Secure and trusted numerical control system and control method thereof

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of numerical control and discloses a safe and reliable numerical control system and a control method thereof. The system comprises a kernel measurement module, a software base monitoring module and a numerical control system identity authentication module. The kernel measurement module is used for measuring a Linux kernel based on a Bios boot Linux kernel to obtain a kernel measurement result when hardware starts; the operating system is started when the kernel measurement result is measurement success; the software base monitoring module is used for running a reliable software base, judging whether a numerical control system file is a file in a white list based on the reliable software base; the numerical control system is started if yes; the numerical control system identity authentication module is used for performing numerical control system operation permission authentication according to authorization information in a numerical control system identity authentication file. The application performs layer-by-layer authentication from starting, including Linux kernel measurement, software base monitoring and numerical control system identity authentication when numerical control software operates, ensures that the numerical control system operation is performed in a safe environment and by a correct operator, has a simple structure and greatly improves the safety of the numerical control system.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of numerical control, in particular to a safe and reliable numerical control system and a control method thereof. BACKGROUND

[0002] In recent years, the manufacturing industry in China has developed rapidly, and numerical control machine tools, as key equipment for production and processing enterprises, are facing various industrial viruses and network attack risks. Once improperly protected by external attacks, it will lead to the danger of shutdown of numerical control machine tools and even the entire production line. For example, the backdoor of the centrifuge control system was invaded by a virus, and nearly a thousand centrifuges exploded due to excessive motor load caused by the virus.

[0003] Security is one of the most important features of numerical control systems, which is also reflected in current numerical control systems. For example, the current numerical control system assigns different permissions to the numerical control system in terms of function use and information viewing. Different permissions have different functions and information that can be viewed. However, this security control can only ensure the security of use at the user level, and the numerical control system still has security risks. SUMMARY

[0004] The main purpose of the present application is to provide a safe and reliable numerical control system and a control method thereof, which aims to solve at least one of the above problems.

[0005] To achieve the above purpose, the present application provides a safe and reliable numerical control system, comprising:

[0006] A kernel measurement module is configured to measure the Linux kernel based on the Bios to boot the Linux kernel and obtain a kernel measurement result when the hardware is started;

[0007] When the kernel measurement result is successful, the operating system is started;

[0008] A software base monitoring module is configured to run a trusted software base and determine whether the numerical control system file is a file in the white list based on the trusted software base;

[0009] If so, the numerical control system is started;

[0010] A numerical control system identity authentication module is configured to perform operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file.

[0011] In some embodiments, the kernel measurement module is specifically configured to measure whether the current hash value of the current Linux kernel based on the Bios is consistent with the set initial hash value of the Linux kernel when the hardware is started;

[0012] If the current hash value is consistent with the Linux kernel initial hash value, then the kernel measurement result is measurement success;

[0013] If the current hash value is inconsistent with the Linux kernel initial hash value, then the kernel measurement result is measurement failure.

[0014] In some embodiments, the trusted software base is a continuously-executing software base program that runs before the numerical control system software runs, and the trusted software base runs and uses files in a whitelist of the trusted software base.

[0015] In some embodiments, the numerical control system identity authentication module is specifically configured to query the authorization information corresponding to the numerical control system after the numerical control system is started, and the authorization information includes a unique identification code, a numerical control system type, and a permission password.

[0016] The external management center writes the authorization information into a numerical control system identity authentication file and downloads the numerical control system identity authentication file based on the external management center;

[0017] Before operating the numerical control system, the information in the numerical control system identity authentication is parsed to obtain the authorization information.

[0018] It is determined whether the current information of the numerical control system is consistent with the parsed authorization information, so as to perform operation permission authentication of the numerical control system.

[0019] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the application further provides a control method of a secure and trusted numerical control system, comprising:

[0020] When the hardware is started, the Linux kernel is measured based on the Bios booting, and a kernel measurement result is obtained.

[0021] When the kernel measurement result is measurement success, the operating system is started.

[0022] The trusted software base is run, and it is determined whether the numerical control system file is a file in a whitelist based on the trusted software base.

[0023] If yes, the numerical control system is started.

[0024] Operation permission authentication of the numerical control system is performed according to the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file.

