Carrier, electronic equipment and information synchronization method

By setting up a first path and a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip, the root key and security status are synchronized, which solves the problem of data theft, tampering or forgery during data transmission and improves communication security and data integrity.

CN118981805APending Publication Date: 2024-11-19LENOVO (BEIJING) LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411047822.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-31
Publication Date
2024-11-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

During data transmission between the processor and the embedded security chip, data may be stolen, tampered with, or forged. The embedded security chip cannot verify the authenticity and legality of the data, leading to increased security risks.

Method used

A first path and a second path are set between the processor and the embedded security chip. The first path is used to transmit the root key and encryption request, and the second path realizes the synchronization of the security state through different hardware connections, including a first register and a second register to reflect the security state of the processor, and performs real-time synchronization through the second hardware.

Benefits of technology

It enables rapid synchronization of security status between the processor and the embedded security chip, ensuring that the embedded security chip is aware of the processor's true security status in a timely manner, thereby improving communication security, preventing data leakage and tampering, and maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of data.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention provides a carrier, electronic equipment and an information synchronization method, which are applied to the technical field of communication security. The carrier comprises: a processor for generating a root key; the embedded security chip is used for processing the encryption request based on the root key; a first path and a second path exist between the processor and the embedded security chip; wherein the first path is connected with the processor and the embedded security chip through the first hardware, the second path is connected with the processor and the embedded security chip through the second hardware, and the first hardware is different from the second hardware; the first path is used for sending a root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip, and the second path is used for transmitting the current security state of the processor to the embedded security chip.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure relates to the field of communication security technology, and more specifically, to a carrier, an electronic device and an information synchronization method. Background Art

[0002] As a hardware module specially used for secure storage and sensitive data processing, embedded security chips are widely used in mobile devices. They cooperate with the processor to process related requests to improve data security, reduce security risks, and provide more reliable security protection for the device.

[0003] However, since data transfer between the processor and the embedded security chip needs to pass through the non-secure domain, data may be stolen, tampered with or forged during the data transmission process, and the embedded security chip cannot confirm the authenticity and legality of the received data. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of this, the present disclosure provides a carrier, an electronic device and an information synchronization method.

[0005] The first aspect of the present disclosure provides a carrier for carrying and conducting electronic components, including: a processor for generating a root key; an embedded security chip for processing encryption requests based on the root key; a first path and a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip; wherein the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware, and the first hardware is different from the second hardware; the first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip, and the second path is used to transmit the current security status of the processor to the embedded security chip.

[0006] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the carrier also includes: a first register, which is set in the processor, and the state of the first register matches the current security state of the processor; a second register, which is set in the embedded security chip, and the state of the second register is used to reflect the current security state of the processor; the first register and the second register are connected based on the second hardware, and in response to the state of the first register being changed, the state of the second register is changed synchronously.

[0007] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the second hardware is an integrated circuit, and the state of the second register can be changed by the state of the first register.

[0008] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the first register is a one-time programmable non-volatile memory; if the processor changes the data stored in the first register, the first register changes from a connected readable state to a disconnected non-readable state.

[0009] A second aspect of the present disclosure provides an electronic device, comprising: a processor, for generating a root key; an embedded security chip, for processing encryption requests based on the root key when the security state of the processor is trusted; a first path and a second path exist between the processor and the embedded security chip; wherein the first path is connected via a first hardware connection, and the second path is connected via a second hardware connection, the first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip, and the second path is used to transmit the current security state of the processor to the embedded security chip.

[0010] The third aspect of the present disclosure provides an information synchronization method, which is applied to a processor, including: obtaining the security status of the processor; synchronizing the security status to an embedded security chip based on a second path; wherein the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware, and there is a first path between the processor and the embedded security chip that is different from the second path; the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through the first hardware; and the embedded security chip receives an encryption request through the first path.

[0011] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method also includes: when the security state is an untrusted state, updating the state of the first register to a first state characterizing that the processor is in an untrusted state; in response to the state of the first register being updated to the first state, controlling the second hardware to send a signal to the embedded security chip characterizing that the processor is in an untrusted state.

[0012] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method further includes: generating a root key in response to powering on the device; and sending the root key to the embedded security chip based on the first path.

[0013] The fourth aspect of the present disclosure provides an information synchronization method, which is applied to an embedded security chip, including: obtaining the security status of the processor based on a second path; when the security status indicates that the processor is in an untrusted state, refusing to receive encryption requests from a first path; wherein the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through second hardware, and the first hardware is different from the second hardware.

[0014] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method further includes: when the security state represents that the processor is in a trusted state, processing the received encryption request based on the root key; wherein the root key is transmitted from the processor to the embedded security chip based on the first path. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0015] The above and other objects, features and advantages of the present disclosure will become more apparent through the following description of the embodiments of the present disclosure with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0016] Figure 1 A block diagram of a carrier according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0017] Figure 2 A block diagram of a carrier according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0018] Figure 3 The schematic diagram shows the principle diagram of information transmission by the carrier according to the embodiment of the present disclosure;

[0019] Figure 4 A block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0020] Figure 5 A schematic diagram showing a method for implementing information synchronization by a carrier or an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is shown;

[0021] Figure 6 A flowchart of an information synchronization method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0022] Figure 7 A flowchart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0023] Figure 8 A flowchart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0024] Fig. 9 A flowchart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown;

[0025] Fig.10 The following schematically shows a flow chart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0026] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, it should be understood that these descriptions are exemplary only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. In the following detailed description, for ease of explanation, many specific details are set forth to provide a comprehensive understanding of the embodiments of the present disclosure. However, it is apparent that one or more embodiments may also be implemented without these specific details. In addition, in the following description, descriptions of known structures and technologies are omitted to avoid unnecessary confusion of the concepts of the present disclosure.

