End-to-end protection method
By using hardware components such as logic circuits or finite state machines in electronic devices to implement end-to-end protection methods, the problem of too many components in the prior art is solved, and the efficiency and security of CAN bus or CAN FD bus communication are improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410602751.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2024-05-10
- Filing Date
- 2024-05-15
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
AI Technical Summary
Existing end-to-end protection methods suffer from an excessive number of components in communication between electronic devices, especially when using CAN bus or CAN FD bus. Component simplification is needed to improve efficiency.
End-to-end protection methods are implemented using hardware components such as logic circuits or finite state machines, replacing software implemented by the processor. By controlling the generation and verification methods of field data, message integrity and security are ensured.
It reduces the number of components required to perform end-to-end protection in electronic devices, and improves the efficiency and security of communication, especially in CAN bus or CAN FD bus communication.
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Figure CN119011176A_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0002] This application claims the benefit of priority of European patent application No. EP23174371 filed on May 19, 2023 and entitled “End-to-End Protection Method”, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety to the maximum extent permitted by law. Technical Field
[0003] The present disclosure generally relates to electronic systems and electronic devices. In addition, the present disclosure relates to communication between two or more electronic devices, and more specifically to an end-to-end protection method for wired communication between two or more electronic devices or an end-to-end protection method for wireless communication between two or more electronic devices. Background Art
[0004] In communications, end-to-end protection involves verification of the transmission of messages. More specifically, end-to-end protection involves verification of the integrity of transmitted messages, verification of the address of the recipient of the message, and the like.
[0005] It is desirable to at least partially improve certain aspects of known end-to-end protection methods, and electronic devices that perform these end-to-end protection methods. Summary of the invention
[0006] A device that performs communication via a bus and uses end-to-end protection including fewer components is required.
[0007] A device that performs communication via a CAN bus and uses end-to-end protection including fewer components is needed.
[0008] A device that performs communication via a CAN FD (Light) bus and uses end-to-end protection including fewer components is needed.
[0009] One embodiment addresses all or some of the disadvantages of known devices that perform end-to-end protection methods.
[0010] One embodiment provides an electronic device including a hardware component that performs an end-to-end protection method, rather than a processor that implements software that performs the end-to-end protection method.
[0011] One embodiment provides an end-to-end protection method performed by hardware components, rather than by software implemented by a processor.
[0012] One embodiment provides an electronic device adapted to perform communication via a communication bus, and the electronic device includes a hardware component that is different from a processor and can directly perform an end-to-end protection method for the communication.
[0013] Another embodiment provides a method for end-to-end protection of communications directly performed by hardware components of an electronic device, the electronic device being adapted to perform said communications via a communication bus.
[0014] According to one embodiment, the communication bus is a Controller Area Network bus.
[0015] According to one embodiment, the communication bus is a Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate bus.
[0016] According to one embodiment, the communication bus is known under the trade name "Controller Area Network Flexible Data-rate Lightweight Bus".
[0017] According to one embodiment, the communication bus is known under the trade name "Controller Area Network Flexible Data-rate XL Bus".
[0018] According to one embodiment, the hardware component is a finite state machine.
[0019] According to one embodiment, during said communication the device is adapted to receive and / or transmit at least one message comprising control field data.
[0020] According to one embodiment, the end-to-end protection method comprises a method for generating said control field data of said at least one message.
[0021] According to one embodiment, the generation method comprises the following steps:
[0022] - calculating the control field data using data from the message; and
[0023] -Increment the message counter.
[0024] According to one embodiment, the end-to-end protection method comprises a verification method of said control field data of said at least one message.
[0025] According to one embodiment, the verification method comprises the following steps:
[0026] - calculating a first version of said control field data using data from said message;
[0027] - verifying said first version using a second version of said control field data included in said message;
[0028] - verifying the value of a message counter with a stored value of said message counter;
[0029] - if one of the verifications fails, increment an error counter; and
[0030] - If all verifications succeed, decrement the error counter.
[0031] Another embodiment provides a system, which includes the first electronic device mentioned above and at least one second electronic device.
[0032] According to one embodiment, the at least one second electronic device is an electronic device of the type of electronic device previously described.
