Satellite concealed time service deception method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

This invention provides a covert time synchronization deception method, device, electronic equipment, and storage medium for satellites, belonging to the field of electronic countermeasures technology. The covert time synchronization deception method includes the following steps: controlling the step size of the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency shift, ensuring that the step size does not exceed the target receiver's loss-of-lock threshold; after the step size of the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency shift stabilizes at a fixed value, altering the timestamp information of the deception signal to complete the deception of the target receiver's timestamp. This invention is based on synchronous deception signal generation technology, which can strip away the correlation peaks of the real navigation satellite signal with a slight power advantage. During the time synchronization deception process, using the deception model established according to this method, it is possible to induce a 1PPS phase shift in the target receiver or even alter its timestamp without changing the target's positioning result, thus achieving covert alteration of the target terminal's signal layer and information layer time synchronization results.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of electronic countermeasures technology, and more specifically, relates to a method, device, electronic device and storage medium for satellite covert timing deception. Background Technology

[0002] Navigation satellite systems play a vital role in transportation, finance, surveying and mapping, and aerospace. Interference or damage to their functions or performance can severely impact the normal operation of national infrastructure and military equipment systems. In particular, the secure timing provided by navigation satellite systems is a prerequisite for the operation of power grid systems, timing systems, communication networks, and command and control systems.

[0003] However, current technologies in the field of navigation satellite countermeasures primarily focus on impacting the positioning function of navigation satellites, neglecting the exploration of countermeasures against their timing capabilities. Researching effective time-domain countermeasure methods will play a crucial role in establishing time-domain countermeasure capabilities for navigation satellites and improving the reliability of systems reliant on navigation satellite timing.

[0004] When a deceptive signal attempts to alter timestamp information, it will be inconsistent with the real signal at the information level, making it impossible to enter the receiver's tracking loop with low power. Therefore, it is necessary to use high-power suppression methods to block the target receiver's tracking of the real signal, thus solving the problem of being unable to deceive the target receiver's timestamp information in a covert manner. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method, device, electronic device and storage medium for satellite covert timing deception. This invention can achieve deception and interference of the 1PPS phase and timestamp of navigation satellite timing terminal in a low-power covert manner.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, a first aspect of the present invention provides a satellite covert timing deception method, comprising the following steps:

[0007] Obtain the approximate location of the target receiver;

[0008] Based on the approximate location of the target receiver, estimate the navigation satellite code phase observation at the target receiver and generate a sky synchronization deception signal at the phase center of the target receiving antenna.

[0009] The synchronization deception signal is used to replace the real navigation satellite signal to gain control of the target receiver tracking loop;

[0010] After gaining control, the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal is decomposed to obtain the relationship between the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal and the navigation satellite clock error and the target receiver's own clock error;

[0011] By adding the deception code phase change amount to the above formula, the target receiver's own clock bias change amount caused by the deception code phase change amount is obtained; based on the target receiver's own clock bias change amount, the artificially created Doppler frequency shift is obtained;

[0012] Based on the artificially created Doppler frequency shift, the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift is controlled so that the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift is not greater than the target receiver's loss of lock threshold.

[0013] After the step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at a fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered to complete the deception of the target receiver's timestamp.

[0014] Furthermore, the relationship for the artificially created Doppler frequency shift is as follows:

[0015]

[0016] in,

[0017] In the formula, Δf is the artificially created Doppler frequency shift; f0′ is the tracking center frequency after induced pulling, and f0 is the actual signal center frequency; Δρ is the phase change of the deception code. The change in clock bias of the target receiver caused by the phase change of the deception code is denoted by c, where c is the speed of light.

[0018] Furthermore, the step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop is controlled by the following method:

[0019] Convert the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift into a step size of the deception code phase change:

[0020]

[0021] And ensure that the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift is not greater than the lockout threshold;

[0022] in, For the target receiver to track the center frequency shift of the loop, This refers to the step size of the phase change in the deception code.