[0027] The terms used herein are only for describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present disclosure. The terms "comprise", "include", etc. used herein indicate the existence of the features, steps, operations and / or components, but do not exclude the existence or addition of one or more other features, steps, operations or components.

[0028] All terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the meanings commonly understood by those skilled in the art unless otherwise defined. It should be noted that the terms used herein should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the context of this specification and should not be interpreted in an idealized or overly rigid manner.

[0029] When using expressions such as "at least one of A, B, and C, etc.", they should generally be interpreted according to the meaning of the expression commonly understood by those skilled in the art (for example, "a system having at least one of A, B, and C" should include but is not limited to a system having A alone, B alone, C alone, A and B, A and C, B and C, and / or A, B, C, etc.).

[0030] The embodiments of the present disclosure provide a carrier, an electronic device, and an information synchronization method. Before introducing the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure, the related technologies involved in the present disclosure are first described.

[0031] The Central Processing Unit (CPU) is the core component of a computer system, responsible for executing instructions in computer programs and processing various data. During the power-on process of the device, the hardware root trust module in the CPU generates a RoT (root of trust, also known as a root key) and sends the generated RoT to the eSE (Embedded Secure Element) chip for the eSE chip to process sensitive information.

[0032] The Root of Trust (RoT) is a source that can always be trusted in the cryptographic system and is a trusted representation of the terminal key system. It is used to generate, protect and manage digital certificates and keys. Authentication of received requests based on the RoT can ensure that the received keys and other encrypted information are authentic and authorized.

[0033] The bootloader is located in the storage medium of a computer or mobile device. It is responsible for loading the operating system kernel when the system starts up and initializing and configuring the system. The bootloader is usually pre-installed by the manufacturer of the computer or mobile device and is used to control the system startup process. When the bootloader is unlocked, it means that the user or a third party can modify the loaded operating system or the boot process, thereby destroying the trust chain originally set by the manufacturer. Therefore, when the bootloader is unlocked, the system may be in an untrusted state.

[0034] As an embedded security element, the Embedded Secure Element (eSE) chip is used to provide the eSE StrongBox service. The eSE StrongBox service is mainly used to securely store and process sensitive information, and is often used in business scenarios with high security requirements, such as mobile payment, identity authentication, and encrypted communication. The eSE StrongBox service is designed to protect sensitive data through the built-in security elements of the eSE chip (such as secure key storage, encryption engine, etc.), and provide secure data storage and processing functions to prevent malware or unauthorized visitors from obtaining information.

[0035] However, the eSE strongbox service is built on the non-secure world in the system. In the system, there are two main execution environments: the secure domain and the non-secure domain. The secure domain is a trusted execution environment supported by hardware, while the non-secure domain is a normal operating system execution environment. The eSE StrongBox service needs to run in the secure domain to ensure the security of its functions and data while communicating with the non-secure domain.

[0036] Since data transfer between the processor and the embedded security chip needs to pass through the non-secure domain, and the non-secure domain lacks the necessary security protection measures, the data may be stolen, tampered with or forged during the data transmission process, resulting in damage to data integrity, affecting the credibility of the data, and increasing security risks.

[0037] The embedded security chip cannot obtain the real security status of the central processor in time to verify the correctness of the received data. For example, when the boortloader is unlocked, the risky software uses an unsafe third-party operating system to replace the original operating system of the system. At this time, the RoT obtained by the embedded security chip from the central processor may be the RoT that has been reset or tampered with without authorization, which will cause the eSE strongbox service provided by the embedded security chip to be abnormal, seriously endangering the security of the system.

[0038] Based on the above problems, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a carrier for carrying and conducting electronic components, including: a processor for generating a root key; an embedded security chip for processing encryption requests based on the root key; there is a first path and a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip; wherein the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware, and the first hardware is different from the second hardware; the first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip, and the second path is used to transmit the current security status of the processor to the embedded security chip.

[0039] The disclosed embodiment of the present invention realizes rapid synchronization of the security status between the processor and the embedded security chip by setting a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip, so that the embedded security chip synchronizes the security status of the central processor in a timely manner, thereby improving communication security.

[0040] Figure 1 A block diagram of a carrier according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0041] like Figure 1 As shown, the carrier is used to carry and conduct electronic components, and can be, for example, a circuit board. The carrier 100 includes a processor 110 , an embedded security chip 120 , a first path 130 , and a second path 140 .

[0042] The processor 110 is configured to generate a root key.

