Unmanned aerial vehicle directional induction path planning method based on position deception
The method uses linear programming and a rollback process to efficiently guide drones to a target area using deception, addressing inefficiencies in existing methods by minimizing detection and time.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411151801.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-21
AI Technical Summary
Existing methods for drone path planning based on location deception are inefficient and lack quantitative analysis, leading to increased detection probability and time to reach a designated area, making them unsuitable for military applications.
A method involving linear programming to determine the expected drone position at each moment, ensuring the deception behavior is not discovered, and using a rollback process to adjust the flight direction and speed when the position is unreasonable, with a jammer generating deceptive signals to lure the drone to a target area.
Enables fast, efficient, and covert navigation of drones to a designated area by minimizing detection probability and time, ensuring the drone follows a reasonable deception trajectory.
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Figure CN119085647A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle induction, and in particular to a method for unmanned aerial vehicle induction path planning based on position deception. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of drone technology, its application in the military field has become more and more extensive. How to deal with the threat of enemy drones has become an issue that needs to be studied urgently. Limited by the preset positions of weapons and equipment, the enemy can use intelligence information to plan the attack path of the drone, thereby reducing the probability of the drone being shot down, resulting in a significant increase in our physical shooting cost; using electromagnetic interference to cut off the enemy's control over the drone will cause the drone mission to fail and return or make unpredictable behaviors, which will not be able to effectively strike the enemy and bring unpredictable dangers to our own positions. Therefore, whether from the perspective of improving strike efficiency, protecting our own positions or eliminating the enemy, it is a better solution to lure the enemy drone to a designated area without being discovered, and then capture or strike it.
[0003] A Chinese patent application with publication number CN111624627A discloses a method and system for inducing drones based on location deception. The system describes the functional modules for implementing location deception, mainly including array antenna units, signal receiving units, target tracking units, strategy generation units, induction signal generation units, etc.; the drone induction method proposed based on the system describes the steps of drone induction based on location deception, but in this method, only a method for generating pseudo-range delay based on the ephemeris information of all visible satellites, the current position of the target drone and the expected position of the target drone at the next moment is given, and no method for determining the expected position of the drone at the next moment is given. A Chinese patent application with publication number CN118050751B discloses a method and system for inducing drones based on location deception, in which a method for determining the expected position of the drone at the next moment is given, and a flight fluctuation coefficient index is proposed to avoid unreasonable location deception that causes the drone to discover deception, but the purpose of this method is to enable the drone to reach its preset real destination normally, and it is not suitable for military application scenarios.
[0004] A Chinese patent application with publication number CN111650620B discloses the use of the parallelogram rule to determine the flight speed and direction of a drone, which only reduces the detection of deception from a qualitative perspective. Although it reduces the probability of detection, it greatly increases the time to fly to the target area. The patent uses a variety of means to try to reduce the deviation between the deception trajectory and the preset trajectory, but this method is based on qualitative analysis and does not have reasonable indicators for quantitative analysis to determine whether the position of the deception point at a certain moment is reasonable. The patent attempts to use greater redundancy to meet the requirements of deception concealment, which greatly sacrifices deception efficiency.
[0005] Therefore, for a designated area, how to plan the expected position of the drone at each moment to ensure that the deception behavior is not discovered by the drone and to lure the drone to the designated area in a shorter time is an important issue that needs to be urgently solved when the drone induction method based on location deception is applied in military scenarios. Summary of the invention
[0006] In view of the above analysis, the present invention aims to provide a UAV directional induction path planning method based on position deception, so as to solve the problem that the existing methods cannot achieve fast, efficient and covert target UAV navigation deception.
