A trusted verification method, apparatus and image forming device

By obtaining the status information of the protective firmware and determining its availability before sending a trusted verification request, the verification delay problem when the protective firmware is busy or abnormal is solved, ensuring the normal operation of the business system and the integrity of verification.

CN115186267BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17ZHUHAI PANTUM ELECTRONICS CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210784617.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-06-29
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2042-06-29

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, when the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, it cannot provide a reliable verification result in a timely manner, which affects the operation of the business system and may even cause subsequent reliable verification requests to be unable to be processed.

Method used

Before sending a trusted verification request, the trusted software base first obtains the status information of the protection firmware to determine whether it is in an exploitable state, and only sends the request when it is determined to be exploitable.

Benefits of technology

This avoids unnecessary waiting in the business system, ensures the integrity of trusted verification requests and responses, and prevents it from affecting subsequent verification operations.

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Abstract

This application provides a trusted verification method, apparatus, and image forming device. The method includes: a trusted software base acquiring status information of protective firmware; the trusted software base determining whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information; and if the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state, sending a trusted verification request to the protective firmware. In this application embodiment, before sending the trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the trusted software base first acquires the status information of the protective firmware, and after determining that the protective firmware is in an available state, sends the trusted verification request to the protective firmware. This method can avoid invalid waiting on the business system side, which would affect the operation of the business system. In addition, it can ensure the integrity of each trusted verification request and trusted verification response, avoiding impact on subsequent trusted verifications.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of computer technology, and more specifically to a trusted verification method, apparatus, and image forming device. Background Technology

[0002] Trusted Computing (TC) is a technology promoted and developed by the Trusted Computing Group (Trusted Computing Cluster, formerly known as TCPA). Trusted computing widely uses trusted computing platforms supported by hardware security modules in computing and communication systems to improve overall system security. Trusted Software Base is software that conforms to the standard "Information Security Technology—Trusted Computing Specification—Trusted Software Base" and is used for trusted verification.

[0003] In embedded devices, by embedding a trusted software base into the business system, protection can be provided at each stage from the device's startup to its operational state. Specifically, the trusted software base can send trusted verification requests to the protective firmware and receive the trusted verification results returned by the firmware. Based on the trusted verification results, the trusted software base can then perform further trusted control measures, such as blocking or issuing warnings, or generating logs and reporting them to the management center.

[0004] However, in existing technologies, trusted software bases typically only focus on whether the issued trusted verification requests are effectively verified. When the protection firmware is in a busy state, it may not be able to provide the corresponding trusted verification results in a timely manner. During the execution of the business system, it may be in an abnormal state due to the timeout of the trusted software base's active / passive measurement behavior, which may affect the operation of the business system and even cause subsequent trusted verification requests to be unable to be processed. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, this application provides a trusted verification method, apparatus, and image forming device to solve the problem in the prior art that when the protection firmware is in a busy state, it may not be able to provide the corresponding trusted verification result in a timely manner, thereby affecting the operation of the business system and even causing subsequent trusted verification requests to be unable to be processed.

[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a trusted verification method, including:

[0007] The trusted software base obtains the status information of the protective firmware, which is used to receive the trusted verification request sent by the trusted software base and return the trusted verification result to the trusted software base.

[0008] The trusted software base determines whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware.

[0009] If the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state, it sends the trusted verification request to the protective firmware.

[0010] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base acquires the status information of the protective firmware, including:

[0011] The trusted software base obtains the status information of the protective firmware through the hardware layer.

[0012] In one possible implementation, the hardware layer includes a storage module and a trusted cryptographic module, the trusted software base is stored on the storage module, the protective firmware is embedded in the trusted cryptographic module, and the trusted software base obtains the status information of the protective firmware, including:

[0013] The trusted cryptographic module obtains the status information of the protective firmware;

[0014] The trusted cryptographic module sends the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module;

[0015] The main control module sends the status information of the protection firmware to the trusted software base.

[0016] In one possible implementation, the trusted cryptographic module sends the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module, including:

[0017] The trusted cryptographic module sends the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module based on a mailbox mechanism and / or an interrupt mechanism.

