Optimization method for power grid-aggregator-user three-party participation demand response game
By establishing a three-party master-slave game model for power grid, aggregator and users, optimizing grid regulation, the problem of unreasonable resource allocation in power grid regulation is solved, the grid supply and demand balance and user active response is achieved, and the model's calculation efficiency and Fitting accuracy.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411033203.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
AI Technical Summary
In the existing power grid regulation method, the power grid, as the initiator of demand response, only provides fixed incentive prices and demand electricity, resulting in the aggregator obtaining too many resources, failing to effectively promote the reasonable allocation of social resources among various subjects, and it is difficult to meet frequency regulation. and emergency response requirements.
Establish a master-slave game model with the participation of the power grid, aggregator and user. Through the optimization of the double-layer Kriging element model, build the master-slave game model of the power grid-agent and aggregator-user to ensure the balance of interests of the power grid, aggregator and users. , promote coordinated optimization of the source and load side.
The power grid supply and demand balance has been achieved, and the normal participation of huge load-side resources on the power system has been promoted. The problem of aggregators obtaining too many resources has been overcome, and the incentive for users to actively participate in source and load response has been improved, which has reduced the computational complexity and improved the The fitting accuracy of the model is achieved.
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Figure CN119005594A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of power system dispatching, and in particular to an optimization method for a demand response game involving a power grid, an aggregator and a user. Background Art
[0002] With the gradual development and maturity of my country's power market, the trading entities and trading models of the power market have continued to show diversified development, resulting in complex interactive regulation and fierce game relationships between market entities. In terms of interactive regulation, in order to maintain the stability of the power system, the power grid needs to make frequent adjustments, and demand response through the user side can greatly improve the efficiency of regulation and save the cost of power grid construction. Due to the large number of users, wide distribution, and difficulty in directly accepting regulation, aggregators are needed to aggregate them. However, the current regulation mainly responds to demand through the ancillary service market, which has the problems of large market clearing calculation scale, long demand time, and difficulty in meeting the regulation requirements in frequency regulation and emergency response. At present, many studies have been conducted to optimize the regulation scheme by establishing a master-slave game model that maximizes the profit of aggregators and minimizes the cost of purchasing electricity for users. However, in these models, the power grid, as the initiator of demand response, only plays the role of providing fixed incentive prices and fixed demand electricity amounts, and does not participate in the game, which is easy to cause aggregators to obtain too many resources, which is not conducive to the reasonable allocation of social resources among various entities, and the corresponding control effect on the source and load side needs to be improved. Summary of the invention
[0003] In order to address the deficiencies in the prior art, the present invention provides an optimization of the demand response game among the three parties of power grid, aggregator and user. By establishing a master-slave game model in which the three entities of power grid, aggregator and user all participate in demand response, the rational allocation of social resources is promoted, and the interests of multiple entities are balanced while better motivating users to actively participate in source-load response, thus promoting coordinated optimization on the source-load side and achieving supply-demand balance in the power grid.
[0004] The present invention adopts the following technical solution.
[0005] In a first aspect, the present invention provides an optimization method for a power grid, an aggregator and a user to participate in a demand response game.
[0006] Methods include:
[0007] Establish mathematical models for the interaction between power grid, aggregator and users in demand response respectively;
[0008] Based on the mathematical models, the power grid is taken as the first dominant player in the game, and the aggregator is taken as the first subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model between the power grid and the aggregator; at the same time, the aggregator is taken as the second dominant player in the game, and the user is taken as the second subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model between the aggregator and the user;
[0009] By establishing a double sample set based on incentives and responses and combining the double-layer Kriging metamodel theory, the two master-slave game models constructed are optimized to obtain the master-slave game metamodel of the power grid-aggregator and the master-slave game metamodel of the aggregator-user.
[0010] The two optimized master-slave game meta-models are solved to obtain an optimization plan for the power grid, aggregator and users to participate in demand response.
[0011] Optionally, the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction is established as follows:
[0012]
[0013] In the formula, is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction; is the total price of response incentives issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the total price of response compensation sent by aggregator j to the user; is the unit power incentive price issued by the power grid to aggregator j; I is the user set; T is the time set; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the unit electricity compensation price issued by aggregator j to user i within its jurisdiction; and are the minimum and maximum unit electricity incentive prices issued by aggregator j to users respectively.
[0014] Optionally, the established mathematical model of user participation in demand response is as follows:
[0015]
[0016] In the formula, is the total revenue of all users participating in demand response interaction within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the total price of response compensation sent by aggregator j to the user; The reduced electricity costs for all users within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the response cost of all users within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the compensation price for user i in the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; i is the loss aversion coefficient of user i; α t and β t are the first coefficient and the second coefficient of the user response cost at time t respectively; It is the maximum amount of electricity responded by user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t.
