A method and system for assessing the safety status of the primary circuit pressure boundary of a reactor.

Abstract

This invention belongs to the field of nuclear power plant technology and discloses a method and system for assessing the safety status of the pressure boundary of a reactor primary circuit. The method includes: collecting data based on characteristic variables of a key component of the pressure boundary; preprocessing the characteristic variable data collected from the key component; inputting the processed data into the safety status assessment model corresponding to the component; performing calculations through the model to obtain the safety status assessment result for the component; associating the assessment result with the component and its identifier; quantifying the assessment result; displaying the quantified result in the form of a planar coordinate axis; associating the key component with its basic information, which can be viewed through the basic information menu on the visualization display page, such as production date, manufacturer, and rated parameters; and managing the data of all components through a data management module and a database.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to, but is not limited to, the field of nuclear power plant technology, and particularly relates to a method and system for assessing the safety status of the pressure boundary of the primary circuit of a reactor. Background Technology

[0002] In nuclear power plants, when the primary coolant system of a nuclear reactor experiences problems such as leaks or breaches, the integrity of the pressure boundary (the pressure boundary of the primary coolant system) is compromised, leading to coolant leakage and potentially affecting or even endangering the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Maintaining a good safety condition at the pressure boundary is fundamental to the safe operation of a nuclear power plant. During the service life of a nuclear power plant, to ensure its safe operation, operation and management personnel need to constantly monitor the safety status of the pressure boundary in order to take timely and appropriate action.

[0003] Currently, nuclear power plant operation and management personnel monitor the safety status of pressure boundaries through the following methods:

[0004] (1) Nuclear power plant maintenance and inspection. During reactor shutdown and maintenance, maintenance personnel conduct a comprehensive inspection of the pressure boundary and determine whether the pressure boundary meets the requirements for safe operation of the nuclear power plant and whether it is in a safe state based on the inspection results.

[0005] (2) Regular safety inspections. In accordance with nuclear safety management requirements, technicians regularly conduct comprehensive inspections of the reactor primary coolant system. Then, based on the inspection results, they determine whether the pressure boundary meets the requirements for safe operation of the nuclear power plant and whether it is in a safe state.

[0006] (3) Monitoring of operating parameters. This method is suitable for real-time monitoring of the pressure boundary during the operation of nuclear power plants. The method involves the operation and management personnel observing the changes in the operating parameters of the reactor primary coolant system and its equipment. When the relevant parameters of the primary coolant system and its equipment, such as the pressurizer pressure and liquid level, suddenly drop rapidly, it can be determined that the reactor primary coolant system may be leaking and there is a problem with the safety of the pressure boundary.

[0007] (4) Leakage monitoring. A pre-installed reactor primary coolant leakage monitoring system is used to monitor for leaks in the primary coolant circuit to determine the integrity and safety of the primary coolant pressure boundary.

[0008] Based on the above analysis, the urgent technical problems that need to be solved in the existing technology are:

[0009] (1) Maintenance and routine safety inspections of nuclear power plants can only be carried out after the reactor has been shut down for a period of time, which greatly affects the economy and efficiency of the nuclear power plant. Moreover, there is a considerable time interval between each maintenance or routine safety inspection and the next inspection. During this time interval, the safety status of the pressure boundary may change, making it difficult for operation and management personnel to understand the current safety status of the pressure boundary and to grasp and predict the safety status of key aspects of the pressure boundary.

[0010] (2) The operation parameter monitoring method is used to monitor the safety status of the pressure boundary. When the operation parameter is found to be abnormal, the pressure boundary of the reactor primary coolant may have already had a problem, which does not play a preventive role in preventing the hidden dangers of the pressure boundary.

[0011] (3) The above methods rely to some extent on the historical experience of the operation and management personnel in the nuclear power plants they manage. When the operation and management personnel are replaced, the newly appointed operation and management personnel will find it difficult to grasp the safety status of the pressure boundary.

[0012] (4) Operation and management personnel cannot grasp the safety status of weak links and the overall safety situation of the pressure boundary through the above methods.

[0013] (5) The safety status and safety situation of key links at the pressure boundary lack visualization. Summary of the Invention

[0014] To address the problems existing in the prior art, this invention provides a method and system for assessing the safety status of the pressure boundary of the primary circuit of a reactor.

[0015] This invention is implemented as follows: a method for assessing the safety status of the pressure boundary of a reactor primary loop, comprising:

[0016] S1, data is collected based on the characteristic variables of a key link in the pressure boundary.

[0017] S2 preprocesses the feature variable data collected in a key process and converts it into a unified data type.

[0018] S3. Input the processed data into the safety status assessment model corresponding to this stage. The model performs calculations to obtain the safety status assessment result for this stage.

[0019] S4 links the evaluation results with the process and its identifier, causing the color of the process and its identifier to change to match the color of the corresponding security status level, thus displaying the security status of the process in a visual form.

[0020] S5. At the same time, the evaluation results of this step are quantified.

[0021] S6 displays the quantification results in a planar coordinate system. The horizontal axis represents time, and the vertical axis represents the security level. The broken line connecting the security situations at different stages of this process shows the trend of the security situation over time.

[0022] S7 links key processes with their basic information. The basic information of the process can be viewed through the basic information menu on the visual display page, such as production date, manufacturer, and rated parameters.

[0023] In S8, data from all stages is managed by the data management module and the database.

[0024] Furthermore, the method for constructing the safety situation map of the pressure boundary includes:

[0025] (1) Identify the key factors affecting the safety of the pressure-bearing boundary:

[0026] The safety status of a pressure boundary is determined by its integrity. Weak links within the pressure boundary determine its integrity and safety status. These weak links are critical to the safety status of the pressure boundary. Depending on the reactor type of the nuclear power plant, the weak links of the pressure boundary will vary, and their critical links can be determined based on the actual structure of the pressure boundary. In this invention, the weak links of the pressure boundary include key equipment or parts such as the reactor sealing surface, reactor control rod sockets, reactor outlet, reactor inlet, main gate valve outlet, main gate valve sealing surface, steam generator U-tube, steam generator inlet, steam generator outlet, main coolant pump sealing surface, and main check valve.

[0027] The safety status of the pressure boundary reflects the overall safety condition of each key component of the pressure boundary.

[0028] (2) Construct a visualization of the pressure boundary of the primary coolant in a nuclear reactor.

[0029] 1) Use visualization software to construct a visualization of the pressure boundary (it can be a three-dimensional or two-dimensional graphic).

[0030] 2) The visualization graphics must include all key aspects of the pressure boundary.

[0031] 3) The visualization graphics include the main equipment at the pressure boundary, as well as the connections between equipment, pipes and other objects.

[0032] 4) Vertical, distinctive arrows with a certain width and height are placed at key points in the visualization of the pressure boundary.

[0033] 5) The colors of each key component and its indicator arrow are dynamically variable, and their colors are associated with the safety status information of that key component. The colors of the key components and their indicator arrows indicate the safety status of that key component for users to observe.