[0025] In some embodiments, when the hardware is started, the Linux kernel is measured based on the Bios booting, and a kernel measurement result is obtained, comprising:

[0026] At hardware startup, whether a current hash value of a current Linux kernel based on a Bios metric is consistent with a set Linux kernel initial hash value is determined;

[0027] If the current hash value is consistent with the Linux kernel initial hash value, a kernel metric result is a metric success;

[0028] If the current hash value is inconsistent with the Linux kernel initial hash value, the kernel metric result is a metric failure.

[0029] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0030] In some embodiments, the method further comprises:

[0031] In some embodiments, the operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file comprises:

[0032] After the numerical control system is started, the authorization information corresponding to the numerical control system is queried; wherein the authorization information comprises a unique identification code, a numerical control system type and a permission password;

[0033] The authorization information is written into the numerical control system identity authentication file by an external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded;

[0034] Before the numerical control system is operated, the authorization information is obtained by parsing the numerical control system identity authentication file;

[0035] Whether the current information of the numerical control system is consistent with the parsed authorization information is determined to perform the operation permission authentication of the numerical control system.

[0036] In some embodiments, the authorization information is written into the numerical control system identity authentication file by the external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded, comprising:

[0037] The external management center logs in an identity authentication server;

[0038] The authorization information is written into the identity authentication server to generate the numerical control system identity authentication file;

[0039] The numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded from the identity authentication server.

[0040] In some embodiments, the operation of the numerical control system is authorized by parsing the numerical control system identity authentication file to obtain authorization information before the operation of the numerical control system.

[0041] Before the operation of the numerical control system, the permission management interface is switched to;

[0042] The numerical control system identity authentication file is imported to perform permission authentication;

[0043] The operator permission is switched to the authentication permission and displayed on the permission management interface;

[0044] When the authentication operation instruction is received, the numerical control system identity authentication file is parsed to obtain authorization information, and the operation permission of the numerical control system is authenticated according to the authorization information.

[0045] The present application provides a safe and reliable numerical control system, comprising: a kernel measurement module, configured to measure the Linux kernel based on the Bios boot Linux kernel to obtain a kernel measurement result when the hardware is started; start the operating system when the kernel measurement result is successful; a software base monitoring module, configured to run a trusted software base, and determine whether the numerical control system file is a file in the white list based on the trusted software base; if so, start the numerical control system; a numerical control system identity authentication module, configured to authenticate the operation permission of the numerical control system according to the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file. In the present application, layer-by-layer authentication is performed from the start, including Linux kernel measurement, software base monitoring, and numerical control system identity authentication when the numerical control software is operated, to ensure that the operation of the numerical control system is performed in a safe environment and by a correct operator. The present application has a simple structure and greatly improves the security of the numerical control system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0046] Figure 1 The structure block diagram of an embodiment of the safe and reliable numerical control system of the present application;

[0047] Figure 2 The flowchart of an embodiment of the control method of the safe and reliable numerical control system of the present application;

[0048] Figure 3 The kernel measurement flowchart when the Bios is started, which is related to the embodiment of the present application;

[0049] Figure 4 The software base monitoring flowchart when the numerical control software is running, which is related to the embodiment of the present application;

[0050] Figure 5 The numerical control system identity authentication and permission switching flowchart when the numerical control system is operated, which is related to the embodiment of the present application;

[0051] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the process for applying for and importing identity authentication documents into the CNC system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an example of a control method for a secure and reliable CNC system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0053] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in the hardware operating environment involved in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0054] The realization of the objective, functional features and advantages of the present invention will be further explained in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation

[0055] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0056] It should be noted that all directional indications (such as up, down, left, right, front, back, etc.) in the embodiments of the present invention are only used to explain the relative positional relationship and movement of each component in a certain specific posture (as shown in the figure). If the specific posture changes, the directional indication will also change accordingly.

[0057] Furthermore, the use of terms such as "first" and "second" in this invention is for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying their relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Therefore, a feature defined with "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of that feature. Additionally, the technical solutions of the various embodiments can be combined with each other, but only on the basis of being achievable by those skilled in the art. If the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or impossible to implement, it should be considered that such a combination of technical solutions does not exist and is not within the scope of protection claimed by this invention. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only for explaining the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.

[0058] This invention proposes a safe and reliable numerical control system and its control method.

[0059] Reference Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a structural block diagram of an embodiment of the safe and reliable CNC system of the present invention.