[0023] Furthermore, the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift gradually increases in the first stage, remains constant in the second stage, and gradually decreases in the third stage until it stabilizes at a fixed value.

[0024] After the step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at the fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered to complete the deception of the target receiver's timestamp.

[0025] Furthermore, the relation is as follows:

[0026]

[0027] Among them, (x i ,y i ,z i ) represents the coordinates of the navigation satellite, δt i For the clock bias of navigation satellites, ρ i For the pseudorange observation used to deceive the signal, Ri is the true geometric distance between the navigation satellite and the target receiver, and X = (x u ,y u ,z u ) T Let δt be the target receiver coordinates. u Let c be the clock bias of the target receiver itself, and c be the speed of light.

[0028] Furthermore, by adding the deception code phase change to the above formula, the formula for the change in the target receiver's own clock bias caused by the deception code phase change is as follows:

[0029]

[0030] The clock bias of the target receiver after deception is:

[0031]

[0032] Where Δρ is the phase change of the deception code. δt represents the change in the target receiver's clock bias caused by the phase change of the deception code. u ′ represents the clock bias of the target receiver after deception.

[0033] Furthermore, during the stepping phase of the center frequency shift of the control target receiver tracking loop, the 1PPS phase shift level is controlled to be greater than 30µs.

[0034] A second aspect of the present invention provides a satellite covert timing deception device, comprising:

[0035] The information acquisition module is used to obtain the approximate location of the target receiver;

[0036] The synchronous deception signal generation module is used to estimate the navigation satellite code phase observation at the target receiver based on the approximate location of the target receiver, and generate a sky synchronization deception signal at the phase center of the target receiving antenna.

[0037] The target receiver tracking loop control module is used to strip away the correlation peaks of the real navigation satellite signal and replace the control of the target receiver tracking loop with the synchronization deception signal to obtain control over the target receiver tracking loop.

[0038] The pseudorange observation decomposition module is used to decompose the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal after obtaining the control authority, and obtain the relationship between the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal and the navigation satellite clock error and the target receiver's own clock error.

[0039] The relation calculation module is used to add the deception code phase change amount to the relation to obtain the target receiver's own clock bias change amount caused by the deception code phase change amount; and to obtain the artificially created Doppler frequency shift based on the target receiver's own clock bias change amount.

[0040] The step control module is used to control the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift based on the artificially created Doppler frequency shift, such that the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift gradually increases in the first stage, remains constant in the second stage, and gradually decreases in the third stage until it stabilizes at a fixed value; and...

[0041] The timestamp spoofing interference module is used to tamper with the timestamp information of the spoofing signal after the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at the fixed value, thereby completing the spoofing of the target receiver's timestamp.

[0042] A third aspect of the present invention provides a satellite covert timing deception electronic device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor, and the processor executes the computer program to implement a satellite covert timing deception method as described in any of the preceding claims.

[0043] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when loaded and executed by a processor, implement a satellite covert timing deception method as described in any of the preceding claims.

[0044] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following technical effects:

[0045] This invention discloses a satellite covert timing deception method based on synchronous deception signal generation technology. It controls the step size of the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency shift, ensuring this step size does not exceed the target receiver's loss-of-lock threshold. After the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency shift stabilizes at a fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered. This timing deception method can strip away the correlation peaks of the real navigation satellite signal with a slight power advantage. During the timing deception process, using the deception model established according to this method, it can induce a 1PPS phase shift in the target receiver and even tamper with its timestamp without changing the target's positioning result, thus achieving covert alteration of the target terminal's signal layer and information layer timing results. Attached Figure Description

[0046] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0047] Figure 1 A flowchart of a satellite covert time synchronization deception method provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 This is a diagram of the covert intra-second time deception traction strategy provided in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a satellite covert timing deception device provided in Embodiment 2 of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0050] To make the technical problem to be solved, the technical solution, and the beneficial effects of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0051] The terminology used in the embodiments of this invention is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the invention. The singular forms “a,” “the,” and “the” as used in the embodiments of this invention and the appended claims are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0052] The terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only, to distinguish objects, such as substances, from one another, and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of indicated technical features. For example, without departing from the scope of embodiments of the invention, a first XX may also be referred to as a second XX, and similarly, a second XX may also be referred to as a first XX. Thus, features defined with "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature.

