Method for planning demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy in green supply chain

Abstract

The application discloses a demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain, belongs to the field of sustainable development, and relates to a competitive supply chain model under a joint low-carbon strategy that manufacturers all conduct green investment and retailers conduct low-carbon promotion, and a competitive supply chain model under a single low-carbon strategy that manufacturers all conduct green investment and retailers do not conduct low-carbon promotion.The application adopts the above structure to provide a two-tier competitive supply chain Stackelberg game model composed of two mutually competitive manufacturers and a retailer, and aims to study a supply chain coordination problem in a green marketing environment, so as to maximize the profits of all parties in the supply chain.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of sustainable development technology, in particular to a demand response order and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain. BACKGROUND

[0002] Because there is usually competition in the market, the decisions of other competitors also have a significant impact on the performance of manufacturers. With the spread of the green market, competition between alternative products becomes fierce, such as different brands of sports shoes. Therefore, some researchers no longer focus on a single supply chain party, but study the impact of competition on supply chain performance under the background of low carbon from different angles, such as channel competition between two alternative products, or competition between multiple retailers. These studies emphasize that the green consciousness of consumers and the carbon emission reduction efforts of brand parties will have an impact on product competition, and explore their impact on the decisions of each party in the supply chain. However, they do not consider the green efforts of retailers, nor do they analyze the impact of retailers on the decisions of competing manufacturers. Therefore, it is urgent to understand how the green efforts of a company will affect the choices of other parties in the supply chain under different competition intensities. SUMMARY

[0003] The purpose of the present application is to provide a demand response order and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain, which proposes a Stackelberg game model of a two-tier competition supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers and a retailer. The purpose is to study the supply chain coordination problem under the environment of green marketing, so as to maximize the profits of each party in the supply chain.

[0004] In order to achieve the above purpose, the present application provides a demand response order and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain, which includes a competitive supply chain model under a joint low-carbon strategy in which manufacturers make green investments and retailers conduct low-carbon promotion, and a competitive supply chain model under a single low-carbon strategy in which manufacturers make green investments and retailers do not conduct low-carbon promotion, wherein the competitive supply chain model under the joint low-carbon strategy comprises the following steps:

[0005] S11, determining the demand rate function D1 of the product produced by the manufacturer M1 and the demand rate function D2 of the product produced by the manufacturer M2;

[0006] S12, determining the total order function q1 obtained by the manufacturer M1 and the total order function q2 obtained by the manufacturer M2;

[0007] S13, constructing the profit function of the retailer according to the functions obtained in S11 and S12 the profit function of the manufacturer M1 and the profit function of the manufacturer M2

[0008] S14, calculate the profit function partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l1 of manufacturer M1 partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l2 of manufacturer M2, determine the optimal product emission reduction level to ensure the maximum profit function, and obtain the optimal emission reduction level function l 1max and l 2max ;

[0009] S15, bring the optimal emission reduction level function l 1max and l 2max into the profit function of the retailer , and use the Lagrange optimization method to obtain the optimal order quantity of the retailer for the product of manufacturer M1 and the optimal order quantity of the retailer for the product of manufacturer M2 and the optimal promotion level u of the retailer CJ ;

[0010] S16, calculate the optimal emission reduction level of manufacturer M1 and the total order quantity according to the optimal order quantity , calculate the optimal emission reduction level of manufacturer M2 and the total order quantity according to the optimal order quantity .

[0011] The steps for establishing the competitive supply chain model under the single low-carbon strategy are as follows:

[0012] S21, determine the demand rate function D3 of the product produced by manufacturer M1 and the demand rate function D4 of the product produced by manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy;

[0013] S22, determine the total order quantity function q3 obtained by manufacturer M1 and the total order quantity function q4 obtained by manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy;

[0014] S23, construct the profit function of the retailer the profit function of manufacturer M1 and the profit function of manufacturer M2

[0015] S24, calculate the profit function partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l1 of manufacturer M1 partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l2 of manufacturer M2, determine the optimal product emission reduction level to ensure the maximum profit function, and obtain the optimal emission reduction level function l under the single low-carbon strategy 3max and l4max ;

[0016] S25, the optimal emission reduction level function l 3max and l 4max into the retailer's profit function , using the Lagrange optimization method, the retailer's optimal order quantity for the manufacturer M1 product under a single low-carbon strategy and the retailer's optimal order quantity for the manufacturer M2 product

[0017] S26, according to the optimal order quantity The optimal emission reduction level of the manufacturer M1 under a single low-carbon strategy and the total order quantity According to the optimal order quantity The optimal emission reduction level of the manufacturer M2 and the total order quantity are calculated.

