Distributed stealth address generation method, device, medium and product for threshold signature

Abstract

The application discloses a distributed stealth address generation method and device for threshold signature, a medium and a product, relates to the field of user identity privacy protection, and comprises the following steps: initialization: generating public parameters required by a distributed stealth address generation system; decentralized key generation: a sender, a total number of n1, a threshold of t1; a receiver, a total number of n2, a threshold of t2, generating respective private key fragments, public key fragments and complete public keys; distributed stealth address generation: at least t1 senders input the private key fragments, the complete public key of the receiver, and calculate a stealth address D; one-time private key fragment generation: at least t2 receivers input the private key fragments, the complete public key of the sender, calculate corresponding one-time private key fragments, and verify consistency by using a Lagrange polynomial. The distributed receiver entity can use the stealth address to receive money, and execute threshold signature of subsequent transactions by using the corresponding one-time private key fragments.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of user identity privacy protection, and in particular to a distributed stealth address generation method, device, medium and product for threshold signature. Background Art

[0002] Protecting user identity privacy is crucial in blockchain systems. Stealth addresses are a technology used to protect the privacy of recipient identities in blockchain transaction systems. Stealth addresses ensure that the receiving address of each transaction is unique. Although all transaction records are public, external observers cannot link multiple transactions to the same recipient, effectively protecting the recipient's identity. Furthermore, stealth addresses reduce the risk of attacks on specific addresses. If a single address is leaked or compromised, other addresses and transactions remain unaffected. Stealth addresses also allow users to continuously receive transactions from different senders while maintaining the same public-private key pair, simplifying key and address management. Therefore, stealth addresses are applicable not only to personal privacy protection but also to corporate financial privacy and a variety of other scenarios, providing significant advantages for blockchain transactions.

[0003] Threshold signatures enhance the security of blockchain transactions by distributing the signing process among multiple parties. This approach ensures that no single entity possesses the complete private key, reducing the risk of key compromise and effectively defending against malicious attacks. However, when using threshold signatures, the complete private key is never available. This presents a challenge when calculating the one-time private key corresponding to a stealth address. Without the complete private key, traditional methods for generating one-time private keys for stealth addresses are unfeasible, necessitating innovative solutions to effectively integrate threshold signatures with stealth address generation mechanisms. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a distributed stealth address generation method, device, medium and product for threshold signature, which can enable distributed receiving entities to use stealth addresses to receive payments and use corresponding one-time private key shards to execute threshold signatures for subsequent transactions.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following solutions:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signatures, comprising:

[0007] Initialize the distributed stealth address generation system;

[0008] Each sending entity generates a private key shard a i , a public key shard A i and the complete public key A; where a i∈Z q ; Z q is an integer between 0 and q-1; q is the order of the elliptic curve group;

[0009] Each receiving entity generates a private key shard b j , a public key shard B j and the complete public key B; where b j ∈Z q ;

[0010] Shard a based on the private key i Calculate the elliptic curve random point X with the complete public key B i ;

[0011] Based on the elliptic curve random point X i Calculation Commitment KGC i and open commitment KGD i ;

[0012] Broadcast the commitment KGC i ;

[0013] Open the commitment KGD i Encrypt and send to other sending entities;

[0014] Each sending entity i has a random elliptic curve point X i , i∈S1 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the sender's Lagrangian interpolation result Ω; where S1 is the sender set, the members in S1 are greater than or equal to t1, and t1 is the sender set threshold;

[0015] Calculate a stealth address D based on the sender's Lagrange interpolation result Ω and the complete public key B;

[0016] Shard b based on the private key j Calculate the elliptic curve random point Y with the complete public key A j ;

[0017] Based on the elliptic curve random point Y j Calculation Commitment KGC j and open commitment KGD j ;

[0018] Broadcast the commitment KGC j ;

[0019] Open the commitment KGD j Encrypt and send to other recipient entities;

[0020] Each receiving entity j has a random point Y on the elliptic curve j, j∈S2 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the Lagrangian interpolation result Ω' of the receiver; where S2 is the receiver set, the members in S2 are greater than or equal to t2, and t2 is the receiver set threshold;

[0021] Use Ω', elliptic curve to generate element G, and private key shard b j and counter ξ as input, calculate the one-time private key shard d j and the corresponding stealth address shard D j ;

[0022] Stealth Address Shard D j be broadcast;

[0023] Based on the stealth address D and stealth address fragment D j Verify the consistency of the Lagrangian relation.