[0033] According to one embodiment, at least one second electronic device performs the end-to-end protection method by using software. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0034] The foregoing features and advantages, as well as other features and advantages, will be described in detail in the following description of specific embodiments given by way of illustration and not limitation with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0035] Figure 1 An embodiment of the system is illustrated very schematically in block diagram form, as well as wired communications performed within the system;
[0036] Figure 2 The block diagram shows very schematically the Figure 1 The structure of the messages transmitted during the communication;
[0037] Figure 3 The block diagram shows very schematically Figure 2 An example of generation of control field data of a message;
[0038] Figure 4 Communications protected by the end-to-end protection method are illustrated in block diagram form.
[0039] Figure 5 An example of a generation method of an embodiment of an end-to-end protection method is illustrated; and
[0040] Figure 6 An example of a verification method of an embodiment of an end-to-end protection method is illustrated. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0041] In the various drawings, similar features have been denoted by similar reference numerals. In particular, common structural and / or functional features between various embodiments may have the same reference numerals, and may be provided with the same structure, dimensions, and material properties.
[0042] For clarity, only operations and elements that are useful for understanding the embodiments described herein are shown and described in detail.
[0043] Unless otherwise indicated, when referring to two elements being connected together, this means a direct connection without any intermediate elements except conductors, and when referring to two elements being coupled together, this means the two elements may be connected or they may be coupled via one or more other elements.
[0044] In the following disclosure, unless otherwise indicated, when referring to absolute position qualifiers such as terms "front", "back", "top", "bottom", "left", "right", etc., or relative position qualifiers such as terms "above", "below", "higher", "lower", etc., or directional qualifiers such as "horizontal", "vertical", etc., reference is made to the orientation shown in the accompanying drawings.
[0045] Unless otherwise specified, the expressions "approximately", "approximately", "substantially" and "about" mean within 10%, and preferably within 5%.
[0046] Figure 1 An embodiment of the system 100 , as well as the wired communications performed within the system 100 , is illustrated very schematically in block diagram form.
[0047] The system 100 includes at least one commander device 101 (COM), hereinafter referred to as commander 101, and one or more responder devices 102 (RSP), hereinafter referred to as responders 102. Figure 1 In the example shown, the system 100 includes one commander 101 and three responders 102. The commander 101 and the responders 102 are both electronic devices and may be electronic component units (ECUs).
[0048] According to one embodiment, the system 100 is a complex electronic system, such as a personal computer, a smart phone, a car, etc. The commander 101 may include or may be a main part of the system 100, such as a main processor. The responder may be a secondary part of the system 100, such as a secondary processor, a secondary electronic component unit, a secondary motor.
[0049] According to a preferred embodiment, system 100 is an electronic component of a car. In this case, commander 101 may be a control portion of a car's network, or a central unit of a car, or a main communication router of a car, and responder 102 is a device associated with one or more features of the car. According to one example, responder 102 may be an electronic component associated with a windshield washer system, a headlight controller, an air conditioning system, a battery, etc.
[0050] According to one embodiment, the commander 101 is capable of performing wired communication with each responder 102. More specifically, the commander 101 is linked to each responder 102 via a communication bus 103.
[0051] The communication bus 103 may be any type of communication bus, such as a single-cable bus or a multi-cable bus. According to one embodiment, the communication bus 103 may be selected from the group consisting of: a controller area network bus (CAN bus), a controller area network flexible data rate bus (CAN FD bus), a communication bus known under the trade name “controller area network flexible data rate light bus” (CAN FD (light) bus), a communication bus known under the trade name “controller area network flexible data rate XL bus” (CAN FD XL bus), an inter-integrated circuit bus (I2C bus), etc. According to a preferred embodiment, the communication bus 103 is a communication bus known under the trade name “controller area network flexible data rate light bus” (CAN FD (light) bus).
[0052] The communication between the commander 101 and one or more responders 102 can use a typical commander / responder scheme, formerly known as a master / slave scheme. More specifically, and according to one example, the commander 101 can send a message including one or more commands and / or one or more replies to the responder 102, and can receive a message including a reply from the responder 102. On the other hand, the responder 102 can send a message including one or more replies to the commander 101, and can receive a message including one or more instructions and / or one or more replies from the commander 101.
