Intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method and system for launch vehicle

Abstract

The application discloses a launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method and system, and particularly relates to the field of autonomous safety control. The application receives safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data and flight control and guidance data from a launch vehicle autonomous safety control system, and performs data verification to ensure accuracy and consistency. Then, whether autonomous safety control is needed at present is judged according to the flight phase of the rocket and a preset safety control period. Whether the rocket is in a stable flight state and whether it exceeds a preset safety pipeline range are analyzed based on the attitude data and the flight trajectory of the rocket. Whether the rocket has a risk of falling into a protection zone is judged according to the predicted landing point of the rocket and the preset protection zone range. Finally, corresponding safety control alarms, destruction instructions or exit autonomous safety control judgment operations are executed according to the output type.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of autonomous safety control, more particularly, the present application relates to a launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method and system. BACKGROUND

[0002] As an important carrier of modern aerospace, launch vehicles are responsible for transporting satellites and related aerospace equipment to outer space. However, due to the complexity and uncertainty of rocket flight, any problems in any link can lead to major safety accidents. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure the safety and reliability of launch vehicles during flight.

[0003] Currently, some research has been done in the field of autonomous safety control of launch vehicles at home and abroad. For example, some countries have successfully developed rocket models with autonomous obstacle avoidance and fault diagnosis functions. However, these studies mostly focus on the application of specific technologies, lacking a comprehensive set of decision criteria.

[0004] However, in actual use, it still has some disadvantages, such as the traditional safety control method mainly relies on real-time monitoring and manual intervention of the ground control system, but this method has low reliability, needs subjective judgment of human beings, and needs additional ground station, which is expensive. SUMMARY

[0005] In order to overcome the above-mentioned defects of the prior art, the embodiments of the present application provide a launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method and system to solve the problems raised in the background art.

[0006] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application provides the following technical scheme:

[0007] Step A1: receiving safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data and flight control and guidance data from the launch vehicle autonomous safety control system;

[0008] Step A2: checking the received safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data and flight control and guidance data to determine the accuracy and consistency of the data;

[0009] Step A3: determining whether the current is in the period that needs autonomous safety control according to the flight phase of the rocket and the preset safety control period;

[0010] Step A4: analyzing whether the rocket is in a stable flight state based on the attitude data of the rocket;

[0011] Step A5: judging whether the rocket exceeds the preset safety pipeline range based on the flight trajectory and safety parameters;

[0012] Step A6: According to the expected landing point of the rocket and the preset protection zone range, it is judged whether the rocket has the risk of falling into the protection zone;

[0013] Step A7: According to the output type, the operation is performed.

[0014] Preferably, in the step A1, the safety control and guidance data is collected through a satellite navigation system; the satellite navigation system includes Beidou and GPS, which can provide high-precision position, speed and time information; a receiver installed on the launch vehicle receives signals from the satellite and extracts the required data; the inertial data is collected by an inertial sensor installed inside the rocket; the flight control and guidance data is obtained through a satellite navigation system; the flight control and guidance data includes navigation state information, flight path information and target point information.

[0015] Preferably, in the step A2, the received data is standardized and consistent with the data inspection, and the steps of the inspection are as follows:

[0016] Checksum calculation and comparison: the checksum method is used for data consistency check, the checksum of the received data is calculated, and the checksum provided by the sending end is compared; if the two are inconsistent, the data has been damaged and error in the transmission process;

[0017] Logical rule check: according to the business rules and logical relationship of the data, it is checked whether the data meets the specific conditions;

[0018] For example, it is checked whether the control instruction in the safety control and guidance data matches the execution instruction in the flight control and guidance data, and whether the position, speed and other information in the inertial data are consistent with the corresponding information in the flight control and guidance data.

[0019] Multi-source data comparison: by comparing the data between different data sources in multiple data sources, the consistency of the data is checked.

