Virtual trusted root system based on baseboard management controller and its application method

Abstract

The present invention discloses a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller and an application method thereof. The system includes a baseboard management controller and a host. The host includes N virtual machines or containers. The software virtualization layer in the virtual machine or container uses a virtual trusted root device to provide trusted root device services for applications in the virtual machine or container. The baseboard management controller has an independent CPU and memory and provides N virtual trusted domains with memory isolation from each other for the host. The N virtual trusted domains correspond to the N virtual machines or containers one by one. Each virtual trusted domain contains a virtual trusted root so that the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel to complete the functional logic of the trusted root. The present invention enhances the security of the virtual trusted root and can effectively reduce the efficiency loss when the host runs the virtual trusted root.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of virtualization and trusted computing, and in particular to a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller and an application method thereof. Background Art

[0002] The baseboard management controller (BMC) is an important unit of the server. It uses a virtual keyboard, interface, mouse, power supply, etc. to provide remote management functions for the server. BMC is essentially an embedded system that uses a Linux-based system as a control system and supports the industry-standard IPMI protocol. BMC is an important basic system in the server. At present, many manufacturers have adopted self-developed BMC and supporting monitoring and management subsystems.

[0003] As cloud computing technology grows in scale and matures, various security issues brought about by cloud computing have also attracted people's attention. Virtualization technology, as the core technology in cloud computing environment, can provide cloud users with an isolated system environment, allowing users to use computing services like on real computers. However, the security issues of virtualization also bring huge security challenges to the cloud computing environment. For example, the host machine uses the virtual machine manager to control the virtual machine, the cloud tenant data privacy protection problem, and the unauthorized behavior between virtual machines. As an important information security technology, trusted computing technology provides some solutions for virtualization security in cloud environment.

[0004] Trusted computing technology has become an important means to improve the security of cloud infrastructure and virtualized environments. At present, the trust of physical hosts is achieved through TPM / TCM chips in the world, which belongs to the trusted computing technology of passive defense. The dual-system architecture formed by my country's self-controlled active immune trusted computing can use TPCM to actively measure and monitor the system. At present, the mainstream trusted roots in China are implemented through TPM, TCM or TPCM. The security boundary of the server is limited to the host system, and the trustworthiness of the virtualization layer cannot be well guaranteed. In order to provide complete trusted services for virtual machines (VMs), assigning a separate virtual trusted root to each virtual machine is a mainstream security solution.

[0005] The virtual trusted roots implemented by the existing technology are vTPM, vTCM and vTPCM. There are generally three methods: 1. Software simulation virtual trusted root, full virtualization: using software simulation, providing an implementation that is fully compatible with the hardware trusted root interface, running on the host side, generally implemented in a virtual machine or the host host os process. 2. Hardware trusted root context extension: modify the hardware trusted root to provide independent contexts for multiple guest os, which can be saved and loaded. 3. Paravirtualized trusted root: The paravirtualized trusted root coordinates the access of virtual machines through software components. Some functions are implemented by the hardware trusted root, and some are simulated by software. At the same time, some device access interfaces need to be changed.

[0006] The existing technology for implementing virtual trusted roots has the following problems: 1. Currently, there are few implementations of hardware trusted root context extension, and more software virtual trusted roots are used. At the same time, the trusted root is generally an embedded module, and the computing speed and resources are limited. The hardware trusted root context extension has performance bottlenecks when the number of virtual machines and the access load are heavy, which affects the use. 2. The paravirtualized trusted root solution is similar to the hardware trusted root context extension, and there is a performance bottleneck when multiple virtual machines access it; at the same time, because the access interface of some devices has changed, the calling interface of existing applications needs to be modified, and the application needs to be modified, which is not conducive to service deployment. 3. Using software to simulate the trusted root on the host system side cannot guarantee the security of running data. 4. The host can access the instantiation data of each virtual trusted root (usually stored in the host file system in the form of files). 5. Resource isolation is not implemented, which poses a security risk. 6. It occupies host resources and is not efficient. Summary of the invention

[0007] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is as follows: In view of the above-mentioned problems in the prior art, a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller and an application method thereof are provided, which enhances the security of the virtual trusted root and can effectively reduce the efficiency loss when the virtual trusted root is run on the host.