[0018] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base determines whether the protective firmware is in an exploitable state based on the status information of the protective firmware, including:

[0019] If the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state.

[0020] If the protective firmware is in a non-busy and non-abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state.

[0021] In one possible implementation, the method further includes:

[0022] If the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state, it will not send the trusted verification request to the protective firmware.

[0023] In one possible implementation, after sending the trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the method further includes:

[0024] The trusted software base receives the trusted verification result sent by the protective firmware.

[0025] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a trusted verification device, comprising:

[0026] Main control module;

[0027] Storage module, wherein a trusted software base is stored on the storage module;

[0028] A trusted cryptographic module, wherein protective firmware is embedded in the trusted cryptographic module;

[0029] The protective firmware is used to receive a trusted verification request sent by the trusted software base and return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base;

[0030] The trusted software base is used to obtain the status information of the protective firmware; determine whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware; if the protective firmware is determined to be in an available state, then send the trusted verification request to the protective firmware.

[0031] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base is used to obtain the status information of the protective firmware, specifically including:

[0032] The trusted cryptographic module is used to obtain the status information of the protective firmware and send the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module;

[0033] The main control module is used to receive the status information of the protection firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module, and to send the status information of the protection firmware to the trusted software base.

[0034] In one possible implementation, the trusted cryptographic module is used to send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module, specifically including: the trusted cryptographic module is used to send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module based on a mailbox mechanism and / or an interrupt mechanism;

[0035] The main control module is used to receive the status information of the protective firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module, specifically including: the main control module is used to receive the status information of the protective firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module based on the mailbox mechanism and / or interrupt mechanism.

[0036] In one possible implementation, determining whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware includes:

[0037] If the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state.

[0038] If the protective firmware is in a non-busy and non-abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state.

[0039] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide an image forming apparatus, including the trusted verification device described in any one of the first aspects.

[0040] In this embodiment, before sending a trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the trusted software base first obtains the status information of the protective firmware. After determining that the protective firmware is in an usable state based on the status information, it sends the trusted verification request to the protective firmware. This method avoids unnecessary waiting on the business system side, which could affect the operation of the business system. Furthermore, it ensures the integrity of each trusted verification request and response, preventing impact on subsequent trusted verifications. Attached Figure Description

[0041] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0042] Figure 1A A structural block diagram of a trusted verification device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0043] Figure 1B A structural block diagram of a trusted verification device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0044] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a trusted verification method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0045] Figure 3 A structural block diagram of another trusted verification device provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0046] Figure 4 This is a structural block diagram of an image forming apparatus provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0047] To better understand the technical solution of this application, the embodiments of this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0048] It should be understood that the described embodiments are merely some, not all, of the embodiments in this application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments in this application without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0049] The terminology used in the embodiments of this application is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of this application. The singular forms “a,” “the,” and “the” used in the embodiments of this application and the appended claims are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0050] It should be understood that the term "and / or" used in this article is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. Additionally, the character " / " in this article generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects have an "or" relationship.

[0051] Trusted Computing (TC) is a technology promoted and developed by the Trusted Computing Group (Trusted Computing Cluster, formerly known as TCPA). Trusted computing widely uses trusted computing platforms supported by hardware security modules in computing and communication systems to improve overall system security. A Trusted Software Base is software that conforms to the "Information Security Technology—Trusted Computing Specification—Trusted Software Base" standard and is used for trusted verification. On embedded devices, by embedding the Trusted Software Base into the business system, protection can be provided at each stage from the device's startup to its running state.

[0052] See Figure 1A Here is a structural block diagram of a trusted verification device provided in an embodiment of this application; see also Figure 1B This is a structural block diagram of a trusted verification device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 1A and 1B As shown, from an overall architecture perspective, this trusted verification device comprises a software layer and a hardware layer. The hardware layer includes a main control module and a trusted security module. The software layer includes a trusted software base and protective firmware; the trusted software base further includes applications, a kernel, and a bootloader. In specific implementations, the main control module can be a System on Chip (SoC), a Microcontroller Unit (MCU), etc., and this embodiment does not impose specific limitations on this. The trusted security module is a type of secure hardware used for trusted verification.

