Distribution network 5G differential protection time synchronization cheating prevention method

In the distribution network 5G differential protection, using timestamp comparison and synchronization algorithm that does not rely on external time source, the sampling synchronization error problem caused by external time source signal abnormality or spoofing is solved, and the reliability of differential protection is improved , realizes efficient anti-time fraud detection in distribution network applications.

CN118944016APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12BEIJING SIFANG JIBAO ENG TECH +2
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411041518.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-31
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the application scenario of 5G differential protection for distribution networks, when external time source signals are abnormal or deceived, sampling synchronization errors will lead to errors in the differential protection function, and it is difficult for the existing technology to effectively prevent such errors.

Method used

The first distribution terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp recorded by the crystal oscillator timer into a fraction of seconds and sends it to the second distribution terminal device for timestamp comparison and determination. If the time stamp difference exceeds the preset value, Then, it is judged that there is time-based deception, and a synchronization algorithm that does not rely on external time sources is used for sampling and synchronization.

Benefits of technology

It effectively improves the reliability of the differential protection function, avoids misoperation caused by abnormal or deception of the time source signal, and does not require additional external functions or modules, and has small calculation amounts.

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Abstract

A distribution network 5G differential protection time synchronization cheating prevention method comprises the steps that 1, a first distribution network terminal device converts an original sampling timestamp recorded by a crystal oscillator timer of the first distribution network terminal device into a second decimal based on a time synchronization source accessed by the first distribution network terminal device, and the converted second decimal and the original sampling timestamp are sent to a second distribution network terminal device; step 2, the second distribution network terminal device converts the second decimal calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into a timestamp of a crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device based on a time synchronization source accessed by the second distribution network terminal device; 3, the second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal into a timestamp of a crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device; 4, the second distribution network terminal device judges the timestamps obtained through conversion in the step 2 and the step 3, and if the difference value of the timestamps exceeds a preset value, it is indicated that time tick exists. The method provided by the invention is small in calculation amount, and effectively improves the application reliability of the differential protection function in the power distribution network.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of relay protection for power systems, and more specifically, to a method for preventing timing fraud in 5G differential protection of distribution networks. Background Art

[0002] DTU (Distribution Terminal Unit) is one of the important devices in the distribution network, which is used to collect and calculate the data of the primary quantity in the power grid. Due to the disadvantages of the traditional overcurrent protection principle of DTU, such as complex setting, large power outage range, long delay, and easy over-tripping, the current DTU device adds differential protection principle in the design to more accurately locate and quickly isolate the fault point.

[0003] The realization of the differential protection principle requires adjacent DTU devices in the distribution network to realize the two functions of mutual transmission of sampling data and synchronization of sampling data at both ends. In the distribution network, dedicated differential protection optical fiber channels are generally not configured. In order to avoid the construction of a large number of optical fiber communication networks along the distribution network, the current DTU equipment chooses to use 5G wireless networks to realize the function of mutual transmission of sampling data during design.

[0004] 5G wireless networks have characteristics such as large communication delays and non-fixed delays. When the industry currently uses 5G networks to implement DTU differential protection functions, the industry currently mainly designs synchronization solutions based on unified clock signals. Clock signals are generally implemented using satellite timing (such as GPS timing) or using timing signaling issued by 5G networks. However, the currently available timing sources all use wireless signals to achieve timing, so there is a possibility of being attacked or interfered with. In addition, because most distribution network cabinets are placed outdoors, the timing receiving equipment itself may be damaged after long-term use. When an erroneous timing signal is input into the distribution network DTU and used for sampling data synchronization of differential protection, it may cause miscalculation of the differential protection function, causing the device to malfunction.

[0005] In the prior art, in the 5G differential application scenario of the distribution network, when sampling synchronization is performed based on an external time source, errors in sampling synchronization may occur due to time source deception or abnormal operation of the time source. Summary of the invention

[0006] In order to solve the deficiencies in the prior art, the present invention provides a distribution network 5G differential protection anti-timing deception method, which can solve the technical problem of preventing the distribution network 5G differential protection from misoperation due to abnormal or deception of the timing source signal when the timing source realizes sampling synchronization.

[0007] The present invention adopts the following technical solution.

[0008] A distribution network 5G differential protection anti-timing deception method comprises the following steps:

[0009] Step 1: The first distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp recorded by its own crystal oscillator timer into decimal seconds based on the time synchronization source it accesses, and sends the converted decimal seconds and the original sampling timestamp to the second distribution network terminal device;

[0010] Step 2: The second distribution network terminal device converts the fraction of a second calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into a timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device based on the time synchronization source connected to the second distribution network terminal device;

[0011] Step 3, the second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself;

[0012] Step 4: The second distribution network terminal device compares the timestamps converted in steps 2 and 3 respectively. If the timestamp difference exceeds a preset value, it indicates that timing fraud exists.

