Anti-disassembly authentication method, system and device, storage medium and product

Abstract

The invention discloses an anti-disassembly authentication method, system and device, a storage medium and a product, and relates to the technical field of mobile terminals, and the anti-disassembly authentication method comprises the steps: obtaining the binding state information of an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC); the binding state information is sent to a data authentication end to instruct the data authentication end to return authentication data based on the binding state information, and the authentication data is used for authenticating the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC; receiving the authentication data, and performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result; and if the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, adjusting the use state of the eUICC into a forbidden state. According to the invention, the disassembly behavior in the terminal can be detected.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of mobile terminal technology, and in particular to an anti-tampering machine authentication method, system, device, storage medium and computer program product. Background Art

[0002] In some IoT devices, in order to prevent IoT cards from being lost or used for illegal purposes by criminals, it is necessary to set the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card to be used only in specific terminals, thereby preventing illegal users from putting the card in other terminals for use.

[0003] In the related technology, when a device is generally connected to the network for the first time, the SIM card number is bound to the device's IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number. When the device subsequently accesses the network, if the IMEI of the device changes, it cannot be used. However, if the device is disassembled maliciously to obtain the eUICC (embedded universal integrated circuit card), when the IMEI number of the terminal device is read, the eUICC can be inserted into the new device and the IMEI number of the external device can be tampered with. At this time, the disassembly of the device cannot be detected.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a technology that can prevent the eUICC from being disassembled and used in other terminals.

[0005] The above contents are only used to assist in understanding the technical solution of the present application and do not constitute an admission that the above contents are prior art. Summary of the invention

[0006] The main purpose of this application is to provide an anti-tampering authentication method, system, device, storage medium and computer program product, which aims to solve the technical problem in the related technology that the eUICC is inserted into a new device and the IMEI number of the external device is tampered with by malicious disassembly, resulting in preventing the eUICC from being disassembled and used in other terminals.

[0007] To achieve the above purpose, the present application proposes an anti-tampering machine authentication method, which is applied to a mobile terminal. The anti-tampering machine authentication method includes:

[0008] Obtaining the binding status information of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC;

[0009] sending the binding state information to a data authentication terminal to instruct the data authentication terminal to return authentication data based on the binding state information, wherein the authentication data is used to authenticate the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC;

[0010] Receiving the authentication data, and performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result;

[0011] If the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

[0012] In one embodiment, before the step of obtaining the binding status information of the eUICC, the step further includes:

[0013] Obtain the terminal information of the current device and the electronic identification of the eUICC;

[0014] Generate an eUICC signature value based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extract a first certificate corresponding to a first private key of the eUICC;

[0015] Sending the first certificate and the eUICC signature value to a data authentication end, so that the data authentication end generates a system signature value and an authentication random number based on the eUICC signature value and the first certificate;

[0016] receiving a system signature value and an authentication random number fed back by the data authentication end, and binding the system signature value, the authentication random number, and the first certificate to the eUICC.

[0017] In one embodiment, the step of generating an eUICC signature value based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extracting a first certificate corresponding to a first private key of the eUICC includes:

[0018] Sign the terminal information and the electronic identification using the first private key in the eUICC to obtain an eUICC signature value;

[0019] The eUICC certificate corresponding to the private key and the card manufacturer certificate of the eUICC corresponding to the manufacturer are integrated into a first certificate, and the first certificate, the electronic identification and the eUICC signature value are stored in the current device.

[0020] In one embodiment, the authentication data includes a card merchant certificate, an authentication random number, and a system signature value; the step of performing signature verification on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result includes:

[0021] Authenticating the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate;

[0022] After determining that the card merchant certificate is a legitimate certificate, extracting the public key of the card merchant certificate;

[0023] The system signature value is verified by the public key. If the verification fails, or if the verification passes and the authentication random number and the terminal information of the mobile terminal are inconsistent with the preset authentication data, a verification failure result is generated. Otherwise, a verification success result is generated.

[0024] To achieve the above purpose, the present application proposes an anti-tampering machine authentication method, which is applied to a data authentication terminal. The anti-tampering machine authentication method includes:

[0025] Receiving binding status information sent by the mobile terminal;

[0026] querying authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal based on the binding state information;

[0027] The authentication data is sent to the mobile terminal to instruct the mobile terminal to perform a signature verification process on the authentication data, and when a signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

[0028] In one embodiment, before the step of receiving the binding status information sent by the mobile terminal, the method further includes:

[0029] receiving a first certificate and an eUICC signature value sent by the mobile terminal, where the first certificate includes an eUICC certificate and a card merchant certificate;

[0030] Extracting the eUICC public key from the eUICC certificate;

[0031] Verifying the eUICC signature value by using the eUICC public key to generate a signature value binding result, where the signature value binding result is used to represent a binding result between the mobile terminal and the eUICC;

[0032] After the signature verification is passed, generating an authentication random number based on the terminal information of the mobile terminal;

[0033] The terminal information, the electronic identification and the authentication random number are processed by a preset private key to obtain a system signature value;

[0034] The authentication random number and the system signature value are fed back to the mobile terminal, so that the mobile terminal binds the system signature value, the authentication random number and the first certificate with the eUICC.

[0035] In one embodiment, the step of generating an authentication random number based on the terminal information includes:

[0036] Get timestamp;

[0037] Concatenate the timestamp and the device identification number in the terminal information into a random number seed;

[0038] The random number seed is processed by a random number algorithm to obtain an authentication random number.

