A secure handshake method for V2X communication system of intelligent connected vehicles

Abstract

The present invention relates to a secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle, comprising the following steps: Step 1: After obtaining a regional key, basic encryption and decryption protection is performed on the communication through FPGA hardware; Step 2: After the handshake begins, the vehicle needs to go to the cloud platform to pull the key value and expiration time of the other vehicle, and the key is recorded as UseridKey; Step 3: After the vehicle sends the expiration time to the other vehicle, it can quickly calculate the UseridKey and use the key value to decrypt the secret text expiration time to verify whether it is correct; Step 4: After the verification is passed by the other vehicle, it is considered that the handshake is successful and a handshake success mark is sent to the vehicle. The vehicle needs to randomly generate a new key, which is recorded as ConnectKey. This key is used for basic communication between the two devices in the later stage. The present invention has the dual protection of hardware encryption and decryption and platform encryption, and has high communication efficiency, fast speed, and higher security.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a V2X vehicle-to-everything (V2X) security handshake method for intelligent connected vehicles based on FPGA encryption and cloud platform service dual encryption, belonging to the field of V2X secure communication technology. Background Art

[0002] V2X stands for Vehicle to X, where X represents infrastructure, vehicle, pedestrian, and road, and can also represent anything. V2X is a wireless technology primarily used in connected vehicles to improve road safety and traffic management. It is a key technology in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), enabling communication between vehicles, with roadside infrastructure, and with the internet. This enables real-time traffic information, including road conditions, pedestrian information, and more. This improves driving safety, reduces congestion, and increases traffic efficiency.

[0003] Among existing technologies, V2X is a necessary technology for autonomous driving and an important part of smart transportation. V2X includes V2V (Vehicle to Vehicle), V2I (Vehicle to Instruction), V2P (Vehicle to Pedestrian), V2R (Vehicle to Road), etc. It is mainly implemented through real-time data communication and interaction between the communication equipment installed on the vehicle and the vehicle, road facilities, people and even the network, and the surrounding information is aggregated to the information terminal in real time to provide a basis for intelligent decision-making for road travel. Based on V2X technology, it can not only greatly improve traffic safety and reduce traffic accident rates, but also provide low-cost, easy-to-deploy support and basic platform for autonomous driving, smart transportation and the next generation of vehicle networking.

[0004] Because V2X systems are currently manufactured and operated by different manufacturers and operate with distinct logic, true interoperability is impossible, information utilization is low, and full sharing with surrounding vehicles is impossible. This necessitates mutual authentication between V2X vehicles to establish trust within the vehicle network. In this context, the effective use of vehicle sensors and artificial intelligence technology to achieve secure authentication between V2X connected vehicles and, in turn, achieve trust-based data dissemination and sharing among vehicles within the region has become a pressing issue. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To overcome the shortcomings of existing research, the present invention provides a secure handshake method for the V2X communication system of intelligent connected vehicles, which has the dual protection of hardware encryption and decryption and platform encryption, high communication efficiency, fast speed, and higher security. The method ensures the security of the handshake process during the V2X communication process. In the V2X communication process, the early handshake is a very important process and is also a link that is extremely vulnerable to attack. Once this link is broken through by hackers, subsequent communications will be insecure, which may pose a great safety hazard to traffic.

[0006] The specific steps of a secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle are as follows:

[0007] Step 1: Use FPGA hardware to perform basic encryption and decryption protection on communications;

[0008] Step 2: After the handshake begins, the vehicle needs to go to the cloud platform to pull the key value of the other vehicle, recorded as UseridKey. This value is composed of the sha256 of the other vehicle's owner ID, vehicle ID, and expiration time. The expiration time is encrypted with the key and sent to the other vehicle;

[0009] Step 3: The other vehicle knows its own owner ID value and vehicle ID value, quickly calculates the UseridKey, and uses the key value to decrypt the encrypted expiration time of the other vehicle to verify whether it is correct. If it is correct and the expiration time has not been reached, it replies that the handshake is successful;

[0010] Step 4: After the other vehicle successfully verifies, the handshake is considered successful and a handshake success flag is sent to the local vehicle. The local vehicle needs to randomly generate a new key, recorded as ConnectKey, which will be used for basic communication between the two vehicles in the future.

[0011] The step 1 specifically includes:

[0012] Step 1.1: Obtain the unique key for the vehicle's region by broadcasting it to the platform or other V2X infrastructure on the roadside. Calculate the permutation table in the DES encryption algorithm using this key.

