System and method for contactless PIN entry
By using wireless communication and mobile device PIN input applications in self-service terminals, contactless PIN code input is realized, solving the problems of virus transmission and visually impaired users caused by manual input, and meeting the security and compatibility requirements .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202110317637.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2020-09-24
- Filing Date
- 2021-03-24
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-03-24
AI Technical Summary
The existing unattended PIN input device requires customers to manually touch the keyboard surface to enter the PIN code, which poses a risk of virus transmission, is inconvenient to users with vision impairment, and is unable to achieve contactless input.
By introducing a wireless communication interface in a self-service terminal, using the PIN input application on the mobile device to establish a wireless connection with the ATM, using CA digital certificates and temporary encryption keys to realize contactless input and storage of the PIN code, avoiding symmetric encryption The key is copied outside the ATM.
It realizes safe input of PIN code without exposing the keyboard surface, reduces the risk of virus transmission, and provides visually impaired users with effortless input, is compatible with existing bank infrastructure, and complies with the security standards of the payment card industry.
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Figure CN114253414B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure generally relates to improved systems and methods for contactless entry of personal identification number (PIN) codes at self-service terminals. Background Art
[0002] Unattended PIN entry devices (PEDs) typically include an encryption keypad for a customer to enter a PIN in a secure manner. Such keypads are known in the art as encrypted PIN pads (or EPPs) and may only include a secure keypad as a customer interface and rely on an external display and card reader of the PED. An encrypted PIN pad is a device that encrypts an identifier such as a PIN entered on the keypad to ensure that the unencrypted PIN is not stored or transmitted anywhere else in the system and therefore cannot be disclosed inadvertently or through manipulation of the system.
[0003] PEDs are typically included in self-service terminals (SSTs), such as automated teller machines (ATMs), gas pumps, service stations, and vending machines. ATMs typically require customers to enter a security PIN through an EPP in the ATM to authorize customer transactions at the ATM. In some cases, the EPP may constitute a separate physical keypad provided for PIN entry, while in other cases, the EPP may be provided through an encrypted touch screen (ETS) that provides a simulated keypad as part of a display on the touch screen.
[0004] One disadvantage of using a PED included on an SST is that each customer must manually touch the outer surface of the keypad to enter their PIN. Such keypad surfaces are exposed to the local environment and may carry pathogens, such as viruses. This may cause customers to be reluctant to use SSTs during periods when the spread of viruses is particularly high, such as during flu season or a pandemic.
[0005] Another disadvantage is that visually impaired customers may have difficulty entering their PIN code using an SST that does not provide a separate keypad but instead simulates a keypad on the touch screen.
[0006] Therefore, there is a need for a contactless PIN entry system and method that overcomes the above-mentioned drawbacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0007] The following detailed description, which is given by way of example and is not intended to limit the present disclosure solely to the examples, will be best understood in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0008] Figure 1 is a block diagram of a conventional automated teller machine connected to a bank's host computer requiring manual entry of a PIN;
[0009] Figure 2Ais a block diagram of one embodiment of a system for contactless PIN entry via a mobile device wirelessly coupled to an automated teller machine that is also coupled to a bank host computer;
[0010] Figure 2B is a block diagram of an alternative embodiment of a system for contactless PIN entry via a mobile device wirelessly coupled to an automated teller machine, which is also coupled to a bank host computer;
[0011] Figure 3 It shows Figure 2A , 2B A flowchart of the method of operation of the system shown in;
[0012] Figure 4 It shows Figure 3 A flowchart of a first aspect of a second embodiment of a method;
[0013] Figure 5 It shows Figure 3 A flowchart of a second aspect of a second embodiment of the method; and
[0014] Figure 6 It shows Figure 3 Flowchart of a third aspect of a second embodiment of the method. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0015] In the present disclosure, like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout the drawings, which illustrate various exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0016] Reference Figure 1, shows a conventional ATM 100 connected to a remote bank host 110 via a dedicated network 111. Typically, multiple ATMs 100 are connected to a remote bank host 110 via a dedicated network 111 to form an ATM network of a particular bank. Each ATM 100 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 101, a display 102, a card reader 103, and an encryption PIN board module 104. The card reader 103 may need to make physical contact with the customer's bank card to read the customer's information (including, in particular, the customer's primary account number (PAN)), or may use a contactless mode such as radio frequency identification (RFID) or near field communication (NFC) to read such information. The encryption PIN board module 104 is an encryption PIN board and includes a keypad 105, an encryption processor 106, and a memory 107 that stores a symmetric encryption key 108. The encryption PIN board module 104 obtains the customer's PIN through manual input by the customer on the keypad 105 in response to instructions provided on the display 102 (requiring the customer to physically contact the keypad 105 in order to enter the PIN). In some cases, a separate EPP module may be omitted, and the display 102 may be an ETS that receives a PIN from a customer according to a prompt provided on the display 102. The encryption PIN pad module 104 also receives the customer's primary account number (PAN) via the CPU 101 and the card reader 103. The encryption key 108 is the bank's symmetric PIN encryption key. The encryption PIN pad module 104 is a security device (e.g., a tamper-proof security module) and is the only device in the ATM that is trusted by the remote bank host 110, which stores the symmetric encryption key 108 and generates a PIN block, i.e., an encrypted message including both the customer's PIN and PAN. The encryption processor 106 in the encryption PIN pad module 104 generates a PIN block using the encryption key 108 upon receiving the customer's PIN and PAN. The encrypted PIN block is forwarded to the remote bank host 110 via the CPU 101 for approval. Since the symmetric encryption key 108 is used to encrypt the customer's PIN and PAN, it must be kept secure and can never be copied outside the encryption PIN pad module 104 in the ATM 100. The encryption PIN pad module 104 is designed to be a tamper-resistant security module. The security features applied to the encryption PIN pad module 104 ensure that it is impossible to eavesdrop on the PIN entry process by any electronic means. The ATM 100 provides a secure login process for each customer, but requires the customer to physically contact the keypad 105 or the display 102 (when the display 102 is a touch screen type display that generates a simulated keypad) in order to enter their PIN.
[0017] Reference now Figure 2A , 2B , showing two embodiments of a system for contactless PIN entry via a mobile device wirelessly coupled to an automated teller machine.
[0018] exist Figure 2A In the embodiment shown in Figure 1 The ATM 100 of FIG. 200 is modified to provide a wireless communication channel 240 with a mobile device 230 including a PIN entry application (mobile application) 235 via a wireless interface 209 added to the cryptographic PIN pad module 204. The PIN entry application 235 includes a stored CA digital certificate (including a public key) for asymmetrically encrypted communications with the ATM associated with the bank that owns the ATM 200. The cryptographic PIN pad module 204 includes a corresponding CA digital certificate, which can be injected into the cryptographic PIN pad module 204 during the manufacturing process or generated in the cryptographic PIN pad module after the cryptographic PIN pad module 204 is deployed. In the latter case, the CA digital certificate is preferably signed with a private key injected into the cryptographic PIN pad module 204 during the manufacturing process. The PIN entry application 235 is used to enter and optionally store the customer's PIN. To maintain security, the PIN entry application 235 never receives or stores the customer's PAN. ATM 200 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 201, a display 202, a card reader 203, and an encryption PIN pad module 204. The display 202 and the card reader 203 correspond to Figure 1 The display 102 and the card reader 103 in the embodiment of the present invention are shown in FIG. 1 . The encryption PIN board module 204 includes a key board 205, an encryption processor 206, a memory 207 for storing an encryption key 208, and a wireless interface 209. The key board 205 corresponds to Figure 1 The wireless interface 209 is adapted to communicate via one or more of a local Wi-Fi channel (IEEE 802.11), a Bluetooth wireless channel, or a Near Field Communication (NFC) channel.
[0019] exist Figure 2B In the embodiment shown in Figure 1 The ATM 100 of the embodiment of the present invention is modified to provide a wireless communication channel 240 with a mobile device 230 including a PIN entry application 235 via a wireless interface 259 coupled to a CPU 251 in the ATM 250. The ATM 250 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 251, a display 252, a card reader 253, an encryption PIN pad module 254, and a wireless interface 259. The display 252 and the card reader 253 correspond to Figure 1The display 102 and the card reader 103 in the embodiment of the present invention are shown in FIG. 2. The encryption PIN pad module 254 includes a keypad 255, an encryption processor 256, and a memory 257 for storing an encryption key 258. The encryption PIN pad module 254 includes a corresponding CA digital certificate, which can be injected into the encryption PIN pad module 254 during the manufacturing process, or generated in the encryption PIN pad module after the encryption PIN pad module 254 is deployed. In the latter case, the CA digital certificate is preferably signed with a private key injected into the encryption PIN pad module 254 during the manufacturing process. The keypad 255 corresponds to Figure 1 The wireless interface 259 may communicate via one or more of a local Wi-Fi channel (IEEE 802.11), a Bluetooth wireless channel, or a near field communication (NFC) channel.
