Power grid endogenous safety control method, system and equipment based on double-host architecture and medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a power grid endogenous safety control method, system and device based on a double-host framework and a medium. The method comprises the steps that in response to a starting instruction of a computing host, trusted to-be-verified parameters of the computing host are acquired; wherein the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices; according to the credible to-be-verified parameter, determining an actual credibility measurement value of the computing host; and dynamically controlling the operation condition of the computing host according to the actual credibility measurement value and a pre-loaded initial white list strategy. The protection host actively obtains the credible to-be-verified parameters of the computing host, and actively completes the credibility verification process of the computing host on the protection host, so that an active defense scheme that the credibility realization process does not depend on an operating system of the computing host is realized, the autonomous system immunity is enhanced, and the reliability of the computing host is improved. And the attack influence and security risk of unknown vulnerabilities are reduced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of power grid security protection technology, and in particular to a power grid intrinsic security control method, system, equipment and medium based on a dual-host architecture. Background Art

[0002] Trusted computing technology is a key technology for active defense of traditional power grids. In the face of security risks, the core idea of ​​the traditional power grid information security system is to strengthen the protection at the boundary level after security partitioning the network environment. Generally speaking, it can effectively deal with viruses and common network attacks. However, with the development of smart grids, the further expansion of network boundaries and the increase in the number of terminals connected to the power grid, the security threats faced are more complex. Traditional boundary protection is obviously insufficient in dealing with organized, high-tech, large-scale attacks (such as APT attacks). The main reason is that the internal computing environment cannot be trusted, which makes information security protection uncontrollable from the root. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present invention provides a power grid intrinsic security control method, system, device and medium based on a dual-host architecture to solve the problem in the prior art that the computing environment cannot be trusted, resulting in the inability to control information security from the root.

[0004] According to one aspect of the present invention, a power grid endogenous security control method based on a dual-host architecture is provided, which is applied to a protection host and includes:

[0005] In response to a startup instruction of a computing host, obtaining a trusted parameter to be verified of the computing host; wherein the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices;

[0006] Determining an actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trustworthy parameter to be verified;

[0007] The operation of the computing host is dynamically controlled according to the actual trust metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

[0008] According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a power grid endogenous safety control device based on a dual-host architecture, which is applied to protect a host, and includes:

[0009] An acquisition module, configured to acquire the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host in response to a startup instruction of the computing host; wherein the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices;

[0010] A first determination module, configured to determine an actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trustworthy parameter to be verified;

[0011] A control module is used to dynamically control the operation of the computing host according to the actual trust metric value and a pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

[0012] According to another aspect of the present invention, a power grid endogenous safety control system based on a dual-host architecture is provided, comprising: a protection host and a computing host; wherein the protection host and the computing host are heterogeneous devices;

[0013] In response to the startup instruction of the computing host, the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host are obtained through the protection host, and the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host is determined according to the trusted parameters to be verified; the operation of the computing host is dynamically controlled according to the actual trusted measurement value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

[0014] According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an electronic device, the electronic device comprising:

[0015] at least one processor; and

[0016] a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein,

[0017] The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the at least one processor, and the computer program is executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on the dual-host architecture described in any embodiment of the present invention.

[0018] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable a processor to implement the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on a dual-host architecture as described in any embodiment of the present invention when executed.

[0019] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer program product is provided, the computer program product comprising a computer program, and the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the method for controlling intrinsic safety of a power grid based on a dual-host architecture as described in any embodiment of the present invention.

[0020] The technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention actively obtains the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host through the protection host, and actively completes the trusted verification process of the computing host on the protection host, thereby realizing an active defense solution in which the trusted implementation process does not rely on the operating system of the computing host, thereby enhancing the immunity of the autonomous system and reducing the attack impact and security risks of unknown vulnerabilities.

[0021] It should be understood that the contents described in this section are not intended to identify the key or important features of the embodiments of the present invention, nor are they intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Other features of the present invention will become easily understood through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0023] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of a power grid endogenous safety control method based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 is a flow chart of another power grid endogenous safety control method based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3 This is a flow chart of a whitelist strategy dynamic update provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4 It is a structural block diagram of a power grid endogenous safety control system based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0027] Figure 5 It is a structural block diagram of another power grid endogenous safety control system based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0028] Figure 6 It is a structural schematic diagram of a power grid endogenous safety control device based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0029] Figure 7 It is a structural block diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0030] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the scheme of the present invention, the technical scheme in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0031] It should be noted that the terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of the present invention and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the data used in this way can be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present invention described herein can be implemented in an order other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, for example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units that are clearly listed, but may include other steps or units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0032] The concept of trusted computing was proposed relatively early, and the technical system is relatively complete. In the existing technology, trusted computing technology includes: trusted 1.0 technology, trusted 2.0 technology and trusted 3.0 technology.

[0033] Among them, Trusted 1.0 technology mainly focuses on host reliability. Trust is a basic property of the system, which is used to determine the system's continuous ability to provide services to users. This ability is also called fault tolerance. It mainly solves the problem of host reliability in the mainframe era. It targets the instability of computer components and adopts technologies such as redundant backup, fault diagnosis, and fault-tolerant algorithms to ensure that the information system can still run as expected in the case of local failures. However, it does not provide targeted solutions to threats such as malicious code and hacker attacks.

[0034] The concept of Trusted 2.0 technology is to start from a physically secure trusted root and build a complete trusted chain from the trusted root to the application in the computing environment, so as to provide the system with trusted support functions such as trusted measurement, trusted storage, and trusted reporting, and support the trusted operation of system applications. However, Trusted 2.0 does not have a clear trusted computing theoretical model, does not solve the trust problem from the perspective of computer architecture, and only makes patches on the existing system. The trusted support provided by the trusted solution based on Trusted 2.0 is limited and solidified. In actual applications, it faces insurmountable obstacles in application compatibility, management, and development.