[0013] Step 1.2: Encrypt the owner ID value using the DES symmetric key encryption algorithm through the permutation table to obtain the ciphertext:

[0014] Step 1.3: The other vehicle obtains the replacement table using the same method, decrypts the ciphertext using the DES algorithm and key to obtain the other vehicle owner's ID value, and verifies whether the value conforms to the platform's ID value format.

[0015] The second step specifically includes:

[0016] Step 2.1: After the other vehicle responds, the vehicle obtains the ID value of the other vehicle computer, which is the unique identifier of the vehicle computer;

[0017] Step 2.2: The vehicle reports the unique identifier of the peer vehicle to the platform and obtains the encryption key from the platform.

[0018] Step 2.3: The UseridKey key obtained from the platform is calculated by combining the sha256 expiration time, the peer vehicle owner ID value, and the peer vehicle computer ID value. The expiration time is encrypted using the UseridKey and the plaintext is sent to the peer.

[0019] The step three specifically includes:

[0020] After the other vehicle obtains the correct expiration time, it knows its own owner ID value and vehicle ID value, calculates its own UserIDKey through the sha256 algorithm, and uses the key value to decrypt the ciphertext sent by the other end. If the decryption is successful and the comparison with the plaintext sent by the other end is passed, and the current time has not reached the expiration time, the verification is considered successful and the handshake success is replied to the other end.

[0021] The step 4 specifically includes:

[0022] Step 4.1: After the other vehicle calculates the correct key, it will send a handshake success notification. This notification is encrypted based on the UseridKey. After receiving the handshake success notification, the vehicle determines that the handshake between the two ends is successful.

[0023] Step 4.2: After receiving the notification of successful handshake, this vehicle randomly generates a new key, encrypts it with UseridKey, and sends it to the other vehicle. The other vehicle decrypts and stores the key after receiving it. Both parties use the new key for encrypted communication.

[0024] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0025] The present invention has the dual protection of hardware encryption and decryption and platform encryption, and has high communication efficiency, fast speed and higher security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0027] Figure 1A flowchart (1) of a secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle according to the present invention;

[0028] Figure 2 A flow chart (2) of a secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle according to the present invention;

[0029] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the V2X vehicle network data interaction relationship in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0030] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0031] Reference Figure 1 The specific steps of a secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle are as follows:

[0032] Step 1: Use FPGA hardware to perform basic encryption and decryption protection on communications;

[0033] Step 2: After the handshake begins, the vehicle needs to go to the cloud platform to pull the key value of the other vehicle, recorded as UseridKey. This value is composed of the sha256 of the other vehicle's owner ID, vehicle ID, and expiration time. The expiration time is encrypted with the key and sent to the other vehicle;

[0034] Step 3: The other vehicle knows its own owner ID value and vehicle ID value, quickly calculates the UseridKey, and uses the key value to decrypt the encrypted expiration time of the other vehicle, and verifies whether it is correct. If correct, it replies that the handshake is successful;

[0035] Step 4: After the handshake is successful, the other vehicle considers the handshake successful and sends a handshake success flag to the local vehicle. The local vehicle needs to randomly generate a new key, recorded as ConnectKey, which will be used for basic communication between the two vehicles in the future.

[0036] In one example of this application, there are two vehicles, A and B, in a common area. V2X communication in that area uses a common key, which serves as the basis for communication among all V2X devices in the area. This key can be obtained in two ways: Method 1 is obtained by each connected vehicle through the platform; Method 2 is obtained by vehicles after being broadcast by roadside infrastructure such as road bollards and traffic lights.

[0037] After vehicles A and B obtain the public key for the region, they calculate a permutation table for their region. Using this table, they encrypt the vehicle owner's ID value via the FPGA and broadcast the encrypted message. Assume that vehicle B receives vehicle A's broadcast message first. Vehicle B decrypts the owner ID value received from vehicle A via the FPGA hardware and verifies that it matches the platform's specified format. If so, the message is deemed legitimate.

[0038] If the vehicle B determines that the ID value is valid, it will reply to the vehicle A with some basic information, such as speed, acceleration, and the ID value of the vehicle owner. After receiving the reply from the other end, the vehicle A will get some basic information about the vehicle B.

[0039] If vehicle A is interested in the other vehicle's information, or is a member of the platoon, it will initiate a handshake with that vehicle. Vehicle A will contact the vehicle network service platform and use the owner ID value provided by the other vehicle to retrieve the UseridKey for the other vehicle. This key is a sha256 combination of the owner ID, the vehicle ID, and the expiration time. If the key is successfully retrieved, it will be used to encrypt the expiration time and then send the encrypted expiration time and the encrypted plaintext to the other vehicle.

