Computer-implemented method and system for obtaining digitally signed data

Through threshold blind signature distribution protocol and secret sharing technology, the problem of insufficient private key protection and security in blockchain systems is solved, and high security and fault tolerance key management is realized, suitable for decentralized and distributed environments .

CN118944895APending Publication Date: 2024-11-12NCHAIN HLDG LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411220692.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2018-01-16
Filing Date
2019-01-10
Publication Date
2024-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing blockchain systems have shortcomings in terms of security, especially in decentralized environments, which are difficult to effectively protect private keys and prevent unauthorized key use, and traditional signature systems lack flexibility and fault tolerance.

Method used

Using threshold blind signature distribution protocol, through joint random secret sharing (JRSS) and joint zero secret sharing (JZSS) technologies, multiple participants can jointly manage and share secrets, ensuring that only participants above the threshold number can access and use secrets. key, thereby improving system security and fault tolerance.

Benefits of technology

It realizes secure hosting and protection of private keys, prevents unauthorized use, enhances the security and flexibility of the system, supports trust systems in distributed and decentralized environments, and can maintain privacy and under shared signatures by multiple parties. Prevent conspiracy.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A method of obtaining digitally signed data is disclosed. The method comprises sending first data (e2) from at least one of the plurality of first participants to at least one second participant, where the first data is based on second data (e) accessible to the at least one said first participant, and the second data is inaccessible to the or each said second participant. Receiving a digital signature (s1) of the first data from at least one of the second participants, and processing the digital signature of the first data by a plurality of the first participants to provide a sharing of a digital signature (s) of the second data, the digital signature of the second data being accessible through a threshold number of the sharing, and less than the threshold number of shares are inaccessible.
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Description

[0001] This application is a divisional application of the invention patent application with Chinese application number 2019800079851 (corresponding to PCT international application number PCT / IB2019 / 050178), application date January 10, 2019, and invention name “Computer-implemented method and system for obtaining digitally signed data”. Technical Field

[0002] The present invention generally relates to the security of data and computer-based resources. More specifically, the present invention relates to cryptography, and also to elliptic curve cryptography, elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA), and threshold cryptography. In one embodiment, the present invention can be described as providing a distribution protocol for blind dealerless thresholds. Background Art

[0003] In this document, we use the term "blockchain" to include all forms of electronic, computer-based distributed ledgers. These include consensus-based blockchain and transaction chain technologies, permissioned and unpermissioned ledgers, shared ledgers, and their variations. The term "user" in this article can refer to a person or a processor-based resource.

[0004] A blockchain is a peer-to-peer electronic ledger implemented as a decentralized, distributed computer-based system that consists of blocks, which in turn consist of transactions. Each transaction is a data structure that encodes the transfer of control of digital assets between participants in a blockchain system and includes at least one input and at least one output. Each block contains a hash of the previous block, so blocks are linked together to create a permanent, unchangeable record of all transactions that have been written to the blockchain since its inception. Transactions contain small programs called scripts embedded in their inputs and outputs that specify how and by whom the outputs of the transaction can be accessed.

[0005] In order for a transaction to be written to the blockchain, it must be “validated”.

[0006] Unlike distributed or centralized systems, decentralized systems have the following advantages: There is no single point of failure. Therefore, they provide a higher level of security and resilience. This security can be further enhanced by using known cryptographic techniques such as elliptic curve cryptography and ECDSA. Summary of the invention

[0007] Therefore, there is a need for a solution to further enhance the security of such a system. The present invention provides such advantages and others.

[0008] The present invention provides a method and system as defined in the accompanying claims.

[0009] According to the present invention, there may be provided a method for obtaining digitally signed data, the method comprising:-

[0010] sending first data from at least one first participant of a plurality of first participants to at least one second participant, wherein the first data is based on second data accessible to at least one of the first participants, and wherein the second data is not accessible to the or each second participant;

[0011] receiving a digital signature of said first data from at least one of said second participants; and

[0012] The digital signature of the first data is processed by a plurality of the first participants to provide a share of the digital signature of the second data, wherein the digital signature of the second data is accessible through a threshold number of the shares and is inaccessible to less than the threshold number of shares.

[0013] By processing the digital signature of the first data by a plurality of first participants to provide a share of the digital signature of the second data, wherein the digital signature of the second data is accessible through a threshold number of shares and is inaccessible for less than the threshold number of shares, this provides the advantage of improved security, since the second participant cannot access the second data, but signs the first data and enables the provision of the digital signature of the second data, while further improving security through the threshold setting. This provides the following advantages: the first participant can designate the second participant as the custodian of the private key used to sign a message (e.g., a blockchain transaction), while preventing the second participant from being able to use the key without authorization, since the second participant cannot access the second data.

[0014] Each of said shares of said digital signature of said second data may comprise a share of a plurality of first secret values ​​shared among a plurality of said first participants via Joint Random Secret Sharing (JRSS).

[0015] This provides the advantage of increased security by providing a dealer-free secret value sharing scheme in which the first participants jointly select the first secret value, thereby avoiding the weaknesses of a single dealer style system.

[0016] Each of the shares of the digital signature of the second data may include at least one first masking share shared among the plurality of first participants via Joint Zero Secret Sharing (JZSS).

[0017] The first data may be generated by shares of the first data such that the first data is accessible by a threshold number of the shares and is inaccessible to less than the threshold number of shares.

[0018] Each of said shares of said first data may comprise a share of a plurality of said first secret values ​​shared among said plurality of said first participants via Joint Random Secret Sharing (JRSS).

[0019] Each of the shares of the first data may include at least one second masked share shared among the plurality of first participants via Joint Zero Secret Sharing (JZSS).

[0020] The method may further comprise receiving third data from at least one of said second participants based on said second secret value.

[0021] This provides the advantage of facilitating the generation of the digital signature of the second data from the digital signature of the first data.

[0022] A digital signature of first data may be generated by sharing of the digital signature of the first data shared among a plurality of second participants, wherein the digital signature of the first data is accessible through a threshold number of the shares and is inaccessible to less than the threshold number of the shares.

[0023] Each of said shares of said digital signature of said first data may comprise a share of a plurality of second secret values ​​shared among a plurality of said second participants via Joint Random Secret Sharing (JRSS).

[0024] Each of said shares of said digital signature of said first data may include at least one third mask share shared among said plurality of said second participants via Joint Zero Secret Sharing (JZSS).

[0025] The second data may be a message.

[0026] The second data may be a hash value of the message.

[0027] The first data may be a blockchain transaction.

[0028] At least one of the digital signatures may be based on a cryptographic system having homomorphic properties.

[0029] At least one of the digital signatures may be based on elliptic curve cryptography.

