A vehicle-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificate

Abstract

The present invention belongs to the technical field of vehicle-cloud communication methods, and specifically relates to a vehicle-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates; in this method, data information is transmitted between an on-board remote communication terminal, an on-board infotainment system and an over-the-air download technology on the vehicle side and an automotive remote service provider on the cloud side, and the digital certificate is responsible for data encryption and signing, and the public key infrastructure is responsible for the generation, distribution and authentication of digital certificates; in the process of data information communication between the vehicle side and the cloud side, an identity authentication gateway is required to verify the identity of the communication party according to the digital certificate of the communication party, and the data transmission process can be carried out only after the identity authentication is successful; the method of the present invention adds an identity authentication process to the vehicle-cloud communication, which can improve the security of remote communication; the public key is encapsulated in a digital certificate, and the public key infrastructure is adopted, which increases the security of the plaintext transmission of the public key.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of vehicle-cloud communication methods, and specifically relates to a vehicle-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates. Background Art

[0002] A digital certificate is a digital authentication that marks the identity information of all parties in Internet communication. The digital certificate is based on the PKI system. PKI is the abbreviation of Public Key Infrastructure. PKI is a technology commonly used in the field of information security to prevent identity forgery. In recent years, with the advancement of the new four modernizations of "electrification, networking, intelligence, and sharing", "Internet of Vehicles" has become a part of most cars. However, while enjoying the convenience of interconnection brought by the Internet of Vehicles, information security issues have gradually surfaced. If the car communication lacks an identity authentication mechanism, there is basically no security at all. Anyone can forge an identity to communicate without being noticed.

[0003] In the communication process between the vehicle-side T-Box (Telematics BOX), IVI (In-Vehicle Infotainment), OTA (Over-the-Air Technology) and the cloud-side TSP (Telematics Service Provider), in order to ensure communication security and prevent identity forgery, asymmetric encryption methods are often used to sign data to ensure the non-repudiation of data. However, since the public key used in asymmetric encryption needs to be transmitted in plain text, it is easy to be obtained by the attacker during the transmission process. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to overcome the above problems, the present invention proposes a vehicle-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates to protect the information security of the vehicle; the method involves digital certificates, public key infrastructure, vehicle-mounted remote communication terminals, vehicle-mounted infotainment systems, vehicle remote service providers and over-the-air download technology. Among them, data information is transmitted between the vehicle-mounted remote communication terminal, vehicle-mounted infotainment system and over-the-air download technology on the vehicle side and the vehicle remote service provider on the cloud side (hereinafter referred to as the vehicle side and the cloud side), the digital certificate is responsible for data encryption and signing, and the public key infrastructure is responsible for the generation, distribution and authentication of digital certificates; in the process of data information communication between the vehicle side and the cloud side, an identity authentication gateway must be passed to verify the identity of the communication party based on the digital certificate of the communication party, and the data transmission process can only be carried out after the identity authentication is successful.

[0005] A vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates includes the following contents:

[0006] Step 1. Acquisition of temporary communication certificate: The public key infrastructure sends a randomly generated PIN code and temporary communication certificate to the cloud-based car remote service provider. The cloud-based car remote service provider symmetrically encrypts the PIN code, using PackageKey as the key, and then pre-sets the encrypted PIN code, root certificate chain, and temporary communication certificate on the vehicle side, and pre-sets PackageKey in the certificate management component on the vehicle side.

[0007] Before applying for a formal communication certificate, the vehicle uses PackageKey to decrypt the PIN code, and then uses the decrypted PIN code to unlock and obtain a temporary communication certificate;

[0008] Step 2. Apply for a formal communication certificate using a temporary communication certificate:

[0009] Step 2.1 The vehicle uses the public key, CN and signature in the temporary communication certificate to package it into a device certificate, and uses this temporary device certificate to establish two-way TLS communication with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway;

[0010] Step 2.2 The vehicle side calculates the CN digest and signs the digest using the private key in the temporary communication certificate to obtain the signed CN;

[0011] Step 2.3 After the vehicle establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud identity authentication gateway, the vehicle VIN, vehicle device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud identity authentication gateway through a private protocol and wait for a response;

[0012] After receiving a positive response, the vehicle sends the certificate request information including the public key, the random number generated by the security chip, and the encryption result of the random number to the cloud identity authentication gateway;

[0013] The cloud identity authentication gateway forwards this data information to the cloud-based car remote service provider through one-way TLS communication. After receiving the certificate request information, the cloud-based car remote service provider calls the public key infrastructure SDK to verify the request information. After successful verification, the certificate request information is sent to the public key infrastructure through the SDK. The public key infrastructure generates a formal communication certificate and sends it back to the vehicle through the data transmission link.

