Online car-hailing driver end anti-cheating secrecy method, device and equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention relates to an online car-hailing driver end anti-cheating secrecy method and device, equipment and a storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: acquiring a first ciphertext; decrypting the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used for performing calculation through a random character string stored in the SO library and a HASH value stored locally to obtain a key, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; encrypting the second plaintext based on a preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used for performing calculation through a random character string stored in the SO library and a HASH value stored locally to obtain a key, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication opposite terminal; and based on a preset rule, updating the HASH value stored locally.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of data security technology, and in particular to an anti-cheating and confidentiality method, device, equipment and storage medium for an online car-hailing driver. Background Art

[0002] With the rise of the sharing economy, online ride-hailing services have become an important part of urban transportation. It provides users with convenient travel options through mobile applications, greatly changing people's travel habits. However, while providing convenience to users, online ride-hailing services also face challenges in data security and privacy protection. In online ride-hailing services, users' personal information, travel data, payment information and other sensitive data need to be securely transmitted and stored between drivers, passengers and platforms.

[0003] During data transmission, traditional encryption technologies such as symmetric encryption algorithms (e.g., AES) are widely used to protect the confidentiality of data. However, the security of these algorithms is highly dependent on the confidentiality of keys. In online ride-hailing services, the distribution and management of keys becomes more complicated because of the involvement of numerous drivers and passenger terminals. In addition, due to the large number of participants in online ride-hailing services and the large amount of data, higher requirements are placed on the efficiency of encryption technology. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of this, a method, device, equipment and storage medium for preventing cheating and keeping confidentiality on the driver side of an online car-hailing service are provided.

[0005] The present invention adopts the following technical solution:

[0006] The embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing cheating and keeping confidentiality at a driver end of an online car-hailing service, the method comprising:

[0007] Get the first ciphertext;

[0008] Decrypting the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0009] Encrypting the second plaintext based on a preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0010] Sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer;

[0011] Based on the preset rules, the locally stored HASH value is updated.

[0012] In some embodiments, updating the locally stored HASH value based on a preset rule includes:

[0013] Agree with the server on the locally saved HASH value and HASH update value;

[0014] If you use the HASH update value to interact with the server, the server will feedback the update information;

[0015] The locally stored HASH value and HASH update value are updated based on the update information.

[0016] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0017] Encrypt and decrypt some local information based on the SO library;

[0018] The SO library is used to calculate a key using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and to encrypt and decrypt part of the local information based on the key.

[0019] In some embodiments, the SO library is generated by C++, and the random string is written in the SO library in the form of an array.

[0020] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0021] The SO library uses the AES+MD5 joint encryption algorithm to calculate the random string and the locally stored HASH value to obtain the key.

[0022] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0023] When a random string leak is found, the so library is upgraded to change its internal random string.

[0024] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0025] Executes a function that disables the AccessibilityService.

[0026] In some embodiments, it also includes:

[0027] Implement anti-screenshot settings for key pages.

[0028] The embodiment of the present invention provides a network car-hailing driver-side anti-cheating and confidentiality device, comprising:

[0029] An acquisition module, used for acquiring a first ciphertext;

[0030] A decryption module, used to decrypt the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key by using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0031] An encryption module, used to encrypt the second plaintext based on a preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0032] A sending module, used for sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer;

[0033] The updating module is used to update the locally stored HASH value based on a preset rule.

[0034] An embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, including:

[0035] A processor, and a memory connected to the processor;

[0036] The memory is used to store a computer program, and the computer program is at least used to execute the above-mentioned anti-cheating and confidentiality method for the online car-hailing driver side;

[0037] The processor is used to call and execute the computer program in the memory.

[0038] An embodiment of the present invention provides a storage medium, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the various steps in the above-mentioned online car-hailing driver-side anti-cheating and confidentiality method are implemented.