[0035] Trusted 3.0 technology is a trusted computing technology based on an active immune system. Trusted 3.0 proposes that computing components and trusted components constitute logically independent systems, and trusted components actively monitor computing components to achieve system trust. In this theory, trusted components do not rely on operating systems and core applications and can develop independently, solving many problems faced by Trusted 2.0. It is suitable for building a triple defense system centrally managed by a security management center and is a trusted computing theory that meets my country's network security requirements.

[0036] In the existing technology, Trusted 1.0 technology focuses on host reliability, which is achieved by adding redundant backup, fault-tolerant algorithms and other technologies, but it cannot solve the problem of active malicious attacks.

[0037] Trusted 2.0 technology builds a trusted software stack based on trusted hardware, and implements the trusted behavior of trusted components in the calling process based on cryptography and hardware security technology, and supports the trust of the stage through these trusted behaviors. However, the trusted components here are called by computer components and are the passive party in the trusted mechanism. The implementation of their trustworthiness is heavily dependent on the trustworthiness of computing components such as the operating system and the application itself.

[0038] Trusted 3.0 technology theoretically proposes to construct a logically independent trusted subsystem, through which the host information is actively monitored. However, it only provides theoretical support, lacks practical and operable trusted computing methods and measurement mechanisms, and lacks disposal measures after problems are discovered.

[0039] Based on the Trusted 3.0 technology, the present invention proposes a method for dynamically updating the dual-system protection structure and security whitelist strategy applicable to the dual-host architecture trusted computing, builds a trusted operating environment, increases active disposal means at the system level, and realizes the software and hardware trustworthiness of the device. In addition, the system's own security protection is realized by accessing the whitelist strategy, and at the same time, the self-security protection is continuously enhanced through the whitelist strategy dynamic update mechanism.

[0040] In one embodiment, Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a power grid intrinsic safety control method based on a dual host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is applicable to the situation where the power grid is provided with its own safety protection. The method can be executed by a power grid intrinsic safety control device based on a dual host architecture. The power grid intrinsic safety control device based on a dual host architecture can be implemented in the form of hardware and / or software. The power grid intrinsic safety control device based on a dual host architecture can be configured in a power grid intrinsic safety control system based on a dual host architecture. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0041] S110. In response to a startup instruction of a computing host, obtain trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host.

[0042] Among them, the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices. Among them, the computing host refers to a host used to perform power grid business functions; the protection host refers to a host used to perform trusted measurement functions and monitor the operation of the computing host. In one example, the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices, that is, two devices with differences in one or more of the hardware structure, operating system, instruction set and performance characteristics (such as processing power, memory capacity, network bandwidth and storage speed, etc.) contained in the two. In an embodiment, the computing host includes hardware equipment, an operating system, application software and trusted firmware; the protection host includes a control module, a monitoring module, a policy module and a trusted cryptographic module.

[0043] Among them, the trusted parameters to be verified refer to parameters that can be used to characterize the integrity of the hardware devices, operating systems, and application software in the computing host. In one example, the trusted parameters to be verified may include parameters for characterizing the characteristics of the hardware devices, parameters for characterizing the integrity of the operating system, and parameters for characterizing the integrity of the application software. Exemplarily, the trusted parameters to be verified include at least one of the following indicators: hardware feature value, computing host boot program summary value, computing host kernel program summary value, computing host file system summary value, computing host startup configuration file summary value, computing host key file list summary value, and computing host business program summary value. Among them, the hardware characteristic value is used to describe the parameters or information of the hardware device characteristics in the computing host. For example, the hardware characteristic value may include but is not limited to: the serial number, disk size, memory size, MAC address and CPU model of the hardware device; the computing host boot program summary value is used to verify the integrity of the computing host boot program and whether it has been tampered with. The computing host boot program summary value can be a fixed-length value obtained by performing a specific algorithm operation on the boot program (such as the BIOS program) in the computing host; the computing host kernel program summary value is used to characterize the consistency and security of the system kernel program, and can be a summary value calculated for the computing host's operating system kernel program; the computing host file system summary value is used to verify the integrity of the computing host boot program and whether it has been tampered with. The digest value of the computing host startup configuration file is used to characterize whether unauthorized tampering has occurred in the file system, and can be a value obtained by performing hash calculations on the contents of the entire file system; the digest value of the computing host startup configuration file is used to characterize whether unauthorized tampering has occurred in the startup configuration file, and can be a value obtained by performing hash calculations on the startup configuration file; the digest value of the computing host key file list is used to characterize whether unauthorized tampering has occurred in the key file list, and can be a value obtained by performing hash calculations on the key file list; the digest value of the computing host business program is used to characterize the integrity and reliability of the application software related to the power grid business, and can be a digest value calculated for the specific application software related to the power grid business running on the computing host. Generally speaking, the computing host boot program digest value, the computing host kernel program digest value, the computing host file system digest value, the computing host startup configuration file digest value, and the computing host key file list digest value are all parameters obtained by measuring the trustworthiness of the computing host's operating system.

[0044] Among them, the startup instruction of the computing host is used to trigger the instruction for the computing host to start running. The protection host is started before the computing host, and the protection host is used to physically control the start and stop operations of the computing host. In an embodiment, after the protection host establishes a communication connection with the trusted firmware in the computing host, the operating parameters of the hardware devices, operating system and application software in the computing host are regularly collected through the trusted firmware, and the trusted parameters to be verified of the system boot program, kernel program and file system are determined based on these operating parameters through the trusted firmware as the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host. Specifically, the trusted firmware can send the serial number, disk size, memory size, MAC address and CPU model of the hardware device to the protection host, and then the protection host splices the serial number, disk size, memory size, MAC address and CPU model of the hardware device into one or more character strings, and uses them as input parameters of the trusted measurement algorithm, so as to output the corresponding measurement value through the trusted measurement algorithm as the trusted measurement value of the hardware device; the trusted firmware can splice the boot program, startup configuration file, system kernel program, file system and key file list of the operating system into one or more character strings, and use them as input parameters of the trusted measurement algorithm, so as to output the corresponding measurement value through the trusted measurement algorithm, as the trusted measurement value of the operating system, that is, to obtain the corresponding computing host boot program summary value, computing host kernel program summary value, computing host file system summary value, computing host startup configuration file summary value and computing host key file list summary value; the trusted firmware can splice the relevant operating parameters of the application (such as performance parameters, network parameters and data processing parameters) into one or more character strings, and use them as input parameters of the trusted measurement algorithm, so as to output the corresponding measurement value through the trusted measurement algorithm, as the trusted measurement value of the application, that is, to obtain the corresponding computing host business program summary value.