[0013] Preferably, in step 1, the time information input by the external timing source includes the exact moment of the second edge of each second.

[0014] Preferably, in step 1, the crystal oscillator timer inside the distribution network terminal device records time in the following manner: using the device's own crystal oscillator as the clock source, starting from the device startup moment, and the unit of the counter is approximately 1 nanosecond, and its timing error is only affected by its own crystal oscillator.

[0015] Preferably, in step 1, the first distribution network terminal device converts the sampling timestamp into decimal seconds, and the specific process is as follows:

[0016] Step 1-1, based on the external timing source, record the timestamp T11 of the crystal oscillator timer at the second edge moment, obtain the timestamp T10 of the previous second edge moment, and calculate the duration Tm1 of one second;

[0017] Step 1-2, calculate the fractional second Ts according to the sampling timestamp Ta and the timestamp T11 of the crystal oscillator timer at the second edge moment, as follows:

[0018] When the sampling timestamp Ta is greater than or equal to T1, calculate the fractional second Ts:

[0019] Ts=(Ta–T11)*1000000000 / Tm1

[0020] When the sampling timestamp Ta is less than T1, calculate the fractional second Ts:

[0021] Ts=1000000000–((T11–Ta)*1000000000 / Tm1)

[0022] Step 1-3, when the calculated fractional second Ts is greater than 1000000000, the fractional second is updated, and the updated fractional second Ts'=Ts-10000000000.

[0023] Preferably, in step 2, the second distribution network terminal device converts the fractional seconds calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself. The specific process is as follows:

[0024] Step 2-1, based on the external timing source, record the timestamp T21 of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device at the second edge moment, obtain the timestamp T20 of the last second edge moment, and calculate the duration Tm2 of one second;

[0025] Step 2-2, obtain the current crystal oscillator timer time T22, and determine whether the current crystal oscillator timer time T22 and the fractional second Ts calculated in step 1 satisfy: T22-T21 is less than 500000000 and Ts is greater than 750000000;

[0026] If the above conditions are met, the calculated sampling timestamp Tb is:

[0027] Tb=T20+(Ts*Tm2 / 1000000000)

[0028] If the above conditions are not met, the calculated sampling timestamp Tb is:

[0029] Tb=T21+(Ts*Tm2 / 1000000000).

[0030] Preferably, in step 3, the second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself based on a synchronization algorithm that does not rely on an external timing source. The synchronization algorithm that does not rely on an external timing source includes a sampling synchronization algorithm based on the fault moment and a phase synchronization algorithm based on voltage phase comparison during normal operation of both sides.

[0031] Preferably, in step 4, a fixed value D is set, and the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself obtained by converting the decimal point of a second is compared with the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself obtained by converting the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal. If the absolute value of the difference between the two exceeds the fixed value D, it is judged that timing fraud exists; otherwise, it is judged that timing fraud does not exist.

[0032] Preferably, in step 4, the value of the constant D is 200000.

[0033] Preferably, for any two power distribution terminals on both sides of the distribution network line, the two power distribution terminals are respectively used as first distribution network terminal devices and steps 1 to 4 of the present invention are executed to perform time synchronization fraud judgment.

[0034] Preferably, for any two power distribution terminal devices on both sides of the distribution network line that are connected and perform differential protection, timing fraud judgment is performed by executing steps 1 to 4 of the present invention.

[0035] The beneficial effect of the present invention lies in that, compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a method for preventing timing fraud for 5G differential protection of distribution network. In the 5G differential application scenario of distribution network, by verifying whether the timing source signal is normal when the timing source signal is normally input, there is no need to add other external functions or modules. The method has a small amount of calculation and effectively improves the reliability of the differential protection function in the distribution network application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0036] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of a method for preventing timing deception of 5G differential protection in a distribution network in the present invention;

[0037] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of a specific technical solution for preventing timing deception in a distribution network 5G differential protection in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] In order to make the purpose, technical scheme and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical scheme of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. The embodiments described in this application are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. Based on the spirit of the present invention, other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are all within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0039] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention proposes a distribution network 5G differential protection anti-timing deception method, the method comprising the following steps:

[0040] Step 1: The first distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp Ta recorded by its own crystal oscillator timer into decimal seconds based on the time synchronization source it accesses, and sends it together with the original sampling timestamp to the second distribution network terminal device;

[0041] Combination Figure 2 The hint, Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the specific technical solution of the 5G differential protection anti-timing deception method for the distribution network displayed in combination with the distribution network terminal device:

[0042] The time information input from the external time source includes the exact moment of the second edge of each second.