[0053] Currently, conventional satellite navigation deception jamming methods mainly focus on affecting the positioning of target terminals, while methods for deceiving time remain unclear. This invention addresses a covert time-spoofing jamming method for navigation satellite timing terminals. By establishing a theoretical formula for time deception and a covert time deception strategy, it can induce a 1PPS phase deviation in the target receiver or even tamper with its timestamp in a low-power manner without altering the target's positioning results, thus covertly altering the timing results of the target terminal's signal and information layers.

[0054] Example 1

[0055] Embodiment 1 of the present invention provides a method for covert satellite time synchronization deception, the process of which is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, it includes the following steps:

[0056] S1. Obtain the approximate location of the target receiver;

[0057] S2. Given the approximate location of the target receiver, estimate the navigation satellite code phase observation at the target receiver using the synchronous deception signal generation technique, and generate a sky synchronization deception signal at the phase center of the target receiving antenna.

[0058] S3. Replace the real navigation satellite signal with a synchronization deception signal to gain control of the target receiver tracking loop;

[0059] S4. After gaining control of the target receiver tracking loop, decompose the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal in S2 to obtain the relationship between the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal and the navigation satellite clock error and the target receiver's own clock error.

[0060] S5. Add the deception code phase change to the relationship in S4 to obtain the target receiver's own clock bias change caused by the deception code phase change; based on the target receiver's own clock bias change, obtain the artificially created Doppler frequency shift.

[0061] S6. Based on the artificially created Doppler frequency shift obtained in S5, control the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift, so that the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift does not exceed the target receiver's loss of lock threshold.

[0062] S7. After the step of the center frequency migration of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at a fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered to complete the deception of the target receiver's timestamp.

[0063] In step S1 above, the approximate location of the target receiver can be obtained through various possible means, including but not limited to intelligence, radar, infrared detection equipment, etc.

[0064] In step S2 above, the synchronization deception signal can be obtained using an existing synchronization deception signal generation model, which will not be described in detail here.

[0065] In step S3 above, gaining control of the target receiver tracking loop can be achieved by the following method: The deception signal power can be increased according to a preset time interval and a preset power step size until control of the target receiver tracking loop is gained. Specifically, in this embodiment, the deception signal transmission power is gradually increased to gain control of the target receiver tracking loop with a slight power advantage, enabling the deception signal to successfully enter the target receiver tracking loop. At this point, the deception and traction process for the target receiver can be initiated. Specifically in this embodiment, the preset power step size is set to 1 dB, ultimately ensuring that the power of the deception signal reaching the target receiver is 5 dB greater than the actual signal power received by the target receiver.

[0066] In step S4 above, the pseudorange observation of the synchronization spoofing signal can be decomposed as shown in equation (1):

[0067]

[0068] In the formula, i represents the navigation satellite PRN, (x i ,y i ,z i ) represents the coordinates of the navigation satellite, δt i For the clock bias of navigation satellites, ρ i For pseudorange observations that deceive signals, R i X = (x) represents the true geometric distance between the navigation satellite and the target receiver. u ,y u ,z u ) T Let δt be the target receiver coordinates. u Let c be the clock bias of the target receiver itself, and c be the speed of light.