[0045] S120: Determine the actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trusted parameters to be verified.

[0046] The actual trust metric value is used to characterize whether unauthorized tampering occurs to the computing host, and the actual trust metric value can be determined based on the integrity, reliability, consistency and historical operations of the computing host. In an embodiment, the computing host includes hardware devices, operating systems and application software, and correspondingly, the protection host can determine the actual trust metric value of the computing host based on the integrity, reliability, consistency and historical operations corresponding to the hardware devices, operating systems and application software.

[0047] S130 , dynamically controlling the operation of the computing host according to the actual trust metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

[0048] Among them, the initial whitelist policy refers to the latest whitelist policy loaded in the protection host. In one example, the whitelist policy may include: whitelist policies corresponding to hardware devices, operating systems, and application software. In actual operation, since the computing host may include multiple different application software, the whitelist policies corresponding to different application software are also different, and the whitelist policy corresponding to each application software can also be dynamically adjusted according to specific operating parameters. Since the hardware devices and operating system of the computing host are generally unchanged, its whitelist policy can be unchanged. Of course, if the relevant parameters corresponding to the hardware devices and operating system of the computing host are adjusted within the allowable range and with authorization, the corresponding whitelist policy can also be dynamically adjusted. In an embodiment, the initial whitelist policies corresponding to the hardware device, operating system and application software can be represented by a trust metric value respectively, that is, the actual trust metric value of the hardware device is compared with the trust metric value of its corresponding initial whitelist policy. If the two are consistent, the hardware device complies with its corresponding initial whitelist policy; the actual trust metric value of the operating system is compared with the trust metric value of its corresponding initial whitelist policy. If the two are consistent, the operating system complies with its corresponding initial whitelist policy; and the actual trust metric value of the application software is compared with the trust metric value of its corresponding initial whitelist policy. If the two are consistent, the application software complies with its corresponding initial whitelist policy; then, if the actual trust metric values ​​of the hardware device, operating system and application software all comply with the corresponding initial whitelist policy, the computing host is controlled to continue running; if one of the actual trust metric values ​​of the hardware device, operating system and application software does not comply with the corresponding initial whitelist policy, the computing host is controlled to stop running.

[0049] The technical solution of this embodiment actively obtains the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host through the protection host, and actively completes the trusted verification process of the computing host on the protection host, thereby realizing an active defense solution in which the trusted implementation process does not rely on the operating system of the computing host, thereby enhancing the immunity of the autonomous system and reducing the attack impact and security risks of unknown vulnerabilities.

[0050] In one embodiment, Figure 2 This is a flowchart of another power grid intrinsic security control method based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention. This embodiment is based on the above embodiment, and further explains the integrity verification process of the protection host, the acquisition process of the trusted parameters to be verified, and the determination process of the actual trusted measurement value. In the embodiment, the protection host includes: a trusted cryptographic module, a control module, a monitoring module, and a policy module; the computing host includes: trusted firmware, hardware devices, an operating system, and application software. Figure 2 As shown, the method includes:

[0051] S210. In response to the startup instruction of the protection host, the system boot program, kernel program and file system of the protection host are sequentially measured by the trusted cryptographic module to obtain corresponding first trusted measurement value, second trusted measurement value and third trusted measurement value.

[0052] Among them, the startup instruction of the protection host is used to trigger the instruction for the protection host to start running. For example, the startup instruction of the protection host can be the power-on instruction of the protection host. After the protection host is powered on, the protection host starts, and the trusted password module in the protection host is started, and the full-function self-test is performed through the trusted password module, and the self-test success information is returned after the complete self-test. In one example, the trusted password module can use a trusted metric algorithm to calculate the system boot program of the protection host to obtain a corresponding first trusted metric value, and then use the trusted metric algorithm to calculate the kernel program to obtain a corresponding second trusted metric value, and then use the trusted metric algorithm to calculate the file system to obtain a corresponding third trusted metric value. Of course, the trusted password module does not limit the order of the trusted metrics of the system boot program, kernel program and file system of the protection host. In one example, the trusted metric algorithm can be SM1, SM2 or SM3 national secret algorithm, and the trusted metric algorithms used by the system boot program, kernel program and file system can be the same or different, and this is not limited.

[0053] S220. Determine the integrity verification result of the protection host through a trusted cryptographic module according to the comparison result of the first trusted metric value and the first preset trusted metric threshold, the comparison result of the second trusted metric value and the second preset trusted metric threshold, and the comparison result of the third trusted metric value and the third preset trusted metric threshold, so that the control module controls the startup operation of the computing host based on the integrity verification result.

[0054] Among them, the first preset trust metric threshold refers to the trust metric value used to characterize the integrity, reliability and consistency of the system boot program; the second preset trust metric threshold refers to the trust metric value used to characterize the integrity, reliability and consistency of the kernel program; the third preset trust metric threshold refers to the trust metric value used to characterize the integrity, reliability and consistency of the file system. In one example, during the initialization of the protection host, the system boot program, kernel program and file system of the protection host can be trusted to obtain the corresponding first preset trust metric threshold, second preset trust metric threshold and third preset trust metric threshold, and then the first preset trust metric threshold, second preset trust metric threshold and third preset trust metric threshold are written into the PCR register of the trusted password module in the protection host. The trusted password module determines whether the first trust metric value and the first preset trust metric threshold are consistent. If they are consistent, the system boot program passes the trusted verification; then determines whether the second trust metric value and the second preset trust metric threshold are consistent. If they are consistent, the kernel program passes the trusted verification; then determines whether the third trust metric value and the third preset trust metric threshold are consistent. If they are consistent, the file system passes the trusted verification. If any trust metric value in the system boot program, kernel program and file system is inconsistent with the corresponding preset trust metric threshold, the integrity check result of the protection host is verification failure; if all trust metric values ​​in the system boot program, kernel program and file system are consistent with the corresponding preset trust metric threshold, the integrity check result of the protection host is verification passed.