[0060] like Figure 1As shown, the secure and trusted numerical control system comprises:

[0061] The kernel measurement module 10 is configured to measure the Linux kernel based on the Bios booting of the Linux kernel at the hardware startup, and obtain a kernel measurement result.

[0062] When the kernel measurement result is measurement success, the operating system is started.

[0063] The software base monitoring module 20 is configured to run a trusted software base, and determine whether the numerical control system file is a file in the white list based on the trusted software base.

[0064] If yes, the numerical control system is started.

[0065] The numerical control system identity authentication module 30 is configured to perform operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file.

[0066] It should be noted that the embodiment takes the modules as an example to describe the architecture of the secure and trusted numerical control system. Figure 1 As shown, the secure and trusted numerical control system architecture comprises the Bios booting of the Linux kernel at the hardware startup, the Linux kernel measurement (the kernel measurement module 10) at the Linux kernel booting, the software base monitoring (the software base monitoring module 20) at the numerical control software running, and the numerical control system identity authentication (the numerical control system identity authentication module 30) at the numerical control software operation.

[0067] In an embodiment, the kernel measurement module 10 is specifically configured to determine whether the current hash value of the current Linux kernel measured by the Bios at the hardware startup is consistent with the set initial hash value of the Linux kernel; if the current hash value is consistent with the initial hash value of the Linux kernel, the kernel measurement result is measurement success; if the current hash value is not consistent with the initial hash value of the Linux kernel, the kernel measurement result is measurement failure.

[0068] Exemplarily, the Bios booting of the Linux kernel at the hardware startup and the Linux kernel measurement at the Linux kernel booting can be achieved by judging the hash value (Hash value) of the Linux kernel at the Bios startup to determine whether the kernel is tampered.

[0069] Specifically, the Bios booting the Linux kernel booting the Linux kernel measurement: after the Bios booting is completed, the Bios booting the Linux kernel booting, before booting the Linux kernel booting, need to wait for the measurement of the Linux kernel is completed. If the current Linux kernel Hash value (the current Hash value) is detected, the initial setting of the kernel Hash value (Linux kernel initial Hash value) is inconsistent, the measurement fails, the Bios cannot boot the Linux kernel booting, thereby avoiding abnormal risky kernel booting, always guaranteeing the kernel security.

[0070] It can be understood that, in order to implement the Bios booting the Linux kernel booting the Linux kernel measurement Hash value comparison, need to install all the kernel before installing the numerical control system to generate a complete Hash value. Specifically, before installing the numerical control system, the Linux kernel module is prepared, and a unique Hash value corresponding to the Linux kernel module is generated by using the trusted module for the Linux kernel module.

[0071] In an embodiment, the trusted software base is a continuously executed software base program running before the numerical control system software runs, and the trusted software base runs and uses the files in the white list of the trusted software base.

[0072] Specifically, the software base monitoring during software running: using the white list to isolate dangerous files from operating the files in the white list. A continuously executed software base program (trusted software base) is run before the numerical control system software runs, and the software base program (trusted software base) can only run and use the files in the software base white list.

[0073] Exemplarily, the software base monitoring during software running: in the software base (trusted software base) used by the numerical control system, a white list is added, and all the files required by the numerical control system are added to the white list. The software base (trusted software base) needs to be deployed before installing the numerical control system, and the white list of the software base needs to be added when installing the numerical control system, wherein the software base (trusted software base) and the numerical control system are located in the same environment.

[0074] It can be understood that, by the above-mentioned kernel measurement module 10 and software base monitoring module 20, the hardware environment and software environment are guaranteed to be secure and trusted environment.

[0075] In an embodiment, the numerical control system identity authentication module 30 is specifically configured to query the authorization information corresponding to the numerical control system after the numerical control system is started; wherein the authorization information includes a unique identification code, a numerical control system type, and a permission password; the authorization information is written into a numerical control system identity authentication file by an external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded; before the numerical control system is operated, the information in the numerical control system identity authentication is parsed to obtain the authorization information; whether the current information of the numerical control system is consistent with the parsed authorization information is judged to perform the operation permission authentication of the numerical control system.

[0076] Specifically, the numerical control system identity authentication during the operation of the numerical control software: the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file is used to judge the current operator and the operation environment, so as to ensure that the operation is performed in a safe environment and by a correct operator.

[0077] Specifically, the numerical control system identity authentication during the operation of the numerical control software: the information in the numerical control system identity authentication is parsed before the operation, the parsed information includes a numerical control system unique identification code, a numerical control system type, and operation permission information, and only when the parsed information is the same as the information stored in the numerical control system itself, the related operation can be performed.

