Control system and method for controlling device or apparatus

By using two security-oriented control devices in the control system, using security-oriented communication connections and processor units to optimize safety sub-functions, the complex security requirements and high performance problems in the prior art are solved, and efficient failure prevention is achieved Processing and security monitoring.

CN118938638APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12SIEMENS AG
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410576801.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-11
Filing Date
2024-05-10
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is difficult to achieve high-performance fault-proof processing while meeting complex safety requirements, especially in real-time security monitoring of dynamic processes and equipment. Hardware redundancy and cost are high, and it is difficult to achieve flexible applications.

Method used

Using a control system consisting of two security-oriented control devices, through a security-oriented communication connection, the first security-oriented control device is used to implement security functions, and the second security-oriented control device optimizes the processing of complex security based on the processor unit. Sub-function, using the combination of software redundancy and hardware redundancy, to achieve on-chip redundancy and high-performance processing.

Benefits of technology

It realizes fault-proof processing of complex security requirements, reduces the demand for hardware redundancy, avoids the problems of high costs and slow cycle time, improves the security and performance of the system, and is suitable for diverse processing paths and application scenarios.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention relates to a control system and a method for controlling a device or apparatus, at least one security function is provided for controlling the device or apparatus, the at least one security function has at least one security sub-function, the control system comprises a first security-oriented control device and a second security-oriented control device, the first security-oriented control device is provided with at least one security sub-function, and the second security-oriented control device is provided with at least one security sub-function. The first security-oriented control device and the second security-oriented control device are communicatively coupled via a security-oriented communication connection, the first security-oriented control device being designed and arranged to implement at least one security function, the second security-oriented control device is based on the processor unit and is designed and arranged to implement at least one security sub-function using input data received from the first security-oriented control device via the security-oriented communication connection. The invention also relates to an associated method for controlling an apparatus or apparatus.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a control system for controlling a device or an apparatus, wherein at least one safety function is provided for controlling the device or the apparatus. The present invention also relates to an associated method. Background Art

[0002] The use of fail-safe controls in industrial automation technology is widespread, with typical application cases such as reliably locking or monitoring limit values. However, due to the development towards efficient and at the same time flexible production, the requirements on safety procedures are also increasing, and the real-time safety monitoring of such dynamic processes and plants requires more complex safety solutions.

[0003] Solutions are known from the prior art in which coded processing or coded procedures are performed in order to meet safety requirements. In this case, safety-related processing steps are performed in two different ways with the aid of coded data and operations, which makes hardware redundancy superfluous and at the same time brings about continuity and scalability of the solution.

[0004] Furthermore, so-called lockstep processors are known. In terms of logic processing, lockstep processors offer the most cost-effective variants, which achieve on-chip redundancy through their inherent multi-core architecture and suitable operation and comparison mechanisms.

[0005] It is known from the publication WO 2016 / 138956 A1 that program parts that can be implemented without coding are implemented with hardware redundancy. For this purpose, two processor units are required for the implementation without coding. Summary of the invention

[0006] Against this background, the object of the present invention is to improve the fail-safe and high-performance processing of programs with complex safety requirements. This object is achieved by the features of the independent claims. Advantageous embodiments are given in the dependent claims.

[0007] The invention relates to a control system for controlling a device or an apparatus, wherein at least one safety function is provided with respect to the control of the device or the apparatus.

[0008] wherein the at least one safety function has at least one safety sub-function,

[0009] The control system includes a first safety-oriented control device and a second safety-oriented control device.

[0010] wherein the first safety-oriented control device and the second safety-oriented control device are communicatively coupled via a safety-oriented communication connection,

[0011] wherein the first safety-oriented control device is designed and arranged to implement the at least one safety function,

[0012] Therein, the second safety-oriented control device is based on a processor unit and is designed and arranged to execute the at least one safety sub-function using input data received from the first safety-oriented control device via the safety-oriented communication connection.

[0013] The safety-oriented control device according to the concept of the present application is designed and arranged in such a way that it can be ensured as far as possible that no hazardous states, for example due to failure of a component, occur during the operation of the safety-oriented control device. In addition, the safety-oriented control device can be designed and arranged in such a way that no unacceptable risks due to devices or equipment occur within the operating range of the safety-oriented control device.