[0053] The messages transmitted via the communication bus 103 have a specific structure, which will be combined with Figure 2 More specifically, each message includes at least one control field data, the generation of which will be combined with Figure 3 A more detailed description is given below. However, the commander 101 and the responder 102 are capable of exchanging multiple types of messages. More specifically, the commander 101 can send three different types of messages.
[0054] The first type is a broadcast message that is sent to each responder 102 of the system 100. No reply from a broadcast message is expected by the commander 101. An example of a broadcast message is a "go to sleep" message, where the commander 101 commands all responders 102 to go into sleep mode.
[0055] The second type is a unicast message that is sent to only one responder 102 of the system 100. The commander 101 expects a reply from the unicast message and waits for the reply. An example of a unicast message is a data request message, in which the commander 101 requests data from the only responder 102. Another example of a unicast message is a data write request message, in which the commander 101 wants to write data to a memory in a register of the only responder 102 and requests authorization.
[0056] The third type is a multicast message sent to multiple responders 102 of the system 100. The commander 101 does not expect a reply from the multicast message. An example of a multicast message is a data program request message, where the commander 101 requests data to be programmed into a series of responders 102.
[0057] According to one embodiment, both the commander 101 and the responder 102 are capable of performing an end-to-end protection method to ensure the security of exchanged messages. The end-to-end protection method is used to detect transmission errors, such as messages sent to the error responder 102, partially sent messages, messages sent multiple times, etc. More specifically, the end-to-end protection method includes a control field data generation method for sent messages and a control field data verification method for received messages. An example of communication within the system 100 using the end-to-end protection method will be described in conjunction with Figure 4 A detailed example of the method for generating control field data for sending a message will be combined with Figure 5 A detailed example of the control field data verification method for receiving a message will be combined with Figure 6 Describe in detail.
[0058] According to one embodiment, there is at least one responder 102, which includes a hardware component 102-E2E capable of performing the end-to-end protection method. More specifically, the at least one responder 102 does not use software implemented by a processor to perform the end-to-end protection method. According to a preferred embodiment, the hardware component 102-E2E is different from the processor and is a monolithic component, such as a logic circuit or a finite state machine.
[0059] According to one example, commander 101 also comprises a hardware component 101 -E2E capable of executing an end-to-end protection method of the type of hardware component 102 -E2E. According to a variant, commander 101 comprises a processor capable of implementing software executing the end-to-end protection method.
[0060] One advantage of using hardware components rather than software implemented by a processor is that it is easier to size a single hardware component appropriately for a small responder 102 than having a processor capable of implementing software.
[0061] According to a variant, the wired communication within the system 100 may be replaced by wireless communication.
[0062] Figure 2 The diagram shows the combination Figure 1 An example of the structure of a message 200 transmitted during communications within the system 100 is described.
[0063] According to one example, the message 200 is a data packet consisting of the following in the following order:
[0064] - Identifier 201 (SID);
[0065] - first control field data 202 (CTRL);
[0066] - Payload 203 (PAYLOAD);
[0067] - Second control field data 204 (CRC1); and
[0068] -End field data 205 (ACK / EOF).
[0069] The identifier 201 indicates the address of the recipient of the message 200. According to one example, if the message 200 is a unicast message sent by the commander 101, the identifier indicates the address of the only responder 102 to which the message 20 is intended. According to another example, if the message 200 is a multicast message sent by the commander 101, the identifier indicates the addresses of multiple responders 102 to which the message 200 is intended. According to another example, if the message 200 is a broadcast message sent by the commander 101, the identifier is a code indicating that the message 200 is sent to all responders.
[0070] The first control field data 202 may contain data indicating, for example, the length of the message 200, and more specifically, the length of the payload 203. According to one example, the first control field data 202 may be used to verify whether the message 200 has been sent in its entirety.
[0071] Payload 203 represents the command, request and / or answer transmitted by message 200. According to one example, the maximum length of payload 203 can be 64 bits. According to one example, payload 203 is composed of the following data in the following order:
[0072] - Third control field data 2031 (CRC2);
[0073] - bit 2032 (0xF);
[0074] - the value of the counter 2033 (CNT); and
[0075] -Data 2034 (DATA).
