Air defense and anti-missile system coordination method, device and equipment of heterogeneous network

Abstract

The application provides a heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system coordination method, device and equipment, the method comprises the following steps: selecting coordination equipment based on coordination rules in at least reconnaissance equipment and striking equipment; forming multiple air defense and anti-missile coordination networks based on the coordination equipment and other category equipment different from the coordination equipment; evaluating the multiple air defense and anti-missile coordination networks based on evaluation indexes to determine a target air defense and anti-missile coordination network with a coordination effect meeting requirements; wherein the evaluation indexes comprise a flexibility index about whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to respond to different requirements, an economy index about whether the communication and maintenance cost is too high, and an attack and defense index about the size of the enemy killing and defense capability. The method provided by the application is used for quickly forming multiple air defense and anti-missile coordination networks, and can objectively and comprehensively evaluate the multiple networks to determine a target air defense and anti-missile coordination network with a coordination effect meeting requirements.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of computer technology, and specifically relates to a collaborative method, device and equipment for a heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system. Background Technology

[0002] In the information age, air defense and missile defense have become crucial means of maintaining security. A typical air defense and missile defense system is a comprehensive system integrating multiple functions such as air defense and missile defense, including elements such as reconnaissance and detection, command and control, and firepower, as well as a communication system to support its internal communications. In recent years, traditional air defense and missile defense systems have faced significant challenges in dealing with complex and ever-changing environments. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a relatively complete collaborative model system or collaborative capability to maximize the effectiveness of the air defense and missile defense system. How to model and evaluate the performance of air defense and missile defense collaborative models, and provide a reliable basis for guiding concepts and research in practical applications, has become a hot topic in current information technology research.

[0003] When studying collaborative combat systems, the first step is to establish a collaborative combat system model. Numerous researchers have done extensive work in this area. Currently, the main methods proposed for designing collaborative combat systems include multi-layered anti-missile collaborative combat mission modeling methods based on UML and Petri nets, collaborative combat system architecture models based on DoDAF, and meta-model-based collaborative combat models. These modeling methods have standardized design principles, improving the systematicity and completeness of collaborative combat system models. However, they suffer from difficulties in model design and limited applicability, failing to meet the needs of informatization. Complex networks, characterized by holistic modeling, offer a new perspective and method for collaborative combat system design, overcoming these shortcomings. Some methods study collaborative combat capabilities based on complex dynamic network methods; others establish collaborative models of command and control systems from a complex network perspective; still others model UAV collaborative combat systems and evaluate their collaborative effects based on complex networks. However, while these complex network-based collaborative combat system studies can characterize the connection relationships of equipment in air defense and anti-missile collaborative combat systems to some extent, they cannot reflect the heterogeneity of air defense and anti-missile system equipment and the diversity of interactions between equipment. Equipment in a collaborative combat system is often simplified into nodes of the same type, and the interaction between equipment is often considered only as edges of the same type, ignoring the non-homogeneity of the collaborative combat system. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method, apparatus and equipment for the coordinated development of heterogeneous air defense and anti-missile systems, which can be used to quickly form multiple coordinated air defense and anti-missile networks and to objectively and comprehensively evaluate the multiple networks to determine the target coordinated air defense and anti-missile network that meets the requirements of the coordinated effect.

[0005] The present invention includes a method for coordinating an air defense and anti-missile system using a heterogeneous network. The heterogeneous network comprises nodes formed by different types of equipment and edges representing the interaction relationships between these nodes. The different types of equipment include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment, and target equipment. The method includes:

[0006] At least among the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, cooperative equipment is selected based on cooperative rules;

[0007] Multiple air defense and anti-missile collaborative networks are formed based on collaborative equipment and other types of equipment that are different from the collaborative equipment. The air defense and anti-missile collaborative networks include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment and target equipment.

[0008] The multiple air defense and anti-missile coordinated networks are evaluated based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and anti-missile coordinated network whose coordinated effect meets the requirements.

[0009] The evaluation indicators include flexibility indicators regarding whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to respond to different needs, economic indicators regarding whether communication and maintenance costs are too high, and offensive and defensive indicators regarding the extent of its ability to kill and defend against enemies.

[0010] As an optional embodiment, the step of selecting cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules from at least the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment includes:

[0011] At least the location information, capability value and concealment value of the reconnaissance equipment and the strike equipment are obtained. The capability value represents the ability of the equipment to perform its own functions, and the concealment value represents the probability that the target equipment will detect the equipment.

[0012] At least among the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, cooperative equipment is selected based on the location information, capability value, concealment value, and cooperation rules.

[0013] As an optional embodiment, the collaboration rules include:

[0014] Based on the distance information, a first collaboration rule is selected to collaborate with equipment of the same category as the equipment itself, provided that the distance to the equipment meets the first threshold.

[0015] Based on the aforementioned capability value, a second collaboration rule is selected to collaborate with equipment of the same category as the equipment itself, provided that the capability value satisfies the second threshold.

[0016] Based on the aforementioned concealment value, a third collaboration rule is established that selects equipment whose concealment value satisfies the third threshold and collaborates with equipment of the same category as its own equipment.

[0017] The fourth collaboration rule is to randomly select equipment of the same category as the user's own equipment for collaboration.

[0018] As an optional embodiment, the flexibility index is measured based on the communication latency between the cooperating equipment and the information sharing range in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network. The communication latency is proportional to the average path length between the cooperating equipment, and the information sharing range refers to the number of nodes through which information propagates in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network.

[0019]

[0020] Where I represents the scope of information sharing, indegree i This represents the amount of information received by nodes corresponding to reconnaissance or strike equipment in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network, count{indegree i >0} represents the number of nodes with information reception greater than 0, k represents the number of reconnaissance nodes and strike nodes in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network, S represents reconnaissance equipment, and A represents strike equipment.