[0014] According to the present application, a safety function is to be understood as a function which must meet safety-oriented standards so that the system on which the safety function is implemented becomes a safety-oriented system. These standards are defined or standardized, for example, by safety preconditions. For example, preconditions must be met which specify the start and stop process, the compliance with the distance to the zone boundary, etc. In particular, the safety standards IEC61508 and ISO 10218 are mentioned here, which should be complied with depending on the application. A safety-oriented function of a control is in particular a stop function or a braking function which is implemented in a safety-oriented manner.

[0015] In addition, the implementation of the safety function can be arranged so as to ensure so-called functional safety, that is, a system failure or fault or a component failure or fault is detected and leads to the adoption of a safe state of the device or the apparatus. Functionally safe implementation includes, in addition to processing or calculating or checking the values ​​for generating the output values ​​of the control unit, also checking the error-free execution of the corresponding processing steps. For example, each functionally protected processing step can be composed of arithmetic-coded processor instructions and / or encoded data values, and / or it can be checked whether the result of the processing step is within a predetermined interval of permissible values ​​in order to verify the rationality of the result of the processing step. The check additionally provided by the functional protection does not in particular change the result, but only generates an additional signal, namely, the processing step is fault-free (no bit error and / or the result of the processing step within the permissible value interval) or the processing step is faulty (bit error, untrustworthy result outside the value interval). In the case of an erroneous processing step, in particular the result is discarded and the safe state is activated.

[0016] The safety function currently has a safety sub-function. The safety sub-function can be subject to the same requirements as the safety function in terms of safety. The safety sub-function can be transferable or encapsulated in terms of implementation. In particular, the inputs of the safety sub-function are defined, which are forwarded by the safety function to the safety sub-function, as well as the outputs of the safety sub-function are defined, which are provided by the safety sub-function to the safety function. In addition, the input values ​​are transmitted to the safety sub-function, for example, directly from a sensor connected to a safety-oriented second control component. For example, the safety sub-function includes a particularly computationally cumbersome, complex or time-consuming program segment of the control program. For example, there are particularly high complexity requirements and performance requirements for the program segment of the safety sub-function. The complexity and the high processing time associated therewith are achieved in particular by the safety requirements and the requirements for safety-oriented processing associated therewith.

[0017] The safety sub-function is advantageously processed on a second safety device based on a processor unit. The second processor unit is preferably configured to be optimized for safety-oriented processing of complex program segments. This is particularly advantageous in that the working mode of the first safety device remains unchanged.

[0018] The first safety device is, for example, a so-called F-PLC, i.e. a fail-safe PLC for controlling a device or an installation or a part of an installation. This first safety device can be used in the usual way for less complex program segments and can be connected, in particular, as usual, to fail-safe sensor devices and fail-safe actuators. The transfer of specific program segments to the second safety device enables the control system to be used flexibly for application situations, such as safety-oriented robots, since it is here that Cartesian calculations are often required in three-dimensional space using corresponding arithmetic operations, in particular trigonometric operations, and the use of floating-point numbers is often a requirement.

[0019] The first safety component can advantageously have a software-based mechanism for the safety-oriented implementation of the safety function, which mechanism can be selected overall independently of the complexity of the safety function. Only by means of the diversity in the implementation of the safety function on the first safety component in software can this section of the program be carried out in a safety-oriented manner. The attendant advantages of software redundancy can be utilized, in particular the use or expandability in combination with non-safety-oriented hardware.

[0020] The second safety component can now be advantageously tailored and optimized to the requirements of the safety subfunction. In particular, the safety-oriented mechanisms provided on the first safety component cannot be provided on the second safety component as well, but instead mechanisms more suitable for complex control program segments are selected for safety-oriented processing.

[0021] In particular, the mechanism of implementing on-chip redundancy is implemented on the processor unit. Thus, for complex sub-functions, neither cumbersome processing in software in a diversified manner nor complete dual-channel redundant implementation in hardware with the necessity of multiple PLCs is required. Thus, the high costs caused by cumbersome individual architectures (partially also due to the lack of standards) or by manual program adaptation are avoided, in which the appropriate structuring of the application program must be selected. At the same time, high performance is achieved, and the disadvantages of slower cycle times do not have to be tolerated. Here, the processor unit is understood to be hardware composed of processors, which is contrary to processing program code on hardware with multiple processors.