[0043] The processor 110 may be a central processing unit (CPU), which is responsible for generating a root of trust (RoT) in the early stage of system startup, wherein the RoT is the basis for ensuring the integrity and credibility of each component during the system startup process. In addition, the processor 110 is also used to execute instructions in a computer program and process various data.

[0044] The embedded security chip 120 is used to process encryption requests based on the root key.

[0045] There are a first path and a second path between the processor 110 and the embedded security chip 120 .

[0046] The first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip. For example, after the processor 110 generates or updates the root key, the root key generated or updated by the processor is sent to the embedded security chip 120 based on the first path. In addition, the first path is also used to send an encryption request to the embedded security chip.

[0047] Specifically, the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware. The first hardware is different from the second hardware.

[0048] Exemplarily, the first hardware may be a serial peripheral interface (SPI) interface, which transmits and receives data based on a synchronous serial data bus protocol to implement data exchange. The processor sends the generated root key to the embedded security chip through the first hardware.

[0049] Furthermore, the first hardware may also include multiple interfaces with different security levels to meet different data transmission requirements. For example, a root key generated by a processor is sent to an embedded security chip based on a first interface, and an encryption request is sent to the embedded security chip based on a second interface, wherein the security level of the first interface is higher than that of the second interface. By setting interfaces with different security levels, the security and reliability of root key transmission are further improved.

[0050] The second path is used to transmit the current security status of the processor to the embedded security chip. In response to changes in the processor security status, information is promptly transmitted to the embedded security chip through the second path to timely update the security status of the processor in the embedded security chip. The information transmission process of the second path is not subject to interference and manipulation at the software level, and the security of the second path is greater than that of the first path.

[0051] The second hardware is an integrated circuit (Power Management Integrated Circuit, PMIC) that can send pulse signals, which is used to change the state of the second register accordingly when the state of the first register changes. The second hardware can be, for example, a 555 controller, a microcontroller, an FPGA, etc. Different security states correspond to different pulse signals. If the current security state of the processor changes, the second hardware sends a corresponding pulse signal to the embedded security chip to promptly transmit the current security state of the processor to the embedded security chip.

[0052] In some embodiments, when the processor security state is trusted, the pulse signal generated by the second hardware is a square wave pulse signal; when the processor security state is untrusted, the pulse signal generated by the second hardware is a triangular wave pulse signal. If the current security state of the processor is changed to untrusted, the second hardware sends a triangular pulse signal to the embedded security chip to indicate that the processor security state is untrusted.

[0053] It should be noted that the above pulse signals are only exemplary and do not mean that the pulse signals are limited to the above forms. Technicians can also configure complex and personalized pulse signals according to actual needs to improve the security of the pulse signals and prevent the information represented by the pulse signals from being cracked.

[0054] Figure 2 A block diagram of a carrier according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0055] like Figure 2 As shown, in Figure 1 Based on the carrier shown in FIG. 1 , the carrier 100 of this embodiment may further include a first register and a second register. It should be noted that the implementation details of other parts of the carrier of this embodiment can be found in FIG. Figure 1The embodiment part of the carrier shown is not described in detail here.

[0056] like Figure 2 As shown, the carrier is used to carry and conduct electronic components, including a processor 110 , an embedded security chip 120 , a first path 130 , a second path 140 , a first register 111 , and a second register 121 .

[0057] The first register 111 is set in the processor 110. The state of the first register matches the current security state of the processor. The current security state of the processor can be obtained by reading the state of the first register.

[0058] The first register may be a one-time programmable non-volatile memory. If the processor changes the data stored in the first register, the first register changes from a connected readable state to a disconnected non-readable state.

[0059] In the embodiment of the present disclosure, the connected readable state of the first register corresponds to a security state of the processor being a trusted state, and the disconnected non-readable state of the first register corresponds to a security state of the processor being an untrusted state.

[0060] The first register may include an electronic fuse (eFuse), a one-time programmable memory (OTP), a mask ROM, or the like.

[0061] The disclosed embodiment is described by taking the first register as an electronic fuse. The electronic fuse works based on the principle of electronic fusing, which represents data "0" or "1" by short circuit or open circuit. Once programmed, the data will be permanently retained and cannot be erased or rewritten.

[0062] When the security state of processor 110 is a trusted state, the eFuse is in a pass state (i.e., connected and readable state). When the security state of the processor changes to an untrusted state, the processor applies current or voltage to blow the eFuse, so that the electrical characteristics of the eFuse are permanently changed to a blown state (disconnected and unreadable state). This state cannot be changed or erased, and can effectively prevent malicious tampering by unsafe software.

[0063] In some embodiments, the first code logic that controls the processor to change the state of the first register is stored in a read-only memory (ROM) built into the processor. When the security state of the processor becomes an untrusted state, the first code logic stored in the ROM is automatically activated, and this activation will not be interfered with or manipulated by any software level (such as TEE and REE), and has high security and confidentiality.

[0064] In some embodiments, the security state of the processor 110 may be determined based on the state of the boot loader. If the boot loader is unlocked, it means that the authority of the processor may be replaced by a third party, and at this time, the security state of the processor 110 becomes untrusted.