[0039] In addition, to achieve the above purpose, the present application also proposes an anti-tampering machine authentication system, the anti-tampering machine authentication system comprising:

[0040] A mobile terminal, the mobile terminal being used to obtain binding status information of the eUICC; send the binding status information to a data authentication terminal, and receive authentication data fed back by the data authentication terminal based on the binding status information; perform signature verification on the authentication data, and when the signature verification fails, adjust the use status of the eUICC to a disabled state;

[0041] A data authentication terminal, the data authentication terminal is used to receive binding status information sent by a mobile terminal; based on the binding status information, query the authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal; and send the authentication data to the mobile terminal.

[0042] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application also proposes an anti-dismantling machine authentication device, which includes: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program is configured to implement the steps of the anti-dismantling machine authentication method as described above.

[0043] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application also proposes a storage medium, which is a computer-readable storage medium, and a computer program is stored on the storage medium. When the computer program is executed by the processor, the steps of the anti-dismantling machine authentication method described above are implemented.

[0044] In addition, to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the anti-tampering machine authentication method as described above are implemented.

[0045] The present application proposes an anti-disassembly authentication method, system, device, storage medium and computer program product. The present application obtains the binding status information of the eUICC, and then sends the binding status information to the data authentication end, so that the data authentication end returns the authentication data based on the binding status information, and then verifies the authentication data to obtain the verification result; if the verification result shows that the verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state. Because the authentication data is the binding data between the mobile terminal and the eUICC, and the binding data is used to authenticate the association between the device and the eUICC, when the verification fails, it can be detected that the eUICC and the device used do not correspond, and it can be determined that the device has been disassembled, thereby avoiding the situation where the eUICC cannot be detected when it is disassembled and used in other terminals. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the present application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the present application.

[0047] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, for ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative labor.

[0048] Figure 1 A flowchart of the first embodiment of the method for authenticating an anti-tampering device according to the present application;

[0049] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the system architecture involved in the anti-tampering machine authentication method for this application;

[0050] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the anti-dismantling machine detection process involved in the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in an embodiment of the present application;

[0051] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the overall execution process involved in the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in the embodiment of the present application;

[0052] Figure 5 A flowchart of the second embodiment of the method for authenticating an anti-tampering device according to the present application;

[0053] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the authentication binding process involved in the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in the embodiment of the present application;

[0054] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the module structure of the anti-tampering machine authentication device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0055] Figure 8 Schematic diagram of the device structure of the hardware operating environment involved in the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0056] The purpose, features and advantages of this application will be further described in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0057] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the technical solutions of the present application and are not used to limit the present application.

[0058] In order to better understand the technical solution of the present application, a detailed description will be given below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0059] The main solutions of the embodiments of this application are:

[0060] Obtaining the binding status information of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC;

[0061] sending the binding state information to a data authentication terminal to instruct the data authentication terminal to return authentication data based on the binding state information, wherein the authentication data is used to authenticate the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC;

[0062] Receiving the authentication data, and performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result;

[0063] If the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

[0064] According to the related technology, when someone maliciously disassembles the device to obtain the eUICC (embedded universal integrated circuit card) and then reads the IMEI number of the terminal device, the eUICC can be inserted into a new device and the IMEI number of the external device can be tampered with. At this time, the disassembly of the device cannot be detected.

[0065] The present application provides an anti-disassembly authentication method, system, device, storage medium and computer program product. The present application obtains the binding status information of the eUICC, and then sends the binding status information to the data authentication terminal, so that the data authentication terminal returns the authentication data based on the binding status information, and then verifies the authentication data to obtain the verification result; if the verification result shows that the verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state. Because the authentication data is the binding data between the mobile terminal and the eUICC, and the binding data is used to authenticate the association between the device and the eUICC, when the verification fails, it can be detected that the eUICC and the device used do not correspond, and it can be determined that the device has been disassembled, thereby avoiding the situation where the eUICC cannot be detected when it is disassembled and used in other terminals.

[0066] It should be noted that the execution subject of this embodiment may be a computing service device with data processing, network communication and program running functions, such as a tablet computer, a personal computer, a mobile phone, etc., or an electronic device capable of realizing the above functions, a mobile terminal, etc. The following takes a mobile terminal as an example to illustrate this embodiment and the following embodiments.

[0067] Based on this, the embodiment of the present application provides an anti-tampering machine authentication method, which is applied to a mobile terminal, referring to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the first embodiment of the anti-tampering machine authentication method of the present application.

[0068] In this embodiment, the anti-tampering device authentication method includes steps S10 to S40:

[0069] Step S10, obtaining the binding status information of the eUICC;

[0070] It should be noted that eUICC is an embedded SIM card. During use, eUICC is welded on various terminal devices (cars, mobile phones, wearable devices). After users purchase devices with eUICC, they select numbers through the APP (application) provided by operators or agents, write the communication authentication data of the corresponding number into eUICC, and log in to the mobile network of the device. It is similar to the eUICC of the traditional USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) card, but the software and hardware are more complex and can meet the needs of dynamic loading of operator data. Multiple Profiles (subscription profiles) belonging to different operators can be loaded on the same eUICC, but only one can be used at the same time.

[0071] Specifically, this application involves multiple functional terminals, refer to Figure 2 , wherein the mobile terminal is an entity that needs to access the mobile network, and the eUICC is pre-installed in the mobile terminal.

[0072] CA (Certificate Authority): CI (Certificate of Incorporation) provider, standard PKI (public key infrastructure) certificate authority, issues trusted digital certificates to all communicating parties within the system.

[0073] CI issues certificates to eUICC manufacturers. During the production process, eUICC manufacturers generate a separate certificate for each eUICC and write it into the eUICC. CI issues certificates to the anti-tampering authentication system / data authentication terminal. The anti-tampering system stores the issued certificates securely in the back end. The eUICC certificate system can be used to bind the device and eUICC to prevent the mobile terminal from being disassembled during subsequent use.