[0018] Preferably, in S11, the demand rate function D1 is,

[0019]

[0020] The demand rate function D2 is,

[0021]

[0022] where a represents the original market demand with competition, x represents a random variable related to uncertainty, η represents the sensitivity of consumers to retailer promotion, u represents the promotion level of the retailer, g represents the green sensitivity of consumers to product emission reduction level, b s represent the competition rate of sustainable development;

[0023] In S12, the order total function q1 is,

[0024]

[0025] The order total function q2 is

[0026]

[0027] Q1 represents the order quantity of the manufacturer M1 original market demand, Q2 represents the order quantity of the manufacturer M2 original market demand.

[0028] Preferably, in S13, the retailer's profit function is,

[0029]

[0030] wherein E denotes the expected value, c1 denotes the retailer operating cost of the product of manufacturer M1, c2 denotes the retailer operating cost of the product of manufacturer M2, w1 denotes the wholesale price of the product of manufacturer M1, w2 denotes the wholesale price of the product of manufacturer M2, p1 denotes the retail price of the product of manufacturer M1, p2 denotes the retail price of the product of manufacturer M2, I R denotes the retailer promotion cost ratio, s1 denotes the residual value of the product of manufacturer M1, s2 denotes the residual value of the product of manufacturer M2;

[0031] The profit functions of manufacturer M1 and manufacturer M2 are,

[0032]

[0033] wherein k M1 denotes the sustainability investment cost ratio of manufacturer M1, k M2 denotes the sustainability investment cost ratio of manufacturer M2, P M1 denotes the production cost of manufacturer M1, P M2 denotes the production cost of manufacturer M2.

[0034] Preferably, in S14, the second-order partial derivatives of the profit functions of manufacturer M1 and manufacturer M2 with respect to the product abatement level are taken, and according to the property that the profit function itself is a concave function, the optimal abatement level function l 1max and l 2max are obtained, as shown below,

[0035]

[0036] Preferably, in S15, the optimal promotion level u CJ of the retailer is,

[0037]

[0038] wherein A and B are parameters, and the expression is in the form of a short-cut, and the functions are,

[0039]

[0040] The optimal order quantity of the product of manufacturer M1 is,

[0041]

[0042] The optimal order quantity of the product of manufacturer M2 is,

[0043]

[0044] Preferably, in S21, the demand rate function D3 of the product produced by manufacturer M1 under the single low-carbon strategy is

[0045] D3 = a + x + (g + b s ) l1 - b s l2;

[0046] the demand rate function D4 of the product produced by manufacturer M2 is

[0047] D4 = a + x + (g + b s ) l2 - b s l1;

[0048] in S23, the profit function of the retailer under the single low-carbon strategy is

[0049]

[0050] the profit function of manufacturer M1 under the single low-carbon strategy and the profit function of manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy are

[0051]

[0052] Preferably, in S25, the optimal order quantity of the product of manufacturer M1 and the optimal order quantity of the product of manufacturer M2 by the retailer are

[0053]

[0054] Preferably, in S26, the optimal emission reduction level of manufacturer M1 and the total order quantity are

[0055]

[0056] the optimal emission reduction level of manufacturer M2 and the total order quantity are

[0057]

[0058] ​Preferably, the parameters of the competitive supply chain model under the joint low-carbon strategy and the competitive supply chain model under the single low-carbon strategy are subjected to sensitivity analysis, the green sensitivity of the consumer is high, the low-carbon efforts of the manufacturer can attract more green consumers, because the green action of the manufacturer is more effective, at this time, the promotional enthusiasm of the retailer will decrease, the green promotion behavior of the retailer is sensitive to the consumer, the low-carbon promotion of the retailer can attract more consumers, because the green action of the retailer is more effective, at this time, the low-carbon efforts of the manufacturer will decrease.

[0059] Therefore, the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method of the green supply chain with the above structure has the following advantages:

[0060] (1) The comprehensive optimization problem of ordering quantity, product emission reduction level and retailer low-carbon promotion level is studied. The mutual influence between the green efforts of two competing manufacturers and retailers is analyzed, and suggestions for decision optimization of each party in the green supply chain are provided.