[0055] It should be noted that the protection host does not participate in the calculation process of the power grid business function, that is, the trust measurement process of the system boot program, kernel program and file system in the protection host only needs to be executed once. During the process of the computing host executing power grid business, the existing attack sources cannot attack the protection host, thus ensuring the trustworthy security of the protection host.

[0056] S230. In response to a startup instruction from the computing host, the monitoring module receives trusted parameters to be verified and corresponding trusted signature information to be verified sent by the trusted firmware.

[0057] Among them, the trusted signature information to be verified is obtained by the trusted firmware using the trusted firmware private key to sign the trusted parameters to be verified. When the integrity check result of the protection host is that the verification is passed, the protection host controls the computing host to power on to start the computing host. The monitoring module in the protection host can generate an information collection instruction, and the monitoring module private key is used to sign the information collection instruction to generate the corresponding information collection signature information, and the information collection instruction and the information collection signature information are sent to the trusted firmware in the computing host; after the trusted firmware receives the information collection instruction and the information collection signature information, the monitoring module certificate is used to verify the information collection signature information, and after the verification is passed, the trusted firmware collects the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host, and the trusted firmware private key is used to sign the trusted parameters to be verified, and the corresponding trusted signature information to be verified is generated, and the trusted parameters to be verified and the trusted signature information to be verified are sent to the monitoring module.

[0058] S240: Verify the trusted signature information to be verified by using a pre-configured trusted firmware certificate through a trusted cryptographic module to obtain a corresponding trusted signature verification result.

[0059] After the monitoring module receives the trusted parameters to be verified and the corresponding trusted signature information to be verified, the trusted cryptographic module uses a pre-configured trusted firmware certificate to verify the trusted signature information to obtain the corresponding trusted signature verification result.

[0060] S250: When the result of the trusted signature verification is that the signature verification is passed, the actual trust measurement value of the computing host is determined by the trusted cryptographic module based on the trusted parameters to be verified of the hardware device, the operating system and the application software.

[0061] When the result of the trusted signature verification is passed, the trusted cryptographic module analyzes the trusted parameters to be verified corresponding to the hardware device, operating system and application software respectively to determine the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host. Specifically, if the trusted parameters to be verified corresponding to the hardware device, operating system and application software respectively are all verified, then the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host is passed; if one of the trusted parameters to be verified corresponding to the hardware device, operating system and application software respectively fails the verification, then the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host is failed.

[0062] S260: Sign the actual trusted measurement value using the private key of the monitoring module through the trusted cryptographic module to obtain corresponding trusted measurement signature information.

[0063] Among them, the monitoring module private key is a secret key used to encrypt and decrypt data, and perform digital signatures and identity authentication operations. The private key is unique and confidential. After the actual trusted measurement value is signed with the monitoring module private key, the corresponding trusted measurement signature information can be obtained.

[0064] S270: Send the actual trust metric value and the trust metric signature information to the policy module through the monitoring module.

[0065] S280. The policy module uses the certificate of the monitoring module to verify the trusted metric signature information to obtain a corresponding trusted metric verification result.

[0066] The certificate of the monitoring module can be a digital certificate used to characterize the identity of the monitoring module and the validity and legality of its attributes. The certificate of the monitoring module can include: a public key and a digital signature. After the actual trusted measurement value is signed with the private key of the monitoring module, the certificate of the monitoring module is required to verify the trusted measurement signature information.

[0067] S290: When the trusted metric verification result is that the trusted metric verification is passed, the policy module analyzes the actual trusted metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy to dynamically control the operation of the computing host.

[0068] In one embodiment, an actual trusted metric value and a pre-loaded initial whitelist policy are analyzed by a policy module to dynamically control the operation of a computing host, including: when the actual trusted metric value meets the initial whitelist policy, the computing host is controlled to continue to run by the control module; when the actual trusted metric value does not meet the initial whitelist policy, the actual trusted metric value is sent to the policy module by the monitoring module, and the actual trusted metric value is analyzed by the policy module to obtain a corresponding metric value analysis result; when the metric value analysis result is normal, a new whitelist policy is generated by the policy module, and the initial whitelist policy is dynamically updated with the new whitelist policy, and the computing host is controlled to continue to run by the control module; when the metric value analysis result is abnormal, the computing host is handled abnormally by the control module.

[0069] Among them, the metric analysis result is used to characterize the analysis result corresponding to the new actual trusted metric value obtained by trust measurement of the running parameters of the application program in the computing host after the authorized operation is performed; the new whitelist policy refers to the new trusted metric threshold obtained by trust measurement of the running parameters of the application program after the authorized operation is performed on the application program in the computing host. If the actual trusted metric value meets the initial whitelist policy, the control module controls the computing host to continue to run; if the actual trusted metric value does not meet the initial whitelist policy, the monitoring module sends the new actual trusted metric value to the policy module so that the policy module detects whether the actual trusted metric value is abnormal. If the new actual trusted metric value is normal, the policy module generates a new whitelist policy that matches the actual trusted metric value and reloads the new whitelist policy; if the new actual trusted metric value is abnormal, the control module performs abnormal processing on the computing host. In one embodiment, the control module performs abnormal processing on the computing host, including: stopping access to the computing host process through the control module, stopping the computing host system process, and shutting down the entire system of the computing host. The control module can terminate the process access to the computing host, stop the system process of the computing host, and stop the operation of the entire system of the computing host. It can also be understood that the control module physically controls the computing host to power off.

[0070] In one embodiment, the trusted verification process based on the dual-host architecture includes the following steps:

[0071] Step 1: After the whole machine is powered on, the protection host starts.

[0072] Step 2: Start the trusted cryptographic module (TCM) in the protection host. The trusted cryptographic module performs a full-function self-test and returns a self-test success after completing the self-test.