[0065] Further, when it is detected that the state of the boot loader has changed to the unlocked state, the first code logic stored in the ROM is automatically activated to control the processor to change the state of the first register to change the first register from a connected readable state to a disconnected non-readable state.

[0066] Since the first register is a one-time programmable non-volatile memory, its state cannot be restored after it is changed. Therefore, when the first register becomes disconnected and non-readable, the information that "the processor security state is untrusted" will be permanently saved and will not be changed. Even if the unsafe software controls the device to restart, it can still be determined that the processor's current security state is untrusted by reading the state of the first register.

[0067] By associating the first register state with the security state of the processor, the security state of the processor can be directly reflected from a physical level, thereby ensuring the correctness of the read security state of the processor.

[0068] The second register 121 is set in the embedded security chip 120, and the state of the second register is used to reflect the current security state of the processor.

[0069] In some embodiments, the first register and the second register are connected based on a second hardware connection, and in response to a state of the first register being changed, a state of the second register is synchronously changed.

[0070] When the state of the first register changes to a disconnected and unreadable state, the processor controls the second hardware to send a specified pulse signal to the second register to synchronously change the state of the second register, indicating to the embedded security chip that the current security state of the processor is an untrusted state.

[0071] Exemplarily, in response to the state of the first register being a disconnected non-readable state, the second logic code stored in the ROM is automatically activated to control the second hardware to send a signal to the embedded security chip indicating that the processor is in an untrusted state, so as to transmit the current state of the processor to the embedded security chip.

[0072] The second register may be, for example, a status register, and the status information in the register may be updated based on a pulse signal sent by the second hardware.

[0073] For example, when a triangular wave pulse signal indicating that the current state of the processor is an untrusted state is received, the state information in the second register will also be changed synchronously to indicate that the current security state of the processor is an untrusted state.

[0074] The embedded security chip can know the current security state of the processor by reading the state information in the second register, and perform corresponding operations based on the current security state of the processor. When the current security state of the processor is untrusted, the embedded security chip 120 refuses to receive the encryption request.

[0075] The disclosed embodiment sets the first register, the second register and the second hardware to synchronize information between the processor and the embedded security chip, so that the embedded security chip can know the current real security status of the processor in a timely manner and make a correct response in a timely manner to avoid leakage and tampering of sensitive data, which helps to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the data and ensure the security and credibility of the computing environment.

[0076] Specifically, the present disclosure sets the first register to reflect the current security status of the processor. Once the state of the first register is determined to be unchangeable, the authenticity of the processor's security status can be effectively guaranteed. In addition, the state synchronization between the first register and the second register is achieved through the second hardware, so that the embedded security chip can obtain the current security status of the processor in a timely manner. Compared with the first path, the information transmission speed of the second path is faster, which can effectively reduce the transmission delay, and the second path is not easily affected by external interference, which can effectively improve the real-time and accuracy of information synchronization.

[0077] Figure 3 The schematic diagram shows the principle of information transmission by a carrier according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0078] Combination Figure 3 right Figure 1 and Figure 2 The process of information transmission in the carrier is further explained. It should be noted that the implementation details of other parts of the carrier of this embodiment can be found in Figure 1 or Figure 2 The embodiment part of the carrier shown is not described in detail here.

[0079] like Figure 3 As shown, there is a first path and a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip.

[0080] Exemplarily, the first path can complete the communication between the processor and the embedded security chip based on a secure driver (Secure driver), a functional module trusted application (KeyMint TA), a functional module hardware abstraction layer (KeyMint HAL), a Strongbox hardware abstraction layer (Strongbox HAL) and an eSE serial peripheral interface (eSE SPI Driver).

[0081] In response to device startup, the bootloader runs. The bootloader is responsible for initializing the hardware, loading the operating system kernel and starting the system, as well as passing system control to the TEE to start a secure operating environment. The hardware root trust module (not shown in the figure) in the TEE generates the root of trust.

[0082] In some embodiments, the Secure driver and KeyMint TA are in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The KeyMint TA is responsible for managing and executing key-related operations to ensure that the transmitted information is protected. The Secure driver is responsible for establishing a secure channel between the processor and the embedded security chip to ensure the secure transmission of the root of trust and prevent middle attacks or data tampering. The KeyMint HAL provides an interface to access the TEE to achieve secure communication between the operating system and the TEE. The generated root of trust can be extracted from the TEE environment based on the KeyMint HAL, and the extracted root of trust can be sent to the Strongbox HAL, which will send the root of trust to the secure area inside the embedded security chip. The transmission of the root key between the processor and the embedded security chip is completed.

[0083] Among them, the process of obtaining and sending the root key by KeyMint HAL and Strongbox HAL can be completed based on the Framework KeyStore Service in the Android framework. Framework KeyStoreService is a service for secure storage and management of keys, mainly used for key storage, access control, key exchange and secure transmission. In addition, applications can also send encryption requests to the embedded security chip through the Framework KeyStore Service.

[0084] The second path is based on the first register, the second register and the second hardware to communicate between the processor and the embedded security chip. The first register is set inside the processor and controlled by the CPU BROM in the processor. In response to the bootloader being unlocked, the CPU BROM changes the state of the first register. In response to the change in the state of the first register, the second hardware sends a specified signal to the first register to indicate that the current state of the processor is untrustworthy.

