Vehicle and road cloud credible interaction multi-node identity authentication method based on block chain architecture

Abstract

The invention discloses a vehicle and road cloud trusted interaction multi-node identity authentication method based on a block chain architecture, and the method comprises the steps: enabling a vehicle and a nearest road side unit in a road side calculation facility to enter a bidirectional authentication stage when the vehicle enters a new communication range of the road side calculation facility; after the bidirectional authentication is passed, the roadside computing facility provides a corresponding service according to the request of the vehicle; in the process that a first vehicle and a second vehicle in the communication range of the same roadside computing facility carry out message transmission between vehicles through anonymous identities, if the first vehicle judges that the second vehicle sends false information to the first vehicle, the first vehicle packages the false information sent by the second vehicle and sends the packaged false information to a certificate issuing mechanism; and after verification of the certificate issuing mechanism, if the second vehicle is determined to be an abnormal vehicle, the certificate issuing mechanism searches the real identity of the abnormal vehicle and punishes the abnormal vehicle.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of traffic information interaction technology, and in particular to a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interaction multi-node identity authentication method based on a blockchain architecture. Background Art

[0002] Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) technology is gradually reshaping the face of the transportation system by achieving interoperability between vehicles (V2V) and vehicles and infrastructure (V2I). By integrating advanced sensors, communication equipment and computing platforms, vehicles can perceive the surrounding environment and exchange real-time data with other vehicles, infrastructure and even cloud services. This technological advancement has not only greatly improved road safety and traffic efficiency, but also laid the foundation for the development of driver assistance systems and autonomous driving technologies. However, the rapid development of the Internet of Vehicles also brings risks of privacy leakage and security threats. The large amount of data generated by vehicles during driving, including location trajectory, speed information, driving behavior and intention, etc., may be used maliciously; in addition, if the source of the information is not reliably confirmed, false information will spread throughout the Internet of Vehicles environment, making it impossible for roadside infrastructure to provide effective services, and ultimately leading to the paralysis of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0003] Therefore, how to achieve secure data sharing while protecting user privacy has become a pressing issue that needs to be addressed. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of this, an embodiment of the present invention provides a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture to solve the problem of insufficient protection of vehicle privacy data in vehicle network communications in the prior art.

[0005] The embodiment of the present invention provides a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture, including:

[0006] When the vehicle enters the communication range of a new roadside computing facility, the vehicle and the nearest roadside unit in the roadside computing facility enter the two-way authentication phase;

[0007] After the two-way authentication is passed, the roadside computing facility provides corresponding services according to the vehicle's request;

[0008] During the process of inter-vehicle message transmission between a first vehicle and a second vehicle within the communication range of the same roadside computing facility through anonymous identities, if the first vehicle determines that the second vehicle sends false information to it, the first vehicle packages the false information sent by the second vehicle and sends it to the certificate issuing authority; after verification by the certificate issuing authority, if the second vehicle is determined to be an abnormal vehicle, the certificate issuing authority will find the real identity of the abnormal vehicle and punish it;

[0009] Among them, the certificate issuing authority and the roadside computing facility form a blockchain architecture; the roadside computing facility includes a plurality of roadside units and a roadside computing device; the roadside computing device is communicatively connected with all roadside units in the roadside computing facility;

[0010] When a vehicle first enters the communication range of the roadside computing facility, the vehicle registers its identity with the certificate authority; the certificate authority generates a corresponding pseudonym and vehicle public and private key pair based on the certification materials provided by the vehicle, and uploads the mapping relationship between the vehicle's pseudonym and the vehicle's public key to the blockchain architecture.

[0011] Optionally, it also includes:

[0012] The certificate issuing authority generates the roadside unit identity information, the roadside unit certificate and the roadside unit public key according to the location information of the roadside unit; wherein the certificate issuing authority uses its private key to sign the roadside unit identity information and the roadside unit public key;

[0013] The roadside unit broadcasts data externally; the data includes the public key of the roadside computing device, the roadside unit certificate, and the signature information of the roadside unit.

[0014] Optionally, the vehicle and the nearest roadside unit in the roadside computing facility enter into a mutual authentication phase including:

[0015] After the vehicle receives the broadcast information from the roadside unit, the vehicle verifies the legitimacy of the broadcast information from the roadside unit based on the public key of the certificate authority and the public key of the roadside unit. If the information is legitimate, the vehicle completes the authentication of the roadside unit.