[0061] (2) The competitive supply chain model proposed also considers the efforts of the retailer in promoting green products, which is specifically manifested as the application of low-carbon promotion strategy, stimulates the manufacturer to make green investment, and helps the retailer to obtain better profits in the green market.

[0062] (3) The influence of consumer green consciousness and the sensitivity of consumers to retailer promotion activities are analyzed, and the importance of establishing a green marketing environment is embodied.

[0063] The technical solutions of the present application will be described in further detail below with the help of the accompanying drawings and examples. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0064] Figure 1 The flow chart for the establishment of the competitive supply chain of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method of the green supply chain of the present application;

[0065] Figure 2 The schematic diagram of the competitive supply chain of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method of the green supply chain of the present application;

[0066] Figure 3 The schematic diagram of the benchmark model supply chain of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method of the green supply chain of the present application;

[0067] Figure 4 The product competition analysis under the single low-carbon strategy of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method of the green supply chain of the present application;

[0068] Figure 5The consumer green sensitivity analysis under the single low-carbon strategy of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in the green supply chain of the present application;

[0069] Figure 6 The product competition analysis under the joint low-carbon strategy of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in the green supply chain of the present application;

[0070] Figure 7 The profit of the manufacturer M1 about the promotion level and green consciousness under the joint low-carbon strategy of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in the green supply chain of the present application;

[0071] Figure 8 The profit of the manufacturer M2 about the promotion level and green consciousness under the joint low-carbon strategy of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in the green supply chain of the present application;

[0072] Figure 9 The profit of the retailer about the promotion level and green consciousness under the joint low-carbon strategy of the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in the green supply chain of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0073] EMBODIMENT

[0074] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some of the embodiments of the present application but not all the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the accompanying drawings can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0075] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed present application, but only represents selected embodiments of the present application. All other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments in the present application without creative labor are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0076] It should be noted that: similar reference numerals and letters represent similar items in the following drawings, therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined and explained in the subsequent drawings.

[0077] In the description of the present application, it should be noted that the terms "upper", "lower", "inner", "outer" and the like indicate the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings, or the orientation or positional relationship commonly placed when the product of the present application is used, and are only for the convenience of describing the present application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the indicated device or element must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and therefore cannot be understood as a limitation on the present application.

[0078] In the description of the present application, it should be noted that unless otherwise explicitly specified and limited, the terms "set", "mount", "connect" should be understood broadly, for example, it can be fixedly connected, or it can be detachably connected, or integrally connected; it can be mechanically connected, or it can be electrically connected; it can be directly connected, or it can be indirectly connected through an intermediate medium, or it can be connected inside two elements. For those skilled in the art, the specific meaning of the above terms in the present application can be understood according to the specific circumstances.

[0079] Some embodiments of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples and features in the examples can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0080] The model of the present application is operated under the following conditions,

[0081] (1) Both manufacturers use an order production system to produce products, so the production quantity is the same as the order quantity issued by the retailer.

[0082] (2) The model does not consider backlog orders.

[0083] (3) Since the focus of retail promotion is the sustainable development of products, when the product emission reduction quantity is 0, the retailer will not carry out low-carbon promotion activities.

[0084] (4) In order to ensure the survival of the enterprise, the retail price should cover the total cost of a single product, including production cost, operation cost and green investment cost under the single low-carbon strategy, and production cost, operation cost, promotion cost and green investment cost under the joint low-carbon strategy.

[0085] As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 , the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in the green supply chain of the present application includes a competitive supply chain model under a joint low-carbon strategy in which manufacturers make green investments and retailers carry out low-carbon promotion (the competitive supply chain model is a supply chain model composed of one retailer and two manufacturers) and a competitive supply chain model under a single low-carbon strategy in which manufacturers make green investments and retailers do not carry out low-carbon promotion, wherein the competitive supply chain model under the joint low-carbon strategy comprises the following steps:

[0086] S11, determining a demand rate function D1 of products produced by the manufacturer M1 and a demand rate function D2 of products produced by the manufacturer M2;

[0087] The demand rate function D1 is,

[0088]

[0089] The demand rate function D2 is,

[0090]

[0091] wherein a represents a competitive original market demand, x represents a random variable related to uncertainty, η represents a consumer sensitivity to retailer promotion, u represents a promotion level of the retailer, g represents a consumer green sensitivity to product abatement level, b s represents a competitive ratio of sustainable development;

[0092] S12, determining a total order quantity function q1 obtained by the manufacturer M1 and a total order quantity function q2 obtained by the manufacturer M2;

[0093] The total order quantity function q1 is,

[0094]

[0095] The total order quantity function q2 is

[0096]

[0097] Q1 represents an order quantity of the original market demand of the manufacturer M1, and Q2 represents an order quantity of the original market demand of the manufacturer M2.