[0069] In step S5 above, according to the four-satellite positioning principle, increasing or decreasing the code phase difference by the same amount for the spoofing signal corresponding to each navigation satellite will not change the relative geometric distance between each navigation satellite and the target receiver, that is, it will not change the positioning result of the target receiver; because ρ iThe target receiver measures its own clock bias based on its own clock. Artificially creating a code phase difference in the deception signal will affect the target receiver's judgment of its own clock bias. Specifically, by adding the deception code phase change to equation (1), the relationship between the deception code phase change and the target receiver's own clock bias change is obtained as follows:

[0070] Equation (2):

[0071] Equation (3):

[0072] Where Δρ is the phase change of the deception code. δt represents the change in the target receiver's clock bias caused by the phase change of the deception code. u ′ represents the clock bias of the target receiver after deception.

[0073] The existence of Δρ signifies a change in the signal Doppler, which will induce a shift in the center frequency of the target receiver's tracking loop. This is equivalent to artificially creating a Doppler frequency shift Δf. Therefore, inducing a bias in the target receiver's clock bias actually pulls the center frequency of the target receiver's tracking loop. Specifically, the relationship for artificially creating the Doppler frequency shift is:

[0074] Equation (4):

[0075] Equation (5):

[0076] Where Δf is the artificially created Doppler frequency shift; f0′ is the tracking center frequency after induced pulling, and f0 is the actual signal center frequency; Δρ is the phase change of the deception code. The change in clock bias of the target receiver caused by the phase change of the deception code is denoted by c, where c is the speed of light.

[0077] In step S6 above, to avoid excessive instantaneous Doppler from the synchronization spoofing signal causing the target receiver to lose lock, it is necessary to control the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift, ensuring that the step size does not exceed the target receiver's lock-out threshold. Specifically, the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift is controlled as follows:

[0078] Convert the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift into a step size of the deception code phase change:

[0079] Equation (6):

[0080] in, For the target receiver to track the center frequency shift of the loop, This refers to the step size of the phase change in the deception code. That is, it needs to be controlled. It should not be too large, that is, control. The maximum pull rate should not be too large. It should start with a smaller pull rate and then gradually increase the migration rate of the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency. Simultaneously, limited by the receiver's high dynamic tracking capability, the maximum pull rate should not exceed the loss-of-lock threshold, typically set at 100 ns / s, ensuring that the step size of the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency migration does not exceed 100 ns / s. Once the maximum pull rate is reached, the current rate can be maintained to continuously deceive the target receiver's tracking loop. When the pull rate approaches the expected level, control should be applied again. The traction rate should not be too high; gradually decrease it until the traction range stabilizes at a fixed level. This concealed, time-deception traction strategy, operating within seconds, is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, in Figure 2 In the target receiver tracking loop, the step size of the center frequency shift gradually increases in the first stage, remains constant in the second stage, and gradually decreases in the third stage until it stabilizes at a fixed value.

[0081] In step S7 above, after the step size of the center frequency migration of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at a fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered, causing the target receiver to lose lock. When the towing range is large enough (i.e., during the step size control of the center frequency migration of the target receiver tracking loop, the 1PPS phase migration level is controlled to be greater than 30µs), the real navigation satellite timing signal is no longer within the target receiver tracking loop. Thus, when the timestamp of the deception signal jumps and the target receiver reacquires it, the difficulty of capturing the real signal will increase. This allows the target receiver to "accept" the synchronization deception signal with different timestamp information, achieving the purpose of deceiving the target receiver's timestamp.

[0082] This invention discloses a satellite covert timing deception method. By controlling the step size of the target receiver's tracking loop center frequency shift, the step size is ensured to be no greater than the target receiver's loss-of-lock threshold. After the step size stabilizes at a fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered. This timing deception method can deceive the target receiver's clock bias (or 1PPS phase or timing result) and timestamp information (or timing calculation time or information layer time information) with a slight power advantage, simultaneously achieving deception at both the signal and information layers. This achieves a covert timing deception effect, significantly improving the operability of the deception information and expanding the functionality of the deception interference technology while maintaining its covertness.