[0039] The present invention adopts the above technical scheme to obtain a first ciphertext; decrypt the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally saved HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; encrypt the second plaintext based on the preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally saved HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; send the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer; based on a preset rule, update the locally saved HASH value. In this way, in the scheme provided by the present application, by obtaining the first ciphertext, the system can protect sensitive information from unauthorized access. This encryption measure effectively prevents data from being stolen or leaked during transmission or storage. The locally preset SO library is not only used to decrypt the first ciphertext to obtain plaintext, but also used to generate the key required for encryption and decryption. The random string stored in the SO library is combined with the locally saved HASH value to dynamically generate a key. This dynamic key generation mechanism allows different keys to be used for each encryption and decryption, greatly improving the security of the system. Ensure data integrity and authenticity: By encrypting the second plaintext to generate the second ciphertext, the system ensures the integrity and authenticity of the data during transmission. Only the preset communication peer with the correct key can decrypt and access the original data. Sending the second ciphertext to the preset communication peer ensures the security of data transmission. Since the data is encrypted, even if the data is intercepted during transmission, the data content cannot be interpreted without the correct key. Improve the flexibility and adaptability of the system: Based on the preset rules, the locally saved HASH value is updated, so that the system can adapt to environmental changes, such as changes in user behavior patterns or the evolution of security threats. This dynamic update mechanism improves the flexibility and adaptability of the system. Regularly updating the HASH value helps reduce security risks caused by HASH value leakage. Even if the old HASH value is cracked, the attacker cannot use this information because the HASH value has been updated. By ensuring the security and integrity of the data, users can use the service more confidently, which improves the user's trust and satisfaction, thereby improving the overall user experience. In summary, this technical solution provides a secure, reliable and flexible data protection mechanism through a series of encryption and decryption operations, as well as dynamic key management and HASH value updates, providing online car-hailing drivers with a more secure communication and data transmission strategy. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0040] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0041] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of an anti-cheating and confidentiality method for an online car-hailing driver provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 2 It is a partial flow chart of a method for preventing cheating and keeping secrets on a ride-hailing driver side provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 3 It is a partial flow chart of a method for preventing cheating and keeping secrets on a ride-hailing driver side provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 4 It is a partial flow chart of a method for preventing cheating and keeping secrets on a ride-hailing driver side provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 5 It is a structural schematic diagram of an anti-cheating and confidentiality device for a driver of an online car-hailing vehicle provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 6 It is a structural schematic diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0047] To make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solution of the present invention will be described in detail below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other implementation methods obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work belong to the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0048] Figure 1 A flowchart of an anti-cheating and confidentiality method for an online car-hailing driver provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0049] refer to Figure 1 , the method may specifically include the following steps:

[0050] S101, obtaining a first ciphertext;

[0051] In this step, the system receives encrypted data from a source, namely the first ciphertext. This ciphertext may be sent by the communication peer or read from the storage medium. The first ciphertext is the result of the original data (first plaintext) being processed by the encryption algorithm, with the purpose of protecting the data from unauthorized third parties. Obtaining the first ciphertext is the starting point of the decryption process, ensuring that the subsequent steps can proceed smoothly.

[0052] S102: decrypting the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key by using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0053] This step involves using the locally preset SO library to decrypt the first ciphertext and restore the original data (first plaintext). The SO library contains the necessary decryption algorithm and key generation logic. Specifically, the SO library performs the following operations: Key generation: The SO library first needs to generate a key for decryption. This key is calculated by combining the random string stored in the SO library and the locally saved HASH value. The random string provides the randomness of the encryption key, while the HASH value provides the integrity and consistency check of the data. Ciphertext decryption: Once the key generation is completed, the SO library will use this key to decrypt the first ciphertext. The decryption algorithm will reverse the encryption process and restore the original data (first plaintext). Security assurance: Since the generation of the key depends on the random string and HASH value, the key used for each decryption is unique, which increases the security of the system and prevents the risk of the key being predicted or reused.

[0054] S103, encrypting the second plaintext based on a preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key by using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0055] In this step, the system will use the same SO library to perform encryption operations on another set of data (the second plaintext) to generate a second ciphertext. This step is similar to S102, but is applied to different data sets. The specific operation is as follows: If the system design allows, the second plaintext can be encrypted using the same key generated in S102, or a new key can be generated as needed. The second plaintext is encrypted using the encryption algorithm and key in the SO library to generate a second ciphertext to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data. The second ciphertext is ready to be sent to the preset communication peer to ensure the security of the data during transmission.

[0056] S104, sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer;

[0057] In this step, the system sends the second ciphertext to the preset communication peer through the network or other communication channels. This step ensures that the encrypted data can be safely transmitted to the destination while maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the data.