[0098] S13, constructing a profit function of the retailer according to the functions obtained in S11 and S12 The profit function of the manufacturer M1 is and the profit function of the manufacturer M2 is

[0099] In S13, the profit function of the retailer is,

[0100]

[0101] wherein E represents, c1 represents a retailer operating cost of products of the manufacturer M1, c2 represents a retailer operating cost of products of the manufacturer M2, w1 represents a wholesale price of products of the manufacturer M1, w2 represents a wholesale price of products of the manufacturer M2, p1 represents a retail price of products of the manufacturer M1, p2 represents a retail price of products of the manufacturer M2, I Rs1 represents the residual value of the product of manufacturer M1, s2 represents the residual value of the product of manufacturer M2;

[0102] The profit function of manufacturer M1 and manufacturer M2 is,

[0103]

[0104]

[0105] wherein k M1 represents the sustainability investment cost rate of manufacturer M1, k M2 represents the sustainability investment cost rate of manufacturer M2, P M1 represents the production cost of manufacturer M1, P M2 represents the production cost of manufacturer M2.

[0106] The parameters of the profit function satisfy the following restriction conditions,

[0107] Q1>0;

[0108] Q2>0;

[0109] p1>c1+P M1 +k M1 l1+I R u;

[0110] p2>c2+P M2 +k M2 l2+I R u;

[0111] S14, the profit function the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l1 of manufacturer M1 the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l2 of manufacturer M2, the optimal product emission reduction level is determined when the profit function is guaranteed to be maximum, and the optimal emission reduction level function l 1max and l 2max ;

[0112] Due to the restriction conditions of the profit function, when the partial derivative of the profit function is obtained,

[0113]

[0114] This shows that the profit function is a concave function in the second partial derivative with respect to the product emission reduction level l1 of manufacturer M1, and the profit function is a concave function in the second partial derivative with respect to the product emission reduction level l2 of manufacturer M2.

[0115] So, taking the first derivative of the profit functions of manufacturer Ml and manufacturer M2 with respect to the product abatement level, and setting the derivative to zero, we can derive the optimal abatement level function l 1max and l 2max As shown below,

[0116]

[0117]

[0118] The original market demand for both products follows a uniform distribution, so,

[0119] F(Q1) = Q1 / 2a;

[0120] F(Q2) = Q2 / 2a;

[0121] where F(Q1) represents the cumulative distribution function of Q1, and F(Q2) represents the cumulative distribution function of Q2.

[0122] S15, the optimal abatement level function l 1max and l 2max is brought into the retailer's profit function Using the Lagrange optimization method, we can obtain the retailer's optimal order quantity for manufacturer Ml's product and the retailer's optimal order quantity for manufacturer M2's product and the retailer's optimal promotion level u CJ ;

[0123] The retailer's optimal promotion level u CJ is,

[0124]

[0125] where A represents the original market demand without competition, and its function is,

[0126]

[0127] B represents, and its function is,

[0128]

[0129] The retailer's optimal order quantity for manufacturer Ml's product is,

[0130]

[0131] The retailer's optimal order quantity for manufacturer M2's product is,

[0132]

[0133] S16, calculating the optimal order quantity the optimal abatement level for manufacturer M1 and the total order quantity S17, calculating the optimal order quantity the optimal abatement level for manufacturer M2 and the total order quantity S18, calculating the optimal order quantity.