[0034] 6) The constructed visualizations should be vivid, intuitive, and easy to observe.

[0035] 7) Visual graphics can be drawn using software such as Unity 3D.

[0036] (3) Establish a safety status assessment model for key links:

[0037] The method for establishing an equipment safety status assessment model is to use relevant factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance as input variables of the assessment model, and the output of the assessment model is the equipment safety level, which represents the safety status.

[0038] For specific methods and steps, please refer to the section "Methods for Establishing a Safety Status Assessment Model for Key Links" below.

[0039] (4) Information association:

[0040] The evaluation results of the safety status assessment model for each key component of the pressure-bearing boundary are correlated with the colors of the corresponding key components and their iconic arrows in the visualization of the pressure-bearing boundary.

[0041] In the visualization, the key components (equipment) and their designated arrows are colored blue, green, yellowish-green, yellowish-red, and red, respectively representing reliable, safe, basically safe, risky, and unsafe conditions. The corresponding statuses for these five states are as follows:

[0042] "Reliable" corresponds to "favorable situation";

[0043] "Safety" corresponds to "normal situation";

[0044] "Basic security" corresponds to "potential threat situation";

[0045] "The existence of risk" corresponds to "dangerous situation";

[0046] “Insecure” corresponds to “high-risk situation”.

[0047] (5) Safety status display

[0048] The safety status display adopts three visualization methods: the color of the iconic arrow; the color of the key link itself; and the coordinate graph showing the historical development trend.

[0049] (6) Safety status of the pressure boundary

[0050] The safety status of each key component of the pressure boundary together constitutes the nuclear safety situation map of the pressure boundary, showing the overall safety status of the pressure boundary. Based on the safety status of the pressure boundary, users can grasp the overall safety situation of the pressure boundary and the current safety vulnerabilities.

[0051] Furthermore, the security status display specifically includes:

[0052] 1) Iconic arrow display

[0053] Based on the information association, the current security status of critical links is displayed using a distinctive arrow set for that link. The current color of the distinctive arrow indicates the current security status of the critical link.

[0054] 2) The key links themselves show

[0055] In the visualization of the pressure boundary, key elements are associated with their current safety status assessment results and displayed with corresponding colors.

[0056] The color of the critical link is the same as the color of its iconic arrow, and together they indicate the safety status of that critical link.

[0057] 3) The coordinate graph shows the historical development trend.

[0058] The coordinate graph shows the relationship between the safety status of each key link and time, and represents the historical development trend of the safety status of key links.

[0059] Furthermore, the specific methods for establishing a safety status assessment model for key aspects of the pressure-bearing boundary include:

[0060] (1) Analysis of factors affecting the safety status of key links in the pressure-bearing boundary

[0061] The safety of critical components at pressure boundaries is closely related to the reliability and technical performance of the equipment. Factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance also affect the safety of critical components. These factors are as follows:

[0062] 1) Inherent factors

[0063] The inherent reliability level or inherent defects of equipment resulting from factors such as design, material selection, and processing technology.

[0064] 2) Environmental factors

[0065] Environmental conditions such as high temperature, high pressure, humidity, radioactivity, harmful gases, vibration, wear, corrosion, and electromagnetic fields affect the reliability and technical performance of equipment. Harsh environmental conditions can accelerate equipment aging and failure.

[0066] 3) Usage factors

[0067] The impact of equipment operation and use on equipment reliability and technical performance is related to factors such as the intensity of equipment use, load, and usage method.

[0068] 4) Installation or replacement factors

[0069] The impact of equipment installation or replacement on equipment reliability and technical performance.

[0070] 5) Aging factors

[0071] This refers to the impact of aging and deterioration on the reliability and technical performance of equipment.

[0072] 6) Maintenance factors

[0073] Proper maintenance can greatly improve the reliability and technical performance of equipment, while poor or absent maintenance will accelerate the aging of equipment.

[0074] 7) Maintenance factors

[0075] Maintenance allows us to identify and eliminate equipment malfunctions, monitor equipment status, and maintain equipment functionality. However, improper maintenance can create hidden equipment problems, or even lead to operational failures or accidents.

[0076] 8) Detection and inspection factors

[0077] Inspections and checks can help identify equipment malfunctions, assess equipment status, and improve the safety of equipment use.

[0078] 9) Service life

[0079] The lifespan of equipment is usually related to how long it has been in use, but other factors can also extend or shorten its lifespan.

[0080] 10) Other factors

[0081] The impact of factors other than those mentioned above on equipment reliability and technical performance.

[0082] (2) Determine the input variables for the safety status assessment model of key links

[0083] 1) Evaluation variables

[0084] Factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance are used as evaluation variables for the safety status of critical links at the pressure boundary; these variables are then used as input variables in the equipment safety status evaluation model. Specifically, the evaluation variables include 11 types, such as inherent factor variables, environmental factor variables, usage factor variables, failure variable variables, and other factor variables. It should be noted that the types and number of evaluation variables for different links can be determined based on the actual situation.

[0085] 2) Evaluation Variables

[0086] When assessing the safety status of critical components at the pressure-bearing boundary, it is necessary to obtain the variable values ​​characterizing each factor. Since the precise values ​​of these variables are difficult to obtain, a method is adopted to determine the variable values ​​by dividing them into different level ranges. Specifically, the value range of each variable is divided into several different regions, each region representing a technical state of a critical component at the pressure-bearing boundary. This technical state also reflects the reliability and safety level of the critical component at the pressure-bearing boundary. The division of the variable value range should be based on the specific characteristics of each variable.

[0087] (3) Determine the output variables of the safety status assessment model for key links.

[0088] The output variables of the safety status assessment model are defined as safety levels, denoted by SSD. The safety level of a certain link represents the safety risk level or safety status of that link; the higher the safety level, the lower the risk of that link.

[0089] (4) Establish a safety status assessment model for key links

[0090] 1) Evaluation Model

[0091] When assessing the safety of the critical link at the pressure boundary, the aforementioned influencing factors are used to construct characteristic variables for equipment safety assessment, which serve as inputs to the safety assessment model for the critical link at the pressure boundary.

[0092] Here, SSD is used to represent the security level of a device, and the security level of a device can be expressed as:

[0093] SSD=f(VS,VE,VU,VI,VA,VM,VR,VC,VL,VO,VF)(1)

[0094] In the formula:

[0095] VS represents inherent factor variables;

[0096] VE represents environmental factor variables;

[0097] VU indicates the use of factor variables;

[0098] VI represents installation factor variables;

[0099] VA represents aging-related variables;

[0100] VM represents the maintenance factor variable;

[0101] VR represents maintenance factor variables;

[0102] VC indicates the examination factor variable;

[0103] VL represents the service life factor variable;

[0104] VF represents the fault (leakage or rupture) variable.

[0105] VO represents variables other than those mentioned above.

