Multi-wheel brake system based on brake capacity and brake failure comprehensive disposal method

Abstract

The embodiment of the application relates to the technical field of multi-wheel brake control, in particular to a multi-wheel brake system based on brake capacity and a brake fault comprehensive treatment method, the system comprises an instruction control system and a drive control system, the drive control system comprises N brake channels, each brake channel comprises a hydraulic system, a cut-off valve, two servo valves, two brake wheels and two pressure sensors; the hydraulic system is connected with the cut-off valve, the cut-off valve is connected with the two servo valves, the two servo valves are connected with the two brake wheels, and the two brake wheels are provided with the pressure sensors; the hydraulic system is used for providing a hydraulic oil source; the cut-off valve is used for controlling the opening and closing of the hydraulic oil source; the servo valve is used for adjusting the flow of the hydraulic oil source; the brake wheel is used for executing a brake operation; and the pressure sensor is used for detecting brake pressure and transmitting the brake pressure to the instruction control system. Therefore, brake capacity is compared according to the comprehensive fault result, the margin with high brake capacity is preferentially used, and the safety of the system is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The embodiments of this application relate to the field of brake control technology, and in particular to a multi-wheel braking system based on braking capability and a comprehensive method for handling brake failures. Background Technology

[0002] Aircraft brake control is primarily used to ensure the safety and directional stability of aircraft during landing braking and taxiing under various runway conditions, and to automatically adjust brake pressure to prevent wheel slippage. Therefore, to ensure flight safety, the aircraft brake control system employs a dual-redundancy design. In the event of a failure in the primary redundancy braking system, the secondary redundancy braking system can take over.

[0003] For aircraft with only two wheels, a brake failure on either wheel will directly lead to a flight safety accident. Therefore, when the primary system fails, it can usually be switched to the backup system unconditionally. However, for multi-wheel aircraft, there are numerous system accessories and channels, and different accessory failures and their quantities will result in different losses of braking capability. Traditional methods for setting fault levels only rely on the type and number of faults, without considering the remaining braking capability of the system after multiple fault combinations. If both redundancies fail simultaneously, switching redundancy based on traditional fault levels may lead to a loss of braking capability, failing to maximize the advantages of dual-redundancy design. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The main objective of the embodiments of this application is to propose a multi-wheel braking system based on braking capacity and a comprehensive method for handling braking failures. The aim is to maximize the aircraft's braking capacity and improve flight safety through dual-redundancy design of key system components and comprehensive failure handling that preserves maximum braking capacity.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application provide a multi-wheel braking system based on braking capability, comprising: a command control system and a drive control system. The drive control system includes N sets of braking channels, each set of braking channels including a hydraulic system, a cut-off valve, two servo valves, two brake wheels, and two pressure sensors, wherein N is an integer greater than 1.

[0006] The hydraulic system is connected to one end of the shut-off valve via hydraulic lines. The other end of the shut-off valve is connected to one end of two servo valves via hydraulic lines. The two servo valves are located on both sides of the shut-off valve. The other ends of the two servo valves are connected to two brake wheels via hydraulic lines. Pressure sensors are installed on the two brake wheels.

[0007] The hydraulic system is used to provide the hydraulic oil source;

[0008] The shut-off valve is used to control the connection and disconnection of the hydraulic oil source;

[0009] The servo valve is used to regulate the flow rate of the hydraulic oil source input to the brake wheel;

[0010] The brake wheel is used to perform braking operations;

[0011] The pressure sensor is used to detect brake pressure and transmit the detected brake pressure to the command control system.

[0012] To achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application also provide a comprehensive method for handling multi-wheel system brake failures, the method comprising:

[0013] The braking capability of multi-wheel aircraft braking systems is divided into several levels, including normal braking, loss of 1 / N braking capability, and brake failure; when more than N / 2 braking channels fail, the brakes are considered to have failed.