[0016] After the roadside unit receives the authentication information sent by the vehicle, it performs a timeliness check, hash check and pseudonym check on the authentication information; if all pass, the roadside unit completes the authentication of the vehicle; if any one fails, interaction is not possible.

[0017] Optionally, the roadside computing facility provides corresponding services according to the vehicle's request, including:

[0018] The vehicle uses the roadside unit public key to asymmetrically encrypt the service request information;

[0019] The roadside unit performs a validity check on the received service request information; if the validity check passes, the roadside unit uses its private key to decrypt it and provides the corresponding service to the vehicle that made the request based on the service request information.

[0020] Optionally, it also includes:

[0021] The vehicle selects two random numbers and constructs a verification variable for the encrypted service request information;

[0022] The vehicle sends verification variables to the roadside unit;

[0023] The roadside unit performs verification through the verification equation; if it passes, it accepts the service request information and provides the corresponding service; if it fails, it refuses to provide the service.

[0024] Optionally, the first vehicle and the second vehicle within the communication range of the same roadside computing facility perform inter-vehicle message transmission through anonymous identities, including:

[0025] The first vehicle / the second vehicle selects three random numbers and generates a temporary anonymous identity and signature information of the corresponding vehicle by combining the vehicle's pseudonym, a hash function and a public key of a certificate authority;

[0026] The first vehicle sends a message to the second vehicle; the message includes a temporary anonymous identity of the first vehicle, random number information, actual communication content, a timestamp, and signature information of the first vehicle;

[0027] The second vehicle checks the message for timeliness, verifies the validity of the signature, and verifies the authenticity of the message in turn; if all of them pass, the message is received and vehicle-to-vehicle interaction is carried out; if any one of them fails, the second vehicle determines that the first vehicle is an abnormal vehicle, and the second vehicle packages the temporary anonymous identity of the first vehicle, the public key of the second vehicle, the actual communication content, and the signature information of the second vehicle and sends them to the certificate authority for verification.

[0028] Optionally, if the certificate authority verifies that the first vehicle is an abnormal vehicle, the certificate authority uses the private key of the certificate authority to restore the temporary anonymous identity of the first vehicle to obtain the pseudonym of the first vehicle: the certificate authority queries the database according to the pseudonym of the first vehicle to obtain the real identity information of the first vehicle, and removes the relevant information of the first vehicle from the blockchain architecture.

[0029] Optionally, it also includes: the permissions of the roadside unit include: verification function and query function; the certificate authority is deployed in the cloud, and the permissions of the certificate authority include: uploading blockchain; the permissions of the roadside computing device include: uploading blockchain; the permissions of the vehicle include: query function.

[0030] Beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0031] The embodiment of the present invention provides a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interaction multi-node identity authentication method under a blockchain architecture. Through identity authentication between multiple nodes such as a cloud-based certificate issuing authority, a roadside computing facility, a roadside unit, and a vehicle, support is provided for trusted interaction of information such as vehicle status and driving intention. Blockchain technology is used to solve the problem of trusted data ownership, and abnormal vehicles are quickly located when false information is identified, thereby protecting vehicle privacy and the Internet of Vehicles environment. In addition, by storing proofs on the chain and performing calculations off the chain, the efficiency of vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-road authentication is effectively improved. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0032] The features and advantages of the present invention will be more clearly understood by referring to the accompanying drawings, which are schematic and should not be construed as limiting the present invention in any way. In the accompanying drawings:

[0033] Figure 1 An architecture diagram of a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication system based on a blockchain architecture in an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0034] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of data interaction during the initialization and registration phases of a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interaction multi-node identity authentication method based on a blockchain architecture in an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0035] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of two-way authentication and service phase data interaction of a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on a blockchain architecture in an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0036] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of data interaction in the message verification phase and the revocation phase of a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on a blockchain architecture in an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0037] Figure 5 A step diagram of a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture in an embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0039] like Figure 1 to Figure 4As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on a blockchain architecture, comprising:

[0040] When the vehicle enters the communication range of a new roadside computing facility, the vehicle and the nearest roadside unit in the roadside computing facility enter the two-way authentication phase;

[0041] After the two-way authentication is passed, the roadside computing facility provides corresponding services according to the vehicle's request;

[0042] During the process of inter-vehicle message transmission between a first vehicle and a second vehicle within the communication range of the same roadside computing facility through anonymous identities, if the first vehicle determines that the second vehicle sends false information to it, the first vehicle packages the false information sent by the second vehicle and sends it to the certificate issuing authority; after verification by the certificate issuing authority, if the second vehicle is determined to be an abnormal vehicle, the certificate issuing authority will find the real identity of the abnormal vehicle and punish it;

