Trusted video acquisition method and device and readable storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides a credible video acquisition method and device and a readable storage medium, and the specific implementation scheme is as follows: executing system integrity measurement after system power-on is completed, and obtaining measurement log information; calling an internal private key to sign a PCR metric value in the metric log information to obtain a signature value; sending the signature value and a built-in digital certificate to a verification platform; and receiving an equipment verification result fed back by the verification platform after performing dual verification on the signature value and the digital certificate, and if the equipment verification result indicates that the verification is passed, enabling the system to enter a video acquisition state. According to the scheme, a verification mechanism of the video acquisition equipment is provided, the data acquisition credibility of the video acquisition equipment is improved, in addition, the verification platform executes dual verification including the digital certificate and the system integrity on the video acquisition equipment, the security intensity of verification of the video acquisition equipment is improved, and the user experience is improved. And the data acquisition credibility of the video acquisition equipment is fully ensured.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a trusted video acquisition method, device and readable storage medium. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous development of Internet of Things technology, it has been applied in more and more fields. As a typical Internet of Things device, video acquisition equipment has been widely used in smart home, smart driving and other fields. In practical applications, video acquisition equipment can usually collect video data after startup. However, as the core of network monitoring, the authenticity of video data is crucial. Taking the field of smart driving as an example, autonomous driving such as drones, unmanned ships, unmanned cars, and robots requires high fidelity of the credibility of video data. The credibility of video data determines the safety of autonomous driving. In addition, taking the field of public safety as an example, video surveillance data is an important part of identification data and affects the judgment effect. Therefore, the information security of the data collection method of current video acquisition equipment is relatively low.

[0003] It is worth noting that the techniques described in this section are not necessarily techniques that have been previously conceived or employed. Unless otherwise indicated, it should not be assumed that any technique described in this section is considered to be prior art simply because it is included in this section. Similarly, unless otherwise indicated, the issues mentioned in this section should not be considered to have been recognized in any prior art. Summary of the invention

[0004] The embodiments of the present application provide a trusted video acquisition method, device, and readable storage medium, which aim to solve one of the problems in the related art at least to a certain extent.

[0005] A first aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a trusted video acquisition method, which is applied to a video acquisition device, including:

[0006] After the system is powered on, the system integrity measurement is performed to obtain the measurement log information;

[0007] Calling the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value;

[0008] Sending the signature value and the built-in digital certificate to the verification platform;

[0009] The device verification result fed back by the verification platform after double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate is received, and if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the system enters a video acquisition state.

[0010] Optionally, performing system integrity measurement after the system is powered on to obtain measurement log information includes:

[0011] After the system is powered on, the hash value is calculated for each system file;

[0012] Obtaining a corresponding PCR measurement value based on the hash value of each of the system files;

[0013] Based on the file identifier of each system file and the corresponding hash value and PCR measurement value, measurement log information is generated.

[0014] Optionally, the number of the system files is n, and the calculation formula of the PCR metric value is expressed as:

[0015] PCR1=H1

[0016] PCR2=HASH(PCR1||H2)

[0017] PCR3=HASH(PCR2||H3)

[0018] …

[0019] PCRn=HASH(PCRn-1||Hn)

[0020] Among them, PCR1, ..., PCRn represent the PCR measurement values ​​corresponding to n system files, and H1, ..., Hn represent the hash values ​​corresponding to the 1st to nth system files respectively.

[0021] Optionally, the calling of the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information, before obtaining the signature value, further includes:

[0022] Sending a device startup status to the verification platform; wherein the device startup status includes a normal device startup status and an abnormal device startup status;

[0023] Receiving a random number generated by the verification platform in response to a normal state of device startup;

[0024] The calling of the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value includes:

[0025] The calling of the internal private key signs the random number and the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value.

[0026] A second aspect of the embodiment of the present application provides a trusted video acquisition method, which is applied to a verification platform, including:

[0027] Receive a signature value and a digital certificate sent by a video acquisition device; wherein the signature value is a signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling an internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information;

[0028] Performing double verification on the signature value and the digital certificate;

[0029] The device verification result is sent to the video acquisition device; wherein, if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the video acquisition device enters a video acquisition state.