[0076] The third control field data 2031 (CRC2) may include data representing control data such as a payload. According to one example, the third control field data 2031 includes cyclic redundancy check (CRC) data. An example of the generation of the third control field data 2031 will be combined with Figure 3 Provide detailed explanation.
[0077] Bit 2032 may represent an optional extra bit used to make message 200 conform to a standard size. Bit 2032 may have different positions in message 200. According to one example, bit 2032 is a padding bit of the following value 2033.
[0078] The value 2033 of the counter may represent the number of messages 200. According to one example, the value is incremented each time a new message is generated.
[0079] Data 2034 (DATA) contains the commands, requests and / or responses transmitted by message 200.
[0080] The second control field data 204 may contain data representing, for example, control data of the message 200. According to one example, the second control field data 204 includes cyclic redundancy check (CRC) data.
[0081] End field data 205 may contain data indicating the end of message 200. It may be an acknowledgement bit or an end bit.
[0082] According to a variant, the message 200 may include only one or two of the control field data 202 , 204 and 2031 .
[0083] Figure 3 The diagram shows the combination Figure 2 An example of generation of the third control field data 2031 (CRC) of the message 200 is described.
[0084] According to one example, the third control field data 2031 is obtained by a combination of the data 2034 , the value 2033 of the counter, the bit 2032 , and the data identifier 301 (DATA ID).
[0085] According to one embodiment, the data identifier 301 is data known only to the device generating the message 200, and for example the commander of the communication, meaning the commander 101. The data identifier 301 is not part of the message 200. More specifically, the data identifier 301 is individual for each device and each message type. The data identifier is not transmitted with the protected message and is only stored locally and used to calculate the control field data 2031 and for verifying the received message.
[0086] Figure 4 It is a diagram that shows the combination Figure 1 A block diagram of the steps of a communication method 400 within the system 100 is described. The communication method 400 uses a combination of Figure 1 Describes the end-to-end protection method.
[0087] In an initial step 401 (payload generation), a first device such as a commander 101 or responder 102 of the system 100 wants to send a message to another second device such as one or more responders 102 or commander 101. For this purpose, the first device prepares the message and more specifically the payload.
[0088] In step 402 (E2E protection data generation), following the initial step 401, once the payload of the message is ready, the first device may generate one or more control field data, such as in combination with Figure 2 Control field data of the type described herein 202, 204 and / or 2031.
[0089] In step 403 (Send), following step 402 , a message including a payload and one or more control field data is sent to the second device using the communication bus 103 .
[0090] In step 404 (Receive), following step 403, the message is received by the second device.
[0091] In step 405 (CRC verification), following step 402, the second device performs a verification method for one or more control field data of the message. If the verification is successful (output "yes" of step 405), the next step is step 406 (read the message), otherwise (output "no" of step 405), the next step is step 407 (ignore the message).
[0092] In step 406, following step 405, the authentication has succeeded and the second device can read the message.
[0093] In step 407, following step 405, the verification has not been successful and the second device cannot read the message. The message may be identified as an error message. There are a number of possible options. The second device may ignore the message. The second device may prepare a reply with an error code. The second device may record information that an error message was received.
[0094] Figure 5 The diagram is combined Figure 4 4 is a block diagram of the steps of a control field data generation method 500 used in a communication method of the type described in the communication method 400. More specifically, the method 500 may be used in step 402 of the communication method 400.
[0095] In initial step 501 (start control field generation), a device such as commander 101 or one of responders 102 has prepared the payload of the message and is ready to generate the combined Figure 2One or more control field data of the type described in control field data 202, 204 and / or 2031. Figure 5 In the example, the generated control field data belongs to the combination of Figure 2 Describes the type of control field data 2031.
[0096] In step 502 (message CNT), following the initial step 501, the device stores the value of the message counter, which belongs to the combination Figure 2 Describes the type of value 2033.
[0097] In step 503 (Padding), following step 502, the device conforms to the size of its payload by optionally adding some extra bits such as padding bits 2033.
[0098] In step 504 (calculate CRC), following step 503, the device calculates the control field data using the stored payload, the value of the message counter and the bits. Figure 3 Data of the described data identifier 301 type may also be used to calculate control field data.