[0134] The above optimal solution is the only optimal solution when the following constraints are satisfied,

[0135]

[0136] The steps for establishing the competitive supply chain model under the single low-carbon strategy are,

[0137] S21, determining the demand rate function D3 of the product produced by manufacturer M1 and the demand rate function D4 of the product produced by manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy;

[0138] The demand rate function D3 of the product produced by manufacturer M1 under the single low-carbon strategy is,

[0139] D3 = a + x + (g + b s ) l1 - b s l2;

[0140] The demand rate function D4 of the product produced by manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy is,

[0141] D4 = a + x + (g + b s ) l2 - b s l1;

[0142] S22, determining the total order quantity function q3 obtained by manufacturer M1 and the total order quantity function q4 obtained by manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy;

[0143] The total order quantity function q3 obtained by manufacturer M1 under the single low-carbon strategy is,

[0144] q3 = Q1 + (g + b s ) l1 - b s l2;

[0145] The total order quantity function q4 obtained by manufacturer M2 under the single low-carbon strategy is,

[0146] q4 = Q2 + (g + b s ) l2 - b s l1;

[0147] S23, constructing the profit function of the retailer according to the functions obtained in S21 and S22 Profit function of manufacturer M1 and profit function of manufacturer M2

[0148] Profit function of retailer under single low carbon strategy is,

[0149]

[0150] Profit function of manufacturer M1 under single low carbon strategy and profit function of manufacturer M2 is,

[0151]

[0152] The profit functions satisfy the following constraints,

[0153] Q1>0;

[0154] Q2>0;

[0155] pi>ci+P M1 +k M1 li;

[0156] p2>c2+P M2 +k M2 l2;

[0157] S24, calculate the profit function under single low carbon strategy the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level li of manufacturer M1 the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to the product emission reduction level l2 of manufacturer M2, determine the optimal product emission reduction level when the profit function is maximized, and obtain the optimal emission reduction level function l under single low carbon strategy 3max and l 4max ;

[0158] When the above constraints are satisfied, the profit function and the profit function The second partial derivative can be obtained,

[0159]

[0160] Thus, the profit function and the profit function are concave functions, and their extreme values are taken when the first partial derivative is zero,

[0161]

[0162]

[0163] S25, the optimal emission reduction level function l 3max and l 4max into the retailer's profit function , using the Lagrange optimization method, the retailer's optimal order quantity for the manufacturer M1 product under a single low-carbon strategy and the retailer's optimal order quantity for the manufacturer M2 product

[0164] the optimal emission reduction level function l 3max and l 4max into the retailer's profit function , we can get

[0165]

[0166] the optimal order quantity for the manufacturer M1 product and the optimal order quantity for the manufacturer M2 product ,

[0167]

[0168] S26, according to the optimal order quantity the optimal emission reduction level of the manufacturer M1 under a single low-carbon strategy and the total order quantity , according to the optimal order quantity the optimal emission reduction level of the manufacturer M2 and the total order quantity .

[0169] the optimal emission reduction level of the manufacturer M1 and the total order quantity ,

[0170]

[0171] the optimal emission reduction level of the manufacturer M2 and the total order quantity ,

[0172]

[0173] A numerical case study was conducted, setting a single strategy benchmark model and a joint strategy benchmark model, and comparing the superiority of the competitive supply chain model in improving the emission reduction level. The benchmark model is a simple supply chain model composed of one manufacturer and one retailer, as shown in Figure 3 ,

[0174] the benchmark model under a single low-carbon strategy, the retailer's profit function is

[0175]

[0176] The manufacturer's profit function is,

[0177]

[0178] Its optimal emission reduction for,

[0179]

[0180] Its optimal total order quantity for,

[0181]

[0182] Benchmark model under joint strategy, the retailer's profit function for,

[0183]

[0184] Manufacturer's profit function for,

[0185]

[0186] The retailer's optimal promotion intensity u BJ for,

[0187]

[0188] Its optimal emission reduction level for,

[0189]

[0190]

[0191] Its optimal total order quantity for,

[0192]

[0193] The original market demand rates in the two cases are A = 200 and a = 100 respectively. Assume that the green sensitivity ratio of consumers to the sustainability level of products is g = 5 and the sensitivity ratio to retailer promotions is η = 5. The competition ratio between manufacturers M1 and M2 is b S =1, if b S =0 means no competition, b S The larger the value, the more intense the competition. The product provided by manufacturer M1 has a high production cost P M1 =40, but the cost rate of green investment is low k M1= 0.4, and the wholesale price is w1= 55. The manufacturer M2 provides the product with a low production cost P M2 = 14.4, but the green investment cost rate is high k M2 = 1, and the wholesale price is w2= 40. The retailer sells the two types of products at prices p1= 80 and p2= 60, and the salvage values are s1= 10 and s2= 5, respectively. The operating cost of the retailer is: c1= 5 for the product of manufacturer M1, and c2= 2 for the product of manufacturer M2. The low-carbon promotion cost is assumed to be I R = 0.2.