[0021] As an optional embodiment, the economic efficiency index is measured based on the connection costs incurred by communication transmission between different nodes in the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network, as well as the maintenance costs of different nodes. The connection cost C edge for:

[0022]

[0023] The node maintenance cost C node for:

[0024]

[0025] Where c1 represents the edge connection cost incurred for communication transmission per unit distance between the nodes, ∑d ij x ij c1 represents the sum of the lengths of the edges in the network, and c2 represents the maintenance cost of each node, which is proportional to the number of times the node processes information.

[0026] As an optional embodiment, the offensive and defensive indicators measure the kill capability based on the capability values ​​of the nodes selected by the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network at different stages of the operation, and measure the defensive capability based on the concealment value of the nodes participating in the operation and the number of kill chains in the network. The kill chain represents the complete combat path from reconnaissance equipment to target equipment to strike equipment.

[0027] The lethality Q is:

[0028]

[0029] The defensive capability S is:

[0030]

[0031] count{degree (ij) >0} represents the number of nodes that have participated in the i-th phase of the operation more than 0 times, deg ree (ij) This represents the number of times the j-th node has participated in the combat during the i-th phase, and its capability. (ij) This represents the capability value of the j-th node in the i-th stage; cc i Represents the hidden value of node i, n chain This indicates the number of kill chains in the network.

[0032] As an optional embodiment, the evaluation of the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements includes:

[0033] An evaluation strategy is formed by combining the analytic hierarchy process and the method of approximating the ideal solution.

[0034] Based on the evaluation indicators, the values ​​of each indicator of each air defense and anti-missile cooperative network are determined. The indicator values ​​are the measurement parameters of each indicator, including one or more of the following: communication latency, information sharing range, connection cost, node maintenance cost, lethality, and defense capability.

[0035] The multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks are evaluated based on the aforementioned index values ​​and evaluation strategies to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements.

[0036] As an optional embodiment, the evaluation of the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on the index values ​​and evaluation strategies to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements includes:

[0037] The normalized weights corresponding to each of the aforementioned index values ​​are calculated and determined based on the aforementioned analytic hierarchy process.

[0038] Construct an index value matrix;

[0039] The index value matrix is ​​positiveized based on the near-ideal solution method, so that the index representing the negative and the corresponding index value are positiveized.

[0040] Based on the approach-to-ideal solution method, the normalized index value matrix is ​​processed to obtain a standardized index value matrix.

[0041] Multiply the standardized index value matrix by the normalized weights of each index value to obtain the weighted standardized index matrix.

[0042] Based on the method of approximating the ideal solution, positive and negative ideal solutions are calculated for the index matrix. The positive ideal solution is the maximum value of the column vector of the index matrix, and the negative ideal solution is the minimum value of the column vector of the index matrix.

[0043] The distances between each of the aforementioned air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks and the positive and negative ideal solutions are calculated using Euclidean distance.

[0044] Based on the distance, the proximity of each of the air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks to the positive ideal solution or the negative ideal solution is calculated;

[0045] The target air defense and missile defense cooperative network is determined from the plurality of air defense and missile defense cooperative networks based on the proximity.

[0046] Another embodiment of the present invention also provides a heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system coordination device. The heterogeneous network comprises nodes formed by different types of equipment and edges representing the interaction relationships between different nodes. The different types of equipment include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment, and target equipment to be attacked. The device includes:

[0047] The selection module is used to select cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules, at least among reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment.

[0048] A forming module is used to form multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on cooperative equipment and other types of equipment that are different from the cooperative equipment. The air defense and anti-missile cooperative network includes the reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment and target equipment.

[0049] The evaluation module is used to evaluate the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks according to evaluation indicators, so as to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements.

[0050] The evaluation indicators include flexibility indicators regarding whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to respond to different needs, economic indicators regarding whether communication and maintenance costs are too high, and offensive and defensive indicators regarding the extent of its ability to kill and defend against enemies.

[0051] Another embodiment of the present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising:

[0052] At least one processor; and,

[0053] A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein,

[0054] The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to implement the heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system cooperative method as described in any of the embodiments above.

[0055] The beneficial effects of this invention include proposing various collaborative rules for rapidly forming air defense and anti-missile collaborative networks for joint operations, enhancing the network's reconnaissance, strike, and other combat capabilities. It also proposes an evaluation system for objectively and comprehensively evaluating the various air defense and anti-missile collaborative networks formed. This evaluation system fully considers the characteristics of various equipment within the air defense and anti-missile system and the relationships between them, thus enabling more accurate identification of the target air defense and anti-missile collaborative network with optimal collaborative effects. This provides strong support for collaborative modeling and evaluation of air defense and anti-missile systems under informationized conditions and offers high-value reference data for the practical application of air defense and anti-missile systems.

[0056] Other features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the following description, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the structures particularly pointed out in the written description, claims, and drawings.

[0057] The technical solution of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. Attached Figure Description

[0058] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system collaborative method of the present invention.

[0059] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network under different cooperative rules of the present invention.

[0060] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the evaluation index system structure of the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network of the present invention.

[0061] Figure 4 This is a visual distribution diagram of different types of equipment in one embodiment of the present invention.

[0062] Figure 5 This is a distribution diagram of the index values ​​of different collaborative networks in this invention.

[0063] Figure 6 This is a proximity curve diagram of different collaborative networks in this invention.

[0064] Figure 7 This is a structural block diagram of the heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system collaborative device of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0065] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, but these are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.

[0066] It should be understood that various modifications can be made to the embodiments disclosed herein. Therefore, the following description should not be considered as limiting, but merely as an example of embodiments. Other modifications within the scope and spirit of this disclosure will be apparent to those skilled in the art.

[0067] The accompanying drawings, which are included in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the present disclosure and, together with the general description of the disclosure given above and the detailed description of the embodiments given below, serve to explain the principles of the disclosure.