[0074] It should be noted that the binding status information may be the data and certificate that determine whether the eUICC is in a binding state and bound to the eUICC. Before the anti-tampering authentication of the eUICC is performed, the device needs to be authenticated and bound to the eUICC. During the authentication, the background system is used to determine whether the current eUICC is pre-bound to the corresponding terminal, so as to timely identify other disassembly behaviors of the mobile terminal by other personnel.

[0075] In a feasible implementation manner, before the step S10 of obtaining the binding status information of the eUICC, the following further includes:

[0076] Obtain the terminal information of the current device and the electronic identification of the eUICC;

[0077] It should be noted that the binding process is completed before the device is detected. By making an initial binding request to the terminal device, the terminal and eUICC are bound to each other.

[0078] It should be noted that the terminal information includes the IMEI number (each device has its own unique ID), terminal fingerprint ID (each device is different), terminal model, terminal manufacturer, and timestamp. The electronic identification is the unique identification corresponding to the eUICC.

[0079] It should be noted that during the binding process, the terminal sends an initial binding instruction to the eUICC, and the eUICC determines whether its own state is an unbound state, and continues if it is an unbound state.

[0080] Generate a first certificate based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extract the first certificate corresponding to the first private key of the eUICC;

[0081] It should be noted that the first certificate includes the root certificate, the card manufacturer certificate / anti-tampering machine authentication platform certificate, and the eUICC certificate. The root certificate is a self-signed certificate and is the starting point of the trust chain. The card manufacturer certificate (Embedded EUICCManufacturer) is also called the card manufacturer certificate, which is issued by the root certificate. The eUICC certificate is issued by the card manufacturer certificate and written to the eUICC in the card manufacturer's production workshop. The data authentication end certificate is also issued by the root certificate. This certificate system can be used for subsequent authentication of the disassembly machine to achieve the purpose of anti-tampering machine.

[0082] It should be noted that the card vendor produces eUICC in the production plant, pre-makes certificates, and supplies eUICC in batches to terminal manufacturers. Terminal manufacturers complete the authentication and binding process of anti-tampering devices in their own production plants. Since the production plant is mass-produced, the security of the binding process can be guaranteed. After the terminal is bound in the plant, it is delivered to the end user, and the user cannot change the binding-related information.

[0083] It should be noted that the eUICC signature value is obtained by obtaining the eUICC's own EID, signing the device IMEI number, device fingerprint ID, terminal model, terminal manufacturer, timestamp, and EID using the private key in the eUICC. After the signature is completed, the eUICC certificate corresponding to the private key, the eUICC manufacturer's card merchant certificate, EID, and eUICC signature value are returned to the terminal.

[0084] In a feasible implementation manner, the step of generating an eUICC signature value based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extracting a first certificate corresponding to a first private key of the eUICC includes:

[0085] Sign the terminal information and the electronic identification using the first private key in the eUICC to obtain an eUICC signature value;

[0086] It should be noted that the first private key is a private key in the eUICC, and the terminal information and the electronic identification are signed by the private key to generate a signature value belonging to the eUICC.

[0087] The eUICC certificate corresponding to the first private key and the card manufacturer certificate of the eUICC corresponding to the manufacturer are integrated into a first certificate, and the first certificate, the electronic identification and the eUICC signature value are stored in the current device.

[0088] It should be noted that the first certificate has been generated during production and can be directly called from the database. After generating the eUICC signature value, the eUICC sends the first certificate, the electronic identification and the eUICC signature value to the terminal for subsequent authentication and binding process.

[0089] Sending the first certificate and the eUICC signature value to a data authentication end, so that the data authentication end generates a system signature value and an authentication random number based on the eUICC signature value and the first certificate;

[0090] It should be noted that the terminal sends the device IMEI number, terminal fingerprint ID, terminal model, terminal manufacturer, timestamp, EID, eUICC certificate, card merchant certificate, and eUICC signature value to the data authentication end for initial binding.

[0091] It should be noted that after receiving the initialization binding request, the data authentication end checks whether the terminal manufacturer is a registered manufacturer and determines whether the IMEI and EID have been bound.

[0092] It should be noted that the data authentication end uses its own CI certificate to verify the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate. If it is legitimate, the card merchant certificate is used to verify the legitimacy of the eUICC certificate. If it is not legitimate, the public key is extracted through the eUICC certificate, and the eUICC EID information is obtained from the public key information, and the eUICC signature value is verified using the eUICC public key. If the above certificate verification fails, the data authentication end returns verification failure and ends the binding process.

[0093] After the signature value is verified, the data authentication end is used to generate an authentication random number (random number generation method: obtain the timestamp and terminal IMEI as the random number seed, and use the random number algorithm to generate a random number using the random number seed). The system signature value is generated using the system's own private key for the device IMEI number, terminal fingerprint ID (Identity document), terminal model, terminal manufacturer, timestamp, EID, and authentication random number.

[0094] Binding the system signature value, the authentication random number, and the first certificate to the eUICC.

[0095] It should be noted that the data authentication end returns the timestamp, system signature value, certificate corresponding to the system's own private key, and authentication random number to the terminal.

[0096] Then, the terminal sends the device IMEI number, terminal fingerprint ID, terminal model, terminal manufacturer, timestamp, system signature value, data authentication terminal certificate, and system random number to the eUICC for binding confirmation.

[0097] Specifically, the step of binding the system signature value, the authentication random number, and the first certificate to the eUICC includes:

[0098] receiving a system signature value, an authentication random number, and the first certificate fed back by the data authentication end; and binding the system signature value, the authentication random number, and the first certificate to the eUICC, and generating a binding success message after the binding is successful;

[0099] The binding success message is sent to the data authentication end.