[0008] In order to solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0009] A virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller comprises a baseboard management controller and a host, wherein the host comprises N virtual machines or containers, wherein the virtual machines or containers comprise a virtual trusted root device for providing trusted root device services for applications in the virtual machines or containers, wherein the baseboard management controller has an independent CPU and memory and provides the host with N virtual trusted domains with memory isolation from each other, wherein the N virtual trusted domains correspond one-to-one to the N virtual machines or containers, and each virtual trusted domain comprises a virtual trusted root so that the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through a virtual trusted root driver in a host operating system kernel to complete the functional logic of the trusted root.

[0010] Furthermore, the virtual trusted root runs as the only running instance in the virtual trusted domain.

[0011] Further, when the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host kernel, the data stored between the virtual trusted domains is bound to the virtual trusted domain and stored in encrypted form.

[0012] Furthermore, the encrypted storage refers to encrypting and storing data using a key associated with the virtual trusted domain.

[0013] Furthermore, the virtual trusted domain is a trusted execution environment based on an architecture supporting a general trusted execution environment, a confidential virtual machine based on a trusted execution environment architecture supporting confidential virtual machines, or virtualized hardware generated by processor hardware virtualization based on a processor architecture supporting hardware trusted root virtualization.

[0014] Furthermore, the virtual root of trust is vTPM, vTCM or vTPCM.

[0015] Furthermore, the baseboard management controller is connected to the host based on a system high-speed bus interface.

[0016] Furthermore, the baseboard management controller is connected to the mainboard of the host in a manner of being embedded in the mainboard or being an independent board.

[0017] Furthermore, the baseboard management controller includes a virtual trusted root management module for receiving trusted domain commands from the host to implement management of the trusted domain, including lifecycle management, trusted root scheduling, resource management and migration management; the lifecycle management includes creating a corresponding virtual trusted root for the virtual machine when creating the virtual machine, and destroying the corresponding virtual trusted root for the virtual machine when destroying the virtual machine; the trusted root scheduling includes virtualizing the virtual trusted root when creating the corresponding virtual trusted root, and establishing a connection channel between the virtual trusted root device and the virtual trusted root when the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host kernel; the resource management includes managing instance data resources of the virtual trusted root based on virtual machine creation, destruction and migration operations; the migration management includes monitoring virtual machine migration operations, performing resource authentication on the virtual machine migration operations when the virtual machine migration operations are detected, and executing migration scheduling of the virtual trusted root only after the authentication is passed.

[0018] The present invention also proposes an application method of a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller, comprising the following steps:

[0019] S1, the application in the virtual machine or container calls the trusted root device service provided by the virtual machine operating system to issue an operation command;

[0020] S2, the host's CPU exits the virtual machine mode and enters the KVM module in the host kernel;

[0021] S3, the host's CPU switches from the KVM module in the host kernel to the QEMU virtualization layer in the user space to call the virtual trusted root device;

[0022] S4, the virtual trusted root device of the QEMU virtualization layer calls the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel;

[0023] S5, the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel communicates with the virtual trusted root management module in the baseboard management controller through the interactive channel between the host and the baseboard management controller;

[0024] S6, the virtual trusted root management module in the baseboard management controller establishes a connection between the virtual trusted root and the virtual machine or container;

[0025] S7, the virtual trusted root executes the commands issued by the application in the virtual machine or container.

[0026] Compared with the prior art, the present invention mainly has the following advantages:

[0027] The present invention makes full use of the hardware dual architecture of the baseboard management controller and the mainboard, and physically isolates the virtual trusted root. Specifically, a virtual trusted root device is used in the host system to process the device access request triggered by the virtual machine application, and the information is transmitted to the virtual trusted root module in the baseboard management controller system through the host and baseboard management controller interaction mechanism. The virtual trusted root module runs in the trusted domain of the baseboard management controller to complete the functional logic of the trusted root. The virtual trusted root is run in the trusted execution environment of the baseboard management controller, and the data in the operation of the virtual trusted root is protected, which further enhances security. The virtual trusted root runs on the BMC, using the spare computing power of the BMC, and does not occupy the computing resources of the mainboard. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0028] Figure 1 4 is a system architecture diagram of an embodiment of the present invention.