[0017] Optionally, the established mathematical model of the power grid participating in demand response is as follows:
[0018]
[0019] Where P K The total benefit of the grid participating in demand response interaction; C Nl The network loss cost reduced by the grid participating in demand response interaction; C Ou Compensation cost for load shedding reduced by grid participation in demand response interaction; C Se is the electricity sales revenue reduced by the grid participating in demand response interaction; J is the set of aggregators; I is the set of users; is the average electricity price of aggregator j in a time period T; δ is the network loss rate; γ t is the compensation coefficient for period t; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the compensation price for user i in the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t; is the average power consumption of user i of aggregator j in period t; is the electricity price of aggregator j in period t; is the total aggregate load of aggregator j in period t; is the unit electricity incentive price sent by the power grid to aggregator j; and They are respectively the minimum and maximum values of the unit electric energy incentive issued by the power grid.
[0020] Optionally, the constructed power grid-aggregator master-slave game model is expressed as follows:
[0021]
[0022] Where P K the total benefits of participating in demand response interactions for the grid; is the unit power incentive price sent by the power grid to aggregator j; θ K represents the unit energy incentive price strategy set issued by the power grid to the aggregator; θ LAa A set of response power strategies that the aggregator feeds back to the grid; is the total aggregate load of aggregator j in period t; is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction.
[0023] Optionally, the constructed aggregator-user master-slave game model is expressed as follows:
[0024]
[0025] In the formula, is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction; θ LAb represents the unit electricity compensation price strategy set issued by the aggregator to the user; θ Us Represents the set of response power strategies that users feedback to aggregators; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the total revenue of all users participating in demand response interaction within the jurisdiction of aggregator j.
[0026] Optionally, the step of establishing a dual sample set based on stimulus and response includes:
[0027] Step 1: The unit energy incentive price strategy set θ sent from the power grid to the aggregator K and the unit electricity compensation price strategy set θ issued by the aggregator to the user LAb Random sampling is performed to obtain the dominant strategy sample set A:
[0028]
[0029] In the formula, represents the unit energy incentive price of the nth strategy issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the unit electricity compensation price of the nth strategy issued by aggregator j to the user;
[0030] Step 2: Substitute the dominant strategy sample set A into the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction to obtain the subordinate strategy sample set B:
[0031]
[0032] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy of aggregator j in period t; is the response power of the nth strategy of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t;
[0033] Step 3: Substitute the dominant strategy sample set A and the subordinate strategy sample set B into the two constructed master-slave game models to obtain updated dominant strategy sample set A1 and subordinate strategy sample set B1 respectively:
[0034]
[0035] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy after aggregator j is updated in period t, The response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j after the nth strategy is updated in time period t.
[0036] Optionally, the step of optimizing the two constructed master-slave game models includes:
[0037] The subordinate strategy sample set B1 is input into the DACE toolbox to construct a two-layer Kriging meta-model, and then the dominant strategy sample set A1 is used for training to obtain the implicit mapping relationship of the subordinate positions in the two master-slave game models as follows:
[0038]
[0039] In the formula, F kri1 (·) is the constructed aggregator Kriging metamodel; F kri2 (·) is the completed user Kriging metamodel;
[0040] Based on the aggregator Kriging metamodel, the expression of the optimized power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel is as follows:
[0041]
[0042] Based on the user Kriging metamodel, the expression of the optimized aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel is as follows:
[0043]
[0044] Optionally, the step of solving the two optimized master-slave game meta-models includes:
[0045] First, the aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel is solved to obtain the aggregator's quotation and quotation strategy, and then its strategy is introduced into the power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel to obtain the final transaction price and response cost of the power grid;
[0046] Among them, the master-slave game metamodels of power grid-aggregator and aggregator-user satisfy the following constraints after reaching equilibrium:
[0047]
[0048] In the formula, Represents the game equilibrium solution of the two master-slave game meta-models; is the equilibrium strategy sent by the power grid to aggregator j; is the equilibrium strategy of aggregator j itself; is the equilibrium strategy of users of aggregator j in period t; is the equilibrium strategy for users other than user i∈I represented by aggregator j.
[0049] In a second aspect, the present invention provides an optimization of a demand response game involving a power grid, an aggregator and a user, and executes the steps of any method described in the first aspect of the present invention, wherein the system comprises:
[0050] Establishing modules for respectively establishing mathematical models of the interaction between the grid, aggregators and users in demand response;
[0051] A construction module is used to construct a master-slave game model of a power grid and an aggregator based on the mathematical models, taking the power grid as the first dominant player of the game and the aggregator as the first subordinate; and at the same time, taking the aggregator as the second dominant player of the game and the user as the second subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model of an aggregator and a user;
[0052] An optimization module is used to optimize the two master-slave game models constructed by establishing a double sample set based on incentives and responses and combining the double-layer Kriging metamodel theory to obtain a power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel and an aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel;
[0053] The solution module is used to solve the two optimized master-slave game meta-models to obtain an optimization plan for the power grid, aggregator and user to participate in demand response.