[0078] It should be noted that the numerical control system identity authentication file needs to be applied after the relevant information is filled in the relevant authorization center (for example, the external management center).

[0079] In this embodiment, from the power-on, at the time of hardware startup, the Bios boots the Linux kernel, the Linux kernel measurement at the time of Linux kernel startup guarantees the safe and reliable hardware environment, at the time of the operation system startup of the numerical control system, the software base (trusted software base) is used for monitoring to guarantee the safe and reliable software running environment, and finally the numerical control system identity authentication file is used to guarantee the safe and reliable operation of the numerical control system through the unique information in the numerical control system identity authentication file. The safe and reliable numerical control system architecture in this embodiment is simple, and the safety of the numerical control system is greatly improved.

[0080] The embodiment provides a safe and credible numerical control system, comprising: a kernel measurement module 10, which is used for performing Linux kernel measurement based on Bios booting of the Linux kernel when hardware starts, and obtaining a kernel measurement result; starting an operating system when the kernel measurement result is measurement success; a software base monitoring module 20, which is used for running a credible software base, judging whether a numerical control system file is a file in a white list based on the credible software base, and starting the numerical control system if yes; and a numerical control system identity authentication module 30, which is used for performing operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to authorization information in a numerical control system identity authentication file. In the embodiment, layer-by-layer authentication is performed from starting, including Linux kernel measurement, software base monitoring and numerical control system identity authentication when numerical control software is operated, so that the operation of the numerical control system is ensured to be performed in a safe environment and by a correct operator. The numerical control system has simple architecture and greatly improves the safety of the numerical control system.

[0081] The embodiment provides a control method of a safe and credible numerical control system. Figure 2 , Figure 2 FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an embodiment of the control method of the safe and credible numerical control system.

[0082] As shown in FIG. 1, the control method of the safe and credible numerical control system comprises the following steps. Figure 2

[0083] Step S100: performing Linux kernel measurement based on Bios booting of the Linux kernel when hardware starts, and obtaining a kernel measurement result;

[0084] Step S200: starting an operating system when the kernel measurement result is measurement success;

[0085] Step S300: running a credible software base, judging whether a numerical control system file is a file in a white list based on the credible software base;

[0086] Step S400: starting the numerical control system if yes;

[0087] Step S500: performing operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to authorization information in a numerical control system identity authentication file.

[0088] It should be noted that the execution subject in the embodiment can be an electronic device, which can be a computer device with a data processing function, and can also be other devices that can realize the same or similar functions, and the embodiment does not limit this. In the embodiment, the computer device is taken as an example for description.

[0089] ​In one embodiment, during hardware startup, the Linux kernel is metric based on the BIOS to obtain kernel metric results, including: during hardware startup, measuring whether the current hash value of the current Linux kernel is consistent with the set initial hash value of the Linux kernel based on the BIOS; if the current hash value is consistent with the initial hash value of the Linux kernel, the kernel metric result is a successful metric; if the current hash value is inconsistent with the initial hash value of the Linux kernel, the kernel metric result is a failed metric.

[0090] For example, the Linux kernel metrics at the time of hardware boot, when the BIOS boots the Linux kernel, can be used to determine whether the kernel has been tampered with by judging the hash value of the Linux kernel at the time of BIOS boot.

[0091] Specifically, such as Figure 3 As shown, the Linux kernel measurement during BIOS boot from hardware startup is as follows: After BIOS startup is complete, it will boot the Linux kernel. Before booting the Linux kernel, it needs to wait for the measurement of the Linux kernel to complete. If the current Linux kernel hash value is detected to be inconsistent with the initially set kernel hash value, the measurement fails, and the BIOS cannot boot the Linux kernel (the boot process terminates), thus avoiding abnormal and risky kernel boots and ensuring kernel security. If the current Linux kernel hash value is detected to be consistent with the initially set kernel hash value, the measurement succeeds, and the operating system boots.

[0092] Understandably, in order to implement the comparison of Linux kernel metrics hash values ​​during BIOS boot of the Linux kernel, all kernels need to be installed before installing the CNC system to generate complete hash values. Specifically, before installing the CNC system, prepare the Linux kernel modules and use trusted modules to generate a unique hash value for each Linux kernel module.