[0073] Step 3: The trusted cryptographic module uses the SM3 national cryptographic algorithm to perform an HMAC operation on the system boot program of the protection host to obtain a first trust measurement value, recorded as TV1, and determines whether it is consistent with the first preset trust measurement threshold (recorded as PCR1 value) in the PCR register in the trusted cryptographic module. If consistent, the trust measurement of the system boot program passes the verification.

[0074] Step 4: The trusted cryptographic module uses the SM3 national encryption algorithm to perform HMAC operation on the kernel program in the protection host to obtain a second trust measurement value, recorded as TV2, and determines whether it is consistent with the second preset trust measurement threshold (recorded as PCR2 value) in the PCR register in the trusted cryptographic module. If consistent, the trust measurement of the kernel program passes the verification.

[0075] Step 5: The trusted cryptographic module uses the SM3 national cryptographic algorithm to perform HMAC operation on the file system in the protection host, obtains a third trust measurement value, denoted as TV3, and determines whether it is consistent with the third preset trust measurement threshold (denoted as PCR3) value in the PCR register in the trusted cryptographic module. If consistent, the trust measurement of the file system passes the verification.

[0076] If any of the measurement values ​​in step 6 and step 3-5 are inconsistent, the integrity verification of the protection host fails.

[0077] Step 7: After the integrity check of the protection host passes, start the computing host.

[0078] Step 8: The monitoring module periodically communicates with the trusted firmware at intervals of 5 minutes.

[0079] Step 9: The monitoring module generates an information collection instruction (referred to as IA), signs the information collection instruction IA using the monitoring module private key, generates information collection signature information (referred to as SIA), and sends IA and SIA to the trusted firmware.

[0080] Step 10: After receiving IA and SIA, the trusted firmware uses the monitoring module certificate to verify the signature of the information collection message. After the signature verification is passed, the trusted firmware collects the trusted parameters to be verified (referred to as MA) of the computing host (wherein MA may include hardware feature values, computing host boot program summary values, computing host kernel program summary values, computing host file system summary values, and computing host business program summary values, etc.), and uses the trusted firmware private key to sign MA, generate trusted signature information to be verified (referred to as SMA), and send MA and SMA to the monitoring module.

[0081] Step 11: After the monitoring module receives MA and SMA, the trusted cryptographic module uses the trusted firmware certificate to verify the trusted signature information. After the signature verification is passed, the trusted parameter MA to be verified is analyzed and processed to generate the corresponding actual trusted measurement value (represented as PA), and the private key of the monitoring module is used to sign PA to generate trusted measurement signature information (represented as SPA), and PA and SPA are sent to the policy module.

[0082] Step 12: After receiving PA and SPA, the policy module uses the monitoring module certificate to verify the trusted measurement signature information. After the signature verification is passed, the PA is analyzed and tested to see if it complies with the current initial whitelist policy. If it does, it passes and the control module controls the computing host to continue running.

[0083] Step 13: If it does not comply with the current initial whitelist policy, the policy module generates a control instruction IB, signs the instruction IB using the policy module private key, generates a signature SIB, and sends the IB and SIB to the control module.

[0084] Step 14: After receiving the IB and SIB, the control module uses the policy module certificate to verify the signature of the message. After the signature verification is passed, the corresponding system operation instruction IC is generated according to the IB instruction, the instruction IC is signed using the control module certificate, and the signature SIC is generated, and the IC and SIC are sent to the trusted firmware of the computing host.

[0085] Step 15: After receiving IC and SIC, the trusted firmware uses the control module certificate to verify the signature of the message. After the signature verification is passed, the system operation instruction is executed to protect the normal, stable and safe operation of the host.

[0086] In one embodiment, Figure 3 1 is a flowchart of a whitelist strategy dynamic update provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 As shown, the process of dynamic update of whitelist policy includes the following steps:

[0087] S310: After the protection host is started, the policy module in the protection host loads the initial whitelist policy.

[0088] S320: The trusted firmware in the computing host periodically collects the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host.

[0089] The trusted parameters to be verified may include hardware feature values, computing host boot program summary values, computing host kernel program summary values, computing host file system summary values, and computing host business program summary values, etc. The trusted parameters to be verified are signed using a trusted firmware certificate to generate corresponding trusted signature information to be verified, and the trusted parameters to be verified and the trusted signature information to be verified are sent to the protection host.

[0090] S330. The trusted cryptographic module in the protection host uses the SM3 algorithm to determine the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host based on the trusted parameters to be verified.

[0091] In an embodiment, the monitoring module uses a trusted firmware certificate to verify the trusted parameters to be verified and the trusted signature information to be verified, and after the verification is passed, the trusted cryptographic module can use the SM3 algorithm to generate a corresponding actual trusted measurement value (denoted as B) based on the trusted parameters to be verified.

[0092] S340. The policy module in the protection host determines whether the actual trust metric value complies with the initial whitelist policy; if so, execute S350; if not, execute S360.

[0093] S350: Allow the computing host to continue running.

[0094] S360, sending the new actual trust metric value to the policy module to detect whether the change of the new actual trust metric value is normal, if so, executing S370; if not, executing S380.

[0095] S370: Generate a new whitelist policy according to the new actual trust metric value and authorize it.

[0096] S380. Record the log and report it.

[0097] S390, calling the control module to handle exceptions on the computing host, including access control to the computing host process, starting and stopping the computing host system process, and turning on and off the computing host system.

[0098] In this embodiment, the protection host actively obtains the information of the computing host through the trusted firmware, and all trusted verifications are actively completed by the protection component. The trusted implementation does not depend on the operating system of the computing host and its own trustworthiness, which enhances the immunity of the autonomous system. By protecting the control module of the host, the immunity of the autonomous system is enhanced and the impact of unknown vulnerability attacks is reduced.