[0029] Figure 2 FIG. 4 is a diagram of a virtual trusted domain architecture based on an architecture supporting a universal trusted execution environment in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0030] Figure 3 A diagram of a virtual trusted domain architecture based on a trusted execution environment architecture supporting confidential virtual machines in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0031] Figure 4 A diagram of a virtual trusted domain architecture based on a processor architecture supporting hardware trusted root virtualization in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0032] Figure 5 The figure is a flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0033] Before introducing the specific embodiments of the present invention, related concepts or terms are first explained.

[0034] BMC: Baseboard Management Controller.

[0035] Host: physical machine.

[0036] Guest: virtual machine.

[0037] qemu: In a virtual machine, qemu acts as a virtualization layer, responsible for providing virtual hardware and managing the operation of virtual machines.

[0038] Embodiment 1

[0039] While cloud computing is expanding at an unprecedented speed, it also brings huge security risks. Trusted computing platform is an effective means to solve cloud security issues. Trusted technologies based on cloud computing generally use vTPM, vTCM or vTPCM as the platform's root of trust. Currently used technologies generally use software virtualization on the host to support virtual root of trust.

[0040] Using software to implement virtual trusted roots has problems such as not being able to guarantee running data, not being able to achieve complete isolation, thus posing security risks, and occupying host computing resources. For virtual trusted roots implemented by software running on the host side, the data during the running process can be obtained by the virtual machine monitor, which poses certain security risks.

[0041] With the Trusted Execution Environment technology, the CPU of the baseboard management controller (BMC) can build a trusted domain, and multiple trusted domains are isolated from each other. The system on the host and the virtual machine monitor cannot obtain the runtime data of the virtual trusted root, thereby enhancing security.

[0042] In view of the above problems, this embodiment proposes a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller (BMC), including a baseboard management controller and a host. In the host system, qemu implements a virtual trusted root device, processes device access requests triggered by virtual machine applications, and transmits information to a virtual trusted root module in the BMC system through the host and BMC interaction mechanism. The virtual trusted root module runs in the trusted domain of the BMC to complete the functional logic of the trusted root.

[0043] Since the BMC system and the physical host system are two physically isolated systems, the trusted execution environment system on the BMC is isolated from the monitoring and management subsystem running in the BMC, which greatly enhances the security of the virtual trusted root. The system does not limit the CPU architecture that the BMC must use, and is compatible with a variety of mainstream CPU architectures that currently support the trusted execution environment, including arm trustzone, arm cca, intel sgx, risc-vkeystone, etc. At the same time, the BMC generally runs baseboard management services and motherboard monitoring programs, etc., and the system load is relatively small. Running the virtual trusted root on the BMC will not affect the existing services of the BMC, and at the same time release the computing resources of the host, which can effectively reduce the efficiency loss when the virtual trusted root is running on the host.

[0044] like Figure 1 As shown, the virtual trusted root system of this embodiment consists of two parts: a baseboard management controller virtual trusted root module set in the baseboard management controller and a host virtual trusted root module set in the host. The two modules are physically isolated to realize a trusted computing architecture of a dual system of computing and security. The following describes these two trusted root modules.

[0045] The baseboard management controller virtual root of trust module implements the virtualization of the root of trust and consists of the following two parts:

[0046] 1) Virtual trusted root management module

[0047] The virtual trusted root management module receives the trusted domain command from the host to manage the trusted domain. It includes lifecycle management, trusted root scheduling module, resource management and migration management, among which:

[0048] The lifecycle management module manages the lifecycle of the virtual trusted root, including the creation and destruction of the virtual trusted root;

[0049] The trusted root scheduling module establishes a connection channel between the virtual trusted device and the virtual trusted root in the host virtual machine, and schedules the trusted domain to realize the virtualization of the trusted root;

[0050] The resource management module manages the instance data resources of the virtual trusted root;

[0051] Migration management is used to authenticate and schedule resources when virtual machines migrate.