[0014] Step 3: Formal communication link establishment:

[0015] Step 3.1 After receiving the official communication certificate, the vehicle immediately disconnects the two-way TLS connection previously established by the temporary communication certificate, and uses the official communication certificate to establish a new two-way TLS communication with the cloud identity authentication gateway, and signs the CN summary value of the official communication certificate with the private key of the official communication certificate;

[0016] Step 3.2 Before the vehicle side conducts formal data transmission and information sending, the vehicle VIN, equipment unique identification code, CN of the formal communication certificate and the signature of CN must be sent to the cloud identity authentication gateway through a private protocol. After receiving a positive response, subsequent data transmission and information sending can be formally carried out.

[0017] In step 2.3, after the vehicle-side establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway, the vehicle VIN, vehicle-side device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud-based identity authentication gateway through a private protocol and wait for a response; if a negative response is received, the current connection is disconnected and returned to step 1.

[0018] If a negative response is obtained instead of an affirmative response in step 3.2, the process returns to step 1.

[0019] The temporary communication certificate template in step 1 is shown in the following table:

[0020]

[0021] The formal communication certificate template generated in step 2 is shown in the following table:

[0022]

[0023]

[0024] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0025] The method of the present invention adds an identity authentication process to vehicle-cloud communication, which can improve the security of remote communication; the public key is encapsulated in a digital certificate, and a public key infrastructure is adopted to increase the security of plaintext transmission of the public key.

[0026] Aiming at the insufficient security in the process of public key transmission, the present invention introduces the concepts of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) and digital certificates, and proposes a vehicle-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates to prevent identity forgery and message tampering in the process of vehicle-cloud communication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0027] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings used in the description of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on the contents of the embodiments of the present invention and these drawings without creative work.

[0028] Figure 1This is a diagram of the vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication process of the present invention.

[0029] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0030] The present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It is to be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention, rather than to limit the present invention. It should also be noted that, for ease of description, only parts related to the present invention, rather than all structures, are shown in the accompanying drawings.

[0031] In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, the terms "connected", "connected", and "fixed" should be understood in a broad sense, for example, it can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium, it can be the internal connection of two elements or the interaction relationship between two elements. For ordinary technicians in this field, the specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood according to specific circumstances.

[0032] In the present invention, unless otherwise clearly specified and limited, a first feature being "above" or "below" a second feature may include that the first and second features are in direct contact, or may include that the first and second features are not in direct contact but are in contact through another feature between them. Moreover, a first feature being "above", "above" and "above" a second feature includes that the first feature is directly above and obliquely above the second feature, or simply indicates that the first feature is higher in level than the second feature. A first feature being "below", "below" and "below" a second feature includes that the first feature is directly below and obliquely below the second feature, or simply indicates that the first feature is lower in level than the second feature.

[0033] In the description of this embodiment, the terms "upper", "lower", "left", "right" and other directions or positional relationships are based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the drawings, and are only for the convenience of description and simplification of operation, rather than indicating or implying that the device or element referred to must have a specific direction, be constructed and operate in a specific direction, and therefore cannot be understood as limiting the present invention. In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are only used to distinguish in the description and have no special meaning.

[0034] like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, a vehicle-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates is used. When the vehicle is offline, the vehicle will pre-set the root certificate chain and temporary communication certificate, and initiate a formal communication certificate application to the cloud based on the temporary communication certificate. After the TSP in the cloud recognizes the application, it will forward the application information to PKI. PKI will issue a formal communication certificate based on the certificate application information and feedback the certificate to TSP and the vehicle.

[0035] The vehicle side establishes formal data transmission communication based on the formal communication certificate. The communication request first reaches the identity authentication gateway in the cloud. The vehicle side and the identity authentication gateway need to establish a two-way data security transmission channel. The identity authentication gateway authenticates the vehicle side based on the formal communication certificate information. If the identity authentication is successful, the identity authentication gateway will use one-way encrypted transmission to unpack the data information and forward it to the cloud-based car remote service provider. The cloud-based car remote service provider will perform corresponding processing and operations based on the received information. The specific contents are as follows:

[0036] 1. Acquisition of temporary communication certificate: The public key infrastructure sends a randomly generated PIN code and temporary communication certificate to the cloud-based car remote service provider. The cloud-based car remote service provider symmetrically encrypts the PIN code, using PackageKey as the key, and then pre-sets the encrypted PIN code, root certificate chain, and temporary communication certificate on the vehicle side, and pre-sets PackageKey in the certificate management component on the vehicle side.