[0106] 2) Input variable subset partitioning (states)

[0107] 3) Output variable subset (state) partitioning

[0108] The output variable SSD subset (state) is divided as follows:

[0109] SSD = FS, NS, TS, AS, DS

[0110] FS represents a favorable situation, NS represents a normal situation, TS represents a potential threat situation, AS represents an unfavorable situation, DS represents a dangerous situation, and LS represents an unsafe situation (leakage situation).

[0111] 4) Evaluate the algorithm's reasoning rules

[0112] Based on the subset partitioning of the input variables in the inference system and the relationship between each variable and the state of a certain stage, inference rules for the evaluation algorithm can be designed. In the evaluation of the safety state of a certain stage, conditional inference is used to establish the inference rules. Considering the importance of nuclear safety and the nuclear safety margin that a certain stage should possess, the basic principles followed in designing the rules are: the questioning principle, that is, taking a questioning attitude towards the state of a certain stage; and the worst-case scenario principle, that is, considering the most unfavorable situation of the stage, that is, always taking the most unfavorable factor of a stage as the first consideration in determining the state of the stage. The inference principles of the evaluation algorithm are as follows:

[0113] ①If VS = Val, then SSD is LS; (The output is the unsafe or leaky state)

[0114] ②If VS=VSf, VE=VEne or VEse, VU=VUne, VI=VUne, VA=VAne, VM=VMf, VR=VRfr, VC=VCf, VL=VLm or VLe, VO=VOn, then SSD is FS; (The output result is the favorable situation)

[0115] ③If VS=VSf, VE=VEne or VEse, VU=VUne, VI=VUne, VA=VAse, VM=VMforVMsm, VR=VRfr, VC=VCf, VL=VLm or VLe, VO=VOn, then SSD is NS; (The output result is the normal state)

[0116] ④If VS = VSd or VE = VEse or VI = VIse or VA = VAme or VR = VRsr or VL = VLml or VO = VOs, then SSD is TS; (The output is the potential threat)

[0117] ⑤If VE = VEbe or VU = VUbe or VI = VIbe or VA = VAbe or VR = VRpr or VL = VLl or VO = VOb, then SSD is DS; (The output is the dangerous situation)

[0118] ⑥ else, other isAS. (The remaining output results represent unfavorable situations.)

[0119] 5) Output Quantization

[0120] The situation is represented by segments in the range [0,1]. Based on the six situations, the range [-1,1] is divided into six levels, each level representing a situation, as follows:

[0121]

[0122] Using the above quantification, the evaluation result of a certain stage can be used as the vertical axis, and the evaluation date as the horizontal axis. This allows us to display the trend of the safety status of that stage over time. Note: The output quantification values ​​are determined based on expert knowledge and experience.

[0123] Furthermore, the specific methods for classifying the values ​​of variables for assessing the safety status of critical links at the pressure boundary include:

[0124] ①Inherent Factor Variables (VS)

[0125] It reflects the inherent technical characteristics and reliability level of key links in the pressure-bearing boundary.

[0126] If a certain component of the pressure-bearing boundary does not have inherent defects or shortcomings in design and manufacturing, the value of the inherent factor variable of that component can be considered fixed and can be taken as "normal"; if the component has inherent defects or shortcomings in design and manufacturing, the value can be taken as "defective" according to the degree of the inherent defects or shortcomings of that component.

[0127] ② Environmental Factor Variables (VE)

[0128] The impact of environmental factors on various aspects of the pressure boundary is complex, and its influence on each aspect is often a long-term, iterative process. The severity of the impact varies among different factors, and the effects on the technical performance of each aspect can range from minor to severe, even leading to failure. Therefore, the range of values ​​for environmental factor variables is quite wide. Based on the degree of influence of environmental factors on equipment technical performance, the impact of environmental factor variables can be categorized into several levels, such as "no impact," "impact," and "significant impact."

[0129] ③ Use factor variables (VU)

[0130] The impact of usage factors includes factors such as the correctness of use, the intensity of use, and the method of use. Based on the actual situation of the impact of usage at a certain stage, the impact of usage factor variables can be divided into three levels: "no impact," "some impact," and "significant impact."

[0131] ④ Installation or replacement factor variables (VI)

[0132] If a certain component is installed correctly, it will not affect the technical performance of that component, and this factor can be disregarded. However, if there are deficiencies in the installation of that component, and its technical performance is adversely affected as the equipment is used over time, then the effect of this factor needs to be considered.

[0133] Based on the actual impact of installation factors, the influence of these variables can be categorized into two levels: "no impact" and "impactful." This is because if the installation has a significant impact, reinstallation may be considered.

[0134] If a certain component has been recently replaced, and the replacement process has been inspected and tested, then that component can be considered a new component and there is no installation-related factor affecting it.

[0135] ⑤ Aging-related variables (VA)

[0136] Aging is a common phenomenon in nuclear power systems. Based on the degree of aging in a particular component, the impact of aging can be divided into four levels: "no aging", "aging", "moderate aging", and "severe aging".

[0137] ⑥ Maintenance Factor Variables (VM)

[0138] During service, the quality of maintenance directly affects the performance of each component. In reality, some components may be difficult to maintain, creating potential problems or safety risks. Based on the maintenance status of these components, maintenance factors can be categorized into three levels: "Good Maintenance," "Average Maintenance," and "No Maintenance."

[0139] ⑦ Maintenance Factor Variables (VR)

[0140] Maintenance is also a crucial factor directly affecting the technical performance of each component. A faulty component can have its technical performance restored through proper maintenance. However, incomplete maintenance in a particular component can create hidden dangers, thus reducing its safety performance. In reality, some components may be difficult to maintain, creating potential problems or safety risks. Based on the actual maintenance situation of a component, maintenance factors can be categorized into three levels: "thorough maintenance (or replacement with a new part)," "incomplete maintenance," and "poor maintenance."

[0141] ⑧ Detection and inspection factor variables (VC)

[0142] Regular inspections and checks can identify faults or problems in each stage, and timely corrective measures can maintain them in good technical condition. If inspections and checks are lacking in any stage, it may create hidden dangers and increase safety risks. Based on the actual situation of inspections and checks in each stage, the impact of inspection factors can be divided into three levels: "diligent inspection," "average inspection," and "no inspection." Among these, "no impact" represents a relatively good situation in terms of inspection and problem handling; "some impact" represents a relatively average situation in terms of inspection and problem handling; and "significant impact" represents a situation where inspections and checks are lacking.

[0143] 9. Service life variable (VL)

[0144] Service life directly impacts the safety of each component. The impact of service life is related to the length of time a component is in service. Based on the analysis of the impact of service life on the safety of a component, the service life variable can be divided into four stages: "early stage," "mid-stage," "late mid-stage," and "late stage."

[0145] ⑩ Fault Variables

[0146] Cracks and leaks in critical links at pressure boundaries directly affect the safety of critical links, putting those links in an unsafe state.