[0020] For example, the inertial data and the flight control and guidance data can be compared to check whether the position, speed and other information between them are consistent;

[0021] According to the result of data consistency check, it is analyzed whether the data has error and inconsistency;

[0022] If errors and inconsistencies are found, the causes and positions of the errors are determined, and error handling measures are taken according to the causes and positions of the errors; for example, if the data is damaged in the transmission process, the data can be re-received; if the data has logical errors, data repair and correction are needed;

[0023] Cross comparison of safety control and guidance data, inertial data and flight control and guidance data is performed to check whether the logical relationship between them is consistent;

[0024] For example, compare the position, speed, etc. information in the inertial navigation data and the inertial measurement unit data to see if there is a significant difference.

[0025] Preferably, in step A3, first, compare the current flight phase of the rocket with the preset safety control period; if the rocket is currently in a certain preset safety control period, further safety control judgment is performed.

[0026] After determining that the rocket is in the preset safety control period, analyze the real-time flight parameters; compare the actual parameter value with the preset theoretical data and safety threshold; if the actual parameter value is within the preset fault line range, it is considered that the rocket flight state is normal, and no autonomous safety control is needed.

[0027] If the actual parameter value exceeds the fault line range and does not reach the allowed destruction line, the system will issue a warning signal to prompt action, but no autonomous safety control is needed at this time.

[0028] If the actual parameter value reaches and exceeds the allowed destruction line, and the rocket landing point is at the boundary of the protection zone, autonomous safety control is performed.

[0029] Preferably, in step A4, if the pitch or yaw attitude angle deviation is greater than ± 30° for 3s, the "abnormal flight attitude" fault type alarm is established; if the pitch or yaw attitude angle deviation is greater than ± 45° for 4s, the "abnormal flight attitude" fault type destruction is established.

[0030] If the pitch angle and yaw angle of the rocket deviate from the theoretical trajectory, causing the rocket to be unable to complete normal flight, this type of flight state is classified as "abnormal flight attitude" fault type; if the pitch angle and yaw angle of the rocket conform to the theoretical trajectory and complete normal flight, this type of flight state is classified as normal type.

[0031] The source of the autonomous judgment information for abnormal flight attitude is the inertial measurement unit; the flight control combination makes an effectiveness and consistency decision on the attitude abnormal data, and after the decision is effective, it is used as the autonomous control discrimination information source for abnormal flight attitude.

[0032] Preferably, in step A5, in the takeoff monitoring segment and the initial safety control segment, the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type integrates three fault modes of descending flight, reverse flight, and abnormal vertical flight.

[0033] In the basic safety control segment, if the rocket deviates from the theoretical trajectory and flies out of the boundary line on both sides of the safety pipeline, this type of flight state is classified as "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type.

[0034] In the basic safety control section, if the rocket deviates from the theoretical value due to abnormal operation of the power device or other reasons, and the flight speed or position deviates, and the falling point falls outside the falling point pipeline, the flight state is classified as "out of falling point safety pipeline" fault type; if the falling point falls into the set pipeline, the flight state is classified as normal state;

[0035] In the take-off monitoring section and the initial safety control section, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 3 seconds continuously within 30 seconds after take-off, the "out of safety pipeline" fault type alarm and the "out of safety pipeline" fault type destruction are established; wherein the set pipeline is set according to the flight trajectory.

[0036] Preferably, in step A6, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 3 seconds continuously and the falling point falls within the boundary of any protection area, the "fall into protection area" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 6 seconds continuously and the falling point falls within the boundary of any protection area, the "fall into protection area" fault type destruction is established; if the flight trajectory does not exceed the corresponding set pipeline and the falling point falls within the boundary of any protection area, the output is normal state.

[0037] Preferably, in step A7, if one of the outputs of steps 4, 5 and 6 is a fault type of the aircraft, the safety control alarm and destruction instructions are followed; if the output is normal state, the autonomous safety control judgment is exited.