[0014] Based on the structure and function of the braking system of a multi-wheeled aircraft, the braking capacity is calculated when a single or multiple faults occur. Faults with the same braking capacity are classified into the same level according to several levels of braking capacity.

[0015] When the braking system of a multi-wheeled aircraft malfunctions, the braking capacity of the main brake control unit and the braking capacity of the backup brake control unit are determined according to the braking capacity level corresponding to the malfunction.

[0016] The braking capabilities of the main brake control unit and the backup brake control unit are compared. If the braking capability of the main brake control unit is greater than that of the backup brake control unit, the main brake control unit remains operational. If the braking capability of the main brake control unit is equal to that of the backup brake control unit, the main brake control unit remains operational. If the braking capability of the main brake control unit is less than that of the backup brake control unit, the backup brake control unit is switched to operation.

[0017] To achieve the above objectives, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, when the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements any of the methods for comprehensive handling of multi-wheel system brake failures described in the present application.

[0018] This application addresses multi-wheel braking systems by employing a dual-redundancy design for critical components. It analyzes the impact of each fault on braking capability, synthesizes faults with comparable impacts, and then compares the braking capabilities of the two redundancies based on the synthesized fault. The redundancy with higher braking capability is prioritized, thus improving system safety. This method avoids the problem that switching solely based on the presence or type of fault cannot guarantee maximum preservation of system braking capability, fully leveraging the advantages of dual-redundancy design to enhance system safety.

[0019] In some alternative embodiments, the command control system includes a brake command sensor and a brake control unit;

[0020] The brake command sensor is used to receive brake commands from the driver and / or passenger and send the brake commands to the brake control unit;

[0021] The brake control unit receives brake commands from the brake command sensor and controls the shut-off valve and servo valve to output the corresponding brake pressure based on the brake command, brake pressure, and wheel speed signals.

[0022] In some optional embodiments, the brake command sensor adopts an electrically redundant design, including a driver command sensor and a passenger command sensor, which serve as backups for each other. The driver command sensor includes a driver left command sensor and a driver right command sensor, and the passenger command sensor includes a passenger left command sensor and a passenger right command sensor.

[0023] The driver's left command sensor is used to receive the driver's left brake command;

[0024] The driver's right command sensor is used to receive the driver's right brake command;

[0025] The passenger-side left command sensor is used to receive the passenger's left brake command;

[0026] The passenger-side right command sensor is used to receive right brake commands from the passenger.

[0027] In some alternative embodiments, the brake control unit employs an electrically redundant design, including a main brake control unit and a backup brake control unit, which serve as backups for each other.

[0028] In some alternative embodiments, the shut-off valve, servo valve, and pressure sensor are all designed with electrical redundancy.

[0029] In some optional embodiments, when N=6, the braking capability of the wheeled aircraft braking system can be divided into 5 levels, including: normal braking, loss of 1 / 6 braking capability, loss of 1 / 3 braking capability, loss of 1 / 2 braking capability, and brake failure.

[0030] The fault types corresponding to normal braking are: driver's side command sensor failure, passenger side command sensor failure, and pressure sensor failure.

[0031] The fault type corresponding to the loss of 1 / 6 braking capability is: any one group of brake channels is faulty;

[0032] The fault type corresponding to the loss of 1 / 3 braking capability is: any 2 sets of braking channels are faulty;

[0033] The fault type corresponding to the loss of 1 / 2 braking capability is: any 3 sets of braking channels are faulty;

[0034] The fault types corresponding to brake failure are: both the driver's command sensor and the passenger's command sensor are faulty, or any three or more brake channels are faulty. Attached Figure Description

[0035] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a set of brake channels for a multi-wheel braking system based on braking capability provided in one embodiment of this application;

[0036] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an aircraft braking system with 12 main wheels provided in one embodiment of this application;

[0037] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a comprehensive method for handling multi-wheel system brake failures provided in one embodiment of this application;