[0024] Optionally, the private key shard a i Shard A with public key i Satisfies the discrete logarithm relationship A i =a i G;

[0025] The public key fragment A i and the complete public key A satisfy the Lagrange interpolation relationship

[0026] Where G is the elliptic curve generator, S1 is the sender set, the number of members in S1 is greater than or equal to t1, and λ i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, Σ is the accumulator; It means that at least t1 participants jointly calculate an interpolation using Lagrange interpolation polynomials;

[0027] The private key shard b j Shard B with the public key j Satisfies the discrete logarithm relationship B j =b j G;

[0028] Public key shard B j and the complete public key B satisfy the Lagrange interpolation relationship

[0029] Here, S2 is the set of receivers, and the number of members in S2 is greater than or equal to t2; It means that at least t2 participants jointly calculate an interpolation using the Lagrange interpolation polynomial.

[0030] Optionally, based on the private key shard a i Calculate the elliptic curve random point X with the complete public key B i Specifically, the following formula is used:

[0031] X i :=a i B, where := means the result of the calculation on the right is assigned to the value on the left.

[0032] Based on the elliptic curve random point X i Calculation Commitment KGC i and open commitment KGD i Specifically, the following formula is used:

[0033] (KGC i ,KGD i ):=Com(X i )

[0034] Com is the commitment algorithm, and the input is X i , output KGC i and KGD i .

[0035] Optionally, each sending entity i performs a random elliptic curve point X i , i∈S1 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the sender's Lagrangian interpolation result Ω using the following formula:

[0036]

[0037] Among them, λ i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, Σ is the accumulator, a is the complete private key of the sender set, b is the complete private key of the receiver set, and G is the elliptic curve generator;

[0038] The stealth address D is calculated based on the Lagrange interpolation result Ω and the complete public key B of the sender using the following formula:

[0039] D:=hash(Ω,ξ)·G+B

[0040] Where, := indicates that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left, Ω is the Lagrange interpolation result of the sender, and ξ represents the counter.

[0041] Optionally, based on the private key shard b j Calculate the elliptic curve random point Y with the complete public key A i Specifically, the following formula is used:

[0042] Y j :=b j ·A

[0043] Among them, := means that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left;

[0044] Based on the elliptic curve random point Yj Compute the commitment KGC j and open the commitment KGD j Specifically, the following formula is used:

[0045] (KGC j ,KGD j ):=Com(Y j )

[0046] Wherein, Com refers to the commitment algorithm.

[0047] Optionally, each receiver entity j performs Lagrange interpolation on the elliptic curve random point Y j , j∈S2, to obtain the Lagrange interpolation result Ω' of the receiver. The following formula is used:

[0048]

[0049] Wherein, λ j is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, Σ is the accumulator, a is the complete private key of the sender set, b is the complete private key of the receiver set, G is the elliptic curve generator, and Ω is the Lagrange interpolation result of the sender.

[0050] Using Ω', G, the private key fragment b j and the counter ξ as input, the one-time private key fragment d j and the corresponding stealth address fragment D j are calculated. The following formula is used:

[0051] d j :=hash(Ω’,ξ)+b j

[0052] D j :=d j ·G

[0053] Wherein, := means that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left, Ω' is the Lagrange interpolation result of the receiver, ξ represents the counter, and G is the elliptic curve generator.

[0054] Optionally, the consistency of the Lagrange relationship is verified based on the stealth address D and the stealth address fragment D j The following formula is used:

[0055]

[0056] Wherein, λ j is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient.

[0057] In a second aspect, the present application provides a computer device comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of any of the above-described methods for generating a distributed stealth address for threshold signatures.

[0058] In a third aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of any of the above-mentioned methods for generating a distributed stealth address for threshold signatures.

[0059] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of any of the above-mentioned methods for generating a distributed stealth address for threshold signatures.

