to request the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number includes: step E01) the electric energy meter 90 and the support machine 80 agree on a binary function; step E02) the support machine 80 associates an identification number with each matching number, and makes the matching number and the identification number public; step E03) the electric energy meter 90 extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, finds the identification number associated with the matching data with the same N bits at the end of the hash value, and records it as the target identification number; step E04) the electric energy meter 90 other than itself is selected as a relay table, and the relay table establishes a storage relay layer, and the storage relay layer opens up a number of relay storage areas, which are addressing associated address codes for the relay storage areas, The address code is a continuous integer, and an address table is established, as shown in Table 3. The address table stores the relay storage area addressing and the corresponding address code. The identification number and the address code are both hexadecimal numbers. After the address code is stored and retrieved once, it is deleted from the address table. The relay table generates a new address code interval for the relay storage area addressing. The relay table sends the address code starting value to the electric energy meter 90, that is, [BB411B7D, BB425E21] is sent to the electric energy meter 90; step E05) the electric energy meter 90 sends the relay table identification to the support machine 80, and the support machine 80 communicates with the relay table and agrees on a hidden number; step E06) the electric energy meter 90 randomly selects from the address code interval. An address code is used as the target address code, and the electric energy meter 90 generates a conversion number, so that the conversion number and the target identification number are substituted into the binary function to obtain the result that is exactly the target address code; step E07) the electric energy meter 90 sends the conversion number to the support machine 80; step E08) the support machine 80 substitutes each identification number and the received conversion number into the binary function to obtain 16 N-th power output values, and the output value is used as the designated address; step E09) the matching number and the exhaustive number are encrypted, and the encryption key is agreed in advance by the electric energy meter 90 and the support machine 80, and the encrypted matching number and the exhaustive number are associated with the designated address obtained by the corresponding identification number as a relay body, and sent to the relay table; step E10) The relay table divides the designated address in the relay body by 2 and normalizes it, and then adds it to the hidden number to obtain a corrected designated address. The relay table hands over the received relay body to the storage agent layer 30 for storage, and the storage agent layer 30 stores the relay body in the corrected designated address; Step E11) After waiting for a preset period of time, the electric energy meter 90 sends the selected target address code to the relay table. The relay table divides the target address code by 2 and normalizes it, and then adds it to the hidden number to obtain a corrected target address code. The data stored in the addressing corresponding to the corrected target address code is sent to the electric energy meter 90. The electric energy meter 90 decrypts it using the secret key agreed with the support machine 80 to obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number.

[0083] Table 3 Relay table using address table

[0084] Since the electric energy meter 90 does not know the value of the hidden number, it cannot obtain the target address code used by the relay table, and can only obtain the storage address storing the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number by sending the randomly selected target address code to the relay table, which is restored by the relay table. This further improves the security of the data stored in the relay table.

[0085] The above-described embodiment is only a preferred solution of the present invention and does not limit the present invention in any form. There are other variations and modifications without exceeding the technical solution described in the claims.