[0100] It should be noted that after receiving the request to confirm the binding, the eUICC uses the CI certificate saved by itself to verify the legitimacy of the card vendor certificate. If it is legitimate, the public key of the card vendor certificate is extracted and the system signature value is verified using the public key. If the verification is successful, the eUICC saves the IMEI number, terminal fingerprint ID, timestamp, and authentication random number, and updates the eUICC status to the binding status, and returns the terminal binding success. If it is not legitimate, the terminal will not modify the status and directly return the data authentication end binding failure.

[0101] The terminal feeds back the binding success message to the data authentication end, which saves the binding relationship between the terminal and the eUICC and data such as the authentication random number, timestamp, EID, IMEI number, and terminal fingerprint ID.

[0102] Step S20, sending the binding state information to the data authentication terminal to instruct the data authentication terminal to return authentication data based on the binding state information, where the authentication data is used to authenticate the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC;

[0103] It should be noted that the data authentication end can be an anti-tampering machine background system used for data authentication and binding. During the anti-tampering machine detection process, it determines whether the IMEI number of the device and the electronic identification of the eUICC are bound, and then signs the data with the certificate of the anti-tampering machine authentication system, and then returns the authentication data.

[0104] Specifically, the authentication data includes various data used for binding between the device and the eUICC, including: system signature value, certificate corresponding to the system's own private key, authentication random number, and these data are signed by the anti-tampering machine authentication system to determine that they are in a bound state.

[0105] It should be noted that the authentication random number is a random number obtained by concatenating the timestamp with the IMEI number of the terminal, which is used to be stored in the background system. During the anti-tampering authentication process, the authentication random number is verified to determine whether a background binding operation has been performed between the device and the eUICC.

[0106] Step S30, receiving the authentication data, and performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result;

[0107] It should be noted that after receiving the authentication data, the mobile terminal performs a signature verification process on the authentication data. The signature verification process is performed in the eUICC, wherein the signature verification process may include: verifying the legitimacy of the system certificate, and whether the retained terminal information and the authentication random number are consistent with the current verification. The verification failure includes that the verification system certificate is not legal, the retained terminal information is inconsistent with the current verification data, and the authentication random number is inconsistent with the current verification data. When any of the conditions is met, the verification is determined to have failed. If the verification fails, it means that there is no binding relationship between the eUICC and the device, and it can be determined that the current terminal has been illegally disassembled.

[0108] Step S40: If the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use state of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

[0109] It should be noted that when it is determined that the signature verification result shows that the signature verification has failed, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state, that is, when it is determined that the eUICC is a card that has been disassembled and replaced, its use on the device is restricted.

[0110] Specifically, the overall execution flow diagram involved in the present application is to initialize the state of the eUICC, and then bind the terminal to the eUICC. After the binding is completed, when the terminal or other device is turned on, the eUICC and its terminal are authenticated for anti-tampering. According to the authentication result or signature verification result obtained, it is determined whether to perform a disabling operation on the eUICC.

[0111] In a feasible implementation manner, the authentication data includes a card merchant certificate, an authentication random number, and a system signature value; the step S40 of performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result includes:

[0112] Authenticating the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate;

[0113] It should be noted that the card merchant certificate is a certificate used by the manufacturer to verify and authorize the electronic certificate of the embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC). When verifying, the legitimacy verification must be carried out before the subsequent process can be executed.

[0114] After determining that the card merchant certificate is a legitimate certificate, extracting the public key of the card merchant certificate;

[0115] It should be noted that after receiving the binding verification request, the eUICC uses its own CI certificate to verify the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate. If it is legitimate, it extracts the public key of the card merchant certificate and uses the public key to verify the system signature value.

[0116] The system signature value is verified by the public key. If the verification fails, or if the verification passes and the authentication random number and the terminal information of the mobile terminal are inconsistent with the preset authentication data, a verification failure result is generated. Otherwise, a verification success result is generated.

[0117] It should be noted that the system signature value is verified using the public key. If the verification is successful, the authentication random number and IMEI number are checked to see if they are consistent with those saved previously. If they are inconsistent, verification failure is returned. If the authentication random number and IMEI number are consistent with those saved previously, and the new authentication random number is not empty, the authentication random number saved by the eUICC is updated.

[0118] It should be noted that the situations where signature verification fails include: 1. signature verification fails, 2. signature verification passes, but the authentication random number and the terminal information of the mobile terminal are inconsistent with the preset authentication data. The situation where signature verification succeeds requires that both conditions are met, that is, signature verification passes, and the authentication random number and the terminal information of the mobile terminal are consistent with the preset authentication data.

[0119] It should be noted that if the eUICC fails to verify, the eUICC will change its status to disabled and will no longer interact with the terminal, and the terminal will not be able to perform network operations. The eUICC returns the verification result to the terminal, and the terminal returns the verification result to the background authentication system, which records and saves the verification result.

[0120] It can be understood that the schematic diagram of the anti-tampering machine detection process involved in this embodiment is as follows Figure 3 As shown in the figure, it mainly involves the process of three-end interaction. Among them, the terminal device and eUICC are integrated devices. In the overall execution process, the two are integrated into a mobile terminal for processing. The anti-tampering machine background system is the data authentication end used for system signature. The execution process is as follows:

[0121] The mobile terminal determines the timestamp of the current execution, obtains the terminal device's own IMEI number and fingerprint ID, then obtains the binding information of the eUICC, determines whether the eUICC is in a binding state, and sends the binding state information to the data authentication end; the data authentication end then determines whether the terminal's IMEI number and the electronic identification of the eUICC are in a binding state, and then determines the authentication random number. After the authentication random number expires, a new authentication random number is generated, and all data is signed by the system certificate to determine that all data has been authenticated by the system. Then, the data authentication end returns the authentication data to the mobile terminal, and the mobile terminal verifies the signed authentication data to verify whether the authentication data is legal, and determines whether the terminal IMEI number and the authentication random number retained in the background server are consistent with the result of this verification. If the verification fails, the eUICC is disabled. If the verification succeeds, it means that the eUICC is bound to the current terminal device, and has not been disassembled by others, and can be used normally.

