Vehicle formation driving control method for preventing eavesdropping attack

Abstract

The invention discloses a vehicle formation driving control method for preventing eavesdropping attacks, and belongs to the technical field of vehicle networking safety. In a formation vehicle wireless transmission process, a designed fuzzy vector is introduced, state privacy is effectively protected, and a formation control task is completed at the same time. Comprising the following steps: determining a leading vehicle and a following vehicle, and further determining a network topology; the leading vehicle randomly generates a fuzzy vector meeting a condition, and transmits a false state to the following vehicle according to a formation control communication protocol; the following vehicle designs a noise vector, receives a fuzzy vector transmitted by the leading vehicle, and transmits a false state of the following vehicle according to a designed formation control communication protocol when the following vehicle communicates with front and back adjacent vehicles; and constructing a second-order dynamic model of the leading vehicle and the following vehicle, designing control input based on a formation control communication protocol, and completing formation control. The method has the advantages of being easy and convenient to operate, low in calculation complexity and high in real-time performance.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of vehicle formation safety control, and in particular relates to a vehicle formation driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks. Background Art

[0002] With the development of communication technology, vehicle-to-vehicle communication ensures real-time sharing of status information between vehicles, allowing vehicles to change their own status in time according to the motion status of adjacent vehicles, so that the entire fleet forms a stable formation, which helps to improve road capacity and efficiency, save energy, and protect the environment. However, the shared information includes sensitive information, such as the trajectory of the navigator. In an open communication environment, eavesdroppers can illegally obtain sensitive information by eavesdropping on the communication channel, disrupting the smooth completion of the formation mission, and even threatening the personal safety of the driver.

[0003] In the prior art, the patent with application number CN201910294303.1 and titled “A vehicle formation evaluation method based on privacy protection” proposes a solution, which ensures the authenticity of information through bilinear mapping, protects the immutability of vehicle trust value through homomorphic encryption algorithm and timestamp, and calculates the trust value of the vehicle through filterable truth value, so as to achieve the safety evaluation of vehicle formation. However, this method only conducts safety evaluation on the behavior of formation vehicles, and does not protect the privacy of transmitted information. The open communication environment of formation vehicle data transmission makes it easy for eavesdroppers to obtain vehicle status and further undermine the completion of formation tasks. In addition, the patent with application number CN202410140826.1 and titled “A vehicle formation safety monitoring system based on remote driving” proposes a solution, which monitors and manages the status of vehicle formation through a monitoring center, and warns and handles abnormal situations. This method improves the safety of formation driving, but does not provide protection for the privacy of data.

[0004] In summary, how to design a formation control communication protocol that has practical engineering application value, is lightweight, has low computational complexity, and can effectively defend against eavesdropping attacks to infer vehicle status, while protecting the privacy of vehicle owners, has become a difficulty that needs to be solved urgently. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the threat of eavesdropping attacks to vehicle platooning tasks, the present invention provides a vehicle platooning driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks.

[0006] Technical solution: The present invention discloses a vehicle formation driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks, comprising the steps of:

[0007] (1) Initialize a platoon driving task with N vehicles. Set the front vehicle in the platoon as the leader vehicle, numbered 0, and the direction of the leader vehicle is the driving direction of the platoon. Set the other vehicles in the platoon as follower vehicles, numbered {1,...,(N-1)}. The leader vehicle establishes a communication connection with each follower vehicle, and each follower vehicle also communicates with its front and rear adjacent vehicles.

[0008] (2) Establish a weighted directed graph G(V,E,A) to represent the network structure of the vehicle formation and the communication relationship between vehicles, V = {v1,v2,...,v n} represents the node set of the network, each node represents a vehicle in the formation, represents the edge set, A=[a ij ] n×n Represents the adjacency matrix of graph G;

[0009] (3) Selecting the position and speed of the vehicle as the system state, establishing a second-order vehicle dynamics model of the leading vehicle and the following vehicle, extracting state information from the system state, adding fuzzy vectors and random noise, and periodically exchanging the state information according to the communication relationship between the vehicles;

[0010] (4) Based on its own status and the status information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the following vehicle designs a platoon control communication protocol so that the following vehicle and the lead vehicle reach the same speed and the same safe distance is maintained between the vehicles in the platoon.

