Certificateless data encryption method, system and equipment for train-ground communication

Abstract

The invention relates to a certificateless data encryption method, system and equipment for vehicle-ground communication. The method comprises the following steps: a key generation center generates a main public key and a main private key of the system; the terminal configuration tool calls a key generation center interface, and the terminal configuration tool and a key generation center cooperate to generate a key pair for each terminal; the terminal configuration tool writes configuration information of each terminal into each terminal to complete initialization of each terminal, and the configuration information comprises a key pair and a main public key; in the communication process, a sender of the terminal calculates a real public key of a receiver, the real public key is used for encrypting a transmission message and then transmitting the encrypted transmission message, and the receiver decrypts the encrypted transmission message by using a private key of the receiver. Compared with the prior art, the method has the advantages that the safety is higher, the system complexity and the operation cost are reduced, and the like.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data security of train operation control systems, and in particular to a certificateless data encryption method, system and device for train-to-ground communication. Background Art

[0002] The train control system is a technical equipment that monitors, controls and adjusts the train speed and braking mode according to the objective conditions and actual conditions of the train running on the railway line. Ensuring the security of data transmission in the train control system is an extremely important topic. In the current train control system, the European ERTMS / ETCS series standards are mainly used to use encryption technology to ensure protection against damage and camouflage threats in the seven security communication threats listed in EN50159, and combined with the PKI key management system to ensure that the security signal equipment in the railway transportation management system can establish communication with an authorized security signal equipment, and ensure the authenticity and integrity of the information exchanged between signal equipment. However, due to the characteristics of the train control system such as distributed, fast mobile speed, and limited computing resources, the traditional PKI-based key management system is difficult to maintain certificates during the application process, and communication and computing resources are occupied. Difficulties such as the use of more resources have greatly hindered its promotion and application. Therefore, it is considered to introduce a certificate-free authentication system to solve the current application problems of cryptographic technology.

[0003] After searching, the Chinese invention patent publication number CN 116566607 A discloses a network transmission security encryption method suitable for urban rail transit systems, including: the key generation center selects system parameters and generates a public-private key pair; the ground-to-vehicle communication device generates part of the public-private key pair; the key generation center of the ground-to-vehicle communication device generates another part of the public-private key pair of the ground-to-vehicle communication device to form a complete public-private key pair, and the ground-to-vehicle communication device verifies the complete public key and the complete private key; based on the device to be transmitted message, a message signature is generated; the message sender device uses the message receiver key to encrypt the message to be transmitted, form encrypted data and transmit it; the message receiver uses the device private key to decrypt the encrypted data. The existing patent has the problem that the private key is generated by the ground-to-vehicle communication device in each place, and there are security issues caused by device disguise.

[0004] How to achieve certificateless data encryption for vehicle-ground communication has become a technical problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the defects of the above-mentioned prior art and to provide a certificateless data encryption method, system and device for vehicle-to-ground communication.

[0006] The purpose of the present invention can be achieved by the following technical solutions:

[0007] According to one aspect of the present invention, a certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-ground communication is provided, comprising the following steps:

[0008] Step S101, the key generation center generates a master public key and a master private key of the system;

[0009] Step S102: The terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center interface, and the terminal configuration tool and the key generation center cooperate to generate a key pair for each terminal;

[0010] Step S103, the terminal configuration tool writes the configuration information of each terminal into each terminal to complete the initialization of each terminal, wherein the configuration information includes a key pair and a master public key;

[0011] Step S104, during the communication process, the sender of the terminal calculates the real public key of the receiver, and uses the real public key to encrypt the transmission message before transmission, and the receiver uses his own private key to decrypt it.

[0012] Preferably, the key pair generation process includes:

[0013] The terminal configuration tool generates identification numbers for each terminal;

[0014] The terminal configuration tool generates a random number for each terminal and calculates a partial public key of each terminal based on the random number;

[0015] The terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center interface, and the key generation center calculates the terminal key pair using the terminal identification number and part of the terminal's public key;

[0016] The key generation center securely returns the calculated terminal key pair to the terminal configuration tool.

[0017] Preferably, the terminal initialization process further includes: after the terminal receives the configuration information, verifying the validity of the key pair.