[0099] In one embodiment, Figure 4 This is a block diagram of a power grid intrinsic safety control system based on a dual-host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention. It should be noted that the power grid intrinsic safety control system based on a dual-host architecture can also be understood as a power Internet of Things smart terminal for power grid intrinsic safety control based on a dual-host architecture, and is a smart terminal used in power Internet of Things services. Figure 4 As shown, the power grid endogenous safety control system based on the dual-host architecture in this embodiment includes: a protection host 410 and a computing host 420; wherein the protection host 410 and the computing host 420 are heterogeneous devices;

[0100] In response to the startup instruction of the computing host 420, the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host 420 are obtained through the protection host 410, and the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host 420 is determined based on the trusted parameters to be verified; the operation of the computing host 420 is dynamically controlled based on the actual trusted measurement value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

[0101] In one embodiment, Figure 5 is a structural block diagram of another power grid endogenous safety control system based on a dual host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 As shown, this embodiment is Figure 4Based on the above, the structures of the protection host and the computing host are further described. The protection host 410 includes: a trusted cryptographic module 4101, a control module 4102, a monitoring module 4103 and a policy module 4104; the computing host 420 includes: a trusted firmware 4201, a hardware device 4202, an operating system 4203 and an application software 4204.

[0102] In the embodiment, the control system adopts a dual-host architecture, and the protection host 410 and the computing host 420 are heterogeneous, one of which is used as a computing host to perform business functions; the other host is used as a protection host, and a trusted cryptographic module is installed to perform trusted measurement functions, and continuous policy monitoring is performed on the computing host during its operation, and dynamic updates of the security whitelist policy are realized. The protection host 410 is started before the computing host 420, and can physically control the start and stop of the computing host 420 (the protection host can control the power supply of the computing host). When it is detected that the computing host 420 is invaded and the computing host 420 cannot be controlled by policy, the computing host 420 is forcibly shut down through physical control of the protection host 410 to reduce security risks.

[0103] The computing host 420 includes a trusted firmware 4201, a hardware device 4202, an operating system 4203, and an application software 4204. When the system is powered on, first, after completing the trusted measurement of the trusted firmware 4201, the protection host 410 allows the computing host 420 to load the trusted firmware 4201; secondly, the trusted firmware 4201 performs a trusted measurement on the hardware device 4202 on the system. The trusted measurement of the hardware device 4202 is achieved by verifying the characteristic data of the hardware device 4202 (the hardware serial number, disk size, memory size and other information are combined, and the generated measurement values ​​are different due to different sorting), so as to realize the authentication of the entire hardware device; thirdly, the trusted firmware 4201 performs a trusted measurement on the operating system 4203, and performs a trusted measurement on the system kernel, file system, startup configuration file and key file list, and checks whether the contents of these files have been tampered with; finally, the trusted firmware 4201 performs a trusted measurement on the application software 4204, and measures the execution program and configuration file of the application software 4204.

[0104] The protection host 410 is composed of four parts: a trusted cryptographic module 4101, a control module 4102, a monitoring module 4103, and a policy module 4104. The trusted cryptographic module 4101 is used to provide basic functions such as cryptographic calculation and identity authentication, and supports the national secret SM2, SM3, and SM4 algorithms; the policy module 4104 performs threat intelligence analysis, dynamically generates security policies, realizes dynamic updates of security whitelist policies, realizes the security capabilities of active immune defense, has lightweight environmental measurement policies, and has measurement policies for business behaviors. The monitoring module 4103 is used to regularly monitor the behaviors of the protection host 410 and the computing host 420, communicate with the trusted firmware 4201 in the computing host 420, regularly collect data and behaviors of the computing host 420, and hand over the collected data to the policy module 4104 for analysis to protect the software and application security of the computing host 420; the control module 4102 realizes the function of the protection host 410 controlling the computing host 420, including the access control function of the computing host process, the start and stop function of the computing host system process, and the start and stop function of the computing host system.

[0105] It should be noted that Figure 4 and Figure 5 The power grid intrinsic safety control system based on dual-host architecture shown is used to execute the above-mentioned power grid intrinsic safety control method based on dual-host architecture.

[0106] In one embodiment, Figure 6 Schematic diagram of the structure of a power grid endogenous safety control device based on a dual host architecture provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 6 As shown, the device includes: an acquisition module 610, a first determination module 620 and a control module 630.

[0107] The acquisition module 610 is used to obtain the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host in response to the startup instruction of the computing host; wherein the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices;

[0108] A first determination module 620, configured to determine an actual trust metric value of a computing host according to a trustworthy parameter to be verified;

[0109] The control module 630 is used to dynamically control the operation of the computing host according to the actual trust metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

[0110] In one embodiment, the protection host includes a trusted cryptographic module and a control module; before responding to a startup instruction of the computing host and obtaining the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host, the power grid endogenous safety control device based on the dual-host architecture further includes:

[0111] The measurement module is used to respond to the startup instruction of the protection host, and to measure the integrity of the system boot program, kernel program and file system of the protection host in sequence through the trusted cryptographic module to obtain the corresponding first trusted measurement value, second trusted measurement value and third trusted measurement value;

[0112] The second determination module is used to determine the integrity verification result of the protection host through the trusted cryptographic module according to the comparison result of the first trust metric value and the first preset trust metric threshold, the comparison result of the second trust metric value and the second preset trust metric threshold, and the comparison result of the third trust metric value and the third preset trust metric threshold, so that the control module controls the startup operation of the computing host based on the integrity verification result.

[0113] In one embodiment, the computing host includes: trusted firmware; the protection host includes a monitoring module and a trusted cryptographic module; obtaining the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host is specifically used for:

[0114] The trusted parameters to be verified and the corresponding trusted signature information to be verified sent by the trusted firmware are received through the monitoring module; wherein the trusted signature information to be verified is obtained by the trusted firmware signing the trusted parameters to be verified using the trusted firmware private key.

[0115] In one embodiment, before determining the actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trustworthy parameters to be verified, the power grid endogenous safety control device based on the dual-host architecture further includes:

[0116] The signature verification module is used to verify the trusted signature information to be verified by using a pre-configured trusted firmware certificate through a trusted cryptographic module to obtain a corresponding trusted signature verification result;

[0117] Correspondingly, the first determination module is specifically used to determine the actual trust measurement value of the computing host based on the trusted parameters to be verified of the hardware device, the operating system and the application software through the trusted cryptographic module when the trusted verification result is passed.