[0022] In order to ensure the safety of the system, safe communication between the safety components is provided via a safety-oriented communication connection, in particular when using a safety protocol, such as the so-called PROFIsafe protocol. In particular, message errors during data exchange between the safety components are advantageously detected thereby.

[0023] The proposed control system enables fail-safe and high-performance processing of safety subroutines with complex safety requirements while being connected to a fail-safe control that is freely programmable by the user and operates in a variety of processing paths.

[0024] By transferring the safety subroutine, resources are released in the control of the coded work, which resources can be advantageously used for other safety or standard operations.

[0025] According to one embodiment, the first safety-oriented control means is designed and provided to carry out at least one safety function using a coded operating method, in particular a “coded processing” method.

[0026] The method for handling coded tasks is based on the principle of implementing software codes in a variety of ways on processor units. In particular, safety-related processing steps are performed in two different ways with the aid of coded data and operations, which makes hardware redundancy for these processing steps superfluous and at the same time brings about continuity and scalability of the solution.

[0027] For example, so-called "diversified coding" is used, which is based on two different implementations of the same security function. The two implementations are:

[0028] - Native implementation: A native implementation corresponds to the implementation of the original safety function without coding. Here, the source code for the original safety function constitutes the source code of the native implementation. The native implementation works according to the native (original) input values ​​and the native state. The native implementation only changes the native state. The result of the native implementation is the native output.

[0029] - Coded implementation: Coded implementation (processing using coding) is a variant of the coding of the safety function. Coded implementation works based on the coded input value and the coded state. The result is the coded output.

[0030] Both implementations are completely independent calculations, but they operate on the same values. The encoded input value is a variant of the encoding of the native input value. The source code of the native safety function is used to create the source code of the encoded implementation. This creation can be done either manually or, as recommended for reproducibility, using appropriate tools.

[0031] According to a configuration, the second safety-oriented control component is designed and arranged to execute at least one safety sub-function using an uncoded method. By using an uncoded method on the second safety-oriented control component, subroutines with high performance requirements or complexity requirements can be transferred to a fail-safe, high-performance second control unit, for example, by suitable on-chip hardware redundancy.

[0032] All existing tools for automation and connection of sensors and actuators can be advantageously used on the first safety-oriented control component. The second safety-oriented control component is used as a safety coprocessor to execute complex subroutines with high performance requirements, which cannot be executed with sufficiently high cycle times or with reasonable effort on the first safety-oriented control component due to the processing of the codes used there.

[0033] In particular, for calculations or program segments in which data are to be stored, for example, in arrays, arranged as matrices or as vectors, conventional safety programs on PLCs, which are typically used when implemented on a first safety-oriented control device, reach their limits. Furthermore, there are no suitable possibilities for storing the remaining data. Dynamic variables that change during the process and are stored as intermediate values, for example, in order to estimate the position of a moving device in an industrial system more precisely, can be advantageously used on a second safety-oriented control device.

[0034] The second safety-oriented control device is connected to the first safety-oriented control device via a safety protocol for communicating the relevant inputs and outputs of the subprogram. Complex subprograms can be executed with high performance on the coprocessor using all the operations available there and the results can be safely communicated back to the F-PLC.

[0035] In a variant, the second safety-oriented control means is permanently programmed. Advantageously, the control means is thus optimally configured for the specific application and the hardware used, for example by embedding or localizing specific functions in the high-performance area. Furthermore, a preliminary test can advantageously be carried out, in particular also with certification for a specific application.

[0036] In an alternative embodiment, the second safety-oriented controller is freely programmable so that it can be provided quasi-standardly for a variety of applications and can be adapted to applications by the end user, for example in the form of a safety application.

[0037] According to the design scheme, the second safety-oriented control device is designed and arranged to implement hardware redundancy on a processor unit, especially based on a multi-core architecture with a lockstep core. Therefore, on-chip redundancy is achieved, that is, redundant implementation on a single processor unit. For example, in the use of a lockstep core, two or more cores implement the same code. Independent comparators compare the results and identify different values ​​when a fault is implemented. For example, the lockstep core uses a delay of several clock cycles when processing the same instruction and uses a slight deviation in the spatial arrangement of the core to achieve diversity. For example, temporal and spatial differentiation is required to exclude common faults, so-called common faults.