[0194] The numerical results of the benchmark model under the single low-carbon strategy are shown in the following table,

[0195]

[0196] The numerical results of the benchmark model under the joint low-carbon strategy are shown in the following table,

[0197]

[0198]

[0199] When the retailer adopts low-carbon promotion, the manufacturers are relatively idle. When coordinating with manufacturer M1, the retailer decides to achieve a higher promotion level, i.e., u BJ = 27.8. Therefore, manufacturer M1 is not willing to spend too much cost to achieve more emission reduction. Since the retailer contributes more in low-carbon promotion, both manufacturer M1 and the retailer can obtain higher profits under the joint low-carbon strategy compared with the single low-carbon strategy.

[0200] The numerical results of the competitive supply chain model under the single low-carbon strategy and the joint low-carbon strategy are shown in the following table,

[0201]

[0202] Under the single strategy, both manufacturer M1 and manufacturer M2 show initiative in product sustainability development due to the existence of competition. The profit of manufacturer M1 is lower than that of manufacturer M2, which may be due to its higher production cost. In this competition, the biggest beneficiary should be the retailer, whose profit rate increases significantly, which may be due to the high total demand rate of consumers driven by the green investment of the two manufacturers. For the supply chain under the joint low-carbon strategy, the emission reduction level of both manufacturer M1 and manufacturer M2 is slightly lower due to the fact that the retailer attracts more green consumers through promotion. Since the green investment cost rate of manufacturer M1 is lower, it maintains a higher emission reduction level than manufacturer M2. Compared with the single low-carbon strategy, all three parties can obtain better profits under the joint low-carbon strategy.

[0203] It is found that, under the competitive supply chain model, the manufacturers M1 and M2 always maintain a certain level of emission reduction, and will not appear the case of emission reduction level being 0 as in the benchmark model.

[0204] As shown in Figures 4 to 9 , the sensitivity analysis is carried out on the parameters of the competitive supply chain model under the joint low-carbon strategy and the competitive supply chain model under the single low-carbon strategy. When the green sensitivity of consumers to manufacturers is high, the low-carbon efforts of manufacturers can attract more green consumers, because the green action of manufacturers is more effective, at this time the promotional enthusiasm of retailers will decrease, and when the green sensitivity of consumers to retailers is high, the low-carbon promotion of retailers can attract more consumers, because the green action of retailers is more effective, at this time the low-carbon efforts of manufacturers will decrease.

[0205] As shown in Figure 4 , Figure 5 , the sensitivity analysis of the green sensitivity of consumers is carried out on the competitive supply chain model under the single low-carbon strategy. The higher the green sensitivity of consumers, the more green products can attract more green consumers, thereby stimulating manufacturers to make more contributions in green investment. Therefore, the manufacturers M1 and M2 both increase the emission reduction level of products, and the total order quantity of the manufacturers M1 and M2 also increases. Although green investment needs additional cost, manufacturers can obtain higher profits in the greener market. Retailers also benefit from the increased demand of consumers and earn higher profits.

[0206] As shown in Figures 6 to 9 , the sensitivity analysis is carried out on the competitive supply chain model under the joint low-carbon strategy. The higher the green sensitivity of consumers, the more green consumers can be attracted by the low-carbon efforts of manufacturers. The higher the green sensitivity of consumers, the more green consumers can be attracted by the low-carbon action of manufacturers, and the promotional enthusiasm of retailers will decrease, because the green action of manufacturers is more effective. Therefore, the level of retail promotion decreases significantly, and the emission reduction level of the manufacturers M1 and M2 increases with the increase of the green sensitivity of consumers. The higher the product emission reduction level, the larger the total order quantity. However, green investment needs additional cost, the profit of the manufacturer M1 does not change significantly, and the profit of the manufacturer M2 decreases with the increase of g.

[0207] Therefore, the demand response type ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method of the green supply chain with the above structure is adopted, a Stackelberg game model of a two-tier competitive supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers and a retailer is proposed. The purpose is to study the supply chain coordination problem under the green marketing environment, so as to realize the profit maximization of each party in the supply chain.