[0043] The time recording method of the crystal oscillator timer inside the distribution network terminal device is: using the device's own crystal oscillator as the clock source, starting from the device startup time, and the unit is about 1 nanosecond. Its timing error is only affected by its own crystal oscillator;

[0044] Furthermore, the sampling timestamp recorded by the crystal oscillator timer of the first distribution network terminal device itself is converted into decimal seconds. The specific process is as follows:

[0045] (1) Based on the external timing source, record the timestamp T11 of the crystal oscillator timer at the second edge moment, obtain the timestamp T10 of the previous second edge moment, and calculate the duration Tm1 of one second;

[0046] (2) Calculate the fractional second Ts according to the sampling timestamp Ta and the timestamp T11 of the crystal oscillator timer at the second edge moment, as follows:

[0047] When the sampling timestamp Ta is greater than or equal to T1, calculate the fractional second Ts:

[0048] Ts=(Ta–T11)*1000000000 / Tm1

[0049] When the sampling timestamp Ta is less than T1, calculate the fractional second Ts:

[0050] Ts=1000000000–((T11–Ta)*1000000000 / Tm1)

[0051] (3) When the calculated fractional second Ts is greater than 1000000000, the fractional second is updated, and the updated fractional second Ts'=Ts-1000000000.

[0052] Step 2, the second distribution network terminal device, based on the time synchronization source connected to itself, converts the fraction of a second calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into a timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself;

[0053] The second distribution network terminal device converts the fractional seconds calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device based on the time synchronization source connected to the second distribution network terminal device. The specific process is as follows:

[0054] (1) Based on the external timing source, record the timestamp T21 of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device at the second edge moment, obtain the timestamp T20 of the previous second edge moment, and calculate the duration Tm2 of one second;

[0055] (2) Obtain the current crystal oscillator timer time T22, and determine whether the current crystal oscillator timer time T22 and the fractional second Ts calculated in step 1 satisfy the following conditions: T22-T21 is less than 500000000 and Ts is greater than 750000000;

[0056] If the above conditions are met, the calculated sampling timestamp Tb is:

[0057] Tb=T20+(Ts*Tm2 / 1000000000)

[0058] If the above conditions are not met, the calculated sampling timestamp Tb is:

[0059] Tb=T21+(Ts*Tm2 / 1000000000).

[0060] The converted sampling timestamp Tb represents the time when the sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal device is mapped to the crystal oscillator clock of the second distribution network terminal device.

[0061] Step 3, the second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device based on other synchronization algorithms;

[0062] Among them, other synchronization algorithms used are other synchronization algorithms that can be used in the 5G differential application scenarios of the distribution network without relying on external timing sources. For example, a sampling synchronization algorithm based on the fault moment and a phase synchronization algorithm based on the voltage phase comparison during normal operation of both sides can be used.

[0063] The first distribution network terminal device sends the original sampling timestamp Ta recorded by its own crystal oscillator timer to the second distribution network terminal device. The second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp Ta of the first distribution network terminal device into the timestamp of the internal crystal oscillator of the second distribution network terminal device through a synchronization algorithm, which is recorded as Tb2.

[0064] Step 4, the second distribution network terminal device compares the timestamps converted in steps 2 and 3 respectively. If the timestamp difference exceeds a preset value, it indicates that timing fraud exists.

[0065] Set a constant value D, and compare the timestamp Tb of the second distribution network terminal device's own crystal oscillator timer converted from decimal seconds with the timestamp Tb2 of the second distribution network terminal device's own crystal oscillator timer converted from the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal. When it is found that the absolute value of the difference between the two exceeds the constant value D, it is considered that the timing source connected to the first or second distribution network terminal device is abnormal, which means that timing fraud exists and further inspection is required.

[0066] Preferably, the fixed value D can be set to 200000, and can also be adjusted according to site requirements.

[0067] Due to line differential protection, the distribution terminal devices on both sides of the line need to perform differential calculations equally, that is, the distribution terminal devices on both sides of the line are respectively used as the first distribution network terminal devices and execute steps 1 to 4 of the present invention for judgment. When the timestamp difference exceeds the preset value in any case, it is judged that there is deception in the timing source between the two distribution terminal devices.

[0068] Therefore, each power distribution terminal device can simultaneously support the functions of the first and second power distribution network terminal devices in the above steps 1-4.

[0069] Due to the complex topology of the distribution network line, each distribution terminal needs to be networked with multiple other distribution terminal devices to realize the differential function. Therefore, each distribution terminal device can simultaneously support connection with multiple other distribution terminal devices on the opposite side of the line. Any two distribution terminal devices can realize the judgment of time deception through the method proposed in the present invention.

[0070] The beneficial effect of the present invention lies in that, compared with the prior art, in the 5G differential application scenario of the distribution network, the present invention verifies whether the timing source signal is normal when the timing source signal is normally input, without adding other external functions or modules. The method has a small amount of calculation and effectively improves the reliability of the differential protection function in the distribution network application.