[0030] The present invention also provides a system, comprising:

[0031] Processor; and

[0032] A memory comprising executable instructions that, due to being executed by a processor, cause the system to perform any embodiment of the computer-implemented method described herein.

[0033] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having executable instructions stored thereon, which, due to execution by a processor of a computer system, causes the computer system to perform at least an embodiment of the computer-implemented method described herein. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] These and other aspects of the invention will become apparent from and elucidated with reference to the embodiments described herein. Embodiments of the invention will now be described by way of example only and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0035] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a blind signature distribution system embodying the present invention; and

[0036] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating a computing environment in which various embodiments may be implemented. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0037] Overview

[0038] In this application, a threshold-based dealerless blind signature distribution system is described. The system builds on a group signature scheme that is different from the traditional individual signature system deployed in a wallet and adds a new system designed to allow distributed threshold blind signatures of messages. The system deployed in this way is scalable and robust, tolerant of errors and malicious attackers. The system supports both dealer systems and dealerless systems and supports deployment with unlimited flexible combinations of distributions.

[0039] Blind signature schemes allow messages to be signed without knowledge of the message contents. This includes the ability to act as a trustee of a private key without knowledge of which addresses or keys have been entrusted.

[0040] Combined with a threshold signature scheme, where a document can be validly digitally signed by a threshold number of participants, but not by fewer than a threshold number of participants, this allows the holder of a private key to create a trust system in which messages can be signed by the party that manages the address without knowing the amount being maintained.

[0041] When combined with a threshold system, Alice enables multiple parties to act together without having to know the identities of the other blind parties.

[0042] Since the threshold blinding key results in a message involving a signature using a blind signature, parties cannot collude even if they also have access to the identities of the other parties and obtain a sufficient number of threshold shares to be able to blind sign a message, since this message is only valid if it enters the transaction unblinded with a standard ECDSA signature.

[0043] The threshold blinding technique also increases the security of the basic system by adding randomness to the address that can be injected, helping to resist faulty RNGs (random number generators). The blind signing party can act as a key custodian or custodian. This can be used as a backup to the master key in case the master key is lost, or as a backup to add a second layer of authorization and control. When using several independent parties as trust protectors, the use of several systems or operators allows for a RAID-like key management system with increased redundancy and increased security.

[0044] In existing implementations, the payer wallet may be lost, damaged or stolen. The hardware wallet may be damaged or lost. In the system described in this application, the hardware system can be divided into multiple parts, and the hardware device can be safely moved or recreated. In this application, the following symbols are used:

[0045]

[0046] Standard ECDSA values ​​apply:

[0047] w=s -1 modn

[0048] u1=ew mod n

[0049] u2=r.wmod n

[0050] x=u1G+u2D A

[0051] All standard ECDSA rules apply. A linear transformation can be constructed such that:

[0052] s=x.e+b

[0053] This relationship is used in blinding the message to be signed. Now, the second participant (Alice) can sign a blind message in place of the message to be used, maintaining the message and sending only the blind message hash.

[0054] 1) Alice sends the blind hash of the message to the first participant Bob

[0055] 2) Bob signs the "blind hash" and returns the signed value to Alice

[0056] 3) Alice un-blinds Bob’s value to get the signature. This can be used to reconstruct a valid transaction

[0057] Threshold blinding can be done scalably in the following way:

[0058] 1) Alice’s key is split

[0059] 2) Bob's value is split

[0060] 3) Bob and Alice’s keys are split

[0061] 4) Alice and Bob’s keys are intact but the value used for blinding is divided

[0062] Let Alice choose a value α in the range [1, (n-1)]. Next, calculate:

[0063] β=hash(α+1)

[0064] γ=hash(α+β)

[0065] δ=hash(α+γ)

[0066] If β is a threshold, then Alice can be considered as T u A group of squares, where A1 to A Tv is a shard or threshold version of Alice, with the specific instance denoted as A i Here, α is selected using Algorithm #1, which is explained in detail below.

[0067] Previous Work

[0068] Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS)

[0069] Shamir (1979) first introduced a dealer-based secret sharing scheme that allows for distributed management of keys. Problems associated with this scheme arise from having to trust dealers who cannot be verified. This form of the scheme is fully compatible with the system disclosed in this application and can be used for group distribution of individual key slices created by the process described herein.

[0070] Joint Random Secret Sharing (JRSS) (Pedersen, 1992)

[0071] The stated goal of the process is to create a method in which a group of participants can collectively share a secret without any of the participants knowing the secret. Each participant chooses a random value as its local secret and distributes values ​​derived from that random value to the group using SSSS. Each participant then adds all the shares received from participants, including its own share. This sum is the joint random secret share. The randomness provided by a single honest participant is sufficient to maintain the confidentiality of the combined secret value. This state remains true even if all (n-1) other participants intentionally choose non-random secret values.

[0072] Joint Zero Secret Sharing (JZSS) (Ben-Or, 1988)

[0073] JZSS is similar to JRSS, except that each participant shares 0 as a replacement for the random value. The shares produced using this technique help eliminate any potential weaknesses in the JRSS algorithm.

[0074] Desmedt

[1987] introduced the concept of group-oriented cryptography. This process allows a participant to send a message to a group of people in a way that only a selected subset of the participants can decrypt the message. In the system, members are known if the sender must know the members to use their public keys; the group is anonymous if there is a single public key that is kept independent of the members. The system disclosed in this application combines these two approaches and allows both known and anonymous senders and signers to exist in a group.

[0075] Blind signature (Chaum, 1982)

[0076] Blind signatures allow one party to create a valid signature for another party in a secure manner, without the signer ever viewing the message. In this system, only the signer can generate a valid signature, and the owner of the message to be signed can be sure that their message has not been altered and was distributed correctly, allowing them to redeem it in the system. Furthermore, the system is unthinkable in that no party other than the parties requesting the application of the signature can derive the relationship between the blinded and unblinded values ​​and signature pairs.

[0077] Including blind signatures in a threshold system allows messages to be signed in a protocol where the signer cannot link ownership to an address. This way, the signer can neither determine the amount held by the party they are protecting nor the amount transferred. This additional level of privacy adds additional security because collusion within the threshold group protecting the keys is no longer possible. This becomes infeasible due to the need to know which blind keys will be associated with which deposits. In a peer-to-peer group, it is possible to build a system where a threshold group of members is used to protect the keys of other members. In this scheme, a group of depositors will each split the signing function among the other members so that no member knows the holdings of other members in the group.

[0078] The scheme can also be used for other forms of message exchange, thereby allowing a distributed peer group to maintain the privacy of all members while not being able to reveal sensitive information about the group members.