[0060] According to the specific embodiments provided in this application, this application discloses the following technical effects:

[0061] This application provides a distributed stealth address generation method, device, medium, and product for threshold signatures, including the basic public parameters and tools required to initialize the system. Each participant generates their own private key and public key on the system, generates a sender-generated stealth address, through which blockchain assets can be received, and generates a private key shard corresponding to the stealth address that only the receiver can generate, that is, only the receiver can use the assets corresponding to the stealth address. That is, in the solution of this application, the distributed sender entity can generate a stealth address, and the distributed receiver entity can generate a corresponding one-time private key shard. These one-time private key shards are combined through Lagrange interpolation to form a complete one-time private key, which corresponds to the stealth address. Therefore, the distributed receiver entity can use the stealth address to receive funds and use the corresponding one-time private key shard to perform threshold signatures for subsequent transactions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0062] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0063] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for generating a distributed stealth address for threshold signatures provided in one embodiment of the present application;

[0064] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0065] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of this application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of this application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0066] In order to make the above-mentioned purposes, features and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the present application is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0067] like Figure 1 As shown, a distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature is provided. The method is executed by a computer device, and specifically can be executed by a computer device such as a terminal or a server alone, or can be executed by a terminal and a server together. In an embodiment of the present application, the method includes the following steps 101 to 117.

[0068] in:

[0069] Step 101: Initialize the generation of distributed stealth addresses.

[0070] The order of the elliptic curve group is q and the generator is G. The hash function hashes data of any length {0,1} * Mapping to random integers modulo q:

[0071] hash:{0,1} * →Z q

[0072] Among them, hash refers to the hash function, Z q It is an integer between 0 and q-1.

[0073] Step 102: Each sending entity generates a private key fragment a i 、A public key shard A i and the complete public key A; where a i ∈Z q ; Z q It is an integer between 0 and q-1.

[0074] Step 103: Each receiving entity generates a private key shard b j , a public key shard B j and the complete public key B; where b j ∈Z q .

[0075] Step 102 and step 103 are decentralized key generation. In threshold signature, the sender set and the receiver set are composed of n1 and n2 entities respectively, and the corresponding thresholds are t1 and t2.

[0076] n1 sender entities execute the Shamir secret sharing protocol, and each sender entity obtains a private key shard a i ∈Z q 、A public key shard A i And the complete public key A. Among them, the private key fragment a i Shard A with public key i Satisfies the discrete logarithm relationship A i =a i G; Public key shard A i and the complete public key A satisfy the Lagrange interpolation relationship in, The sender set is S1, the number of members in S1 is greater than or equal to t1, λ i are the Lagrange interpolation coefficients, and Σ is the accumulator.

[0077] In addition, in the decentralized key generation protocol, the complete private key a∈Z q Will not appear.

[0078] Similarly, n2 receiving entities execute the Shamir secret sharing protocol, and each receiving entity obtains a private key shard b j ∈Zq, a public key shard B j And the complete public key B. Among them, the private key fragment b j Shard B with the public key j Satisfies the discrete logarithm relationship B j =b j G; public key shard B j and the complete public key B satisfy the Lagrange interpolation relationship

[0079] In addition, in the decentralized key generation protocol, the complete private key b∈Z q Will not appear.

[0080] Step 104: Shard a based on the private key i Calculate the elliptic curve random point X with the complete public key B i .

[0081] Step 105: Based on the elliptic curve random point X i Calculation Commitment KGC i and open commitment KGD i .

[0082] Step 106: Broadcast the commitment KGC i .

[0083] Step 107: Open the Commitment KGD i Encrypted and sent to other sending entities.

[0084] Step 108: Each sending entity i calculates a random point X on the elliptic curve i , i∈S1 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the sender's Lagrangian interpolation result Ω; where S1 is the sender set, the members in S1 are greater than or equal to t1, and t1 is the sender set threshold.

[0085] Step 109: Calculate the stealth address D based on the Lagrange interpolation result Ω and the complete public key B of the sender.

[0086] Steps 104 to 109 are distributed stealth address generation. When at least t1 sender entities participate, the following three steps are performed:

[0087] 1) Commitment: Each sender i enters its private key shard a i and the recipient's public key B, then calculated as follows:

[0088] X i :=a i ·B

[0089] Among them, := means that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left.

[0090] Compute commitment and open commitment:

[0091] (KGC i ,KGD i ):=Com(X i )

[0092] Com is the commitment algorithm, and the input is X i , output KGC i and KGD i .

[0093] Broadcast Commitment KGC i .

[0094] 2) Open commitment: Open commitment KGD i Sent confidentially to other senders.

[0095] The confidentiality method and the encryption of the opening commitment before sending it to the other party can be any confidentiality method. For example, it can be copied privately using a USB flash drive and sent to the other party to ensure that it is not leaked.

[0096] 3) Output stealth address D: Each sender entity i to point X i, i∈S1 performs Lagrange interpolation and obtains:

[0097]

[0098] The formula is derived as follows:

[0099]

[0100] Then, taking Ω, the recipient’s public key B, and a counter ξ as input, we calculate the stealth address D:

[0101] D:=hash(Ω,ξ)·G+B

[0102] Therefore, at least t1 sending entities can use their private key shard a i , execute threshold signature and transfer funds to stealth address D.

