AP-STA mutual authentication protected by SAE-PK

Abstract

Embodiments herein provide systems, apparatuses, and methods for authenticating an access point and a station in a wireless local area network. An access point and a station may generate a key encryption key (KEK). The access point and the station may transmit an authentication credential encrypted based on the KEK. The access point may authenticate the station by verifying the station authentication credential, and the station may authenticate the access point by verifying the access point authentication credential.

Description

Background Art

[0001] Wireless communication technologies use various standards and protocols to send data between access points and wireless communication devices. For example, wireless communication system standards and protocols may include the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) (e.g., 4G), 3GPP New Radio (NR) (e.g., 5G), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs) (commonly referred to within industry organizations as WLANs). ).

[0002] In the 802.11 standard for WLAN, an access point (AP) is a device that creates a wireless local area network (WLAN) or A WLAN is a device that connects to a wired network. An access point (AP) can connect to a wired network (such as Ethernet) and provide wireless access to the network for other devices. A station is a device that can wirelessly connect to an AP to join a WLAN network. A station can be a laptop, smartphone, tablet, or any other device with a WLAN adapter.

[0003] AP and station use Various protocols have been established to improve security on wireless communication networks. For example, simultaneous authentication of peer entities is the core authentication protocol of WPA3-Personal. Alliance-certified devices, including both access points (APs) and non-AP stations (STAs), must support the protocol. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0004] To easily identify the discussion of any particular element or act, the most significant digit(s) in a reference number refers to the drawing number that first introduces the element.

[0005] Figure 1 A signal flow diagram of the SAE protocol according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0006] Figure 2 A signal flow diagram of the SAE-PK protocol according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0007] Figure 3 A diagram illustrating some solutions for providing per-STA authentication according to some embodiments.

[0008] Figure 4 A simplified block diagram illustrating different per-STA authentication techniques according to some embodiments.

[0009] Figure 5 A signal flow diagram of a SAE-PK method for authentication according to some embodiments is illustrated, wherein additional modifications are used to improve the SAE-PK method.

[0010] Figure 6 A signal flow diagram for SAE-PK protected authentication credential provisioning according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0011] Figure 7 A signaling diagram of a STA and an AP using authentication credentials based on self-signed certificates according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0012] Figure 8 Signaling and networking diagrams for a WLAN using multiple APs using self-signed certificate based authentication credentials are illustrated in accordance with some embodiments.

[0013] Fig. 9 Signaling and networking diagrams for a WLAN using public key based authentication credentials according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0014] Fig.10 Signaling and networking diagrams for a WLAN using multiple APs using connector-based authentication credentials are illustrated in accordance with some embodiments.

[0015] Fig.11 A flow chart illustrating SAE-PK cryptogram generation according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0016] Fig.12 A JSON Web Signature (JWS) payload for a DPP connector is illustrated according to some embodiments.

[0017] Fig.13 A system for performing signaling between a wireless device and a network device according to embodiments disclosed herein is illustrated. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0018] Wireless communication technology uses various standards and protocols to send data between access points and wireless communication devices. One standard for wireless communication is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs), commonly referred to within the industry as ). Provides a convenient way to establish a network between devices. Devices can connect to Access point to join a network and connect to the Internet wirelessly. Security is important to protect data and devices from unauthorized access.

[0019] One method of establishing a secure network involves using Simultaneous Authentication of Equivalent Entities (SAE). SAE is the core authentication protocol of WPA3-Personal. Alliance authentication devices (including both access points (AP) and non-AP stations (STA)) must support the protocol. SAE is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol. This means that SAE relies on passwords to guide trust between two devices.

[0020] All non-AP STAs use the same password to authenticate to the AP. Using the same password can lead to security vulnerabilities. For example, in many public In hot scenes, you can easily access Password. For example, public The network password may be displayed on a sign. Once an intruder knows the AP's If the AP has a password, an intruder can use the same service set identifier (SSID) and password to start the evil twin AP. Then, the evil twin AP can lure non-AP STAs to join the evil twin AP. For SAE, non-AP STAs have no way to authenticate the AP.

[0021] Another authentication protocol is SAE-Public Key (PK). SAE-PK provides protection against evil twin attacks for client devices in public networks. SAE-PK is defined in the WPA3 R3 standard to allow an AP to: 1) generate a public and private key pair; 2) generate an SAE password as a fingerprint of the public key. During SAE authentication, the AP provides its public key to the non-AP STA, which enables the non-AP STA to match the SAE password with the public key, thereby verifying that the AP is not an evil twin AP. AE-PK provides an AP with a powerful means to authenticate itself based on the SAE authentication protocol.

[0022] Figure 1 A signal flow diagram 100 of the SAE protocol according to some embodiments is illustrated. As shown, the AP 102 may generate 106 a SAE password. The STA 104 may be provisioned 108 with a service set identifier (SSID) corresponding to the AP 102 and the SAE password.