[0068] These and other features of the invention will become apparent from the following description of preferred forms of embodiments given as non-limiting examples, with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0069] It should also be understood that although the invention has been described with reference to some specific examples, those skilled in the art can certainly implement many other equivalent forms of the invention, which have the features described in the claims and are therefore all within the scope of protection defined herein.

[0070] The above and other aspects, features and advantages of this disclosure will become more apparent when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and in view of the following detailed description.

[0071] Specific embodiments of the present disclosure are described thereafter with reference to the accompanying drawings; however, it should be understood that the disclosed embodiments are merely examples of the present disclosure, which may be implemented in various ways. Well-known and / or repeated functions and structures are not described in detail to avoid unnecessary or redundant details that could obscure the present disclosure. Therefore, the specific structural and functional details disclosed herein are not intended to be limiting, but merely to serve as the basis and representative basis for the claims to teach those skilled in the art to use the present disclosure in a variety of substantially any suitable detailed structures.

[0072] This specification may use the phrases “in one embodiment,” “in another embodiment,” “in yet another embodiment,” or “in still another embodiment,” all of which may refer to one or more of the same or different embodiments according to this disclosure.

[0073] The embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0074] This invention provides a method for the coordinated operation of an air defense and anti-missile system using a heterogeneous network. The heterogeneous network comprises nodes formed by different types of equipment and edges representing the interaction relationships between these nodes. For example, a heterogeneous network can be expressed as G = (V, E), where V and E are sets of nodes and edges, respectively. Each edge in E represents the interaction relationship between a pair of nodes in V. If the number of types of nodes V in the network is |V type |>1 or the number of types of edge E|E type If |>1, then the network is a heterogeneous network. In an air defense and anti-missile system, based on the role each piece of equipment plays in combat, the equipment can be divided into four main categories: reconnaissance equipment (S), decision-making equipment (D) serving as the command center, strike equipment (A), and target equipment (T). These different categories respectively include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment, and target equipment to be attacked. An edge represents the material and information interaction relationship between nodes. Edges between different nodes have different meanings; for example, T→S is a reconnaissance edge, S→S is a reconnaissance coordination edge, S→D is an intelligence transmission edge, D→A is a decision-making edge, A→T is a strike edge, and A→A is a strike coordination edge. According to the above edge definitions, in actual combat, coordination modes of the same type of equipment will occur, such as reconnaissance equipment coordination S->S, decision-making equipment coordination D->D, and strike equipment coordination A->A. However, in practical applications, the coordination of reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment has the greatest impact on combat operations.

[0075] Furthermore, such as Figure 1 As shown, the method in this embodiment includes:

[0076] S101: At least in reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, select cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules;

[0077] S102: Multiple air defense and anti-missile coordination networks are formed based on coordinating equipment and other types of equipment that are different from the coordinating equipment. The air defense and anti-missile coordination networks include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment and target equipment.

[0078] S103: Evaluate multiple air defense and anti-missile coordination networks based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and anti-missile coordination network whose coordination effect meets the requirements;

[0079] The evaluation indicators include flexibility indicators regarding whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to meet different needs, economic indicators regarding whether communication and maintenance costs are too high, and offensive and defensive indicators regarding the extent of its ability to kill and defend against enemies.

[0080] The method described in this embodiment proposes multiple coordination rules to facilitate the selection of different coordination equipment in various scenarios, providing convenience for each combat node. Based on these multiple coordination rules, various types of equipment can quickly form an air defense and anti-missile coordination network for collaborative operations, enhancing the network's reconnaissance, strike, and other combat capabilities. Furthermore, the method in this embodiment also proposes an evaluation system for objectively and comprehensively evaluating the various air defense and anti-missile coordination networks formed. This evaluation system fully considers the inherent characteristics of various equipment in the air defense and anti-missile system as well as the interrelationships between them, thereby more accurately determining the target air defense and anti-missile coordination network with the optimal coordination effect. This provides strong support for the collaborative modeling and evaluation of air defense and anti-missile systems under informationized conditions and also provides high-value reference data for the practical application of air defense and anti-missile systems.

[0081] Specifically, in an air defense and anti-missile system network, after a reconnaissance node (reconnaissance equipment) detects enemy target information, it should transmit the enemy information to which reconnaissance nodes to achieve reconnaissance coordination (S->S). Similarly, after a strike node (strike equipment) receives information from a decision-making node, it should transmit the information to which strike nodes to achieve strike coordination (A->A). This is crucial for combat operations. Therefore, this embodiment proposes coordination rules, enabling the aforementioned nodes to achieve equipment coordination by combining these rules.

[0082] For example, selecting cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules at least in reconnaissance and strike equipment includes:

[0083] S104: Obtain at least the location information, capability value, and concealment value of reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment. The capability value represents the ability of the equipment to perform its own functions, and the concealment value represents the probability that the target equipment will detect the equipment.

[0084] S105: At least in reconnaissance and strike equipment, select cooperative equipment based on location information, capability value, concealment value, and cooperation rules.

[0085] Furthermore, the coordination rules proposed in this embodiment include:

[0086] The first collaboration rule is the collaboration rule based on distance information, which selects equipment that meets the first threshold distance from its own equipment and is of the same category as its own equipment.

[0087] The second collaboration rule is based on capability value. It selects equipment whose capability value meets the second threshold and which is of the same category as its own equipment for collaboration.

[0088] The third collaboration rule is a collaboration rule based on concealment value, which selects equipment whose concealment value meets the third threshold and collaborates with equipment of the same category as its own equipment.

[0089] The fourth collaboration rule is the random collaboration rule, which randomly selects equipment of the same category as its own equipment for collaboration.