[0093] In one embodiment, the method further includes: deploying a trusted software base before installing the CNC system, and adding a whitelist of the trusted software base when installing the CNC system; wherein the trusted software base is a continuously executing software base program that runs before the CNC system software runs, and the trusted software base runs and uses files in the whitelist of the trusted software base.

[0094] Specifically, the software base monitoring of the software runtime: using a whitelist to isolate dangerous files to operate on the files in the whitelist. A continuously executed software base program (trusted software base) is run before the software of the numerical control system is run, and the software base program (trusted software base) can only run and use the files in the software base whitelist.

[0095] Exemplarily, the software base monitoring of the software runtime: in the software base (trusted software base) used by the numerical control system, a whitelist is added, and all the files required by the numerical control system are added to the whitelist. The software base (trusted software base) needs to be deployed before the numerical control system is installed, and the whitelist of the software base is added when the numerical control system is installed, wherein the software base (trusted software base) and the numerical control system are located in the same environment.

[0096] As shown in Figure 4 , after the Linux kernel measurement is successful, the operating system is started, the software base (trusted software base) is started, and it is judged whether the files related to the numerical control system are in the whitelist of the trusted software base. If yes, the numerical control system is started, and if not, the operating system is restarted to continue the judgment.

[0097] It can be understood that when the power is turned on, the hardware is started, the Bios boots the Linux kernel, and the Linux kernel measurement is started when the Linux kernel is started. The generated Hash value is compared, and the operating system is started after the comparison is successful. When the operating system is started, the software base is started, and the software base will continuously monitor and only allow programs in the whitelist to run. The above kernel measurement operation and software base monitoring operation realize that the hardware environment and the software environment are guaranteed to be a safe and trusted environment.

[0098] In an embodiment, the operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file includes: after the numerical control system is started, the authorization information corresponding to the numerical control system is queried; wherein the authorization information includes a unique identification code, a numerical control system type and a permission password; the authorization information is written into the numerical control system identity authentication file by an external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded; before the numerical control system is operated, the authorization information is obtained by analyzing the numerical control system identity authentication file; it is judged whether the current information of the numerical control system and the authorization information obtained by analyzing are consistent, so as to authenticate the operation permission of the numerical control system.

[0099] Specifically, the identity authentication of the numerical control system during the operation of the numerical control software: the authorization information in the identity authentication file of the numerical control system is used to judge the current operator and the operation environment, so as to ensure that the operation is performed in a safe environment and by a correct operator. For example, the identity authentication of the numerical control system during the operation of the numerical control software: before the operation, the information in the identity authentication of the numerical control system is parsed, and the parsed information includes the unique identification code of the numerical control system, the type of the numerical control system, and the operation permission, and only when the parsed information is the same as the information of the numerical control system itself, the related operation can be performed, and the safety and reliability of the operation of the numerical control system are ensured by the unique information in the identity authentication file of the numerical control system.

[0100] For example, after the numerical control system is started, the unique identification code of the numerical control system, the type of the numerical control system, and the related permission password are queried, the information is filled into the identity authentication file of the numerical control system by the external management center, and the information is downloaded. When the numerical control system is operated, the information in the identity authentication file of the numerical control system imported by the operator is extracted, including but not limited to the unique identification code, the type of the numerical control system, and the related permission password, and the above information is compared with the current information of the numerical control system. If the comparison is successful, it means that the identity authentication file of the numerical control system has authorized the operator, and the operation can be performed.

[0101] Specifically, as shown in the left side of the identity authentication process of the numerical control system during the operation of the numerical control system, the operator can send a request to operate the numerical control system, and the numerical control system performs identity authentication (for example, authentication of the permission, the unique identifier, and the machine tool type). If the authentication fails, the authentication failure result is returned, and the operator cannot operate the numerical control system. If the authentication is passed, the numerical control system performs the operation and returns the operation result to the operator. Figure 5

[0102] In an embodiment, the external management center logs in to the identity authentication server, writes the authorization information into the identity authentication server to generate the identity authentication file of the numerical control system, and downloads the identity authentication file of the numerical control system from the identity authentication server.

[0103] For example, the identity authentication of the numerical control system during the operation of the numerical control software: before the operation, the information in the identity authentication of the numerical control system is parsed, and the parsed information includes the unique identification code of the numerical control system, the type of the numerical control system, and the operation permission, and only when the parsed information is the same as the information of the numerical control system itself, the related operation can be performed. It should be noted that the identity authentication file of the numerical control system needs to be applied after the relevant information is filled in the relevant authorization center (for example, the external management center).