[0023] In some embodiments, the STA 104 may transmit a probe request 110 to the AP 102 to initiate an authentication process. The AP 102 may transmit a probe response 112. The probe response 112 may include the security protocols supported by the AP 102. In some embodiments, the AP 102 may transmit a beacon 114 to the STA 104. The beacon 114 may be transmitted periodically to advertise the presence and capabilities of the AP 102. The beacon 114 may include the SSID, the supported security protocols, and the group that the AP 102 is using.

[0024] STA 104 transmits an SAE commit message 116 to AP 102, and AP transmits a commit message 118 to STA 104. In the commit exchange, both parties may exchange group, scalar, and element field data. AP 102 and STA 104 generate a pairwise master key (PMK) and a key encryption key (KCK) (e.g., PMK, KCK 120 and PMK, KCK 122) based on a shared secret. AP 102 may transmit an SAE confirm message 124 to STA 104, and STA 104 may transmit an SAE confirm message 126 to AP 102. Each of these confirm messages may include a confirm field having a value that may be used by a receiving device to confirm that both AP 102 and STA 104 are using the same key.

[0025] The STA 104 may authenticate 128 the AP 102 via the SAE password. The AP 102 may authenticate 130 the STA 104 via the SAE password. In other words, the AP 102 and the STA 104 authenticate each other based on the SAE password.

[0026] Figure 2 A signal flow diagram 200 of the SAE-PK protocol according to some embodiments is illustrated. As shown, the AP 202 may generate 206 a static public / private key pair and may generate 208 a SAE-PK password as a fingerprint of the static public / private key pair. The SSID and SAE password corresponding to the AP 202 may be supplied 210 to the STA 204.

[0027] In some embodiments, the STA 204 may transmit a probe request 212 to the AP 202 to initiate an authentication process. The AP 202 may transmit a probe response 214. The probe response 214 may include the security protocols supported by the AP 202. In some embodiments, the AP 202 may transmit a beacon 216 to the STA 204. The beacon 216 may be transmitted periodically to advertise the presence and capabilities of the AP 202. The beacon 216 may include the SSID, the supported security protocols, and the group that the AP 202 is using.

[0028] STA 204 transmits an SAE commit message 218 to AP 202, and AP 202 may transmit a commit message 220 to STA 204. In the commit exchange, both parties may exchange group, scalar, and element field data. AP 202 and STA 204 generate a pairwise master key (PMK), a key encryption key (KCK), and a key encryption key (KEK) (e.g., PMK, KCK, KEK 222 and PMK, KCK, KEK 224) based on a shared secret. AP 202 may transmit an SAE confirmation message 226 to STA 204. SAE confirmation message 226 may include a confirmation field and a modifier, which is a secret parameter used to generate an SAE password (e.g., a fingerprint from a public / private key pair). The modifier may be protected by the KEK. SAE confirmation message 226 may also include a public key of AP 202 generated at 206 and a signature generated by the private key of AP 202 generated at 206. STA 204 may transmit a SAE acknowledgement message 228 to AP 202. SAE acknowledgement message 228 may include an acknowledgement field having a value that may be used by a receiving device, where STA 204 is using the same key as AP 102 and STA 104 is using the same key.

[0029] As shown, AP 202 authenticates 232 STA 204 based on the SAE password, and STA 204 authenticates 230 AP 202 based on both the SAE password and the AP's public / private key pair. SAE-PK provides strong authentication from the AP side. However, STA side authentication still relies on the SAE password, which is shared with all STAs authorized to associate to AP 202. More and more Use cases require strong per-STA authentication. For example, in some In a network, an AP (or a mesh AP system) needs to distinguish / authenticate different associated devices so as to assign these devices to different virtual local area networks (VLANs) or provide different types of services.

[0030] Figure 3 A diagram 300 illustrating some solutions for providing per-STA authentication. In a system using WPA2-PSK 302, a different pre-shared key (PSK) may be assigned to each device or group of devices. However, PSK is subject to dictionary attacks.

[0031] In a system using WPA3-SAE 304, a different ID / password combination may be assigned to each device or group of devices. However, the password ID may become a target for tracking. In addition, the ID / password may not be as strong as a public / private key based solution. For example, if an AP is hacked, the stolen ID / password may be used to authenticate with the AP.

[0032] In a system using WPA3-Enterprise 306, a device certificate is used to authenticate a device. However, it is difficult and expensive for an AP to gain trust in the device certificate and maintain the device certificate.

[0033] Figure 4 A simplified block diagram 400 of different per-STA authentication techniques is illustrated. As shown, in WPA2P-PPSK 402, different PSKs may be assigned to each station. WPA2P-PPSK 402 may use out-of-band (OOB) supply of per-STA passwords. As previously discussed, this method may be vulnerable to dictionary attacks. WPA3P-PWID 404 may use OOB supply to provide the ID and password of each station. This may be difficult to achieve because it will require changes to the current system. For example, both ID and password may be requested from the device, and currently many networks only require passwords. WPA3E-EAP-TLS 406 may use OOB supply of per-STA certificates or signed certificates. Certificates typically require PKI support. The maintenance cost of certificates may be high.