[0079] Methods and Implementation

[0080] The protocol of this embodiment can be based on a hierarchical derivation of private keys, using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to encrypt secret information that needs to be sent between participants. In this case, it is both feasible and desirable to organize all messages into a single data packet sent to all users so that it can be verified against potentially compromised or hostile participants when necessary.

[0081] Signature generation is performed by coordinating participant p (c) By default, any key slice can act as a coordination participant, and the requirement depends on the individual implementation of the protocol. The algorithms used are documented below, and subsequent sections detail their deployment.

[0082] Creating dealer-free blinded ECDSA threshold keys

[0083] In the system of this embodiment, the first participant Alice is defined (i) The ownership group of the second participant Bob will use (i) The ability of a group or system to blindly sign a private key is beneficial to the controller.

[0084] Alice Group

[0085] First, the unblinded threshold group Alice (i) A set of first secret values ​​is selected in the form of random numbers.

[0086]

[0087] The group has T u T is the threshold v members, so that A ai It's a secreta The shard of the i-th member.

[0088] Algorithm 1 - Key Generation - For a more detailed version of Algorithm 1, see the Appendix below

[0089] Domain parameters (curve, cardinality n, generator G)

[0090] Input: N / A

[0091] Output: Blind key share A a1 ,..A ai ,A b1 ,…A bi ,A c1 …A ci ,A d1 …A di .

[0092] Using Algorithm 1, members of Alice group can participate in the T v T u Here, Alice's T v The threshold number T among members u members to create or use the second secret value A a .

[0093] Similarly, the JRSS process is used with Algorithm 1 to create other second secret values, using A bi Create A b , using A ci Create A c and using A di Create A d .

[0094] Each value may be used and created using the same threshold set (u,v), or each value may be partitioned and created using separate thresholds and members.

[0095] In this system, each secret A ai , A bi , A ci and A di Use only once. If these values ​​need to be used again, use Algorithm 2, described in more detail below, to re-share the secret using a variation of JZSS.

[0096] Algorithm 2 Update Private Key - For a more detailed version of Algorithm 2, see the Appendix below

[0097] Input: Participant P i Private key A a , A b , A c , A dThe sharing of ai , A bi , A ci , A di .

[0098] Output: Participant P i The new private key share A' ai , A' bi , A' ci , A' di

[0099] In the ideal case where there is only a single Alice group (only one group shares (T u ,T v )), this process requires T v broadcast as value.

[0100] A ai , A bi , A ci , A di Each can be sent in a single broadcast message.

[0101] Bob Group

[0102] Bob of the first participant group (i) is defined as a signature group. The group has (T u ',T v ') or T as required v 'T of the total members u ' members to share and use a first secret value (Bp, Bq), where Bp and Bq are the recreated blind values ​​used by Bob's group to sign blind messages for Alice's group.

[0103] Algorithm 4 – Blind Key for Bob’s Group

[0104] 1) Bob, a member of Bob's group (i) A second secret value is chosen as a random number:

[0105]

[0106] 2) Bob's group calculates the following values:

[0107] a)BP=(Bp -1 .G)

[0108] b) BQ = (Bq.Bp -1 .G)

[0109] Here, BP is calculated using a variation of Algorithm 3, which is described in more detail in the Appendix of this application.

[0110] 3) Generate mask share –

[0111] b ai ←Z q Using JRSS

[0112] b bi ,b ci ←Z q 2 Leveraging JZSS

[0113] 4) Broadcast –

[0114] α i =Bp i .b ai +b bi modq

[0115] β i =G×b ai

[0116] 5)χ=Interpolate(α i ,...,α Tv )

[0117] [=Bp.b a modq]

[0118] Among them, the operation Interpolate(α i ,…,α Tv ) indicates that by sharing α i Recover the secret value shared among the participants.

[0119] 6)δ=Exp-Interpolate(β i ,...,β Tv )

[0120] =G xb a

[0121] Among them, the operation Exp-Interpolate(β i ,…,β Tv ) indicates that by sharing β i Recover the elliptic curve point secret value shared between the participants.

[0122] 7)((Bp -1 .b a -1 )xb a x G)=δxχ -1

[0123]

[0124] This is a point function, and we can use (Bp-1 x G) is used as the input in the modified Algorithm 1.

[0125] 8) Use Bq i , that is, B q The sharing of (Bp -1 .G), each of Bob(i)

[0126] Members will broadcast:

[0127] f i =Bq i x(Bp -1 .G)

[0128] 9)BQ×Exp-Interpolate(f1,...,f Tv )

[0129]

[0130] 10) The two EC points BP and BQ are sent to Alice group in the form of third data. Secret exchange can be used to maintain confidentiality, for example, as disclosed in international patent application WO2017 / 145016.

[0131] Threshold message to be blinded

[0132] Next, Alice(i)'s group uses the value from Bob(i)'s group to compute a value that can be published safely because it has been blinded using (5).

[0133] Algorithm 5 – Alice (single group)

[0134] Alice knows BP and BQ from the previous broadcast of Bob(i)'s group.

[0135] Alice starts by computing the secret value:

[0136] A K ×(A c .A a ) -1 BP

[0137] This is done as follows:

[0138] 1) Create a mask share:

[0139] M ai Use JZSS, so take advantage of JZSS,

[0140] 2) Alice(i) broadcasts the value:

[0141] Aμi =(A ci .A ai )+M ai modq

[0142]

[0143] 3) Now, Alice(i) calculates Aμ, where

[0144] A μ =Interpolate(A μ1 ,…,A μTv )mod q

[0145] =A c .A a modq

[0146] Therefore, A μ -1 =(A c .A a ) -1

[0147] 4) A k =A μ -1 BP

[0148] >[×(A c .A a ) -1 ×BP]

[0149] Next, Alice(i) calculates the blinded B public key.

[0150] A T =(A a .A K(x) ) -1 (A b G+BQ+A d .A c -1 ×BP]

[0151] Among them, A K(x) Represents elliptic curve point A K The x-coordinate

[0152] Bob Group does not know A T or A K , and if no A is found a , A b , A c and A d In this case, it is impossible to determine whether any of his values ​​or efforts are going to and from A TIf Alice's group keeps these to a security threshold, Bob or any other party will never know Alice's details.

[0153] Alice can now use public key A in the standard creation of an address T , and even if Bob played a role in helping to sign the transaction, Alice would further obscure any ability for Bob(i) to determine her address.

[0154] Algorithm 6 – Alice calculates the public key

[0155] 1) Generate mask sharing:

[0156] Using JRSS,

[0157] 2) Generate mask sharing:

[0158] Using JZSS,

[0159] 3) Calculation:

[0160] Aμ i =(A ai .A K(x) )

[0161] >[=A a .A K(x) modq]

[0162] Broadcast Aμ to all Alice(i) members i .