[0103] Step 110: Shard b based on the private key j Calculate the elliptic curve random point Y with the complete public key A j .

[0104] Step 111: Based on the elliptic curve random point Y j Calculation Commitment KGC j and open commitment KGD j .

[0105] Step 112: Broadcast the commitment KGC j .

[0106] Step 113: Open the Commitment KGD j Encrypted and sent to other recipient entities.

[0107] Step 114: Each receiving entity j calculates the random point Y of the elliptic curve j , j∈S2 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the Lagrangian interpolation result Ω' of the receiver; where S2 is the receiver set, the members in S2 are greater than or equal to t2, and t2 is the receiver set threshold.

[0108] Step 115: Shard b using Ω', G, and private key j and counter ξ as input, calculate the one-time private key shard d j and the corresponding stealth address shard D j .

[0109] Step 116: Stealth Address Fragment D j was broadcast.

[0110] The above steps 110-116 are the one-time private key shard generation: when there are at least t2 recipient entities participating, the following three steps are performed:

[0111] 1) Commitment: Each recipient j enters his private key shard b j and the sender's public key A, then calculate:

[0112] Y j :=b j ·A

[0113] Compute commitment and open commitment:

[0114] (KGC j ,KGD j ):=Com(Y j )

[0115] Broadcast Commitment KGC j .

[0116] 2) Open commitment: Open commitment KGD j Sent confidentially to other recipients.

[0117] 3) Output one-time private key shard d j :Each receiver j to point Y j , j∈S2 performs Lagrange interpolation and obtains:

[0118]

[0119] The formula is derived as follows:

[0120]

[0121] Then, use Ω', G, and private key to shard b j and counter ξ as input, calculate the one-time private key shard d j and the corresponding stealth address shard D j :

[0122] d j :=hash(Ω',ξ)+b j

[0123] D j :=d j ·G

[0124] Stealth Address Shard D j was broadcast.

[0125] Step 117: Based on the stealth address D and stealth address fragment D j Verify the consistency of the Lagrangian relation.

[0126] Each receiver j fragments D with a stealth address jAnd the stealth address D as input, verify the consistency of the Lagrange interpolation relation:

[0127]

[0128] Therefore, at least t2 recipient entities can use their one-time private key shard d j , run the threshold signature and spend the assets in the stealth address D.

[0129] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a server or a terminal. The internal structure diagram thereof may be as follows: Figure 2 As shown. The computer device includes a processor, memory, an input / output interface (I / O), and a communication interface. The processor, memory, and I / O interface are connected via a system bus, and the communication interface is connected to the system bus via the I / O interface. The processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device is used to store distributed stealth address generation data for threshold signatures. The I / O interface of the computer device is used to exchange information between the processor and external devices. The communication interface of the computer device is used to communicate with external terminals via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements a distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signatures.

[0130] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 2 The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific computer device may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different component arrangement.

[0131] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is further provided, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps in the above method embodiments when executing the computer program.

[0132] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, storing a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiments are implemented.

[0133] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above method embodiments are implemented.

[0134] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of relevant data must comply with relevant regulations.

[0135] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM may be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM).

[0136] The databases involved in the various embodiments provided herein may include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, distributed databases based on blockchains. The processors involved in the various embodiments provided herein may include, but are not limited to, general-purpose processors, central processing units, graphics processing units, digital signal processors, programmable logic units, data processing logic units based on quantum computing, and the like.

[0137] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0138] This document uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The description of the above examples is only intended to help understand the method and core concept of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, based on the concept of this application, there may be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting this application.