[0034] Embodiments herein may implement the SAE-PK-MA 408 technique to mitigate some of the issues discussed above with respect to the per-STA credential approach. The SAE-PK-MA 408 approach may use OOB provisioning per SAE password. Additionally, the SAE-PK-MA 408 approach may use protected inbound (IB) provisioning per-STA authentication credentials.

[0035] Figure 5 The SAE-PK method for authentication is illustrated (see Figure 2 2. The signal flow diagram 500 of FIG. 500 is described in detail with additional modifications for improving the SAE-PK method. The SAE commit handshake 502 may include SAE commit messages from both the STA 204 and the AP 202. The SAE commit message may include groups, scalars, and elements.

[0036] The SAE Commit message can be used to enable the AP 202 and STA 204 to create a KEK 504 to protect subsequent information exchanges. Currently, SAE-PK only uses the KEK 504 to protect the modifier 506 of the SAE Confirm message from the AP 202. The modifier is a "secret" parameter used to generate the SAE password (i.e., K_AP's fingerprint). SAE-PK enables the AP 202 to provide its authentication credentials (AC) (modifiers, Sig k_AP, K_AP), but only the "modifier" is encrypted by the KEK. Using the KEK can improve security. In fact, for better privacy protection, the entire AC can be encrypted. Additionally, in some embodiments, the STA 204 can also utilize the SAE confirmation message 508 (e.g., IB message) to securely provision its own AC.

[0037] Figure 6 A signal flow diagram 600 for SAE-PK protected authentication credential provisioning is illustrated. In the illustrated embodiment, SAE-PK is extended to enable secure in-band provisioning of authentication credentials (AC) between an AP 602 and a STA 604. In-band provisioning may occur when a STA 604 establishes first authentication with an AP 602, or when an AC from either side is revoked or updated.

[0038] For example, AP 602 may generate 606 or be provisioned (e.g., via OOB signaling) an authentication credential (AP-AC) having a public / private key pair (K_AP, k_AP). The AP-AC including the public / private key pair may be used to authenticate the AP. Some AP-AC material (such as the public key) is available to devices (e.g., STA 604) that have the AP's SAE password and want to connect to the network, while the private key is kept secret by AP 602.

[0039] The AP-AC may include one or more of the following parameters. In some embodiments, the AP-AC may include an AP identifier (short ID). The AP identifier may include a service set identifier / basic service set identifier (SSID / BSSID), an identity resolution key (IRK) (e.g., for mobile AP identity protection), or an AP ID in other formats (e.g., a hash of K_AP), or a signed AP ID.

[0040] In some embodiments, the AP-AC may include an authentication key. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a self-signed public key (K_AP) with a corresponding private key. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a self-signed certificate with a corresponding private key. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a certificate signed by a root using a root signing key pair. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a device provisioning protocol (DPP) connector signed by a configurator using a configurator signing key pair. The DPP connector may be a Wi-Fi Easy Connect TM In some embodiments, the AP-AC may include an AP-AC fingerprint (i.e., an SAE password). For example, the AP-AC may include fingerprint generation parameters (e.g., a "modifier" transmitted in an SAE confirmation message). The AP 602 may generate 608 the SAE password as a fingerprint or root signing key of K_AP.

[0041] The STA 604 may also generate 610 or be provisioned (e.g., via OBB signaling) its own authentication credentials (STA-AC). The STA-AC may include one or more of the following options. In some embodiments, the STA-AC may include a STA identifier (e.g., a short ID). The STA identifier may include an IRK. In some embodiments, the STA identifier may include a STA ID in other formats or a signed STA ID (such as a hash of the public key of the STA 604 (K_STA)), or a STA-AC fingerprint and corresponding fingerprint generation parameters (e.g., "modifiers").

[0042] In some embodiments, the STA-AC may include an authentication key. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a self-signed public key (K_STA) with a corresponding private key. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a self-signed certificate with a corresponding private key. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a certificate signed by a root using a root signing key pair. In some embodiments, the authentication key may include a DPP connector signed by a configurator using a configurator signing key pair. The SSID and SAE password corresponding to the AP 602 may be provided 612 to the STA 604.

[0043] In some embodiments, the STA 604 may transmit a probe request 614 to the AP 602 to initiate an authentication process. The AP 602 may transmit a probe response 616. The probe response 616 may include the security protocols supported by the AP 602. In some embodiments, the AP 602 may transmit a beacon 618 to the STA 604. The beacon 618 may be transmitted periodically to advertise the presence and capabilities of the AP 602. The beacon 618 may include the SSID, the security protocols supported, and the group that the AP 602 is using.

[0044] STA 604 and AP 602 may perform an SAE commit exchange. STA 604 transmits an SAE commit message 620 to AP 602, and AP 602 transmits a commit message 622 to STA 604. In the commit exchange, both parties may exchange groups, scalars, and elements to generate keys for encrypting subsequent communications between AP 602 and STA 604.