[0085] Compared with the first path, the second path information transmission does not need to be processed by software, which can effectively avoid software-level delays and overheads, and the second path is more specialized, which can effectively improve the efficiency of information transmission. Therefore, by setting the second path, the present disclosure can receive the security status of the processor in advance before the embedded security chip receives the information transmitted by the first path, realize security status early warning, and effectively prevent the security chip from being deceived by risk information sent by risky software.

[0086] Figure 4 A block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0087] like Figure 4 As shown, the electronic device 400 includes a processor 401 and an embedded security chip 402 .

[0088] Processor 401 is used to generate a root key.

[0089] The processor 401 may be a central processing unit (CPU), which is responsible for generating a root of trust (RoT) in the early stage of system startup, wherein the RoT is the basis for ensuring the integrity and credibility of each component during the system startup process. In addition, the processor 401 is also used to execute instructions in a computer program and process various data.

[0090] The embedded security chip 402 is used to process encryption requests based on the root key.

[0091] There are a first path and a second path between the processor 401 and the embedded security chip 402. The first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip. For example, after the processor 401 generates or updates the root key, the root key generated or updated by the processor is sent to the embedded security chip 402 based on the first path. In addition, the first path is also used to send an encryption request to the embedded security chip 402.

[0092] The second path 413 is used to transmit the current security state of the processor 401 to the embedded security chip 402. In response to the change in the security state of the processor, information is promptly transmitted to the embedded security chip through the second path 413 to timely update the security state of the processor in the embedded security chip. The information transmission process of the second path is not subject to interference and manipulation at the software level, and the security of the second path is greater than that of the first path.

[0093] Specifically, the processor 401 can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to the program stored in the read-only memory (ROM) 403 or the program loaded from the storage part 409 to the random access memory (RAM) 404. The processor 401 may include, for example, a general-purpose microprocessor (e.g., a CPU), an instruction set processor and / or a related chipset and / or a dedicated microprocessor (e.g., an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)), etc. The processor 401 may also include an onboard memory for caching purposes. The processor 401 may include a single processing unit or multiple processing units for performing different actions of the method flow according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0094] In the RAM 404 , various programs and data necessary for the operation of the electronic device 400 are stored.

[0095] The processor 401 , the ROM 403 , and the RAM 404 are connected to each other via a bus 405 . The bus 405 may further include a first path. The processor 401 and the embedded security chip 402 are connected to each other via the first path in the bus 405 .

[0096] The processor 401 performs various operations of the method flow according to the embodiment of the present disclosure by executing the program in the ROM 403 and / or the RAM 404. It should be noted that the program may also be stored in one or more memories other than the ROM 403 and the RAM 404. The processor 401 may also perform various operations of the method flow according to the embodiment of the present disclosure by executing the program stored in the one or more memories.

[0097] According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the electronic device 400 may further include an input / output (I / O) interface 406, which is also connected to the bus 405. The electronic device 400 may further include one or more of the following components connected to the I / O interface 406: an input portion 407 including a keyboard, a mouse, etc.; an output portion 408 including a cathode ray tube (CRT), a liquid crystal display (LCD), etc., and a speaker, etc.; a storage portion 409 including a hard disk, etc.; and a communication portion 410 including a network interface card such as a LAN card, a modem, etc. The communication portion 410 performs communication processing via a network such as the Internet. A drive 411 is also connected to the I / O interface 406 as needed. A removable medium 412, such as a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a semiconductor memory, etc., is installed on the drive 411 as needed, so that a computer program read therefrom is installed into the storage portion 409 as needed.

[0098] Based on the above-mentioned carrier and electronic device, the present disclosure also provides an information synchronization method. Figure 5 The principle diagram of the information synchronization method implemented by a carrier or an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0099] like Figure 5 As shown, the processor obtains the state of the first register. When the state of the first register is a disconnected and non-readable state, the processor transmits a specified signal to the embedded security chip through a second path to indicate that the current security state of the processor is an untrusted state, so that the embedded security chip can know the current security state of the processor in a timely manner and perform corresponding operations on the received encryption request based on the current security state of the processor.

[0100] Specifically, when the current security state of the processor is untrustworthy, the embedded security chip refuses to receive the encryption request sent by the software. When the current security state of the processor is trustworthy, the received encryption request is processed based on the root key.

[0101] In some embodiments, the processor transmits a specified signal to the embedded security chip through a second path to characterize that the current security state of the processor is an untrusted state, including: in response to the state of the first register being a disconnected non-readable state, controlling the second hardware to send a specified signal to the embedded security chip to achieve timely transmission of the security state.

[0102] The second hardware is an integrated circuit (Power Management Integrated Circuit, PMIC) that can send pulse signals, such as a 555 controller, a microcontroller, an FPGA, etc.

[0103] The second code logic that controls the second hardware to send a specified signal to the embedded security chip is stored in the processor's built-in read-only memory (ROM). When the state of the first register changes to a disconnected and non-readable state, the second code logic stored in the ROM is automatically activated to control the second hardware to send a specified pulse signal to the embedded security chip to complete the synchronization of the processor's security state. This process will not be interfered with or manipulated by any software layer (such as TEE and REE), and has high security and confidentiality.