[0163] (Among them, A K(x) It's point A K x coordinate of

[0164] 4) Use Algorithm 1 to calculate (A b .G).

[0165] Here, Af i =G×A bi

[0166] Broadcast Af to all Alice(i) members i .

[0167] (A b .G)=Exp-Interpolate(Af i ,...Af Tv )

[0168] >[=A b ×G]

[0169] 5) Calculate [Aa .A K(x) ] -1

[0170] First, take A μ

[0171] Now, A μ =Interpolate(A μi ,…,A μTv )mod q

[0172]

[0173] This can therefore be used to later calculate [A a A K(x) ] -1 .

[0174] 6) First, use the same method as in Algorithm 4 to calculate the value (A C -1 .BP).

[0175] 7) This is used to calculate the value (A d .A c -1 .BP)

[0176] 8) Generate mask sharing:

[0177] Using JRSS,

[0178] Using JZSS, M ei ,

[0179] 9) Broadcast the value to Alice(i) group:

[0180] α i =A ci .M di +M ei modq

[0181] β i =BP×M di

[0182] 10)χ=Interpolate(α i ,...,α TV )

[0183] >[=(A c .M d )modq]

[0184] 11)δ=Exp-Interpolate(β1,…β TV )

[0185] >[=BP×M d ]

[0186] 12)(A c -1 .BP)=χ -1 xδ

[0187] >[=(BP×A c -1 )]

[0188] Return to A c -1 .BP is a point on the curve BP. This is used as input in Algorithm 1.

[0189] 13) Use A di and EC point (A c -1 .BP), each member of Alice(i) broadcasts:

[0190] f i =A di ×(A c -1 BP)

[0191] 14) A d .A c -1 .BP=Exp-Interpolate(f1,...,f Tv )

[0192] >[=(A d .A c -1 .BP)]

[0193] 15) Now there is a method for calculating the public key A T All parts of . Use the following formula to calculate:

[0194] A T =(A a .A K(x) ) -1 .(A b .G+BQ+A d .A c -1 BP)

[0195] = A a -1 A K(x) -1 (A b + Bq Bp -1 + A d Ac -1 B -1 ) G (1)

[0196] Right now:

[0197] Algorithm (5.4) × [(6.4) + BQ + (6.14)], which returns EC point A T , A T The public key used for blinding.

[0198] Create an address

[0199] Convert this public key in the standard way to create an address:

[0200] A T =A T (x,y)

[0201] 1) Use A T The parity bit and complete A of (y) T The (x) coordinate represents the public key.

[0202] 2) Hash the public key twice

[0203] a) Using SHA256

[0204] b) Using RIPEMD160

[0205] 3) Prepend the version number (this is the address version number). If the protocol is standard, use version 01. If you want to use P2SH, you can also make it version 03.

[0206] 4) Append the checksum to the end of the versioned public key hash from (3). The checksum is the value from (3)

[0207] The double SHA256 hash of the returned value is the first 4 bytes.

[0208] 5) BASE58 encodes the value created in (4). This is a standard format address, and Alice(i) group may receive payments to this address, and this address will appear as any normal address at this point.

[0209] Unless Alice leaks the value A a ,A b ,A c &A d Otherwise, no one, including Bob, can see who owns A. T The address of.

[0210] Even if these values ​​are leaked, Alice(i) does not have to let anyone else know that these values ​​are related to Bob(i)'s signature group. If Alice has a bad RNG, she is still safe because Bob(i) can inject randomness into the process.

[0211] Blinded signatures in threshold groups.

[0212] To sign a message, or to sign any other message (such as an email on an anonymous host), Alice (i) needs to have the hash of the message or transaction, e = h(m). With the hash of the message (or transaction) and the signature, Alice (i) can reconstruct the message (transaction) and the signature from the public key A. T and the associated base 58 address redemption. Algorithm 3 Signature Generation - For a detailed version of Algorithm 3, see the Appendix below Domain Parameters: Curve, Base n, Generator G

[0213] Input: message to be signed e = H(m)

[0214] Private key sharing

[0215] Output: Signature For e = H(m)

[0216] Alice maintains privacy by not letting Bob(i) know the contents of the message (transaction). Therefore, Bob(i) does not discover that he is signing a T For the message, Alice(i) blinds the hash value.

[0217] Algorithm 7 – Blinded Hashing

[0218] Alice creates the first data as a blinded version of the second data, i.e. the hashed message (transaction) e.

[0219] Here e2 = A a .e+A b (modq). Created as follows:

[0220] 1) First, Alice (i) generates a mask share using JZSS

[0221] 2) Alice(i) will send the value Av(i)=Aa(i)e+Ab(i)+Ma(i)modq

[0222] Alice(i) sends the value Av(i) to other Alice members who can interpolate the value set

[0223] 3)e2=Interpolate(Av1,...,Av v )

[0224] =A a .e+A b modq

[0225] 4) e2 is broadcast to Bob(i) group. This will be done using an encrypted channel, where Bob verifies Alice's identity. For example, this can be achieved by the arrangement disclosed in international patent application WO2017 / 145016. Here, Alice pays Bob for the signature, and the exchange is done over a closed encrypted session channel.

[0226] If Bob receives a message from a non-Alice party and signs that message, the value cannot be unblinded and therefore remains secure. Even if Bob has the payment and the record, he has no information about the signed Alice transaction because the value e2 is blinded and Alice did not send the message to Bob, only the blinded hash.

[0227] Now, Bob signs the blinded hash and returns it (i.e., the digital signature of the first data) to Alice.

[0228] Bob(i) is creating the message s1=Bp.e2+Bqmodqs1 which will be returned to Alice, and s1 is the blinded version of the signature.

[0229] To do this, Bob(i) uses Algorithm 8 to sign from his threshold group and return s1 to Alice(i).

[0230] Algorithm 8

[0231] s1=Bp.e2+Bqmodq

[0232] 1) Bob(i) creates a mask share using JZSS.

[0233] Using JZSS,

[0234] 2) Bob(i) broadcasts

[0235] Bs i =Bp (i) .e2+Bq (i) +M b(i) modq

[0236] 3)s1=Interpolate(Bs1,...,Bs Tv )

[0237] >[=Bp.e2+Bqmodq]

[0238] 4) Bob(i) sends s1 to Alice(i), the blinded s1 signature value

[0239] Alice now has the blinded s1 part of the signature and K(x) )

[0240] Alice (i) may use a threshold deblinding method to recover the ssignature value, ie, the digital signature of the second data, from the blinded s1 value using Algorithm 9 .