[0058] S105: Based on a preset rule, update the locally stored HASH value.

[0059] In this step, the system updates the locally saved HASH value according to preset rules. This may be based on time, data changes, or other security policies. The purpose of updating the HASH value is: Enhance security: Regularly updating the HASH value can reduce the risk of the HASH value being cracked and improve the security of the system. Adapt to changes: As the environment changes, such as changes in user behavior or the emergence of new security threats, updating the HASH value can help the system adapt to these changes and maintain the security of the data. Maintain data consistency: Updating the HASH value helps ensure the consistency and integrity of the data, especially in distributed systems, the update of the HASH value can ensure that the data of all nodes is synchronized. These steps together constitute a complete data encryption, decryption, and transmission process, which is designed to protect the security and integrity of the data while providing efficient data processing capabilities.

[0060] Specifically, conventional signature files are divided into two parts, online and offline. However, due to the lack of security awareness in early product development, there is only one online signature, and it is public. The result is that only one copy is used for both offline and online. Therefore, offline debugging and testing are highly dependent on this online signature file.

[0061] In order to prevent others from changing the application after stealing the code and signature, the technical solution of gradually eliminating key interfaces can be adopted for the previously launched versions. For future versions, in order to avoid the continued use of key interfaces of the server to block in the future, and in actual production, the leaked version often has a large version gap with the current version, so the solution of the present invention - dynamic signature verification is adopted to implement it. The so-called dynamic signature verification is to perform a secondary calculation on the HASH value (signature) of the application signature combined with a preset random string (condiment) to obtain a new string (mixture), which is compared with the reference string (answer) regularly issued by the server. If they are the same, they pass, otherwise they fail.

[0062] mixture=encode(signature,condiment)

[0063] Specifically, each condiment is hardcoded in a C++ generated so library (Security-SO) in the form of an array. When the application is opened, whether for debugging, testing or online operation, it is necessary to verify the so library first: obtain the signature of the application through JNI inside the so library, and then use the AES+MD5 joint encryption algorithm to implement the encode(*) function to calculate the mixture, and finally compare the mixture with the regularly updated answer. At the same time, the so library has the functions of saving and obtaining key information and encrypting the network request body and decrypting the response body. If the so library signature verification fails, the App will lose other key functions of the so library necessary for operation, making the App paralyzed.

[0064] In some embodiments, when a random string is found to be leaked, the so library is upgraded to change the random string inside it. That is, when a leaked version is found, the so library can be upgraded to change the hard-coded condiment inside it, and dependencies can be added to the normal version source code through a secure network link, and then normal users are guided to forcibly upgrade to the normal version within a certain time frame. After the transition period ends, the server will no longer issue the original answer corresponding to the leaked version, paralyzing the leaked version.

[0065] The solution provided in this application can protect network request and response data. For details, refer to Figure 2 .

[0066] Generally, network requests are directly encrypted and decrypted in NATIVE. The solution of the present invention places the encryption and decryption of network requests in the SO library, and uses the condiment hard-coded in the SO library in the form of an array to perform encryption operations and store the key KEY locally. When it is needed, the condiment is used to perform decryption operations to obtain the plaintext KEY.

[0067] In some embodiments, updating the locally stored HASH value based on preset rules includes: agreeing with the server on the locally stored HASH value and HASH update value; if the HASH update value is used to interact with the server; the server will feedback update information; and updating the locally stored HASH value and HASH update value based on the update information.

[0068] Specifically, refer to Figure 3 , agree on a default KEY with the server n and key. When used as the initial KEY for encryption request, the server determines whether the KEY is used. n After responding to the key expiration information, the so library receives the information and then uses KEY nRequest a dedicated interface, which carries the latest key KEY n+1 Information response ciphertext, using KEY n Decrypt it and then use KEY n+1 Replace the initial KEY n , with KEY n+1 (ie: HASH value) Also sent is the key KEY′ used for refreshing n+1 (ie: HASH update value), when KEY n+1 When it expires, use KEY′ n+1 Replace KEY as a temporary key n+1 Request a dedicated interface to obtain KEY n+2 ,KEY′ n+2 Repeat the above steps for the ciphertext.