[0038] According to the design, the first safety-oriented control means is designed and arranged to receive output data from the second safety-oriented control means. For example, the result of a safety function, such as zone monitoring, is obtained as output data. For example, the second safety-oriented control means processes the entire safety function for this purpose: for zone monitoring, the position of the kinematic system in Cartesian space is calculated. For example, the position is compared with the defined zone boundary. As a result, it is obtained whether the kinematic system is stopped in the safety zone, so that in particular the stop of the kinematic system must be initiated, or whether the kinematic system is stopped in the defined working zone, etc. In addition to the safety-oriented calculation of intermediate values ​​(such as position, speed, acceleration, orientation, etc.) in the safety function, it is also advantageous to evaluate whether there is or is about to be a damage to the zone or limit value, etc. within the processing scope of the safety function program. As a result, the stop ID is then output to the first safety-oriented control means as output data, for example. For example, information is also outputted together, which reaction is carried out overall by the control, that is, in what way and method the connected actuator should be controlled. Therefore, the entire calculation and analysis is advantageously carried out within the scope of implementing the safety function on the second safety-oriented control unit. In order to output control instructions to the actuator, for example, the first safety-oriented control means is used again. Furthermore, in this context, the first safety-oriented control unit is preferably also used for communication with the sensor system, so that the safety coprocessor performs complex safety-related calculations only virtually invisibly from the perspective of the peripherals. Moreover, in the representation, only information about the results obtained by the second safety-oriented control unit or the initiated measures is provided as an output of the first safety-oriented control unit. This achieves a particularly high throughput.

[0039] According to a design concept, the first safety-oriented control device is designed and arranged to process output data received from the second safety-oriented control device via a safety-oriented communication connection in order to implement at least one safety function. According to this design concept, the intermediate values ​​required for the safety function are calculated and provided by the second safety-oriented control device. For example, values ​​for position, speed, acceleration, orientation, etc. are provided, which are then further processed within the scope of the implementation of the safety function on the first safety-oriented control device. For example, complex calculations can be implemented on a coprocessor, for example, just by taking into account trigonometric functions or by using floating-point numbers, and only values ​​are returned to the safety PLC working with coded processing, which values ​​can also be further processed in an coded manner without expenditure.

[0040] Furthermore, if a system fault or a fault state of the first safety-oriented controller is detected, for example by the first safety-oriented controller using a coding-based diversified program processing, the first safety-oriented controller initiates the adoption of a safe state.

[0041] According to a configuration, the second safety-oriented control means is designed and arranged to initiate a safety measure according to a result of the safety sub-function. In a configuration, the safety measure is initiated directly by the second safety-oriented control means.

[0042] For this purpose, the actuator, in particular only certain parts of the actuator, can be directly connected to the second safety-oriented control means. For example, a dedicated drive which causes the movement of the kinematic system in three-dimensional space can be controlled directly by the control of the coprocessor. Thus, an emergency stop can be realized directly and without delay via a communication path or the like, particularly advantageously.

[0043] Furthermore, the second safety-oriented control means is also designed and arranged to detect system faults based on a diverse implementation of the program code. Advantageously, when a disruptive system behavior such as a component failure of a sensor or other system fault is detected, a safety measure is initiated by the second safety-oriented control means, which leads to the adoption of a safe state. For example, the actuator directly pre-sets a value that leads to the adoption of a safe state.

[0044] According to the design, the first safety-oriented control means is designed and arranged to initiate a safety measure as a function of output data received via the safety-oriented communication connection. The initiation of the safety measure by the first safety-oriented control means is then carried out by an actuator connected to the first safety-oriented control means without the second safety-oriented control means being aware of the actuator. For example, a stop is initiated when a zone violation or a limit value violation is calculated within the scope of the safety function implemented on the first safety-oriented control means, or when information about a stop to be initiated, in particular a stop ID, is provided by the second safety-oriented control means. Furthermore, the adoption of a safe state is also initiated by the first safety-oriented control means when, for example, a system fault or a fault state of the second safety-oriented control means is determined by the second safety-oriented control means.