[0043] Among them, the certificate issuing authority and the roadside computing facility form a blockchain architecture; the roadside computing facility includes a number of roadside units;

[0044] When a vehicle first enters the communication range of the roadside computing facility, the vehicle registers its identity with the certificate authority; the certificate authority generates a corresponding pseudonym and vehicle public-private key pair based on the certification materials provided by the vehicle, and uploads the mapping relationship between the vehicle's pseudonym and the vehicle's public-private key pair to the blockchain architecture.

[0045] This embodiment provides a multi-node identity authentication method for trusted interaction between vehicle, road and cloud under a blockchain architecture. It provides support for trusted interaction of information such as vehicle status and driving intention through identity authentication between multiple nodes such as cloud-based certificate issuing authorities, roadside computing facilities, roadside units, and vehicles. It specifically includes the following six stages.

[0046] Initialization phase: The certificate authority selects the parameters necessary for identity authentication, generates public and private key pairs for itself and the roadside computing facilities, and builds a blockchain network.

[0047] Registration phase: The certificate authority registers the roadside unit and the vehicle, generates the roadside unit certificate and the vehicle pseudonym, and uploads the vehicle pseudonym and vehicle public key to the chain.

[0048] Two-way authentication phase: The vehicle and the roadside unit verify the authenticity of the certificate and pseudonym. If successful, they enter the service phase.

[0049] Service phase: The vehicle uses the public key of the roadside unit to encrypt the request message, selects two random numbers to construct a verification variable and sends it to the roadside unit. After receiving the request message, the roadside unit verifies the authenticity of the request message and decrypts the message after verification to provide services to the vehicle.

[0050] Message verification phase: The vehicle selects three random numbers, uses the random numbers to generate a temporary anonymous identity, and uses the anonymous identity to transmit messages between vehicles.

[0051] Revocation stage: If the vehicle determines that there is an abnormal vehicle sending a false message, the message will be packaged and sent to the certificate authority. After verification, the certificate authority uses its own private key to restore the abnormal vehicle's pseudonym and find the abnormal vehicle's real identity to punish it.

[0052] This embodiment uses blockchain technology to solve the problem of reliable data ownership, and quickly locates abnormal vehicles when false information is identified, protecting vehicle privacy and the Internet of Vehicles environment; in addition, by storing proofs on the chain and performing calculations off the chain, the authentication efficiency between vehicles and between vehicles and roads is effectively improved.

[0053] In a specific embodiment, Figure 5 As shown, including:

[0054] Initialization phase: The certificate authority selects the parameters necessary for identity authentication, generates a public and private key pair for itself and the roadside computing device, and builds a blockchain network;

[0055] In a specific embodiment, Figure 2 As shown, the certificate authority selects two sufficiently large prime numbers p and q, and accordingly selects an elliptic curve E:y based on the finite field G(p) = {0, 1, 2, ..., p-1} 2 =x 3 +ax+b(modp), where a,b∈G(p) and 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0, and select a cyclic additive group G1 with generator P and order q and a cyclic multiplicative group G of the same order T , suppose a bilinear map e satisfies this pairing relation e:G1×G1→G T .

[0056] The certificate authority selects a random number SK CA ∈Z * q as the private key, and calculate

[0057] PK CA =SK CA ·P (1)

[0058] PK CA The certificate authority then selects three collision-resistant hash functions H1: {0,1} * →G1,H2:G1→Z*q,H3:{0,1} * ×G1→Z *q , then the certificate authority will send these public parameters {p,q,e,E,G1,G t ,H1,H2,H3,P} and the mapping relationship between the real identity of the certificate authority and the public key RID CA -PK CA In addition, the roadside computing device (RCF) selects a random number SK RCF ∈Z * q As the private key, calculate:

[0059] PK RCF =SK RCF ·P (2)

[0060] PK RCF As the public key of the roadside computing device.

[0061] Registration phase: The certificate authority registers the roadside unit and the vehicle, generates the roadside unit certificate and the vehicle pseudonym, and uploads the vehicle pseudonym and vehicle public key to the chain.