[0011] Furthermore, the adjacency matrix A in step (2) is [a ij ] n×n When the condition i≠j and (i,j)∈E is satisfied, a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0.

[0012] Furthermore, the adding of the blur vector in step (3) is specifically as follows:

[0013] In the kth sampling period of the formation control process, the pilot vehicle randomly generates N-1 two-dimensional vectors δ j =[δ 1,j ,δ 2,j ] T , (j∈{1,2,...,N-1}), so that for i=1,2, we have Established;

[0014] The leading vehicle sends a data packet to the No. 1 following vehicle in the formation. The data packet includes the false state information of the leading vehicle after being blurred by the vector δ1.

[0015] Send a data packet to the n∈{2,...,N-1} following vehicles in the formation, including the leader vehicle vector δ n The false state information after blurring, and the blur vector δ added to car (n-1) n-1 .

[0016] Furthermore, the data packet sent by the pilot car to car 1 is in represents the false position and speed of the leading vehicle after being blurred by vector δ1 in the kth sampling period, and transmits it to the following vehicle No. 1;

[0017] The data packet sent by the pilot car to vehicle n∈{2,...,N-1} is Among them [δ 1,n-1 ,δ 2,n-1 ] T represents the fuzzy vector added by the pilot car to vehicle n-1, It represents the false position and speed information transmitted by the pilot car to vehicle n. The calculation formula is:

[0018]

[0019] The (n-1)th vehicle receives the state information from the nth vehicle after adding the fuzzy vector, which is expressed as:

[0020]

[0021] Furthermore, the adding of random noise in step (3) is specifically:

[0022] The (n-1),n∈{2,...,N-1}th vehicle generates random noise ω n-1 (k) = [ω 1,n-1 (k),ω 2,n-1 (k)] T , add random noise ω to car n n-1 (k) and receives the false position and speed information after the vehicle No. n, which includes the data packet n-1 The blurred status information of vehicle number n.

[0023] Furthermore, the noise signal randomly generated by the (n-1)th vehicle is expressed as:

[0024]

[0025]

[0026] Among them, the random variable v n-1 (k) It obeys the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and the set {v n-1 (k)} n＝2,...,N-1；k＝0,1,2，... and These variables in are jointly independent, 0<μ1<1, 0<μ2<1 for all vehicles;

[0027] The state information after adding random noise from the (n-1)th vehicle to the nth vehicle is expressed as

[0028]

[0029]

[0030] Furthermore, the second-order dynamic model of the pilot vehicle in step (3) is expressed as:

[0031]

[0032] Where x0(k) represents the position of the pilot car, v0(k) represents the speed of the pilot car, and u0(k) represents the control input;

[0033] The second-order dynamic model of the j,j∈{1,...,N-1}th following vehicle is expressed as:

[0034]

[0035] Where x j (k), v j (k),u j (k) represent the position, velocity and control input of the jth following vehicle respectively;

[0036] The goal of the vehicle platooning mission is to ensure that the following vehicle travels at the same speed as the leading vehicle, and that the vehicles in the platoon maintain the same safe distance, which can be described as:

[0037]

[0038] Where r represents the safe distance between two adjacent cars, and d represents the length of the car body.

[0039] Furthermore, the design of the formation control communication protocol in step (4) is specifically as follows:

[0040] (4.1) Define the position error △x between vehicle n and vehicle (n-1) in the kth sampling period n (k), speed error △v n (k), expressed as:

[0041]

[0042]

[0043] (4.2) Define the position error inferred by the eavesdropper after stealing the transmitted data Speed ​​Error It is expressed as:

[0044]

[0045]

[0046] (4.3) Design the formation control communication protocol as follows:

[0047]

[0048]

[0049] V(h n-1,n (k) = V1 + V2 tanh (C1h n-1,n (k)-C2)

[0050]

[0051] Among them, α, β, κ, λ, p, q, η, γ, V1, V2, C1, C2 are control parameters; r n-1,n represents the desired distance between vehicles n-1 and n, and r n-1,n =-r n,n-1 ; r n represents the expected distance between the pilot vehicle and vehicle n; k n Indicates the communication link between vehicle n and the pilot vehicle. If there is a connection, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0; represents the pseudo distance between vehicles n-1 and n; Γ = (κ / α)k n , is the fuzzy vector gain; tanh(·) represents the hyperbolic tangent function; θ n represents the input of the electronic throttle of the nth vehicle, that is, the throttle opening; c and b are system parameters that represent the relationship between the electronic throttle opening and the vehicle acceleration.