[0054] Optionally, the optimization module includes:
[0055] Obtain the dominant strategy sample set unit, which is used to send the unit power incentive price strategy set θ from the power grid to the aggregator K and the unit electricity compensation price strategy set θ issued by the aggregator to the user LAb Random sampling is performed to obtain the dominant strategy sample set A:
[0056]
[0057] In the formula, represents the unit energy incentive price of the nth strategy issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the unit electricity compensation price of the nth strategy issued by aggregator j to the user;
[0058] The subordinate strategy sample set obtaining unit is used to substitute the dominant strategy sample set A into the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction to obtain the subordinate strategy sample set B:
[0059]
[0060] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy of aggregator j in period t; is the response power of the nth strategy of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t;
[0061] The sample set updating unit is used to substitute the dominant strategy sample set A and the subordinate strategy sample set B into the two constructed master-slave game models to obtain the updated dominant strategy sample set A1 and the subordinate strategy sample set B1 respectively:
[0062]
[0063] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy after aggregator j is updated in period t, The response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j after the nth strategy is updated in time period t.
[0064] Optionally, the optimization module further includes:
[0065] The training double-layer Kriging metamodel unit is used to input the subordinate strategy sample set B1 into the DACE toolbox to construct a double-layer Kriging metamodel, and then use the dominant strategy sample set A1 for training to obtain the implicit mapping relationship of the subordinate positions in the two master-slave game models as follows:
[0066]
[0067] In the formula, F kri1 (·) is the constructed aggregator Kriging metamodel; F kri2 (·) is the completed user Kriging metamodel;
[0068] The first optimization unit is used to obtain the expression of the optimized power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel based on the aggregator Kriging metamodel as follows:
[0069]
[0070] The second optimization unit is used to obtain the expression of the optimized aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel based on the user Kriging metamodel as follows:
[0071]
[0072] In a third aspect, the present invention provides a terminal, including a processor and a storage medium;
[0073] The storage medium is used to store instructions;
[0074] The processor is used to operate according to the instructions to execute the steps of any one of the methods described in the first aspect of the present invention.
[0075] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of any one of the methods described in the first aspect of the present invention.
[0076] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:
[0077] The present invention establishes a master-slave game model for the three main bodies of the power grid, aggregators and users in the power market, accurately reflects the operating interest needs of each main body, overcomes the problem that the master-slave game model of the existing method that only considers the aggregators and users easily causes the aggregators to obtain too many resources, promotes the reasonable allocation of resources in the model, balances the interests of multiple subjects, and better motivates users to actively participate in source-load response, promotes coordinated optimization on the source-load side, achieves supply and demand balance in the power grid, and promotes the normalized participation of massive load-side resources in interactive regulation of the power system.
[0078] The present invention fits the lower layer in each master-slave game model based on a double-layer Kriging metamodel, generates a functional relationship between the upper-layer strategy and the lower-layer parameters, greatly reduces the complexity of calculation, and improves the calculation speed of the master-slave game model; in addition, the present invention constructs and trains the Kriging metamodel by establishing a double sample set, thereby overcoming the shortcomings of the traditional single-sample set Kriging metamodel construction method in terms of error estimation accuracy and model approximation ability that are difficult to adapt to increasingly complex practical problems, and improves the fitting accuracy of the Kriging metamodel. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0079] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the optimization method for the power grid, aggregator and user to participate in the demand response game in the present invention;
[0080] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the interactive game architecture among the power grid, aggregator and user in the present invention;
[0081] Figure 3 This is a structural principle block diagram of the optimization system in which the power grid, aggregator and user participate in the demand response game in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0082] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. The embodiments described in the present invention are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the spirit of the present invention, other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are all within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0083] Embodiment 1:
[0084] Reference Figure 1 The embodiment of the present invention provides an optimization method for a power grid, an aggregator and a user to participate in a demand response game, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0085] Step S1: Establish mathematical models for the interaction of power grid, aggregator and user in demand response respectively;
[0086] In this embodiment, the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction is as follows:
[0087]
[0088] In the formula, is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction; is the total price of response incentives issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the total price of response compensation sent by aggregator j to the user; is the unit power incentive price issued by the power grid to aggregator j; I is the user set; T is the time set; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the unit electricity compensation price issued by aggregator j to user i within its jurisdiction; and are the minimum and maximum unit electricity incentive prices issued by aggregator j to users respectively.
[0089] The mathematical model of user participation in demand response is as follows:
[0090]
[0091] In the formula, is the total revenue of all users participating in demand response interaction within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the total price of response compensation sent by aggregator j to the user; The reduced electricity costs for all users within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the response cost of all users within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the compensation price for user i in the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; i is the loss aversion coefficient of user i, and its value depends on the user's sensitivity to loss. The larger its value, the more sensitive the user is. Under the same conditions, compared with other users with lower loss sensitivity, such users are less willing to respond; α t and β tare the first coefficient and the second coefficient of the user response cost at time t, respectively. Affected by factors such as user comfort sensitivity, the coefficients of different users are generally different, but they can be measured by the user's past behavior in participating in demand response; It is the maximum amount of electricity responded by user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t.