[0090] For example, to adapt to battlefield mission requirements, various types of equipment will be deployed in different locations. When a reconnaissance node detects enemy information or a strike node receives information from a decision-making node, it can select the k nearest nodes of the same type for reconnaissance or strike coordination based on the first coordination rule. This facilitates shorter coordination communication latency, thereby reducing the operational time of the entire air defense and anti-missile system. Specifically, for example... Figure 2 As shown in (a), the number of nodes that can collaborate is k, and in this embodiment, k = 2, and the same applies below. Assume the geographical coordinates of node i and node j are (x... i ,y i ) and (x j ,y i If ), then the distance d between the nodes. ij This can be expressed using Euclidean distance:

[0091]

[0092] For example, in an air defense and missile defense system, different nodes have different capability attributes, i.e., capability values. Selecting nodes with strong reconnaissance capabilities for reconnaissance coordination will improve the ability to detect the enemy. Similarly, selecting nodes with strong strike capabilities for strike coordination will improve the ability to kill the enemy. Therefore, based on capability-based coordination rules, equipment that needs to coordinate can select the top k nodes of the same type with the highest capability values ​​for reconnaissance coordination or strike coordination. Figure 2 As shown in (b), nodes S2 and S3 are the two nodes with the strongest reconnaissance capabilities, so other reconnaissance nodes will choose these two nodes for reconnaissance coordination. Similarly, they will also choose nodes A2 and A5, which have strong strike capabilities, for strike coordination.

[0093] For example, when conducting reconnaissance or strike coordination, the concealment value of each node can be considered, and coordinating equipment can be selected based on this value. The concealment value of a node represents the probability that an enemy target will detect it. The higher the concealment value of a node, the less likely an enemy target is to detect it. Therefore, in an air defense and missile defense system, equipment can select the k highest concealment values ​​for coordination among reconnaissance or strike nodes, allowing the entire air defense and missile defense system to better avoid detection and destruction by the enemy. Figure 2 As shown in (c), nodes S3 and S5 have the highest concealment values, therefore other reconnaissance nodes will choose these two nodes for reconnaissance coordination. Similarly, they will also choose nodes A3 and A5, which have strong strike capabilities, for strike coordination. The implementation of this concealment-based coordination rule can effectively improve the survivability and combat effectiveness of the entire air defense missile system.

[0094] Alternatively, it is also possible Figure 2As shown in (d), an air defense and anti-missile cooperative network is formed by randomly selecting nodes in the network for reconnaissance coordination or strike coordination.

[0095] Furthermore, such as Figure 3 As shown, different collaborative networks for air defense and missile defense systems can be constructed based on different collaborative rules. To evaluate the quality of these collaborative networks, a reasonable and comprehensive evaluation index system needs to be established. Establishing an evaluation index system for air defense and missile defense collaborative networks requires adherence to principles of scientific rigor, completeness, and feasibility. Accordingly, this embodiment proposes an evaluation system constructed from three dimensions: economy, flexibility, and offensive / defensive capabilities. That is, it establishes three different evaluation indicators for economy, flexibility, and offensive / defensive capabilities to evaluate different collaborative networks. The overall structure of the evaluation system in this embodiment can be referenced. Figure 3 As shown.

[0096] First, the economic evaluation index, or simply economic index, is based on the connection costs incurred by communication transmission between different nodes in the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network, as well as the maintenance costs of different nodes. Different cooperation rules result in different connection costs between nodes. Furthermore, the number of times each node processes information varies, leading to different maintenance costs for different nodes. For example, the connection cost C... edge for:

[0097]

[0098] Node maintenance cost C node for:

[0099]

[0100] Where c1 represents the edge connection cost incurred for communication transmission per unit distance between nodes, ∑d ij x ij c1 represents the sum of the lengths of the edges in the network, and c2 represents the maintenance cost of each node, which is proportional to the number of times the node processes information.

[0101] Secondly, the flexibility of a collaborative network refers to its ability to quickly and easily adjust its network structure to adapt to different operational environments and mission requirements, thus enabling adaptive warfare. The speed of building a collaborative network depends primarily on the time consumed by collaborative communication; therefore, collaborative communication latency can be used to measure the network's flexibility. Collaborative communication latency can be measured by the average path length between reconnaissance or strike nodes. A longer average path length indicates a longer time required for coordination between nodes, resulting in poorer coordination effectiveness. The collaborative communication latency T is defined as follows, where k is the number of reconnaissance and strike nodes in the air defense and missile defense network, and S and A represent the reconnaissance and strike nodes in the network, respectively:

[0102]

[0103] Furthermore, when reconnaissance or strike nodes acquire enemy information, sharing this information with more nodes makes the cooperative network structure more adaptable to complex and ever-changing battlefield environments, preventing information loss when that node is destroyed by the enemy after it has been concentrated at a single node. Therefore, in this embodiment, the scope of information sharing can also be used to measure the flexibility of the cooperative network. The scope of information sharing I is defined as follows:

[0104]

[0105] Where I represents the scope of information sharing, in degree i This represents the information received by nodes corresponding to reconnaissance or strike equipment in an air defense and anti-missile coordination network, i.e., the in-degree, count{in degree i >0} represents the number of nodes with a data reception volume greater than 0, k represents the number of reconnaissance nodes and strike nodes in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network, S represents reconnaissance equipment, and A represents strike equipment. The greater the amount of information flowing to reconnaissance nodes or strike nodes, and the greater the number of reconnaissance nodes or strike nodes receiving information, the wider the scope of information sharing.

[0106] Offensive and defensive metrics are used to evaluate the extent to which a constructed cooperative network has the ability to kill the enemy and defend against enemy attacks.