[0104] Specifically, as shown in the left side of the identity authentication process of the numerical control system during the operation of the numerical control system, the operator can send a request to operate the numerical control system, and the numerical control system performs identity authentication (for example, authentication of the permission, the unique identifier, and the machine tool type). If the authentication fails, the authentication failure result is returned, and the operator cannot operate the numerical control system. If the authentication is passed, the numerical control system performs the operation and returns the operation result to the operator. Figure 6 ​As shown, the administrator logs into the authentication server, sets passwords for each level of access, a unique machine tool identifier, and the machine tool type. This authorization information (passwords for each level of access, unique machine tool identifier, and machine tool type) is stored in the authentication server. When an operator needs to operate the CNC system, the operator can request the authentication server to generate an authentication file, download the generated authentication file, and import the authentication file into the CNC system for identity verification.

[0105] In one embodiment, before operating the CNC system, the CNC system authentication file is parsed to obtain authorization information, including: switching to the permission management interface before operating the CNC system; importing the CNC system authentication file for permission authentication; switching the operator's permission to authentication permission and displaying it on the permission management interface; and upon receiving an authentication operation instruction, parsing the CNC system authentication file to obtain authorization information, and then authenticating the CNC system's operation permission based on the authorization information.

[0106] For example, such as Figure 5 The right side shows the permission switching process during CNC system operation. The operator can switch to the permission management interface, select permissions (e.g., all permissions), and import the authentication file via USB drive. The CNC system parses the authentication file to perform permission authentication, switches the operator's permissions to the authenticated permissions, and returns the authenticated permissions. The authenticated permissions are then displayed in the permission management interface (this displayed authentication permissions may not be all permissions, but only a portion of the operator's permissions).

[0107] It should be noted that, with Figure 7 The process shown is used as an example to explain in detail the control method of a safe and reliable CNC system.

[0108] like Figure 7 As shown, power on; hardware startup; the Linux kernel metrics during BIOS booting of the Linux kernel will be compared with the generated hash value to confirm successful operating system startup; the trusted software base will run, which will continuously monitor and only allow programs on the whitelist to run; the CNC system will run.

[0109] The administrator logs into the identity authentication server and sets passwords for each level of access, a unique machine tool identifier, and the machine tool type. This authorization information (passwords for each level of access, a unique machine tool identifier, and the machine tool type) is stored in the identity authentication server. When the operator needs to operate the CNC system, the operator can request the identity authentication server to generate an identity authentication file and download the generated identity authentication file.

[0110] The operator switches the permission management interface to enter the permission management interface, selects a permission, and imports an identity authentication file through a U disk; the numerical control system parses the identity authentication file to perform permission authentication, switches the operator permission to the authentication permission, and returns the authenticated permission, and displays the authenticated permission in the permission management interface.

[0111] The operator can issue a request to operate the numerical control system, and the numerical control system performs identity authentication (for example, authentication of permission, a unique identifier, and a machine tool type); if the authentication is passed, the numerical control system executes the operation and returns an operation result to the operator.

[0112] In this embodiment, starting from the power-on, at the hardware startup, the Bios boots the Linux kernel, the Linux kernel measurement ensures the security and trustworthiness of the hardware environment, at the startup of the operating system of the numerical control system, the software base (trusted software base) is used for monitoring to ensure the security and trustworthiness of the software running environment, and finally the numerical control system identity authentication file is used to ensure the security and trustworthiness of the operation of the numerical control system through the unique information in the numerical control system identity authentication file. Whether it is the hardware environment, the software environment or the software operation, the relevant security and trustworthiness are detected, and a safe and trustworthy environment is provided for the numerical control system throughout the process. The control method of this embodiment greatly improves the security of the numerical control system.

[0113] In this embodiment, starting from the power-on, at the hardware startup, the Bios boots the Linux kernel, the Linux kernel measurement ensures the security and trustworthiness of the hardware environment, at the startup of the operating system of the numerical control system, the software base (trusted software base) is used for monitoring to ensure the security and trustworthiness of the software running environment, and finally the numerical control system identity authentication file is used to ensure the security and trustworthiness of the operation of the numerical control system through the unique information in the numerical control system identity authentication file. Whether it is the hardware environment, the software environment or the software operation, the relevant security and trustworthiness are detected, and a safe and trustworthy environment is provided for the numerical control system throughout the process. The control method of this embodiment greatly improves the security of the numerical control system.