[0045] The AP 602 and the STA 604 generate a PMK, a KCK, and a KEK (e.g., PMK, KCK, KEK 624 and PMK, KCK, KEK 626). The AP 602 may transmit an SAE confirmation message 628 to the STA 604. The SAE confirmation message 628 may include a confirmation field, a modifier, and an AP-AC. The modifier and the AP-AC may be protected by the KEK. The modifier and the AP-AC may be stored by the STA 604 and used to authenticate the AP 602. The AP 602 may utilize the KEK generated during the SAE submission handshake to protect the exchange of the AP's authentication credentials. For example, the AP-AC and the modifier may be encrypted by the AP 602 using the KEK. Encryption may increase the privacy of the AP-AC information, which may be particularly useful for protecting the identity of a mobile AP.

[0046] The STA 604 may authenticate 632 the AP 602 using various parameters. For example, the STA 604 may authenticate 632 the AP 602 based on the AP's public key K_AP or a root signing key. For example, the STA 604 may verify that the K_AP or the root signing key corresponds to the SAE cryptographic key. In some embodiments, the STA 604 may authenticate 632 the AP 602 by verifying the AP-AC. The STA 604 may decrypt the AP-AC and confirm that the AP-AC corresponds to the AP 602.

[0047] STA 604 may transmit an SAE confirmation message 630 to AP 602. SAE confirmation message 630 may include a confirmation field and STA-AC. STA 604 may utilize the KEK generated during the SAE submission handshake to protect the exchange of the STA's authentication credentials. For example, AP-AC may be encrypted by STA 604 using the KEK. AP 602 may authenticate 634 STA 604 by verifying STA-AC. For example, AP 602 may decrypt STA-AC and confirm that STA-AC corresponds to STA 604. This may provide strong per-STA authentication. For example, in some In a network, an AP (or mesh AP system) may be able to use STA-AC to distinguish / authenticate different associated devices in order to assign these devices to different virtual local area networks (VLANs) or provide different types of services. Both AP-AC and STA-AC are encrypted during provisioning for better privacy protection.

[0048] Figure 7 A signaling diagram 700 of a STA 704 and an AP 702 using authentication credentials based on self-signed certificates is illustrated. Specifically, the illustrated embodiment provides details on initial authentication and post-provisioning authentication when self-signed certificates are used for SAE-PK authentication credential provisioning, as described in reference to FIG. Figure 6 discussed.

[0049] As shown, AP 702 can support both WPA3 Personal SAE-PK (WPA3P-SAE-PK) and WPA3 Enterprise Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (WPA3E-EAP-TLS). AP 702 can connect to a station that supports one of WPA3P-SAE, WPA3P-SAE-PK, WPA3E-EAP-TLS, or WPA3P-SAE-PK+WPA3E-EAP-TLS. In signaling diagram 700, STA 704 supports WPA3P-SAE-PK+WPA3E-EAP-TLS.

[0050] As reference Figure 6 As explained, during the SAE-PK protected authentication credential provisioning process, both AP 602 and STA 604 provide authentication credentials to each other. Figure 7 In the illustrated embodiment, AP 702 and STA 704 use self-signed certificates as authentication credentials.

[0051] During the first authentication, the AP 702 and the STA 704 exchange self-signed certificates. The AP 702 transmits the self-signed certificate to the STA 704 during the SAE commit message. The STA 704 may store the self-signed certificate from the AP 702. The STA 704 transmits the self-signed certificate to the AP 702. The AP 702 may store the self-signed certificate from the STA 704. Both the AP 702 and the STA 704 may revoke their certificates at any time. However, if the certificates are revoked, the AP 702 and the STA 704 need to re-perform the SAE-PK protected provisioning to exchange new certificates.

[0052] After exchanging self-signed certificates, AP 702 and STA 704 can use the post-provisioning authentication process to authenticate each other. The post-provisioning authentication process refers to authenticating an AP or STA after provisioning authentication credentials (e.g., a self-signed certificate). During the post-provisioning authentication process, AP 702 can use the stored STA self-signed certificate to authenticate STA 704, and STA 704 can use the stored AP self-signed certificate to authenticate AP 702. As shown, the post-provisioning authentication process may include EAP-TLS or PMK caching. If PMK caching is used, AP certificates and STA certificates can be securely exchanged and verified during the 4-way handshake. AP 702 and STA 704 can also exchange AP IDs and STA IDs signed by private keys associated with their certificates during the 4-way handshake.

[0053] Figure 8The signaling diagram 800 and networking diagram 808 of a WLAN using multiple APs using self-signed certificate-based authentication credentials are illustrated. Specifically, the illustrated embodiment provides details on initial authentication and post-provisioning authentication when self-signed certificates are used for SAE-PK authentication credential provisioning, as described in reference to FIG. Figure 6 discussed.

[0054] As shown, the first AP 804 and the second AP 806 may support both WPA3P-SAE-PK and WPA3E-EAP-TLS. The first AP 804 may perform an initial authentication process 810 with the STA 812. Subsequent authentications performed on the first AP 804 may rely on a post-provisioning authentication process. If the first AP 804 is configured to be in the same network (e.g., the same SSID and password) with multiple APs (e.g., the second AP 806), resources may be saved if the other APs also rely on the post-provisioning authentication process 814. Therefore, the controller 802 may be used to provide a unified certificate to each of these APs to allow the STA 812 to roam freely between the first AP 804 and the second AP 806.