[0122] The overall execution flow diagram involved in this embodiment is as follows Figure 4 As shown, in the initial state, the eUICC is not in a binding state. First, data is exchanged through the data authentication terminal, the mobile terminal and the eUICC to establish the association between the mobile terminal and the eUICC, that is, to establish a binding relationship. When the mobile terminal is turned on, the eUICC is authenticated and tested. When it is detected that the eUICC has a binding relationship with the current terminal device, it can be determined that the current device has not been disassembled and can be used normally. If the authentication fails, the eUICC is disabled.

[0123] The present application proposes an anti-disassembly authentication method, system, device, storage medium and computer program product. The present application obtains the binding status information of the eUICC, and then sends the binding status information to the data authentication end, so that the data authentication end returns the authentication data based on the binding status information, and then verifies the authentication data to obtain the verification result; if the verification result shows that the verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state. Because the authentication data is the binding data between the mobile terminal and the eUICC, and the binding data is used to authenticate the association between the device and the eUICC, when the verification fails, it can be detected that the eUICC and the device used do not correspond, and it can be determined that the device has been disassembled, thereby avoiding the situation where the eUICC cannot be detected when it is disassembled and used in other terminals.

[0124] Based on the first embodiment of the present application, in the second embodiment of the present application, the same or similar contents as those in the above-mentioned embodiment 1 can be referred to the above introduction, and will not be repeated in the following. Figure 5 Before the step S10 of obtaining the binding status information of the eUICC, the anti-tampering device authentication method further includes steps S100 to S300:

[0125] Step S100, receiving binding status information sent by the mobile terminal;

[0126] It should be noted that during the binding process, the terminal sends an initial binding instruction to the eUICC, and the eUICC determines whether its own state is an unbound state, and continues if it is an unbound state.

[0127] Step S200: querying authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal based on the binding state information;

[0128] It should be noted that the binding process is completed before the device is detected. By receiving the initial binding request from the terminal device, the terminal and the eUICC are bound to each other.

[0129] It should be noted that after receiving the binding status information sent by the mobile terminal, the authentication data between the mobile terminal and the eUICC is queried through the background server, that is, the system signature value, timestamp, certificate corresponding to the system's own private key, authentication random number, etc. are returned to the terminal.

[0130] Step S300: Send the authentication data to the mobile terminal to instruct the mobile terminal to perform signature verification on the authentication data, and when the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, adjust the use status of the eUICC to a disabled state.

[0131] It should be noted that after the authentication data is sent to the mobile terminal, the mobile terminal will perform a signature verification on the authentication data to verify whether a binding relationship is established between the eUICC and the mobile terminal. If the mobile terminal fails the signature verification, it means that the current mobile terminal has been disassembled, and the eUICC needs to be adjusted to a disabled state. If the signature verification passes, it can be used normally.

[0132] In a feasible implementation manner, before the step S100 of receiving the binding status information sent by the mobile terminal, the method further includes:

[0133] receiving a first certificate and an eUICC signature value sent by the mobile terminal, where the first certificate includes an eUICC certificate and a card merchant certificate;

[0134] It should be noted that after the eUICC signature value is generated, the eUICC certificate, card merchant certificate, and electronic identification are sent together to the data authentication end for processing. Among them, the card merchant certificate is an electronic certificate used to verify and authorize the embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC). The card merchant certificate is specially designed to be used with the eUICC. eUICC, or embedded universal integrated circuit card, is a non-removable SIM card that is welded inside the device and is widely used in IoT devices and some mobile devices. Since this type of card cannot be physically replaced like a traditional SIM card, remote technical support, such as OTA updates, is required to manage its internal user information and network permissions. This is the key to the role of the card merchant certificate.

[0135] Extracting the eUICC public key from the eUICC certificate;

[0136] It should be noted that before extracting the public key, the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate is verified through the CI certificate saved by itself. If it is legal, the legitimacy of the eUICC certificate is verified using the card merchant certificate. If it is legal, the public key is extracted through the eUICC certificate, and the electronic identification information of the eUICC is obtained from the public key information.

[0137] Verifying the eUICC signature value by using the eUICC public key to generate a signature value binding result, where the signature value binding result is used to represent a binding result between the device and the eUICC;

[0138] It should be noted that the eUICC signature value is verified by the eUICC public key. If the above certificate verification fails, the data authentication end returns verification failure, ends the binding process, and generates a signature value binding result.

[0139] After the signature verification is passed, an authentication random number is generated based on the terminal information;

[0140] The terminal information, the electronic identification and the authentication random number are processed by a preset private key to obtain a system signature value;

[0141] The authentication random number and the system signature value are fed back to the mobile terminal.

[0142] It should be noted that the data authentication end is used to generate an authentication random number (random number generation method: obtain the timestamp and terminal IMEI as the random number seed, and use the random number algorithm to generate a random number using the random number seed), and the system signature value is generated using the system's own private key for the device IMEI number, terminal fingerprint ID, terminal model, terminal manufacturer, timestamp, EID, and authentication random number.

[0143] It should be noted that after the authentication random number and the system signature value are generated, these two data are sent to the mobile terminal, and then the mobile terminal executes the subsequent binding process.

[0144] In a feasible implementation manner, the step of generating an authentication random number based on the terminal information includes:

[0145] Get timestamp;

[0146] Concatenate the timestamp and the device identification number in the terminal information into a random number seed;

[0147] It should be noted that the timestamp is the current time point for binding the terminal to the eUICC, and multiple time points and the device identification number (IMEI number) in the terminal information are concatenated into multiple random number seeds.