[0241] Algorithm 9

[0242] Alice (i) wants to obtain the unblinded s signature component from the blinded part of s1. She calculates s = A c .s1+A d (modq) to do it.

[0243] To do this, Alice(i):

[0244] 1) Create a hash share using JZSS

[0245] Using JZSS,

[0246] 2) Alice (i) broadcasts to all other Alice members

[0247] s i =A c(i) s1+A d(i) +M a(i)

[0248] 3)s=Interpolate(s1,…s Tv )

[0249] >[=A c .s1+A d (modq)]

[0250] Now, each party in Alice(i)'s group has (A K(x) ,s), the (A K(x) ,s) is a valid ECDSA signature and can be used with public key A T Or the associated address is verified in the protocol as usual.

[0251] S can be shown to be a valid ECDSA signature of e as follows.

[0252] Extensions

[0253] s=A c s1+A d =A c (Bpe2+Bq)+A d

[0254] =A c Bp(A a e+A b )+A c Bq+A d =A c B a e+A c B b +A c Bq+A d

[0255] =(A c B a )(e+A a -1 [A b +Bq Bp -1 +A d A c -1 B -1 )

[0256] But from equation 1 above, corresponding to the public key A T The private key d A yes

[0257] A a -1 A K(x) -1 (A b +Bq Bp -1 +A d A c -1 B -1 )

[0258] Therefore, the next

[0259] s=(A c B a )[e+A K(x) d A ] = k -1 [e+A K(x) d A ], where k = (A c B a ) -1 , from which we can see that s is a valid ECDSA signature of e, and is signed by public key A T is verified.

[0260] This signature along with the message will be able to form a standard transaction, which Alice (i) can redeem if it is broadcast to the network.

[0261] Bob(i) will not have any information about which address Alice has used.

[0262] He will know neither the address nor the transaction amount nor where it was sent.

[0263] Even though Bob(i) possesses and protects the key, he has no knowledge of the transaction.

[0264] Security considerations

[0265] Benger et al. (2014) provide an example of ECDSA private key recovery using the flash and reload method. This case is just one example of an attack against system RAM and cache. These methods make it inadequate to use procedures such as Shamir SSS

[1979] when reconstructing private keys. Furthermore, in any case where a private key is reconstructed, a requirement for trust is introduced. In this case, it is necessary to rely on the systems and procedures of the entity holding the private key. Even if the trusted party is not malicious, it is necessary to rely on its procedures. As can be seen in many recent compromises, this reliance on reconstructing private keys provides an avenue for attack.

[0266] Since it is both a direct replacement for existing ECDSA implementations and fully transparent and compatible with current protocols, its implementation does not require hard or soft forks, and the implementation is indistinguishable from any current transactions. The present invention can treat individuals as separate participants, allowing group signatures of keys with recovery capabilities. For example, four key slices can be used to implement a two-of-two scheme, where an online wallet provider or exchange maintains two key slices and end users maintain two shards. The exchange and the user each have a two-of-two process on their key slices, and then combine them with each other for secure signing of messages when needed.

[0267] In this scheme, group Bob(i) can at least view the hash of the message provided from Alice(i).

[0268] 1. Since the members of Bob(i) cannot know the value A jointly or independently a or A b , so no member of the group can determine whether e2 is a blinded version of the message hash e.

[0269] 2. Similarly, Bob(i) does not know the value A c or A d , so the relationship between the signature values ​​s and s1 cannot be determined.

[0270] 3. In a similar manner as used when computing the Rabin() signature, Bob(i) cannot easily determine the value A a A c .

[0271] Under the assumption of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, Bob(i) cannot determine A T The relationship between (x) and the elliptic curve point BP.

[0272] 4. In a similar manner, Bob(i) does not know whether the value BP or BQ is used to construct Alice(i)'s group public key A T (x,y).

[0273] 5. Here, once Alice(i) has broadcast the deblinded message, the value of the public key associated with the transaction remains obscure. If Alice(i) delays broadcasting the signature of the blinded message received from Bob(i), then including many other transactions in the block means that Bob(i) cannot determine more than that Alice(i) has the signed message and has the potential to transact it after receiving the signed message.

[0274] 6. No external party needs to have any information about the transaction between Alice(i) and Bob(i).

[0275] The privacy level between these parties can therefore be increased.

[0276] The effective result of this process is that a threshold group of Alice(i) members, who may or may not be representative of the entire group, are able to send to a guardian group Bob(i) who can help sign transactions or other messages, while the content of the message provided by Alice(i) remains hidden.

[0277] As long as Alice(i) remains in a position where she has reasonable confidence in the sending of messages, and the volume of messages in the system remains significantly above zero, Bob(i) cannot determine that a message could have come from Alice(i).

[0278] In this scheme, it is important that Alice (i) does not reuse parameter A when signing different hash values. a &A b If these values ​​are reused with different values ​​of e, this will enable the calculation of information that enables Bob(i) to link the obfuscated hash e2 with the original hash value of the broadcast message e. This is due to the fact that adding a further linear equation leads to the following situation: Bob(i) can a &A bThe result is that Bob(i) will be able to search for this value e on the blockchain and link it to the corresponding Alice(i) group public key A T (x,y), and possibly linked to other derived public keys associated with the group.

[0279] In a similar way, it is important that Alice(i) does not reuse parameter A c &A d , since this will result in Bob(i) being able to compute the relationship between the blinded signature used by Alice(i) and the published signature, and thus in a manner similar to the reuse of parameter A a &A b search the blockchain in such a way that he can determine the public key A of Alice(i)’s group T (x,y).

[0280] Similarly, the parameter B generated by Bob(i) p &B q and BP&BQ should not be reused. Without these parameters, Alice(i) cannot create a forgery of the blinded signature created by Bob(i), and therefore cannot unblind a signature that would appear to be created by public key A. T (x,y) generates such a signature. Since the value B p &B q is calculated by Bob(i) using a key scheme obtained, for example, by the arrangement disclosed in international patent application WO2017 / 145016, so B p &B q Each value of B is unique for each message generated by Alice(i), and under the assumption of a collision-free hashing algorithm, any party using the service will have their own B generated for each message that is never reused. p &B q version.

[0281] The present invention introduces a group signature process. The coupling of a fault-tolerant signature system to a distributed key creation system eliminates all centralization and trust requirements. The development of many systems will require trust. In addition, the introduction of an implicit decentralized system allows the creation of more robust and resilient protocols. The compatibility between ECDSA [Johnson, 2001] and Shamir's SSS [Shamir, 1979] allows the introduction of a system that uses a new verifiable secret sharing scheme. This system is far more efficient than any system derived from Feldman [Feldman, 1987] or Pedersen [Pedersen, 1992] without losing any security.