[0037] Before the vehicle rolls off the assembly line and prepares to apply for a formal communication certificate, the vehicle uses PackageKey to decrypt the PIN code, and then uses the decrypted PIN code to unlock and obtain a temporary communication certificate;

[0038] 2. Use the temporary communication certificate to apply for a formal communication certificate:

[0039] 2.1 The vehicle uses the public key, CN and signature in the temporary communication certificate to package it into a device certificate, and uses this temporary device certificate to establish two-way TLS communication with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway; the identity authentication gateway is deployed on the TSP platform, which is equivalent to the first line of defense of the TSP.

[0040] 2.2 The vehicle side calculates the CN summary and signs the summary using the private key in the temporary communication certificate to obtain the signed CN;

[0041] 2.3 After the vehicle establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud identity authentication gateway, the vehicle VIN, vehicle device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud identity authentication gateway through a private protocol and wait for a response;

[0042] After receiving a positive response, the vehicle sends the certificate request information including the public key, the random number generated by the security chip, and the encryption result of the random number to the cloud identity authentication gateway;

[0043] The cloud-based identity authentication gateway forwards this data information to the backend of the cloud-based automotive remote service provider through one-way TLS communication (the cloud-based automotive remote service provider (TSP) includes the identity authentication gateway, the backend, the PKI SDK, and some components not involved in the present invention. The backend mentioned here is similar to the entity part of the TSP, where the cloud functions are actually implemented, similar to the backend server). After receiving the certificate request information, the cloud-based automotive remote service provider calls the SDK of the public key infrastructure to verify the request information. After the verification is successful, the certificate request information is sent to the public key infrastructure through the SDK. The public key infrastructure generates a formal communication certificate and sends it back to the vehicle-side device through the data transmission link;

[0044] 3: Formal communication link establishment:

[0045] 3.1 After receiving the official communication certificate, the vehicle-side device immediately disconnects the two-way TLS connection established by the temporary communication certificate in 2.1 (because the certificate has changed at this time, the official communication certificate needs to be used to re-establish the TLS connection), and uses the official communication certificate to establish a new two-way TLS communication with the cloud identity authentication gateway, and uses the private key of the official communication certificate to sign the CN summary value of the official communication certificate;

[0046] 3.2 Before the vehicle side conducts formal data transmission and information sending, the vehicle VIN, equipment unique identification code, CN of the formal communication certificate and the signature of CN must be sent to the cloud identity authentication gateway through a private protocol. After receiving a positive response, subsequent data transmission and information sending can be formally carried out.

[0047] In step 2.3, after the vehicle-side establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway, the vehicle VIN, vehicle-side device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud-based identity authentication gateway through a private protocol and wait for a response; if a negative response is received, the current connection is disconnected and returned to step 1.

[0048] If a negative response is obtained instead of an affirmative response in step 3.2, the process returns to step 1.

[0049] The T-BOX temporary communication certificate template in step 1 is shown in the following table:

[0050]

[0051]

[0052] The T-BOX formal communication certificate template generated in step 2 is shown in the following table:

[0053]

[0054] Example 2

[0055] like Figure 2 As shown, a vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates includes the following contents:

[0056] Step 1. Obtaining a temporary communication certificate:

[0057] The public key infrastructure sends a randomly generated PIN code and temporary communication certificate to the cloud-based car remote service provider. The cloud-based car remote service provider symmetrically encrypts the PIN code, using PackageKey as the key, and then pre-sets the encrypted PIN code, root certificate chain, and temporary communication certificate on the vehicle side, and pre-sets the PackageKey in the certificate management component on the vehicle side.

[0058] Before applying for a formal communication certificate, the vehicle uses PackageKey to decrypt the PIN code, and then uses the decrypted PIN code to unlock and obtain a temporary communication certificate;

[0059] Step 2. Apply for a formal communication certificate using a temporary communication certificate:

[0060] Step 2.1 The vehicle uses the public key, CN and signature in the temporary communication certificate to package into a device certificate, and keeps the private key by itself. The cloud identity authentication gateway verifies the vehicle identity based on the device certificate. After successful verification, it uses this temporary device certificate to establish two-way TLS communication with the vehicle.