[0147] Other variable factors (VO)

[0148] The impact of other factors on equipment safety is generally determined based on the actual situation and can generally be divided into three levels: "no impact", "impact", and "significant impact".

[0149] Another objective of this invention is to provide a reactor primary circuit pressure boundary safety status assessment system that implements the aforementioned reactor primary circuit pressure boundary safety status assessment method, comprising:

[0150] 1. Visualization module:

[0151] The visualization module visually displays the safety status of each key component of the primary coolant system of a nuclear reactor in a graphical way. The visualization graphics are drawn using Unity 3D.

[0152] 2. Key Process Safety Status Assessment Model Management Module:

[0153] This module includes a safety status assessment model for each key component of the pressure-bearing boundary. Using this model, based on the relevant information of each key component input by the system, the current safety status analysis of each key component is completed, and the analysis results are correlated with the corresponding components of the pressure-bearing boundary and displayed in a visual format on the pressure-bearing boundary visualization structure diagram.

[0154] 3. Data Management Module:

[0155] This module manages data, including historical data, for each key aspect of the pressure boundary. Users can query historical data for each key aspect within a specified time range to gain a clear understanding of the historical safety status and development trends of each key aspect.

[0156] 4. User Management Module:

[0157] This module manages system users. System users are divided into two main categories: administrators and regular users. Administrators have system maintenance and management privileges, while regular users have the privileges of nuclear power plant operation and management personnel, i.e., system usage and management privileges.

[0158] Furthermore, a visualization module displays a structural diagram of the pressure boundary of the reactor primary coolant system. In this diagram, key components that may affect the integrity of the pressure boundary are marked with colors and colored markers (upright arrows), with the color of each component and its marker representing its corresponding safety status. All key components and their markers in the visualization diagram of the reactor primary coolant system together constitute the overall safety situation diagram of the reactor primary coolant pressure boundary. This safety situation diagram allows for direct observation and understanding of the current overall safety situation and the safety status of key components at the pressure boundary. This enables nuclear power operation and management personnel to view the current overall safety situation and the safety status of each key component at any time through the management system.

[0159] Based on the safety status map of the pressure boundary, nuclear power operation and management personnel can observe and grasp the weak links of the pressure boundary, predict the safety status of each key link of the pressure boundary, and take appropriate disposal decisions and measures in a timely manner before problems occur at the pressure boundary, so as to prevent and eliminate the hidden dangers existing at the pressure boundary.

[0160] Using the data management module, nuclear power operation and management personnel can observe the overall safety status of the pressure boundary and the safety status of each key component at any time through the system display terminal equipment, and identify the weak points of the pressure boundary. Newly appointed operation and management personnel can also use the data management module to understand the changes in the safety status of each key component of the pressure boundary over time, and grasp the safety status of the pressure boundary and each key component.

[0161] Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer device, the computer device including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, causing the processor to perform the steps of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment method.

[0162] Another object of the present invention is to provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment method.

[0163] Another objective of this invention is to provide an information data processing terminal, which includes the aforementioned reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment system.

[0164] Based on the above technical solutions and the technical problems solved, the advantages and positive effects of the technical solution to be protected by this invention are as follows:

[0165] First, this invention enables nuclear power plant operation and management personnel to observe and understand the current overall safety situation at the pressure boundary and the safety status of each key component at any time through a system display terminal. The system provides real-time data presentation, which helps to comprehensively grasp the operating status and ensure the safe and reliable operation of the nuclear power plant under various operating conditions.

[0166] This invention can promptly alert nuclear power plant operation and maintenance personnel to preventative measures by monitoring adverse changes in the safety situation. Compared with traditional methods that rely on monitoring operating parameters and leaks, it significantly reduces the reactive approach of taking remedial measures only after problems such as leaks in the reactor primary coolant system occur, thus improving the foresight and proactiveness of safety management.

[0167] This invention uses a safety situation diagram to visually represent the safety status of the primary coolant pressure boundary. This method presents complex data in a clear and easy-to-understand way, helping operation and management personnel quickly identify safety hazards and enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of risk assessment.

[0168] This invention proposes a safety status assessment model for key components and its construction method. Combining multi-dimensional data analysis technology, it scientifically evaluates the safety status of key components at pressure boundaries. This model provides a theoretical basis for the safety monitoring of nuclear power plants, further enhancing the system's intelligent and refined management level.

[0169] Secondly, as supplementary evidence of the inventive step of the claims of this invention, it is also reflected in the following important aspects:

[0170] (1) The expected benefits and commercial value of the technical solution of this invention after transformation are as follows:

[0171] (2) The technical solution of this invention fills a technical gap in the industry both domestically and internationally:

[0172] (3) The technical solution of the present invention solves a technical problem that people have long wanted to solve but have never been able to solve successfully:

[0173] (4) The technical solution of the present invention overcomes technical bias: Attached Figure Description

[0174] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the principle of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment method provided in this embodiment of the invention;

[0175] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment system provided in this embodiment of the invention;

[0176] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the software architecture provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0177] Figure 4 This is a two-dimensional visualization diagram of the safety status of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0178] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the invention.

[0179] This invention provides a method and display system for assessing the safety status of the pressure boundary of the primary coolant circuit in a reactor. The system displays the safety status of the pressure boundary of the primary coolant circuit in a visual manner and manages the safety status assessment model, data, and users of key links related to the safety status.

[0180] First, data was collected using characteristic variables to target key aspects of the pressure boundary. The collected data underwent preprocessing in a standardized format, converting it into a standardized data type to ensure the accuracy and consistency of subsequent analyses.

[0181] The pre-processed data is input into a pre-built safety status assessment model. Through model calculations, the safety status assessment result for that stage is obtained. The model, based on an evaluation algorithm of key feature variables, can accurately determine the safety status of that stage.

[0182] The safety status assessment results are linked to the corresponding links and their markers. The color of the markers changes with the safety status level, making the safety status of the links visually apparent and allowing operators to quickly grasp the safety status of key links.

[0183] The evaluation results are quantified and the development trend of the safety situation at each stage is displayed using a two-dimensional coordinate axis. The horizontal axis represents time, and the vertical axis represents the safety level. Connecting the safety situations at different time periods forms a broken line, visually presenting the dynamic trend of safety status changes over time.

[0184] By linking with the basic information menu on the visual page, basic information about each stage can be viewed in real time, such as production date, manufacturer, and rated parameters. This information integration method improves the comprehensiveness and convenience of information management.

[0185] Data from all stages is centrally managed by the data management module and database, ensuring data integrity, reliability, and traceability, and providing solid data support for dynamic monitoring and analysis of the security situation.

[0186] The system includes a pressure boundary safety status visualization module, a key component model management module, a data management module, and a user management module. The technical methods include: a method for constructing a pressure boundary safety status map of the reactor primary coolant; a safety status visualization method; and a key component safety status assessment model.

[0187] 1. Visualization module

[0188] The visualization module visually displays the safety status of each key component of the primary coolant system of a nuclear reactor in a graphical way. The visualization graphics are drawn using Unity 3D.