[0053] In one possible implementation, the main control module includes a storage module that stores a trusted software base; the trusted security module includes a trusted cryptographic module, and the protection firmware is embedded in the trusted cryptographic module, such as... Figure 1A As shown.

[0054] In another possible implementation, the trusted security module includes a storage module and a trusted cryptographic module. The storage module stores a trusted software base, and the protective firmware is embedded in the trusted cryptographic module, such as... Figure 1B As shown.

[0055] The Trusted Software Base (TKB) can send trusted verification requests to the protective firmware and receive the trusted verification results returned by the firmware. Based on the trusted verification results, the TKB can then perform further trusted management, such as blocking or issuing warnings, or generating logs and reporting them to the management center.

[0056] However, in existing technologies, trusted software bases typically only focus on whether the issued trusted verification requests are effectively verified. When the protection firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, it may not be able to provide the corresponding trusted verification results in a timely manner. During the execution of the business system, it may be in an abnormal state due to the timeout of the trusted software base's active / passive measurement behavior, thereby affecting the operation of the business system and even causing subsequent trusted verification requests to be unable to be processed.

[0057] To address the aforementioned issues, this application provides a trusted verification method. Before sending a trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the trusted software base first obtains the status information of the protective firmware. After determining that the protective firmware is in an usable state based on the status information, it sends the trusted verification request to the protective firmware. This method avoids unnecessary waiting on the business system side, which could affect the operation of the business system. Furthermore, it ensures the integrity of each trusted verification request and response, preventing impact on subsequent trusted verifications. A detailed description is provided below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0058] See Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a trusted verification method provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 2 As shown, it mainly includes the following steps.

[0059] Step S201: The trusted software base obtains the status information of the protection firmware.

[0060] In this embodiment, the protective firmware is used to receive a trusted verification request sent by a trusted software base, and after receiving the trusted verification request, to return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base. "Returning a trusted verification result to the trusted software base" means that under normal circumstances, the protective firmware can promptly and reliably return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base after receiving the trusted verification request. However, under certain circumstances, such as when the protective firmware is busy or in an abnormal state, the protective firmware cannot promptly and reliably return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base after receiving the trusted verification request.

[0061] Therefore, in this embodiment of the application, before sending a trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the trusted software base first obtains the status information of the protective firmware. The status information of the protective firmware is used to characterize whether the protective firmware can return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base in a timely and reliable manner after receiving the trusted verification request sent by the trusted software base.

[0062] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base can synchronize the status information of the protection firmware in real time through the hardware layer, so as to obtain the status information of the protection firmware in a timely manner.

[0063] See Figure 3 This is a structural block diagram of another trusted verification device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 As shown in this embodiment, the status information of the protective firmware is obtained through a trusted cryptographic module and sent to the main control module. Upon receiving the status information, the main control module sends it to a trusted software base, enabling the trusted software base to access the status information. Specifically, the main control module and the trusted cryptographic module can synchronize the status information of the protective firmware based on a mailbox mechanism and / or an interrupt mechanism. Of course, those skilled in the art can also use other communication mechanisms for information transmission between the main control module and the trusted cryptographic module; this embodiment does not impose specific limitations on this.

[0064] It should be noted that the mailbox mechanism and / or interruption mechanism are implemented based on a new physical path set up by the main control module and the trusted cryptographic module. This new physical path runs in parallel with the original physical path between the main control module and the trusted cryptographic module.

[0065] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base can also obtain the status information of the protective firmware through the software layer. For example, the trusted software base can send a status detection message to the protective firmware. If it receives a response message from the protective firmware, it determines that the protective firmware can return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base; if it does not receive a response message from the protective firmware within a preset time, it determines that the protective firmware cannot return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base.

[0066] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base can actively acquire the status information of the protective firmware; or, the protective firmware can actively send the status information to the trusted software base, and the trusted software base can passively receive the status information of the protective firmware. This application does not impose specific limitations on this.