[0107] Specifically, when an enemy target appears, the air defense and anti-missile system needs to go through three stages—reconnaissance, decision-making, and strike—to achieve a complete kill effect. Therefore, the kill capability depends on the capability values ​​of the nodes selected in each stage. The capability of the reconnaissance stage can be represented by the capability of the reconnaissance nodes in the network; similarly, the decision-making and strike stages can be represented by the capabilities of the decision-making and strike nodes in the network, respectively. The kill capability Q is defined as follows:

[0108]

[0109] count{deg ree (ij) >0} represents the number of nodes that have participated in the i-th phase of the operation more than 0 times, deg ree (ij) This represents the number of times the j-th node has participated in the combat during the i-th phase, and its capability. (ij) This represents the capability value of the j-th node in the i-th stage.

[0110] Defense capabilities are mainly considered from two aspects: first, the concealment value of nodes in the network participating in combat. Selecting nodes with high concealment values ​​to participate in combat makes them less likely to be detected by the enemy on the battlefield, thus greatly reducing the probability of being attacked; second, the resilience of the air defense and anti-missile coordination network. Network resilience refers to the ability of our weapons and equipment to maintain their combat functions under enemy attack. Since the air defense and anti-missile coordination network constructed in this embodiment is a heterogeneous network, the network's resilience can be measured by the number of kill chains.

[0111] In an air defense and missile defense system network, a kill chain represents the complete operational path from reconnaissance of enemy targets to fire strikes against those targets. Therefore, a kill chain can be represented as a link formed against an enemy target, consisting of certain functional nodes and edges. Combining the English codes for various nodes mentioned earlier, T→S→D→A→T represents a typical kill chain, T→S→S→D→A→T represents a kill chain with reconnaissance coordination, T→S→D→A→A→T represents a kill chain with strike coordination, and T→S→S→D→A→A→T represents a kill chain with both reconnaissance and strike coordination. Therefore, the defensive capability S of each coordinated network is:

[0112]

[0113] cc i Represents the hidden value of node i, n chain This indicates the number of kill chains in the network.

[0114] Furthermore, in this embodiment, when evaluating multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements, the following steps are included:

[0115] S106: Evaluation strategy is formed by combining the analytic hierarchy process and the method of approximating the ideal solution;

[0116] S107: Based on the evaluation indicators, determine the values ​​of each indicator for each air defense and missile defense coordination network. The indicator values ​​are for each...

[0117] y' ij =max(y j )-y ijThe target measurement parameters include one or more of the following: communication latency, information sharing range, connection cost, node maintenance cost, lethality, and defense capability.

[0118] S108: Evaluate multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on indicator values ​​and evaluation strategies to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements.

[0119] Among them, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-objective decision analysis method. It decomposes the decision problem into several levels, constructs a hierarchical model, compares and judges the relative importance of factors at each level using external information, determines the weight of each factor, and finally obtains the comprehensive score of the solution. The TOPSIS method is a comprehensive evaluation method that approximates the ideal solution. This method first standardizes the evaluation indicators, then finds the optimal and worst solutions among all options, and then calculates the score of each solution by measuring the spatial distance and proximity of each solution to the two ideal solutions; the higher the score, the better the solution. Since the evaluation indicator system of the air defense and anti-missile collaborative network has positive and negative evaluation indicators, such as greater attack capability being better (positive indicator) and lower edge cost being better (negative indicator), and these indicators have different evaluation dimensions for the air defense and anti-missile collaborative network, in order to address the evaluation problem in this embodiment, the evaluation strategy of this embodiment is a combination of the Analytic Hierarchy Process and the approximate ideal solution method, that is, a fusion of the two methods.

[0120] Specifically, multiple air defense and missile defense cooperative networks are evaluated based on indicator values ​​and evaluation strategies to identify target air defense and missile defense cooperative networks that meet the requirements for cooperative effectiveness, including:

[0121] S109: The normalized weight w corresponding to each indicator value is calculated and determined based on the analytic hierarchy process. For example, for the evaluation index system of air defense and anti-missile cooperative network, the importance of the index is first determined and assigned a value, and then a judgment matrix is ​​constructed. After that, the maximum eigenvalue λmax of the matrix is ​​calculated and it is judged whether it meets the consistency test. If it passes the test, the normalized weight w corresponding to each indicator value can be obtained.

[0122] S110: Construct the index value matrix Y = (y ij ) n×m , where n is the number of air defense and missile defense coordination networks, m is the number of evaluation indicators, and y ij Let j be the index value of the i-th air defense and anti-missile coordination network;

[0123] S111: Based on the method of approximating the ideal solution, the index value matrix is ​​positiveized, so that the indicators representing negative values ​​and their corresponding index values ​​are positiveized: Y'=(y' ij ) m×n y jLet y represent the j-th index value. i ' j Y' represents the j-th index value of the i-th air defense and anti-missile cooperative network after normalization, and Y' represents the index value matrix after normalization.

[0124] S112: Based on the method of approximating the ideal solution, the normalized index value matrix is ​​normalized to obtain the standardized index value matrix X: X = (x ij ) m×n x ij This represents the j-th index value of the i-th air defense and anti-missile coordination network after standardization.

[0125] S113: Multiply the standardized index value matrix by the normalized weights of each index value to obtain the weighted standardized index matrix:

[0126]

[0127] S114: The positive ideal solution p is obtained by calculating the index matrix based on the method of approximating the ideal solution. + and negative ideal solution p - Where the positive ideal solution is the maximum value of the column vector of the index matrix, the negative ideal solution is the minimum value of the column vector of the index matrix, and T is the transpose of the matrix.

[0128]

[0129] S101: Calculate the distances between each air defense and anti-missile cooperative network and the positive ideal solution and the negative ideal solution using Euclidean distance:

[0130]

[0131] This represents the positive ideal solution of the j-th index matrix. Let p represent the negative ideal solution of the j-th index matrix. ij Represents each element in the index matrix;

[0132] S115: Calculate the proximity of each air defense and missile defense cooperative network to the negative ideal solution based on distance. The target air defense and missile defense cooperative network is determined from multiple air defense and missile defense cooperative networks based on proximity. The smaller the proximity, the better the comprehensive evaluation result of the cooperative network.