[0040] If vehicle B receives the plaintext and secret text of the expiration time, vehicle B reads its own owner ID value and vehicle computer ID value. After obtaining the above ID values, it uses the plaintext expiration time and the same encryption method to obtain its own vehicle's UseridKey, and uses the secret key to decrypt the secret text expiration time sent by vehicle A. After decryption, it is compared with the plaintext expiration time. If the comparison is successful and the current time does not reach the expiration time, the first step of the handshake is considered completed.

[0041] If the first handshake step is completed, Car B needs to reply to Car A to inform it that the first handshake step is completed. After that, Car A needs to randomly generate a secret key, called ConnectKey, and transmit the secret key to Car B. At this time, Car A and Car B have completed all the handshake processes, and both recognize each other as safe and trustworthy vehicles and begin to share highly trusted vehicle information.

[0042] It should be noted that the process in which car B replies to the first handshake completion step and car A sends the ConnectKey to car B both use the UseridKey to encrypt the message, ensuring that every step of the communication process is secure.

[0043] Reference Figure 3 The interaction between car A, car B and the traffic light is to obtain the local regional key, and the interaction between car A and car B is to obtain handshake communication. During the handshake, only car A and the platform need to interact to obtain the key value of the other party.

[0044] The embodiments of the present invention are described in detail above with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the present invention is not limited to the described embodiments. It is apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations to these embodiments may be made without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention, and these changes and modifications still fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle, characterized by: The following steps are involved: Step 1: Use FPGA hardware to perform basic encryption and decryption protection on communications; Step 2: After the handshake begins, the vehicle goes to the cloud platform to pull the key value of the other vehicle, recorded as UseridKey. UseridKey is calculated using the sha256 algorithm, with the input parameters being the owner ID value, vehicle ID value, and expiration time of the other vehicle. The expiration time is encrypted with the key and sent to the other vehicle. Step 3: The other vehicle knows its own owner ID value and vehicle ID value, quickly calculates the UseridKey, and uses the key value to decrypt the encrypted expiration time of the other vehicle to verify whether it is correct or expired. If correct, it replies that the handshake is successful; Step 4: After the other vehicle successfully verifies, the handshake is considered successful and a handshake success flag is sent to the local vehicle. The local vehicle needs to randomly generate a new key, recorded as ConnectKey, which will be used for basic communication between the two vehicles in the future. The step 1 specifically includes: Step 1.1: Obtain the unique key for the vehicle's region by broadcasting it to the platform or other V2X infrastructure on the roadside. Calculate the permutation table in the DES encryption algorithm using this key. Step 1.2: Encrypt the owner ID value using the DES symmetric key encryption algorithm through the permutation table to obtain the ciphertext: Step 1.3: The other vehicle obtains the replacement table using the same method, decrypts the ciphertext using the DES algorithm and key to obtain the other vehicle owner's ID value, and verifies whether the value conforms to the platform's ID value format.

2. A secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle according to claim 1, characterized in that: The second step specifically includes: Step 2.1: After the other vehicle responds, this machine obtains the ID value of the other vehicle, which is the unique identifier of the vehicle; Step 2.2: The vehicle computer reports the unique identifier of the other vehicle computer to the platform and obtains the encryption key of the other vehicle computer from the platform; Step 2.3: The UseridKey key obtained from the platform is calculated by combining the sha256 expiration time, the peer vehicle owner ID value, and the peer vehicle ID value. The expiration time is encrypted using the UseridKey and the plaintext is sent to the peer vehicle.

3. The secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step three specifically includes: After the other vehicle obtains the correct expiration time, it knows its own owner ID value and vehicle ID value, calculates its own UserIDKey through the sha256 algorithm, and uses the key value to decrypt the ciphertext sent by the other end. If the decryption is successful and the comparison with the plaintext sent by the other end is passed, and the current time has not reached the expiration time, it is considered that the verification is successful, and the handshake success is replied to the other vehicle.

4. The secure handshake method for a V2X communication system of an intelligent connected vehicle according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 4 specifically includes: Step 4.1: After the other vehicle calculates the correct key, it will send a handshake success notification. This notification is encrypted based on the UseridKey. After receiving the handshake success notification, the vehicle determines that the handshake between the two ends is successful. Step 4.2: After receiving the notification of successful handshake, this vehicle randomly generates a new key, encrypts it with UseridKey, and sends it to the other end. After receiving it, the other end vehicle decrypts and stores the key. Both parties use the new key for encrypted communication.

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