[0055] The controller 802 may have its own certificate (e.g., a root certificate). The controller 802 may provide the root certificate to the first AP 804 and the second AP 806. Both the first AP 804 and the second AP 806 may store the root certificate and use the root certificate for the authentication process. If the entire extended service set (ESS) or mobility domain uses the same SSID and SAE password, the SAE password may be generated by using the root's signed public key instead of the public key (K_AP) of the individual AP.

[0056] For example, during the first authentication process 810, the first AP 804 and the STA 812 exchange certificates. The first AP 804 may transmit 816 to the STA 812 a SAE-PK authenticated and SAE-PK protected root certificate and a root signing certificate that 812 may store. The STA 812 may transmit to the first AP 804 a SAE-PK protected self-signed certificate 818 that the first AP 804 may store. Additionally, the STA self-signed certificate may be distributed to all APs. For example, the first AP 804 may share the STA self-signed certificate with the controller 802, which may share the STA self-signed certificate with the second AP 806. The STA may also use additional handshakes to obtain a root signing certificate, for example, from the controller.

[0057] After exchanging certificates, the first AP 804 or the second AP 806 and the STA 812 may authenticate each other using a post-provisioning authentication process (e.g., a post-provisioning authentication process 814). In the post-provisioning authentication process, the second AP 806 may authenticate the STA 812 using a stored STA self-signed certificate or a root certificate, and the STA 812 may authenticate the second AP 806 using a stored root certificate. As shown, the post-provisioning authentication process may include EAP-TLS or Fast Transition (FT). If FT is used, the AP certificates and STA certificates may be securely exchanged and verified during the FT 4-way handshake. The AP and STA may also exchange AP IDs and STA IDs signed by the root during the FT 4-way handshake.

[0058] Fig. 9 The signaling diagram 900 and networking diagram 902 of a WLAN using public key-based authentication credentials are illustrated. Specifically, the illustrated embodiment provides details about the initial authentication process 910 and the post-provisioning authentication process 908 when public key-based authentication credentials are provisioned, as shown in FIG. Figure 6 discussed.

[0059] As shown, AP 904 can support both WPA3P-SAE-PK and AP / STA MA. AP 904 can connect to a station that supports one of WPA3P-SAE, WPA3P-SAE-PK, or WPA3P-SE-PK+AP / STA MA. In signaling diagram 900, STA 906 supports WPA3P-SAE-PK+AP / STA MA.

[0060] During the first authentication process 910, the AP 904 and the STA 906 exchange self-signed public keys. The AP 904 may transmit the SAE-PK authenticated and SAE-PK protected self-signed public key 912 to the STA 906. The STA 906 may transmit the SAE-PK protected self-signed public key and / or the STA ID to the AP 904. The AP 904 may store the STA ID and / or the STA public key. The STA ID may be a short fingerprint of the STA public key, just as the SAE password is a fingerprint of the AP public key. Caching the short STA ID, rather than the long STA public key, may reduce the storage burden of the AP. The STA 906 may store the SSID and SAE password of the AP.

[0061] After the first authentication process 910, the AP 904 and the STA 906 may use a post-provisioning authentication process 908. In the illustrated embodiment, the AP 904 may transmit a protected self-signed public key and / or an AP ID (from the AP) to the STA 906 via SAE-PK or a 4-way handshake 914. The STA 906 may verify the protected self-signed public key and / or the AP ID based on the SSID and the SAE password. The STA 906 may transmit a protected self-signed public key and / or an AP ID (from the AP) to the AP 904 via SAE-PK or a 4-way handshake 916. If the AP 904 only stores the STA ID, the STA 906 may transmit the protected self-signed public key and the corresponding modifier to the AP 904. The AP 904 may verify the received protected signed public key and / or AP ID using the STAID and / or the STA public key.

[0062] Fig.10 The signaling diagram 1000 and networking diagram 1002 of a WLAN using multiple APs using connector-based authentication credentials are illustrated. Specifically, the illustrated embodiment provides details on the initial authentication and post-provisioning authentication of SAE-PK authentication credentials provisioning, as shown in FIG. Figure 6 discussed.

[0063] As shown, the first AP 1004 and the second AP 1006 may support both WPA3P-SAE-PK and AP / STA MA. The first AP 1004 may perform an initial authentication process 1010 with the STA 1014. Subsequent authentications performed on the first AP 1004 or the second AP 806 may rely on a post-provisioning authentication process 1012. The first AP 1004 and the second AP 1006 may be configured with the same SSID and password.

[0064] The configurator 1008 may be used to provide a unified certificate to each of these APs to allow the STA 1014 to roam freely between the first AP 804 and the second AP 806. The configurator 1008 may have its own signing key (e.g., a private key / public key pair). The configurator 1008 may provide the signing key to the first AP 1004 and the second AP 1006. Both the first AP 1004 and the second AP 1006 may store the signing key and use the signing key for the authentication process. If the entire ESS or mobility domain uses the same SSID and SAE password, the SAE password is generated using the signing public key of the configurator.