[0083] The satellite covert timing deception method of this invention establishes a deception traction theory in the time and frequency domains, revealing the correspondence between time changes, phase changes, and frequency changes in the time and frequency domains. It has important guiding significance for further exploring new paths, methods, and strategies for deception and interference technology, as well as for researching more complete anti-interference and anti-deception technologies.

[0084] The satellite covert timing deception method of this invention can deceive the timing result of the target receiver alone without changing its positioning result, filling the gap in the current deception and interference technology that only focuses on positioning deception effectiveness and cannot deceive the timing result of the target alone.

[0085] Example 2

[0086] This invention provides a satellite covert time synchronization deception device, such as... Figure 3 As shown, it includes:

[0087] The information acquisition module is used to obtain the approximate location of the target receiver;

[0088] The synchronous deception signal generation module is used to estimate the navigation satellite code phase observation at the target receiver based on the approximate position of the target receiver, and generate a sky synchronization deception signal at the phase center of the target receiving antenna.

[0089] The target receiver tracking loop control module is used to strip away the correlation peaks of the real navigation satellite signal and replace the control of the target receiver tracking loop with a deceptive signal to gain control of the target receiver tracking loop.

[0090] The pseudorange observation decomposition module is used to decompose the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal after gaining control of the target receiver tracking loop, and obtain the relationship between the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal and the navigation satellite clock error and the target receiver's own clock error.

[0091] The relation calculation module is used to add the deception code phase change amount to the relation to obtain the target receiver's own clock bias change amount caused by the deception code phase change amount; and to obtain the artificially created Doppler frequency shift based on the target receiver's own clock bias change amount.

[0092] The stepping control module is used to control the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift based on an artificially created Doppler frequency shift. The step size gradually increases in the first stage, remains constant in the second stage, and gradually decreases until it stabilizes at a fixed value in the third stage.

[0093] The timestamp spoofing jamming module is used to tamper with the timestamp information of the spoofing signal after the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop has stabilized at a fixed value, thereby completing the spoofing of the target receiver's timestamp.

[0094] The modules described above are connected sequentially. The device provided in this embodiment of the invention has the same implementation principle and technical effects as the aforementioned method embodiment. For the sake of brevity, any parts not mentioned in the device embodiment can be referred to the corresponding content in the aforementioned method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0095] Example 3

[0096] This invention provides a satellite covert time synchronization deception electronic device, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the satellite covert time synchronization deception method described in Embodiment 1.

[0097] Specifically, the electronic device may be a mobile phone, computer, or tablet computer, and includes a memory and a processor. The electronic device may also include an input / output (I / O) interface and communication components.

[0098] The processor is used to execute all or part of the steps in the satellite covert timing deception method as described in Example 1. The memory is used to store various types of data, which may include, for example, instructions for any application or method in the electronic device, as well as application-related data. The processor may be implemented as an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), Digital Signal Processor (DSP), Programmable Logic Device (PLD), Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor, or other electronic components.

[0099] Example 4

[0100] This invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are loaded and executed by a processor, a satellite covert time synchronization deception method of Embodiment 1 is implemented.

[0101] The computer-readable storage media in this invention include: flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory, such as SD (Secure Digital Memory Card), random access memory (RAM), static random access memory (SRAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), magnetic memory, disk, optical disk, server, APP (Application) application store, and other media that can store program verification codes.

[0102] The above embodiments merely illustrate several implementation methods of the present invention, and their descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, but they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of the present invention, and these all fall within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of this patent should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for covertly deceiving satellite timing, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Obtain the approximate location of the target receiver; Based on the approximate location of the target receiver, estimate the navigation satellite code phase observation at the target receiver and generate a sky synchronization deception signal at the phase center of the target receiving antenna. The synchronization deception signal is used to replace the real navigation satellite signal to gain control of the target receiver tracking loop; After gaining control, the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal is decomposed to obtain the relationship between the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal and the navigation satellite clock error and the target receiver's own clock error; By adding the deception code phase change amount to the above formula, the target receiver's own clock bias change amount caused by the deception code phase change amount is obtained; based on the target receiver's own clock bias change amount, the artificially created Doppler frequency shift is obtained; Based on the artificially created Doppler frequency shift, the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift is controlled so that the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift is not greater than the target receiver's loss of lock threshold. After the step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at a fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered to complete the deception of the target receiver's timestamp.