[0007] To achieve the above object, the present invention comprises the following steps:
[0008] Step (1), after our radar can stably track the enemy UAV, the time to start deception is T0. At this time, the planned position of the UAV is PL(0), and the actual position is RL(0), so RL(0)=PL(0);
[0009] Step (2), preliminarily determine the flight direction: for any T k At time k = 0, 1, 2, ..., the line connecting the actual position of the UAV and the center point of the target area is taken as the expected flight direction of the UAV, and its direction vector is expressed as Where D is the target location that the drone is expected to reach;
[0010] Step (3), determine the deceptive displacement according to the drone speed: Assume that the drone T k to T k+1 The displacement vector is: Where V max is the maximum flight speed of the drone;
[0011] Step (4), according to the displacement vector And the k+1 time position PL(k+1) of the drone’s preset path, we get the position ML(k) of the deception point:
[0012]
[0013] That is T k At this moment, the drone thinks it is at ML(k). The drone follows the displacement vector determined in step (3) Go forward and achieve the purpose of deception;
[0014] Step (5), judging whether the position of the deception point obtained in step (4) is reasonable, if the position of the deception point is considered reasonable, and the delay information is obtained, jumping to (7), if the position of the deception point is considered unreasonable, executing step (6) for re-planning;
[0015] Step (6): when it is determined that the position of the deceptive point is unreasonable, a rollback process is performed, and after the process is completed, the process jumps to step (5);
[0016] Step (7), generating a deception signal according to the delay information solved in step (5) and sending it to the drone;
[0017] Step (8), determine whether the real position RL(k+1) is within the target area. If it is within the target area, send a signal to shoot down or capture the drone. If not, jump to step (2) until the preset trajectory processing is completed.
[0018] Furthermore, in step (5), whether the position of the deceptive point is reasonable is determined, specifically including:
[0019] The following linear programming problem is constructed: the time delay equation group is obtained according to the real position pseudo-range equation group and the position pseudo-range equation group of the deceptive point, the constraint equation group is constructed in combination with the clock error constraint condition, and the minimum value of the sum of the time delay of the time delay equation group is solved under the constraint of the constraint equation group; if a solution exists, the position of the deceptive point is considered reasonable; if no solution exists, the position of the deceptive point is considered unreasonable.
[0020] Furthermore, the rollback process in step (6) specifically includes:
[0021] Get the position of the deception point at time k:
[0022] ML(k)=RL(k-1)
[0023] Correct the flight direction and speed of the drone, where the flight direction vector of the drone at time k is:
[0024]
[0025] Drone flight speed:
[0026]
[0027] Where V min is the real displacement vector of the minimum flight speed of the UAV Update the real position at the next moment
[0028] Furthermore, V max The value is 0.15km / s; V min The value is 0.1km / s
[0029] The present invention is based on a location deception method. According to the current real position of the drone and the preset trajectory, the ideal position of the deception point is calculated from the perspective of reaching the target position as quickly as possible. According to the clock error constraint, time delay and minimum target, whether the position of the ideal deception point is reasonable is judged. If the ideal deception is unreasonable, it means that the real position of the drone deviates too far from the preset trajectory and needs to be adjusted. At this time, the position of the deception point of the drone is backed off so that the movement direction of the drone at the next moment is close to the preset trajectory, thereby making the real trajectory more reasonable. In this way, there is a quantitative judgment on whether the position of the deception point of the drone is reasonable, rather than a qualitative judgment, which ultimately enables the drone to deviate from the preset trajectory to the maximum extent under the premise of meeting the requirements of deception concealment. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0030] Figure 1 It is a plan view of unpredictable trajectory and real trajectory;
[0031] Figure 2 This is a detailed picture of the end of the drone's actual trajectory. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0032] The specific implementation of the present invention is described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings so that those skilled in the art can better understand the present invention. It should be noted that in the following description, when the detailed description of known functions and designs may dilute the main content of the present invention, these descriptions will be omitted here.
[0033] 1. The principle of location deception interference in forwarding deception
[0034] In military scenarios, signal cracking is difficult, so forwarding deception jamming methods are often used. After receiving the real satellite signal, the jammer adds time delay information, amplifies the power, and resends it to cover the original satellite signal to achieve deception jamming of the target.
[0035] Assume that the drone constructs a pseudo-range equation group by receiving signals from four satellites during flight to achieve three-dimensional coordinate positioning. Assume that the coordinates of the four navigation satellites are S1, S2, S3, and S4, and the real coordinate of the drone is P.
[0036] For the true position P, its pseudo-range equation group can be expressed as:
[0037]
[0038] in, are the pseudo-range measurement value of the ith satellite to the actual position of the UAV and the distance between the satellite and the actual position of the UAV, c is the speed of light, Δt P is the clock difference between the user clock and the satellite clock.
[0039] Assuming that the deception coordinates of the drone are M, for the position of the deception point M, its pseudo-range equation group can be expressed as:
[0040]
[0041] in, are the pseudo-range measurement value of the position of the spoofing point by the i-th satellite and the actual distance between the satellite and the position of the spoofing point of the drone, Δt M is the clock difference between the user clock and the satellite clock, which includes the fixed delay from the jammer to the deception point.