[0052] 2) Virtual Root of Trust Instance

[0053] The virtual trusted domain is an isolated trusted area on the baseboard management controller, which is used to implement a virtual trusted root with high security requirements. According to different baseboard management controller processor architectures, the virtual trusted domain has different implementation schemes. In this embodiment, the virtual trusted domain has three typical implementation schemes: based on an architecture that supports a general trusted execution environment, based on a trusted execution environment architecture that supports confidential virtual machines, and based on a processor architecture that supports hardware trusted root virtualization.

[0054] Based on the architecture that supports a common trusted execution environment such as Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the architectures that support the universal trusted execution environment are represented by Intel's SGX and ARM's TrustZone. For Intel SGX, a trusted domain corresponds to a secure area (enclave); for ARM TrustZone, a trusted domain corresponds to a trusted application. At this time, the virtual trusted root is running in the trusted execution environment.

[0055] Based on the trusted execution environment architecture that supports confidential virtual machines such as Figure 3 As shown in Figure 1, the trusted execution environment architectures that support confidential virtual machines include Intel TDX, AMD SEV, and ARM CCA. For Intel TDX or Arm CCA that support the trusted virtualization mechanism, the trusted domain corresponds to the independent confidential virtual machine. At this time, the virtual trusted root runs as the only application in the confidential virtual machine.

[0056] Based on processor architectures that support hardware root of trust virtualization such as Figure 4 As shown, there are currently processors that support hardware virtualization of the root of trust. When the processor is used as a BMC processor, it can provide the system with a virtual root of trust with stronger security and higher efficiency. At this time, the trusted domain is directly generated by the processor hardware virtualization.

[0057] The host virtual root of trust module is located in the host system and provides a virtual root of trust for the virtual machine guest. The host virtual root of trust module consists of three parts: virtual root of trust device, virtual root of trust driver, and host and BMC interaction mechanism:

[0058] 1) Virtual trusted root device:

[0059] QEMU implements trusted root device simulation. The operations on the trusted root device in the virtual machine system guest os will be forwarded to QEMU. In the virtual machine system guest os, the application sees a real trusted root device and can run without modifying the virtual machine system guest os.

[0060] 2) Virtual trusted root driver:

[0061] The virtual trusted root driver works in the host OS kernel layer of the host's physical machine system, receives the trusted root operation command from QEMU, and forwards it to the virtual trusted root in the baseboard management controller for processing.

[0062] 3) Host and BMC interaction mechanism

[0063] The host and BMC interaction mechanism provides a physical channel for the host and BMC to communicate. To ensure the communication rate with the virtual trusted root, use the system high-speed bus interface to connect, such as USB or PCIE interface, to achieve the connection between the baseboard management controller and the host based on USB interface or PCIe interface. To ensure the security of data in transmission, cryptographic methods need to be used to process the data.

[0064] To summarize, the host of this embodiment includes N virtual machines or containers, and the virtual trusted root device is implemented by QEMU in the virtual machine or container, so that the virtualization layer in the virtual machine adopts the virtual trusted root device to provide trusted root device services for the applications in the virtual machine or container. In addition, the baseboard management controller has an independent CPU and memory and provides N virtual trusted domains with mutual memory isolation for the host. The N virtual trusted domains correspond one-to-one to the N virtual machines or containers, and each virtual trusted domain contains a virtual trusted root so that the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel to complete the functional logic of the trusted root.

[0065] In this embodiment, the virtual trusted root runs as the only running instance in the virtual trusted domain. The virtual trusted domain provides basic security guarantee for the virtual trusted root. When the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host kernel, the memory between each virtual trusted domain is isolated, ensuring the data security during operation; the data stored between each virtual trusted domain is bound to the virtual trusted domain and encrypted and stored, ensuring the storage security of the virtual trusted root data.

[0066] The security domain of the baseboard management controller isolates and protects the data saved by the applications running therein, and encrypts the data using the key bound to the security domain. This ensures that the system running on the baseboard management controller and other security domains cannot access the data, ensuring the security of data storage. Therefore, in this embodiment, encrypted storage refers to encrypting and storing data using the key associated with the virtual trusted domain.