[0030] Optionally, the double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate includes:

[0031] Authenticating the digital certificate using preset digital certificate authentication information;

[0032] If the authentication is successful, the device public key is parsed from the digital certificate;

[0033] Decrypting the signature value using the device public key to obtain the PCR measurement value to be verified;

[0034] The PCR measurement value to be verified is identified.

[0035] Optionally, the identifying the PCR measurement value to be verified includes:

[0036] Querying a corresponding standard hash value according to a file identifier in the measurement log information sent by the video acquisition device;

[0037] Obtaining a corresponding standard PCR measurement value based on the standard hash value;

[0038] The PCR measurement value to be verified is identified using the PCR measurement value.

[0039] Optionally, before receiving the signature value and the digital certificate sent by the video acquisition device, the method further includes:

[0040] Receiving a device startup status sent by the video acquisition device;

[0041] If the device startup state is a normal device startup state, the built-in random number generator is called to generate a random number, and the random number is sent to the video acquisition device; wherein the signature value is the signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling the internal private key to sign the random number and the PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information.

[0042] A third aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising: a memory and a processor, wherein the processor is used to execute a computer program stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements each step of the trusted video acquisition method provided in the first aspect or the second aspect of the embodiment of the present application.

[0043] The fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, each step of the trusted video acquisition method provided in the first aspect or the second aspect of the embodiments of the present application is implemented.

[0044] As can be seen from the above, according to the trusted video acquisition method, device and readable storage medium provided by the present application, after the system is powered on, the system integrity measurement is performed to obtain the measurement log information; the internal private key is called to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value; the signature value and the built-in digital certificate are sent to the verification platform; the device verification result fed back by the verification platform after double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate is received, and if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the system enters the video acquisition state. The present application provides a verification mechanism for a video acquisition device, which improves the data acquisition credibility of the video acquisition device. In addition, the verification platform performs double verification of the video acquisition device including the digital certificate and the system integrity, which improves the security strength of the video acquisition device verification, so that the data acquisition credibility of the video acquisition device is fully guaranteed.

[0045] It should be understood that the content described in this section is not intended to identify the key or important features of the present application, nor is it intended to limit the scope of the present application. Other features of the present application will become easily understood through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] The accompanying drawings exemplarily illustrate the embodiments and constitute a part of the specification, and together with the text description of the specification, are used to explain the exemplary implementation of the embodiments. The drawings shown are for illustrative purposes only and do not limit the scope of the claims. In all drawings, the same reference numerals refer to similar but not necessarily identical elements.

[0047] Figure 1 A basic flow chart of a trusted video acquisition method applied to a video acquisition device provided in one embodiment of the present application;

[0048] Figure 2 A basic flow chart of a trusted video acquisition method applied to a verification platform provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0049] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of signaling interaction of a trusted video acquisition method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0050] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of functional modules of a trusted video acquisition device applied to a video acquisition device provided in one embodiment of the present application;

[0051] Figure 5A schematic diagram of functional modules of a trusted video acquisition device applied to a verification platform provided in one embodiment of the present application;

[0052] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0053] In order to make the purpose, features, and advantages of the invention of this application more obvious and easy to understand, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of this application, not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0054] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of technical features indicated. Thus, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the embodiments of the present application, the meaning of "multiple" is two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined. In addition, the term "comprising" indicates the presence of the described features, wholes, steps, operations, elements and / or components, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, wholes, steps, operations, elements, components and / or their collections.

[0055] In order to solve the problem of low information security of the data acquisition method of the video acquisition device in the related art, an embodiment of the present application provides a trusted video acquisition method applied to the video acquisition device, such as Figure 1 The figure shows a basic flow chart of a trusted video acquisition method applied to a video acquisition device provided by this embodiment. The trusted video acquisition method includes the following steps:

[0056] Step 101: After the system is powered on, perform system integrity measurement to obtain measurement log information.