[0104] In some embodiments, the state of the first register matches the current security state of the processor. The current security state of the processor can be determined by detecting whether the bootloader has been unlocked or whether the operating system has been tampered with. For example, in response to the bootloader state changing to unlocked, it is determined that the current security state of the processor is an untrusted state, and the data stored in the first register is changed by the processor to change the first register from a connected readable state to a disconnected non-readable state. The first code logic that controls the processor to change the state of the first register is stored in a read-only memory (ROM) built into the processor. When the security state of the processor changes to an untrusted state, the first code logic stored in the ROM is automatically activated.

[0105] The following will be combined Figure 6~Figure 8 The information synchronization method provided by the embodiment of the present disclosure is described in detail.

[0106] Figure 6 The flowchart of the information synchronization method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0107] like Figure 6 As shown, the method is applied to a processor and includes operations S610 to S620.

[0108] In operation S610 , a security state of a processor is acquired.

[0109] In operation S620 , the security state is synchronized to the embedded security chip based on the second path.

[0110] The second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through the second hardware.

[0111] In some embodiments, the security state of the processor is related to the state of the boot loader and / or the operating system. When the boot loader is unlocked or the operating system is maliciously tampered with, the device is easily affected by unsafe software, for example, loading an unsafe operating system kernel in the device, tampering with the secure root of trust and other malicious operations, increasing the possibility of the system being attacked. Therefore, when it is detected that the boot loader is unlocked or the operating system is maliciously tampered with, it means that the security state of the processor is untrustworthy.

[0112] Taking the boot loader as an example, the unlocking status of the boot loader may be stored in a specific area. The unlocking status of the boot loader can be obtained by reading a specific register or storage area. When the unlocking status of the boot loader is unlocked, the security status of the processor is determined to be an untrusted state.

[0113] When the security state of the processor becomes untrustworthy, the security state is synchronized to the embedded security chip based on the second path. The second path is a hardware path, and its information transmission is not controlled by software, which has high security and effectively ensures the security and timeliness of information transmission.

[0114] In some embodiments, when the security state of the processor is untrusted, the state of the first register is updated to a first state representing that the processor is in an untrusted state; in response to the state of the first register being updated to the first state, the second chip is controlled to send a signal to the embedded security chip representing that the processor is in an untrusted state.

[0115] The first register is a single-time programmable non-volatile memory, and the code logic for changing the first register is stored in a ROM built into the processor. After the security state of the processor is acquired based on operation S410, the security state is parsed, and in response to the security state being an untrusted state, the logic code stored in the ROM is automatically activated, and the control processor updates the state of the first register to the first state.

[0116] In response to the state of the first register being the first state, the second hardware is controlled to send a signal to the embedded security chip for indicating that the processor is in an untrusted state. The second hardware is an integrated circuit that can send a pulse signal, and different pulse signals corresponding to different processor security states are different to indicate the current state of the processor.

[0117] In some embodiments, there is a first path between the processor and the embedded security chip that is different from the second path. The first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through first hardware, and the embedded security chip receives an encryption request from the processor based on the first path.

[0118] In some embodiments, the above-mentioned information synchronization method further includes: generating a root key in response to powering on the device; and sending the root key to the embedded security chip based on the first path.

[0119] Specifically, when the device is powered on and starts to boot, the hardware root trust module in the processor verifies the signature of the boot loader and generates a root key of the system, and sends the root key to the embedded security chip based on the first path for the embedded security chip to store or process sensitive data.

[0120] The first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through the first hardware, the first hardware may be a serial peripheral device interface, and the first path may include one or more serial peripheral device interfaces. Different interfaces have different security levels. For example, when sending a root key to the embedded security chip, it can be sent based on the first interface. When sending an encryption request to the embedded security chip, it can be sent based on the second interface. The security level of the first interface is higher than the security level of the second interface.

[0121] Figure 7 The following schematically shows a flow chart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0122] like Figure 7 As shown, in Figure 7 Based on the information synchronization method shown in FIG. 1 , the information synchronization method of this embodiment further includes operations S630 to S640. It should be noted that for other implementation details of the control method of this embodiment, please refer to Figure 6 The embodiment of the information synchronization method shown will not be described in detail here.

[0123] Figure 7 The following schematically shows a flow chart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0124] like Figure 7 As shown, the method is applied to a processor and includes operations S610 to S640.

[0125] In operation S610 , a security state of a processor is acquired.

[0126] In operation S620 , the security state is synchronized to the embedded security chip based on the second path.

[0127] In operation S630 , in response to the security status of the processor being untrusted, a first root key is generated.

[0128] In operation S640 , the first root key is transmitted to the embedded security chip based on the first path.

[0129] In some embodiments, since the state of the first register matches the current security state of the processor, it can be determined whether a new root key needs to be generated based on the state of the first register.

[0130] Specifically, when the first register is in a disconnected and non-readable state, the control processor generates a new root key (i.e., the first root key), and sends the first root key to the embedded security chip based on the first path, so that the embedded security chip can process the received encryption request. Among them, the third code logic for controlling the processor to generate the first root key is stored in the ROM built into the processor. In response to the first register being in a disconnected and non-readable state, the third code logic is automatically activated to control the control processor to generate the first root key. Based on the above-mentioned carrier and electronic device, the present disclosure also provides an information synchronization method. The following will be combined with Figure 8 The information processing method is described in detail.