[0065] For example, during the first authentication process 1010, the first AP 1004 may transmit a SAE-PK authenticated and SAE-PK protected configurator signing key 1016 and a signed connector to the STA 1014. The STA 1014 may store the configurator signing key 1016. The STA 1014 may transmit a SAE-PK protected self-signed connector 1018 to the first AP 1004. The first AP 1004 may store the STA self-signed connector 1018 or the configurator signing key of the STA 1014. The STA self-signed connector may be distributed to all APs; alternatively, an additional handshake may be performed between the STA and the configurator so that the STA provides the connector to the configurator and obtains the configurator-signed connector (or STA ID) from the configurator.

[0066] In the post-provisioning authentication process 1012, the second AP 1006 may use the stored STA self-signed connector 1018 or configurator signing key to authenticate the STA 1014, and the STA 1014 may use the stored configurator signing key to authenticate the second AP 1006. As shown, the post-provisioning authentication process may include the second AP 1006 transmitting a protected configurator signing connector to the STA 1014, and the STA 1014 transmitting a protected self-signed or configurator signing connector to the second AP 1006 via SAE-PK or FT. This information, along with the information stored from the first authentication process 1010, may be used to authenticate both the second AP 1006 and the STA 1014.

[0067] Fig.11 Flowchart 1100 illustrating SAE-PK cryptographic generation according to some embodiments. The hash extension may be based on RFC 3972. The input to the hash function may be modified by prefixing the public key (K_AP 1102) with a 128-bit modifier (M 1104). M 1104 may be found randomly by (brute force) searching such that the first 8*Sec bits (Z 1106) of the hash output are equal to 0. Search time complexity = O(2 8*Sec ), where Sec∈{2,3,4,5}. The second original image strength of the fingerprint: N=(8*Sec+5λ-2) bits.

[0068] Fig.12 1202 is illustrated for a DPP connector according to some embodiments. The configurator may possess a signing key pair (c-sign-key, C-sign-key). The configurator may use the c-sign-key to sign the connector. The provisioned device may use the c-sign-key to verify that the connector of other devices is signed by the same configurator.

[0069] Fig.13 A system 1300 for performing signaling 1334 between a STA 1302 and an AP 1318 according to embodiments disclosed herein is illustrated. The system 1300 may be part of a wireless communication system as described herein. The STA 1302 may be, for example, a UE of the wireless communication system. The AP 1318 may be, for example, an access point of the wireless communication system.

[0070] STA 1302 may include one or more processors 1304. Processor 1304 may execute instructions to perform various operations of STA 1302, as described herein. Processor 1304 may include one or more baseband processors implemented using, for example, a central processing unit (CPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a controller, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) device, another hardware device, a firmware device, or any combination thereof configured to perform the operations described herein.

[0071] STA 1302 may include memory 1306. Memory 1306 may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions 1308 (which may include, for example, instructions executed by processor 1304). Instructions 1308 may also be referred to as program code or a computer program. Memory 1306 may also store data used by processor 1304 and results calculated by the processor.

[0072] STA 1302 may include one or more transceivers 1310, which may include a radio frequency (RF) transmitter and / or receiver circuit system, which uses an antenna 1312 of STA 1302 to facilitate signaling (e.g., signaling 1334) to and / or from STA 1302 with other devices (e.g., AP 1318).

[0073] STA 1302 may include one or more antennas 1312 (e.g., one, two, four, or more). For implementations with multiple antennas 1312, STA 1302 may take full advantage of the spatial diversity of such multiple antennas 1312 to transmit and / or receive multiple different data streams on the same time-frequency resources. This approach may be referred to as, for example, a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) approach (referring to multiple antennas used on the transmitting device and receiving device sides to implement this aspect, respectively). MIMO transmission by STA 1302 may be implemented based on precoding (or digital beamforming) applied at STA 1302, which multiplexes data streams between antennas 1312 based on known or assumed channel characteristics, so that each data stream is received with appropriate signal strength relative to other streams and at a desired location in the spatial domain (e.g., the location of a receiver associated with the data stream). Certain implementations may use a single-user MIMO (SU-MIMO) approach (where data streams are all destined for a single receiver) and / or a multi-user MIMO (MU-MIMO) approach (where individual data streams may be destined for individual (different) receivers at different locations in the spatial domain).

[0074] In certain embodiments with multiple antennas, STA 1302 may implement analog beamforming techniques whereby the phases of signals transmitted by antennas 1312 are relatively adjusted such that the (joint) transmissions of antennas 1312 may be directed (this is sometimes referred to as beam steering).

[0075] STA 1302 may include one or more interfaces 1314. Interfaces 1314 may be used to provide input to STA 1302 or output from the SMR. For example, STA 1302 as a UE may include interfaces 1314, such as microphones, speakers, touch screens, buttons, etc., to allow a user of the UE to provide input and / or output to the UE. Other interfaces of such UEs may consist of transmitters, receivers, and other circuit systems that allow communication between the UE and other devices (e.g., in addition to the transceiver 1310 / antenna 1312 described above), and may communicate according to known protocols (e.g., etc.) to perform the operation.