[0069] In some embodiments, it also includes: encrypting and decrypting part of the local information based on the SO library; wherein the SO library is used to calculate the key through the random string stored in the SO library and the locally stored HASH value, and encrypting and decrypting part of the local information based on the key.

[0070] Specifically, refer to Figure 4 Generally, Android information storage is directly stored locally in plain text by SharedPreference in the Native layer through key-value. This patent encapsulates the information storage and acquisition process into the SO library, and the Native layer stores and obtains the information through the agreed interface. The advantage of this is that even if the local information file of the application is leaked, the security of the information can be guaranteed. At the same time, the necessity of the SO library is further enhanced, so that the operation of the application cannot be separated from the support of the SO library, and support is provided for the security of the application supported by the security of the SO library.

[0071] In some embodiments, the functionality of disabling the AccessibilityService is performed.

[0072] The online ride-hailing driver-side app developed purely with Android Framework native technology has an accessibility auxiliary design mechanism that allows plug-in programs to monitor the host app's page display events and obtain display content through the accessibility machine service provided by the system without the permission of the app developer or even without intrusive tampering with the app code, and then automatically trigger the host app's order-accepting behavior based on preset conditions. The leakage of app code and signature has made it easier for others to illegally exploit this mechanism.

[0073] In some embodiments, the functionality of disabling the AccessibilityService is performed.

[0074] Android AccessibilityService is an accessibility feature that allows applications to access other applications on the user's device. Through AccessibilityService, applications can obtain information about user interface elements, such as buttons, text, and images, and handle user input events. AccessibilityService buries interfaces for text changes, sliding, and UI changes in View, ViewGroup, TextView, and other controls. When these states change, the controls will call back the system API, and the API system will then assemble the data of these objects into AccessibityEvent, AccessibilityNodeInfo, etc. to indirectly save these data, and then return these data to the corresponding App through cross-process.

[0075] The original intention of AccessibilityService is to help people with disabilities use their devices, such as providing screen reading functions for the visually impaired or gesture control functions for people with motor disabilities. Obviously, such auxiliary functions are not necessary for practitioners in the travel industry, but they provide convenient conditions for others to illegally obtain order information, preset filtering conditions, and accept orders independently.

[0076] Therefore, this patent proposes to completely disable AccessibilityService in the online car-hailing driver app. The specific solution is that during development, all activities of the app inherit a base class BaseActivity, and in the onCreate method of BaseActivity, execute the following process:

[0077] Get Window;

[0078] Get DecorView;

[0079] Set the AccessibilityDelegate.

[0080] Then, implement each method of AccessibilityDelegate and no longer execute the original default operation in each method, thereby blocking AccessibilityService.

[0081] However, not all plug-in monitoring is implemented using the AccessibilityService mechanism. There are also some AI text recognition plug-in programs that intercept App pages in a loop, use AI to identify page information, and then automatically simulate triggering click events at the corresponding locations, thereby illegally obtaining order information, presetting filtering conditions, and independently accepting orders.

[0082] In some embodiments, it also includes: executing key page screenshot prevention settings. That is, for such plug-in programs that use AI to monitor information, this patent uses key page screenshot prevention to block them. The specific solution is to execute the following steps in the onCreate method of the order grabbing page Activity:

[0083] Get window;

[0084] Add flagWindowManager.LayoutParams.FLAG_SECURE;

[0085] Figure 5 1 is a schematic diagram of a structure of an anti-cheating and confidentiality device for a ride-hailing driver provided by another embodiment of the present invention. The device is suitable for executing an anti-cheating and confidentiality method for a ride-hailing driver provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 As shown, the device may specifically include:

[0086] An acquisition module 51, used to acquire a first ciphertext;

[0087] A decryption module 52 is used to decrypt the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key by using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext;

[0088] The encryption module 53 is used to encrypt the second plaintext based on the preset SO library to obtain the second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate the key by using the random string stored in the SO library and the locally stored HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain the first plaintext;

[0089] A sending module 54, used for sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer;

[0090] The updating module 55 is used to update the locally stored HASH value based on a preset rule.

[0091] It should be noted that the anti-cheating and confidentiality device for online car-hailing drivers provided in the embodiments of the present invention can execute the anti-cheating and confidentiality method for online car-hailing drivers provided in any embodiment of the present invention, and has the functional modules and beneficial effects corresponding to the execution method. Since the method embodiment has been elaborated in detail, the device embodiment is only a simple example. For details, please refer to the description in the method embodiment.