[0282] The introduction of threshold signature blinding, which extends the work of Chaum (1982), leads to a situation where no trusted party is required even in network-based exchanges. In this way, a true form of anonymous digital cash or asset transfer system can be maintained, and even linked to a secure private voting system.

[0283] In this application, a system is disclosed that extends functionality without changing the basic protocol. A system using the invention:

[0284] 1. No trusted third party is required to select or distribute key secrets,

[0285] 2. It is possible to create a distributed banking transaction system that does not rely on third-party trust,

[0286] 3. Each member or group of members can independently verify that the share of the secret key held corresponds to the notified address and public key,

[0287] 4. There is a protocol for refreshing private key slices to mitigate the effects of eavesdropping and related attacks, and

[0288] 5. Group signatures of transactions and messages do not require a trusted third party.

[0289] 6. A third party can maintain the integrity of the keys in the threshold group. The group signers will not know how much assets are held under their protection. Since this is a threshold system, if some members of the signing group are unavailable,

[0290] The other members are still able to blindly sign the transaction, thus allowing the move.

[0291] Since sensitive data never appears in storage in the system of the present invention, it solves many existing security risks. In addition, it allows the distribution of exchange-based systems, web wallets and other forms of commerce. In this system, hierarchical threshold groups can interact with other hierarchical threshold groups to ensure the integrity of keys over time. In this case, a scheme can be created that allows transfers on given events. Such situations would include wills and property transfers that can be controlled and protected, allowing keys to be recovered in various situations.

[0292] Now turn to Figure 2 , provides an illustrative simplified block diagram of a computing device 2600 that can be used to practice at least one embodiment of the present disclosure. In various embodiments, the computing device 2600 can be used to implement any of the systems shown and described above. For example, the computing device 2600 can be configured to function as a data server, a network server, a portable computing device, a personal computer, or any electronic computing device. Figure 2As shown, computing device 2600 may include one or more processors (collectively referred to as 2602) with one or more levels of cache memory and memory controller, and the processor may be configured to communicate with a storage subsystem 2606 including a main memory 2608 and a permanent storage 2610. As shown, main memory 2608 may include dynamic random access memory (DRAM) 2618 and read-only memory (ROM) 2620. Storage subsystem 2606 and cache memory 2602 may be used to store information, such as details associated with transactions and blocks described in the present disclosure. Processor 2602 may be used to provide the steps or functions of any embodiment described in the present disclosure.

[0293] The processor 2602 may also communicate with one or more user interface input devices 2612 , one or more user interface output devices 2614 , and a network interface subsystem 2616 .

[0294] The bus subsystem 2604 may provide a mechanism for enabling the various components and subsystems of the computing device 2600 to communicate with each other as intended. Although the bus subsystem 2604 is schematically shown as a single bus, alternative embodiments of the bus subsystem may utilize multiple busses.

[0295] The network interface subsystem 2616 may provide an interface to other computing devices and networks. The network interface subsystem 2616 may serve as an interface to receive data from and send data to other systems other than the computing device 2600. For example, the network interface subsystem 2616 may enable a data technician to connect the device to a network so that the data technician can transfer data to and receive data from the device while being located at a remote location (e.g., a data center).

[0296] The user interface input devices 2612 may include one or more user input devices, such as a keyboard; a pointing device such as an integrated mouse, trackball, touchpad, or graphics tablet; a scanner; a barcode scanner; a touch screen incorporated into a display; an audio input device such as a voice recognition system, a microphone, etc.; and other types of input devices. In general, the use of the term "input device" is intended to include all possible types of devices and mechanisms for inputting information into the computing device 2600.

[0297] The one or more user interface output devices 2614 may include a display subsystem, a printer, or a non-visual display such as an audio output device. The display subsystem may be a cathode ray tube (CRT), a flat panel device such as a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting diode (LED) display, or a projector, or other display device. In general, use of the term "output device" is intended to include all possible types of devices and mechanisms for outputting information from the computing device 2600. The one or more user interface output devices 2614 may be used, for example, to present a user interface to facilitate user interaction with an application that performs the described processes and variations therein, when such interaction is appropriate.

[0298] The storage subsystem 2606 may provide a computer-readable storage medium for storing basic programming and data structures that may provide the functionality of at least one embodiment of the present disclosure. Applications (programs, code modules, instructions) may provide the functionality of one or more embodiments of the present disclosure when executed by one or more processors and may be stored in the storage subsystem 2606. These application modules or instructions may be executed by one or more processors 2602. In addition, the storage subsystem 2606 may provide a repository for storing data used in accordance with the present disclosure. For example, the main memory 2608 and the cache memory 2602 may provide volatile storage for programs and data. The permanent storage 2610 may provide permanent (non-volatile) storage for programs and data and may include flash memory, one or more solid-state drives, one or more magnetic hard drives, one or more floppy disk drives with associated removable media, one or more optical drives (e.g., CD-ROM or DVD or Blue-Ray) drives with associated removable media, and other similar storage media. Such programs and data may include programs for executing the steps of one or more embodiments as described in the present disclosure and data associated with transactions and blocks described in the present disclosure.

[0299] The computing device 2600 may be of various types, including a portable computer device, a tablet computer, a workstation, or any other device described below. Additionally, the computing device 2600 may include another device that may be connected to the computing device 2600 via one or more ports (e.g., USB, headphone jack, Lightning connector, etc.). The device that may be connected to the computing device 2600 may include a plurality of ports configured to accept fiber optic connectors. Thus, the device may be configured to convert optical signals into electrical signals that may be transmitted through the port connecting the device to the computing device 2600 for processing. Due to the ever-changing nature of computers and networks, the Figure 2 The description of the computing device 2600 depicted in FIG. 2 is intended only as a specific example for the purpose of illustrating a preferred embodiment of the device. Figure 2 Many other configurations of the systems depicted with more or fewer components are possible.

[0300] It should be noted that the above embodiments illustrate rather than limit the present invention, and that those skilled in the art will be able to design many alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the present invention as defined by the appended claims. In the claims, any reference numerals in parentheses shall not be interpreted as limiting the claims. The words "comprise" and "comprising" and the like do not exclude the presence of elements or steps other than those listed in any claim or the entire specification. In this specification, "comprise" means "include or consist of...", and "comprising" means "including or consist of...". The singular form of an element does not exclude the plural form of such elements, and vice versa. The present invention can be implemented by hardware comprising several different elements and by a suitably programmed computer. In a device claim that lists several means, several of these means may be implemented by one and the same hardware. The fact that certain means are recorded in mutually different dependent claims does not mean that a combination of these means cannot be used advantageously.