[0076] STA 1302 may include an authenticator module 1316. Authenticator module 1316 may be implemented via hardware, software, or a combination thereof. For example, authenticator module 1316 may be implemented as a processor, circuit, and / or instructions 1308 stored in memory 1306 and executed by processor 1304. In some examples, authenticator module 1316 may be integrated within processor 1304 and / or transceiver 1310. For example, authenticator module 1316 may be implemented by a combination of software components (e.g., executed by a DSP or general purpose processor) and hardware components (e.g., logic gates and circuit systems) within processor 1304 or transceiver 1310.

[0077] The authenticator module 1316 may be used in various aspects of the present disclosure, for example, Figures 5 to 12 Authenticator module 1316 is configured to authenticate AP 1318 and provide authentication credentials to AP 1318.

[0078] The AP 1318 may include one or more processors 1320. The processor 1320 may execute instructions to cause various operations of the AP 1318 to be performed, as described herein. The processor 1320 may include one or more baseband processors implemented using, for example, a CPU, a DSP, an ASIC, a controller, an FPGA device, another hardware device, a firmware device, or any combination thereof configured to perform the operations described herein.

[0079] AP 1318 may include memory 1322. Memory 1322 may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that stores instructions 1324 (which may include, for example, instructions executed by processor 1320). Instructions 1324 may also be referred to as program code or a computer program. Memory 1322 may also store data used by processor 1320 and results calculated by the processor.

[0080] AP 1318 may include one or more transceivers 1326, which may include RF transmitter and / or receiver circuitry that uses antenna 1328 of AP 1318 to facilitate signaling (e.g., signaling 1334) to and / or from AP 1318 with other devices (e.g., STA 1302).

[0081] AP 1318 may include one or more antennas 1328 (e.g., one, two, four, or more). In embodiments with multiple antennas 1328, AP 1318 may perform MIMO, digital beamforming, analog beamforming, beamsteering, etc., as described.

[0082] The AP 1318 may include one or more interfaces 1330. The interface 1330 may be used to provide input to or output from the AP 1318. For example, the AP 1318 as a base station may include an interface 1330 consisting of a transmitter, a receiver, and other circuit systems (e.g., in addition to the transceiver 1326 / antenna 1328 already described), which enables the base station to communicate with other equipment in the core network and / or enables the base station to communicate with external networks, computers, databases, etc., for the purpose of operating, managing, and maintaining the base station or other equipment operably connected to the base station.

[0083] AP 1318 may include an authenticator module 1332. Authenticator module 1332 may be implemented via hardware, software, or a combination thereof. For example, authenticator module 1332 may be implemented as a processor, circuit, and / or instructions 1324 stored in memory 1322 and executed by processor 1320. In some examples, authenticator module 1332 may be integrated within processor 1320 and / or transceiver 1326. For example, authenticator module 1332 may be implemented by a combination of software components (e.g., executed by a DSP or general purpose processor) and hardware components (e.g., logic gates and circuit systems) within processor 1320 or transceiver 1326.

[0084] The authenticator module 1332 may be used in various aspects of the present disclosure, for example, Figures 5 to 12 The authenticator module 1332 is configured to authenticate the STA 1302 and provide the STA 1302 with authentication credentials.

[0085] For one or more embodiments, at least one of the components shown in one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to perform one or more operations, techniques, processes, and / or methods as described herein. For example, the processor described herein in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples shown herein. For another example, the circuit system associated with the STA or AP described above in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples shown herein.

[0086] Unless otherwise expressly stated, any of the above embodiments may be combined with any other embodiment (or combination of embodiments). The foregoing description of one or more specific implementations provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the scope of the embodiments to the precise form disclosed. In view of the above teachings, modifications and variations are possible or can be obtained from the practice of various embodiments.

[0087] Embodiments and implementations of the systems and methods described herein may include various operations that may be embodied in machine executable instructions to be executed by a computer system. A computer system may include one or more general or special purpose computers (or other electronic devices). A computer system may include hardware components that include specific logic for performing operations, or may include a combination of hardware, software, and / or firmware.

[0088] It should be appreciated that the systems described herein include descriptions of specific embodiments. These embodiments may be combined into a single system, partially incorporated into other systems, separated into multiple systems, or otherwise divided or combined. In addition, it is contemplated that parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. of one embodiment may be used in another embodiment. For clarity, these parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. are described only in one or more embodiments, and it should be appreciated that unless otherwise stated herein, these parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. may be combined with or substituted for parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. of another embodiment.

[0089] It is understood that the use of personally identifiable information should be subject to privacy policies and practices that are generally recognized to meet or exceed industry or government requirements for maintaining user privacy. Specifically, personally identifiable information data should be managed and processed to minimize the risk of unintentional or unauthorized access or use, and the nature of the authorized use should be clearly stated to users.