[0062] In a specific embodiment, Figure 2 As shown, the roadside unit is first registered. The certificate authority generates a real identity RID for the roadside unit based on the geographical location of the roadside unit. RSU , then the certificate authority selects a random number SK RSU ∈Z * q , calculate the public key PK RSU =SK RSU P, and generate the roadside unit certificate Cert RSU :

[0063] Cert RSU = {PK RSU ,RID RSU ,σ CA} (3)

[0064] where σ CA As shown in formula (4), using SK CA PK RSU and RID RSU sign:

[0065] σ CA ={SK CA ,PK RSU ,RID RSU} (4)

[0066] At this point, the roadside unit registration is completed, followed by vehicle registration.

[0067] The vehicle first submits the vehicle's real information RID to the certification authority Veh The certificate authority verifies that the certificate is legitimate and selects a random number SK. Veh ∈Z * q , generate a public key PK for the vehicle Veh =SK Veh In addition, the certificate authority needs to generate a pseudonym for the vehicle. The certificate authority selects a random number r p , calculate the pseudonym according to formula (5).

[0068] PID Veh =H3(RID Veh ||PK CA ||r p ||t n ) (5)

[0069] where t n is the current timestamp. Finally, the certificate authority will Veh and PK Veh Construct a mapping relationship and upload the PID Veh and RID Veh The mapping relationship is stored in the local database of the certification authority.

[0070] Two-way authentication phase: The vehicle and the roadside unit verify the authenticity of the certificate and pseudonym. If they pass, they enter the service phase;

[0071] In a specific embodiment, Figure 3 As shown, the vehicle first authenticates the roadside unit.

[0072] When a vehicle enters the communication range of a new roadside computing facility, the first roadside unit in the area broadcasts a message M1 to the vehicle:

[0073] M1={Cert RSU ,PK RCF ,σ RSU} (6)

[0074] where σ RSU for

[0075] σ RSU ={SK RSU ,Cert RSU ,PK RCF} (7)

[0076] After the vehicle receives the message, it first checks whether the onboard database has PK RCFIf it exists, it means that the vehicle has not left the communication range of the current roadside computing facility or has authenticated with this roadside computing facility before, and the message can be transmitted directly without authentication; if it does not exist, the vehicle first needs to use PK CA Verify Cert RSU The legitimacy of RSU Verification RSU The legitimacy of is shown in formula (9).

[0077] Ver(PK CA ,Cert RSU )→true (8)

[0078] Ver(PK RSU ,σ RSU )→true (9)

[0079] If the verification is passed, the vehicle will be PK RCF With PK RSU The mapping relationship is stored in the vehicle database for subsequent verification and communication. Next, the roadside unit authenticates the vehicle. The vehicle sends a hash string h to the roadside unit. j and signature σ Vehj :

[0080] h j =H3(PID Veh ||t nj ) (10)

[0081] σ Vehj ={SK Veh ,PID Veh ,t nj ,h j} (11)

[0082] Among them, t nj is the current timestamp. After receiving the information, the RSU first performs a timeliness check. If the information satisfies formula (12), it is considered to have passed. nr is the timestamp after the roadside unit receives the message, and ε is the maximum time interval set by the system based on the transmission delay:

[0083] Δt=t nr -t nj <ε (12)

[0084] Next, a hash check is performed. The roadside unit performs a hash operation based on the information in the signature, as shown in formula (13):

[0085] h j '=H3(PID Veh ||t nj ) (13)

[0086] If h j =h j ', then the check is passed. Finally, the pseudonym check is performed and the roadside unit queries the PID through the blockchain Veh Is it on the blockchain? If it exists, it means it is a pseudonym approved by the certificate authority, and then verify σ Vehj The validity of the PK returned by the blockchain Veh Verification is performed, as shown in formula (14). If the verification fails, it can be determined that the vehicle has stolen the pseudonym of another vehicle.

[0087] Ver(PK Veh ,σ Vehj )→true (14)

[0088] Service phase: The vehicle uses the public key of the roadside unit to encrypt the request message, selects two random numbers to construct a verification variable and sends it to the roadside unit. After receiving the request message, the roadside unit verifies the authenticity of the request message and provides services to the vehicle by post-decrypting the message.

[0089] In a specific embodiment, Figure 3 As shown, at this time the vehicle has passed two-way authentication with the roadside unit.