[0038] The application also provides a launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision system using the above-mentioned launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method, wherein the autonomous safety evaluation and control decision system comprises:

[0039] A data acquisition module for receiving safety control and guidance data, inertial group data and flight control and guidance data from the autonomous safety control system of the launch vehicle;

[0040] A data verification module for verifying the received safety control and guidance data, inertial group data and flight control and guidance data to determine the accuracy and consistency of the data;

[0041] A judgment module for judging whether the current time is within the time period requiring autonomous safety control according to the flight phase of the rocket and the preset safety control time period;

[0042] An analysis module for analyzing whether the rocket is in a stable flight state based on the attitude data of the rocket;

[0043] A safety pipeline range judgment module for judging whether the rocket exceeds the preset safety pipeline range based on the flight trajectory and safety parameters;

[0044] Judgment protection zone module: for judging whether the rocket has the risk of falling into the protection zone according to the expected landing point of the rocket and the preset protection zone range;

[0045] Execution module: for executing operation according to the output type.

[0046] Technical effects and advantages of the present application:

[0047] High reliability: the rocket safety control is executed by high-reliable on-board equipment, the equipment chain is shortened, and the reliability is improved without relying on subjective judgment of people;

[0048] Strong applicability: the present method can be applied to both land-launched launch vehicles and sea-launched launch vehicles;

[0049] Good economy: only on-board equipment is needed, and no additional ground station is needed, so that the cost can be greatly saved: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0050] Figure 1 The present application is a method flowchart.

[0051] Figure 2 The present application is an autonomous safety control determination flowchart.

[0052] Figure 3 The present application is a module connection diagram. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0053] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0054] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 2 The present application provides a launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method, which comprises the following steps:

[0055] Step A1: receiving safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data and flight control and guidance data from a launch vehicle autonomous safety control system;

[0056] In step A1, the safety control and guidance data are collected by a satellite navigation system; the satellite navigation system includes Beidou and GPS, and can provide high-precision position, speed and time information; a receiver installed on the launch vehicle receives signals from the satellite and extracts the required data;

[0057] The inertial measurement unit data is collected by inertial sensors installed inside the rocket, and the collection method is specifically as follows:

[0058] Before the rocket is launched, the gyroscope and accelerometer are initialized and set, including calibrating the sensor and setting the sampling frequency. During the flight of the rocket, the gyroscope and accelerometer will collect the angular velocity and acceleration data of the rocket in real time. These data are output in the form of analog signals or digital signals. The collected data are stored in the memory inside the rocket and extracted when needed.

[0059] The flight control and guidance data are obtained through a satellite navigation system. The flight control and guidance data include navigation state information, flight path information, and target point information.

[0060] Step A2: Check the received safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data, and flight control and guidance data for accuracy and consistency.

[0061] In the step A2, the received data are standardized and checked for consistency. The checking steps are specifically as follows:

[0062] Checksum calculation and comparison: The checksum method is used to check the consistency of the data. The checksum of the received data is calculated and compared with the checksum provided by the sending end. If the two checksums are inconsistent, the data has been damaged or corrupted during transmission.

[0063] Logical rule check: According to the business rules and logical relationships of the data, check whether the data meet certain conditions.

[0064] For example, check whether the control instructions in the safety control and guidance data match the execution instructions in the flight control and guidance data, and whether the position, speed, and other information in the inertial measurement unit data are consistent with the corresponding information in the flight control and guidance data.

[0065] Multi-source data comparison: Compare the data between different data sources in multiple data sources to check the consistency of the data.

[0066] For example, the inertial measurement unit data can be compared with the flight control and guidance data to check whether the position, speed, and other information between them are consistent.

[0067] According to the results of the data consistency check, analyze whether the data has errors and inconsistencies.

[0068] If errors and inconsistencies are found, determine the cause and location of the errors, and take error handling measures according to the cause and location of the errors. For example, if the data is damaged during transmission, the data can be re-received. If the data has logical errors, data repair and correction are needed.

[0069] Cross comparison of the safety control data, inertial unit data and flight control safety control data is performed to check whether the logical relationship between them is consistent.

[0070] For example, the position, velocity and other information in the safety control data and the inertial unit data are compared to see whether there is a significant difference.