[0114] In addition, the embodiment of the application also provides a storage medium, and the storage medium stores a control program of a safe and trustworthy numerical control system. When the control program of the safe and trustworthy numerical control system is executed by a processor, the steps of the control method of the safe and trustworthy numerical control system are implemented.

[0115] In addition, to achieve the above object, the application further provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a control program of a secure and trusted numerical control system stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the control program of the secure and trusted numerical control system is configured to implement the control method of the secure and trusted numerical control system as described above.

[0116] With reference to Figure 8 , Figure 8 The electronic device structure schematic diagram of the hardware running environment involved in the embodiment of the application is shown in FIG. 1.

[0117] As Figure 8 shown, the electronic device can include a processor 1001, such as a central processing unit (CPU), a communication bus 1002, a user interface 1003, a network interface 1004, and a memory 1005. The communication bus 1002 is used to realize the connection and communication between the components. The user interface 1003 can include a display, an input unit such as a keyboard, and can also include a standard wired interface, a wireless interface. The network interface 1004 can optionally include a standard wired interface, a wireless interface (such as a wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) interface). The memory 1005 can be a high-speed random access memory (RAM memory) or a stable non-volatile memory (NVM), such as a disk memory. The memory 1005 can also be a storage device independent of the aforementioned processor 1001.

[0118] Those skilled in the art can understand Figure 8 that the structure shown in the above is not a limitation on the electronic device, and can include more or fewer components than the diagram, or combine certain components, or different component arrangements.

[0119] As Figure 8 shown, the memory 1005 as a storage medium can include an operating system, a network communication module, a user interface module, and a control program of a secure and trusted numerical control system.

[0120] In Figure 8The network interface 1004 is mainly used for data communication with a network server, and the user interface 1003 is mainly used for data interaction with a user. The processor 1001 and the memory 1005 in the electronic device of the present application can be arranged in the electronic device, and the processor 1001 calls the control program of the secure and trusted numerical control system stored in the memory 1005, and executes the control method of the secure and trusted numerical control system provided by the embodiments of the present application.

[0121] It should be understood that the above is only illustrative, and does not constitute any limitation on the technical solutions of the present application. In specific applications, those skilled in the art can set it up according to the needs, and the present application does not limit this.

[0122] It should be noted that the above-described workflow is only illustrative and does not limit the scope of protection of the present application. In actual application, those skilled in the art can select part or all of them to achieve the purpose of the embodiment scheme according to actual needs, which is not limited here.

[0123] In addition, it should be noted that in this paper, the terms "include", "contain" or any other variant thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that the process, method, article or system including a series of elements not only includes those elements, but also includes other elements not explicitly listed, or includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or system. Without more limitations, the element defined by the sentence "including a" does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or system including the element.

[0124] The above-mentioned embodiment numbers of the present application are only for description, not representing the advantages and disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0125] From the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be realized by software and necessary general hardware platform, of course, also can be realized by hardware, but in many cases, the former is a better embodiment. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the present application can be embodied in the form of software product, which is stored in a storage medium (such as read only memory (Read Only Memory, ROM) / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk), including a plurality of instructions for making a terminal device (which can be a mobile phone, computer, server, or network device, etc.) execute the method described in each embodiment of the present application.