[0042] Assume that the forwarding delays are τ i (i=1,2,3,4), according to equations (1) and (2):
[0043]
[0044] Where Δt = Δt P -Δt M It is the clock difference jump.
[0045] According to the question, there are the following constraints:
[0046]
[0047] The total forwarding delay is required to be the shortest, which can be expressed as:
[0048] Under the constraints of equations (3) and (4), we can find τ i (i=1,2,3,4), so that Minimum.
[0049] This is a typical linear programming problem. Solving τ i After that, the jammer can be controlled according to the delay scheme to generate the desired deception signal to deceive the UAV.
[0050] Generally speaking, after our position is preset, the position of the jammer will not change, and the jammer's interference range is limited. If the enemy UAV wants to attack our position, it will fall into the working range of our jammer. There is no need to consider the situation where our jammer cannot interfere with the enemy UAV. If the enemy UAV exceeds the working range of our jammer, it can be regarded as no threat to our position and can be ignored.
[0051] The calculated clock difference between the real position of the drone and the position of the deception point is affected by the distance from the jammer to the position of the drone's deception point. It is an important indicator for the drone to detect whether it has been deceiving. When it exceeds the preset threshold, an alarm will be generated. We do not need to deliberately care about the distance between the deception point and the jammer. We only need to make the calculated clock difference meet the constraints after the position of the deception point is determined. On this basis, if the forwarding delay and the probability of being detected by the deception behavior are the smallest, then the probability of being detected by the deception behavior is the smallest.
[0052] 2. Principle of trajectory deception interference in forwarding deception
[0053] Considering that the drone performs automatic navigation after entering the interference airspace, and completes the flight mission by flying according to the preset trajectory through its own proportional differential controller, when the waypoints on each preset trajectory are infinitely close, it can be considered that the drone is moving in a uniform straight line between adjacent waypoints, and the movement speed is the quotient of the distance between the two waypoints and the time difference between the two waypoints. At each waypoint, the default drone will have completed the deflection of the flight direction based on the current solution position and the preset trajectory waypoint.
[0054] When the trajectory of the drone is known, the flight direction and speed of the drone can be controlled by controlling the relative position of the deception point and the preset trajectory waypoint. By controlling the position of the deception point of the drone point by point, the actual flight trajectory of the drone can be controlled more accurately, and it can be lured into a safe area.
[0055] Consider that the flight speed range of the drone is [0.1, 0.15] and the trajectory sampling interval is 1s.
[0056] In order to lure the drone to the target area as quickly as possible, after each deception signal is sent, the drone is expected to move towards the target point at the fastest speed. The speed should be 0.15 km / s, where RL(k) is the real position of the drone at time k, and D is the target position that the drone is expected to reach.
[0057] Assume that the drone always flies at a speed of 0.15km / s, and adjusts its flight direction in time every time it receives positioning information. Ignoring the impact of the external environment on the drone, assume that the drone moves in a uniform straight line along the initial direction at the initial speed.
[0058] An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for directional guidance path planning of a drone based on position deception, comprising the following steps:
[0059] (1) After our radar can stably track the enemy UAV (hereinafter referred to as UAV), the time to start deception is T0. Because no deception has been implemented before, the UAV is still on the planned route. At this time, the planned position of the UAV is PL(0), and the real position is RL(0), so RL(0)=PL(0).
[0060] (2) Preliminary determination of the flight direction. k time, k=0,1,2,…, k represents the time, k=0 represents the time when the spoofing starts, and the subsequent integers represent the time when the spoofing device sends the spoofing signal, and the integer is taken. The line connecting the real position of the drone and the center point of the target area is taken as the flight direction we expect the drone to fly, and its direction vector can be expressed as D is the target location that the drone is expected to reach.
[0061] (3) Determine the deceptive displacement based on the drone speed. Assume that the drone T k to T k+1 The displacement vector is: Among them, 0.15 is the maximum flight speed of the drone, in km / s.
[0062] (4) Based on the displacement vector and the position of the drone at time k+1 of the preset path, the position of the deception point ML(k) can be obtained:
[0063]
[0064] That is T k At this moment, the drone thinks it is at ML(k) and moves according to (3). Go forward and achieve the purpose of deception.
