Anti-deception jamming data protection method and system for electric power inspection unmanned aerial vehicle

By obtaining the drone's flight speed and position information in real time, dynamically adjusting the flight constraint radius and data transmission strategy, and using token transmission mechanism and information comparison methods to verify the authenticity of data, solving the data security problems caused by deceptive interference in power drone patrols, realizing the secure transmission and authenticity verification of data.

CN119717859AActive Publication Date: 2025-03-28CHINA ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE CO LTD +2

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411928956.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-12-25
Publication Date
2025-03-28
Estimated Expiration
2044-12-25

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

During the inspection of power drones, they face the problems of deceptive interference resulting in misalignment of location information and tampering with or leaking the inspection data.

Method used

By obtaining the flight speed and position information of the drone in real time, dynamically adjusting the flight constraint radius and data transmission strategy, and using token transmission mechanism and information comparison methods to verify the authenticity and integrity of the data.

Benefits of technology

Effectively identify and respond to deceptive interference, ensure the security and reliability of inspection data, and adapt to different inspection scenarios and interference situations.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle information safety, and particularly relates to an anti-deception jamming data protection method and system for an electric power inspection unmanned aerial vehicle, and the method comprises the steps: firstly obtaining the flight speed and position information of the unmanned aerial vehicle in real time, and dynamically adjusting the actual flight constraint radius of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to the comparison result of the flight speed and a preset threshold value; and calculating the actual flight distance between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the nearest route point, and comparing the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the unmanned aerial vehicle is subjected to position deception interference. And under the condition that the position of the unmanned aerial vehicle is safe, receiving inspection data transmitted by the unmanned aerial vehicle by adopting a token transmission mechanism, and dynamically adjusting a time window of data transmission according to the flight speed. The flight speed and the position information of the unmanned aerial vehicle are acquired in real time, and the flight constraint radius and the data transmission strategy are dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed and the position information, so that the deception jamming is dynamically identified and coped.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security of electric power drones, and specifically relates to a method and system for protecting electric power inspection drones from deceptive interference data. Background Art

[0002] With the continuous improvement of the intelligence and automation level of the power system, power drone inspection, as a new inspection method, has occupied a pivotal position in the power operation and maintenance system. Compared with traditional inspection methods, power drone inspection has the advantages of wide inspection coverage, high efficiency, less manual participation, and low risk, which plays a vital role in the stable operation of the power system.

[0003] However, power drone inspections face many challenges in data transmission and information security. During the inspection process, power drones need to transmit sensitive information such as the status of inspected power facilities in real time. This data is crucial for the safe operation of the power system, but it may also become a target of attack. When drones are attacked by third-party malicious attacks, such as GPS spoofing interference, data link hijacking spoofing interference, etc., the drone's location information will be inaccurate and the inspection data will be tampered with or leaked. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method and system for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data, so as to solve the problems in the prior art that when drones are subjected to deceptive interference, the drone position information may be inaccurate, the inspection data may be tampered with or leaked, and the like.

[0005] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solution: In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for protecting power inspection drones from fraudulent interference data, comprising: Obtain real-time flight speed and location information during drone inspections; Comparing the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjusting the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius; Calculate the actual flight distance between the drone and the nearest route point according to the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the drone is interfered by location spoofing; when the drone is not interfered by location spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the drone by a token transmission mechanism; According to the received inspection data, whether the drone is hijacked by link deception is verified by information comparison; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0006] As an optional solution of the present invention, adjusting the preset flight constraint radius according to the size comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius includes: When the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is enlarged as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than a threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is reduced as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

[0007] As an optional solution of the present invention, in the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the drone with a token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; wherein, when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than a threshold speed, the time window is reduced; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

[0008] As an optional solution of the present invention, comparing the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the drone is interfered by location spoofing includes: When the actual flight distance is greater than the actual flight constraint radius, it is determined that the position of the UAV is spoofed and interfered with; otherwise, the position of the UAV is not spoofed and interfered with.

[0009] As an optional solution of the present invention, calculating the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point according to the position information includes: Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route; According to the latitude and longitude of the starting point and the end point, the north and east components of the direction vector are calculated, and the direction vector of the inspection route is determined according to the north and east components; Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point; Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point as the actual flight distance.

[0010] As an optional solution of the present invention, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection points, which specifically includes: Calculate the vector between the drone position and the starting point of the inspection route ; Calculating vectors The projected length in the direction of the inspection route’s direction vector; Add the projection length to the latitude and longitude of the starting point of the inspection route, and move along the direction of the direction vector to obtain the latitude and longitude of the projection point.