[0038] The components include: 1. Hydraulic system; 2. Shut-off valve; 31. Servo valve; 32. Servo valve; 41. Brake wheel; 42. Brake wheel; 51. Pressure sensor; 52. Pressure sensor; 6. Brake command sensor; 6-1. Driver's left command sensor; 6-2. Driver's right command sensor; 6-3. Passenger's left command sensor; 6-4. Passenger's right command sensor; 7. Brake control unit; 7-1. Main brake control unit; 7-2. Backup brake control unit. Detailed Implementation

[0039] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this application clearer, the various embodiments of this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, those skilled in the art will understand that many technical details have been provided in the various embodiments of this application to help readers better understand this application. However, the technical solutions claimed in this application can be implemented even without these technical details and various changes and modifications based on the following embodiments. The division of the various embodiments below is for the convenience of description and should not constitute any limitation on the specific implementation of this application. The various embodiments can be combined with and referenced by each other without contradiction.

[0040] The following is a detailed description of the implementation details of the multi-wheel braking system based on braking capability and the comprehensive method for handling braking failures proposed in this embodiment. The following content is only for the convenience of understanding and is not necessary for implementing this solution.

[0041] This embodiment proposes a multi-wheel braking system based on braking capability, taking an aircraft braking system with 12 main wheels as an example. Figure 1 and Figure 2As shown, it includes: a command control system and a drive control system. The drive control system includes 6 sets of brake channels. Each set of brake channels includes a hydraulic system 1, a shut-off valve 2, a servo valve 31, a servo valve 32, a brake wheel 41, a brake wheel 42, a pressure sensor 51, and a pressure sensor 52.

[0042] Hydraulic system 1 is connected to one end of shut-off valve 2 via hydraulic lines. The other end of shut-off valve 2 is connected to one end of servo valve 31 and servo valve 32 via hydraulic lines. Servo valve 31 and servo valve 32 are respectively located on both sides of shut-off valve 2. The other ends of servo valve 31 and servo valve 32 are connected to brake wheel 41 and brake wheel 42 via hydraulic lines. Pressure sensor 51 and pressure sensor 52 are respectively installed on brake wheel 41 and brake wheel 42.

[0043] Hydraulic system 1 is used to provide a hydraulic oil source;

[0044] The shut-off valve 2 is used to control the connection and disconnection of the hydraulic oil source;

[0045] Servo valve 31 and servo valve 32 are used to regulate the flow rate of the hydraulic oil source input to brake wheel 41 and brake wheel 42;

[0046] Brake wheel 41 and brake wheel 42 are used to perform braking operations;

[0047] Pressure sensor 51 and pressure sensor 52 are used to detect brake pressure and transmit the detected brake pressure to the command control system.

[0048] In one example, the command control system includes a brake command sensor 6 and a brake control unit 7;

[0049] Brake command sensor 6 is used to receive brake commands from the driver and / or passenger and send the brake commands to brake control unit 7;

[0050] The brake control unit 7 is used to receive the brake command sent by the brake command sensor 6, and control the cut-off valve 2, servo valve 31 and servo valve 32 to output the corresponding brake pressure according to the brake command, brake pressure and wheel speed signal.

[0051] In one example, the brake command sensor 6 adopts an electrically redundant design, including a driver command sensor and a passenger command sensor, which serve as backups for each other. The driver command sensor includes a driver left command sensor 6-1 and a driver right command sensor 6-2, and the passenger command sensor includes a passenger left command sensor 6-3 and a passenger right command sensor 6-4.

[0052] The driver's left command sensor 6-1 is used to receive the driver's left brake command;

[0053] The driver's right command sensor 6-2 is used to receive the driver's right brake command;

[0054] The passenger-side left command sensor 6-3 is used to receive the passenger-side left brake command;

[0055] The passenger-side right command sensor 6-4 is used to receive the passenger-side right brake command.

[0056] In one example, the brake control unit 7 adopts an electrically redundant design, including a main brake control unit 7-1 and a backup brake control unit 7-2, which serve as backups for each other.