[0020] Reference Figure 3 , showing the description Figure 2A , 2B 300 of the operation of the embodiment shown in FIG. A customer who wants to use the ATM 200, 250 for banking transactions first presents their bank card (e.g., a contactless EMV card) to the card reader 203, 253 at step 305. This can be done conventionally by sliding the bank card into a slot in the card reader 203, 253, or by using a contactless mode of the bank card based on, for example, a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag or a near field communication (NFC) interface. In this way, the CPU 201, 251 obtains the customer's PAN and forwards it to the encryption processor 206, 256 within the encryption PIN board module 204, 254.
[0021] Next, at step 310, the ATM 200, 250 attempts to establish a wireless communication channel 240 with the customer's mobile device 230. The customer opens a PIN entry application 235 on their mobile device 230. In one version, once the bank card is presented, the ATM 200, 250 causes the wireless interface 209, 259 to scan for open PIN entry applications 235 on nearby mobile devices 230 and establishes a communication channel with the mobile device 230 when an open PIN entry application 235 is found. When no open PIN entry application 235 is found on a nearby mobile device 230, and a communication channel cannot be established, processing continues to step 340 through decision box 315, and the ATM 200, 250 returns to standard PIN entry using the keypad 205, 255. In another version, the PIN entry application 235 initiates contact with the ATM 200, 250 in order to establish a communication channel. Once a wireless connection is established between the mobile device 230 and the ATM 200, 250, the ATM 200, 250 may request identification information, such as the phone ID and bank card nickname ("Bob's Phone"), from the PIN entry application 235. Upon receiving such information from the PIN entry application 235, the ATM 200, 250 preferably provides an indication on the display 202 that a connection has been established with the mobile device 230 having the received identification information (e.g., "Connected to Bob's Phone"). The ATM 200, 250 preferably also provides status information and / or instructions on the display 202. The PIN entry application 235 may store the customer's PIN and be arranged to automatically provide the PIN upon request to the ATM 200, 250. In this case, the ATM 200, 250 may provide a status display indicating "Getting PIN for Bank X Debit Card". In addition, the PIN entry application 235 may have a lock mode that requires the customer to unlock the mobile device 230 before the customer can enter the PIN so that the PIN entry application 235 can transmit the entered PIN to the ATM 200, 250. If the PIN entry application 235 is set to this mode, the ATM 200, 250 may provide a status display indicating "Unlock mobile device to enter PIN for Bank X debit card". In addition, the PIN entry application 235 may have an always enter mode that requires the customer to enter the PIN through the mobile device 230 every time it is used. If the PIN entry application 235 is set to this mode, the ATM 200, 250 may provide a status display indicating "Enter PIN for Bank X debit card". Once this step is completed, the customer's PIN will be stored in a temporary memory in the mobile device 230 for further processing.This is accomplished by moving a stored version of the PIN to temporary memory, or by storing the PIN in temporary memory following manual entry by the customer via mobile device 230 (eg, in response to a prompt such as those described above).
[0022] Next, at step 320, the mobile device 230 verifies the ATM's CA digital certificate (including the ATM public key). This is done by receiving the ATM CA digital certificate (public key) from the ATM 200, 250 and verifying that the received ATM CA digital certificate is authentic using the CA digital certificate received from the same certificate authority and previously stored in the PIN entry application 235. The ATM 200, 250 may initiate the transmission of the ATM CA digital certificate to the mobile device 230. Alternatively, the mobile device 230 may initiate the transmission by issuing a request to the ATM 200, 250 to transmit the ATM CA digital certificate from the ATM 200, 250 to the mobile device 230. In another embodiment, the ATM 200, 250 may sign certain identification data (i.e., mobile device specific information) received from the mobile device 230, such as the ID of the mobile phone, date and / or time, the ID of the ATM 200, 250, or a random number. The signed data may then be included in the CA digital certificate provided by the ATM 200, 250 to the mobile device 230. This allows the mobile device 230 to perform further validation checks (by ensuring such information is properly signed) to verify that the received CA digital certificate is authentic and up to date. In an alternative embodiment, the ATM CA digital certificate may be displayed as a QR code on the display 202, 252 of the ATM 200, 250 and read by the mobile device 230 using a QR reader module built into the PIN entry application 235. This prevents man-in-the-middle attacks between the mobile device 230 and the ATM 200, 250 because the ATM digital CA digital certificate is not transmitted over the communication channel between the mobile device 230 and the ATM 200, 250.