[0118] In one embodiment, the protection host includes: a trusted password module, a policy module, a control module and a monitoring module; the control module includes:

[0119] The signature unit is used to sign the actual trusted measurement value using the private key of the monitoring module through the trusted cryptographic module to obtain the corresponding trusted measurement signature information;

[0120] A sending unit, used to send the actual trusted measurement value and the trusted measurement signature information to the policy module through the monitoring module;

[0121] The signature verification unit is used to verify the trusted measurement signature information using the certificate of the monitoring module through the policy module to obtain the corresponding trusted measurement signature verification result;

[0122] The analysis unit is used to analyze the actual trusted metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy through the policy module when the trusted metric verification result is that the trusted metric verification is passed, so as to dynamically control the operation of the computing host.

[0123] In one embodiment, the policy module analyzes the actual trust metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy to dynamically control the operation of the computing host, specifically for:

[0124] When the actual trust measurement value meets the initial whitelist policy, the computing host is controlled to continue running through the control module;

[0125] When the actual trusted metric value does not meet the initial whitelist policy, the monitoring module sends the actual trusted metric value to the policy module, and the policy module analyzes the actual trusted metric value to obtain the corresponding metric value analysis result;

[0126] When the metric analysis result is normal, a new whitelist policy is generated through the policy module, and the new whitelist policy is used to dynamically update the initial whitelist policy, and the computing host is controlled to continue running through the control module;

[0127] When the metric analysis result is abnormal, the control module performs abnormal processing on the computing host.

[0128] In one embodiment, the control module performs exception processing on the computing host, specifically for: stopping access to the computing host process, stopping the system process of the computing host, and shutting down the entire system of the computing host through the control module.

[0129] The power grid intrinsic safety control device based on dual-host architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention can execute the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on dual-host architecture provided in any embodiment of the present invention, and has the corresponding functional modules and beneficial effects of the execution method.

[0130] In one embodiment, Figure 7 is a structural block diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 7As shown, a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device 10 that can be used to implement an embodiment of the present invention is shown. The electronic device is intended to represent various forms of digital computers, such as laptop computers, desktop computers, workbenches, personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframe computers, and other suitable computers. The electronic device can also represent various forms of mobile devices, such as personal digital processing, cellular phones, smart phones, wearable devices (such as helmets, glasses, watches, etc.) and other similar computing devices. The components shown herein, their connections and relationships, and their functions are merely examples and are not intended to limit the implementation of the present invention described and / or required herein. In one example, the electronic device 10 can be a protection host or a computing host, but the protection host and the computing host are two different electronic devices.

[0131] like Figure 7 As shown, the electronic device 10 includes at least one processor 11, and a memory connected to the at least one processor 11, such as a read-only memory (ROM) 12, a random access memory (RAM) 13, etc., wherein the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by at least one processor, and the processor 11 can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to the computer program stored in the read-only memory (ROM) 12 or the computer program loaded from the storage unit 18 to the random access memory (RAM) 13. In the RAM 13, various programs and data required for the operation of the electronic device 10 can also be stored. The processor 11, the ROM 12, and the RAM 13 are connected to each other through a bus 14. An input / output (I / O) interface 15 is also connected to the bus 14.

[0132] A number of components in the electronic device 10 are connected to the I / O interface 15, including: an input unit 16, such as a keyboard, a mouse, etc.; an output unit 17, such as various types of displays, speakers, etc.; a storage unit 18, such as a disk, an optical disk, etc.; and a communication unit 19, such as a network card, a modem, a wireless communication transceiver, etc. The communication unit 19 allows the electronic device 10 to exchange information / data with other devices through a computer network such as the Internet and / or various telecommunication networks.

[0133] The processor 11 may be a variety of general and / or special processing components with processing and computing capabilities. Some examples of the processor 11 include, but are not limited to, a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), various special artificial intelligence (AI) computing chips, various processors running machine learning model algorithms, a digital signal processor (DSP), and any appropriate processor, controller, microcontroller, etc. The processor 11 executes the various methods and processes described above, such as the power grid endogenous security control method based on the dual host architecture.

[0134] In some embodiments, the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on the dual host architecture can be implemented as a computer program, which is tangibly contained in a computer-readable storage medium, such as a storage unit 18. In some embodiments, part or all of the computer program can be loaded and / or installed on the electronic device 10 via the ROM 12 and / or the communication unit 19. When the computer program is loaded into the RAM 13 and executed by the processor 11, one or more steps of the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on the dual host architecture described above can be executed. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the processor 11 can be configured to execute the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on the dual host architecture in any other appropriate manner (for example, by means of firmware).

[0135] Various implementations of the systems and techniques described above herein can be implemented in digital electronic circuit systems, integrated circuit systems, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on chips (SOCs), load programmable logic devices (CPLDs), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various implementations can include: being implemented in one or more computer programs that can be executed and / or interpreted on a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, which can be a special purpose or general purpose programmable processor that can receive data and instructions from a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device, and transmit data and instructions to the storage system, the at least one input device, and the at least one output device.

[0136] Computer programs for implementing the methods of the present invention may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These computer programs may be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing device, so that when the computer program is executed by the processor, the functions / operations specified in the flow chart and / or block diagram are implemented. The computer program may be executed entirely on the machine, partially on the machine, partially on the machine and partially on a remote machine as a stand-alone software package, or entirely on a remote machine or server.

[0137] In the context of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium may be a tangible medium that may contain or store a computer program for use by or in combination with an instruction execution system, device or equipment. A computer-readable storage medium may include, but is not limited to, electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor systems, devices or equipment, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Alternatively, a computer-readable storage medium may be a machine-readable signal medium. A more specific example of a machine-readable storage medium may include an electrical connection based on one or more lines, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0138] To provide interaction with a user, the systems and techniques described herein may be implemented on an electronic device having: a display device (e.g., a CRT (cathode ray tube) or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor) for displaying information to the user; and a keyboard and a pointing device (e.g., a mouse or trackball) through which the user can provide input to the electronic device. Other types of devices may also be used to provide interaction with the user; for example, the feedback provided to the user may be any form of sensory feedback (e.g., visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback); and input from the user may be received in any form (including acoustic input, voice input, or tactile input).