[0148] The random number seed is processed by a random number algorithm to obtain an authentication random number.

[0149] It should be noted that each random number seed is calculated and processed through a random number algorithm to generate a corresponding authentication random number for subsequent authentication processes.

[0150] The authentication binding process diagram involved in this embodiment is as follows Figure 6 As shown by Figure 6 It can be seen that the binding process mainly involves three-end interactions. At this time, the eUICC and the terminal device are not combined into one device. The anti-tampering device background system is the data authentication end. The execution steps are as follows:

[0151] The terminal device initiates the initial binding request related to the eUICC by reading the IMEI or fingerprint ID. The eUICC determines whether it is in the binding state and obtains its own information. It returns the eUICC certificate, card merchant certificate, signature information, etc. to the terminal device. The terminal device then sends a binding request to the anti-tampering machine background system. In addition, the anti-tampering machine background system verifies the signature data and generates a corresponding authentication random number. After signing all data with the system's corresponding certificate, the system verification data is fed back to the terminal device. The terminal device sends the system verification data to the eUICC, verifies the legitimacy of the system certificate through the eUICC, verifies the signature data, and changes its own state to the binding state after the verification is passed. The binding result is sent to the terminal device and the anti-tampering machine background system. The anti-tampering machine background system saves the binding data and authentication data in the database, and the binding process ends.

[0152] In this embodiment, an asymmetric key system is introduced, and after both parties use certificates to establish mutual trust, a system-generated authentication random number is used for subsequent anti-tampering authentication. In the anti-tampering authentication process, the terminal needs to connect to the backend system and eUICC to verify the authentication random number, and the authentication random number is stored in the eUICC, which can effectively prevent the possibility of the eUICC being dismantled and used in other terminals.

[0153] The present application also provides an anti-tampering machine authentication system, the anti-tampering machine authentication system comprising:

[0154] A mobile terminal, the mobile terminal being used to obtain binding status information of the eUICC; send the binding status information to a data authentication terminal, and receive authentication data fed back by the data authentication terminal based on the binding status information; perform signature verification on the authentication data, and when the signature verification fails, adjust the use status of the eUICC to a disabled state;

[0155] A data authentication terminal, the data authentication terminal is used to receive binding status information sent by a mobile terminal; based on the binding status information, query the authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal; and send the authentication data to the mobile terminal.

[0156] It should be noted that the above examples are only used to understand the present application and do not constitute a limitation on the anti-dismantling machine authentication method of the present application. More simple transformations based on this technical concept are all within the protection scope of the present application.

[0157] This application also provides an anti-tampering machine authentication device, please refer to Figure 7 , applied to a mobile terminal, the anti-tampering machine authentication device comprises:

[0158] The first acquisition module 10 is used to obtain the binding status information of the eUICC;

[0159] A first sending module 20, configured to send the binding state information to a data authentication terminal to instruct the data authentication terminal to return authentication data based on the binding state information, wherein the authentication data is used to authenticate the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC;

[0160] The first receiving module 30 is used to receive the authentication data and perform signature verification on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result;

[0161] The adjusting module 40 is configured to adjust the use state of the eUICC to a disabled state if the signature verification result indicates that the signature verification fails.

[0162] Optionally, the anti-tampering machine authentication device further includes:

[0163] The second acquisition module is used to obtain the terminal information of the current device and the electronic identification of the eUICC;

[0164] a generating module, configured to generate an eUICC signature value based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extract a first certificate corresponding to a first private key of the eUICC;

[0165] a second sending module, configured to send the first certificate and the eUICC signature value to a data authentication end, so that the data authentication end generates a system signature value and an authentication random number based on the eUICC signature value and the first certificate;

[0166] The binding module is configured to receive the system signature value and the authentication random number fed back by the data authentication end, and bind the system signature value, the authentication random number and the first certificate to the eUICC.

[0167] Optionally, the generating module includes:

[0168] a signing unit, configured to sign the terminal information and the electronic identification by using the first private key in the eUICC to obtain an eUICC signature value;

[0169] The integration unit is used to integrate the eUICC certificate corresponding to the first private key and the card manufacturer certificate of the manufacturer corresponding to the eUICC into a first certificate, and store the first certificate, the electronic identification and the eUICC signature value in the current device.

[0170] Optionally, the receiving module includes:

[0171] An authentication unit, used to authenticate the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate;

[0172] A second extraction unit, configured to extract the public key of the card merchant certificate after determining that the card merchant certificate is a legal certificate;

[0173] The signature verification processing unit is used to verify the system signature value through the public key. If the verification is successful and the authentication random number and terminal information are inconsistent with the preset authentication data, a signature verification failure result is generated; otherwise, a signature verification success result is generated.

[0174] The present application also provides an anti-tampering machine authentication device, which is applied to a data authentication terminal. The anti-tampering machine authentication device includes:

[0175] A second receiving module, used to receive binding status information sent by the mobile terminal;

[0176] a query module, configured to query authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal based on the binding state information;

[0177] The third sending module is configured to send the authentication data to the mobile terminal to instruct the mobile terminal to perform signature verification on the authentication data, and adjust the use state of the eUICC to a disabled state when the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails.

[0178] Optionally, the device further comprises:

[0179] A third receiving module is configured to receive a first certificate and an eUICC signature value sent by the mobile terminal, where the first certificate includes an eUICC certificate and a card merchant certificate;

[0180] An extraction module, configured to extract the eUICC public key from the eUICC certificate;

[0181] a signature verification module, configured to verify the eUICC signature value by using the eUICC public key, and generate a signature value binding result, wherein the signature value binding result is used to represent a binding result between the device and the eUICC;

[0182] A generation module, used to generate an authentication random number based on the terminal information after the signature verification is passed;

[0183] A processing module, used to process the terminal information, the electronic identification and the authentication random number through a preset private key to obtain a system signature value;

[0184] A feedback unit is configured to feed back the authentication random number and the system signature value to the mobile terminal, so that the mobile terminal binds the system signature value, the authentication random number and the first certificate with the eUICC.