[0189] 2. Key Process Safety Status Assessment Model Management Module

[0190] This module includes a safety status assessment model for each key component of the pressure-bearing boundary. Using this model, based on the relevant information of each key component input by the system, the current safety status analysis of each key component is completed, and the analysis results are correlated with the corresponding components of the pressure-bearing boundary and displayed in a visual format on the pressure-bearing boundary visualization structure diagram.

[0191] 3. Data Management Module

[0192] This module manages data, including historical data, for each key aspect of the pressure boundary. Users can query historical data for each key aspect within a specified time range to gain a clear understanding of the historical safety status and development trends of each key aspect.

[0193] 4. User Management Module

[0194] This module manages system users. System users are divided into two main categories: administrators and regular users. Administrators have system maintenance and management privileges, while regular users have the privileges of nuclear power plant operation and management personnel, i.e., system usage and management privileges.

[0195] To visualize the safety status of the pressure boundary of the primary coolant in a nuclear reactor, this invention provides a method for constructing a visualization graphic of the safety status of the pressure boundary, a method for assessing the safety status of key components, and a method for visually displaying the safety status.

[0196] 1. Method for constructing a safety situation diagram of a pressure boundary

[0197] The method for constructing a safety situation diagram of a pressure boundary is as follows:

[0198] (1) Identify the key factors affecting the safety of the pressure boundary.

[0199] The safety status of a pressure boundary is determined by its integrity. Weak links within the pressure boundary determine its integrity and safety status. These weak links are critical to the safety status of the pressure boundary. Depending on the reactor type of the nuclear power plant, the weak links of the pressure boundary will vary, and their critical links can be determined based on the actual structure of the pressure boundary. In this invention, the weak links of the pressure boundary include key equipment or parts such as the reactor sealing surface, reactor control rod sockets, reactor outlet, reactor inlet, main gate valve outlet, main gate valve sealing surface, steam generator U-tube, steam generator inlet, steam generator outlet, main coolant pump sealing surface, and main check valve.

[0200] The safety status of the pressure boundary reflects the overall safety condition of each key component of the pressure boundary.

[0201] (2) Construct a visualization of the pressure boundary of the primary coolant in a nuclear reactor.

[0202] 1) Use visualization software to construct a visualization of the pressure boundary (it can be a three-dimensional or two-dimensional graphic).

[0203] 2) The visualization graphics must include all key aspects of the pressure boundary.

[0204] 3) The visualization graphics include the main equipment at the pressure boundary, as well as the connections between equipment, pipes and other objects.

[0205] 4) Vertical, distinctive arrows with a certain width and height are placed at key points in the visualization of the pressure boundary.

[0206] 5) The colors of each key component and its indicator arrow are dynamically variable, and their colors are associated with the safety status information of that key component. The colors of the key components and their indicator arrows indicate the safety status of that key component for users to observe.

[0207] 6) The constructed visualizations should be vivid, intuitive, and easy to observe.

[0208] 7) Visual graphics can be drawn using software such as Unity 3D.

[0209] (3) Establish a safety status assessment model for key links

[0210] The method for establishing an equipment safety status assessment model is to use relevant factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance as input variables of the assessment model, and the output of the assessment model is the equipment safety level, which represents the safety status.

[0211] For specific methods and steps, please refer to the section "Methods for Establishing a Safety Status Assessment Model for Key Links" below.

[0212] (4) Information association

[0213] The evaluation results of the safety status assessment model for each key component of the pressure-bearing boundary are correlated with the colors of the corresponding key components and their iconic arrows in the visualization of the pressure-bearing boundary.

[0214] In the visualization, the key components (equipment) and their designated arrows are colored blue, green, yellowish-green, yellowish-red, and red, respectively representing reliable, safe, basically safe, risky, and unsafe conditions. The corresponding statuses for these five states are as follows:

[0215] "Reliable" corresponds to "favorable situation";

[0216] "Safety" corresponds to "normal situation";

[0217] "Basic security" corresponds to "potential threat situation";

[0218] "The existence of risk" corresponds to "dangerous situation";

[0219] “Insecure” corresponds to “high-risk situation”.

[0220] (5) Safety status display

[0221] The safety status display adopts three visualization methods: the color of the iconic arrow; the color of the key link itself; and the coordinate graph showing the historical development trend.

[0222] 1) Iconic arrow display

[0223] Based on the information association, the current security status of critical links is displayed using a distinctive arrow set for that link. The current color of the distinctive arrow indicates the current security status of the critical link.

[0224] 2) The key links themselves show

[0225] In the visualization of the pressure boundary, key elements are associated with their current safety status assessment results and displayed with corresponding colors.

[0226] The color of the critical link is the same as the color of its iconic arrow, and together they indicate the safety status of that critical link.

[0227] 3) The coordinate graph shows the historical development trend.

[0228] The coordinate graph shows the relationship between the safety status of each key link and time, and represents the historical development trend of the safety status of key links.

[0229] (6) Safety status of the pressure boundary

[0230] The safety status of each key component of the pressure boundary together constitutes the nuclear safety situation map of the pressure boundary, showing the overall safety status of the pressure boundary. Based on the safety status of the pressure boundary, users can grasp the overall safety situation of the pressure boundary and the current safety vulnerabilities.

[0231] 2. Method for Establishing a Safety Status Assessment Model for Key Links at Pressure Boundary

[0232] (1) Analysis of factors affecting the safety status of key links in the pressure-bearing boundary

[0233] The safety of critical components at pressure boundaries is closely related to the reliability and technical performance of the equipment. Factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance also affect the safety of critical components. These factors are as follows:

[0234] 1) Inherent factors

[0235] The inherent reliability level or inherent defects of equipment resulting from factors such as design, material selection, and processing technology.

[0236] 2) Environmental factors

[0237] Environmental conditions such as high temperature, high pressure, humidity, radioactivity, harmful gases, vibration, wear, corrosion, and electromagnetic fields affect the reliability and technical performance of equipment. Harsh environmental conditions can accelerate equipment aging and failure.

[0238] 3) Usage factors

[0239] The impact of equipment operation and use on equipment reliability and technical performance is related to factors such as the intensity of equipment use, load, and usage method.

[0240] 4) Installation or replacement factors

[0241] The impact of equipment installation or replacement on equipment reliability and technical performance.

[0242] 5) Aging factors

[0243] This refers to the impact of aging and deterioration on the reliability and technical performance of equipment.

[0244] 6) Maintenance factors

[0245] Proper maintenance can greatly improve the reliability and technical performance of equipment, while poor or absent maintenance will accelerate the aging of equipment.

[0246] 7) Maintenance factors

[0247] Maintenance allows us to identify and eliminate equipment malfunctions, monitor equipment status, and maintain equipment functionality. However, improper maintenance can create hidden equipment problems, or even lead to operational failures or accidents.