[0011] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a data protection device for preventing deceptive interference of a power inspection drone, comprising: Data acquisition module, used to obtain the flight speed and position information of the drone during the inspection process in real time; A first comparison module is used to compare the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius; The second comparison module is used to calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point according to the position information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is interfered by position spoofing; when the UAV is not interfered by position spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the UAV by a token transmission mechanism; The third comparison module is used to verify whether the drone is hijacked by link deception by using information comparison according to the received inspection data; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0012] As an optional solution of the present invention, in the second comparison module, calculating the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point according to the position information includes: Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route; According to the latitude and longitude of the starting point and the end point, the north and east components of the direction vector are calculated, and the direction vector of the inspection route is determined according to the north and east components; Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point; Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point as the actual flight distance.

[0013] In a third aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the processor is used to execute a computer program stored in the memory to implement the above-mentioned method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data.

[0014] In a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, and when the at least one instruction is executed by a processor, the anti-deceptive interference data protection method for the power inspection drone as described above is implemented.

[0015] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: The anti-deceptive interference data protection method for electric power inspection drones proposed in this scheme provides an effective solution to the data transmission and information security challenges faced during the electric power drone inspection process. The method obtains the flight speed and position information of the drone in real time, and dynamically adjusts the flight constraint radius and data transmission strategy according to the flight speed and position information, thereby realizing dynamic identification and response to deceptive interference. The anti-deceptive interference communication data protection device, electronic device and computer-readable storage medium provided by the present invention also solve the problems raised in the background technology section.

[0016] This solution further ensures the security of inspection data by introducing a token transmission mechanism, through identity authentication and encrypted transmission.

[0017] This solution can adjust the protection strategy in real time according to the flight speed and location information of the drone to adapt to different inspection scenarios and interference situations.

[0018] This solution dynamically adjusts the time window for data transmission, thereby ensuring data security while also taking into account the transmission of important data.

[0019] Through information comparison and integrity verification, this solution can identify data link hijacking, deception and interference, and ensure the authenticity and reliability of inspection data. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0020] The drawings constituting a part of the present application are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the present invention. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a method for protecting data from fraudulent interference of a power inspection drone according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a structural block diagram of a device for protecting communication data from fraudulent interference according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 The present invention is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with embodiments. It should be noted that the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0022] The following detailed description is an exemplary description, which is intended to provide further detailed description of the present invention. Unless otherwise specified, all technical terms used in the present invention have the same meaning as those generally understood by those skilled in the art to which the present application belongs. The terms used in the present invention are only for describing specific embodiments, and are not intended to limit exemplary embodiments according to the present invention.

[0023] Example 1 In this solution, the "flight radius" refers to the distance between the drone and the nearest route point during flight. This distance is represented by the distance of the drone vertically mapped on the inspection route.

[0024] Most existing security protection methods rely on static preset parameters and fixed protection strategies, and are difficult to adapt to the complex and changeable environment and interference during the drone inspection process. Especially in dynamic scenarios such as changes in drone flight speed and route adjustments, traditional protection methods are often unable to timely and effectively identify and respond to various deceptive interferences, resulting in a significant reduction in the security protection effect. An embodiment of the present invention provides a data protection method for power inspection drones against deceptive interference, which stores pre-planned inspection routes in the drone, obtains the GPS information of the current drone, and dynamically updates the constraint radius of the drone flight according to the drone flight speed, based on whether the current position of the drone is always less than the constraint radius from the inspection route. If the distance is always less than the constraint radius, it means that the drone is inspecting in a safe state and data transmission can be performed, otherwise data transmission is interrupted.

[0025] like Figure 1 As shown, a method for protecting data of a power inspection drone from deceptive interference includes: S1. Obtain the flight speed and location information of the drone during the inspection process in real time.

[0026] Specifically, the inspection route is the power line that the drone needs to inspect, and the drone flies according to the pre-planned inspection route during the inspection process. The remote control terminal and the drone both store the pre-planned inspection route.

[0027] In this solution, the flight speed can be obtained in real time through the drone's sensor or control system.

[0028] In this solution, the location information of the drone is GPS location information.

[0029] In some other embodiments, an inertial navigation system may be combined to assist in positioning the drone.

[0030] S2. Compare the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius.

[0031] It should be noted that the length of the flight constraint radius depends to a certain extent on the flight speed of the drone controlled by the operator. When the drone flies at a faster speed, it reflects that the current inspection route is less important. At this time, the flight constraint radius is larger, thereby reducing the transmission overhead between information; when the drone flies at a slower speed, the drone's flight constraint distance is reduced to improve accuracy and ensure that the drone is always in a safe state.