[0090] Although the foregoing has been described in considerable detail for the sake of clarity, it will be apparent that certain changes and modifications may be made without departing from the principles of the invention. It should be noted that there are many alternative ways to implement both the processes and the apparatus described herein. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are to be regarded as illustrative rather than restrictive, and the specification is not limited to the details given herein, but may be modified within the scope and equivalents of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for a station in a wireless local area network, the method comprising: generating a key encryption key (KEK) based on signaling with the access point; receiving an inbound message from the access point including a modifier and access point authentication credentials, the modifier and the access point authentication credentials both being encrypted based on the KEK; decrypting the modifier and the access point authentication credential based on the KEK; as well as The access point is authenticated by verifying the access point authentication credentials. The method of claim 1 , wherein the inbound message is a SAE confirmation message.

3. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: Generate station authentication credentials, encrypting the station authentication credentials based on the KEK; as well as The station authentication credentials are transmitted to the access point. 4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the access point authentication credential comprises at least one of an access point identifier, an authentication key, an access point authentication fingerprint, or any combination thereof. 5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the access point authentication credential comprises a self-signed public key with a corresponding private key. The method of claim 1 , wherein the access point authentication credentials comprise a self-signed certificate with a corresponding private key.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the access point authentication credentials comprise a certificate signed by a root using a root signing key pair.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the access point authentication credentials include a connector signed by a configurator using a configurator signing key pair.

9. A station device, comprising: processor; and a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processor, configure the apparatus to: generating a key encryption key (KEK) based on signaling with the access point; receiving an inbound message from the access point including a modifier and access point authentication credentials, the modifier and the access point authentication credentials both being encrypted based on the KEK; decrypting the modifier and the access point authentication credential based on the KEK; as well as The access point is authenticated by verifying the access point authentication credentials.

10. The station apparatus of claim 9, wherein the inbound message is a SAE acknowledgement message.

11. The station device of claim 9, wherein the instructions further configure the device to: Generate station authentication credentials, encrypting the station authentication credentials based on the KEK; and The station authentication credentials are transmitted to the access point. 12 . The station device of claim 9 , wherein the access point authentication credential comprises at least one of an access point identifier, an authentication key, an access point authentication fingerprint, or any combination thereof.

13. The station device of claim 9, wherein the access point authentication credential comprises a self-signed public key with a corresponding private key.

14. The station device of claim 9, wherein the access point authentication credential comprises a self-signed certificate having a corresponding private key.

15. The station device of claim 9, wherein the access point authentication credentials include a certificate signed by a root using a root signing key pair.

16. The station device of claim 9, wherein the access point authentication credential comprises a connector signed by a configurator using a configurator signing key pair.

17. A method for an access point in a wireless local area network, the method comprising: generating a key encryption key (KEK) based on signaling with the station; receiving an inbound message from the station including station authentication credentials, the station authentication credentials being encrypted based on the KEK; decrypting the station authentication credentials based on the KEK; as well as The station is authenticated by verifying the station authentication credentials. The method of claim 17 , wherein the inbound message is a SAE acknowledgement message.

19. The method according to claim 17, further comprising: Generate access point authentication credentials, encrypting the access point authentication credentials based on the KEK; as well as The access point authentication credentials are transmitted to the access point.

20. The method of claim 17, wherein the station authentication credentials include at least one of an access point identifier or an authentication key.

21. The method of claim 17, wherein the station authentication credentials include a self-signed public key with a corresponding private key.

22. The method of claim 17, wherein the station authentication credentials comprise a self-signed certificate with a corresponding private key.

23. The method of claim 17, wherein the station authentication credentials include a certificate signed by a root using a root signing key pair.

24. The method of claim 17, wherein the station authentication credentials include a connector signed by a configurator using a configurator signing key pair.

25. An access point device, the access point device comprising: processor; and a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processor, configure the apparatus to: generating a key encryption key (KEK) based on signaling with the station; receiving an inbound message from the station including station authentication credentials, the station authentication credentials being encrypted based on the KEK; decrypting the station authentication credentials based on the KEK; as well as The station is authenticated by verifying the station authentication credentials.

26. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the inbound message is a SAE acknowledgement message.

27. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the instructions further configure the device to: Generate access point authentication credentials, encrypting the access point authentication credentials based on the KEK; and The access point authentication credentials are transmitted to the access point.

28. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the station authentication credentials include at least one of an access point identifier or an authentication key.

29. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the station authentication credentials include a self-signed public key with a corresponding private key.

30. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the station authentication credentials comprise a self-signed certificate having a corresponding private key.

31. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the station authentication credentials include a certificate signed by a root using a root signing key pair.

32. The access point device of claim 25, wherein the station authentication credentials include a connector signed by a configurator using a configurator signing key pair.

33. An apparatus comprising means for performing the method of any one of claims 1 to 8 or 17 to 24.

34. A computer-readable medium comprising instructions which, when executed by one or more processors of an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform a method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 or claims 17 to 24.

35. An apparatus comprising logic, modules, or circuitry operable to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 8 or 17 to 24.

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