[0023] Many additional security features can be implemented in the present system and method. The PIN entry application 235 can maintain a list of preferred ATMs (e.g., the five most recently visited ATMs) and store the ATM CA digital certificates of each of these ATMs locally. Since the ATM CA digital certificates are not transmitted over the communication channel when using one of these preferred ATMs, man-in-the-middle attacks are prevented. The PIN entry application 235 can upload an offline copy of the certificate ID to the monitoring station of the bank owner (financial institution) for verification after use. In addition, the PIN entry application can upload an online copy of the certificate ID to the monitoring station for real-time verification. The PIN entry application 235 can maintain a log of all certificates for tracking any discrepancies in any transaction involving the customer owner of the mobile device 230. Finally, each ATM 200, 250 can maintain a log of all mobile devices 230 that are connected to the ATM and transmit PINs to the ATM (regardless of whether the customer transaction is authorized).
[0024] Once the encryption key is verified, processing continues at step 325 where the customer's PIN is encrypted by the PIN entry application 235. In a first embodiment, the PIN is first formatted as a PAN-less PIN block as specified by ISO 9564 (Financial Services - Personal Identification Number (PIN) Management and Security). Next, the PIN entry application 235 generates a temporary symmetric encryption key and uses the temporary symmetric encryption key to encrypt the PAN-less PIN block. Finally, the PIN entry application 235 encrypts the temporary symmetric encryption key using the public key associated with the ATM CA digital certificate received from the ATM 200, 250.
[0025] In the second embodiment, if Figure 4 As shown in the flowchart 400 of FIG. 4 , at step 410, the mobile device 230 first requests a one-time RSA PIN transmission public key from the encryption PIN pad module 204, 254 through the PIN input application 235. Next, at step 420, the encryption processor 206, 256 generates a one-time RSA PIN transmission public key. At step 430, the encryption processor 206, 256 signs the one-time RSA PIN transmission key with the ATM private key, and then at step 440, forwards the signed one-time RSA PIN transmission key to the mobile device 230. At step 450, the PIN input application 235 in the mobile device 230 verifies the signature of the one-time RSA PIN transmission key using the ATM public key. Finally, at step 460, the PIN input application 235 in the mobile device 230 encrypts the PIN using the one-time RSA PIN transmission key.
[0026] At step 330, after encrypting the PIN at step 325, the PIN entry application 235 transmits the encrypted PIN to the ATM 200, 250. In a first embodiment, the PIN entry application 235 forwards the encrypted PIN and the encrypted temporary symmetric encryption key to the ATM 200, 250 via the communication channel established at step 310, where the encrypted PIN and the encrypted temporary symmetric encryption key are routed to the encryption PIN pad module 204, 254.
[0027] In the second embodiment, if Figure 5 As shown in the flowchart 500 of FIG. 5 , at step 510, the mobile device 230 optionally first sends the RSA encrypted PIN to the remote bank host 110. This can be done via a secure communication channel with the ATM 200, 250, or via a separate reverse channel using a wireless Internet or cellular data connection. At step 520, upon receipt, the bank host signs the RSA encrypted PIN with the bank host's virtual hardware security module (VHSM) secret key, and at step 530, the VHSM-signed RSA encrypted PIN is forwarded to the mobile device 230 (via the same communication channel). Finally, at step 540, the PIN entry application 235 in the mobile device 230 sends the VHSM-signed RSA encrypted PIN to the ATM 200, 250 for routing to the encrypted PIN pad module 204, 254.
[0028] At step 335, upon receiving the encrypted PIN at the encryption PIN pad module 204, 254, the encryption processor 206, 256 decrypts the PIN. In a first embodiment, this is accomplished by first decrypting the encrypted temporary symmetric encryption key using the private key associated with the ATM's CA digital certificate. Once the temporary symmetric encryption key is decrypted, the encryption processor 206, 256 uses the temporary symmetric encryption key to decrypt the PIN block. In a second embodiment, as shown in FIG. Figure 6 As shown in the flowchart 600 of FIG. 6A , at step 610, the cryptographic PIN pad module 204, 254 first verifies the host bank signature (if so signed) using the VHSM public key stored in the cryptographic PIN pad module 204, 254. Once verified, the cryptographic PIN pad module 204, 254 decrypts the PIN using the secret key of the RSA key pair at step 620. Finally, at step 630, the cryptographic PIN pad module 204, 254 deletes the one-time RSA key pair.
[0029] Once the decrypted PIN is available at the encryption PIN pad module 204, 254 at step 345, the encryption processor 206, 256 formats the PIN and PAN into an appropriate PIN block according to ISO 9564 and then encrypts the PIN block in a conventional manner using the stored encryption key 208, 258.