[0045] The initiation of safety measures can again consist in adopting a safe state due to the detected system fault. The second safety-oriented controller then, for example, provides a backup value to the first safety-oriented controller or inhibits communication with the first safety-oriented controller. The first safety-oriented controller then continues to operate in a variant, since the fault was only detected at the second safety-oriented controller. In an alternative embodiment, the first safety-oriented controller also cautiously initiates the adoption of a safe state, since the backup values ​​for the functional safety of the system are considered insufficient.

[0046] The invention further relates to a method for controlling a device or an installation, wherein the device or the installation is controlled by means of at least one safety function.

[0047] wherein the at least one safety function has at least one safety sub-function,

[0048] The control system includes a first safety-oriented control device and a second safety-oriented control device.

[0049] wherein the first safety-oriented control device and the second safety-oriented control device exchange data via a safety-oriented communication connection,

[0050] wherein the first safety-oriented control device implements the at least one safety function,

[0051] Therein, the second safety-oriented control device is based on a processor unit and executes the at least one safety sub-function using received input data.

[0052] According to one embodiment, the first safety-oriented control means carries out at least one safety function using a coded operating method, in particular a “coded processing” method.

[0053] According to one embodiment, the second safety-oriented control means implements at least one safety sub-function using an uncoded operating method.

[0054] According to one embodiment, the second safety-oriented control device implements hardware redundancy on the processor unit, in particular based on a multi-core architecture with lockstep cores.

[0055] According to one refinement, the first safety-oriented control component receives output data from the second safety-oriented control component.

[0056] According to one embodiment, the first safety-oriented control unit processes output data received from the second safety-oriented control unit via the safety-oriented communication connection in order to execute at least one safety function.

[0057] According to a refinement, the second safety-oriented control device initiates a safety measure as a function of a result of the safety sub-function.

[0058] According to one embodiment, the first safety-oriented control means initiates a safety measure as a function of output data received via the safety-oriented communication connection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0059] The present invention will be described in more detail below based on an embodiment with the aid of the accompanying drawings.

[0060] Figure 1 A schematic diagram showing components of a control system according to a first embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 2 A schematic diagram showing components of a control system according to a second embodiment of the present invention;

[0062] Figure 3 A schematic diagram showing components of a control system according to a third embodiment of the present invention;

[0063] Figure 4 A schematic diagram showing components of a control system according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention;

[0064] In the figures, functionally identical elements are provided with the same reference symbols unless otherwise indicated. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0065] exist Figure 1 , a first exemplary embodiment is shown in which a first safety-oriented control component, in particular a fail-safe PLC (F-PLC), is provided in a control system C for a system with a motion-controlled component, on which a coded processing method is used to implement a control program code in a safety-oriented manner. In this case, the control program code is implemented in software in a variety of ways, so that the probability of remaining unrecognized system faults or implementation faults is correspondingly smaller than the requirements for system safety.

[0066] The first embodiment is a system in which a gripper arm robot is used and which intrudes into areas where people are present. Accordingly, safety requirements are imposed on the control system C, which ensure safety-oriented monitoring of the movements, corresponding activation of safety measures depending on the movement pattern or movement course, setting of emergency stop procedures, etc.

[0067] A safety application is created on the fail-safe PLC F-PLC, which implements the safety requirements and has a safety function F. The safety function F includes, in particular, a plurality of safety function modules, which determine how the drive reacts to the actuation of the emergency off switch or how the axial safety function is parameterized. For example, axial speed monitoring, axial force monitoring and axial torque monitoring are provided in the safety function modules of the safety function F, wherein limit values ​​are predefined for the corresponding variables. For example, a limit torque is predefined for each axis, and when this limit torque is exceeded, the kinematic system initiates a stop.

[0068] For example, when the end effector approaches an area of ​​the safety zone that does not allow the end effector to enter, the speed of the end effector of its own motion in Cartesian space should also be reduced. For example, when the end effector reaches the boundary of the area, the stopper should also be turned on.

[0069] For this type of safety monitoring, the current position of the robot and its axis segments in space is determined and compared with a defined spatial region determined by a zone. This requires calculations, which are based, for example, on trigonometric relationships between the axes of the kinematic system. In addition, parameters describing the kinematic system or the properties of the kinematic system, such as dimensions or movement radii, are predefined. These data are specific to the system or machine manufacturer and are therefore individual and cannot usually be influenced by the system operator. Therefore, the values ​​predefined as parameters are usually described only by floating point numbers.