Claims

1. A distribution network 5G differential protection anti-timing fraud method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1: The first distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp recorded by its own crystal oscillator timer into decimal seconds based on the time synchronization source it accesses, and sends the converted decimal seconds and the original sampling timestamp to the second distribution network terminal device; Step 2: The second distribution network terminal device converts the fraction of a second calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into a timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device based on the time synchronization source connected to the second distribution network terminal device; Step 3, the second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself; Step 4: The second distribution network terminal device compares the timestamps converted in steps 2 and 3 respectively. If the timestamp difference exceeds a preset value, it indicates that timing fraud exists.

2. The method for preventing timing fraud in 5G differential protection of distribution network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 1, the time information input from the external timing source includes the exact moment of the second edge of each second.

3. The method for preventing timing fraud in 5G differential protection of distribution network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 1, the crystal oscillator timer inside the distribution network terminal device records time in the following way: using the device's own crystal oscillator as the clock source, starting from the device startup time, and the unit is approximately 1 nanosecond. Its timing error is only affected by its own crystal oscillator.

4. The method for preventing timing fraud in 5G differential protection of distribution network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 1, the first distribution network terminal device converts the sampling timestamp into decimal seconds. The specific process is as follows: Step 1-1, based on the external timing source, record the timestamp T11 of the crystal oscillator timer at the second edge moment, obtain the timestamp T10 of the previous second edge moment, and calculate the duration Tm1 of one second; Step 1-2, calculate the fractional second Ts according to the sampling timestamp Ta and the timestamp T11 of the crystal oscillator timer at the second edge moment, as follows: When the sampling timestamp Ta is greater than or equal to T1, calculate the fractional second Ts: Ts=(Ta–T11)*1000000000 / Tm1 When the sampling timestamp Ta is less than T1, calculate the fractional second Ts: Ts=1000000000–((T11–Ta)*1000000000 / Tm1) Step 1-3, when the calculated fractional second Ts is greater than 1000000000, the fractional second is updated, and the updated fractional second Ts'=Ts-10000000000.

5. The method for preventing timing fraud in 5G differential protection of distribution network according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step 2, the second distribution network terminal device converts the fractional seconds calculated by the first distribution network terminal device into the timestamp of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device itself. The specific process is as follows: Step 2-1, based on the external timing source, record the timestamp T21 of the crystal oscillator timer of the second distribution network terminal device at the second edge moment, obtain the timestamp T20 of the last second edge moment, and calculate the duration Tm2 of one second; Step 2-2: Obtain the current crystal oscillator timer time T22, and determine whether the current crystal oscillator timer time T22 and the second decimal of seconds Ts calculated in Step 1 satisfy: T22 – T21 <5000000>00, and Ts > 750000000; If the above conditions are satisfied, calculate the converted sampling timestamp Tb as: Tb = T20 + (Ts * Tm2 / 1000000000) If the above conditions are not satisfied, calculate the converted sampling timestamp Tb as: Tb = T21 + (Ts * Tm2 / 1000000000).

6. The method for preventing time synchronization spoofing in 5G differential protection for distribution network connection according to claim 1, characterized in that In Step 3, the second distribution network terminal device converts the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal into the timestamp of its own crystal oscillator timer based on a synchronization algorithm that does not rely on an external time synchronization source. The synchronization algorithm that does not rely on an external time synchronization source includes a sampling synchronization algorithm based on the fault moment and a phase synchronization algorithm based on the comparison of voltage phases during normal operation on both sides.

7. The method for preventing time synchronization spoofing in 5G differential protection for distribution network connection according to claim 1, characterized in that In Step 4, set a fixed value D, compare the timestamp of the second distribution network terminal device's own crystal oscillator timer converted from the second decimal of seconds with the timestamp of the second distribution network terminal device's own crystal oscillator timer converted from the original sampling timestamp of the first distribution network terminal. If the absolute value of the difference between the two exceeds the fixed value D, it is determined that there is time synchronization spoofing; otherwise, it is determined that there is no time synchronization spoofing.

8. The method for preventing time synchronization spoofing in 5G differential protection for distribution network connection according to claim 1, characterized in that In Step 4, the value of the fixed value D is 200000.

9. The method for preventing time synchronization spoofing in 5G differential protection for distribution network connection according to claim 1, characterized in that For two distribution terminals on both sides of a distribution network line, use the two distribution terminals as the first distribution network terminal device respectively and execute Steps 1 to 4 of the present invention to judge time synchronization spoofing.

10. The method for preventing time synchronization spoofing in 5G differential protection for distribution network connection according to claim 1, characterized in that For any two connected distribution terminal devices on both sides of a distribution network line that perform differential protection, judge time synchronization spoofing by executing Steps 1 to 4 of the present invention.

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