[0032] In step S2, the preset flight constraint radius is adjusted according to the size comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius, specifically including: when the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is enlarged as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is reduced as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

[0033] In this scheme, the actual flight constraint radius of the UAV is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed.

[0034] When adjusting the actual flight constraint radius, the initial parameters include the drone's preset flight constraint radius , speed threshold When the UAV flies at the speed threshold, the actual flight constraint radius is the preset flight constraint radius. When the current speed of the UAV is detected to exceed the threshold, the speed diffusion factor is introduced. , adjust the flight constraint radius.

[0035] The mathematical formula model for adjusting the flight constraint radius is described as follows:

[0036] in, is the actual flight constraint radius, is the velocity diffusion factor.

[0037] S3. Calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point based on the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is interfered by location deception; when the UAV is not interfered by location deception, receive the inspection data transmitted by the UAV by a token transmission mechanism.

[0038] In this solution, the flight constraint radius of the drone is dynamically determined based on the flight speed of the drone, and the current state of the drone is determined by the constraint radius to ensure that information is only transmitted under a safe state; the encrypted inspection data is transmitted to the remote control end through the identity authentication method of the token containing the information characteristics of the drone. In addition to the necessary information of the token, the data transmitted by the token transmission mechanism also includes the timestamp, the current GPS location information of the drone, the unique serial number of the drone, the current speed information of the drone, etc. The drone generates a token containing its own identity and signs the token with the private key of the drone. The drone end sends the generated token to the remote control end, which accepts the token and verifies it. If the verification is successful, it sends its own token to the drone end for verification. If the verification is successful, the two parties establish a communication connection.

[0039] Specifically, the token transfer mechanism includes: Token generation and signing: The drone generates a token containing its own identity information and signs it using a private key.

[0040] Token verification: The remote control receives the token and verifies it. After successful verification, the two parties establish a communication connection.

[0041] Time window adjustment: Dynamically adjust the time window for data transmission according to the flight speed to optimize information transmission efficiency.

[0042] In step S3, in the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the drone by the token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; wherein, when the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the time window is reduced; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

[0043] It should be noted that the speed of the drone indirectly reflects the importance of the current inspection location information. The flight speed of the drone indirectly indicates the priority of the current inspection task. When the flight speed is slow, it reflects that the inspection data is more important. The time window for receiving information is shortened to achieve rapid information transmission and reduce the risk of data link deception and hijacking.

[0044] As an example, if the drone is currently moving at a slow speed, such as when photographing a fault point on a power tower, it indirectly proves that the inspection information has a higher priority and a smaller time window is set, that is, the time range within which the recipient is allowed to accept a request or token is shortened, thereby improving the security of information transmission verification.

[0045] In step S3, the actual flight distance is compared with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the drone is interfered with by position spoofing, specifically including: when the actual flight distance is greater than the actual flight constraint radius, it is determined that the drone's position is interfered with by spoofing, the drone is currently in an unsafe state, and no data transmission is performed; if the actual flight distance of the drone is less than or equal to the actual flight constraint radius, the drone's current position information is safe, and information transmission or the next step of verification and other operations are performed.

[0046] When calculating the actual flight distance of the drone relative to the inspection route, the current position of the drone is vertically mapped onto the inspection route to determine whether the mapped distance exceeds If it is outside the range, it means that the drone is in an unsafe state and no data transmission is performed. If it is within the safe range, reliable information transmission can be performed.

[0047] Specifically, to calculate the actual flight distance of the drone relative to the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the drone can be projected onto the inspection route, and the straight-line distance between the projection point and the current position of the drone can be calculated. For the sake of explanation and illustration, this scheme assumes that the inspection route is a straight line segment, or is approximately a straight line segment. The specific steps are as follows: 1) Determine the starting point and end point of the inspection route. Assume that the starting point of the inspection route is A ( lat A , lon A ), the end point is B ( lat B , lon B ), lat Indicates latitude, lon Indicates longitude.

[0048] 2) According to the latitude and longitude of the starting point and the end point, calculate the north and east components of the direction vector, and determine the direction vector of the inspection route according to the north and east components. The details are as follows: North component: △ lat dir =lat B -latA East component: △ lon dir ≈lon B -lonA Direction vector: =(△ lat dir ,△ lon dir ) 3) Calculate the projection point of the current position of the drone. P ( lat P , lon P ) is projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point P ′( lat P′ , lon P′ ). The details are as follows: First, calculate the drone position P Starting point of the inspection route A The vector between :

[0049] Then, calculate the vector Direction vector of the inspection route Projection length in direction: ;in, represents the dot product, express of the module length).