[0092] The mathematical model of power grid participation in demand response is as follows:
[0093]
[0094] Where P K The total benefit of the grid participating in demand response interaction; C Nl The network loss cost reduced by the grid participating in demand response interaction; C Ou Compensation cost for load shedding reduced by grid participation in demand response interaction; C Se is the electricity sales revenue reduced by the grid participating in demand response interaction; J is the set of aggregators; I is the set of users; is the average electricity price of aggregator j in a time period T; δ is the network loss rate; γ t is the compensation coefficient for period t; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the compensation price for user i in the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t; is the average power consumption of user i of aggregator j in period t; is the electricity price of aggregator j in period t; is the total aggregated load of aggregator j in period t, and its value is the sum of the response power of each user represented by aggregator j in this period. If its value is zero, it means that the aggregator does not participate in the demand response project in this period; is the unit electricity incentive price sent by the power grid to aggregator j; and They are respectively the minimum and maximum values of the unit electric energy incentive issued by the power grid.
[0095] Step S2: Based on the mathematical models, the power grid is taken as the first dominant player in the game, and the aggregator is taken as the first subordinate, to construct a power grid-aggregator master-slave game model; at the same time, the aggregator is taken as the second dominant player in the game, and the user is taken as the second subordinate, to construct an aggregator-user master-slave game model;
[0096] It is further explained that the main players in the game include power grids, aggregators, and various end users represented by aggregators. Among these three parties, only the power grid-aggregator and aggregator-user have direct connections, and they constitute a master-slave game relationship. Between the power grid and the aggregator, the power grid is the initiator of demand response, has information advantages, and occupies a dominant position in the game. Between the aggregator and the user, the user is limited by his own energy and the cost of obtaining information, and is in a passive position in the game.
[0097] In this embodiment, the expression of the master-slave game model between the power grid and the aggregator is as follows:
[0098]
[0099] Where P K is the total benefit of the grid participating in demand response interaction; j k is the unit power incentive price sent by the power grid to aggregator j; θ K represents the unit energy incentive price strategy set issued by the power grid to the aggregator; θ LAa A set of response power strategies that the aggregator feeds back to the grid; is the total aggregate load of aggregator j in period t; is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction. In the master-slave game model of power grid-aggregator, the strategy of the dominant power grid is The strategy of the aggregator in a subordinate position is
[0100] In this embodiment, the expression of the aggregator-user master-slave game model is as follows:
[0101]
[0102] In the formula, is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction; θ LAb represents the unit electricity compensation price strategy set issued by the aggregator to the user; θ Us Represents the set of response power strategies that users feedback to aggregators; P is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; j Us is the total revenue of all users participating in the demand response interaction within the jurisdiction of aggregator j. In the master-slave game model between aggregators and users, the strategy of the dominant aggregator is The strategy for users in a subordinate position is
[0103] Step S3: By establishing a double sample set based on incentives and responses and combining the double-layer Kriging metamodel theory, the two constructed master-slave game models are optimized to obtain the power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel and the aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel;
[0104] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment, the step of establishing a dual sample set based on excitation and response in step S3 includes:
[0105] Step 1: Use Latin hypercube sampling to send the unit energy incentive price strategy set θ from the power grid to the aggregator K and the unit electricity compensation price strategy set θ issued by the aggregator to the user LAb Random sampling is performed to obtain the dominant strategy sample set A:
[0106]
[0107] In the formula, represents the unit energy incentive price of the nth strategy issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the unit electricity compensation price of the nth strategy issued by aggregator j to the user;
[0108] Step 2: Substitute the dominant strategy sample set A into the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction to obtain the subordinate strategy sample set B:
[0109]
[0110] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy of aggregator j in period t; is the response power of the nth strategy of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t;
[0111] Step 3: Substitute the dominant strategy sample set A and the subordinate strategy sample set B into the two constructed master-slave game models to obtain updated dominant strategy sample set A1 and subordinate strategy sample set B1 respectively:
[0112]
[0113] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy after aggregator j is updated in period t, The response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j to the nth strategy after updating in time period t. Among them, A1 is a low-credibility sample set, and B1 is a high-credibility sample set.
[0114] As an embodiment of the present invention, the step of optimizing the two constructed master-slave game models in step S3 includes:
[0115] First, the subordinate strategy sample set B1 is input into the DACE toolbox of MATLAB to construct a double-layer Kriging metamodel, where the expression of the double-layer Kriging metamodel is as follows:
[0116]
[0117] Where Kr(x) is the output value of the double-layer Kriging metamodel function; x is the input value of the metamodel; is the adaptive factor, reflecting the correlation between sample sets A1 and B1; It is the output value of the underlying Kriging metamodel; The mean is 0 and the variance is σ 2 A static random process; is the final output value of the double-layer Kriging meta-model; τ is the correlation vector, which is composed of the correlation functions between all known points and unknown points; R is the correlation matrix, which is composed of the correlation function values between known sample points; is the output value function value set of the underlying Kriging metamodel; x h Enter the value for the hth metamodel.