[0092] The present invention also provides an electronic device. Figure 6 , Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device, such as Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device includes: a processor 61, and a memory 62 connected to the processor 61; the memory 62 is used to store a computer program, and the computer program is at least used to execute the anti-cheating and confidentiality method for the online car-hailing driver in an embodiment of the present invention; the processor 61 is used to call and execute the computer program in the memory.

[0093] It can be understood that the same or similar parts of the above embodiments can be referenced to each other, and the contents not described in detail in some embodiments can refer to the same or similar contents in other embodiments.

[0094] It should be noted that, in the description of the present invention, the terms "first", "second", etc. are only used for descriptive purposes and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance. In addition, in the description of the present invention, unless otherwise specified, the meaning of "plurality" refers to at least two.

[0095] Any process or method description in a flowchart or otherwise described herein may be understood to represent a module, segment or portion of code that includes one or more executable instructions for implementing the steps of a specific logical function or process, and the scope of the preferred embodiments of the present invention includes alternative implementations in which functions may not be performed in the order shown or discussed, including performing functions in a substantially simultaneous manner or in the reverse order depending on the functions involved, which should be understood by those skilled in the art to which the embodiments of the present invention belong.

[0096] It should be understood that the various parts of the present invention can be implemented by hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. In the above-mentioned embodiments, a plurality of steps or methods can be implemented by software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented by hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one of the following technologies known in the art or their combination: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function for a data signal, a dedicated integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0097] A person skilled in the art may understand that all or part of the steps in the method for implementing the above-mentioned embodiment may be completed by instructing related hardware through a program, and the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which, when executed, includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiment.

[0098] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into a processing module, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one module. The above-mentioned integrated module may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional module. If the integrated module is implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as an independent product, it may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.

[0099] The storage medium mentioned above can be a read-only memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc.

[0100] In the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "examples", "specific examples", or "some examples" means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representation of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described may be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0101] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described above, it is to be understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and are not to be construed as limitations of the present invention. A person skilled in the art may change, modify, replace and vary the above embodiments within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for preventing cheating and keeping secrets on the driver side of an online car-hailing service, characterized in that: include: Get the first ciphertext; Decrypting the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; Encrypting the second plaintext based on a preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypting the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; Sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer; Based on the preset rules, the locally stored HASH value is updated.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The updating of the locally stored HASH value based on a preset rule includes: Agree with the server on the locally saved HASH value and HASH update value; If you use the HASH update value to interact with the server, the server will feedback the update information; The locally stored HASH value and HASH update value are updated based on the update information.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: Encrypt and decrypt some local information based on the SO library; The SO library is used to calculate a key using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and to encrypt and decrypt part of the local information based on the key.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The SO library is generated by C++, and the random string is written in the SO library in the form of an array.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: The SO library uses the AES+MD5 joint encryption algorithm to calculate the random string and the locally stored HASH value to obtain the key.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: When a random string leak is found, the so library is upgraded to change its internal random string.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Also includes: Implement anti-screenshot settings for key pages; and / or, Executes a function that disables the AccessibilityService.

8. An anti-cheating and confidentiality device for online car-hailing drivers, characterized in that: include: An acquisition module, used for acquiring a first ciphertext; A decryption module, used to decrypt the first ciphertext based on a locally preset SO library to obtain a first plaintext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key by using a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; An encryption module, used to encrypt the second plaintext based on a preset SO library to obtain a second ciphertext; wherein the SO library is used to calculate a key through a random string stored in the SO library and a locally stored HASH value, and decrypt the first ciphertext based on the key to obtain a first plaintext; A sending module, used for sending the second ciphertext to a preset communication peer; The updating module is used to update the locally stored HASH value based on a preset rule.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A processor, and a memory connected to the processor; The memory is used to store a computer program, and the computer program is used at least to execute the anti-cheating and confidentiality method for the online car-hailing driver side according to any one of claims 1 to 7; The processor is used to call and execute the computer program in the memory.

10. A storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, each step of the anti-cheating and confidentiality method for the online car-hailing driver side is implemented as described in any one of claims 1-7.

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