[0133] To better describe and demonstrate the effectiveness of the method in this embodiment, the following description is based on specific examples:

[0134] For example, suppose the battlefield is set within a 200×200×50 (km) area. In this case, the air defense and anti-missile system has 23 reconnaissance devices, 1 decision-making device, and 20 strike devices; the enemy has 3 incoming targets. Given the deployment locations, capabilities, and concealment values ​​of our equipment, the number and locations of the enemy incoming targets, and the distribution of equipment on each side as follows... Figure 4 As shown in the figure, the size of each piece of equipment is directly proportional to its own capability value.

[0135] Based on the above calculation method for index values, the index value k of the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network under the four cooperative modes can be obtained, as detailed below. Figure 5 As shown in the figure. The results indicate that regardless of the chosen collaboration method, as the number of collaborations increases, the network index values ​​increase, leading to increased edge connection costs and node maintenance costs, as well as longer collaboration communication latency. However, the information sharing range expands, and both lethality and defensive capabilities continuously improve. Furthermore, analysis of the network index effects generated under different collaboration modes reveals that distance-based collaboration networks have the best collaboration communication latency, but are only moderately effective in terms of node maintenance costs and lethality. Capability-based collaboration networks have the best lethality and lower node maintenance costs, but are less effective in terms of collaboration communication latency and information sharing range. Concealment-based collaboration networks have the best defensive capabilities and lower node maintenance costs, but are less effective in terms of collaboration communication latency and information sharing range. Random collaboration networks, except for a relatively good information sharing range, are not ideal in other aspects. In summary, the index value results are consistent with past actual combat situations, demonstrating the scientific validity and rationality of the index calculation method in this embodiment. However, based on the above four types of collaborative network indicator values, it is difficult to distinguish the superiority or inferiority of networks under each collaborative mode solely from the indicator values. Therefore, the evaluation method of this embodiment is used to comprehensively evaluate the collaborative network. First, the indicator weights are calculated. The importance of each indicator can be scored using historical data or experts in the relevant field. The average of the scores is then used to construct a judgment matrix. Simultaneously, the consistency ratio CR of this judgment matrix is ​​calculated as -3.8e-06 < 0.1. Passing the consistency test, the weight of the primary indicator relative to the air defense and anti-missile collaborative network, w = [0.2, 0.23, 0.57], can be calculated. Similarly, the weights of each secondary indicator relative to the primary indicator can be calculated. Combining the weights of the primary and secondary indicators, the weights of the six evaluation indicators relative to the air defense and anti-missile collaborative network, w = [0.02, 0.04, 0.07, 0.14, 0.37, 0.36], can be obtained. Based on the above indicator values ​​and weights, the proximity values ​​under the four collaborative network modes can be calculated, such as... Figure 6 As shown.

[0136] Analysis of the calculation results shows that among the four types of collaborative networks, the capability-based collaborative network has the worst information sharing range, high collaboration time (poor flexibility), and suboptimal edge connection cost (mediocre economics). Only its lethality is optimal, yet it remains the best collaborative network. This indicates that lethality is the most critical indicator affecting the overall effectiveness of the collaborative network, a conclusion supported by the aforementioned indicator weights. The distance-based collaborative network has the highest edge connection cost and node maintenance cost, indicating the worst economics. Furthermore, its lethality and attack capability are the lowest, indicating the worst offensive and defensive capabilities. Although its information sharing range is optimal, its collaborative effect is the worst under an evaluation system that prioritizes offensive and defensive capabilities. As the number of collaborations in the network increases, although the indicator values ​​change, the evaluation results based on the comprehensive evaluation method proposed in this embodiment remain essentially unchanged: capability-based collaboration is still the best, random collaboration is the worst, and collaboration based on concealment and distance falls somewhere in between. Therefore, in air defense and anti-missile system operations, capability-based collaborative modes should be prioritized for striking the enemy.

[0137] like Figure 7 As shown, another embodiment of the present invention also provides a heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system coordination device 100. The heterogeneous network includes nodes formed by different types of equipment and edges representing the interaction relationships between different nodes. The different types of equipment include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment, and target equipment to be attacked. The device includes:

[0138] The selection module is used to select cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules, at least among reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment.

[0139] A forming module is used to form multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on cooperative equipment and other types of equipment that are different from the cooperative equipment. The air defense and anti-missile cooperative network includes the reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment and target equipment.

[0140] The evaluation module is used to evaluate the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks according to evaluation indicators, so as to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements.

[0141] The evaluation indicators include flexibility indicators regarding whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to respond to different needs, economic indicators regarding whether communication and maintenance costs are too high, and offensive and defensive indicators regarding the extent of its ability to kill and defend against enemies.

[0142] As an optional embodiment, the step of selecting cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules from at least the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment includes:

[0143] At least the location information, capability value and concealment value of the reconnaissance equipment and the strike equipment are obtained. The capability value represents the ability of the equipment to perform its own functions, and the concealment value represents the probability that the target equipment will detect the equipment.

[0144] At least among the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, cooperative equipment is selected based on the location information, capability value, concealment value, and cooperation rules.

[0145] As an optional embodiment, the collaboration rules include:

[0146] Based on the distance information, a first collaboration rule is selected to collaborate with equipment of the same category as the equipment itself, provided that the distance to the equipment meets the first threshold.

[0147] Based on the aforementioned capability value, a second collaboration rule is selected to collaborate with equipment of the same category as the equipment itself, provided that the capability value satisfies the second threshold.

[0148] Based on the aforementioned concealment value, a third collaboration rule is established that selects equipment whose concealment value satisfies the third threshold and collaborates with equipment of the same category as its own equipment.