[0131] Figure 8 The flowchart of the information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0132] like Figure 8 As shown, the method is applied to an embedded security chip and includes operations S810 to S820.

[0133] In operation S810 , a security state of a processor is acquired based on a second path.

[0134] In operation S820, if the security status indicates that the processor is in an untrusted state, the encryption request from the first path is rejected.

[0135] In some embodiments, the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware, and the first hardware and the second hardware are different. The first hardware is a security interface, and the second hardware is an integrated circuit.

[0136] In some embodiments, the embedded security chip further includes a second register, and the embedded security chip obtains the security status of the processor by reading the status of the second register.

[0137] The second hardware changes the state of the second register through the state of the first register. In response to the state of the first register being changed to a disconnected non-readable state, the second hardware sends a designated signal to the second register to synchronize the states of the first register and the second register.

[0138] When the second register receives a designated signal sent by the second hardware, the state of the second register is changed. The second register may be, for example, a status register. When a signal sent by the second hardware to indicate that the processor security state is untrustworthy is received, the state in the second register is changed to untrustworthy. The embedded security chip determines the current state of the processor through the state of the second register.

[0139] In the security state, the processor is in an untrusted state and refuses to receive encryption requests from the first path, preventing the reception of wrong or forged root of trust, avoiding the sSE from being deceived, and ensuring communication security.

[0140] Fig. 9 The flowchart of the information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure is schematically shown.

[0141] like Fig. 9 As shown, in Figure 8 Based on the information synchronization method shown in FIG. 1 , the information synchronization method of this embodiment further includes operation S930. It should be noted that for other implementation details of the control method of this embodiment, please refer to FIG. Figure 8 The embodiment of the information synchronization method shown will not be described in detail here.

[0142] like Fig. 9 As shown, the method is applied to an embedded security chip and includes operations S910 to S930.

[0143] In operation S910, a security state of a processor is obtained based on a second path;

[0144] In operation S920 , if the security status indicates that the processor is in an untrusted state, the encryption request from the first path is rejected.

[0145] In operation S930 , if the security state represents that the processor is in a trusted state, the received encryption request is processed based on the root key.

[0146] The root key is transmitted from the processor to the embedded security chip based on the first path.

[0147] In some embodiments, when the security state indicates that the processor is in a trusted state, the embedded security chip processes the received encryption request based on the root key.

[0148] Exemplarily, operation S930 may include processing the received encryption request based on the root key: after receiving the encryption request, the embedded security chip decrypts the encrypted data in the request based on the internally stored root key, obtains the operation data sent by the application, and generates a session key based on the decrypted operation data for subsequent encryption and decryption operations. The decrypted request is processed, and after the request processing is completed, the embedded security chip generates response data and encrypts the response data based on the pre-generated session key. The encrypted response data is sent to the application for subsequent processing by the application. The information synchronization method provided in the embodiment of the present disclosure synchronizes information between the processor and the embedded security chip based on the second path, so that the embedded security chip can know the current security status of the processor in a timely manner, avoid leakage and tampering of sensitive data, help maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the data, and ensure the security and credibility of the computing environment.

[0149] Among them, the information synchronization method based on the second path is mainly completed through hardware, is not easily affected by external interference, and can effectively improve the real-time and accuracy of information synchronization.

[0150] And information synchronization based on the second path can effectively avoid delays and overhead at the software level, so that the embedded security chip can obtain the current security status of the processor in advance before the risky software sends false information, implement security status early warning, effectively prevent the embedded security chip from being deceived by false information, and protect the security of sensitive information.

[0151] Fig.10 The following schematically shows a flow chart of an information synchronization method according to another embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0152] like Fig.10 As shown, in Fig. 9 Based on the information synchronization method shown in FIG. 1 , the information synchronization method of this embodiment further includes operations S1010 to S1030. It should be noted that for other implementation details of the control method of this embodiment, please refer to Fig. 9 The embodiment of the information synchronization method shown will not be described in detail here.

[0153] like Fig.10 As shown, the method is applied to an embedded security chip and includes operations S1010 to S1030.

[0154] In operation S1010 , a security state of a processor is acquired based on a second path.

[0155] In operation S1020 , if the security state represents that the processor is in a trusted state, the received encryption request is processed based on the first authority.

[0156] In some embodiments, the first authority processes the received encryption request based on an original root key (ie, a root key sent by the processor when the device boots up).

[0157] In some embodiments, operation S1020 is related to Fig. 9 The operation details of operation S930 in the embodiments are the same and will not be described again.

[0158] In operation S1030 , if the security status indicates that the processor is in an untrusted state, the received encryption request is processed based on the second authority.

[0159] In some embodiments, the second permission processes the received encryption request based on the first root key newly generated by the processor, and the second permission is less than the first permission.