[0067] In this embodiment, the virtual trusted root is located in the baseboard management controller. The baseboard management controller can be embedded in the motherboard or connected to the motherboard as an independent card. The baseboard management controller has its own independent CPU and memory. These characteristics determine that the baseboard management controller and the motherboard hardware resources (CPU, memory, etc.) are naturally physically isolated.

[0068] As described above, in this embodiment, the baseboard management controller includes a virtual trusted root management module for receiving trusted domain commands from the host, so as to manage the trusted domain, including lifecycle management, trusted root scheduling, resource management and migration management; the lifecycle management includes creating a corresponding virtual trusted root for the virtual machine when the virtual machine is created, and destroying the corresponding virtual trusted root for the virtual machine when the virtual machine is destroyed; the trusted root scheduling includes virtualizing the virtual trusted root when the corresponding virtual trusted root is created, and establishing a connection channel between the virtual trusted root device and the virtual trusted root when the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host kernel; the resource management includes managing the instance data resources of the virtual trusted root based on the virtual machine creation, destruction and migration operations; the migration management includes monitoring the virtual machine migration operation, performing resource authentication on the virtual machine migration operation when the virtual machine migration operation is detected, and executing the migration scheduling of the virtual trusted root only after the authentication is passed.

[0069] Embodiment 2

[0070] This real-time example proposes an application method of a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller in the first embodiment, such as Figure 5 As shown, with vTPM as the virtual trusted root, the virtual trusted root call includes the following steps:

[0071] S1, the application in the virtual machine VM or container calls the trusted root device service provided by the virtual machine operating system guest os to issue an operation command;

[0072] S2, the host's CPU exits the virtual machine guest mode and enters the KVM module in the host kernel of the host physical machine;

[0073] S3, the host's CPU switches from the KVM module in the host kernel to the QEMU virtualization layer in the user space to process the virtual trusted root IO to call the virtual trusted root device;

[0074] S4, the virtual trusted root device of the QEMU virtualization layer calls the virtual trusted root driver in the host OS kernel of the host physical machine operating system;

[0075] S5, the virtual trusted root driver in the host OS kernel of the host physical machine operating system communicates with the virtual trusted root management module in the baseboard management controller through the interactive channel between the host and the baseboard management controller;

[0076] S6, the virtual trusted root management module in the baseboard management controller establishes a connection between the virtual trusted root and the virtual machine VM or container;

[0077] S7, the virtual trusted root executes the command issued by the virtual machine VM or the application in the container.

[0078] In summary, the present invention discloses a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller and an application method thereof. Unlike the general implementation in which the virtual trusted root is implemented on the mainboard in a software simulation manner, the present invention transfers the virtual trusted root to the baseboard management controller for implementation, following the dual-system solution of isolating computing and security, and has a high degree of security. The present invention decouples the virtual trusted root from the system architecture of the mainboard, has no requirements for the system architecture of the mainboard, and has a wide range of applications. The virtual trusted root of the present invention is implemented in the trusted domain of the baseboard management controller, and each trusted domain is isolated from each other. Different isolation capabilities are provided by different CPU architectures, and it can be adapted to multiple different architecture platforms, has strong practicality, and can be expanded to new architectures in the future. The present invention does not require any modification to the Guest OS, and the virtual machine application does not need to be adapted. A high-speed interface is used to connect the baseboard management controller and the mainboard, and an encrypted channel is used to transmit data, which ensures security and avoids performance bottlenecks.

[0079] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following technical effects:

[0080] 1. The virtual trusted root is located in the baseboard management and control machine and is physically isolated from the host, ensuring the security of the dual systems of computing and security.

[0081] 2. The virtual root of trust runs in the trusted domain of the baseboard management controller, and the running data is protected by the trusted execution environment.

[0082] 3. The instance data of the virtual trusted root is strongly bound to the trusted domain and stored in encrypted form, ensuring data storage security.

[0083] 4. The virtual root of trust runs on the baseboard management controller, does not occupy the host's computing resources, and improves overall efficiency.