[0248] 8) Detection and inspection factors

[0249] Inspections and checks can help identify equipment malfunctions, assess equipment status, and improve the safety of equipment use.

[0250] 9) Service life

[0251] The lifespan of equipment is usually related to how long it has been in use, but other factors can also extend or shorten its lifespan.

[0252] 10) Other factors

[0253] The impact of factors other than those mentioned above on equipment reliability and technical performance.

[0254] (2) Determine the input variables for the safety status assessment model of key links

[0255] 1) Evaluation variables

[0256] Factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance are used as evaluation variables for the safety status of critical links at the pressure boundary; these variables are then used as input variables in the equipment safety status evaluation model. Specifically, the evaluation variables include 11 types, such as inherent factor variables, environmental factor variables, usage factor variables, failure variable variables, and other factor variables. It should be noted that the types and number of evaluation variables for different links can be determined based on the actual situation.

[0257] 2) Evaluation Variables

[0258] When assessing the safety status of critical links in a pressure-bearing boundary, it is necessary to obtain the variable values ​​representing each factor. Since the precise values ​​of these variables are difficult to obtain, a method is adopted to determine the variable values ​​by dividing them into different level ranges. Specifically, the value range of each variable is divided into several different regions, each region representing a technical state of a critical link in the pressure-bearing boundary. This technical state also reflects the reliability and safety level of the critical link in the pressure-bearing boundary. The division of variable value ranges should be based on the specific characteristics of each variable. The method for dividing the variable values ​​for assessing the safety status of critical links in a pressure-bearing boundary is described below.

[0259] ①Inherent Factor Variables (VS)

[0260] It reflects the inherent technical characteristics and reliability level of key links in the pressure-bearing boundary.

[0261] If a certain component of the pressure-bearing boundary does not have inherent defects or shortcomings in design and manufacturing, the value of the inherent factor variable of that component can be considered fixed and can be taken as "normal"; if the component has inherent defects or shortcomings in design and manufacturing, the value can be taken as "defective" according to the degree of the inherent defects or shortcomings of that component.

[0262] ② Environmental Factor Variables (VE)

[0263] The impact of environmental factors on various aspects of the pressure boundary is complex, and its influence on each aspect is often a long-term, iterative process. The severity of the impact varies among different factors, and the effects on the technical performance of each aspect can range from minor to severe, even leading to failure. Therefore, the range of values ​​for environmental factor variables is quite wide. Based on the degree of influence of environmental factors on equipment technical performance, the impact of environmental factor variables can be categorized into several levels, such as "no impact," "impact," and "significant impact."

[0264] ③ Use factor variables (VU)

[0265] The impact of usage factors includes factors such as the correctness of use, the intensity of use, and the method of use. Based on the actual situation of the impact of usage at a certain stage, the impact of usage factor variables can be divided into three levels: "no impact," "some impact," and "significant impact."

[0266] ④ Installation or replacement factor variables (VI)

[0267] If a certain component is installed correctly, it will not affect the technical performance of that component, and this factor can be disregarded. However, if there are deficiencies in the installation of that component, and its technical performance is adversely affected as the equipment is used over time, then the effect of this factor needs to be considered.

[0268] Based on the actual impact of installation factors, the influence of these variables can be categorized into two levels: "no impact" and "impactful." This is because if the installation has a significant impact, reinstallation may be considered.

[0269] If a certain component has been recently replaced, and the replacement process has been inspected and tested, then that component can be considered a new component and there is no installation-related factor affecting it.

[0270] ⑤ Aging-related variables (VA)

[0271] Aging is a common phenomenon in nuclear power systems. Based on the degree of aging in a particular component, the impact of aging can be divided into four levels: "no aging", "aging", "moderate aging", and "severe aging".

[0272] ⑥ Maintenance Factor Variables (VM)

[0273] During service, the quality of maintenance directly affects the performance of each component. In reality, some components may be difficult to maintain, creating potential problems or safety risks. Based on the maintenance status of these components, maintenance factors can be categorized into three levels: "Good Maintenance," "Average Maintenance," and "No Maintenance."

[0274] ⑦ Maintenance Factor Variables (VR)

[0275] Maintenance is also a crucial factor directly affecting the technical performance of each component. A faulty component can have its technical performance restored through proper maintenance. However, incomplete maintenance in a particular component can create hidden dangers, thus reducing its safety performance. In reality, some components may be difficult to maintain, creating potential problems or safety risks. Based on the actual maintenance situation of a component, maintenance factors can be categorized into three levels: "thorough maintenance (or replacement with a new part)," "incomplete maintenance," and "poor maintenance."

[0276] ⑧ Detection and inspection factor variables (VC)

[0277] Regular inspections and checks can identify faults or problems in each stage, and timely corrective measures can maintain them in good technical condition. If inspections and checks are lacking in any stage, it may create hidden dangers and increase safety risks. Based on the actual situation of inspections and checks in each stage, the impact of inspection factors can be divided into three levels: "diligent inspection," "average inspection," and "no inspection." Among these, "no impact" represents a relatively good situation in terms of inspection and problem handling; "some impact" represents a relatively average situation in terms of inspection and problem handling; and "significant impact" represents a situation where inspections and checks are lacking.

[0278] 9. Service life variable (VL)

[0279] Service life directly impacts the safety of each component. The impact of service life is related to the length of time a component is in service. Based on the analysis of the impact of service life on the safety of a component, the service life variable can be divided into four stages: "early stage," "mid-stage," "late mid-stage," and "late stage."

[0280] ⑩ Fault Variables

[0281] Cracks and leaks in critical links at pressure boundaries directly affect the safety of critical links, putting those links in an unsafe state.

[0282] Other variable factors (VO)

[0283] The impact of other factors on equipment safety is generally determined based on the actual situation and can generally be divided into three levels: "no impact", "impact", and "significant impact".

[0284] (3) Determine the output variables of the safety status assessment model for key links.

[0285] The output variables of the safety status assessment model are defined as safety levels, denoted by SSD. The safety level of a certain link represents the safety risk level or safety status of that link; the higher the safety level, the lower the risk of that link.

[0286] (4) Establish a safety status assessment model for key links

[0287] 1) Evaluation Model

[0288] When assessing the safety of the critical link at the pressure boundary, the aforementioned influencing factors are used to construct characteristic variables for equipment safety assessment, which serve as inputs to the safety assessment model for the critical link at the pressure boundary.

[0289] Here, SSD is used to represent the security level of a device, and the security level of a device can be expressed as:

[0290] SSD=f(VS,VE,VU,VI,VA,VM,VR,VC,VL,VO,VF)(1)

[0291] In the formula:

[0292] VS represents inherent factor variables;

[0293] VE represents environmental factor variables;

[0294] VU indicates the use of factor variables;

[0295] VI represents installation factor variables;

[0296] VA represents aging-related variables;

[0297] VM represents the maintenance factor variable;

[0298] VR represents maintenance factor variables;

[0299] VC indicates the examination factor variable;

[0300] VL represents the service life factor variable;

[0301] VF represents the fault (leakage or rupture) variable.