[0160] Specifically, in the encryption requests received by the embedded security chip, the importance of the encryption requests can be further subdivided according to the data or operations involved in the encryption requests to obtain multiple encryption requests of different levels, and corresponding permissions can be set for encryption requests of different levels to improve data security.

[0161] For example, the received encryption request may include a first-level encryption request and a second-level encryption request. Among them, the first-level encryption request is more important than the second-level encryption request. The data or operations involved in the first-level encryption request are more critical and sensitive, for example, they may include user privacy information, financial data, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to process the first-level encryption request based on stricter permissions (that is, process the received encryption request based on the first permission) to reduce the risk of data leakage or tampering.

[0162] For the secondary encryption request, the importance and sensitivity of the data or operations involved are lower than those of the primary encryption request. Therefore, the permissions corresponding to the encryption request can be slightly relaxed, and the secondary encryption request can be processed based on the second permission.

[0163] In some embodiments, if the security state indicates that the processor is in an untrusted state, the received encryption request is processed based on the second authority, including: if the received encryption request is a first-level encryption request, the encryption request is not processed. If the received encryption request is a second-level encryption request, the encryption request is processed by the second authority based on the first root key.

[0164] The disclosed embodiment achieves flexible processing of encryption requests by setting different permissions. For the first-level encryption requests with higher importance, they are processed based on the more stringent first permission, effectively improving the security of data processing. For the second-level encryption requests with slightly lower importance, they can be processed based on the second permission to ensure the smooth operation of the system.

[0165] The flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings illustrate the possible implementation architecture, functions and operations of the systems, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. In this regard, each box in the flowchart or block diagram may represent a module, a program segment, or a part of a code, and the above-mentioned module, program segment, or a part of the code contains one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the box may also occur in an order different from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two boxes represented in succession can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each box in the block diagram or flowchart, and the combination of boxes in the block diagram or flowchart, can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a specified function or operation, or can be implemented with a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions. It can be understood by those skilled in the art that the features recorded in the various embodiments of the present disclosure can be combined and / or combined in a variety of ways, even if such a combination or combination is not explicitly recorded in the present disclosure. In particular, without departing from the spirit and teaching of the present disclosure, the features described in the various embodiments of the present disclosure may be combined and / or combined in a variety of ways. All of these combinations and / or combinations fall within the scope of the present disclosure.

[0166] The embodiments of the present disclosure are described above. However, these embodiments are only for illustrative purposes and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure. Although the embodiments are described above, this does not mean that the measures in the various embodiments cannot be used in combination to advantage. Without departing from the scope of the present disclosure, those skilled in the art may make a variety of substitutions and modifications, which should all fall within the scope of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A carrier for carrying and conducting electronic components, comprising: A processor for generating a root key; An embedded security chip for processing encryption requests based on the root key; There is a first path and a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip; Among them, the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware, and the first hardware is different from the second hardware; the first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip, and the second path is used to transmit the current security status of the processor to the embedded security chip.

2. The carrier according to claim 1, further comprising: A first register is set in the processor, and a state of the first register matches a current security state of the processor; A second register, which is set in the embedded security chip, and a state of the second register is used to reflect the current security state of the processor; The first register and the second register are connected based on the second hardware, and in response to a state of the first register being changed, a state of the second register is changed synchronously.

3. The carrier according to claim 2, wherein The second hardware is an integrated circuit, and the state of the second register can be changed by the state of the first register.

4. The carrier according to claim 2, wherein The first register is a one-time programmable non-volatile memory; If the processor modifies the data stored in the first register, the first register changes from a connected readable state to a disconnected non-readable state.

5. An electronic device comprising: A processor for generating a root key; An embedded security chip for processing encryption requests based on a root key when the processor's security state is trusted; There is a first path and a second path between the processor and the embedded security chip; The first path is connected via a first hardware connection, the second path is connected via a second hardware connection, the first path is used to send the root key generated by the processor to the embedded security chip, and the second path is used to transmit the security status of the current processor to the embedded security chip.

6. An information synchronization method, applied to a processor, comprising: Obtaining a security status of the processor; synchronizing the security state to the embedded security chip based on a second path; The second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a second hardware, and a first path different from the second path exists between the processor and the embedded security chip; the first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through a first hardware; The embedded security chip receives an encryption request through the first path.

7. The information synchronization method according to claim 6, wherein: The method further comprises: When the security state is an untrusted state, updating the state of the first register to a first state indicating that the processor is in an untrusted state; In response to the state of the first register being updated to the first state, the second hardware is controlled to send a signal indicating that the processor is in an untrusted state to the embedded security chip.

8. The method according to claim 6, wherein: The method further comprises: In response to the device being powered on, generating a root key; The root key is sent to the embedded security chip based on the first path.

9. An information synchronization method, applied to an embedded security chip, comprising: Obtaining a security state of the processor based on the second path; When the security state indicates that the processor is in an untrusted state, refusing to receive an encryption request from the first path; The first path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through first hardware, and the second path connects the processor and the embedded security chip through second hardware, and the first hardware is different from the second hardware.

10. The information synchronization method according to claim 9, wherein: The method further comprises: In a case where the security state represents that the processor is in a trusted state, processing a received encryption request based on a root key; The root key is transmitted from the processor to the embedded security chip based on the first path.