[0052] Furthermore, the opening of the electronic throttle and the acceleration a of the vehicle n (k) The dynamic equation of the opening of the electronic throttle of vehicle n changing with the vehicle speed is expressed as:

[0053] a n (k) = -b(v n (k)-v0)+c(θ n (k)-θ0)+d n

[0054] Where v0 represents the steady-state speed corresponding to the throttle input of θ0, d nIndicates disturbance.

[0055] Furthermore, the formation control communication protocol is designed, and k=k+1 is set, and steps (4.1) to (4.3) are repeated until the position error and the speed error approach zero.

[0056] In order to defend against eavesdropping attacks during the vehicle formation control process and ensure the security of the formation transmission information, the present invention designs a formation control communication protocol that guarantees data privacy. When the leading vehicle sends its own information to the following vehicle, a fuzzy vector is added to protect its own state from being illegally obtained by eavesdroppers; in order to ensure the completion of the formation task, the fuzzy vector δ added to the n-1 vehicle n-1 Transmit it to the nth following car. And in the process of the nth following car transmitting its own state to the n-1th car, add the fuzzy vector δ n-1 When car n-1 transmits its state to the following car n, it adds the fuzzy vector ω n-1 It protects its own status from being stolen and effectively ensures the security of vehicle privacy information during vehicle formation, providing a new formation control communication protocol for the information security of vehicle formations. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 Flow chart of the method of the present invention.

[0058] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the communication topology of the vehicle platoon in the method of the present invention.

[0059] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the formation control communication protocol designed for the method of the present invention.

[0060] Figure 4 (a) is a vehicle position simulation diagram of the method of the present invention.

[0061] Figure 4 (b) A simulated diagram of the vehicle position inferred after an eavesdropper steals the transmission data considered by the method of the present invention.

[0062] Figure 5 (a) is a simulation diagram of the workshop position error defined by the method of the present invention.

[0063] Figure 5 (b) is a simulation diagram of the position error inferred after the eavesdropper defined by the method of the present invention steals the data.

[0064] Figure 6 (a) is a vehicle speed simulation diagram of the method of the present invention.

[0065] Figure 6 (b) is a simulated diagram of the vehicle speed inferred after the eavesdropper steals the transmission data considered by the method of the present invention.

[0066] Figure 7 (a) is a simulation diagram of workshop speed error defined by the method of the present invention.

[0067] Figure 7 (b) is a simulation diagram of the speed error inferred after the eavesdropper defined by the method of the present invention steals the data. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0068] It should be understood that the following specific embodiments are only used to illustrate the present invention and are not used to limit the scope of the present invention. After reading the present invention, various equivalent modifications of the present invention by those skilled in the art all fall within the scope defined by the claims attached to this application.

[0069] like Figure 1 The figure is a flow chart of a vehicle formation driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks disclosed in the present invention. The method of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the steps of a specific embodiment:

[0070] (1) Initialization process, that is, N vehicles recognize and initialize each other through vehicle-to-vehicle wireless communication technology, and set the front vehicle of the team as the pilot vehicle, numbered 0, and the direction of the pilot vehicle is the driving direction of the formation. The remaining vehicles are follower vehicles, numbered {1,...,(N-1)}. The pilot vehicle establishes a communication connection with the remaining vehicles to provide path planning, speed instructions, and control instructions for the vehicle formation. In addition to receiving information from the pilot vehicle, each follower vehicle also communicates with the adjacent vehicles in front and behind to obtain the position, speed, and acceleration information of the adjacent vehicles to update its own status, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0071] (2) The network structure of the vehicle formation and the communication relationship between vehicles are represented by a weighted directed graph G(V,E,A), V = {v1,v2,...,v n} represents the set of nodes in the network, i.e., the vehicles in the formation, represents an edge set, i.e., a communication connection between vehicles for exchanging position and speed information. Each edge corresponds to a pair of communicating vehicles. ij ] n×n Represents the adjacency matrix of graph G. When the condition i≠j and (i,j)∈E is satisfied, a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0.