[0071] Step A3: According to the flight phase of the rocket and the preset safety control period, it is judged whether the current is in the period that needs to be autonomously controlled;

[0072] In the step A3, first, the current flight phase of the rocket is compared with the preset safety control period; if the rocket is currently in a certain preset safety control period, further safety control judgment is performed;

[0073] After determining that the rocket is in the preset safety control period, the real-time flight parameters are analyzed; the actual parameter value is compared with the preset theoretical data and safety threshold; if the actual parameter value is within the preset fault line range, it is considered that the rocket flight state is normal, and autonomous safety control is not needed.

[0074] If the actual parameter value exceeds the fault line range and does not reach the allowed destruction line, the system will issue a warning signal to prompt action to be taken, but autonomous safety control is not needed at this time.

[0075] If the actual parameter value reaches and exceeds the allowed destruction line, and the rocket landing point is at the boundary of the protection zone, autonomous safety control is performed.

[0076] Step A4: Based on the attitude data of the rocket, it is analyzed whether the rocket is in a stable flight state;

[0077] In the step A4, if the pitch or yaw attitude angle deviation is greater than ± 30° for 3s continuously, the “flight attitude abnormality” fault type alarm is established; if the pitch or yaw attitude angle deviation is greater than ± 45° for 4s continuously, the “flight attitude abnormality” fault type destruction is established;

[0078] If the pitch angle and yaw angle of the rocket deviate from the theoretical trajectory to cause the rocket to be unable to complete normal flight, this flight state is classified as the “flight attitude abnormality” fault type; if the pitch angle and yaw angle of the rocket conform to the theoretical trajectory and complete normal flight, this flight state is classified as the normal type;

[0079] The safety judgment information source of the flight attitude abnormality is the inertial unit; the flight control combination makes an effectiveness and consistency decision on the attitude abnormality data, and after the decision is effective, it is used as the safety control discrimination information source of the flight attitude abnormality.

[0080] Step A5: Based on the flight trajectory and safety parameters, it is judged whether the rocket exceeds the preset safety pipeline range;

[0081] In the step A5, in the take-off monitoring segment and the initial safety control segment, the "out of the safety tube" fault type integrates three fault modes of the falling flight, the reverse flight and the abnormal vertical flight;

[0082] In the basic safety control segment, if the rocket deviates from the boundary line on both sides of the safety tube of the theoretical trajectory, the flight state is classified as the "out of the safety tube" fault type;

[0083] In the basic safety control segment, if the rocket deviates from the theoretical value of the flight speed or position due to abnormal operation of the power device or other reasons, the falling flight occurs, and the predicted landing point falls outside the set landing point tube, the flight state is classified as the "out of the landing point safety tube" fault type; if the predicted landing point falls within the set tube, the flight state is classified as the normal state;

[0084] In the take-off monitoring segment and the initial safety control segment, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set tube for 3 seconds continuously within 30 seconds after take-off, the "out of the safety tube" fault type alarm and the "out of the safety tube" fault type destruction are established; wherein the set tube is set according to the flight trajectory;

[0085] After 30 seconds after take-off, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set tube for 3 seconds continuously, the "out of the safety tube" fault type alarm and the "out of the safety tube" fault type destruction are established;

[0086] In the basic safety control segment, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set tube for 3 seconds continuously, the "out of the safety tube" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set tube for 4 seconds continuously, the "out of the safety tube" fault type destruction is established.

[0087] If the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set tube for 3 seconds continuously and the landing point is outside the landing point safety tube, the "out of the landing point safety tube" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set tube for 4 seconds continuously and the landing point is outside the landing point safety tube, the "out of the landing point safety tube" fault type destruction is established.

[0088] Step A6: According to the predicted landing point of the rocket and the preset protection area range, it is judged whether the rocket has the risk of falling into the protection area;

[0089] The step A6, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline and the landing point falls into the boundary of any protection area within 3s, the "fall into the protection area" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline and the landing point falls into the boundary of any protection area within 6s, the "fall into the protection area" fault type explosion is established; if the flight trajectory does not exceed the corresponding set pipeline and the landing point falls into the boundary of any protection area, the output is normal state.