Claims

1. A distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature, characterized in that: The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature includes: Initialize the distributed stealth address generation system; Each sending entity generates a private key shard a i 、A public key shard A i and the complete public key A; where a i ∈Z q ; Z q is an integer between 0 and q-1; q is the order of the elliptic curve group; Each receiving entity generates a private key shard b j , a public key shard B j and the complete public key B; where b j ∈Z q ; Shard a based on the private key i Calculate the elliptic curve random point X with the complete public key B i ; Based on the elliptic curve random point X i Calculation Commitment KGC i and open commitment KGD i ; Broadcast the commitment KGC i ; Open the commitment KGD i Encrypt and send to other sending entities; Each sending entity i has a random elliptic curve point X i , i∈S1 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the sender's Lagrangian interpolation result Ω; where S1 is the sender set, the members in S1 are greater than or equal to t1, and t1 is the sender set threshold; Calculate a stealth address D based on the sender's Lagrange interpolation result Ω and the complete public key B; Shard b based on the private key j Calculate the elliptic curve random point Y with the complete public key A j ; Based on the elliptic curve random point Y j Calculation Commitment KGC j and open commitment KGD j ; Broadcast the commitment KGC j ; Open the commitment KGD j Encrypt and send to other recipient entities; Each receiving entity j has a random point Y on the elliptic curve j , j∈S2 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the Lagrangian interpolation result Ω' of the receiver; where S2 is the receiver set, the members in S2 are greater than or equal to t2, and t2 is the receiver set threshold; Use Ω', elliptic curve to generate element G, and private key shard b j and counter ξ as input, calculate the one-time private key shard d j and the corresponding stealth address shard D j ; Stealth Address Shard D j be broadcast; Based on the stealth address D and stealth address fragment D j Verify the consistency of the Lagrangian relation.

2. The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: The private key shard a i Shard A with public key i Satisfies the discrete logarithm relationship A i =a i G; The public key fragment A i and the complete public key A satisfy the Lagrange interpolation relationship Where G is the elliptic curve generator, S1 is the sender set, the number of members in S1 is greater than or equal to t1, and λ i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, Σ is the accumulator; It means that at least t1 participants jointly calculate an interpolation using Lagrange interpolation polynomials; The private key shard b j Shard B with the public key j Satisfies the discrete logarithm relationship B j =b j G; Public key shard B j and the complete public key B satisfy the Lagrange interpolation relationship Among them, S2 is the receiver set, and the number of members in S2 is greater than or equal to t2. It means that at least t2 participants jointly calculate an interpolation using the Lagrange interpolation polynomial.

3. The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: Shard a based on the private key i Calculate the elliptic curve random point X with the complete public key B i Specifically, the following formula is used: X i :=a i B, where := means the result of the calculation on the right is assigned to the value on the left; Based on the elliptic curve random point X i Calculation Commitment KGC i and open commitment KGD i Specifically, the following formula is used: (KGC i KGD i ):=With(X i ) Com is the commitment algorithm, and the input is X i , output KGC i and KGD i .

4. The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: Each sending entity i has a random elliptic curve point X i , i∈S1 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the sender's Lagrangian interpolation result Ω using the following formula: Among them, λ i is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, Σ is the accumulator, a is the complete private key of the sender set, b is the complete private key of the receiver set, and G is the elliptic curve generator; The stealth address D is calculated based on the Lagrange interpolation result Ω and the complete public key B of the sender using the following formula: D:=hash(Ω,ξ)·G+B Among them, := indicates that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left, Ω is the Lagrange interpolation result of the sender, and ξ represents the counter.

5. The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: Shard b based on the private key j Calculate the elliptic curve random point Y with the complete public key A j Specifically, the following formula is used: AND j :=b j ·TO Among them, := means that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left; Based on the elliptic curve random point Y j Calculation Commitment KGC j and open commitment KGD j Specifically, the following formula is used: (KGC j KGD j ):=With(Y j ) Here, Com refers to the commitment algorithm.

6. The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: Each receiving entity j has a random point Y on the elliptic curve j , j∈S2 performs Lagrangian interpolation to obtain the Lagrangian interpolation result Ω' of the receiver. The specific formula is as follows: Among them, λ j is the Lagrange interpolation coefficient, Σ is the accumulator, a is the complete private key of the sender set, b is the complete private key of the receiver set, G is the elliptic curve generator, and Ω is the Lagrange interpolation result of the sender; Shard b using Ω', G, and private key j and counter ξ as input, calculate the one-time private key shard d j and the corresponding stealth address shard D j Specifically, the following formula is used: d j :=hash(Ω',ξ)+b j D j :=d j ·G Where := indicates that the calculation result on the right is assigned to the left, Ω' is the Lagrange interpolation result of the receiver, ξ represents the counter, and G is the elliptic curve generator.

7. The distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to claim 1, characterized in that: Based on the stealth address D and stealth address fragment D j The consistency of the Lagrangian relationship is verified using the following formula: Among them, λ j are the Lagrange interpolation coefficients.

8. A computer device comprising: A memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed stealth address generation method for threshold signature according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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