[0065] (5) Determine whether the location of the deception point is reasonable.
[0066] It is generally believed that if the clock difference jump is small and within the tolerance range of the drone, deception behavior is not easy to be discovered. Therefore, constraining the amplitude of the clock difference jump can effectively prevent the deception behavior from being discovered. At the same time, if the total delay is the shortest under this constraint, it is least likely to be discovered.
[0067] The following linear programming problem is constructed: the time delay equation group is obtained according to the real position pseudo-range equation group and the position pseudo-range equation group of the deception point, and the constraint equation group is constructed in combination with the clock error constraint condition, and the minimum value of the time delay sum is solved under this constraint.
[0068] If a solution exists, the position of the deceptive point is considered reasonable, and the delay information is obtained and jump to (7);
[0069] If there is no solution, the location of the deceptive point is considered unreasonable and needs to be replanned (6).
[0070] (6) If the position of the deceptive point is unreasonable, a rollback process is performed. After the process is completed, jump to (5). The rollback process is as follows:
[0071] Since the real position of the drone at time k-1 can be mapped to the position of the deception point of the drone, it means that the real position of the drone is within a reasonable range. Therefore, the position of the deception point at time k is directly obtained:
[0072] ML(k)=RL(k-1).
[0073] Correct the flight direction and speed of the drone,
[0074] At time k, the UAV flight direction vector is:
[0075]
[0076] Drone flight speed:
[0077]
[0078] True displacement vector Update the real position at the next moment:
[0079] (7) Generate a deceptive signal based on the time delay information solved in (5) and send it to the drone.
[0080] (8) Determine whether RL(k+1) is in the target area. If so, send a signal. If not, jump to (2) until the preset trajectory is processed. Even if the drone is already in the safe area, it is still necessary to continue sending deceptive signals according to the above algorithm to prevent the drone from escaping after obtaining the real position.
[0081] 3. Simulation results
[0082] In order to facilitate explanation, understanding and simplify the amount of calculation, the simulation background is mainly a two-dimensional plane. The three-dimensional simulation can be extended according to the algorithm idea. Here, no simulation demonstration is performed. In the simulation, the coordinates of the jammer are (0, 0, 0.3) km, and they are fixed; the initial position of the drone is (30, 1.302, 0.3) km, and the visible satellite coordinates of the enemy drone and the jammer are: S1 (-1863, 19278, -5944) km, S2 (-1915, 18807, 7284) km, S3 (-2075, 19597, 4743) km, S4 (-1927, 18959, 6876) km.
[0083] In the simulation example, the speed of the enemy drone varies in the range of [0.1, 0.15] km / s. Since the time interval between adjacent deception moments is short, it can be assumed that the drone is moving in a uniform straight line during this period, and the speed steering of the drone can be completed instantly. The preset trajectory of the drone is known, and the target area is:
[0084]
[0085] The delay and clock difference jump of each satellite signal should satisfy the constraint of equation (4).
[0086] The deception starts from time 0, and the preset trajectory and real trajectory information of the drone at three different times are intercepted, as shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3:
[0087] Table 1 Preset trajectory coordinates, actual trajectory coordinates and delay scheme at time 0-8
[0088] time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 PL-X 30 29.9 29.8 29.7 29.6 29.5 29.4 29.3 29.2 PL-Y 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 PL-Z 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 RL-X 30 29.86056 29.72113 29.58169 29.44225 29.30281 29.16338 29.02394 28.8845 RL-Y 1.302 1.357293 1.412585 1.467878 1.523171 1.578464 1.633756 1.689049 1.744342 RL-Z 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 <![CDATA[τ1]]> 3.95E-09 7.89E-09 1.18E-08 1.58E-08 1.97E-08 2.37E-08 2.76E-08 3.16E-08 3.55E-08 <![CDATA[τ2]]> 2.56E-12 8.64E-13 6.37E-14 3.11E-17 7.7E-15 3.51E-16 3.19E-11 3.21E-11 3.24E-11 <![CDATA[τ3]]> 8.13E-09 1.63E-08 2.44E-08 3.25E-08 4.06E-08 4.88E-08 5.69E-08 6.5E-08 7.32E-08 <![CDATA[τ4]]> 1.47E-09 2.92E-09 4.39E-09 5.85E-09 7.31E-09 8.77E-09 1.03E-08 1.17E-08 1.32E-08