[0072] (3) The position and speed of the vehicle are selected as the system state, and the second-order vehicle dynamics model of the pilot vehicle is constructed as follows:

[0073]

[0074] Where x0(k) represents the position of the pilot car, v0(k) represents the speed of the pilot car, and u0(k) represents the control input.

[0075] The second-order dynamic model of the j,j∈{1,...,N-1}th following vehicle is expressed as:

[0076]

[0077] Where x j (k), v j (k),u j (k) represent the position, speed and control input of the jth following vehicle respectively. According to the communication connection between vehicles, the state information is exchanged in each sampling period, and the sampling period is recorded as k.

[0078] Based on its own state and the information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the follower vehicle j designs the control input so that it reaches the same speed as the lead vehicle and maintains the same safe distance between the vehicles in the formation, which can be expressed as:

[0079]

[0080] In the formula, r represents the safe distance between two adjacent vehicles, and d represents the vehicle length. That is, the following vehicle travels at the same speed as the lead vehicle, and the vehicles in the formation maintain the same safe distance.

[0081] like Figure 3 As shown in the figure, in the kth sampling period of the formation control process, the pilot vehicle randomly generates N-1 two-dimensional vectors δ j =[δ 1,j ,δ 2,j ] T , (j∈{1,2,...,N-1}), so that for i=1,2, we have Established. The leading vehicle sends a data packet to the No. 1 following vehicle in the formation. The information in the data packet includes the false state information of the pilot car after being blurred by the vector δ1, which can be expressed as:

[0082]

[0083] In the formula Indicates that in the kth sampling period, the leader vehicle adds the false position and velocity of the fuzzy vector δ1 and transmits it to the follower vehicle No. 1, and sends a data packet to the n∈{2,...,N-1} follower vehicles in the formation This includes the fuzzy vector δ added by the pilot car to car (n-1) n-1 =[δ 1,n-1 ,δ 2,n-1 ] T and the vector δn Blurred false status information The calculation formula is:

[0084]

[0085] Since fuzzy vectors are added during the transmission of status information between the pilot vehicle and the following vehicles, the illegal acquisition of the pilot vehicle status by eavesdropping attacks can be effectively prevented.

[0086] The (n-1),n∈{2,...,N-1}th vehicle generates random noise ω n-1 (k) = [ω 1,n-1 (k),ω 2,n-1 (k)] T , the calculation formula is:

[0087]

[0088]

[0089] The random variable v n-1 (k) It obeys the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and the set {v n-1 (k)} n＝2,...,N-1；k＝0,1,2，... and These variables in are jointly independent. 0<μ1<1, 0<μ2<1 for all vehicles. (n-1) vehicles send an additional noise ω to vehicle n. n-1 The false position and velocity information after (k) can be expressed as:

[0090]

[0091] And receive the data packet from vehicle n, that is, n-1 The blurred status information of vehicle number n can be expressed as:

[0092]

[0093] During the information exchange between the two vehicles, the transmitted status values ​​are not the real status. Even if the eavesdropper obtains the relevant data, he cannot infer the real status of the vehicles in the formation.

[0094] Define the position error △x between vehicle n and vehicle (n-1) n (k) and speed error △v n (k) is:

[0095]

[0096]

[0097] The position error inferred by an eavesdropper after stealing the transmitted data Speed ​​Error Defined as:

[0098]

[0099]

[0100] (4) Based on its own status and the status information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the following vehicle designs a platoon control communication protocol so that the following vehicle and the lead vehicle reach the same speed and the same safe distance is maintained between the vehicles in the platoon.

[0101] Based on the results obtained in the previous steps, the communication protocol for the formation control of the leading vehicle and the following vehicle is designed, which can be expressed as:

[0102]

[0103]

[0104] V(h n-1,n (k) = V1 + V2 tanh (C1h n-1,n (k)-C2)

[0105]

[0106] Among them, α, β, κ, λ, p, q, η, γ, V1, V2, C1, C2 are control parameters, c, b are positive numbers, r n-1,n represents the desired distance between vehicles n-1 and n, r n-1,n =-r n,n-1 , r n represents the expected distance between the pilot vehicle and vehicle n, k n Represents the communication link between vehicle n and the pilot vehicle. If there is a connection, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0.