[0057] Specifically, the system integrity measurement of this embodiment refers to the integrity measurement of the software, firmware, etc. loaded in the system after the system of the video acquisition device is powered on, and the corresponding measurement value is recorded in the platform configuration register (PlatformConfiguration Register, PCR). Based on this, it can be ensured that the started system and the running applications are trustworthy.

[0058] In an optional implementation of the present embodiment, the above-mentioned system integrity measurement is performed after the system is powered on to obtain measurement log information, including: after the system is powered on, a hash value is calculated for each system file; based on the hash value of each system file, a corresponding PCR measurement value is obtained; based on the file identifier of each system file and the corresponding hash value and PCR measurement value, measurement log information is generated.

[0059] It should be noted that the measurement log information of this embodiment includes a file identifier, a hash value of the file and a PCR measurement value. In practical applications, the file identifier can be exemplarily a file name, and the calculation method of the hash value of the file can adopt a standard Sha256, SM3 or other algorithms.

[0060] In an optional implementation of this embodiment, assuming that the number of system files is n, the calculation formula of the PCR metric value is expressed as follows:

[0061] PCR1=H1

[0062] PCR2=HASH(PCR1||H2)

[0063] PCR3=HASH(PCR2||H3)

[0064] …

[0065] PCRn=HASH(PCRn-1||Hn)

[0066] Among them, PCR1, ..., PCRn respectively represent the PCR measurement values ​​corresponding to n system files, and H1, ..., Hn respectively represent the hash values ​​corresponding to the 1st to nth system files.

[0067] Step 102: Call the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value.

[0068] In this embodiment, the PCR measurement value may be digitally signed using the private key of the video acquisition device, or the random number and the PCR measurement value may be digitally signed using the private key.

[0069] In an optional implementation of this embodiment, before the above-mentioned calling of the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value, it also includes: sending the device startup status to the verification platform; wherein the device startup status includes the normal device startup status and the abnormal device startup status; receiving the random number generated by the verification platform in response to the normal device startup status. Accordingly, the above-mentioned calling of the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value includes: calling the internal private key to sign the random number and the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value.

[0070] Specifically, in this embodiment, after the video acquisition device is powered on, it returns the device startup status to the verification platform, and the verification platform checks the startup status fed back by the video acquisition device. If the video acquisition device is started normally, the verification platform can call the internal random number generation module to generate an authentication random number Nonce, and then send the random number to the video acquisition device, otherwise the verification platform reports that the video acquisition device fails to start. Next, the video acquisition device calls the internal private key signature module to use the device private key to digitally sign the random number Nonce and the measurement value PCR to obtain the signature value SigKey[Nonce||PCR].

[0071] It is worth mentioning that the verification platform of this embodiment can be a host controller of a video acquisition device, an independent host device, or a cloud platform server, depending on the actual application scenario, and this embodiment does not make a sole limitation on this.

[0072] Step 103: Send the signature value and the built-in digital certificate to the verification platform.

[0073] Specifically, the secure storage area of ​​the video acquisition device of this embodiment pre-stores the device private key and the digital certificate. After the device private key of the secure storage area is called to obtain the signature value, the obtained signature value and the digital certificate retrieved from the secure storage area are sent to the verification platform together, so that the verification platform can perform trustworthy verification on the video acquisition device. It is worth mentioning that in actual applications, the video acquisition device can also send the measurement log information along with the signature value and the digital certificate to the verification platform.

[0074] Step 104: receiving the device verification result fed back by the verification platform after double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate, and if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the system enters the video acquisition state.

[0075] Specifically, after receiving the signature value and digital certificate sent by the video acquisition device, the verification platform of this embodiment first calls the authentication information of the built-in digital certificate to verify the digital certificate of the video acquisition device, and after the digital certificate verification is passed, parses the device public key from the digital certificate of the video acquisition device, and then uses the device public key to decrypt the signature value of the video acquisition device to obtain the PCR measurement value of the video acquisition device, and finally verifies the PCR measurement value. That is, the verification platform performs double verification on the video acquisition device including the digital certificate and system integrity, which can improve the security strength of the verification result.