[0301] appendix

[0302] Algorithm 1 Key Generation

[0303] Domain parameters (curve, cardinality n, generator G)

[0304] Input: N / A

[0305] Output: Blind key share α A(1) ,α A(2) ,...,α A(i) ,...,α A(m)

[0306] For a threshold of l shards from (m) participants, construct the blinding key segment α A(i) , the blinding key segment is associated with participant (i) and (m-1) participants designated as participant (h), which is the other party with whom participant (i) exchanges secrets to sign the blinding key.

[0307] In this scheme, m is the total number of participants, where l≤m, so i=m-1

[0308] Therefore, there exists a (l+1,m)-threshold sharing scheme.

[0309] The method of Algorithm 1 is as follows:

[0310] 1)(j) Each participant p (i) Each participant exchanges an ECC public key (or, in this implementation, an address) with all other participants. This address is the group identity address and does not need to be used for any other purpose.

[0311] It should be noted that this is a derived address disclosed, for example, in international patent application WO2017 / 145016 and is based on a key from a shared value between each participant of the process disclosed therein.

[0312] 2) Each participant p (i) A (k-1)-th degree polynomial f with random coefficients is chosen in a way unknown to all other parties i (x).

[0313] This function is subject to the secrets of the participants chosen as the free terms of the polynomial The value is not shared. The value is calculated using the derived private key.

[0314] f i (h) is limited to the function f (x) The result of function f (x) By participant p (i) To choose the value at point (x=h), participant p (i) The basic equation for is restricted to functions:

[0315] In this equation, a0 is the (i) secret and is not shared.

[0316] Therefore, each participant p (i) There is a secret function f i (x), the function is expressed as a (k-1)-order polynomial, where the free term is defined as a secret of the participants, such that:

[0317]

[0318] 3) Each participant uses P as described above (h) The public key 1 of participant P is encrypted (h) of and exchange P (h) The value is used for decryption.

[0319] It should be noted that for any base point G,

[0320] Therefore, for any set of integers that can be represented as (b,b1,b2,...) If bG=[b1G+b2G+...]modp, then b=[b1+b2+...]modn. In addition, if bG=[b1b2...]modp, then b=[b1b2...]modn.

[0321] Given that is a field, and the value chosen as the ECC private key can be effectively Lagrange interpolated modulo n, and it is concluded that Shamir's secret sharing scheme SSSS[5] can be The conditions for achieving the above.

[0322] 4) Each participant P (i) Broadcast the following value to all participants.

[0323]

[0324] The value associated with the variable h in the above equation can be the participant P (h) position, so that if participant P (h) If h={1,...,j} represents the third participant in the scheme, then h=3, or equivalently may represent the value of the ECC public key used by the participant as an integer. There are use cases and scenarios for either implementation. In the latter implementation, the value h={1,...,j} will be replaced by an array of values ​​mapped to the public keys used by a single participant.

[0325] 5) Each participant P (h≠i) Verify the consistency of the received share with the shares received from every other participant. That is:

[0326]

[0327] f i (h) G is consistent with what the participants share.

[0328] 6) Each participant P (h≠i) Verify that the participant (P (h≠i) ) has and receives shares that are consistent with other received shares:

[0329]

[0330] If there is a disagreement, the participant rejects the protocol and starts over.

[0331] 7) Now, participant p (i) Share it A(i) Calculated as:

[0332]

[0333] in, And d A(j)

[0334] as well as

[0335] Where: Q A =Exp-Interpolate(f1,L,f j )>[=G×d A ]

[0336] return( d A(i) ,Q A )

[0337] Now, participant p (i) The share is used in computing the signature. It can be collected by any participant or by a party acting as a coordinator in the signature collection process. (c) to play this role. Participant p (c) Can vary, and does not need to be the same party on each attempt to collect enough shares to sign a transaction.

[0338] Thus, a private key share has been created without knowing the shares of other participants

[0339] Algorithm 2 updates the private key

[0340] Input: Private key d A Participants P i The sharing of A(i) .

[0341] Output: Participant P i The new private key share d A(i) '.

[0342] Algorithm 2 can be used to update private keys and add randomness to the protocol.

[0343] The recalculation of the hierarchical subkeys can be performed without the need to reconstruct or even have the calculated private key exist. In this way, a hierarchy of addresses and private key pieces can be constructed that, when properly deployed, will eliminate any large-scale fraud or database theft that has occurred in the past.

[0344] 1) Each participant chooses a (k-1)th degree random polynomial subject to the constraint that its free term is 0. This is similar to Algorithm 1, but the participant must verify that the chosen secret of all other participants is zero.

[0345] It should be noted that: Here, 0 is the infinite point on the elliptic curve.

[0346] Using this equation, all active participants verify the function:

[0347]

[0348] For an analogy, see Feldman (1987).

[0349] Generate zero shares:

[0350] 2)d A(i )′=d A(i) +z i

[0351] 3) Return: d A(i )′

[0352] The result of this algorithm is a new key share associated with the original private key. A variation of this algorithm enables increasing the randomness of the first algorithm or engaging in a re-sharing exercise, which results in new key slices without changing the address. In this way, the protocol of the present invention allows a group to additionally mask private key shares without changing the underlying private key. This process can be used to minimize any potential key leakage associated with the continued use and deployment of individual key shares without changing the underlying addresses and private keys.

[0353] Algorithm 3 signature generation

[0354] Domain parameters: curve, cardinality n, generator G

[0355] Input: message to be signed e = H(m)

[0356] Private key share A(i) ∈Z n *

[0357] Output: Signature For e = H(m)

[0358] A) Distributed Key Generation

[0359] 1) Generate a temporary key share using Algorithm 1:

[0360]

[0361] 2) Generate mask sharing using Algorithm 1:

[0362]

[0363] 3) Generate mask sharing using Algorithm 2:

[0364]

[0365] B) Signature Generation

[0366] 4) e = H(m) verifies the hash of message m

[0367] 5) Broadcast

[0368] θ i =D k(i) α i +β i mod n

[0369] as well as

[0370] ω i =G×α i

[0371] 6)μ=Interpolate(θ i ,...,θ n )mod n

[0372] >[=D k α mod n[

[0373] 7)θ=Exp-Interpolate(ω1,...,ω n )

[0374] > = [G × α]

[0375] 8) Calculate (R x ,R y ),in,

[0376]

[0377] 9) r=r x =R x modn

[0378] If r=0, then restart (i.e., start from the initial distribution)

[0379] 10) Broadcast S i =D k(i) (e+D A(i) r)+C i mod n

[0380] 11) S = Interpolate(s i ,...,s n )modn

[0381] If s=0, redo Algorithm 3 (A.1) from the beginning.

[0382] 12) Return (r, s)

[0383] 13) Reconstruct the transaction using the (r,s) pair to form a standard transaction.