[0107] Under the bidirectional head formation topology, k n =1 holds for all following vehicles. represents the pseudo distance between vehicles n-1 and n, Γ = (κ / α)k n , tanh(·) represents the hyperbolic tangent function. θ n The electronic throttle opening size and the vehicle acceleration a n (k) is related to adjusting the throttle opening by the engine control module to further change the vehicle's acceleration. The dynamic equation of the vehicle's electronic throttle opening changing with vehicle speed can be expressed as:

[0108] a n(k) = -b(v n (k)-v0)+c(θ n (k)-θ0)+d n

[0109] Where v0 represents the steady-state speed corresponding to the throttle input of θ0, d n Denotes disturbance. Let k = k + 1, and repeat the steps until the formation task is completed, that is, the position error and speed error tend to zero.

[0110] At this point, the formation control task of defending against eavesdropping attacks can be achieved by using the above-mentioned formation control communication protocol, and the privacy of vehicle transmission information can be protected. In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a pilot-follower formation model consisting of n=4 vehicles is selected to verify the effectiveness of the method of the present invention. The system parameters set in the embodiment are shown in Table 1.

[0111] Table 1 System parameters

[0112]

[0113]

[0114] The driving positions of the leading vehicle and the following vehicle in the formation are as follows: Figure 4 As shown in (a), the position error is Figure 5 As shown in (a), the eavesdropper estimates the position of the vehicles in the formation as follows: Figure 4 As shown in (b), the estimated position error is Figure 5 As shown in (b), the formation control communication protocol does not affect the execution of the formation control task and can effectively prevent attackers from eavesdropping on the vehicle position.

[0115] Under the formation control communication protocol, the speed of the formation vehicles is as follows: Figure 6 As shown in (a), the speed error is Figure 7 (a). As can be seen from the figure, the following car follows the leading car at the expected speed. The eavesdropper estimates the vehicle speed and speed error as follows Figure 6 (b) and 7(b). Figure 5 and Figure 7 The position error and speed error in the platoon control communication protocol can be concluded that the platoon control communication protocol designed by the method of the present invention can prevent eavesdropping attacks from stealing data transmitted between platoon vehicles and illegal inference of position and speed information, while ensuring that the vehicle platoon achieves the control goal. It is easy to operate, has low computational complexity, and high real-time performance, and can be applied to actual traffic systems.

Claims

1. A vehicle formation driving control method for defending against eavesdropping attacks, characterized in that: Includes steps: (1) Initialize a platoon driving task with N vehicles. Set the front vehicle in the platoon as the leader vehicle, numbered 0, and the direction of the leader vehicle is the driving direction of the platoon. Set the other vehicles in the platoon as follower vehicles, numbered {1,...,(N-1)}. The leader vehicle establishes a communication connection with each follower vehicle, and each follower vehicle also communicates with its front and rear adjacent vehicles. (2) Establish a weighted directed graph G(V,E,A) to represent the network structure of the vehicle formation and the communication relationship between vehicles, V = {v1,v2,...,v n } represents the node set of the network, each node represents a vehicle in the formation, represents the edge set, A=[a ij ] n×n Represents the adjacency matrix of graph G; (3) Selecting the position and speed of the vehicle as the system state, establishing a second-order vehicle dynamics model of the leading vehicle and the following vehicle, extracting state information from the system state, adding fuzzy vectors and random noise, and periodically exchanging the state information according to the communication relationship between the vehicles; (4) Based on its own status and the status information received from the lead vehicle and adjacent vehicles, the following vehicle designs a platoon control communication protocol so that the following vehicle and the lead vehicle reach the same speed and the same safe distance is maintained between the vehicles in the platoon.

2. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The adjacency matrix A in step (2) is [a ij ] n×n When the condition i≠j and (i,j)∈E is satisfied, a ij =1, otherwise a ij =0.

3. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The adding of blur vector in step (3) is specifically: In the kth sampling period of the formation control process, the pilot vehicle randomly generates N-1 two-dimensional vectors δ j =[δ 1,j ,δ 2,j ] T , (j∈{1,2,...,N-1}), so that for i=1,2, we have Established; The leading vehicle sends a data packet to the No. 1 following vehicle in the formation. The data packet includes the false state information of the leading vehicle after being blurred by the vector δ1. Send a data packet to the n∈{2,...,N-1} following vehicles in the formation, including the leader vehicle vector δ n The false state information after blurring, and the blur vector δ added to car (n-1) n-1 .

4. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The data packet sent by the pilot car to car 1 is in represents the false position and speed of the leading vehicle after being blurred by vector δ1 in the kth sampling period, and transmits it to the following vehicle No. 1; The data packet sent by the pilot car to vehicle n∈{2,...,N-1} is Among them [δ 1,n-1 ,δ 2,n-1 ] T represents the fuzzy vector added by the pilot car to vehicle n-1, It represents the false position and speed information transmitted by the pilot car to vehicle n. The calculation formula is: The (n-1)th vehicle receives the state information from the nth vehicle after adding the fuzzy vector, which is expressed as:

5. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The adding of random noise in step (3) is specifically: The (n-1),n∈{2,...,N-1}th vehicle generates random noise ω n-1 (k) = [ω 1,n-1 (k),ω 2,n-1 (k)] T , add random noise ω to car n n-1 (k) and receives the false position and speed information after the vehicle No. n, which includes the data packet n-1 The blurred status information of vehicle number n.

6. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The noise signal randomly generated by the (n-1)th vehicle is expressed as: Among them, the random variable v n-1 (k) It obeys the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and the set {v n-1 (k)} n＝2,...,N-1；k＝0,1,2，... and These variables in are jointly independent, 0<μ1<1, 0<μ2<1 for all vehicles; The state information after adding random noise from the (n-1)th vehicle to the nth vehicle is expressed as 7. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 6, characterized in that: The second-order dynamic model of the pilot vehicle described in step (3) is expressed as: Where x0(k) represents the position of the pilot car, v0(k) represents the speed of the pilot car, and u0(k) represents the control input; The second-order dynamic model of the j,j∈{1,...,N-1}th following vehicle is expressed as: Where x j (k), v j (k),u j (k) represent the position, velocity and control input of the jth following vehicle respectively; The goal of the vehicle platooning mission is to ensure that the following vehicle travels at the same speed as the leading vehicle, and that the vehicles in the platoon maintain the same safe distance, which can be described as: Where r represents the safe distance between two adjacent cars, and d represents the length of the car body.

8. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 1 or 7, characterized in that: The design of the formation control communication protocol in step (4) is specifically as follows: (4.1) Define the position error △x between vehicle n and vehicle (n-1) in the kth sampling period n (k), speed error △v n (k), expressed as: (4.2) Define the position error inferred by the eavesdropper after stealing the transmitted data Speed ​​Error It is expressed as: (4.3) Design the formation control communication protocol as follows: In(h n-1,n (k)=V1+V2tanh(C1h n-1,n (k)-C2) Among them, α, β, κ, λ, p, q, η, γ, V1, V2, C1, C2 are control parameters; r n-1,n represents the desired distance between vehicles n-1 and n, and r n-1,n =-r n,n-1 ; r n represents the expected distance between the pilot vehicle and vehicle n; k n Indicates the communication link between vehicle n and the pilot vehicle. If there is a connection, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0; represents the pseudo distance between vehicles n-1 and n; Γ = (κ / α)k n , is the fuzzy vector gain; tanh(·) represents the hyperbolic tangent function; θ n represents the input of the electronic throttle of the nth vehicle, that is, the throttle opening; c and b are system parameters that represent the relationship between the electronic throttle opening and the vehicle acceleration.

9. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 8, characterized in that: The opening size of the electronic throttle and the acceleration a of the vehicle n (k) The dynamic equation of the opening of the electronic throttle of vehicle n changing with the vehicle speed is expressed as: a n (k)=-b(v n (k)-v0)+c(θ n (k)-θ0)+d n Where v0 represents the steady-state speed corresponding to the throttle input of θ0, d n Indicates disturbance.

10. The vehicle platoon driving control method according to claim 8 or 9, characterized in that: The formation control communication protocol is designed, and k=k+1 is set, and steps (4.1) to (4.3) are repeated until the position error and the speed error approach zero.

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