[0302] VO represents variables other than those mentioned above.

[0303] 2) Input variable subset partitioning (states)

[0304] The input variables for evaluating the model are shown in Table 1.

[0305] Table 1. Input variables for evaluating the model

[0306]

[0307]

[0308] For each input variable of the reasoning system shown in Table 1, its subset (state) partitioning is shown in Table 2.

[0309] Table 2. Evaluation of the input variable subset (state) partitioning of the model

[0310]

[0311]

[0312] 3) Output variable subset (state) partitioning

[0313] The output variable SSD subset (state) is divided as follows:

[0314] SSD = FS, NS, TS, AS, DS

[0315] The meanings of the symbols FS, NS, TS, AS, DS, etc. in the above subset (state) partitions are shown in Table 3.

[0316] Table 3. Meaning of symbols in the partitioning of output variable subsets (states)

[0317] Serial Number symbol meaning 1 FS Favorable situation 2 NS normal situation 3 TS Potential threat situation 4 AS unfavorable situation 5 DS Dangerous situation 6 LS Unsafe situation (leakage situation)

[0318] 4) Evaluate the algorithm's reasoning rules

[0319] Based on the subset partitioning of the input variables in the inference system and the relationship between each variable and the state of a certain stage, inference rules for the evaluation algorithm can be designed. In the evaluation of the safety state of a certain stage, conditional inference is used to establish the inference rules. Considering the importance of nuclear safety and the nuclear safety margin that a certain stage should possess, the basic principles followed in designing the rules are: the questioning principle, that is, taking a questioning attitude towards the state of a certain stage; and the worst-case scenario principle, that is, considering the most unfavorable situation of the stage, that is, always taking the most unfavorable factor of a stage as the first consideration in determining the state of the stage. Based on this idea, the inference principles of the evaluation algorithm are designed as follows:

[0320] ①If VS = Val, then SSD is LS; (The output is the unsafe or leaky state)

[0321] ②If VS=VSf, VE=VEne or VEse, VU=VUne, VI=VUne, VA=VAne, VM=VMf, VR=VRfr, VC=VCf, VL=VLm or VLe, VO=VOn, then SSD is FS; (The output result is the favorable situation)

[0322] ③If VS=VSf, VE=VEne or VEse, VU=VUne, VI=VUne, VA=VAse, VM=VMforVMsm, VR=VRfr, VC=VCf, VL=VLm or VLe, VO=VOn, then SSD is NS; (The output result is the normal state)

[0323] ④If VS = VSd or VE = VEse or VI = VIse or VA = VAme or VR = VRsr or VL = VLml or VO = VOs, then SSD is TS; (The output is the potential threat)

[0324] ⑤If VE = VEbe or VU = VUbe or VI = VIbe or VA = VAbe or VR = VRpr or VL = VLl or VO = VOb, then SSD is DS; (The output is the dangerous situation)

[0325] ⑥ else, other isAS. (The remaining output results represent unfavorable situations.)

[0326] 5) Output Quantization

[0327] The situation is represented by segments in the range [0,1]. Based on the six situations, the range [-1,1] is divided into six levels, each level representing a situation, as follows:

[0328]

[0329] Using the above quantification, the evaluation result of a certain stage can be used as the vertical axis, and the evaluation date as the horizontal axis. This allows us to display the trend of the safety status of that stage over time. Note: The output quantification values ​​are determined based on expert knowledge and experience.

[0330] The principle of this invention is as follows Figure 1 As shown.

[0331] The principle of this invention is illustrated by taking the safety status assessment and display of a key link in a pressure-bearing boundary as an example.

[0332] (1) Data collection is carried out based on the characteristic variables of a key link in the pressure boundary.

[0333] (2) Preprocess the feature variable data collected in a key link and convert it into a unified data type.

[0334] (3) Input the processed data into the safety status assessment model corresponding to this stage. Perform calculations through this model to obtain the safety status assessment result of this stage.

[0335] (4) Link the evaluation results with the link and its identifier, so that the color of the link and its identifier changes to match the color of the corresponding security status level, so that the security status of the link is displayed in a visual form.

[0336] (5) At the same time, the evaluation results of this step are quantified.

[0337] (6) Display the quantification results in the form of a plane coordinate axis. In the coordinate axis, the horizontal axis represents time, and the vertical axis represents the safety level. The broken line formed by connecting the safety status at different periods of this stage shows the development trend of its safety status over time.

[0338] (7) Associate key links with their basic information. The basic information of the link can be viewed through the basic information menu on the visualization display page, such as production date, manufacturer, rated parameters, etc.

[0339] (8) Data from all stages is managed by the data management module and the database.

[0340] Figure 2 The composition of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status display system is described. Figure 3 The system's software architecture diagram is described; Figure 4 The diagram describes a two-dimensional visualization of the safety status at the pressure boundary of the reactor primary loop (in the diagram, the main gate valve sealing surface in section A is yellow-red, indicating a dangerous situation; the main coolant pipe in section B is blue, indicating a normal situation).

[0341] An application embodiment of the present invention provides a computer device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the processor performs the steps of a method.

[0342] An application embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, causes the processor to perform the steps of a method.

[0343] An application embodiment of the present invention provides an information data processing terminal, which includes a system.

[0344] I. Specific application areas or related products of this invention.

[0345] II. Evidence related to the technical effects obtained by the embodiments of the present invention.

[0346] It should be noted that embodiments of the present invention can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of both. The hardware portion can be implemented using dedicated logic; the software portion can be stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system, such as a microprocessor or dedicated-design hardware. Those skilled in the art will understand that the above-described devices and methods can be implemented using computer-executable instructions and / or included in processor control code, for example, such code provided on a carrier medium such as a disk, CD, or DVD-ROM, a programmable memory such as read-only memory (firmware), or a data carrier such as an optical or electronic signal carrier. The devices and modules of the present invention can be implemented by hardware circuitry such as very large-scale integrated circuits or gate arrays, semiconductors such as logic chips, transistors, or programmable hardware devices such as field-programmable gate arrays, programmable logic devices, etc., or by software executed by various types of processors, or by a combination of the above-described hardware circuitry and software, such as firmware.