[0018] More preferably, the verification of the validity of the key pair is specifically: comparing whether the public keys Pn and P'n are the same, if they are the same, the verification is valid, otherwise the verification is invalid;

[0019] The public key Pn is calculated as follows:

[0020] Pn=W_n+[λ]Ppub

[0021] Where W_n is the declared public key, λ is the slope used to calculate the addition of two points on the elliptic curve, and Ppub is the primary public key;

[0022] The P'n calculation is specifically as follows:

[0023] P'n=[d_n]G

[0024] Among them, d_n is the private key and G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

[0025] Preferably, the terminal configuration tool is used to perform configuration operations on each of the terminals according to the configuration information.

[0026] More preferably, the configuration operation includes generating a terminal identification number and a partial public key for the terminal, and calling a key generation center interface to generate a terminal key pair.

[0027] Preferably, the terminal configuration tool includes an on-board terminal configuration tool and a trackside terminal configuration tool.

[0028] Preferably, the configuration information also includes a terminal identification number and a random number generated for the terminal.

[0029] According to another aspect of the present invention, a certificateless data encryption system for vehicle-ground communication is provided, the system comprising a key generation center and a terminal, the system comprising a terminal configuration tool respectively communicatively connected to the key generation center and the terminal; the terminal configuration tool generates a terminal identification number for each terminal, generates a random number, and calculates a partial public key; the key generation center cooperates with the terminal configuration tool to generate a terminal key pair.

[0030] Preferably, the key generation center is interfaced with the terminal configuration tool, and performs cryptographic operations based on the terminal identification number and partial public key provided by the terminal configuration tool to generate a terminal key pair, and securely returns the terminal key to the terminal configuration tool, wherein the terminal key pair includes a partial private key and a declared public key.

[0031] Preferably, the terminal configuration tool sends configuration information to the terminal to complete terminal initialization, wherein the configuration information includes a terminal identification number, a key pair, a terminal identification number and a random number generated for the terminal; the terminal verifies the key pair according to the initialization parameters, and after the verification passes, both terminals perform encrypted transmission and decryption.

[0032] According to a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the method described above is implemented when the processor executes the program.

[0033] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0034] 1) The present invention generates a key pair containing a partial private key for each terminal through the cooperation of the terminal configuration tool and the key generation center. This certificateless public key system avoids the certificate management problem in the traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), simplifies the key management process, and is more secure than the key pair generated only by the terminal, and can resist possible quantum computing attacks in the future.

[0035] 2) The initialization configuration of each terminal of the present invention is completed by the terminal configuration tool uniformly sending configuration information, which can prevent terminal equipment from being disguised, is more suitable for dynamic network environments such as railways and rail transit with a large operating environment span, and improves the security of the system.

[0036] 3) The initialization configuration of each terminal of the present invention is completed by the terminal configuration tool sending configuration information uniformly, without the need to establish a communication channel between each terminal and the key generation center, thereby reducing the complexity of the network infrastructure and reducing construction and operation costs.

[0037] 4) The data encryption method of the present invention is simple and does not require the transmission and verification of certificates during each communication. It is suitable for vehicle-to-ground terminal devices with limited resources.

[0038] 5) The data encryption method of the present invention does not require certificate transmission, thus reducing additional data transmission during the communication process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 It is a structural schematic diagram of the certificateless data encryption system in the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the key pair generation and terminal initialization process in the present invention;

[0041] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the encryption and decryption process in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0043] In order to overcome the defects of the prior art, the present invention solves the following problems:

[0044] 1. Simplified key management: The certificateless authentication system does not require a certificate authority (CA) to issue and manage certificates, reducing the complexity and cost of certificate management. It is suitable for dynamic network environments with a large span of railway operating environments. The certificateless public key system can adapt to this dynamic nature and does not require frequent updates and management of certificates.

[0045] 2. Enhanced security: In a certificateless system, the terminal entity private key consists of two parts, one part is generated by a trusted key generation center (KGC), and the other part is generated by the terminal entity or the terminal configuration tool. In this way, even the KGC cannot obtain the complete private key of the entity, thereby improving security.

[0046] 3. Certificateless escrow problem: Certificateless authentication systems avoid the private key escrow problem in identity-based systems, and entities have full control over their own private keys.

[0047] 4. Improve efficiency: Certificateless authentication system can reduce communication overhead and improve efficiency, without the need to transmit and verify certificates during each communication.