[0076] It is worth mentioning that the verification platform of this embodiment determines that the device verification result is verified only after the above double verification is verified. All other cases are deemed as verification failures. After the verification platform obtains the device verification result, it feeds back the device verification result to the video acquisition device. The video acquisition device will enter the video acquisition state when the verification is passed, otherwise the video acquisition device prohibits video acquisition, thereby ensuring the authenticity and credibility of the video data.

[0077] In addition, it should be noted that the above implementation process of this embodiment only performs device verification to ensure that the device is trustworthy, and does not add additional processing to the video data, which can ensure the efficiency of the entire channel such as video data acquisition, transmission, and processing.

[0078] Next, adapted to the aforementioned trusted video acquisition method applied to the video acquisition device, an embodiment of the present application further provides a trusted video acquisition method applied to a verification platform, which can be exemplarily a host controller, an independent host device, or a cloud platform server, such as Figure 2 The figure shows a basic flow chart of a trusted video acquisition method applied to a verification platform provided by this embodiment. The trusted video acquisition method includes the following steps:

[0079] Step 201: receiving a signature value and a digital certificate sent by a video acquisition device, wherein the signature value is a signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling an internal private key to sign a PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information;

[0080] Step 202: Double-verify the signature value and the digital certificate;

[0081] Step 203: Send the device verification result to the video acquisition device, wherein if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the video acquisition device enters a video acquisition state.

[0082] In an optional implementation of the present embodiment, before the above-mentioned receiving the signature value and digital certificate sent by the video acquisition device, it also includes: receiving the device startup status sent by the video acquisition device; if the device startup status is the normal device startup status, calling the built-in random number generator to generate a random number, and sending the random number to the video acquisition device; accordingly, the aforementioned signature value is the signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling the internal private key to sign the random number and the PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information.

[0083] Specifically, in this embodiment, each time the video acquisition device is powered on and connected, the verification platform uses a random number generation module to generate an identification random number Nonce and sends it to the video acquisition device. The random number has good randomness and high security.

[0084] In an optional implementation of the present embodiment, the above-mentioned double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate includes: using preset digital certificate authentication information to authenticate the digital certificate; if the authentication is successful, parsing the device public key from the digital certificate; using the device public key to decrypt the signature value to obtain the PCR measurement value to be verified; and authenticating the PCR measurement value to be verified.

[0085] Furthermore, in an optional implementation of the present embodiment, the above-mentioned identification of the PCR measurement value to be verified includes: querying the corresponding standard hash value according to the file identifier in the measurement log information sent by the video acquisition device; obtaining the corresponding standard PCR measurement value based on the standard hash value; and using the PCR measurement value to identify the PCR measurement value to be verified.

[0086] Specifically, in this embodiment, the verification platform receives the measurement log information, signature value and digital certificate from the video acquisition device, first uses the authentication information of the digital certificate to verify the legitimacy of the digital certificate, then parses the digital certificate to obtain the device public key of the video acquisition device, uses the device public key of the video acquisition device to decrypt the signature value SigKey[Nonce||PCR], and obtains the PCR measurement value to be verified of the video acquisition device. It is worth mentioning that the verification platform has a built-in standard hash value of the measurement file of the video acquisition device. Next, during the signature verification process, the verification platform needs to find the corresponding standard hash value of each measurement file according to the file identifier in the measurement log information, and calculate the standard PCR measurement value of the measurement file based on the standard hash value, and finally uses the standard PCR measurement value to verify the PCR measurement value to be verified of the video acquisition device.

[0087] In order to better illustrate the embodiment of the present application, an embodiment of the present application also provides a detailed reliable video acquisition method, such as Figure 3 The figure shows a signaling interaction diagram of a trusted video acquisition method provided by an embodiment of the present application, which specifically includes the following process:

[0088] Step 301: After the system is powered on, the video acquisition device calculates a hash value for each system file;

[0089] Step 302: The video acquisition device obtains a corresponding PCR measurement value based on the hash value of each system file, and generates measurement log information based on the file identifier of each system file and the corresponding hash value and PCR measurement value;

[0090] Step 303: The video acquisition device sends the device startup status to the verification platform;

[0091] Step 304: the verification platform generates a random number in response to the normal state of device startup;

[0092] Step 305: The verification platform sends a random number to the video acquisition device;