[0090] Step A7: according to the output type, performing operation.

[0091] In the step A7, if the output of step 4, step 5 and step 6 is one of the aircraft fault types, the operation is performed according to the safety control alarm and explosion instruction; if the output is normal state, the autonomous safety control judgment is exited.

[0092] Please refer to Figure 3 The application also provides a launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision method, which uses the above-mentioned launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety evaluation and control decision system, and the solving system comprises:

[0093] A data acquisition module is used to receive safety control and guidance data, inertial group data and flight control and guidance data from the autonomous safety control system of the launch vehicle;

[0094] A data verification module is used to verify the received safety control and guidance data, inertial group data and flight control and guidance data, and judge the accuracy and consistency of the data;

[0095] A judgment module is used to judge whether the current is in the period requiring autonomous safety control according to the flight phase of the rocket and the preset safety control period;

[0096] An analysis module is used to analyze whether the rocket is in a stable flight state based on the attitude data of the rocket;

[0097] A judgment safety pipeline range module is used to judge whether the rocket exceeds the preset safety pipeline range based on the flight trajectory and safety parameters;

[0098] A judgment protection area module is used to judge whether the rocket has the risk of falling into the protection area according to the predicted landing point of the rocket and the preset protection area range;

[0099] An execution module is used to perform operation according to the output type.

[0100] Finally, the above-mentioned is only the preferred embodiment of the application, and is not used to limit the application, any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the application shall be included in the protection scope of the application.