[0048] This embodiment relates to a certificateless data encryption system for vehicle-to-ground communication, such as Figure 1 ,The system mainly includes terminal configuration tools, key generation center (KGC), hardware encryption machine (HSM), ,terminal, and terminal cryptographic calculation module (software or hardware).

[0049] Among them, the terminal configuration tool is mainly used to perform configuration operations on each terminal, including generating a terminal identification number ID_n, a partial public key Un, calling the KGC interface to generate a terminal key pair, etc. In actual applications, the tool may be divided into different configuration tools according to different terminal categories, such as a vehicle-mounted terminal configuration tool and a trackside terminal configuration tool.

[0050] The terminal configuration tool sends the configuration information to the terminal entity.

[0051] The key generation center (KGC) interfaces with the terminal configuration tool, performs cryptographic operations based on the terminal identification number ID_n and partial public key Un provided by the terminal configuration tool, and generates a terminal key pair, where the terminal key pair includes a partial private key t_n and a declared public key W_n. The key generation center (KGC) does not need to run on the line, so only one KGC can be configured and shared according to the actual application. The KGC does not store the complete private key of the terminal, thus avoiding the problem of key escrow.

[0052] Hardware encryption machine (HSM) provides secure and efficient cryptographic computing services for the key generation center, which can be in the form of software or chip. Hardware encryption machine must support at least SM2 algorithm. HSM can provide tamper proof, tamper resistance and other anti-tampering functions to ensure the safe storage and use of keys.

[0053] Terminal: In rail transit applications, the same type of terminal entities have the same parameters when they leave the factory. It is necessary to obtain configuration information such as the terminal identification number through the terminal configuration tool. In this embodiment, the terminal entities take the on-board terminal and the trackside terminal as examples. The terminal identification number, key pair (public-private key pair) and other information are obtained through the terminal configuration tool. The communicating terminal entities generate their own partial private keys, and combine them with the partial private keys generated by KGC to obtain the private key of the terminal. At the same time, both terminal entities calculate their own public keys.

[0054] The terminal password calculation module can be selected in hardware or software form according to the terminal form to provide password operations for the terminal entity. It must support at least SM2, SM3, and SM4 encryption algorithms.

[0055] This embodiment relates to a certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-ground communication, including authentication key generation, communication two-way authentication and data encryption transmission, such as Figure 2 , the specific steps and processes are as follows:

[0056] S101, master key generation system initialization: the key generation center (KGC) generates the system's master public key Ppub and master private key Ppri. This step determines the security parameters of the entire system.

[0057] S102, terminal key pair generation: the terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center (KGC) interface to generate a key pair corresponding to each terminal according to the terminal device ID_n, that is, a partial private key t_n and a declared public key W_n. Each terminal device ID and key pair is unique.

[0058] like Figure 2 , the specific process of generating a key pair is:

[0059] The terminal configuration tool generates each terminal identification number ID_n according to the project rules;

[0060] The terminal configuration tool generates a random number d' for each terminal and calculates a partial public key Un = [d'] G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve;

[0061] The terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center (KGC) interface. The KGC uses the terminal identification number ID_n and the terminal partial public key Un to generate a key pair (i.e., a public-private key pair) for the calculation terminal ID_n, i.e., a partial private key t_n and a declared public key W_n;

[0062] KGC securely returns the partial private key t_n and the declared public key W_n to the terminal configuration tool.

[0063] S103, terminal initialization: The terminal configuration tool writes the configuration information of each terminal into the terminal device to complete the terminal initialization operation. The configuration information includes the terminal identification number ID_n, partial private key t_n, random number d', declared public key W_n, and KGC's master public key Ppub. After receiving the relevant parameters, the terminal verifies the validity of the key pair (t_n, W_n) by calculating the public keys Pn=W_n+[λ]Ppub and P'n=[d_n]G, and checking Pn=P'n. If the two are equal, the verification is valid, otherwise the verification is invalid. Among them, λ is used to calculate the slope when adding two points on the elliptic curve, and its value is generated with reference to the SM2 algorithm. The private key d_n consists of a partial private key t_n and another partial private key generated by the terminal itself.

[0064] d_n=(t_n+d')mod(order of base point G), t_n is a partial private key, d' is a random number generated by the configuration tool for each terminal, and the base point G and its order are both publicly agreed parameters of the system, agreed upon by the cryptographic module.