[0067] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base can periodically acquire the status information of the protective firmware at preset time intervals; or, it can acquire the status information of the protective firmware only before it needs to send a trusted verification request to the protective firmware. This application embodiment does not impose specific limitations on this.

[0068] Step S202: The trusted software base determines whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware.

[0069] In this application embodiment, "available state" means that after receiving a trusted verification request sent by a trusted software base, the protective firmware can return a trusted verification result in a timely and reliable manner.

[0070] For example, the status of the protection firmware includes busy / not busy, abnormal / not abnormal.

[0071] When the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, it typically cannot promptly return the trusted verification result to the trusted software base after receiving the trusted verification request, resulting in an excessively long waiting time for the trusted software base to receive the trusted verification result. Therefore, if the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is unusable.

[0072] When the protective firmware is in a non-busy or non-abnormal state, it can usually return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base in a timely manner after receiving a trusted verification request. Therefore, if the protective firmware is in a non-busy and non-abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state.

[0073] It should be noted that in the actual implementation, the data channel and the query channel may use different physical connections. Therefore, even if the protection firmware is in the process of calculation (data channel is busy), it can still return trusted verification results in a timely and reliable manner through the query channel. In other words, the above-mentioned "busy / not busy" state can specifically refer to the "busy / not busy" state of the query channel.

[0074] Step S203: If the trusted software base determines that the protection firmware is in an available state, it sends a trusted verification request to the protection firmware.

[0075] Specifically, if the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an usable state, it sends a trusted verification request to the protective firmware; if the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state, it does not send the trusted verification request to the protective firmware. It is understood that, in this embodiment, after the trusted software base sends a trusted verification request to the protective firmware, it can receive the trusted verification result sent by the protective firmware within a preset time. Based on the trusted verification result, it can then perform further trusted management, such as blocking or issuing warnings, or generating logs and reporting them to the management center.

[0076] In this embodiment, before sending a trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the trusted software base first obtains the status information of the protective firmware. After determining that the protective firmware is in an usable state based on the status information, it sends the trusted verification request to the protective firmware. This method avoids unnecessary waiting on the business system side, which could affect the operation of the business system. Furthermore, it ensures the integrity of each trusted verification request and response, preventing impact on subsequent trusted verifications.

[0077] Corresponding to the above method embodiments, this application also provides a trusted verification device.

[0078] Please continue reading. Figure 3 The trusted verification device provided in this application includes a main control module; a storage module storing a trusted software base; and a trusted cryptographic module embedding protective firmware. The protective firmware receives trusted verification requests sent by the trusted software base and returns trusted verification results to the trusted software base. The trusted software base obtains the status information of the protective firmware; determines whether the protective firmware is in an exploitable state based on the status information; and if the protective firmware is determined to be in an exploitable state, sends a trusted verification request to the protective firmware.

[0079] In one possible implementation, the trusted software base is used to obtain the status information of the protection firmware, specifically including: a trusted cryptographic module is used to obtain the status information of the protection firmware and send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module; the main control module is used to receive the status information of the protection firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module and send the status information of the protection firmware to the trusted software base.

[0080] In one possible implementation, the trusted cryptographic module is used to send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module. Specifically, the trusted cryptographic module is used to send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module based on a mailbox mechanism and / or an interrupt mechanism. The main control module is used to receive the status information of the protection firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module. Specifically, the main control module is used to receive the status information of the protection firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module based on a mailbox mechanism and / or an interrupt mechanism.

[0081] In one possible implementation, determining whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware includes: if the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unavailable state; if the protective firmware is in a non-busy and non-abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state.

[0082] It should be noted that the specific details of this device embodiment can be found in the description of the above method embodiment, and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0083] Based on the above embodiments, this application also provides an image forming apparatus.

[0084] See Figure 4 This is a structural block diagram of an image forming apparatus provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 4 As shown, the image forming apparatus includes the trusted verification device described in the above embodiments.