Claims

1. A launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety assessment and control decision method, characterized in that, Comprise: Step A1: receiving the safety control data, inertial data and flight control data from the autonomous safety control system of the launch vehicle; Step A2: checking the received safety control data, inertial data and flight control data to determine the accuracy and consistency of the data; Step A3: determining whether the current time is within the period requiring autonomous safety control according to the flight phase of the rocket and the preset safety control period; Step A4: analyzing whether the rocket is in a stable flight state based on the attitude data of the rocket; In step A4, if the pitch or yaw attitude angle deviation is greater than ± 30° for 3s continuously, the "abnormal flight attitude" fault type alarm is established; if the pitch or yaw attitude angle deviation is greater than ± 45° for 4s continuously, the "abnormal flight attitude" fault type explosion is established; If the pitch angle and yaw angle of the rocket deviate from the theoretical trajectory, resulting in the inability to complete normal flight, this type of flight state is classified as "abnormal flight attitude" fault type; if the pitch angle and yaw angle of the rocket conform to the theoretical trajectory and complete normal flight, this type of flight state is classified as normal type; Step A5: determining whether the rocket exceeds the preset safety pipeline range based on the flight trajectory and safety parameters; In step A5, in the take-off monitoring section and the initial safety control section, the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type combines the three fault modes of descending flight, reverse flight and abnormal vertical flight; In the basic safety control section, if the rocket deviates from the theoretical trajectory and flies out of the boundary line on both sides of the safety pipeline, this type of flight state is classified as "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type; In the basic safety control section, if the rocket deviates from the theoretical value due to abnormal operation of the power device or other reasons, resulting in descending flight, and the predicted landing point falls outside the set landing point pipeline, this type of flight state is classified as "exceeding landing point safety pipeline" fault type; if the predicted landing point falls within the set pipeline, this type of flight state is classified as normal state; In the take-off monitoring section and the initial safety control section, within 30s after take-off, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 3s continuously, the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type alarm and the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type explosion are established; wherein the set pipeline is set according to the flight trajectory; After 30s after take-off, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 3s continuously, the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type alarm and the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type explosion are established; In the basic safety control section, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 3s continuously, the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 4s continuously, the "exceeding safety pipeline" fault type explosion is established; If the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 3s continuously and the landing point is outside the landing point safety pipeline, the "exceeding landing point safety pipeline" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline for 4s continuously and the landing point is outside the landing point safety pipeline, the "exceeding landing point safety pipeline" fault type explosion is established; Step A6: According to the expected landing point of the rocket and the preset protection zone range, it is judged whether the rocket has the risk of falling into the protection zone; In the step A6, if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline and the landing point falls within the boundary of any protection area for 3s, the "fall into the protection area" fault type alarm is established; if the flight trajectory exceeds the corresponding set pipeline and the landing point falls within the boundary of any protection area for 6s, the "fall into the protection area" fault type explosion is established; if the flight trajectory does not exceed the corresponding set pipeline and the landing point falls within the boundary of any protection area, the output is normal state; Step A7: According to the output type, the operation is performed.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein: In the step A1, the safety control satellite navigation data is collected by the satellite navigation system; the satellite navigation system includes Beidou and GPS, which can provide high-precision position, speed and time information; the receiver installed on the launch vehicle receives the signal from the satellite and extracts the required data; The inertial sensor installed in the rocket collects the inertial data, and the collection method is as follows: Before the rocket is launched, the gyroscope and accelerometer are initialized and set, including calibrating the sensor and setting the sampling frequency; during the flight of the rocket, the gyroscope and accelerometer will collect the angular velocity and acceleration data of the rocket in real time; these data are output in the form of analog and digital signals; the collected data are stored in the internal memory of the rocket and extracted when used; The flight control satellite navigation data is obtained by the satellite navigation system; the flight control satellite navigation data includes navigation state information, flight path information and target point information.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein: In the step A2, the received data is standardized and the data consistency is verified, and the steps of verification are as follows: Check and calculate and compare: the data consistency is verified by check and sum method, the check and sum of the received data is calculated, and the check and sum provided by the sending end is compared; If they are not consistent, the data has been damaged and error in the transmission process; Logical rule check: according to the business rules and logical relationship of the data, it is checked whether the data meets the specific conditions; Multi-source data comparison: by comparing the data between different data sources in multiple data sources, the consistency of the data is checked; According to the result of data consistency verification, it is analyzed whether the data has error and inconsistency; If error and inconsistency are found, the cause and position of error are determined, and error handling measures are taken according to the cause and position of error; The safety control satellite navigation data, inertial data and flight control satellite navigation data are cross compared to check whether their logical relationship is consistent.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein: In the step A3, first, the current flight phase of the rocket is compared with the preset safety control period; If the rocket is currently in a certain preset safety control period, further safety control judgment is performed; After it is determined that the rocket is in the preset safety control period, the real-time flight parameters need to be analyzed; the actual parameter value is compared with the preset theoretical data and safety threshold; If the actual parameter value is within the preset fault line range, it is considered that the rocket flight state is normal, and no autonomous safety control is needed; If the actual parameter value is out of the fault line range and does not reach the allowed destruction line, the system will send a warning signal to prompt action, but no autonomous safety control is required at this time; If the actual parameter value reaches and exceeds the allowed destruction line, and the rocket landing point is at the boundary of the protection zone, autonomous safety control is performed.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein: In step A7, if the output of steps 4, 5 and 6 is one of the aircraft failure types, the operation is performed according to the safety control warning and destruction instructions; if the output is normal, the autonomous safety control judgment is exited.

6. A launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety assessment and control decision system using the launch vehicle intelligent autonomous safety assessment and control decision method of any one of claims 1-5. The autonomous safety evaluation and control decision system comprises: a data acquisition module for receiving safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data and flight control and guidance data from the autonomous safety control system of the launch vehicle; a data verification module for verifying the received safety control and guidance data, inertial measurement unit data and flight control and guidance data to determine the accuracy and consistency of the data; a judgment module for judging whether the current time is within the period requiring autonomous safety control according to the flight phase of the rocket and the preset safety control period; an analysis module for analyzing whether the rocket is in a stable flight state based on the attitude data of the rocket; a judgment safety pipeline range module for judging whether the rocket exceeds the preset safety pipeline range based on the flight trajectory and safety parameters; a judgment protection zone module for judging whether the rocket has a risk of falling into the protection zone according to the predicted landing point of the rocket and the preset protection zone range; an execution module for executing the operation according to the output type.

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