[0057] In one example, shut-off valve 2, servo valve 31, servo valve 32, pressure sensor 51, and pressure sensor 52 all employ an electrical double-redundancy design.

[0058] Another embodiment of this application relates to a comprehensive method for handling multi-wheel system brake failures, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the method includes:

[0059] Step 101: Divide the braking capability of the multi-wheel aircraft braking system into 5 levels, including normal braking, loss of 1 / 6 braking capability, loss of 1 / 3 braking capability, loss of 1 / 2 braking capability, and brake failure.

[0060] In practice, when some brake wheels lose braking capability, the remaining brake wheels can still bring the aircraft to a stop if the runway length is sufficient or if other deceleration devices are available. Therefore, the braking capability of the brake wheels can be categorized according to the number of brake wheels that have lost braking capability: 1 / 2 loss, 1 / 3 loss, and 1 / 6 loss. When more than half of the brake wheels have lost braking capability, even with auxiliary devices, the aircraft cannot be safely stopped; therefore, this is considered a complete loss of braking capability, and the pilot can use the emergency braking system. To ensure directional stability, multi-wheel systems typically employ symmetrical control; if one brake wheel fails, the symmetrical brake wheels will also cease outputting braking pressure. Therefore, the situation of an odd number of brake wheels losing braking capability does not exist.

[0061] Step 102: Based on the structure and function of the multi-wheel aircraft braking system, calculate the braking capacity when a single fault or multiple faults occur, and classify faults with the same braking capacity into the same level according to several levels of braking capacity.

[0062] In specific implementation, based on Figure 2The diagram illustrates an aircraft braking system with 12 main wheels, analyzing the impact of malfunctions in various components on braking capability. In this 12-wheel system, each cut-off valve controls the oil supply to a set of symmetrical braking wheels. These two symmetrical braking wheels form one braking channel, for a total of six braking channels. Each braking channel consists of one cut-off valve, two servo valves, two pressure sensors, and two braking wheels. The captain and co-pilot each provide one set of left and right braking commands.

[0063] The 12-wheel aircraft braking system uses two sets of commands, one for the pilot and one for the co-pilot, as backups for each other. The pilot and co-pilot each have left and right command sensors. If the pilot's command sensor fails, the co-pilot's command sensor can be used, and the braking function remains unaffected. Therefore, a failure of either the pilot's or co-pilot's command sensor alone will not reduce braking capability. Only when both pilot and co-pilot command sensors fail, and the pilots cannot control the wheel brakes, will braking capability be completely lost.

[0064] A failure of any one shut-off valve will cause both corresponding brake wheels to fail to brake properly, i.e., a failure of one set of brake channels.

[0065] A servo valve failure in any one of its servo valves will cause the corresponding brake wheel to fail to brake properly. However, due to symmetrical control, the symmetrical brake wheel will also cease outputting braking pressure. Therefore, a servo valve failure, like a shut-off valve failure, causes both symmetrical brake wheels to lose braking capability, i.e., one set of brake channels fails. A shut-off valve or servo valve failure on the same brake channel will result in the same set of brake channel failures. Therefore, when shut-off valve and servo valve failures overlap, the braking capability only needs to be determined based on the final number of brake channels affected by the failure.

[0066] When the pressure sensor fails, the braking function is not affected, but because the system cannot obtain the pressure information of the faulty brake wheel, the braking pressure accuracy of that brake wheel will be reduced.

[0067] The combined faults and their impact on braking capability are shown in Table 1:

[0068] Table 1. Overall Faults and Braking Capacity

[0069] Serial Number Comprehensive Fault Braking ability 1 Any command failure during driving Normal braking 2 Passenger command malfunction Normal braking 3 Both driver and passenger commands are malfunctioning. Brake failure 4 One group of brake channel malfunctions Loss of 1 / 6 braking ability 5 Two sets of brake channel malfunctions Loss of 1 / 3 braking ability 6 3 sets of brake channel malfunctions Loss of 1 / 2 braking ability 7 Three or more brake channel malfunctions Brake failure 9 Pressure sensor malfunction Normal braking

[0070] Step 103: When the braking system of a multi-wheeled aircraft malfunctions, determine the braking capacity of the main brake control unit and the braking capacity of the backup brake control unit according to the braking capacity level corresponding to the malfunction.