[0118] Then, the dominant strategy sample set A1 is used for training to obtain the implicit mapping relationship of the subordinate positions in the two master-slave game models as follows:
[0119]
[0120] In the formula, F kri1 (·) is the constructed aggregator Kriging metamodel; F kri2 (·) is the completed user Kriging metamodel;
[0121] Based on the aggregator Kriging metamodel, the expression of the optimized power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel is as follows:
[0122]
[0123] Based on the user Kriging metamodel, the expression of the optimized aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel is as follows:
[0124]
[0125] Step S4: Solve the two optimized master-slave game meta-models to obtain an optimization plan for the power grid, aggregator and user participation in demand response.
[0126] In this embodiment, the YALMIP toolkit is used to call the CPLEX solver to solve the model in step S3. The aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel is first solved to obtain the aggregator's quotation and quotation strategy, and then the strategy is introduced into the power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel to obtain the final transaction price and response cost of the power grid.
[0127] Among them, the master-slave game metamodels of power grid-aggregator and aggregator-user satisfy the following constraints after reaching equilibrium:
[0128]
[0129] In the formula, Represents the game equilibrium solution of the two master-slave game meta-models; is the equilibrium strategy sent by the power grid to aggregator j; is the equilibrium strategy of aggregator j itself; is the equilibrium strategy of users of aggregator j in period t; is the equilibrium strategy of other users represented by aggregator j except user i∈I. The above formula indicates that when the game reaches equilibrium, no game subject can obtain higher returns by adjusting its strategy alone, that is, the solution when the game reaches equilibrium is the optimal strategy.
[0130] The effectiveness of the optimization of the demand response game involving the power grid, aggregator and user provided by the present invention is verified through specific experimental examples.
[0131] It should be noted that the use premise of the method provided in this embodiment includes:
[0132] (1) It is assumed that the demand response issued by the power grid is directly responded to by the aggregators only. Since the main focus of this embodiment is on the strategy of the aggregators in the demand response process, other directly participating entities including large industrial users are not considered in this embodiment.
[0133] (2) In actual demand response, it takes a long time to switch the demand response subject, which is not conducive to the rapid response of demand-side load resources; therefore, this embodiment assumes that during the demand response process, the power grid does not switch the aggregator participating in the response until the response is completed.
[0134] (3) Considering the objective existence of bargaining status and information gap, it is assumed that there is no peer bargaining or information exchange between aggregators and end users.
[0135] (4) It is assumed that all demand response participants have installed demand response smart devices and meet the relevant technical conditions, and communication anomalies are not considered.
[0136] The embodiment of the present invention simulates the interactive game structure among the power grid, the aggregator and the terminal users it represents. Figure 2 The simulation data includes: setting up 3 aggregators to participate in the response, each aggregator has 3 types of users; the implementation scenario is that 688MWh of electricity needs to be dispatched, and source-load interaction is carried out to obtain the required electricity; the incentive price issued by the power grid is The range is set to RMB 300 / MWh-3000 / MWh, the incentive price issued by the aggregator The range is set to 200 yuan / MWh-2800 yuan / MWh; the electricity price of the user during this period The cost of the three types of users is 1000 yuan / MWh. i Take 2.0, 1.7, 1.5, α in turn t , β t The maximum response amount for each type of user is 0.0001 yuan / kWh and 1.5 yuan / kWh respectively. Take 181.33, 326.40, 217.60MW, and the average electricity price of the period is 850 yuan / MWh, the grid loss rate δ is 0.06, and the compensation coefficient γ t is 3.5, the time interval is set to 15 minutes, and the scheduling period is 24 hours; MATLAB software is used to solve, and the results obtained include: the income results of participating in market clearing using the method of the present invention (power grid-aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel) and the traditional method (aggregator-user master-slave game model) are shown in Table 1; the calculation results of using the double sample set to construct the Kriging metamodel to calculate the master-slave game model (the present invention) and using the traditional single sample set to construct the Kriging metamodel to calculate the master-slave game model are shown in Table 2.
[0137] Table 1 Comparison of calculation results of different methods
[0138]
[0139]
[0140] Table 2 Comparison of calculation results of meta-model constructed with single / double sample sets
[0141]
[0142] As can be seen from Table 1, the total revenue of the traditional aggregator-user game model is 511.53 yuan, and the total revenue of the power grid-aggregator-user game meta-model of the present invention is 588.6 yuan, and the overall benefit has increased by 15%; and compared with the traditional aggregator-user game model, the power grid-aggregator-user game meta-model of the present invention avoids the aggregator from obtaining too many resources, increases user revenue, promotes the rational allocation of current social resources, balances the interests of multiple subjects, and better motivates users to actively participate in source-load response. As can be seen from Table 2, the calculation results of the present invention using double sample sets are closer to direct calculations without algorithms, indicating that the calculation accuracy of the meta-model constructed by the double sample sets of the present invention is higher than that of the traditional single sample set method.