[0185] Optionally, the generating module includes:

[0186] An acquisition unit, used to obtain a timestamp;

[0187] A concatenation unit, configured to concatenate the timestamp with the device identification number in the terminal information into a random number seed;

[0188] The processing unit is used to process the random number seed through a random number algorithm to obtain an authentication random number.

[0189] The anti-dismantling machine authentication device provided by the present application adopts the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in the above embodiment, which can solve the technical problem of anti-dismantling machine authentication. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the anti-dismantling machine authentication device provided by the present application are the same as the beneficial effects of the anti-dismantling machine authentication method provided by the above embodiment, and the other technical features in the anti-dismantling machine authentication device are the same as the features disclosed in the above embodiment method, which will not be repeated here.

[0190] The present application provides an anti-dismantling machine authentication device, which includes: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in the above-mentioned embodiment 1.

[0191] Reference below Figure 8 , which shows a schematic diagram of the structure of an anti-tampering machine authentication device suitable for implementing the embodiment of the present application. The anti-tampering machine authentication device in the embodiment of the present application may include but is not limited to mobile terminals such as mobile phones, laptop computers, digital broadcast receivers, PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), PADs (Portable Application Descriptions), PMPs (Portable Media Players), vehicle-mounted terminals (such as vehicle-mounted navigation terminals), etc., and fixed terminals such as digital TVs, desktop computers, etc. Figure 8 The anti-tampering machine authentication device shown is merely an example and should not bring any limitation to the functions and scope of use of the embodiments of the present application.

[0192] like Figure 8As shown, the anti-tampering machine authentication device may include a processing device 1001 (such as a central processing unit, a graphics processor, etc.), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to the program stored in the read-only memory (ROM: Read Only Memory) 1002 or the program loaded from the storage device 1003 to the random access memory (RAM: Random Access Memory) 1004. In RAM1004, various programs and data required for the operation of the anti-tampering machine authentication device are also stored. The processing device 1001, ROM1002 and RAM1004 are connected to each other through a bus 1005. An input / output (I / O) interface 1006 is also connected to the bus. Generally, the following systems can be connected to the I / O interface 1006: an input device 1007 including, for example, a touch screen, a touchpad, a keyboard, a mouse, an image sensor, a microphone, an accelerometer, a gyroscope, etc.; an output device 1008 including, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD: Liquid Crystal Display), a speaker, a vibrator, etc.; a storage device 1003 including, for example, a magnetic tape, a hard disk, etc.; and a communication device 1009. The communication device 1009 can allow the anti-tampering authentication device to communicate with other devices wirelessly or by wire to exchange data. Although the figure shows an anti-tampering authentication device with various systems, it should be understood that it is not required to implement or have all the systems shown. More or fewer systems can be implemented or provided instead.

[0193] In particular, according to the embodiments disclosed in the present application, the process described above with reference to the flowchart can be implemented as a computer software program. For example, the embodiments disclosed in the present application include a computer program product, which includes a computer program carried on a computer-readable medium, and the computer program includes a program code for executing the method shown in the flowchart. In such an embodiment, the computer program can be downloaded and installed from a network through a communication device, or installed from a storage device 1003, or installed from a ROM 1002. When the computer program is executed by the processing device 1001, the above-mentioned functions defined in the method of the embodiment disclosed in the present application are executed.

[0194] The anti-dismantling machine authentication device provided by the present application adopts the anti-dismantling machine authentication method in the above embodiment, which can solve the technical problem of anti-dismantling machine authentication. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the anti-dismantling machine authentication device provided by the present application are the same as the beneficial effects of the anti-dismantling machine authentication method provided by the above embodiment, and the other technical features in the anti-dismantling machine authentication device are the same as the features disclosed in the method of the previous embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0195] It should be understood that the various parts disclosed in this application can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the description of the above embodiments, specific features, structures, materials or characteristics can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0196] The above is only a specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art who is familiar with the present technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

[0197] The present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions (ie, computer programs) stored thereon, and the computer-readable program instructions are used to execute the anti-tampering machine authentication method in the above-mentioned embodiment.

[0198] The computer-readable storage medium provided in the present application may be, for example, a USB flash drive, but is not limited to electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, systems or devices, or any combination of the above. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media may include, but are not limited to: an electrical connection with one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. In this embodiment, the computer-readable storage medium may be any tangible medium containing or storing a program that can be used by or in combination with an instruction execution system, system or device. The program code contained on the computer-readable storage medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to: wires, optical cables, RF (Radio Frequency), etc., or any suitable combination of the above.

[0199] The computer-readable storage medium may be included in the anti-tampering machine authentication device; or may exist independently without being assembled into the anti-tampering machine authentication device.

[0200] The computer-readable storage medium carries one or more programs. When the one or more programs are executed by the anti-tampering machine authentication device, the anti-tampering machine authentication device:

[0201] Obtaining the binding status information of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC;

[0202] sending the binding state information to a data authentication terminal to instruct the data authentication terminal to return authentication data based on the binding state information, wherein the authentication data is used to authenticate the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC;

[0203] Receiving the authentication data, and performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result;

[0204] If the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

[0205] Computer program code for performing the operations of the present application may be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as "C" or similar programming languages. The program code may be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a separate software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0206] The flow chart and block diagram in the accompanying drawings illustrate the possible architecture, function and operation of the system, method and computer program product according to various embodiments of the present application. In this regard, each square box in the flow chart or block diagram can represent a module, a program segment or a part of a code, and the module, the program segment or a part of the code contains one or more executable instructions for realizing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the square box can also occur in a sequence different from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two square boxes represented in succession can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each square box in the block diagram and / or flow chart, and the combination of the square boxes in the block diagram and / or flow chart can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a specified function or operation, or can be implemented with a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0207] The modules involved in the embodiments described in this application may be implemented by software or hardware, wherein the name of the module does not constitute a limitation on the unit itself in some cases.