[0061] Step 2.2 The vehicle side calculates the CN digest and signs the digest using the private key in the temporary communication certificate to obtain the signed CN;

[0062] Step 2.3 After the vehicle establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud authentication gateway, the vehicle sends the vehicle VIN, vehicle device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN to the cloud authentication gateway through a private protocol and waits for a response;

[0063] After receiving the positive response from the cloud-based identity authentication gateway, the vehicle side sends the certificate request information containing the public key, the random number generated by the security chip, and the encryption result of the random number to the cloud-based identity authentication gateway; the cloud-based identity authentication gateway forwards this data information to the cloud-based automotive remote service provider through one-way TLS communication. After receiving the certificate request information, the cloud-based automotive remote service provider calls its built-in public key infrastructure SDK to verify the request information. After successful verification, the certificate request information is sent to the public key infrastructure through the SDK. The public key infrastructure generates a formal communication certificate and sends the formal communication certificate to the cloud-based automotive remote service provider for storage, and at the same time sends the formal communication certificate back to the vehicle side through the data transmission link;

[0064] Step 3: Formal communication link establishment:

[0065] Step 3.1 The vehicle verifies the received official communication certificate. After the verification is successful, it immediately disconnects the two-way TLS connection established by the temporary communication certificate. Then, it packages the public key, CN and signature in the official communication certificate into a device certificate, and keeps the private key by itself. The cloud identity authentication gateway verifies the vehicle identity based on the device certificate. After the verification is successful, it uses this device certificate to establish two-way TLS communication with the vehicle. Then, the vehicle uses the private key to sign the CN summary value of the official communication certificate to obtain the signed CN.

[0066] Step 3.2 Before the vehicle side conducts formal data transmission and information sending, it must also send the vehicle VIN, equipment unique identification code, CN of the formal communication certificate and signature CN through a private protocol to the cloud identity authentication gateway. After the cloud identity authentication gateway verifies, the cloud-based car remote service provider determines to establish a communication link. After the vehicle side receives the link establishment confirmation information from the cloud-based car remote service provider, it sends data. The cloud-based car remote service provider receives the data and gives feedback to the vehicle side after receiving it. The data transmission on the vehicle side is completed.

[0067] In step 2.1, the cloud identity authentication gateway verifies the identity of the vehicle according to the device certificate. If the verification fails, the cloud identity authentication gateway refuses to establish a connection with the vehicle.

[0068] After the vehicle-side establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway in step 2.3, the vehicle VIN, vehicle-side device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud-based identity authentication gateway through a private protocol, and the response from the cloud-based identity authentication gateway is waited for; if a negative response is received, the vehicle-side disconnects the current connection with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway.

[0069] In step 3.2, if the cloud-based identity authentication gateway fails to verify the vehicle VIN, the device unique identification code, the CN of the official communication certificate, and the signature CN, it will refuse to establish a connection with the vehicle.

[0070] The preferred embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the specific details in the above embodiments. Within the technical concept of the present invention, any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention. These simple variations all belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

[0071] It should also be noted that the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any suitable manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the present invention will not further describe various possible combinations.

[0072] In addition, various embodiments of the present invention may be arbitrarily combined, and as long as they do not violate the concept of the present invention, they should also be regarded as the contents disclosed by the present invention.