[0143] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:
[0144] The present invention establishes a master-slave game model for the three main bodies of the power grid, aggregators and users in the power market, accurately reflects the operating interest needs of each main body, overcomes the problem that the master-slave game model of the existing method that only considers the aggregators and users easily causes the aggregators to obtain too many resources, promotes the reasonable allocation of resources in the model, balances the interests of multiple subjects, and better motivates users to actively participate in source-load response, promotes coordinated optimization on the source-load side, achieves supply and demand balance in the power grid, and promotes the normalized participation of massive load-side resources in interactive regulation of the power system.
[0145] The present invention fits the lower layer in each master-slave game model based on a double-layer Kriging metamodel, generates a functional relationship between the upper-layer strategy and the lower-layer parameters, greatly reduces the complexity of calculation, and improves the calculation speed of the master-slave game model; in addition, the present invention constructs and trains the Kriging metamodel by establishing a double sample set, thereby overcoming the shortcomings of the traditional single-sample set Kriging metamodel construction method in terms of error estimation accuracy and model approximation ability that are difficult to adapt to increasingly complex practical problems, and improves the fitting accuracy of the Kriging metamodel.
[0146] Embodiment 2:
[0147] like Figure 3 As shown, the present invention provides an optimization system for a power grid, an aggregator, and a user to participate in a demand response game. The system is used to implement the steps of the method in the above embodiment 1, and the system specifically includes:
[0148] Establishing modules for respectively establishing mathematical models of the interaction between the grid, aggregators and users in demand response;
[0149] A construction module is used to construct a master-slave game model of a power grid and an aggregator based on the mathematical models, taking the power grid as the first dominant player of the game and the aggregator as the first subordinate; and at the same time, taking the aggregator as the second dominant player of the game and the user as the second subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model of an aggregator and a user;
[0150] An optimization module is used to optimize the two master-slave game models constructed by establishing a double sample set based on incentives and responses and combining the double-layer Kriging metamodel theory to obtain a power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel and an aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel;
[0151] The solution module is used to solve the two optimized master-slave game meta-models to obtain an optimization plan for the power grid, aggregator and user to participate in demand response.
[0152] As an embodiment of the present invention, the optimization module includes:
[0153] Obtain the dominant strategy sample set unit, which is used to send the unit power incentive price strategy set θ from the power grid to the aggregator K and the unit electricity compensation price strategy set θ issued by the aggregator to the user LAb Random sampling is performed to obtain the dominant strategy sample set A:
[0154]
[0155] In the formula, represents the unit energy incentive price of the nth strategy issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the unit electricity compensation price of the nth strategy issued by aggregator j to the user;
[0156] The subordinate strategy sample set obtaining unit is used to substitute the dominant strategy sample set A into the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction to obtain the subordinate strategy sample set B:
[0157]
[0158] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy of aggregator j in period t; is the response power of the nth strategy of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t;
[0159] The sample set updating unit is used to substitute the dominant strategy sample set A and the subordinate strategy sample set B into the two constructed master-slave game models to obtain the updated dominant strategy sample set A1 and the subordinate strategy sample set B1 respectively:
[0160]
[0161] In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy after aggregator j is updated in period t, The response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j after the nth strategy is updated in time period t.
[0162] The training double-layer Kriging metamodel unit is used to input the subordinate strategy sample set B1 into the DACE toolbox to construct a double-layer Kriging metamodel, and then use the dominant strategy sample set A1 for training to obtain the implicit mapping relationship of the subordinate positions in the two master-slave game models as follows:
[0163]
[0164] In the formula, F kri1 (·) is the constructed aggregator Kriging metamodel; F kri2 (·) is the completed user Kriging metamodel;
[0165] The first optimization unit is used to obtain the expression of the optimized power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel based on the aggregator Kriging metamodel as follows:
[0166]
[0167] The second optimization unit is used to obtain the expression of the optimized aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel based on the user Kriging metamodel as follows:
[0168]
[0169] The optimization system for the demand response game among three parties including the power grid, aggregator and user provided in the embodiment of the present invention and the optimization method for the demand response game among three parties including the power grid, aggregator and user provided in Example 1 are based on the same technical concept, and can produce the beneficial effects as described in Example 1. For the contents not described in detail in this embodiment, please refer to Example 1.
[0170] Embodiment three:
[0171] A terminal provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes a processor and a storage medium;
[0172] The storage medium is used to store instructions;
[0173] The processor is used to operate according to the instruction to execute the steps of the method according to any one of the first embodiments.
[0174] Embodiment 4:
[0175] An embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the steps of any method described in Embodiment 1 are implemented.
[0176] The present disclosure may be a system, a method and / or a computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium carrying computer-readable program instructions for causing a processor to implement various aspects of the present disclosure.
[0177] A computer-readable storage medium may be a tangible device that can hold and store instructions used by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanical encoding device, such as a punch card or a raised structure in a groove on which instructions are stored, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. As used herein, a computer-readable storage medium is not to be interpreted as a transient signal per se, such as a radio wave or other freely propagating electromagnetic wave, an electromagnetic wave propagating through a waveguide or other transmission medium (e.g., a light pulse through a fiber optic cable), or an electrical signal transmitted through a wire.