[0071] Step 104: Compare the braking capacity of the main brake control unit (first redundancy) with the braking capacity of the backup brake control unit (second redundancy). If the braking capacity of the main brake control unit is greater than that of the backup brake control unit, the main brake control unit remains operational. If the braking capacity of the main brake control unit is equal to that of the backup brake control unit, the main brake control unit remains operational. If the braking capacity of the main brake control unit is less than that of the backup brake control unit, the backup brake control unit is switched to operation.

[0072] like Figure 1 The diagram shows a set of symmetrical wheel brake control systems. Common wheel brake system malfunctions include brake command failure, shut-off valve failure, servo valve failure, and pressure sensor failure. The fault levels, defined by traditional fault types, are as follows:

[0073] Brake command failure > Cut-off valve failure > Servo valve failure > Pressure sensor failure;

[0074] If one shut-off valve in the first redundancy fails and one servo valve in the second redundancy fails, the system switches to the second redundancy. However, in reality, one shut-off valve in a multi-wheel system often controls the oil supply to two servo valves. Therefore, a shut-off valve failure will cause both wheels to lose braking power. Although a servo valve failure only affects one wheel, to ensure symmetrical balance between the left and right wheels and prevent yaw, the controller will simultaneously shut off the brakes of the symmetrical wheel, resulting in both wheels also losing braking power. These two failures are considered a single, combined failure, and the braking capabilities of both redundancies are equal, so no switching occurs. This avoids the loss of redundancy due to simply classifying failures based on fault type.

[0075] In the specific implementation, fault synthesis is performed on the faults of the two redundancies respectively, and the braking capacity is compared according to the results of the fault synthesis. The braking capacity is ordered from smallest to largest as follows:

[0076] Normal braking > Loss of 1 / 6 braking capacity > Loss of 1 / 3 braking capacity > Loss of 1 / 2 braking capacity > Brake failure

[0077] When the braking capacity after the first redundancy fault assessment is greater than the braking capacity after the second redundancy fault assessment, the system switches to the second redundancy; otherwise, the first redundancy remains in operation. This maximizes the utilization of the system's braking capacity while avoiding unnecessary switching that could reduce redundancy, thus improving the safety of the braking system.

[0078] Another embodiment of this application relates to a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program. When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the method embodiments described above.

[0079] That is, those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing related hardware. This program is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a device (which may be a microcontroller, chip, etc.) or processor to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as a USB flash drive, a portable hard drive, ROM (Read-Only Memory), RAM (Random Access Memory), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

[0080] In summary, this application proposes for the first time a multi-wheel braking system based on braking capacity and a comprehensive method for handling braking faults. It analyzes the impact of different system faults on braking capacity, integrates the faults according to the remaining braking capacity levels, compares the braking capacities based on the integrated fault results, prioritizes the use of higher braking capacity margins, fully utilizes the system's design capabilities, and improves system safety.

[0081] Those skilled in the art will understand that the above embodiments are specific embodiments for implementing this application, and in practical applications, various changes can be made to them in form and detail without departing from the spirit and scope of this application.