[0089] Table 2 Preset trajectory coordinates, actual trajectory coordinates and delay scheme at time 115-123
[0090] time 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 PL-X 17.16092 17.02794 16.89496 16.76198 16.62901 16.49603 16.36305 16.23008 16.0971 PL-Y 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 1.302 PL-Z 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 RL-X 13.96473 13.82529 13.68586 13.54642 13.40698 13.26754 13.12811 12.98867 12.84923 RL-Y 7.660664 7.715957 7.77125 7.826542 7.881835 7.937128 7.99242 8.047713 8.103006 RL-Z 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 <![CDATA[τ1]]> 4.69E-07 4.74E-07 4.78E-07 4.82E-07 4.86E-07 4.9E-07 4.95E-07 4.99E-07 5.03E-07 <![CDATA[τ2]]> 2.31E-13 2E-13 1.71E-13 1.46E-13 1.23E-13 1.02E-13 8.38E-14 6.79E-14 5.62E-14 <![CDATA[τ3]]> 9.07E-07 9.14E-07 9.22E-07 9.29E-07 9.36E-07 9.43E-07 9.51E-07 9.58E-07 9.65E-07 <![CDATA[τ4]]> 1.67E-07 1.68E-07 1.7E-07 1.71E-07 1.72E-07 1.74E-07 1.75E-07 1.77E-07 1.78E-07
[0091] Table 3 Preset trajectory coordinates, actual trajectory coordinates and delay scheme at time 237-245
[0092] time 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 PL-X 1.095576 0.971195 0.847119 0.723276 0.599555 0.475809 0.351862 0.227522 0.102606 PL-Y 1.306907 1.309493 1.312698 1.31661 1.321302 1.326817 1.333152 1.340247 1.347976 PL-Z 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 RL-X 0.547138 0.528299 0.532274 0.51936 0.506446 0.505875 0.501953 0.498302 0.499436 RL-Y 12.62766 12.77647 12.62652 12.77597 12.92541 12.77541 12.92536 12.7754 12.9254 RL-Z 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 <![CDATA[τ1]]> 8.85E-07 1.14E-08 8.86E-07 8.98E-07 1.15E-08 8.99E-07 1.16E-08 9E-07 9.13E-07 <![CDATA[τ2]]> 2.88E-16 3.02E-13 2.51E-16 4.3E-15 2.99E-13 2.91E-16 2.98E-13 2.47E-16 4.07E-15 <![CDATA[τ3]]> 1.48E-06 1.96E-08 1.48E-06 1.49E-06 1.95E-08 1.48E-06 1.94E-08 1.48E-06 1.49E-06 <![CDATA[τ4]]> 2.88E-07 3.77E-09 2.87E-07 2.91E-07 3.77E-09 2.9E-07 3.76E-09 2.89E-07 2.92E-07
[0093] Among them, PL-X, PL-Y, and PL-Z represent the X, Y, and Z coordinates of the preset trajectory, respectively. Similarly, RL-X, RL-Y, and RL-Z represent the X, Y, and Z coordinates of the real trajectory, respectively. τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4 represent the forwarding delays of the signals corresponding to satellites S1, S2, S3, and S4, respectively.
[0094] At the 237th moment, the drone was very close to the target area, and at the 238th moment, the drone officially entered the target area. In the target area, the same interference strategy was still implemented on the drone, forcing the drone to get as close to the center of the target area as possible, buying time for capturing or shooting down the drone. As long as there is preset trajectory information, the plan can be executed continuously, making it impossible for the drone to escape.
[0095] More intuitive, Figure 1The trajectory of the drone is described. The red and yellow solid lines are the real trajectory and the preset trajectory of the drone, respectively. The blue dotted line is the line connecting the positions of the deception points at different times. The area formed by the orange dotted line is the safe area. Starting from the 0th moment, the drone moves in the direction that reaches the center of the target area as quickly as possible. Initially, the real trajectory is slightly different from the preset trajectory, and the deception behavior is not easy to be discovered. At this time, the drone can move towards the target area at the fastest speed until the 196th moment. Since the real trajectory is too different from the preset trajectory, there is no reasonable delay solution that can prevent the deception behavior from being discovered. Therefore, the fallback process is adopted. The deception point is selected as the position of the real trajectory at the 195th moment. The drone moves to the 197th moment of the preset trajectory to reduce the difference between the real trajectory and the preset trajectory. It can be seen that the real trajectory of the drone can no longer maintain a straight line, but deviates in the direction of the preset trajectory. At the 197th moment, after the trajectory adjustment at the 196th moment, the drone can find a reasonable delay solution and continue to move towards the target area in the fastest direction. After that, the position of the drone's deception point begins to jump back and forth near the real trajectory and the preset trajectory, so as to continuously adjust the drone's position to maintain the concealment of the deception. This process is repeated, and the final trajectory is a curve.