[0178] The computer-readable program instructions described herein can be downloaded from a computer-readable storage medium to each computing / processing device, or downloaded to an external computer or external storage device via a network, such as the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, and / or a wireless network. The network can include copper transmission cables, optical fiber transmissions, wireless transmissions, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers, and / or edge servers. The network adapter card or network interface in each computing / processing device receives the computer-readable program instructions from the network and forwards the computer-readable program instructions for storage in the computer-readable storage medium in each computing / processing device.
[0179] The computer program instructions for performing the operation of the present disclosure may be assembly instructions, instruction set architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions, machine-related instructions, microcode, firmware instructions, state setting data, or source code or object code written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages, such as Smalltalk, C++, etc., and conventional procedural programming languages, such as "C" language or similar programming languages. Computer-readable program instructions may be executed completely on a user's computer, partially on a user's computer, as an independent software package, partially on a user's computer, partially on a remote computer, or completely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., using an Internet service provider to connect via the Internet). In some embodiments, an electronic circuit, such as a programmable logic circuit, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or a programmable logic array (PLA), may be customized by utilizing the state information of the computer-readable program instructions, and the electronic circuit may execute the computer-readable program instructions, thereby realizing various aspects of the present disclosure.
[0180] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the relevant field should understand that the specific implementation methods of the present invention can still be modified or replaced by equivalents, and any modifications or equivalent replacements that do not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. An optimization method for a demand response game involving a power grid, an aggregator and a user, characterized in that: Methods include: Establish mathematical models for the interaction between power grid, aggregator and users in demand response respectively; Based on the mathematical models, the power grid is taken as the first dominant player in the game, and the aggregator is taken as the first subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model between the power grid and the aggregator; at the same time, the aggregator is taken as the second dominant player in the game, and the user is taken as the second subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model between the aggregator and the user; By establishing a double sample set based on incentives and responses and combining the double-layer Kriging metamodel theory, the two master-slave game models constructed are optimized to obtain the master-slave game metamodel of the power grid-aggregator and the master-slave game metamodel of the aggregator-user. The two optimized master-slave game meta-models are solved to obtain an optimization plan for the power grid, aggregator and users to participate in demand response.
2. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The mathematical model of aggregators participating in demand response interaction is established as follows: In the formula, is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction; is the total price of response incentives issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the total price of response compensation sent by aggregator j to the user; is the unit power incentive price issued by the power grid to aggregator j; I is the user set; T is the time set; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the unit electricity compensation price issued by aggregator j to user i within its jurisdiction; and are the minimum and maximum unit electricity incentive prices issued by aggregator j to users respectively.
3. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The established mathematical model of user participation in demand response is as follows: In the formula, is the total revenue of all users participating in demand response interaction within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the total price of response compensation sent by aggregator j to the user; The reduced electricity costs for all users within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the response cost of all users within the jurisdiction of aggregator j; is the compensation price for user i in the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; i is the loss aversion coefficient of user i; α t and β t are the first coefficient and the second coefficient of the user response cost at time t respectively; It is the maximum amount of electricity responded by user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t.
4. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The established mathematical model of power grid participating in demand response is as follows: Where P K The total benefit of the grid participating in demand response interaction; C Nl The network loss cost reduced by the grid participating in demand response interaction; C Ou Compensation costs for load shedding reduced by grid participation in demand response interactions; is the total price of response incentives issued by the power grid to aggregator j; C Se is the electricity sales revenue reduced by the grid participating in demand response interaction; J is the set of aggregators; I is the set of users; is the average electricity price of aggregator j in a time period T; δ is the network loss rate; γ t is the compensation coefficient for period t; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the compensation price for user i in the jurisdiction of aggregator j during period t; is the average power consumption of user i of aggregator j in period t; is the electricity price of aggregator j in period t; is the total aggregate load of aggregator j in period t; is the unit electricity incentive price sent by the power grid to aggregator j; and They are respectively the minimum and maximum values of the unit electric energy incentive issued by the power grid.
5. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The expression of the constructed power grid-aggregator master-slave game model is as follows: Where P K the total benefits of participating in demand response interactions for the grid; is the unit power incentive price sent by the power grid to aggregator j; θ K represents the unit energy incentive price strategy set issued by the power grid to the aggregator; θ LAa A set of response power strategies that the aggregator feeds back to the grid; is the total aggregate load of aggregator j in period t; is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction.
6. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The expression of the constructed aggregator-user master-slave game model is as follows: In the formula, is the total revenue of aggregator j participating in demand response interaction; θ LAb represents the unit electricity compensation price strategy set issued by the aggregator to the user; θ Us Represents the set of response power strategies that users feedback to aggregators; is the response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; is the total revenue of all users participating in demand response interaction within the jurisdiction of aggregator j.
7. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The step of establishing a dual sample set based on excitation and response includes: Step 1: The unit energy incentive price strategy set θ sent from the power grid to the aggregator K and the unit electricity compensation price strategy set θ issued by the aggregator to the user LAb Random sampling is performed to obtain the dominant strategy sample set A: In the formula, represents the unit energy incentive price of the nth strategy issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the unit electricity compensation price of the nth strategy issued by aggregator j to the user; Step 2: Substitute the dominant strategy sample set A into the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction to obtain the subordinate strategy sample set B: In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy of aggregator j in period t; is the response power of the nth strategy of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; Step 3: Substitute the dominant strategy sample set A and the subordinate strategy sample set B into the two constructed master-slave game models to obtain updated dominant strategy sample set A1 and subordinate strategy sample set B1 respectively: In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy after aggregator j is updated in period t, The response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j after the nth strategy is updated in time period t.
8. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 7 is characterized in that: The step of optimizing the two constructed master-slave game models comprises: The subordinate strategy sample set B1 is input into the DACE toolbox to construct a two-layer Kriging meta-model, and then the dominant strategy sample set A1 is used for training to obtain the implicit mapping relationship of the subordinate positions in the two master-slave game models as follows: In the formula, F kri1 (·) is the constructed aggregator Kriging metamodel; F kri2 (·) is the completed user Kriging metamodel; Based on the aggregator Kriging metamodel, the expression of the optimized power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel is as follows: Based on the user Kriging metamodel, the expression of the optimized aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel is as follows:
9. The optimization method for the demand response game among the power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 1 or 8, characterized in that: The steps of solving the two optimized master-slave game meta-models include: First, the aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel is solved to obtain the aggregator's quotation and quotation strategy, and then its strategy is introduced into the power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel to obtain the final transaction price and response cost of the power grid; Among them, the master-slave game metamodels of power grid-aggregator and aggregator-user satisfy the following constraints after reaching equilibrium: In the formula, Represents the game equilibrium solution of the two master-slave game meta-models; is the equilibrium strategy sent by the power grid to aggregator j; is the equilibrium strategy of aggregator j itself; is the equilibrium strategy of users of aggregator j in period t; is the equilibrium strategy for users other than user i∈I represented by aggregator j.
10. An optimization system for a power grid, an aggregator, and a user to participate in a demand response game, which runs the optimization method for a power grid, an aggregator, and a user to participate in a demand response game as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that the system include: Establishing modules for respectively establishing mathematical models of the interaction between the grid, aggregators and users in demand response; A construction module is used to construct a master-slave game model of a power grid and an aggregator based on the mathematical models, taking the power grid as the first dominant player of the game and the aggregator as the first subordinate; and at the same time, taking the aggregator as the second dominant player of the game and the user as the second subordinate, to construct a master-slave game model of an aggregator and a user; An optimization module is used to optimize the two master-slave game models constructed by establishing a double sample set based on incentives and responses and combining the double-layer Kriging metamodel theory to obtain a power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel and an aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel; The solution module is used to solve the two optimized master-slave game meta-models to obtain an optimization plan for the power grid, aggregator and user to participate in demand response.
11. The optimization system for demand response game involving power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 10, characterized in that: The optimization module includes: Obtain the dominant strategy sample set unit, which is used to send the unit power incentive price strategy set θ from the power grid to the aggregator K and the unit electricity compensation price strategy set θ issued by the aggregator to the user LAb Random sampling is performed to obtain the dominant strategy sample set A: In the formula, represents the unit energy incentive price of the nth strategy issued by the power grid to aggregator j; is the unit electricity compensation price of the nth strategy issued by aggregator j to the user; The subordinate strategy sample set obtaining unit is used to substitute the dominant strategy sample set A into the mathematical model of the aggregator participating in the demand response interaction to obtain the subordinate strategy sample set B: In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy of aggregator j in period t; is the response power of the nth strategy of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j in time period t; The sample set updating unit is used to substitute the dominant strategy sample set A and the subordinate strategy sample set B into the two constructed master-slave game models to obtain the updated dominant strategy sample set A1 and the subordinate strategy sample set B1 respectively: In the formula, represents the total aggregate load of the nth strategy after aggregator j is updated in period t, The response power of user i within the jurisdiction of aggregator j after the nth strategy is updated in time period t.
12. The optimization system for demand response game involving power grid, aggregator and user according to claim 11, characterized in that: The optimization module also includes: The training double-layer Kriging metamodel unit is used to input the subordinate strategy sample set B1 into the DACE toolbox to construct a double-layer Kriging metamodel, and then use the dominant strategy sample set A1 for training to obtain the implicit mapping relationship of the subordinate positions in the two master-slave game models as follows: In the formula, F kri1 (·) is the constructed aggregator Kriging metamodel; F kri2 (·) is the completed user Kriging metamodel; The first optimization unit is used to obtain the expression of the optimized power grid-aggregator master-slave game metamodel based on the aggregator Kriging metamodel as follows: The second optimization unit is used to obtain the expression of the optimized aggregator-user master-slave game metamodel based on the user Kriging metamodel as follows:
13. A terminal comprising a processor and a storage medium; characterized in that: The storage medium is used to store instructions; The processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to execute the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-9.
14. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 are implemented.
Citation Information
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Regional refrigeration demand response strategy generation method and system
CN120999651A