[0085] It should be noted that an image forming apparatus is a device that forms an image on a recording medium through imaging principles. This application does not limit the specific product form of the image forming apparatus. For example, the image forming apparatus can be a printer, fax machine, copier, etc.

[0086] In addition to image forming equipment, the trusted verification method and apparatus provided in this application embodiment can also be applied to other types of electronic devices, and this application embodiment does not impose specific limitations on them.

[0087] In a specific implementation, this application also provides a computer storage medium, wherein the computer storage medium may store a program, and the program, when executed, may include some or all of the steps provided in the various embodiments of this application. The storage medium may be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), or random access memory (RAM), etc.

[0088] In a specific implementation, this application also provides a computer program product, which includes executable instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform some or all of the steps in the above method embodiments.

[0089] In this application embodiment, "at least one" refers to one or more, and "more than one" refers to two or more. "And / or" describes the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent the existence of A alone, the simultaneous existence of A and B, or the existence of B alone. A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one of the following" and similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, and c can represent: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, or abc, where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0090] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps described in the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of electronic hardware and software. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this invention.

[0091] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0092] In several embodiments provided by this invention, any function, if implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0093] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this invention should be included within the protection scope of this invention. The protection scope of this invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method of trusted verification, the method comprising: include: The trusted software base obtains the status information of the protective firmware through the hardware layer. The protective firmware is used to receive the trusted verification request sent by the trusted software base and return the trusted verification result to the trusted software base. The trusted software base determines whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware. If the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state, it sends the trusted verification request to the protective firmware through the software layer.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The hardware layer includes a storage module and a trusted cryptographic module. The trusted software base is stored on the storage module, and the protective firmware is embedded in the trusted cryptographic module. The trusted software base obtains the status information of the protective firmware through the hardware layer, including: The trusted cryptographic module obtains the status information of the protective firmware; The trusted cryptographic module sends the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module; The main control module sends the status information of the protection firmware to the trusted software base.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The trusted cryptographic module sends the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module, including: The trusted cryptographic module sends the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module based on a mailbox mechanism and / or an interrupt mechanism.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trusted software base determines whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware, including: If the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state. If the protective firmware is in a non-busy and non-abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The method further includes: If the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state, it will not send the trusted verification request to the protective firmware.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, After sending the trusted verification request to the protective firmware, the method further includes: The trusted software base receives the trusted verification result sent by the protective firmware.

7. A trusted verification device, characterized in that, include: Main control module; Storage module, wherein a trusted software base is stored on the storage module; A trusted cryptographic module, wherein protective firmware is embedded in the trusted cryptographic module; The protective firmware is used to receive a trusted verification request sent by the trusted software base and return a trusted verification result to the trusted software base; The trusted software base is used to obtain the status information of the protective firmware through the hardware layer; The status information of the protective firmware is used to determine whether the protective firmware is in an available state; if the protective firmware is determined to be in an available state, the trusted verification request is sent to the protective firmware through the software layer.

8. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The trusted software base is used to obtain the status information of the protective firmware through the hardware layer, specifically including: The trusted cryptographic module is used to obtain the status information of the protective firmware and send the status information of the protective firmware to the main control module; The main control module is used to receive the status information of the protection firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module, and to send the status information of the protection firmware to the trusted software base.

9. The apparatus according to claim 8, characterized in that, The trusted cryptographic module is used to send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module, specifically including: the trusted cryptographic module is used to send the status information of the protection firmware to the main control module based on the mailbox mechanism and / or interrupt mechanism; The main control module is used to receive the status information of the protective firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module, specifically including: the main control module is used to receive the status information of the protective firmware sent by the trusted cryptographic module based on the mailbox mechanism and / or interrupt mechanism.

10. The apparatus according to any one of claims 7-9, characterized in that, The step of determining whether the protective firmware is in an available state based on the status information of the protective firmware includes: If the protective firmware is in a busy or abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an unusable state. If the protective firmware is in a non-busy and non-abnormal state, the trusted software base determines that the protective firmware is in an available state.

11. An image forming apparatus, characterized in that, Includes the trusted verification device as described in any one of claims 7-10.

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