[0139] The systems and techniques described herein may be implemented in a computing system that includes backend components (e.g., as a data server), or a computing system that includes middleware components (e.g., an application server), or a computing system that includes frontend components (e.g., a user computer with a graphical user interface or a web browser through which a user can interact with implementations of the systems and techniques described herein), or a computing system that includes any combination of such backend components, middleware components, or frontend components. The components of the system may be interconnected by any form or medium of digital data communication (e.g., a communication network). Examples of communication networks include: a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a blockchain network, and the Internet.

[0140] A computing system may include a client and a server. The client and the server are generally remote from each other and usually interact through a communication network. The client and server relationship is generated by computer programs running on the corresponding computers and having a client-server relationship with each other. The server may be a cloud server, also known as a cloud computing server or cloud host, which is a host product in the cloud computing service system to solve the defects of difficult management and weak business scalability in traditional physical hosts and VPS services.

[0141] An embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, can implement the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on a dual-host architecture as provided in any embodiment of the present invention.

[0142] In the process of implementation, the computer program product can be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof to perform the computer program code of the present invention, including object-oriented programming languages, such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, and conventional procedural programming languages, such as "C" language or similar programming languages. The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a separate software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or can be connected to an external computer (for example, using an Internet service provider to connect through the Internet).

[0143] It should be understood that the various forms of processes shown above can be used to reorder, add or delete steps. For example, the steps described in the present invention can be executed in parallel, sequentially or in different orders, as long as the desired results of the technical solution of the present invention can be achieved, and this document does not limit this.

[0144] The above specific implementations do not constitute a limitation on the protection scope of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that various modifications, combinations, sub-combinations and substitutions can be made according to design requirements and other factors. Any modification, equivalent substitution and improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A power grid endogenous security control method based on a dual-host architecture, characterized in that: Applied to the protection host, including: In response to a startup instruction of a computing host, obtaining a trusted parameter to be verified of the computing host; wherein the computing host and the protection host are heterogeneous devices; Determining an actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trustworthy parameter to be verified; The operation of the computing host is dynamically controlled according to the actual trust metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The protection host includes a trusted password module and a control module; Before the step of obtaining the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host in response to the startup instruction of the computing host, the step further includes: In response to a startup instruction of the protection host, the system boot program, kernel program and file system of the protection host are sequentially measured by the trusted cryptographic module to obtain a corresponding first trust metric value, a second trust metric value and a third trust metric value; The trusted cryptographic module determines the integrity verification result of the protection host according to the comparison result of the first trusted metric value and the first preset trusted metric threshold, the comparison result of the second trusted metric value and the second preset trusted metric threshold, and the comparison result of the third trusted metric value and the third preset trusted metric threshold, so that the control module controls the startup operation of the computing host based on the integrity verification result.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The computing host includes: trusted firmware; the protection host includes a monitoring module and a trusted password module; the obtaining of trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host includes: The monitoring module receives the trusted parameters to be verified and the corresponding trusted signature information to be verified sent by the trusted firmware; wherein the trusted signature information to be verified is obtained by the trusted firmware signing the trusted parameters to be verified using the trusted firmware private key.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The computing host further comprises: hardware equipment, an operating system and application software; before determining the actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trustworthy parameter to be verified, it further comprises: The trusted cryptographic module uses a pre-configured trusted firmware certificate to verify the trusted signature information to be verified, and obtains a corresponding trusted signature verification result; Correspondingly, determining the actual trust metric value of the computing host according to the trustworthy parameter to be verified includes: When the result of the trusted signature to be verified is that the signature is passed, the actual trust measurement value of the computing host is determined by the trusted cryptographic module based on the trusted parameters to be verified of the hardware device, the operating system and the application software.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The protection host includes: a trusted password module, a policy module, a control module and a monitoring module; the dynamic control of the operation of the computing host according to the actual trusted metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy includes: The actual trust metric value is signed by the trusted cryptographic module using the private key of the monitoring module to obtain corresponding trusted metric signature information; Sending the actual trust metric value and the trust metric signature information to the policy module through the monitoring module; The policy module uses the certificate of the monitoring module to verify the trusted metric signature information to obtain a corresponding trusted metric signature verification result; When the trusted metric verification result is that the trusted metric verification is passed, the actual trusted metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy are analyzed by the policy module to dynamically control the operation of the computing host.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The analyzing the actual trust metric value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy by the policy module to dynamically control the operation of the computing host includes: In the case where the actual trust metric value meets the initial whitelist policy, controlling the computing host to continue running through the control module; In the case where the actual trust metric value does not conform to the initial whitelist policy, the actual trust metric value is sent to the policy module through the monitoring module, and the actual trust metric value is analyzed by the policy module to obtain a corresponding metric value analysis result; In the case where the metric value analysis result is normal, generating a new whitelist policy through the policy module, dynamically updating the initial whitelist policy using the new whitelist policy, and controlling the computing host to continue running through the control module; When the metric value analysis result is abnormal, the control module performs abnormal processing on the computing host.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that Performing abnormal processing on the computing host by the control module includes: The control module stops access to the process of the computing host, stops the system process of the computing host, and shuts down the entire system of the computing host.

8. A power grid endogenous safety control system based on a dual-host architecture, characterized in that: include: A protection host and a computing host; wherein the protection host and the computing host are heterogeneous devices; In response to the startup instruction of the computing host, the trusted parameters to be verified of the computing host are obtained through the protection host, and the actual trusted measurement value of the computing host is determined according to the trusted parameters to be verified; the operation of the computing host is dynamically controlled according to the actual trusted measurement value and the pre-loaded initial whitelist policy.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device comprises: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores a computer program executable by the at least one processor, and the computer program is executed by the at least one processor so that the at least one processor can execute the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on a dual-host architecture as described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are used to enable a processor to implement the power grid intrinsic safety control method based on a dual-host architecture according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed.

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