[0126] The above merely describes the preferred embodiments of the present application, and is not intended to limit the patent scope of the present application, and any equivalent structure or equivalent process conversion, or direct or indirect application in other related technical fields, which are made by using the content of the present application specification and drawings, are also included in the patent protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A secure and trusted numerical control system, characterized by, Comprise: Kernel measurement module, for measuring Linux kernel based on Bios booting Linux kernel at hardware startup, obtaining kernel measurement result; When the kernel measurement result is measurement success, start operating system; Software base monitoring module, for running trusted software base, judging whether the numerical control system file is the file in the white list based on the trusted software base; the trusted software base is deployed before installing the numerical control system, and the white list of the trusted software base is added when installing the numerical control system; the trusted software base and the numerical control system are located in the same environment; If yes, start the numerical control system; Numerical control system identity authentication module, for performing operation permission authentication of the numerical control system according to authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file; Before installing the numerical control system, prepare Linux kernel module, and generate a unique Hash value corresponding to the Linux kernel module using trusted module; the kernel measurement module is specifically used for measuring whether the current Hash value of the current Linux kernel based on Bios is consistent with the set initial Hash value of the Linux kernel at hardware startup; if the current Hash value is consistent with the initial Hash value of the Linux kernel, the kernel measurement result is measurement success; if the current Hash value is not consistent with the initial Hash value of the Linux kernel, the kernel measurement result is measurement failure; The numerical control system identity authentication module is specifically used for querying the authorization information corresponding to the numerical control system after starting the numerical control system; wherein, the authorization information includes unique identification code, numerical control system type and permission password; the authorization information is written into the numerical control system identity authentication file by the external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded; before operating the numerical control system, the information in the numerical control system identity authentication is parsed to obtain authorization information; whether the current information of the numerical control system is consistent with the parsed authorization information is judged to perform operation permission authentication of the numerical control system; From the power on, at hardware startup, the Linux kernel measurement at the Linux kernel booting by Bios ensures that the hardware environment is safe and trusted, the monitoring using trusted software base at the operating system startup of the numerical control system ensures that the software running environment is safe and trusted, and finally the numerical control system identity authentication file is used to ensure that the operation of the numerical control system is safe and trusted through the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file.

2. The numerical control system according to claim 1, characterized by The trusted software base is a continuously executed software base program running before the numerical control system software runs, and the trusted software base runs and uses the file in the white list of the trusted software base.

3. A control method of a secure and trusted numerical control system, characterized by, Comprise: Kernel measurement module, for measuring Linux kernel based on Bios booting Linux kernel at hardware startup, obtaining kernel measurement result; When the kernel measurement result is measurement success, start operating system; The running trusted software base judges whether the numerical control system file is a file in a white list based on the trusted software base; the trusted software base is deployed before installation of the numerical control system, and the white list of the trusted software base is added when the numerical control system is installed; the trusted software base and the numerical control system are located in the same environment; If yes, the numerical control system is started; Operation permission authentication of the numerical control system is performed according to authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file; The kernel measurement result is obtained by measuring the Linux kernel based on the Bios, including: when the hardware is started, whether the current hash value of the current Linux kernel measured based on the Bios is consistent with the set Linux kernel initial hash value; if the current hash value is consistent with the Linux kernel initial hash value, the kernel measurement result is measurement success; if the current hash value is not consistent with the Linux kernel initial hash value, the kernel measurement result is measurement failure; Operation permission authentication of the numerical control system is performed according to authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file, including: after the numerical control system is started, the authorization information corresponding to the numerical control system is queried; wherein the authorization information includes a unique identification code, a numerical control system type and a permission password; the authorization information is written into the numerical control system identity authentication file by the external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded; before the numerical control system is operated, the authorization information is obtained by analyzing the numerical control system identity authentication file; whether the current information of the numerical control system is consistent with the authorization information obtained by analysis is judged to perform operation permission authentication of the numerical control system; From the power-on, when the hardware is started, the Linux kernel measurement when the Linux kernel is started by the Bios ensures that the hardware environment is safe and trusted; when the operating system of the numerical control system is started, the software base is used for monitoring to ensure that the software running environment is safe and trusted; finally, the numerical control system identity authentication file is used to ensure that the operation of the numerical control system is safe and trusted through the authorization information in the numerical control system identity authentication file.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The trusted software base is a continuously executed software base program running before the numerical control system software runs, and the trusted software base runs and uses the files in the white list of the trusted software base.

5. The method of claim 3, wherein, The authorization information is written into the numerical control system identity authentication file by the external management center and the numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded, including: The external management center logs in the identity authentication server; The authorization information is written into the identity authentication server to generate the numerical control system identity authentication file; The numerical control system identity authentication file is downloaded from the identity authentication server.

6. The method of claim 3, wherein, Before the numerical control system is operated, the authorization information is obtained by analyzing the numerical control system identity authentication file, including: Before the numerical control system is operated, the permission management interface is switched to; The numerical control system identity authentication file is imported to perform permission authentication; The operator permission is switched to the authentication permission and displayed on the permission management interface; When the authentication operation instruction is received, authorization information is obtained by analyzing the identity authentication file of the numerical control system, and operation permission authentication of the numerical control system is performed according to the authorization information.

Images