[0099] In step 505 (Store CRC), following step 504, the previously calculated control field data is stored by the device.
[0100] In step 506 (increment CNT), following step 505, the message counter is incremented by the device. The value incremented depends on the type of device involved in the communication or the type of communication itself. According to one example, the value incremented is equal to 1.
[0101] According to one example, step 506 may be performed at any time during the control field data generation method 500 , and need not be consecutive to step 505 .
[0102] In step 507 (END CRC GENERATION), following step 506, the device may add the control field data to its message and send the message.
[0103] The advantage of this generation method is that it can be directly performed by hardware components such as logic circuits or finite state machines.
[0104] Figure 6 The diagram is combined Figure 4 4 is a block diagram of the steps of a control field data verification method 600 used in a communication method of the type described in the communication method 400. More specifically, the method 600 may be used in step 405 of the communication method 400.
[0105] In an initial step 601 (Start Control Field Check), a device such as commander 101 or one of responders 102 has received a message and wants to know whether the message can be read.
[0106] In step 602 (calculate CRC), following initial step 601, the device uses the data included in the message, and optionally some data not included in the message, such as in combination with Figure 3 A data identifier of the type described in data identifier 301 is used to calculate its own version of the control field data associated with the received message.
[0107] In step 603 (Check CRC), following step 602, the device compares the control field data stored in the message with its own version calculated in step 602. If the verification is successful (output "yes" of step 603), the next step is step 604 (valid CNT?), otherwise (output "no" of step 603), the next step is step 605 (increase error CNT).
[0108] In step 604, following step 603, the control field data stored in the received message, such as control field data 2031, is the same as the version calculated in step 602. Figure 2 The value of the message counter stored in the message of the type described as value 2033 is compared with the limit value. According to one example, the limit value is 15. If the verification is unsuccessful, that is, if the value of the message counter is greater than the limit value (output "No" of step 604), the next step is step 606 (CNT++?), otherwise, that is, if the value of the message counter is less than the limit value (output "Yes" of step 604), the next step is step 605, in which the error counter is increased.
[0109] In step 605, following step 603 or step 604, the value of the error counter stored by the device is increased or incremented. According to one example, the error counter is increased. According to one example, the increment of the increment is equal to 2.
[0110] In step 606, following step 604, the value of the message counter included in the message is compared with the previous value of the message counter stored by the device. According to an example, the previous value has been stored during the verification of the control field data of the previous data. A comparison value Delta is obtained. If the verification is successful, that is, the comparison data Delta is positive (the output of step 606 is "yes"), the next step is step 607 (Delta), otherwise, that is, the comparison value Delta is negative (the output of step 606 is "no"), and the next step is step 608 (Delta+Max). The following implementation is to avoid using negative numbers in calculations. An implementation using negative numbers is also possible, and in view of the implementation presented, this is obvious to those skilled in the art.
[0111] Furthermore, according to another example, the value of the message counter may also be increased during step 604 even if the value has reached the limit value.
[0112] In step 607, subsequent to step 606, the value of the message counter included in the message is greater than the previous value of the message counter.
[0113] In step 608, following step 606, the value of the message counter included in the message is less than the previous value of the message counter, i.e. the comparison value is negative. In order to perform the calculation only with positive numbers, the comparison data Delta is summed with the limit value. The result of this summation is stored by the device in the data Delta.
[0114] In step 609 (Store CNT), the value of the message counter stored in the message is stored by the device following step 607 or step 608. According to one example, the new value of the message counter replaces the previous value.
[0115] In step 610 (Delta=0?), following step 609, the data Delta is compared with 0. If the verification is unsuccessful (output "No" of step 610), the next step is step 611 (Delta<=Max), otherwise (output "Yes" of step 610), the next step is step 605, in which the error counter is incremented.
[0116] In step 605, following step 610, the data Delta is equal to 0. This means that the value of the message has not changed and the message may have been repeated. According to another example, if the value of the message has not changed, this may be the result of a counter overflow.
[0117] In step 611, the data Delta is different from 0. The data Delta is compared with the maximum data DeltaMax, which represents the number of missed messages acceptable to the device. If the verification is successful (output "yes" of step 611), the next step is step 612 (decrease error CNT), otherwise (output "no" of step 611), the next step is step 605, in which the error counter is incremented.