[0050] Finally, add the projection length to the starting point of the inspection route A The longitude and latitude of the Move in the direction of P ′’s longitude and latitude.

[0051] Specifically: Projection point P The approximate longitude and latitude of ′ is:

[0052]

[0053] 4) Calculate the current position of the drone P With the projection point P The straight-line distance between d , as the actual flight distance.

[0054] As an alternative example, use the distance formula for a rectangular coordinate system as an approximation:

[0055] in, is the radius of the earth; the cosine term in the formula is used to correct the effect of latitude on longitude difference.

[0056] In some other embodiments, the straight-line distance may also be calculated using the following formula:

[0057] in, is the radius of the Earth; is the latitude difference between the drone and the nearest route point; is the longitude difference between the drone and the nearest route point; and are the latitudes of the drone and the nearest route point, respectively.

[0058] In this solution, the drone and the remote control both store the inspection route information. The drone flies according to the preset route. The vertical projection distance between the drone and the route is d is the distance between the drone and the nearest route point. d The smaller the value of is, the smaller the distance deviation between the actual position of the drone and the route is. d When it is less than the threshold, the drone is patrolling in a safe state and data transmission can be performed, otherwise data transmission is interrupted.

[0059] The token transmission method described in this example is a token transmission method that only contains the data formed by the above combination, which is different from the traditional JWT (JSON Web Token) type of token transmission method; the token in this example is only used for the secure transmission of inspection data, and is only for the security and integrity of inspection data; the lightweight design and secure verification method reduce system operation overhead.

[0060] S4. Based on the received inspection data, verify whether the drone is hijacked by link deception by using information comparison; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, decrypt the inspection data.

[0061] Specifically, in step S4, after the remote control receives the inspection data, it first verifies the validity of the token, including whether the token is expired, whether the signature is abnormal, etc. The unique serial number of the drone is compared with the current inspection data to verify whether the information comes from the target drone. Check whether the GPS location information of the drone when generating the inspection data is within the specified constraint radius of the route to verify the authenticity and integrity of the data. If the verification is successful, the inspection data is decrypted to obtain the original data.

[0062] Specifically, after receiving the inspection data, the remote control terminal verifies the integrity of the information, including: first verifying whether the token is valid. When the token is not expired and the signature is normal, the drone serial number and GPS location information in the token are extracted to determine whether the serial number is correct and whether the GPS location of the drone is within the route area. The drone's unique serial number is compared with the current inspection data to verify whether the information comes from the target drone; at the same time, the GPS location information of the inspection data generated by the drone is compared to see if it is within the constraint radius specified by the route, so as to verify the GPS location information while checking whether the current inspection data has been tampered with, reducing the risk of data link spoofing and hijacking.

[0063] Example 2 like Figure 2 As shown, based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiment, the present invention also provides an anti-deceptive interference data protection device for a power inspection drone, comprising: Data acquisition module, used to obtain the flight speed and position information of the drone during the inspection process in real time; A first comparison module is used to compare the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius; The second comparison module is used to calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point according to the position information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is interfered by position spoofing; when the UAV is not interfered by position spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the UAV by a token transmission mechanism; The third comparison module is used to verify whether the drone is hijacked by link deception by using information comparison according to the received inspection data; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0064] Specifically, in the first comparison module, adjusting the preset flight constraint radius according to the size comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius includes: When the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is enlarged as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than a threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is reduced as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

[0065] Specifically, in the second comparison module, in the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the drone using a token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than a threshold speed, the time window is reduced; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

[0066] Example 3 like Figure 3 As shown, the present invention also provides an electronic device 100 for implementing a method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data; The electronic device 100 includes a memory 101 , at least one processor 102 , a computer program 103 stored in the memory 101 and executable on the at least one processor 102 , and at least one communication bus 104 .

[0067] The memory 101 can be used to store a computer program 103. The processor 102 implements the steps of a method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data in Example 1 by running or executing the computer program stored in the memory 101 and calling the data stored in the memory 101.

[0068] The memory 101 may mainly include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store an operating system, an application required for at least one function (such as a sound playback function, an image playback function, etc.), etc.; the data storage area may store data (such as audio data) created according to the use of the electronic device 100, etc. In addition, the memory 101 may include a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk, a memory, a plug-in hard disk, a smart memory card (Smart Media Card, SMC), a secure digital (Secure Digital, SD) card, a flash card (Flash Card), at least one disk storage device, a flash memory device, or other non-volatile solid-state storage devices.