[0070] Functions involving complex calculations based on arithmetic operations are encapsulated in a safety sub-function F′ and outsourced as modular software modules for implementation to a second safety-oriented control component as a safety coprocessor F-CP.

[0071] The safety application for operating the robot is programmed on the fail-safe PLC F-PLC. Sensor devices S0, S12 are also connected to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC and provide values ​​for position, speed, switch status, etc.

[0072] The safety inputs IF'1, IF'2 for the safety sub-function, such as in particular the axis values ​​of the transmitters required for implementing the safety sub-function, are transmitted from the fail-safe PLC F-PLC to the safety coprocessor F-CP, in particular based on safety telegrams, for example according to the PROFIsafe standard, via the safety communication connection P. Furthermore, data are transmitted from the safety coprocessor F-CP back to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC as a result R1, R2 via the safety communication connection P.

[0073] According to a first embodiment, the safety subfunction F' derives the values ​​of variables such as position and velocity in Cartesian space from the dimensions of the kinematic system, the axis values ​​of the various axes of the kinematic system or the axial error values. These values ​​are calculated with the aid of triangulation relationships and based on input values ​​including floating point numbers. For this calculation, an uncoded implementation is advantageously provided on the safety coprocessor F-CP, on which a safety-oriented implementation is based on hardware redundancy with the aid of a lockstep processor. This makes it possible to easily implement arithmetic operations without the need for temporary conversions that are required in coded processing such as coded processes.

[0074] The results R1, R2 of the safety sub-function F' are further processed on the safety coprocessor F-CP by the safety function F. For example, the position of the end effector is returned to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC, and the subsequent comparison (including exceeding the limit value or intrusion into the prohibited area) and the output of the corresponding results O1, O2 of the comparison are carried out on the F-PLC.

[0075] The fail-safe PLC F-PLC is also connected to the actuators A0, A12, for example to the drives of the axes, for implementing reactions. Reactions to be carried out when a preset limit is violated are preset within the scope of the safety function F, for example conditions for disabling the drives. Therefore, according to a first embodiment, a comparison of the values ​​obtained not only by means of the safety function F but also by means of the safety subfunction F' with the preset limit values ​​is carried out on the fail-safe PLC F-PLC.

[0076] The fail-safe PLC F-PLC is regarded as the main loop of the safety program and is the quasi-primary contact point for the kinematic system. The safety sensor devices S0, S12 are also connected to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC.

[0077] A sensor system S0 and an actuator A0 are provided which transmit values ​​at input and receive values ​​at output independently of the processing on the safety coprocessor F-CP.

[0078] According to a second embodiment, the safety coprocessor F-CP receives all required data, such as in particular the axis positions of all participating axes, via defined interfaces. In particular, the associated counter values ​​or time stamps are also transmitted in order to ensure comparability of the different axis values ​​and to be able to take into account time delays when providing or transmitting.

[0079] For example, in reliable motion monitoring, the user also selects which zones of zone monitoring are active, or which cones are monitored. This is achieved via an interface for the application program on the fail-safe PLC.

[0080] Input data relating to the safety sub-function F′ are forwarded, as it were, from the safety function F to the safety sub-function F′ and transmitted by means of a secure communication connection P to the safety coprocessor F-CP.

[0081] For example, the safety coprocessor is a multi-core processor with multiple safety cores. For each safety core, a dual-core processor is constructed on the safety coprocessor F-CP, which performs data processing according to a lockstep mechanism. In this case, the so-called master and the so-called checker only calculate the same steps on slightly geometrically offset cores of the processor, for example slightly rotated and with different time boundary conditions, so that the fault involved in the two paths does not lead to equal results for both cores. If the results of the two calculations on the dual-core processor are consistent, then this result is considered correct and is further processed by the safety subfunction F'.

[0082] exist Figure 2It is shown that the safety coprocessor F-CP provides an identifier of the stop process as the result STOP-ID of the safety sub-function F'. The safety sub-function F' therefore does not only provide a value for further processing by the safety function F of the fail-safe PLC F-PLC, but rather a result STOP-ID which can be forwarded directly from the safety function F to the actuator A12 as an output STOP. For example, a stop is directly caused at the drive.