[0093] Step 306: The video acquisition device uses the internal private key to sign the random number and the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value;

[0094] Step 307: The video acquisition device sends measurement log information, signature value, and built-in digital certificate to the verification platform;

[0095] Step 308: The verification platform uses the preset digital certificate authentication information to authenticate the digital certificate;

[0096] Step 309: The verification platform parses the device public key from the authenticated digital certificate, and authenticates the PCR measurement value based on the measurement log information and the device public key;

[0097] Step 310: the verification platform sends the device verification result to the video acquisition device;

[0098] Step 311: When the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the video capture device enters the video capture state.

[0099] It should be understood that the size of the serial number of each step in this embodiment does not mean the order of execution of the steps. The execution order of each step should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute a sole limitation on the implementation process of the embodiment of this application.

[0100] Next, the embodiment of the present application also provides a trusted video acquisition device using the above-mentioned trusted video acquisition method, wherein: Figure 4 A trusted video acquisition device applied to a video acquisition device provided in an embodiment of the present application mainly includes:

[0101] The measurement module 401 is used to perform system integrity measurement after the system is powered on to obtain measurement log information;

[0102] The signature module 402 is used to call the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value;

[0103] A first sending module 403, used to send the signature value and the built-in digital certificate to the verification platform;

[0104] The first receiving module 404 is used to receive the device verification result fed back by the verification platform after double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate, and if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the system enters the video acquisition state.

[0105] Figure 5 A trusted video acquisition device applied to a verification platform provided in an embodiment of the present application mainly includes:

[0106] The second receiving module 501 is used to receive the signature value and digital certificate sent by the video acquisition device; wherein the signature value is the signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information;

[0107] Verification module 502, used for double verification of signature value and digital certificate;

[0108] The second sending module 503 is used to send the device verification result to the video acquisition device; if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the video acquisition device enters the video acquisition state.

[0109] It should be noted that the trusted video acquisition methods in the aforementioned method embodiments can all be implemented based on the trusted video acquisition device provided in this embodiment. Ordinary technical personnel in the relevant field can clearly understand that for the convenience and conciseness of description, the specific working process of the trusted video acquisition device described in this embodiment can be implemented by referring to the corresponding working process in the aforementioned method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0110] Based on the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, after the system is powered on, the system integrity measurement is performed to obtain the measurement log information; the internal private key is called to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value; the signature value and the built-in digital certificate are sent to the verification platform; the device verification result fed back by the verification platform after double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate is received, and if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the system enters the video acquisition state. The present application solution provides a verification mechanism for video acquisition equipment, which improves the data acquisition credibility of the video acquisition equipment. In addition, the verification platform performs double verification of the video acquisition equipment including the digital certificate and the system integrity, which improves the security strength of the video acquisition equipment verification, so that the data acquisition credibility of the video acquisition equipment is fully guaranteed.

[0111] Figure 6 An electronic device is provided in one embodiment of the present application. The electronic device can be used to implement the trusted video acquisition method in the aforementioned embodiment, and mainly includes: a memory 601 and a processor 602. The memory 601 stores a computer program 603 that can be run on the processor 602. The memory 601 and the processor 602 are in communication connection. When the processor 602 executes the computer program 603, the trusted video acquisition method in the aforementioned embodiment is implemented. The number of processors 602 can be one or more.

[0112] The memory 601 may be a high-speed random access memory (RAM) memory, or a non-volatile memory, such as a disk memory. The memory 601 is used to store executable program codes, and the processor 602 is coupled to the memory 601 .

[0113] Furthermore, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which may be provided in the electronic device in the above embodiments. Figure 6 Memory in the illustrated embodiment.

[0114] The computer readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the trusted video acquisition method in the aforementioned embodiment is implemented. Furthermore, the computer storable medium can also be a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a RAM, a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and other media that can store program codes.

[0115] In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of modules is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation, such as multiple modules or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or modules, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0116] The modules described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as modules may or may not be physical modules, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network modules. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0117] In addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated into a processing module, or each module can exist physically separately, or two or more modules can be integrated into one module. The above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional modules.