[0069] At least one processor 102 may be a central processing unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The processor 102 may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc. The processor 102 is the control center of the electronic device 100, and uses various interfaces and lines to connect various parts of the entire electronic device 100.

[0070] The memory 101 in the electronic device 100 stores a plurality of instructions to implement a method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data, and the processor 102 can execute the plurality of instructions to implement: Obtain real-time flight speed and location information during drone inspections; Comparing the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjusting the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius; Calculate the actual flight distance between the drone and the nearest route point according to the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the drone is interfered by location spoofing; when the drone is not interfered by location spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the drone by a token transmission mechanism; According to the received inspection data, whether the drone is hijacked by link deception is verified by information comparison; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0071] Example 4 If the module / unit integrated in the electronic device 100 is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present invention implements all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment method, and can also be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and the computer program can implement the steps of the above-mentioned method embodiments when executed by the processor. Among them, the computer program includes computer program code, and the computer program code can be in source code form, object code form, executable file or some intermediate form. Computer-readable media may include: any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code, recording medium, U disk, mobile hard disk, disk, optical disk, computer memory and read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory).

[0072] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0073] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0074] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0075] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0076] In the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "one embodiment", "example", "specific example", etc. means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representation of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0077] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the relevant field should understand that the specific implementation methods of the present invention can still be modified or replaced by equivalents. Any modification or equivalent replacement that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data, characterized in that: include: Obtain real-time flight speed and location information during drone inspections; Comparing the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjusting the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius; Calculate the actual flight distance between the drone and the nearest route point according to the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the drone is interfered by location spoofing; when the drone is not interfered by location spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the drone by a token transmission mechanism; According to the received inspection data, whether the drone is hijacked by link deception is verified by information comparison; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, the inspection data is decrypted.

2. The anti-deceptive interference data protection method for electric power inspection drones according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The preset flight constraint radius is adjusted according to the size comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius, including: When the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is enlarged as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than a threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is reduced as the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

3. The anti-deceptive interference data protection method for electric power inspection drone according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the drone using a token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than a threshold speed, the time window is reduced; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

4. The anti-deceptive interference data protection method for electric power inspection drone according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Comparing the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the drone is interfered by location spoofing, including: When the actual flight distance is greater than the actual flight constraint radius, it is determined that the position of the UAV is spoofed and interfered with; otherwise, the position of the UAV is not spoofed and interfered with.

5. The anti-deceptive interference data protection method for electric power inspection drone according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Calculating the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point based on the position information includes: Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route; According to the latitude and longitude of the starting point and the end point, the north and east components of the direction vector are calculated, and the direction vector of the inspection route is determined according to the north and east components; Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point; Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point as the actual flight distance.

6. The anti-deceptive interference data protection method for electric power inspection drone according to claim 5 is characterized in that: Project the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the drone onto the inspection route to obtain the projection points, including: Calculate the vector between the drone position and the starting point of the inspection route ; Calculating vectors The projected length in the direction of the inspection route’s direction vector; Add the projection length to the latitude and longitude of the starting point of the inspection route, and move along the direction of the direction vector to obtain the latitude and longitude of the projection point.

7. A data protection device for power inspection drones against deceptive interference, characterized in that: include: Data acquisition module, used to obtain the flight speed and position information of the drone during the inspection process in real time; A first comparison module is used to compare the flight speed with a preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain an actual flight constraint radius; The second comparison module is used to calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point according to the position information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is interfered by position spoofing; when the UAV is not interfered by position spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the UAV by a token transmission mechanism; The third comparison module is used to verify whether the drone is hijacked by link deception by using information comparison according to the received inspection data; when the drone is not hijacked by link deception, the inspection data is decrypted.

8. The anti-deceptive interference data protection device for electric power inspection drone according to claim 7 is characterized in that: In the second comparison module, the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest route point is calculated according to the position information, including: Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route; According to the latitude and longitude of the starting point and the end point, the north and east components of the direction vector are calculated, and the direction vector of the inspection route is determined according to the north and east components; Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point; Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point as the actual flight distance.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: It includes a processor and a memory, and the processor is used to execute a computer program stored in the memory to implement the anti-deceptive interference data protection method for the power inspection drone as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, and when the at least one instruction is executed by the processor, the anti-deceptive interference data protection method for the power inspection drone as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

Citation Information

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