[0090] The vehicle first uses PK RSU Send the request message in plain text V2I encryption:

[0091] m V2I =Enc(PK RSU ,massage V2I ) (15)

[0092] The vehicle then selects two random numbers r a , r b ,calculate:

[0093]

[0094] The vehicle will PID Veh ,PK Veh ,t ns , σ Vehs ={SK Veh ,R a ||R b ||S s ||m V2I} is sent to the roadside unit, which performs a timeliness check after receiving it and verifies σ Vehs The effectiveness of the final roadside unit calculation:

[0095]

[0096] The calculation results are used to verify whether equations (18) and (19) are valid.

[0097] e(h s3 ,P)=e(h s2 ,PK RSU ) (18)

[0098] S s P=PK Veh ·h s1 '+R b (19)

[0099] If established, the roadside unit accepts the vehicle's request message, and finally the roadside unit uses SK RSU Decryption:

[0100] massage V2I =Dec(SK RSU ,m V2I ) (20)

[0101] Get the plaintext message and provide corresponding services to the vehicle according to the content of the message.

[0102] Message verification phase: The vehicle selects three random numbers, uses the random numbers to generate a temporary anonymous identity, and uses the anonymous identity to transmit messages between vehicles.

[0103] In a specific embodiment, Figure 4 As shown, assuming that car A and car B are transmitting messages in the Internet of Vehicles environment, car A is an abnormal vehicle and car B is a normal vehicle. First, car A needs to select three random numbers x, y, z and obtain a temporary anonymous identity TAID by calculating the following formulas: Veh :

[0104]

[0105] Then car A generates a signature σ VehAc = {Z||β}, generating message M2:

[0106] M2={TAID VehA ,X,massage V2V ,t nca ,σ VehAc} (twenty two)

[0107] Car A broadcasts message M2 to other vehicles, here we take car B as an example. After receiving it, car B first performs a timeliness check and then verifies the validity of the signature. Here, car B calculates:

[0108]

[0109] Then verify whether equation (24) is true. If true, accept the message and interact with the vehicles.

[0110] β·P=X+h c1 '·Y+h c2 '·Z (24)

[0111] Revocation stage: If the vehicle determines that there is an abnormal vehicle sending a false message, the message will be packaged and sent to the certificate authority. After verification, the certificate authority uses its own private key to restore the abnormal vehicle's pseudonym and find the abnormal vehicle's real identity to punish it.

[0112] In a specific embodiment, Figure 4 As shown in the figure, assuming that car B finds that car A sends malicious information to interfere with the Internet of Vehicles environment, car B sends message M3 to the certificate authority:

[0113] M3={TAID VehA ,X,massage V2V ,PK VehB ,σ B} (25)

[0114] where σ B for:

[0115] σ B ={SK VehB ,TAID VehA ,X,massage V2V} (26)

[0116] The certificate authority verifies the authenticity of the message. If the message is false, the certificate authority uses the private key SK CA According to formula (27), the pseudonym of car A is restored.

[0117]

[0118] The certificate authority then queries the local database for the PID based on the pseudonym. VehA Corresponding real identity RID VehA , revealing the true identity of car A and removing the relevant information of car A from the blockchain, and car A is then expelled from the Internet of Vehicles network.

[0119] The certificate authority is deployed in the cloud. The Internet of Vehicles blockchain network is built based on Hyperledger Fabric. The network participants include the certificate authority, roadside computing equipment, roadside units, and vehicles. Figure 1As shown in the figure, the certificate authority and the roadside computing device are absolutely trustworthy and have powerful computing power and storage space, so they have the authority to upload to the blockchain, verify and query in the blockchain network; the roadside unit is semi-trustworthy and has certain computing power, but it may be hacked by attackers, so it cannot have the authority to upload to the blockchain and only retains the authority to verify and query; the vehicle is completely untrustworthy and there may be abnormal vehicles launching attacks, resulting in the vehicle only being able to be queried from the blockchain.

[0120] In a specific embodiment, the architecture of the Internet of Vehicles is set as follows: there are multiple roadside computing facilities within the communication range of the certificate issuing authority, there are multiple roadside units within the communication range of the roadside computing facilities, and there are multiple vehicles within the communication range of the roadside units. When a vehicle enters the communication range of a new roadside computing facility, it needs to perform identity authentication, but when it enters the communication range of a new roadside unit within the communication range of the same roadside computing facility, it does not need to perform authentication.