[0065] S104, authentication and encryption / decryption process. During the communication process, the sender m first calculates the real public key Pn of the receiver n, and then uses the real public key for encryption. The receiver n then uses its own private key for decryption.

[0066] This embodiment also relates to a certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication, the method comprising the following steps:

[0067] Step S201, the master key generation system is initialized: the key generation center KGC generates the master public key P of the system pub and the master private key P pri .

[0068] Step S202: Generate a vehicle terminal key pair. Figure 2 The vehicle terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center KGC interface to generate the private key d_n and the declared public key W corresponding to the vehicle device according to the vehicle terminal identification number. The specific process of generating the vehicle terminal key pair is as follows:

[0069] Step 221, the vehicle-mounted device terminal configuration tool generates each terminal identification number ID_m for the vehicle-mounted terminal m according to the project rules;

[0070] Step 2022, the vehicle terminal configuration tool generates a random number dm for each vehicle terminal, and calculates U_m=[dm]G;

[0071] Step 2023, the vehicle terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center KGC interface, and KGC uses the terminal identification number ID_m and the terminal partial public key Um to generate a public-private key pair of the vehicle terminal m, namely, the partial private key t_m and the declared public key W_m;

[0072] In step 2024, KGC securely returns the partial private key t_m and the declared public key W_m to the vehicle terminal configuration tool.

[0073] Step S203: Generate a trackside terminal key pair. Figure 2 The trackside terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center KGC interface to generate the private key d and the declared public key W corresponding to the vehicle-mounted device according to the trackside terminal device ID. The specific process of generating the key pair is the same as that described in step S202. KGC returns the generated partial private key t_n and the declared public key W_n of the trackside terminal n to the trackside terminal configuration tool securely.

[0074] Step S204, vehicle terminal initialization: the vehicle terminal configuration tool writes the initialization data of each vehicle terminal into the vehicle terminal device.

[0075] Step S2041, the vehicle terminal configuration tool writes the terminal identification number ID_m, the partial private key t_m, the declared public key W_m, and the master public key Ppub of KGC into the vehicle terminal m.

[0076] Step S2042, after receiving the relevant parameters, the vehicle terminal device verifies the key pair (t_m, W_m) by calculating the public key Pm=W_m+[λ]Ppub and P'm=[d_m]G and checking that Pm=P'm.

[0077] Step S205, initialization of the trackside terminal: the trackside terminal configuration tool writes the initialization data of each vehicle terminal into the trackside terminal device. The specific steps are similar to step S204. The trackside terminal n obtains the terminal identification number ID_n, the partial private key t_n, the declared public key W_n, and the master public key P of KGC. pub , calculate the public keys Pn and P'n and perform key pair (t_n, W_n) verification.

[0078] Step S206, authentication and encryption / decryption process, such as Figure 3 The sender first calculates the real public key of the receiver and then performs encryption. The encryption and decryption process can refer to the key negotiation process according to the actual application, perform symmetric key negotiation and session key negotiation activities, ensure transmission integrity and confidentiality, and implement a one-time key mechanism.

[0079] Step S2061, during the communication process, the vehicle-mounted terminal m first requests to send data to the trackside terminal n, and the trackside terminal n sends the declared public key W_n to the vehicle-mounted terminal m.

[0080] Step S2062: The onboard terminal m calculates the real public key Pn of the trackside terminal n based on the received declared public key W_n, and then uses the real public key Pn for encryption.

[0081] In step S2063, the trackside terminal n uses its own private key to decrypt.

[0082] The electronic device of the present invention includes a central processing unit (CPU), which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to computer program instructions stored in a read-only memory (ROM) or loaded from a storage unit into a random access memory (RAM). In the RAM, various programs and data required for device operation can also be stored. The CPU, ROM and RAM are connected to each other via a bus. An input / output (I / O) interface is also connected to the bus.

[0083] Multiple components in the device are connected to the I / O interface, including: input units, such as keyboards, mice, etc.; output units, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; storage units, such as disks, optical disks, etc.; and communication units, such as network cards, modems, wireless communication transceivers, etc. The communication unit allows the device to exchange information / data with other devices through computer networks such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0084] The processing unit performs the various methods and processes described above, such as methods S101 to S104. For example, in some embodiments, methods S101 to S104 may be implemented as a computer software program, which is tangibly contained in a machine-readable medium, such as a storage unit. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program may be loaded and / or installed on the device via a ROM and / or a communication unit. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM and executed by the CPU, one or more steps of methods S101 to S104 described above may be performed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the CPU may be configured to execute methods S101 to S104 in any other appropriate manner (e.g., by means of firmware).