[0208] It should be pointed out finally that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application but not to limit it, and although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the technical solutions of the present application can still be modified or replaced equivalently, and these modifications or equivalent replacements should not make the modified technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present application.

Claims

1. A demand-responsive ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain, characterized by: It includes the method for establishing a competitive supply chain model under a joint low-carbon strategy, in which manufacturers all make green investments and retailers conduct low-carbon promotions, and the method for establishing a competitive supply chain model under a single low-carbon strategy, in which manufacturers all make green investments and retailers do not conduct low-carbon promotions. The steps for establishing a competitive supply chain model under a joint low-carbon strategy are as follows: S11, determine the manufacturer Demand rate function for the product produced and manufacturers Demand rate function for the product produced ; S12, determine the manufacturer Obtained order quantity function and manufacturers Obtained order quantity function ; S13, based on the functions obtained in S11 and S12, construct the retailer's profit function , Manufacturer Profit function and manufacturers Profit function ; S14, calculate profit function About the Manufacturer Product emission reduction level Partial derivatives and profit functions of About the Manufacturer Product emission reduction level The partial derivative of , determines the optimal product emission reduction level when ensuring the maximum profit function, and obtains the optimal emission reduction level function and ; S15, the optimal emission reduction level function and Substitute the retailer's profit function In the Lagrangian optimization method, we obtain the retailer's The best order quantity for a product and retailers to manufacturers The best order quantity for a product and the optimal promotional level for retailers ; S16, based on the optimal order quantity , for manufacturers The optimal emission reduction level and total order quantity Calculate the optimal order quantity , for manufacturers The optimal emission reduction level and total order quantity Perform calculations; The steps to establish a competitive supply chain model under a single low-carbon strategy are: S21, determine the manufacturer under the single low-carbon strategy Demand rate function for the product produced and manufacturers Demand rate function for the product produced ; S22, determine the manufacturer under the single low-carbon strategy Obtained order quantity function and manufacturers Obtained order quantity function ; S23, based on the functions obtained in S21 and S22, construct the retailer's profit function , Manufacturer Profit function and manufacturers Profit function ; S24, calculate the profit function under a single low-carbon strategy About the Manufacturer Product emission reduction level Partial derivatives and profit functions of About the Manufacturer Product emission reduction level The partial derivative of , determines the optimal product emission reduction level when ensuring the maximum profit function, and obtains the optimal emission reduction level function under a single low-carbon strategy and ; S25, the optimal emission reduction level function Substitute the retailer's profit function In the paper, the Lagrangian optimization method is used to obtain the retailer's demand for the manufacturer under the single low-carbon strategy. The best order quantity for a product and retailers to manufacturers The best order quantity for a product ; S26, based on the optimal order quantity , under a single low-carbon strategy, manufacturers The optimal emission reduction level and total order quantity Calculate the optimal order quantity , for manufacturers The optimal emission reduction level and total order quantity Perform calculations.

2. The demand-responsive ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain according to claim 1 is characterized by: In S11, the demand rate function for, ； Demand rate function for, ； in, Indicates the original market demand with competition, represents a random variable associated with uncertainty, Indicates consumers’ sensitivity to retailers’ promotions. represents the retailer's promotion level, Indicates consumers’ green sensitivity to product emission reduction levels, Competitive ratios that represent sustainable development; In S12, the order quantity function for, ； Order quantity function for ； Indicates the manufacturer The order quantity of the original market demand, Indicates the manufacturer The order quantity of the original market demand.

3. The demand-responsive ordering and emission reduction strategy planning method in a green supply chain according to claim 2, characterized in that: In S13, the retailer’s profit function is, ； in, Indicates the expected value. Indicates the manufacturer The retailer's operating costs for the product, Indicates the manufacturer The retailer's operating costs for the product, Indicates the manufacturer Wholesale price of products, Indicates the manufacturer Wholesale price of products, Indicates the manufacturer The retail price of the product, Indicates the manufacturer The retail price of the product, represents the retailer's promotion cost ratio, Indicates the manufacturer The residual value of the product, Indicates the manufacturer The residual value of the product; Manufacturer and manufacturers The profit function is, ； ； in, Indicates the manufacturer Sustainable investment cost rate, Indicates the manufacturer Sustainable investment cost rate, Indicates the manufacturer production costs, Indicates the manufacturer production costs.

Images