2. The satellite covert timing deception method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The relationship for the artificially created Doppler frequency shift is: in, In the formula, Δf is the artificially created Doppler frequency shift; f0′ is the tracking center frequency after induced pulling, and f0 is the actual signal center frequency; Δρ is the phase change of the deception code. Let c be the change in clock bias of the target receiver caused by the phase change of the deception code, and c be the speed of light.

3. The satellite covert timing deception method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop is controlled by the following method: Convert the step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift into a step size of the deception code phase change: And ensure that the step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop is not greater than the loss-of-lock threshold; in, For the target receiver to track the center frequency shift of the loop, This refers to the step size of the phase change in the deception code.

4. The satellite covert timing deception method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step size of the target receiver tracking loop center frequency shift gradually increases in the first stage, remains constant in the second stage, and gradually decreases in the third stage until it stabilizes at a fixed value. After the step size of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at the fixed value, the timestamp information of the deception signal is altered to complete the deception of the target receiver's timestamp.

5. The satellite covert timing deception method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The relationship is as follows: Among them, (x i ,y i ,z i ) represents the coordinates of the navigation satellite, δt i For the clock bias of navigation satellites, ρ i For the pseudorange observation used to deceive the signal, Ri is the true geometric distance between the navigation satellite and the target receiver, and X = (x u ,y u ,z u ) T Let δt be the target receiver coordinates. u Let c be the clock bias of the target receiver itself, and c be the speed of light.

6. The satellite covert timing deception method as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The relationship obtained by adding the deception code phase change to the above formula is as follows: The clock bias of the target receiver after deception is: Where Δρ is the phase change of the deception code. δt represents the change in the target receiver's clock bias caused by the phase change of the deception code. u ′ represents the clock bias of the target receiver after deception.

7. The satellite covert timing deception method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, During the stepping phase of the center frequency shift of the tracking loop of the target receiver, the 1PPS phase shift level is controlled to be greater than 30µs.

8. A satellite covert time synchronization deception device, characterized in that, include: The information acquisition module is used to obtain the approximate location of the target receiver; The synchronous deception signal generation module is used to estimate the navigation satellite code phase observation at the target receiver based on the approximate location of the target receiver, and generate a sky synchronization deception signal at the phase center of the target receiving antenna. The target receiver tracking loop control module is used to strip away the correlation peaks of the real navigation satellite signal and replace the control of the target receiver tracking loop with the synchronization deception signal to obtain control over the target receiver tracking loop. The pseudorange observation decomposition module is used to decompose the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal after obtaining the control, and obtain the relationship between the pseudorange observation of the synchronization deception signal and the navigation satellite clock error and the target receiver's own clock error. The relation calculation module is used to add the deception code phase change amount to the relation to obtain the target receiver's own clock bias change amount caused by the deception code phase change amount; and to obtain the artificially created Doppler frequency shift based on the target receiver's own clock bias change amount. The stepping control module is used to control the stepping of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop according to the artificially created Doppler frequency shift, so that the stepping of the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop gradually increases in the first stage, remains constant in the second stage, and gradually decreases in the third stage until it stabilizes at a fixed value. as well as, The timestamp spoofing interference module is used to tamper with the timestamp information of the spoofing signal after the center frequency shift of the target receiver tracking loop stabilizes at the fixed value, thereby completing the spoofing of the target receiver's timestamp.

9. A satellite covert time synchronization deception electronic device, characterized in that, The system includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor, and the processor executes the computer program to implement a satellite covert timing deception method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, which, when loaded and executed by a processor, implement a satellite covert timing deception method as described in any one of claims 1-7.

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