[0085] The functions described above herein may be performed at least in part by one or more hardware logic components. For example, without limitation, exemplary types of hardware logic components that may be used include: field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on chips (SOCs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), and the like.

[0086] The program code for implementing the method of the present invention can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These program codes can be provided to a processor or controller of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer or other programmable data processing device, so that the program code, when executed by the processor or controller, enables the functions / operations specified in the flow chart and / or block diagram to be implemented. The program code can be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, partially on the machine as a stand-alone software package and partially on a remote machine, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0087] In the context of the present invention, a machine-readable medium may be a tangible medium that may contain or store a program for use by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, device, or equipment. A machine-readable medium may be a machine-readable signal medium or a machine-readable storage medium. A machine-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, devices, or equipment, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. A more specific example of a machine-readable storage medium may include an electrical connection based on one or more lines, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0088] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can easily think of various equivalent modifications or replacements within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, and these modifications or replacements should be included in the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be based on the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step S101, the key generation center generates a master public key and a master private key of the system; Step S102: The terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center interface, and the terminal configuration tool and the key generation center cooperate to generate a key pair for each terminal; Step S103, the terminal configuration tool writes the configuration information of each terminal into each terminal to complete the initialization of each terminal, wherein the configuration information includes a key pair and a master public key; Step S104, during the communication process, the sender of the terminal calculates the real public key of the receiver, and uses the real public key to encrypt the transmission message before transmission, and the receiver uses his own private key to decrypt it.

2. A certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The key pair generation process includes: The terminal configuration tool generates identification numbers for each terminal; The terminal configuration tool generates a random number for each terminal and calculates a partial public key of each terminal based on the random number; The terminal configuration tool calls the key generation center interface, and the key generation center calculates the terminal key pair using the terminal identification number and part of the terminal's public key; The key generation center securely returns the calculated terminal key pair to the terminal configuration tool.

3. A certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The terminal initialization process also includes: after the terminal receives the configuration information, verifying the validity of the key pair.

4. A certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 3, characterized in that: The verification of the validity of the key pair is specifically as follows: comparing whether the public keys Pn and P'n are the same, if they are the same, the verification is valid, otherwise the verification is invalid; The public key Pn is calculated as follows: Pn=W_n+[λ]Ppub Where W_n is the declared public key, λ is the slope used to calculate the addition of two points on the elliptic curve, and Ppub is the primary public key; The P'n calculation is specifically as follows: P'n=[d_n]G Among them, d_n is the private key and G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

5. The certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The terminal configuration tool is used to perform configuration operations on each of the terminals according to the configuration information.

6. A certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 5, characterized in that: The configuration operation includes generating a terminal identification number and a partial public key for the terminal, and calling a key generation center interface to generate a terminal key pair.

7. The certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 1, characterized in that: The terminal configuration tool includes an on-board terminal configuration tool and a trackside terminal configuration tool.

8. A certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 1 or 5, characterized in that: The configuration information also includes a terminal identification number and a random number generated for the terminal.

9. A system using the certificateless data encryption method for vehicle-to-ground communication according to claim 1, the system comprising a key generation center and a terminal, characterized in that: The system includes a terminal configuration tool which is respectively connected to the key generation center and the terminal in communication; the terminal configuration tool generates a terminal identification number for each terminal, generates a random number, and calculates a partial public key; the key generation center cooperates with the terminal configuration tool to generate a terminal key pair.

10. The system according to claim 9, characterized in that The key generation center is connected to the terminal configuration tool through an interface, and performs cryptographic operations based on the terminal identification number and partial public key provided by the terminal configuration tool to generate a terminal key pair, and securely returns the terminal key to the terminal configuration tool, wherein the terminal key pair includes a partial private key and a declared public key.

11. The system according to claim 9, characterized in that The terminal configuration tool sends configuration information to the terminal to complete terminal initialization, wherein the configuration information includes a terminal identification number, a key pair, a terminal identification number, and a random number generated for the terminal; the terminal verifies the key pair according to the initialization parameters, and after the verification passes, both terminals perform encrypted transmission and decryption.

12. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.

Images