[0030] In the last step 350, the encrypted PIN pad module 204, 254 forwards the encrypted PIN block to the bank host for authorization. Thereafter, the customer can conduct normal transactions with the ATM 200, 250 through the interface provided by the PIN entry application 235 on the mobile device 230.
[0031] Figure 2A , 2B The system shown in Figure 3 The attached method allows a PIN to be entered at a self-service terminal (e.g., at an ATM) without the need to physically contact any exposed surface of the ATM, and provides visually impaired users with an improved way to enter their PIN without having to laboriously identify the keys on the keypad by physical contact (e.g., by identifying and reading the Braille characters on each key). This system and method uses a one-time or temporary encryption key to transmit the customer's PIN from the mobile device to the ATM, and does not require the symmetric encryption key 108 to be copied outside the PIN entry device. Therefore, the system and method do not conflict with all applicable international security standards and security requirements currently published by the payment card industry and authorized by payment card brands. As can be seen from the following description, the system and method are compatible with existing banking infrastructure, can be implemented into existing ATMs by making minor modifications to existing ATMs, and can be used by any user with a mobile device that includes a PIN entry application (whether or not the user is a customer of a bank that has an ATM equipped with the system and method).
[0032] Although the present disclosure has been specifically shown and described with reference to preferred embodiments and various aspects thereof, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure. It is intended that the appended claims be interpreted as including the embodiments described herein, the above-mentioned alternatives and all equivalents thereof.
Claims
1. A method for contactlessly inputting a personal identification number (PIN) into a self-service terminal, the self-service terminal comprising an interface for wireless communication with a mobile device, the method comprising: Reading the customer's primary account number from the customer's bank card through a card reader on the self-service terminal; After reading the customer's primary account number from the customer's bank card at the self-service terminal, directly establishing a wireless communication channel between the customer's mobile device and a wireless interface within an encrypted PIN pad module at the self-service terminal by scanning and locating an open PIN entry application on the customer's mobile device; verifying, at the mobile device, a public key of the self-service terminal; formatting the customer's PIN into a PIN block that does not include the customer's primary account number; encrypting only the PIN block of the customer at the mobile device; as well as transmitting only the encrypted PIN block from the mobile device to the self-service terminal; decrypting the PIN block at the self-service terminal, and Wherein, the mobile device of the customer never receives or stores the primary account number of the customer. 2 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising generating a temporary symmetric encryption key at the mobile device. 3 . The method of claim 2 , further comprising encrypting the temporary symmetric encryption key using the public key at the mobile device. 4 . The method of claim 3 , further comprising transmitting the encrypted temporary symmetric encryption key to the self-service terminal.
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising decrypting the encrypted temporary symmetric encryption key at the self-service terminal using a private key of the self-service terminal, the private key corresponding to a public key of the self-service terminal. The method of claim 5 , wherein the PIN block is encrypted at the mobile device using the temporary symmetric encryption key.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the PIN is decrypted at the self-service terminal using the decrypted temporary symmetric encryption key.
8. The method of claim 1 , wherein encrypting only the PIN block at the mobile device comprises: requesting a one-time public key from the self-service terminal; receiving the one-time public key from the self-service terminal; as well as Only the PIN block is encrypted using the one-time public key.
9. A system for contactlessly entering a personal identification number (PIN), the system comprising: a customer's mobile device, the mobile device including a PIN entry application, the PIN entry application never receiving or storing the customer's primary account number; a self-service terminal comprising a central processing unit, a display, a card reader, a PIN input device having an encryption processor, and a wireless interface included in an encryption PIN pad module, the wireless interface being used to wirelessly communicate with the mobile device to receive only the encrypted PIN without receiving a primary account number; wherein the PIN entry application is configured to verify the public key of the self-service terminal at the mobile device, format the PIN for the customer to not include a PIN block for the customer's primary account number, encrypt only the customer's PIN block, and transmit the encrypted PIN block directly to the self-service terminal via the wireless interface over a wireless communication channel, the wireless communication channel being established by scanning and locating the PIN entry application on the customer's mobile device after the customer's primary account number is read from the customer's bank card via the card reader at the self-service terminal; and Wherein the encryption processor is configured to decrypt the encrypted PIN block.
10. The system of claim 9, wherein the PIN entry application is configured to: Generate temporary symmetric encryption keys; encrypting the temporary symmetric encryption key using the public key; and The encrypted temporary symmetric encryption key is transmitted to the self-service terminal.