[0121] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, those skilled in the art may make various modifications and variations without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, and such modifications and variations are all within the scope defined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture, characterized in that: include: When a vehicle enters the communication range of a new roadside computing facility, the vehicle and the nearest roadside unit in the roadside computing facility enter a two-way authentication phase; After the two-way authentication is passed, the roadside computing facility provides corresponding services according to the request of the vehicle; During the process of inter-vehicle message transmission between a first vehicle and a second vehicle within the communication range of the same roadside computing facility through anonymous identities, if the first vehicle determines that the second vehicle sends false information to it, the first vehicle packages the false information sent by the second vehicle and sends it to the certificate issuing authority; After verification by the certificate issuing authority, if the second vehicle is determined to be an abnormal vehicle, the certificate issuing authority will find out the real identity of the abnormal vehicle and impose penalties; The certificate issuing authority and the roadside computing facility form a blockchain architecture; the roadside computing facility includes a plurality of the roadside units and a roadside computing device; the roadside computing device is in communication connection with all the roadside units in the roadside computing facility; When the vehicle first enters the communication range of the roadside computing facility, the vehicle registers its identity with the certificate authority; the certificate authority generates a corresponding pseudonym and vehicle public-private key pair based on the certification materials provided by the vehicle, and uploads the mapping relationship between the vehicle's pseudonym and the vehicle's public key to the blockchain architecture.

2. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Also includes: The certificate issuing authority generates the roadside unit identity information, the roadside unit certificate and the roadside unit public key according to the location information of the roadside unit; wherein the certificate issuing authority uses its private key to sign the roadside unit identity information and the roadside unit public key; The roadside unit broadcasts data externally; the data includes the public key of the roadside computing device, the roadside unit certificate and the signature information of the roadside unit.

3. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The vehicle and the roadside unit closest to the roadside computing facility enter into a two-way authentication phase, including: After the vehicle receives the broadcast information of the roadside unit, the vehicle verifies the legitimacy of the broadcast information of the roadside unit according to the public key of the certificate issuing authority and the public key of the roadside unit; if it is legitimate, the vehicle completes the authentication of the roadside unit; After the roadside unit receives the authentication information sent by the vehicle, the roadside unit performs a timeliness check, a hash check and a pseudonym check on the authentication information; if all pass, the roadside unit completes the authentication of the vehicle; if any one fails, interaction cannot be performed.

4. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The roadside computing facility provides corresponding services according to the request of the vehicle, including: The vehicle uses the roadside unit public key to asymmetrically encrypt the service request information; The roadside unit performs a validity check on the received service request information; if the validity check passes, the roadside unit uses its private key to decrypt the information and provides corresponding services to the vehicle that made the request based on the service request information.

5. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 4 is characterized in that: Also includes: The vehicle selects two random numbers and constructs a verification variable for the encrypted service request information; The vehicle sends the verification variable to the roadside unit; The roadside unit performs verification through a verification equation; if passed, the service request information is accepted and corresponding services are provided; if not passed, the service is refused to be provided.

6. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 1 is characterized in that: A first vehicle and a second vehicle within a communication range of the same roadside computing facility perform inter-vehicle message transmission through anonymous identities, including: The first vehicle / second vehicle selects three random numbers, and generates a temporary anonymous identity and signature information of the corresponding vehicle in combination with the pseudonym of the vehicle, a hash function and a public key of the certificate authority; The first vehicle sends a message to the second vehicle; the message includes a temporary anonymous identity of the first vehicle, random number information, actual communication content, a timestamp, and signature information of the first vehicle; The second vehicle checks the timeliness of the message, verifies the validity of the signature, and verifies the authenticity of the message in turn; if all of them pass, the message is received and vehicle-to-vehicle interaction is performed; if any one of them fails, the second vehicle determines that the first vehicle is an abnormal vehicle, and the second vehicle packages the temporary anonymous identity of the first vehicle, the public key of the second vehicle, the actual communication content, and the signature information of the second vehicle and sends them to the certificate authority for verification.

7. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 6 is characterized in that: If the certificate issuing authority verifies that the first vehicle is an abnormal vehicle, the temporary anonymous identity of the first vehicle is restored using the private key of the certificate issuing authority to obtain the pseudonym of the first vehicle: the certificate issuing authority queries the database according to the pseudonym of the first vehicle to obtain the real identity information of the first vehicle, and removes the relevant information of the first vehicle from the blockchain architecture.

8. The vehicle-road-cloud trusted interactive multi-node identity authentication method based on blockchain architecture according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Also includes: The permissions of the roadside unit include: verification function and query function; the certificate authority is deployed in the cloud, and the permissions of the certificate authority include: uploading blockchain; the permissions of the roadside computing device include: uploading blockchain; the permissions of the vehicle include: query function.

Images