Claims

1. A comprehensive method for handling multi-wheel system brake failures, characterized in that, This method is based on a multi-wheel aircraft braking system, which includes a command control system and a drive control system. The drive control system includes N sets of braking channels. Each set of braking channels includes a hydraulic system, a shut-off valve, two servo valves, two brake wheels, and two pressure sensors. N is an integer greater than 1. The hydraulic system is connected to one end of the shut-off valve via hydraulic lines. The other end of the shut-off valve is connected to one end of two servo valves via hydraulic lines. The two servo valves are located on both sides of the shut-off valve. The other ends of the two servo valves are connected to two brake wheels via hydraulic lines. Pressure sensors are installed on the two brake wheels. The hydraulic system is used to provide the hydraulic oil source; The shut-off valve is used to control the connection and disconnection of the hydraulic oil source; The servo valve is used to regulate the flow rate of the hydraulic oil source input to the brake wheel; The brake wheel is used to perform braking operations; The pressure sensor is used to detect brake pressure and transmit the detected brake pressure to the command control system; The method includes: The braking capability of multi-wheel aircraft braking systems is divided into several levels, including normal braking, loss of 1 / N braking capability, and brake failure. Based on the structure and function of the braking system of a multi-wheeled aircraft, the braking capacity is calculated when a single or multiple faults occur. Faults with the same braking capacity are classified into the same level according to several levels of braking capacity. When the braking system of a multi-wheeled aircraft malfunctions, the braking capacity of the main brake control unit and the braking capacity of the backup brake control unit are determined according to the braking capacity level corresponding to the malfunction. The braking capabilities of the main brake control unit and the backup brake control unit are compared. If the braking capability of the main brake control unit is greater than that of the backup brake control unit, the main brake control unit remains operational. If the braking capability of the main brake control unit is equal to that of the backup brake control unit, the main brake control unit remains operational. If the braking capability of the main brake control unit is less than that of the backup brake control unit, the backup brake control unit is switched to operation.

2. The comprehensive handling method for multi-wheel system brake failure according to claim 1, characterized in that, The command control system includes a brake command sensor and a brake control unit; The brake command sensor is used to receive brake commands from the driver and / or passenger and send the brake commands to the brake control unit; The brake control unit receives brake commands from the brake command sensor and controls the shut-off valve and servo valve to output the corresponding brake pressure based on the brake command, brake pressure, and wheel speed signals.

3. The comprehensive handling method for multi-wheel system brake failure according to claim 2, characterized in that, The brake command sensor adopts an electrically redundant design, including a driver command sensor and a passenger command sensor, which serve as backups for each other. The driver command sensor includes a driver left command sensor and a driver right command sensor, and the passenger command sensor includes a passenger left command sensor and a passenger right command sensor. The driver's left command sensor is used to receive the driver's left brake command; The driver's right command sensor is used to receive the driver's right brake command; The passenger-side left command sensor is used to receive the passenger's left brake command; The passenger-side right command sensor is used to receive right brake commands from the passenger.

4. The comprehensive handling method for multi-wheel system brake failure according to claim 2, characterized in that, The brake control unit adopts an electrical dual-redundancy design, including a main brake control unit and a backup brake control unit, which serve as backups for each other.

5. The comprehensive handling method for multi-wheel system brake failure according to claim 1, characterized in that, The shut-off valve, servo valve, and pressure sensor all employ an electrical double-redundancy design.

6. The comprehensive handling method for multi-wheel system brake failure according to claim 1, characterized in that, When N=6, the braking capability of the wheeled aircraft braking system is divided into 5 levels, including: normal braking, loss of 1 / 6 braking capability, loss of 1 / 3 braking capability, loss of 1 / 2 braking capability, and brake failure. The fault types corresponding to normal braking are: driver's side command sensor failure, passenger side command sensor failure, and pressure sensor failure. The fault type corresponding to the loss of 1 / 6 braking capability is: any one group of brake channels is faulty; The fault type corresponding to the loss of 1 / 3 braking capability is: any 2 sets of braking channels are faulty; The fault type corresponding to the loss of 1 / 2 braking capability is: any 3 sets of braking channels are faulty; The fault types corresponding to brake failure are: both the driver's command sensor and the passenger's command sensor are faulty, or any three or more brake channels are faulty.

7. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the comprehensive handling method for multi-wheel system brake failure as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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