[0096] Although the deception track jumps over a large range when the drone approaches the target area because the actual position is too far from the preset position, it is certain that despite such jumps, according to the delay settlement results, the position of the deception point is still within a reasonable range and will not be discovered by the drone. The above processing allows the drone to fly at an extreme state, minimizing the time to reach the target area. After approaching the center point of the target area, the drone repeatedly jumps around it and cannot get rid of it.
[0097] Further from Figure 2 It can be seen that under normal circumstances, the drone can correct the deviation after one adjustment, which shows that the back-off correction method has a good effect. At the same time, when the drone deviates far from the preset trajectory, frequent correction is required to ensure that the deception behavior is not discovered by the drone.
[0098] Although the above describes the illustrative specific embodiments of the present invention to facilitate those skilled in the art to understand the present invention, it should be clear that the present invention is not limited to the scope of the specific embodiments. For those of ordinary skill in the art, as long as various changes are within the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined and determined by the attached claims, these changes are obvious, and all inventions and creations using the concept of the present invention are protected.
Claims
1. A method for directional guidance path planning of unmanned aerial vehicles based on position deception, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step (1), after our radar can stably track the enemy UAV, the time to start deception is T0. At this time, the planned position of the UAV is PL(0), and the actual position is RL(0), so RL(0)=PL(0); Step (2), preliminarily determine the flight direction: for any T k At time k = 0, 1, 2, ..., the line connecting the actual position of the UAV and the center point of the target area is taken as the expected flight direction of the UAV, and its direction vector is expressed as Where D is the target location that the drone is expected to reach; Step (3), determine the deceptive displacement according to the drone speed: Assume that the drone T k to T k+1 The displacement vector is: Where V max is the maximum flight speed of the drone; Step (4), according to the displacement vector And the k+1 time position PL(k+1) of the drone’s preset path, we get the position ML(k) of the deception point: That is T k At this moment, the drone thinks it is at ML(k). The drone follows the displacement vector determined in step (3) Go forward and achieve the purpose of deception; Step (5), judging whether the position of the deception point obtained in step (4) is reasonable, if the position of the deception point is considered reasonable, and the delay information is obtained, jumping to (7), if the position of the deception point is considered unreasonable, executing step (6) for re-planning; Step (6): when it is determined that the position of the deceptive point is unreasonable, a rollback process is performed, and after the process is completed, the process jumps to step (5); Step (7), generating a deception signal according to the delay information solved in step (5) and sending it to the drone; Step (8), determine whether the real position RL(k+1) is within the target area. If it is within the target area, send a signal to shoot down or capture the drone. If not, jump to step (2) until the preset trajectory processing is completed.
2. The method for directional guidance path planning of a drone based on location deception as described in claim 1 is characterized in that: In step (5), whether the position of the deceptive point is reasonable is judged, specifically including: The following linear programming problem is constructed: the time delay equation group is obtained according to the real position pseudo-range equation group and the position pseudo-range equation group of the deceptive point, the constraint equation group is constructed in combination with the clock error constraint condition, and the minimum value of the sum of the time delay of the time delay equation group is solved under the constraint of the constraint equation group; if a solution exists, the position of the deceptive point is considered reasonable; if no solution exists, the position of the deceptive point is considered unreasonable.
3. The method for directional guidance path planning of a drone based on location deception as described in claim 1 is characterized in that: The rollback process in step (6) specifically includes: Get the position of the deception point at time k: ML(k)=RL(k-1) Correct the flight direction and speed of the drone, where the flight direction vector of the drone at time k is: Drone flight speed: Where V min is the real displacement vector of the minimum flight speed of the UAV Update the real position at the next moment k=k+1.
4. The method for directional guidance path planning of a drone based on location deception as described in claim 1 is characterized in that: V max The value is 0.15km / s; V min The value is 0.1km / s.
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