[0083] For example, in a variant, the safety function F determines which measure is initiated when the result STOP-ID of the safety sub-function F' is present. Although the result STOP-ID is therefore not processed further, the safety function F is used by the user to determine the association of the result of the safety sub-function F' with the measure initiated by the fail-safe PLC F-PLC.

[0084] The output of the safety subfunction F' described so far is the result obtained in the case of an orderly and error-free implementation of the calculation on the safety coprocessor F-CP. This can be a result describing a violation or non-violation of a limit value or zone, as a raw value or intermediate value for further processing on the fail-safe PLC as described above, or already as a final result of the safety function module, and the programmed reaction in the case of a violation of a zone or limit value can be output directly to the actuator accordingly.

[0085] Figure 3 A third exemplary embodiment is shown in which a fault E' is detected on the safety coprocessor F-CP. For example, a hardware failure is detected in one of the processor cores or another fault is detected in the semiconductor components of the processor.

[0086] As a result, the safety coprocessor F-CP returns an indication of the system fault E' to the fail-safe PLC F-CP. In addition, backup values ​​X1, X2 are provided, from which the presence of a "stop" is also detected. Since it is not guaranteed that the safety coprocessor F-CP remains integrated in the fault state, the communication for safety is interrupted and the presence of safe backup values ​​is maintained.

[0087] For example, multiple safety sub-functions F', F". are run on the safety coprocessor F-CP. If a system fault E' is detected on the safety coprocessor F-CP, all application programs implemented by the safety sub-functions F', F". The fail-safe PLC F-PLC continues to run, but the safety state E is activated for all processes or actions that depend on the result of one of the safety sub-functions F', F".

[0088] For example, safe motion monitoring is implemented as a first safety sub-function F′ and safe force monitoring is implemented as a second safety sub-function F″ on the safety coprocessor F-CP. The safety coprocessor F-CP is freely programmable, for example, and can implement any complex safety-related subroutines defined by the user. By outsourcing the subroutines, resources are freed up for the control of the coding work, which resources can be advantageously used for other safety or standard operations.

[0089] According to a fourth embodiment, secure identification of persons in the industrial sector is implemented by means of RTLS (Real Time Location System) on a safety coprocessor F-CP as a safety subfunction F'. In particular, real-time secure location is a requirement, for example in factories, manufacturing plants or warehouses, for stopping processes of moving machine parts or autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) in the event of the approach of persons.

[0090] Figure 4 A fourth embodiment is described. According to one of the examples above, the safety sub-function F' is outsourced to the safety coprocessor F-CP for the purpose of uncoded implementation. In the case of correct implementation, that is to say as long as the safety coprocessor implements the program code safely and without errors, the result of the safety sub-function F' is also returned to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC according to one of the examples above.

[0091] The safety coprocessor F-CP is not freely programmable, so that software and hardware are jointly optimized for the implementation of RTLS functions.

[0092] If a system fault is identified when the program code is implemented in a safe manner on the safety coprocessor F-CP, only a diagnostic message is output to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC. The communication of the result value is prohibited via the safe communication connection P. Measures for the safe state of the moving parts based on the personnel identified around the parts are initiated directly by the safety coprocessor F-CP. For this purpose, the safety coprocessor is directly connected to the actuator A12' and the output of the identified system fault E' causes, for example, a safe stop of a robot gripper or AMR. Only information that the stop has been initiated is output to the fail-safe PLC F-PLC. The fail-safe PLC F-PLC itself is also connected to the actuator A0 and initiates a reaction according to the result of the safety function F implemented on the fail-safe PLC F-PLC.

[0093] Due to the direct connection of the safety coprocessor F-CP to the actuator A12 ′ for deactivating the corresponding drive, a particularly fast reaction is required in safety-critical environments with real-time requirements.

[0094] In a variant, the sensor system can also be connected directly to the safety coprocessor F-CP in order to ensure a particularly high reaction time.