[0208] The readable storage medium provided in this application is a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer-readable program instructions (i.e., computer programs) for executing the above-mentioned anti-dismantling machine authentication method, and can solve the technical problems of anti-dismantling machine authentication. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the computer-readable storage medium provided in this application are the same as the beneficial effects of the anti-dismantling machine authentication method provided in the above-mentioned embodiment, and will not be elaborated here.

[0209] The present application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which implements the steps of the anti-tampering machine authentication method as described above when executed by a processor.

[0210] The computer program product provided in this application can solve the technical problem of anti-tampering machine authentication. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the computer program product provided in this application are the same as the beneficial effects of the anti-tampering machine authentication method provided in the above embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0211] The above descriptions are only some embodiments of the present application, and are not intended to limit the patent scope of the present application. All equivalent structural changes made using the contents of the present application specification and drawings under the technical concept of the present application, or direct / indirect applications in other related technical fields are included in the patent protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for authenticating an anti-tampering device, characterized in that: Applied to a mobile terminal, the anti-tampering device authentication method includes: Obtaining the binding status information of the embedded universal integrated circuit card eUICC; sending the binding state information to a data authentication terminal to instruct the data authentication terminal to return authentication data based on the binding state information, wherein the authentication data is used to authenticate the association relationship between the mobile terminal and the eUICC; Receiving the authentication data, and performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result; If the signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Before the step of obtaining the binding status information of the eUICC, the method further includes: Obtain the terminal information of the current device and the electronic identification of the eUICC; Generate an eUICC signature value based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extract a first certificate corresponding to a first private key of the eUICC; Sending the first certificate and the eUICC signature value to a data authentication end, so that the data authentication end generates a system signature value and an authentication random number based on the eUICC signature value and the first certificate; receiving a system signature value and an authentication random number fed back by the data authentication end, and binding the system signature value, the authentication random number, and the first certificate to the eUICC.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The step of generating an eUICC signature value based on the terminal information and the electronic identification, and extracting a first certificate corresponding to a first private key of the eUICC includes: Sign the terminal information and the electronic identification using the first private key in the eUICC to obtain an eUICC signature value; The eUICC certificate corresponding to the first private key and the card manufacturer certificate of the eUICC corresponding to the manufacturer are integrated into a first certificate, and the first certificate, the electronic identification and the eUICC signature value are stored in the current device.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The authentication data includes a card merchant certificate, an authentication random number, and a system signature value; The step of performing signature verification processing on the authentication data to obtain a signature verification result includes: Authenticating the legitimacy of the card merchant certificate; After determining that the card merchant certificate is a legitimate certificate, extracting the public key of the card merchant certificate; The system signature value is verified by the public key. If the verification fails, or if the verification passes and the authentication random number and the terminal information of the mobile terminal are inconsistent with the preset authentication data, a verification failure result is generated. Otherwise, a verification success result is generated.

5. A method for authenticating an anti-tampering device, characterized in that: Applied to the data authentication end, the anti-tampering device authentication method includes: Receiving binding status information sent by the mobile terminal; querying authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal based on the binding state information; The authentication data is sent to the mobile terminal to instruct the mobile terminal to perform a signature verification process on the authentication data, and when a signature verification result shows that the signature verification fails, the use status of the eUICC is adjusted to a disabled state.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Before the step of receiving the binding status information sent by the mobile terminal, the method further includes: receiving a first certificate and an eUICC signature value sent by the mobile terminal, where the first certificate includes an eUICC certificate and a card merchant certificate; Extracting the eUICC public key from the eUICC certificate; Verifying the eUICC signature value by using the eUICC public key to generate a signature value binding result, where the signature value binding result is used to represent a binding result between the mobile terminal and the eUICC; After the signature verification is passed, generating an authentication random number based on the terminal information of the mobile terminal; Processing the terminal information, the electronic identification of the eUICC, and the authentication random number by using a preset private key to obtain a system signature value; The authentication random number and the system signature value are fed back to the mobile terminal, so that the mobile terminal binds the system signature value, the authentication random number and the first certificate with the eUICC.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The step of generating an authentication random number based on the terminal information of the mobile terminal comprises: Get timestamp; Concatenate the timestamp and the device identification number in the terminal information into a random number seed; The random number seed is processed by a random number algorithm to obtain an authentication random number.

8. An anti-tampering machine authentication system, characterized in that: The anti-tampering machine authentication system comprises: A mobile terminal, the mobile terminal being used to obtain binding status information of the eUICC; send the binding status information to a data authentication terminal, and receive authentication data fed back by the data authentication terminal based on the binding status information; perform signature verification on the authentication data, and when the signature verification fails, adjust the use status of the eUICC to a disabled state; A data authentication terminal, the data authentication terminal is used to receive binding status information sent by a mobile terminal; based on the binding status information, query the authentication data between the eUICC and the mobile terminal; and send the authentication data to the mobile terminal. 9.An anti-tampering machine authentication device, characterized in that: The device comprises: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program is configured to implement the steps of the anti-tampering machine authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium is a computer-readable storage medium, and a computer program is stored on the storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the anti-dismantling machine authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

11. A computer program product, characterized in that The computer program product comprises a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the anti-tampering machine authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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