[0118] In step 612, the error counter is decreased. According to one example, the error counter is decremented. According to one example, the decrement increment is equal to 1.
[0119] In step 613 (accept message), following step 612, the data Delta is less than the maximum data DeltaMax. This means that the device has not missed a message, or has not missed too many messages. The device can accept the message and read it.
[0120] In step 614 (Error CNT>=Max?), following step 605, after detecting multiple problems, the device increments the error counter. The device verifies whether the error counter has not reached the maximum value. This step is optional. If the verification is successful (output "yes" of step 614), the next step is step 615 (enter fail-safe state), otherwise (output "no" of step 614), the next step is step 616 (discard message).
[0121] In step 615, following step 614, the value of the error counter has reached a maximum value, the device cannot accept messages, and can enter a fault mode. During this mode, the device can try to protect itself from other faults and no longer accept any messages until entering another mode, or, for example, until end-to-end protection is restarted.
[0122] In step 616, following step 614, the value of the error counter has not reached the maximum value, the device does not accept the message, and discards the message.
[0123] The advantage of this verification method is that it can be directly performed by hardware components such as logic circuits or finite state machines.
[0124] Various embodiments and variations have been described. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that certain features of these embodiments may be combined, and those skilled in the art will readily conceive of other variations.
[0125] Finally, based on the functional description provided above, the actual implementation of the embodiments and variations described herein is within the capabilities of those skilled in the art.
Claims
1. An electronic device, the electronic device being configured to perform communication via a communication bus, wherein the electronic device comprises a hardware component other than a processor, and wherein the electronic device is configured to directly perform an end-to-end protection method for the communication. 2 . The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the communication bus is a controller area network bus. 3 . The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the communication bus is a Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate bus. 4 . The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the communication bus is a Controller Area Network (CAN) Flexible Data Rate (FD-Lite) bus. 5 . The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the communication bus is a Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate XL bus. The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the hardware component is a finite state machine. 7 . The electronic device of claim 1 , wherein the electronic device is configured to receive, transmit, or receive and transmit at least one message during the communication, the at least one message comprising control field data.
8. The electronic device according to claim 7, wherein the end-to-end protection method comprises: The control field data of the at least one message is generated.
9. The electronic device or method of claim 8, wherein generating comprises: calculating the control field data using data from the message; as well as Increment the message counter.
10. The electronic device according to claim 8, wherein the end-to-end protection method further comprises: The control field data of the at least one message is verified.
11. The electronic device of claim 10, wherein verifying the control field data of the at least one message comprises: calculating a first version of the control field data using data from the message; verifying the first version using a second version of the control field data included in the message; verifying the value of a message counter with a stored value of the message counter; If verification fails, the error counter is incremented; as well as If all verifications succeed, the error counter is decremented.
12. A method for end-to-end protection of communications directly performed by hardware components of an electronic device, the electronic device being adapted to perform the communications via a communications bus, wherein the end-to-end protection method comprises: Generate control field data of at least one message, wherein generating the control field data comprises: calculating the control field data using data from the message; and Increment the message counter; Perform verification, the verification comprising: calculating a first version of the control field data using data from the message; verifying the first version using a second version of the control field data included in the message; verifying the value of a message counter with a stored value of the message counter; If one of the verifications fails, incrementing an error counter; and If all of said verifications are successful, the error counter is decremented.
13. The end-to-end protection method according to claim 12, wherein the communication bus is a controller area network bus.
14. The end-to-end protection method according to claim 12, wherein the communication bus is a Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate bus.
15. The end-to-end protection method according to claim 12, wherein the communication bus is a Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate Lightweight bus.
16. The end-to-end protection method according to claim 12, wherein the communication bus is a Controller Area Network Flexible Data Rate XL bus.
17. The end-to-end protection method according to claim 12, wherein the hardware component is a finite state machine.
18. A system comprising the first electronic device according to claim 1 and at least one second electronic device.
19. The system of claim 18, wherein the at least one second electronic device comprises a second electronic device of the electronic device of claim 1.
20. The system of claim 18, wherein the at least one second electronic device is configured to perform an end-to-end protection method.