[0384] References

[0385] 1) Bar-Ilan, J. Beaver, "Non-Cryptographic Fault-Tolerant Computing in a Constant Number of Rounds", Proc. of the 8th PODC, pp. 201-209, 1989.

[0386] 2) Berlekamp, ​​Elwyn R. (1968), Algebraic Coding Theory, McGraw–Hill, New York, NY.

[0387] 3) Benger, N., van de Pol, J., Smart, NP, Yarom, Y.: “Ooh Aah…Just a Little Bit”: A Small Amount of Side Channel Can Go a Long Way, In: Batina, L., Robshaw, M. (Eds.) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems | CHES 2014, LNCS, Vol. 8731, pp. 75-92. Springer (2014)

[0388] 4) Ben-Or, M., Goldwasser, S., Wigderson, A.: “Completeness theorems for noncryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation”, In: Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 1-10, STOC '88, ACM, New York, NY, USA (1988)

[0389] 5) Chaum, David (1983), “Blind signatures for untraceable payments” (PDF), Advances in Cryptology Proceedings of Crypto, 82(3): 199–203.

[0390] 6) Chen TS, Huang GS, Liu TP and Chung YF (2002), "Digital Signature Scheme Resulted from Identification Protocol for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem", Proceedings of IEEE TENCON'02, pp. 192-195

[0391] 7) Chinnici M. (1995), “CUDA Based Implementation of Parallelized Pollard's rho algorithm for Menezes A. and Vanstone S. Elliptic Curve Systems”, Proposed IEEE P1363 Standard, p. 142.

[0392] 8) Chwei-Shyong Tsai, Min-Shiang Hwang, Pei-Chen Sung, "Blind Signature Scheme Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (http: / / mshwang.ccs.asia.edu.tw / www / myjournal / P191.pdf.)

[0393] 9) Dawson, E.; Donovan, D. (1994), “The breadth of Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme”, Computers & Security, 13: 69–78

[0394] 10) Desmedt.Yuo (1987), "Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: A New Concept", in A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO'87), Carl Pomerance (ed.), Springer-Verlag, London, UK, 120-127.

[0395] 11) ElGamal T. (1985), “A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms”, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 31, pp. 469-472.

[0396] 12) Feldman. P. "A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing", Proceedings of the 28th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 1987, pp. 427-437.

[0397] 13) Gennaro, R., Jarecki, S., Krawczyk, H., Rabin, T.: “Robust threshold DSS signatures”, In: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, 354–371, EUROCRYPT’96, Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg (1996).

[0398] 14) Ibrahim, M., Ali, I., Ibrahim, I., El-sawi, A.: “A robust threshold elliptic curve digital signature providing a new verifiable secret sharing scheme”, In: Circuits and Systems, 2003 IEEE 46th Midwest Symposium on, Vol. 1, pp. 276–280 (2003)

[0399] 15) Johnson, D., Menezes, A., Vanstone, S.: "The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ecdsa)", International Journal of Information Security, 1(1), 36–63 (2001)

[0400] 16) Chakraborty, Kalyan & Mehta, Jay (2011) "A Stamped Blind Signature Scheme based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem" (http: / / ijns.femto.com.tw / contents / ijns-v14-n6 / ijns-2012-v14-n6-p316-319.pdf)

[0401] 17) Kapoor, Vivek, Vivek Sonny Abraham, and Ramesh Singh., “Elliptic Curve Cryptography,” Ubiquity 2008, no. May (2008): 1-8

[0402] 18) Knuth, DE (1997), "The Art of Computer Programming, II: Seminumerical Algorithms" (3rd ed.), Addison-Wesley, p. 505.

[0403] 19) Koblitz, N. "An Elliptic Curve Implementation of the Finite Field Digital Signature Algorithm", In: Advances in Cryptology – Crypto'98. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1462, pp. 327-337, 1998, Springer-Verlag

[0404] 20) Liu CL (1968), “Introduction to Combinatorial Mathematics”, New York: McGraw-Hill.

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Claims

1. A method for obtaining digitally signed data, the method comprising: sending first data from at least one first participant to at least one second participant, wherein the first data is based on second data accessible to at least one first participant, and wherein the second data is inaccessible to the or each second participant; receiving a digital signature of said first data from at least one of said second participants; and The digital signature of the first data is processed by at least one of the first participants to provide a digital signature of the second data.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the digital signature of the second data is provided by processing the digital signature of the first data by a plurality of the first participants to provide sharing of the digital signature of the second data, wherein, The digital signature of the second data is accessible through a threshold number of the shares and is inaccessible to less than the threshold number of shares.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: Each of said shares of said digital signature of said second data comprises a share of a plurality of first secret values ​​shared between a plurality of said first participants by means of Joint Random Secret Sharing, JRSS.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein: Each of the shares of the digital signature of the second data comprises at least one first mask share shared among the plurality of first participants via Joint Zero Secret Sharing JZSS.

5. The method according to claim 3, wherein: The first data is generated through shares of the first data such that the first data is accessible through a threshold number of the shares and is inaccessible to less than the threshold number of shares.

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein: Each of said shares of said first data comprises a share of a plurality of said first secret values ​​shared among said plurality of said first participants by joint random secret sharing JRSS.

7. The method according to claim 6, wherein: Each of the shares of the first data comprises at least one second mask share shared among the plurality of first participants via joint zero secret sharing JZSS.

8. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: Third data based on a plurality of second secret values ​​is received from at least one of the second participants.

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein: A digital signature of the first data is generated by sharing the digital signature of the first data shared among a plurality of the second participants, wherein the digital signature of the first data is accessible through a threshold number of the shares and is inaccessible to less than the threshold number of the shares.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein: Each of said shares of said digital signature of said first data comprises a share of a plurality of second secret values ​​shared among a plurality of said second participants by means of Joint Random Secret Sharing JRSS.

11. The method according to claim 10, wherein: Each of said shares of said digital signature of said first data comprises at least one third mask share shared among said plurality of said second participants via Joint Zero Secret Sharing JZSS.

12. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The second data is a message.

13. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The second data is a hash value of the message.

14. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The first data is a blockchain transaction.

15. The method according to claim 1, wherein: At least one of the digital signatures is based on a cryptographic system having homomorphic properties.

16. The method according to claim 15, wherein: At least one of the digital signatures is based on elliptic curve cryptography.

17. A computer-implemented system comprising: processor; as well as A memory comprising executable instructions which, due to execution by a processor, cause the system to perform any embodiment of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 16.

18. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having executable instructions stored thereon, wherein the executable instructions, when executed by a processor of a computer system, cause the computer system to at least perform an embodiment of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 16.