[0149] The fourth collaboration rule is to randomly select equipment of the same category as the user's own equipment for collaboration.

[0150] As an optional embodiment, the flexibility index is measured based on the communication latency between the cooperating equipment and the information sharing range in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network. The communication latency is proportional to the average path length between the cooperating equipment, and the information sharing range refers to the number of nodes through which information propagates in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network.

[0151]

[0152] Where I represents the scope of information sharing, indegree i This represents the amount of information received by nodes corresponding to reconnaissance or strike equipment in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network, count{indegree i >0} represents the number of nodes with information reception greater than 0, k represents the number of reconnaissance nodes and strike nodes in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network, S represents reconnaissance equipment, and A represents strike equipment.

[0153] As an optional embodiment, the economic efficiency index is measured based on the connection costs incurred by communication transmission between different nodes in the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network, as well as the maintenance costs of different nodes. The connection cost C edge for:

[0154]

[0155] The node maintenance cost C node for:

[0156]

[0157] Where c1 represents the edge connection cost incurred for communication transmission per unit distance between the nodes, ∑d ij x ij c1 represents the sum of the lengths of the edges in the network, and c2 represents the maintenance cost of each node, which is proportional to the number of times the node processes information.

[0158] As an optional embodiment, the offensive and defensive indicators measure the kill capability based on the capability values ​​of the nodes selected by the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network at different stages of the operation, and measure the defensive capability based on the concealment value of the nodes participating in the operation and the number of kill chains in the network. The kill chain represents the complete combat path from reconnaissance equipment to target equipment to strike equipment.

[0159] The lethality Q is:

[0160]

[0161] The defensive capability S is:

[0162]

[0163] count{deg ree (ij) >0} represents the number of nodes that have participated in the i-th phase of the operation more than 0 times, deg ree (ij) This represents the number of times the j-th node has participated in the combat during the i-th phase, and its capability. (ij) This represents the capability value of the j-th node in the i-th stage; cc i Represents the hidden value of node i, n chain This indicates the number of kill chains in the network.

[0164] As an optional embodiment, the evaluation of the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements includes:

[0165] An evaluation strategy is formed by combining the analytic hierarchy process and the method of approximating the ideal solution.

[0166] Based on the evaluation indicators, the values ​​of each indicator of each air defense and anti-missile cooperative network are determined. The indicator values ​​are the measurement parameters of each indicator, including one or more of the following: communication latency, information sharing range, connection cost, node maintenance cost, lethality, and defense capability.

[0167] The multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks are evaluated based on the aforementioned index values ​​and evaluation strategies to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements.

[0168] As an optional embodiment, the evaluation of the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on the index values ​​and evaluation strategies to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements includes:

[0169] The normalized weights corresponding to each of the aforementioned index values ​​are calculated and determined based on the aforementioned analytic hierarchy process.

[0170] Construct an index value matrix;

[0171] The index value matrix is ​​positiveized based on the near-ideal solution method, so that the index representing the negative and the corresponding index value are positiveized.

[0172] Based on the approach-to-ideal solution method, the normalized index value matrix is ​​processed to obtain a standardized index value matrix.

[0173] Multiply the standardized index value matrix by the normalized weights of each index value to obtain the weighted standardized index matrix.

[0174] Based on the method of approximating the ideal solution, positive and negative ideal solutions are calculated for the index matrix. The positive ideal solution is the maximum value of the column vector of the index matrix, and the negative ideal solution is the minimum value of the column vector of the index matrix.

[0175] The distances between each of the aforementioned air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks and the positive and negative ideal solutions are calculated using Euclidean distance.

[0176] Based on the distance, the proximity of each of the air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks to the positive ideal solution or the negative ideal solution is calculated;

[0177] The target air defense and missile defense cooperative network is determined from the plurality of air defense and missile defense cooperative networks based on the proximity.

[0178] Another embodiment of the present invention also provides an electronic device, comprising:

[0179] At least one processor; and,

[0180] A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein,

[0181] The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to implement the heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system cooperative method as described in any of the embodiments above.

[0182] Furthermore, one embodiment of the present invention also provides a storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system coordination method as described above. It should be understood that the various solutions in this embodiment have the corresponding technical effects in the above-described method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0183] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer program product, which is tangibly stored on a computer-readable medium and includes computer-readable instructions, which, when executed, cause at least one processor to perform a cooperative method for a heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system, such as the one described in the embodiments above.

[0184] Furthermore, those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage and optical storage) containing computer-usable program code.

[0185] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A system that specifies functions in one or more boxes.

[0186] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including an instruction set implemented in a process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0187] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0188] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this invention without departing from its spirit and scope. Therefore, if these modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this invention and their equivalents, this invention also intends to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A method for air defense and anti-missile system cooperation of a heterogeneous network, the heterogeneous network comprising nodes formed by different types of equipment and edges representing the interaction between different nodes, the different types of equipment comprising reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, attack equipment, and target equipment to be attacked, characterized in that, The method includes: At least among the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, cooperative equipment is selected based on cooperative rules; Multiple air defense and anti-missile collaborative networks are formed based on collaborative equipment and other types of equipment that are different from the collaborative equipment. The air defense and anti-missile collaborative networks include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment and target equipment. The multiple air defense and anti-missile coordinated networks are evaluated based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and anti-missile coordinated network whose coordinated effect meets the requirements. The evaluation indicators include flexibility indicators regarding whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to respond to different needs, economic indicators regarding whether communication and maintenance costs are too high, and offensive and defensive indicators regarding the extent of the ability to kill and defend against enemies. The flexibility index is measured based on the communication latency between the coordinated equipment and the information sharing range in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network. The communication latency is proportional to the average path length between the coordinated equipment, and the information sharing range refers to the number of nodes through which information propagates in the air defense and anti-missile coordination network. wherein, represents the information sharing range, represents the information receiving amount of the node corresponding to the reconnaissance type equipment or the attack type equipment in the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network, represents the number of the nodes with the information receiving amount greater than 0, represents the number of the reconnaissance nodes and the attack nodes in the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network, represents the reconnaissance type equipment, represents the attack type equipment; The offensive and defensive indicators measure lethality based on the capability values ​​of the nodes selected by the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network at different stages of combat, and measure defensive capability based on the concealment value of the nodes participating in the operation and the number of kill chains in the network. The kill chain represents the complete combat path from reconnaissance equipment to target equipment to strike equipment. wherein said killing ability is: The defense capability Is: Indicates the first step in the course of combat The number of nodes that participated in the combat of this phase more than once during that phase. Indicates the first Phase 1 The number of times each node has participated in this phase of the operation. Indicates the first Phase 1 The capability value of each node; Represents a node The concealment value, This indicates the number of kill chains in the network.