Claims

1. A method for preventing tampering of smart electric energy meters based on blockchain technology, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Read metering readings in a first cycle and write the metering readings into a designated cache area; construct a data preparation layer, wherein the data preparation layer takes out metering readings from the cache area in a first cycle and establishes disk-saved data, wherein the disk-saved data includes metering readings, timestamps, electric energy meter numbers, and designated storage addresses; establish a storage agent layer, wherein the storage agent layer opens up a number of storage areas on a storage medium, generates storage blocks matching the sizes of the disk-saved data in the storage areas, addresses the storage blocks, and establishes an association table, wherein the association table records the storage block addresses and associated random codes, and periodically provides a preset number of random codes to the data preparation layer for use as designated storage addresses; the storage agent layer receives the disk-saved data, queries the association table according to the designated storage address therein, and if the designated storage address exists in the association table, the disk-saved data is saved. According to the storage block address corresponding to the specified storage address, the random code is deleted from the association table. If the specified storage address does not exist in the association table, the stored data is discarded; a fixed layer for evidence is constructed, and the newly stored data in the storage area is included in the set to be fixed in the second cycle, and the timestamps of all the stored data in the set to be fixed are extracted as the time set, and the hash value of each structure in the set to be fixed is extracted as the hash set, and the hash value of the time set and the hash set are extracted together as the fixed hash value, and the fixed hash value is uploaded to the blockchain storage to obtain the corresponding block height and block hash value, and the block height, block hash value, fixed hash value, time set and hash set are associated as a storage data packet for evidence storage; in the third cycle, the metering readings and timestamps contained in the latest stored data are uploaded to the power metering and billing center; The stored data also includes an exhaustive number and a matching number, and the exhaustive number, matching number, meter reading and timestamp meet the proof-of-work condition, and the proof-of-work condition is: extract the hash value of the meter reading and timestamp, the last N bits of the matching number have the same value as the hash value, the first M bits of the hash value extracted from the exhaustive number and the matching number have a value of 0, and the matching number comes from a matching number set, which is generated and issued by the power metering and billing center and is periodically replaced; The electric energy meter uploads the stored disk data and evidence data package to the electric power metering and billing center in the fourth cycle; The power metering and billing center verifies the integrity of the stored data, searches for the time set where the timestamp is located based on the timestamp in the stored data, and finds the evidence data packet corresponding to the stored data evidence based on the time set; Obtain the evidence hash value, block hash value and block height in the evidence data packet, access the blockchain for verification, and if the corresponding block does not have the evidence hash value, the electric energy meter is judged to be abnormal and needs manual inspection or replacement; If the corresponding block has a stored hash value, the hash value of the stored data is extracted, and the hash value is searched in the hash set. If it exists, the verification is passed and the next electric energy meter is verified. If it does not exist, the electric energy meter is judged to be abnormal and needs manual inspection or replacement. A support machine is constructed, which is a computing device. The support machine is connected to a plurality of electric energy meters and an electric power metering and billing center. The support machine receives a set of matching numbers, and searches for an exhaustive number for each matching number in the set of matching numbers. The hash value extracted from the exhaustive number and the matching number satisfies a preset proof-of-work condition. The exhaustive number and the matching number found are associated and stored. When the electric energy meter constructs the storage data, it extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, establishes communication with the support machine, requests the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number that are the same as the last N digits of the hash value, and stores the obtained matching number and exhaustive number in the storage data; Methods for finding an exhaustive number for each matching number in a set of matching numbers include: Randomly generate 16 N-power matching numbers, the last N digits of the matching numbers are all different, and send all matching numbers with associated timestamps to the power metering and billing center for storage; Find an exhaustive number for each randomly generated matching number so that the preset proof-of-work condition is met; When the first cycle is over, all exhaustive numbers are discarded and the method is executed again; The electricity metering and billing center verifies the exhaustive number and matching number of the stored data, extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp to verify whether they are the same as the last N digits of the matching number, and verifies whether the hash value of the exhaustive number and the matching number meet the preset proof-of-work conditions. If they all meet the conditions, the verification passes. If there is any discrepancy, the electricity meter is judged to be abnormal and needs manual inspection or replacement.

2. According to claim 1, a method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter based on blockchain technology is characterized in that: The method for the electric energy meter to obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number that are the same as the last N digits of the hash value includes: The electric energy meter and the support machine agree on a binary function; The support machine associates an identification number with each matching number and makes the matching number and the identification number public; The electric energy meter extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, finds the identification number associated with the matching data with the same N digits at the end of the hash value, and records it as the target identification number; An electric energy meter other than itself is selected as a relay meter, and a storage relay layer is established in the relay meter. The storage relay layer has several relay storage areas, and a random number is associated with the addressing of the relay storage area, and an address table is established. The address table stores the addressing of the relay storage area and the corresponding random number. The electric energy meter applies for a random number from the relay table, and the identification number and the random number are both hexadecimal numbers. After the random number is stored and retrieved once, it is deleted from the address table, and the relay table generates a new random number for the addressing of the relay storage area; The electric energy meter generates a conversion number, so that the conversion number and the target identification number are substituted into the binary function to obtain a result that is exactly the random number; The electric energy meter sends the conversion number and the relay meter identifier to the support machine; The support machine substitutes each identification number and the received conversion number into a binary function to obtain 16 N-th power output values, and the output values ​​are used as designated addresses; Encrypt the matching number and the exhaustive number, the encryption key is agreed upon in advance by the electric energy meter and the support machine, associate the encrypted matching number and the exhaustive number with the designated address obtained by the corresponding identification number as a relay body, and send it to the relay table; The relay table delivers the received relay bodies to the storage agent layer for storage, wherein only a designated address contained in the relay body can be queried in the association table of the relay table and is therefore stored; After waiting for a preset time, the electric energy meter requests the data stored in the designated storage address from the relay meter, and decrypts the data using a pre-agreed secret key to obtain a matching number and a corresponding exhaustive number.