[0095] In general, the first safety-oriented control device of the coded work is used as the basis for connection to the automation field and is especially freely programmable by the user. For example, the advantages of the continuity and scalability of the coded processing are fully utilized. Complex calculations in the program code (this complex calculation is especially impossible with the programming language of the commonly used fail-safe PLC, such as F-FUP or F-KOP, and is only possible slowly or with extremely high manual consumption) are implemented as safety sub-functions on the second safety-oriented control device and complex functions can be realized. These include, for example, inverse operations, the use of floating-point numbers, sine functions or square root functions, etc. The safety subroutine runs on the coprocessor without coding with the help of suitable hardware redundancy and realizes the performance-critical program part.

Claims

1. A control system (C) for controlling a device or an apparatus, wherein: At least one safety function (F) is provided for the control of the device or the apparatus, wherein the at least one safety function (F) has at least one safety sub-function (F'), wherein the control system (C) comprises a first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) and a second safety-oriented control device (F-CP), wherein the first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) and the second safety-oriented control device (F-CP) are communicatively coupled via a safety-oriented communication connection (P), wherein the first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) is designed and arranged to implement the at least one safety function (F), Wherein, the second safety-oriented control device (F-CP) is based on a processor unit, and the second safety-oriented control device is designed and configured to implement the at least one safety sub-function (F') using input data (IF'1, IF'2) received from the first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) via the safety-oriented communication connection (P).

2. The control system (C) according to claim 1, wherein: The first safety-oriented controller (F-PLC) is designed and configured to carry out the at least one safety function (F) using a coded operating method, in particular a coded processing method.

3. The control system (C) according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: The second safety-oriented controller (F-PLC) is designed and configured to execute the at least one safety sub-function (F′) using an uncoded operating method.

4. A control system (C) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein: The second safety-oriented controller (F-CP) is designed and configured to implement hardware redundancy on the processor unit, in particular based on a multi-core architecture with lockstep cores.

5. A control system (C) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein: The first safety-oriented controller (F-PLC) is designed and arranged to receive output data (R1, R2, STOP-ID) from the second safety-oriented controller (F-CP).

6. A control system (C) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein: The first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) is designed and arranged to process output data (R1, R2) received from the second safety-oriented control device (F-CP) via the safety-oriented communication connection (P) in order to implement the at least one safety function (F).

7. A control system (C) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein: The second safety-oriented control means (F-CP) is designed and configured to initiate a safety measure as a function of a result of the safety subfunction (F′).

8. A control system (C) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein: The first safety-oriented control component (F-PLC) is designed and configured to initiate safety measures as a function of output data received via the safety-oriented communication connection (P).

9. A method for controlling a device or an apparatus, wherein: controlling the device or the apparatus by means of at least one safety function (F), wherein the at least one safety function (F) has at least one safety sub-function (F'), wherein the control system (C) comprises a first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) and a second safety-oriented control device (F-CP), wherein the first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) and the second safety-oriented control device (F-CP) exchange data via a safety-oriented communication connection (P), wherein the first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) implements the at least one safety function (F), Therein, the second safety-oriented control component (F-CP) is based on a processor unit and the second safety-oriented control component executes the at least one safety sub-function (F') using received input data (IF'1, IF'2).

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein: The first safety-oriented controller (F-PLC) executes the at least one safety function (F) using a coded operating method, in particular a coded processing method.

11. The method according to claim 9 or 10, wherein: The second safety-oriented controller (F-CP) executes the at least one safety sub-function (F′) using an uncoded operating method.

12. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 11, wherein: The second safety-oriented controller (F-CP) implements hardware redundancy on the processor unit, in particular based on a multi-core architecture with lockstep cores.

13. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 12, wherein: The first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) receives output data from the second safety-oriented control device (F-CP).

14. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 13, wherein: The first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) processes output data received from the second safety-oriented control device via the safety-oriented communication connection (P) in order to implement the at least one safety function.

15. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 14, wherein: The second safety-oriented control component (F-CP) initiates a safety measure as a function of a result of the safety subfunction.

16. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 15, wherein: The first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) initiates safety measures as a function of output data received via the safety-oriented communication connection (P).

17. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 16, wherein: The received input data (IF'1, IF'2) is received from the first safety-oriented control device (F-PLC) via the safety-oriented communication connection (P), or is received via a sensor connected to the second safety-oriented control device (F-CP).