[0118] If the integrated module is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a readable storage medium, including several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned readable storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as USB flash drives, mobile hard drives, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0119] It should be noted that, for the above-mentioned method embodiments, for the sake of simplicity of description, they are all expressed as a series of action combinations, but those skilled in the art should be aware that the present application is not limited by the described action sequence, because according to the present application, certain steps can be performed in other sequences or simultaneously. Secondly, those skilled in the art should also be aware that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily required by the present application.

[0120] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For parts that are not described in detail in a certain embodiment, reference can be made to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0121] The above is a description of the trusted video acquisition method, device and readable storage medium provided by the present application. For technicians in this field, according to the ideas of the embodiments of the present application, there may be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scopes. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as a limitation on the present application.

Claims

1. A trusted video acquisition method, applied to a video acquisition device, characterized in that: include: After the system is powered on, the system integrity measurement is performed to obtain the measurement log information; Calling the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value; Sending the signature value and the built-in digital certificate to the verification platform; The device verification result fed back by the verification platform after double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate is received, and if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the system enters a video acquisition state.

2. The trusted video acquisition method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The system integrity measurement is performed after the system is powered on to obtain measurement log information, including: After the system is powered on, the hash value is calculated for each system file; Obtaining a corresponding PCR measurement value based on the hash value of each of the system files; Based on the file identifier of each system file and the corresponding hash value and PCR measurement value, measurement log information is generated.

3. The trusted video acquisition method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The number of system files is n, and the calculation formula of the PCR metric value is expressed as: PCR1=H1 PCR2=HASH(PCR1||H2) PCR3=HASH(PCR2||H3) …… PCRn=HASH(PCRn-1||Hn) Among them, PCR1, ..., PCRn respectively represent the PCR measurement values ​​corresponding to n system files, and H1, ..., Hn respectively represent the hash values ​​corresponding to the 1st to nth system files.

4. The trusted video acquisition method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: The calling of the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information, before obtaining the signature value, also includes: Sending a device startup status to the verification platform; wherein the device startup status includes a normal device startup status and an abnormal device startup status; Receiving a random number generated by the verification platform in response to a normal state of device startup; The calling of the internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain the signature value includes: The calling of the internal private key signs the random number and the PCR measurement value in the measurement log information to obtain a signature value.

5. A trusted video acquisition method, applied to a verification platform, characterized in that: include: Receive a signature value and a digital certificate sent by a video acquisition device; wherein the signature value is a signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling an internal private key to sign the PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information; Performing double verification on the signature value and the digital certificate; The device verification result is sent to the video acquisition device; wherein, if the device verification result indicates that the verification is passed, the video acquisition device enters a video acquisition state.

6. The trusted video acquisition method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The double verification of the signature value and the digital certificate includes: Authenticating the digital certificate using preset digital certificate authentication information; If the authentication is successful, the device public key is parsed from the digital certificate; Decrypting the signature value using the device public key to obtain the PCR measurement value to be verified; The PCR measurement value to be verified is identified.

7. The trusted video acquisition method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The identifying the PCR measurement value to be verified includes: Querying a corresponding standard hash value according to a file identifier in the measurement log information sent by the video acquisition device; Obtaining a corresponding standard PCR measurement value based on the standard hash value; The PCR measurement value to be verified is identified using the PCR measurement value.

8. The trusted video acquisition method according to any one of claims 5 to 7, characterized in that: Before receiving the signature value and digital certificate sent by the video acquisition device, the method further includes: Receiving a device startup status sent by the video acquisition device; If the device startup state is a normal device startup state, the built-in random number generator is called to generate a random number, and the random number is sent to the video acquisition device; wherein the signature value is the signature value obtained by the video acquisition device calling the internal private key to sign the random number and the PCR measurement value to be verified in the measurement log information.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: The device comprises a memory and a processor, wherein: The processor is used to execute the computer program stored in the memory; When the processor executes the computer program, the steps in the trusted video acquisition method described in any one of claims 1 to 4 or 5 to 8 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the trusted video acquisition method described in any one of claims 1 to 4 or 5 to 8 are implemented.

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