3. According to claim 1, a method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter based on blockchain technology is characterized in that: The method for the electric energy meter to obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number that are the same as the last N digits of the hash value includes: The electric energy meter and the support machine agree on a binary function; The support machine associates an identification number with each matching number and makes the matching number and the identification number public; The electric energy meter extracts the hash value of the metering reading and the timestamp, finds the identification number associated with the matching data with the same N digits at the end of the hash value, and records it as the target identification number; An electric energy meter other than itself is selected as a relay table, and the relay table establishes a storage relay layer, and the storage relay layer opens up a number of relay storage areas, and an address code is associated with the addressing of the relay storage area, and the address code is a continuous integer, and an address table is established, and the address table stores the addressing of the relay storage area and the corresponding address code, and the identification number and the address code are both hexadecimal numbers. After the address code is stored and retrieved once, it is deleted from the address table, and the relay table generates a new address code interval for the addressing of the relay storage area, and the relay table sends the starting value of the address code to the electric energy meter; The electric energy meter sends the relay meter identification to the support machine, and the support machine communicates with the relay meter to agree on a hidden number; The electric energy meter randomly selects an address code from the address code interval as the target address code, generates a conversion number, and substitutes the conversion number and the target identification number into the binary function to obtain a result that is exactly the target address code, and sends the conversion number to the support machine; The support machine substitutes each identification number and the received conversion number into a binary function to obtain 16 N-th power output values, and the output values ​​are used as designated addresses; Encrypt the matching number and the exhaustive number, the encryption key is agreed upon in advance by the electric energy meter and the support machine, associate the encrypted matching number and the exhaustive number with the designated address obtained by the corresponding identification number as a relay body, and send it to the relay table; The relay table divides the designated address in the relay body by 2 and normalizes it, and then adds it to the implicit number to obtain a modified designated address. The relay table sends the received relay body to the storage agent layer for storage, and the storage agent layer stores the relay body in the modified designated address; After waiting for a preset period of time, the electric energy meter sends the selected target address code to the relay meter. The relay meter divides the target address code by 2 and normalizes it, then adds it to the hidden number to obtain a corrected target address code. The data stored in the addressing corresponding to the corrected target address code is sent to the electric energy meter. The electric energy meter decrypts it using the secret key agreed with the support machine to obtain the matching number and the corresponding exhaustive number.

4. According to claim 2, a method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter based on blockchain technology is characterized in that: The support machine records the identifier of the electric energy meter requesting the exhaustive number, verifies whether the electric energy meter is requesting the exhaustive number for the first time in the current first cycle, and if so, continues to execute, otherwise, stops executing.

5. According to claim 2, a method for preventing tampering of a smart electric energy meter based on blockchain technology is characterized in that: The electricity metering and billing center verifies the exhaustive number and matching number of the stored data, and performs the following verification: Extract the hash value of the meter reading and timestamp and verify whether it matches the last N digits of the matching number; Verify whether the hash values ​​of the exhaustive number and the matching number match the preset proof-of-work conditions; Verify that the match number and timestamp match the match number and timestamp uploaded by the support machine, respectively; If they all match, the verification is successful. If there is a mismatch, the electricity meter is judged to be abnormal and requires manual inspection or replacement.