2. The air defense and missile defense system coordination method of a heterogeneous network according to claim 1, characterized in that, The selection of cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules, at least among the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, includes: At least the location information, capability value and concealment value of the reconnaissance equipment and the strike equipment are obtained. The capability value represents the ability of the equipment to perform its own functions, and the concealment value represents the probability that the target equipment will detect the equipment. At least among the reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment, cooperative equipment is selected based on the location information, capability value, concealment value, and cooperation rules.

3. The air defense and missile defense system coordination method of a heterogeneous network according to claim 2, characterized in that, The collaboration rules include: The first collaboration rule is to select equipment that meets the first threshold distance to its own equipment and collaborates with equipment of the same category as its own equipment based on distance information. Based on the aforementioned capability value, a second collaboration rule is selected to collaborate with equipment of the same category as the equipment itself, provided that the capability value satisfies the second threshold. Based on the aforementioned concealment value, a third collaboration rule is established that selects equipment whose concealment value satisfies the third threshold and collaborates with equipment of the same category as its own equipment. The fourth collaboration rule is to randomly select equipment of the same category as the user's own equipment for collaboration.

4. The air defense and missile defense system coordination method of a heterogeneous network according to claim 1, wherein, The economy index is based on the edge cost generated by the communication transmission between different nodes in the air defense and anti-missile cooperative network and the maintenance cost of different nodes, and the edge cost is: : The node maintenance cost Is: in, This represents the cost of connecting nodes per unit distance for communication transmission. This represents the sum of the lengths of the edges in the network. This represents the maintenance cost of each node, which is proportional to the number of times the node processes information.

5. The air defense and missile defense system coordination method of a heterogeneous network according to claim 1, wherein, The evaluation of the multiple air defense and missile defense cooperative networks based on evaluation indicators to determine the target air defense and missile defense cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements includes: An evaluation strategy is formed by combining the analytic hierarchy process and the method of approximating the ideal solution. Based on the evaluation indicators, the values ​​of each indicator of each air defense and anti-missile cooperative network are determined. The indicator values ​​are the measurement parameters of each indicator, including one or more of the following: communication latency, information sharing range, connection cost, node maintenance cost, lethality, and defense capability. The multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks are evaluated based on the aforementioned index values ​​and evaluation strategies to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements.

6. The method for coordinated air defense and anti-missile systems using heterogeneous networks according to claim 5, characterized in that, The evaluation of the multiple air defense and missile defense cooperative networks based on the aforementioned index values ​​and evaluation strategies, to determine the target air defense and missile defense cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements, includes: The normalized weights corresponding to each of the aforementioned index values ​​are calculated and determined based on the aforementioned analytic hierarchy process. Construct an index value matrix; The index value matrix is ​​positiveized based on the near-ideal solution method, so that the index representing the negative and the corresponding index value are positiveized. Based on the approach-to-ideal solution method, the normalized index value matrix is ​​processed to obtain a standardized index value matrix. Multiply the standardized index value matrix by the normalized weights of each index value to obtain a weighted standardized index matrix. Based on the method of approximating the ideal solution, the index matrix is ​​calculated to obtain a positive ideal solution and a negative ideal solution. The positive ideal solution is the maximum value of the column vector of the index matrix, and the negative ideal solution is the minimum value of the column vector of the index matrix. The distances between each of the aforementioned air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks and the positive and negative ideal solutions are calculated using Euclidean distance. Based on the distance, the proximity of each of the air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks to the positive ideal solution or the negative ideal solution is calculated; The target air defense and missile defense cooperative network is determined from the plurality of air defense and missile defense cooperative networks based on the proximity.

7. A heterogeneous network-based air defense and anti-missile system coordination device, wherein the heterogeneous network comprises nodes formed by different types of equipment and edges representing the interaction relationships between the different nodes, wherein the different types of equipment include reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment, and target equipment to be attacked, characterized in that, The device is used to implement a cooperative method for a heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system as described in any one of claims 1-6, comprising: The selection module is used to select cooperative equipment based on cooperative rules, at least among reconnaissance equipment and strike equipment. A forming module is used to form multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks based on cooperative equipment and other types of equipment that are different from the cooperative equipment. The air defense and anti-missile cooperative network includes the reconnaissance equipment, decision-making equipment, strike equipment and target equipment. The evaluation module is used to evaluate the multiple air defense and anti-missile cooperative networks according to evaluation indicators, so as to determine the target air defense and anti-missile cooperative network whose cooperative effect meets the requirements. The evaluation indicators include flexibility indicators regarding whether the network structure can be quickly adjusted to respond to different needs, economic indicators regarding whether communication and maintenance costs are too high, and offensive and defensive indicators regarding the extent of its ability to kill and defend against enemies.

8. An electronic device, comprising: include: At least one processor; as well as, A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to implement the heterogeneous network air defense and anti-missile system cooperative method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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