Claims

1. A vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates, characterized in that It includes the following: Step 1. Acquisition of temporary communication certificate: The public key infrastructure sends a randomly generated PIN code and temporary communication certificate to the cloud-based car remote service provider. The cloud-based car remote service provider symmetrically encrypts the PIN code, using PackageKey as the key, and then pre-sets the encrypted PIN code, certificate management component, and temporary communication certificate on the vehicle side, and pre-sets PackageKey in the certificate management component on the vehicle side. Before applying for a formal communication certificate, the vehicle uses PackageKey to decrypt the PIN code, and then uses the decrypted PIN code to unlock and obtain a temporary communication certificate; Step 2. Apply for a formal communication certificate using a temporary communication certificate: Step 2.1 The vehicle uses the public key, certificate CN and signature in the temporary communication certificate to package it into a device certificate, and uses this temporary device certificate to establish two-way TLS communication with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway; Step 2.2 The vehicle side calculates the summary of the certificate CN and signs the summary using the private key in the temporary communication certificate to obtain the signed CN; Step 2.3 After the vehicle establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud identity authentication gateway, the vehicle VIN, vehicle device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud identity authentication gateway through a private protocol and wait for a response; After receiving a positive response, the vehicle sends the certificate request information including the public key, the random number generated by the security chip and the encryption result of the random number to the cloud identity authentication gateway; The cloud-based identity authentication gateway forwards the certificate request information to the cloud-based automotive teleservice provider through one-way TLS communication. After receiving the certificate request information, the cloud-based automotive teleservice provider calls the SDK of the public key infrastructure to verify the certificate request information. After successful verification, the certificate request information is sent to the public key infrastructure through the SDK. The public key infrastructure generates a formal communication certificate and sends it back to the vehicle through the data transmission link. Step 3: Formal communication link establishment: Step 3.1 After receiving the official communication certificate, the vehicle immediately disconnects the two-way TLS connection previously established by the temporary communication certificate, and uses the official communication certificate to establish a new two-way TLS communication with the cloud identity authentication gateway, and signs the CN summary value of the official communication certificate with the private key of the official communication certificate; Step 3.2 Before the vehicle side conducts formal data transmission and information sending, the vehicle VIN, vehicle-side device identification code, CN of the formal communication certificate and the signature of CN must be sent to the cloud identity authentication gateway through a private protocol. After receiving a positive response, subsequent data transmission and information sending can be formally carried out.

2. A vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates according to claim 1, characterized in that After the vehicle-side establishes a two-way TLS connection with the cloud-based identity authentication gateway in step 2.3, the vehicle VIN, vehicle-side device identification code, certificate CN and signature CN are sent to the cloud-based identity authentication gateway through a private protocol, and a response is waited for; If a negative response is received, the current connection is disconnected and the process returns to step 1.

3. A vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates according to claim 1, characterized in that If a negative response is not an affirmative response obtained in step 3.2, then return to step 1.

4. A vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates according to claim 1, characterized in that The temporary communication certificate template in step 1 is an Excel table, in which the first row from left to right is filled with type, data item name, data item description, definition and explanation, and remarks in sequence; the second to fifth cells from top to bottom in the first column are merged into one, and the content is filled in as: basic items; the sixth to eighth cells from top to bottom in the first column are merged into one, and the content is filled in as: extended domain; the second to eighth cells from top to bottom in the second column are filled in as: C, O, OU, CN, X509v3 BasicConstraints, X509v3 Subject Key Identifier, X509v3 Authority Key Identifier; fill in the second to eighth boxes from the top to the bottom of the third column in sequence: Country, Organization, Type, Name, Standard Extension Domain, Subject Key Identifier, Organization Key Identifier; fill in the second to eighth boxes from the top to the bottom of the fourth column in sequence: CN, FAW-BESTUNE, T-Box, Default-Tbox-XXXX, CA:FALSE, blank, blank; fill in the second to eighth boxes from the top to the bottom of the fifth column in sequence: blank, blank, blank, XXXX: car series such as D058 and C105, fixed value, not fixed, not fixed.

5. According to claim 1, a vehicle-to-cloud communication identity authentication method based on digital certificates is characterized in that The formal communication certificate template generated in step 2 is an Excel table, in which the first row from left to right is filled with type, data item name, data item description, definition and explanation, and remarks; the second to fifth cells from top to bottom in the first column are merged into one, and the content is filled in as: basic items; the sixth to eighth cells from top to bottom in the first column are merged into one, and the content is filled in as: extended domain; the second to eighth cells from top to bottom in the second column are filled in as: C, O, OU, CN, X509v3 BasicConstraints, X509v3 Subject Key Identifier, X509v3 Authority Key Identifier; fill in the second to eighth boxes from the top to the bottom of the third column in sequence: Country, Organization, Type, Name, Standard Extension Domain, Subject Key Identifier, Organization Key Identifier; fill in the second to eighth boxes from the top to the bottom of the fourth column in sequence: CN, FAW-BESTUNE, T-Box, SN-VIN, CA:FALSE, blank, blank; fill in the second to eighth boxes from the top to the bottom of the fifth column in sequence: blank, blank, blank, 26 single characters - 17 single characters, fixed value, not fixed, not fixed.

Images