[0084] 5. The baseboard management controller is compatible with a variety of processor architectures that support trusted execution environments and has a wide range of applications.

[0085] Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application can take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present application can take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-readable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code. The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can guide a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific way, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a product including an instruction device, which implements the functions specified in the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, so that a series of operation steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, so that the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device provide for implementing the process in the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0086] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. All technical solutions under the concept of the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, some improvements and modifications without departing from the principle of the present invention should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller, characterized in that: The invention comprises a baseboard management controller and a host, wherein the host comprises N virtual machines or containers, wherein the virtual machines or containers comprise a virtual trusted root device for providing trusted root device services for applications in the virtual machines or containers, wherein the baseboard management controller has an independent CPU and memory and provides the host with N virtual trusted domains with memory isolation from each other, wherein the N virtual trusted domains correspond one-to-one to the N virtual machines or containers, and each virtual trusted domain comprises a virtual trusted root so that the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel to complete the functional logic of the trusted root.

2. The virtual trusted root system based on baseboard management controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The virtual trusted root runs as the only running instance in the virtual trusted domain.

3. The virtual trusted root system based on baseboard management controller according to claim 2, characterized in that: When the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host kernel, the data stored between the virtual trusted domains is bound to the virtual trusted domain and stored in encrypted form.

4. The virtual trusted root system based on baseboard management controller according to claim 3, characterized in that: The encrypted storage refers to encrypting and storing data using a key associated with the virtual trusted domain.

5. The virtual trusted root system based on baseboard management controller according to claim 1, characterized in that: The virtual trusted domain is a trusted execution environment based on an architecture supporting a general trusted execution environment, a confidential virtual machine based on a trusted execution environment architecture supporting confidential virtual machines, or virtualized hardware generated by processor hardware virtualization based on a processor architecture supporting hardware trusted root virtualization.

6. The baseboard management controller-based virtual root of trust system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The virtual trusted root is vTPM, vTCM or vTPCM.

7. The baseboard management controller-based virtual root of trust system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The baseboard management controller is connected to the host based on a system high-speed bus interface.

8. The baseboard management controller-based virtual root of trust system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The baseboard management controller is connected to the mainboard of the host in a manner of being embedded in the mainboard or being an independent board.

9. The baseboard management controller-based virtual root of trust system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The baseboard management controller includes a virtual trusted root management module for receiving a trusted domain command from a host, and realizing management of the trusted domain, including lifecycle management, trusted root scheduling, resource management and migration management; the lifecycle management includes creating a corresponding virtual trusted root for the virtual machine when creating the virtual machine, and destroying the corresponding virtual trusted root for the virtual machine when destroying the virtual machine; the trusted root scheduling includes realizing virtualization of the virtual trusted root when creating the corresponding virtual trusted root, and establishing a connection channel between the virtual trusted root device and the virtual trusted root when the virtual trusted root device accesses the virtual trusted root in the corresponding virtual trusted domain in the baseboard management controller through the virtual trusted root driver in the host kernel; the resource management includes managing instance data resources of the virtual trusted root based on virtual machine creation, destruction and migration operations; The migration management includes monitoring the virtual machine migration operation, performing resource authentication on the virtual machine migration operation when the virtual machine migration operation is monitored, and executing the migration scheduling of the virtual trusted root only after the authentication is passed.

10. An application method of a virtual trusted root system based on a baseboard management controller according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that: The steps include: S1, the application in the virtual machine or container calls the trusted root device service provided by the virtual machine operating system to issue an operation command; S2, the host's CPU exits the virtual machine mode and enters the KVM module in the host kernel; S3, the host's CPU switches from the KVM module in the host kernel to the QEMU virtualization layer in the user space to call the virtual trusted root device; S4, the virtual trusted root device of the QEMU virtualization layer calls the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel; S5, the virtual trusted root driver in the host operating system kernel communicates with the virtual trusted root management module in the baseboard management controller through the interactive channel between the host and the baseboard management controller; S6, the virtual trusted root management module in the baseboard management controller establishes a connection between the virtual trusted root and the virtual machine or container; S7, the virtual trusted root executes the commands issued by the application in the virtual machine or container.

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