[0347] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, and within the spirit and principles of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for assessing the safety status of the pressure boundary of a reactor primary circuit, characterized in that, include: S1, Data collection is performed based on the characteristic variables of key links in the pressure-bearing boundary; S2, preprocesses the feature variable data collected in key stages and converts it into a unified data type; S3. Input the processed data into the safety status assessment model corresponding to this step; perform calculations through this model to obtain the safety status assessment result of this step; S4. The evaluation results are linked to the process and its identifier, causing the color of the process and its identifier to change to match the color of the corresponding security status level, so that the security status of the process is displayed in a visual form. S5. At the same time, the evaluation results of this step are quantified. S6 displays the quantification results in the form of a plane coordinate axis; in the coordinate axis, the horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis represents the safety level; the broken line formed by connecting the safety status at different periods of this process shows the development trend of its safety status over time. S7 links key processes with their basic information. The basic information of the process can be viewed through the basic information menu on the visual display page, such as production date, manufacturer, and rated parameters. S8, all data in all stages are managed by the data management module and the database; The method for establishing the safety status assessment model for key links at the pressure-bearing boundary includes the following steps: 1) Analyze the factors affecting the safety status of key links at the pressure boundary. These include inherent factors, environmental factors, usage factors, installation or replacement factors, aging factors, maintenance factors, repair factors, testing and inspection factors, service life, and other factors. The impact of various influencing factors on equipment reliability and technical performance is comprehensively analyzed from multiple aspects such as equipment design, processing technology, operating environment, usage, and maintenance. 2) Determine the input variables for the safety status assessment model of key links. The above-mentioned influencing factors are defined as input variables for safety status assessment, including inherent factor variables, environmental factor variables, usage factor variables, installation factor variables, aging factor variables, maintenance factor variables, repair factor variables, inspection and testing factor variables, service life variables, and failure variables. The values ​​of each input variable are divided into different levels, such as "no impact", "some impact" and "significant impact", and the specific level division is determined according to the actual degree and characteristics of the impact; 3) Determine the output variables of the safety status assessment model for key links. The output variables are defined as safety level SSD, including favorable situation FS, normal situation NS, potential threat situation TS, unfavorable situation AS, dangerous situation DS, and unsafe situation LS; The output variable SSD is quantified in the range [-1,1] and divided into six levels to represent the changing trend of the safety status of the process over time.

2. The method for assessing the safety status of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Methods for constructing a safety situation diagram of a pressure boundary include: (1) Identify the key factors affecting the safety of the pressure boundary: The safety status of a pressure boundary is determined by its integrity; the weak points of a pressure boundary determine its integrity and safety status; these weak points are key factors affecting the safety status of the pressure boundary; depending on the reactor type of the nuclear power plant, the weak points of the pressure boundary will also be different, and the key points can be determined according to the actual structure of the pressure boundary; in this invention, the weak points of the pressure boundary include key equipment or parts such as the reactor sealing surface, reactor control rod socket, reactor outlet, reactor inlet, main gate valve outlet, main gate valve sealing surface, steam generator U-tube, steam generator inlet, steam generator outlet, main coolant pump sealing surface, and main check valve; The safety status of the pressure boundary reflects the overall safety condition of each key link of the pressure boundary; (2) Construct a visualization of the pressure boundary of the primary coolant circuit in a nuclear reactor. 1) Use visualization software to construct a visual representation of the pressure boundary; 2) The visualization must include all key aspects of the pressure-bearing boundary; 3) The visualization graphics include the main equipment at the pressure boundary, as well as the connections between equipment, pipelines, and other objects; 4) Vertical, distinctive arrows with a certain width and height are placed at key points in the visualization of the pressure boundary; 5) The colors of each key link and its symbolic arrow are dynamically variable, and their colors are associated with the safety status information of that key link; the colors of the key links and their symbolic arrows show the safety status of that key link for users to observe. 6) The constructed visualizations should be vivid, intuitive, and easy to observe; 7) Visual graphics can be drawn using software such as Unity 3D; (3) Establish a safety status assessment model for key links: The method for establishing an equipment safety status assessment model is to use relevant factors affecting equipment reliability and technical performance as input variables of the assessment model, and the output of the assessment model is the equipment safety level, which represents the safety status. (4) Information association: The evaluation results of the safety status assessment model for each key link of the pressure-bearing boundary are correlated with the colors of the corresponding key links and their iconic arrows in the visualization of the pressure-bearing boundary. In the visualization, the key elements and their symbolic arrows are colored blue, green, yellowish-green, yellowish-red, and red, respectively representing reliable, safe, basically safe, at risk, and unsafe conditions. The corresponding situations for these five states are as follows: "Reliable" corresponds to "favorable situation"; "Safety" corresponds to "normal situation"; "Basic security" corresponds to "potential threat situation"; "Risk exists" corresponds to "dangerous situation"; "Insecure" corresponds to "high-risk situation"; (5) Safety status display The safety status display uses three visualization methods: color-coded arrows; color-coded key components; and a coordinate graph showing historical trends. (6) Safety status of the pressure boundary The safety status of each key component of the pressure-bearing boundary together constitutes the nuclear safety situation map of the pressure-bearing boundary, showing the overall safety status of the pressure-bearing boundary; based on the safety status of the pressure-bearing boundary, users can grasp the overall safety situation of the pressure-bearing boundary and the current safety vulnerabilities.

3. The method for assessing the safety status of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The security status display specifically includes: 1) Iconic arrow display Based on the information association, the current security status of the critical link is displayed by a symbolic arrow set for that link; the current color of the symbolic arrow indicates the current security status of the critical link. 2) The key links themselves show In the visualization of the pressure boundary, key elements are associated with their current safety status assessment results and displayed with corresponding colors; The color of the critical link is consistent with the color of its iconic arrow, and the two together indicate the safety status of the critical link. 3) The coordinate graph shows the historical development trend. The coordinate graph shows the relationship between the safety status of each key link and time, and represents the historical development trend of the safety status of key links.

4. The method for assessing the safety status of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The method for classifying the values ​​of the safety status evaluation variables for key links at the pressure-bearing boundary includes: 1) Inherent Factor Variables (VS) If there are no design or manufacturing defects, the value is "normal"; if there are defects or flaws, the value is "defective" depending on the degree of the defect. 2) Environmental variables (VE) The impact of the environment on the equipment is classified into three levels: "no impact", "impact", and "significant impact". 3) Use factor variables (VU) Based on factors such as usage method and intensity, it is divided into "no impact", "some impact" and "significant impact"; 4) Installation or replacement factor variables (VI) If the installation is correct, the value is "no impact"; if the installation is incomplete, the value is "has an impact". 5) Aging-related variables (VA) Based on the degree of aging, they are divided into "no aging", "some aging", "moderate aging" and "severe aging"; 6) Maintenance Factor Variables (VM) Based on maintenance status, they are categorized as "well maintained", "moderately maintained" and "no maintenance"; 7) Maintenance Factor Variables (VR) Repairs are categorized into "thorough repair", "incomplete repair", and "poor repair" based on the condition of the repair. 8) Detect and examine the variable factors (VC). Based on the inspection results, the results are categorized as "thorough inspection", "general inspection" and "no inspection". 9) Useful life variable (VL) Based on the lifespan stage, it is divided into "early stage", "mid stage", "mid-to-late stage" and "end stage"; 10) Fault Variables (VF) If a crack or leak occurs, the value is "unsafe"; 11) Other Factor Variables (VO) Based on the actual impact, it is divided into "no impact", "impact", and "significant impact".

5. A reactor primary circuit pressure boundary safety status assessment system that implements the reactor primary circuit pressure boundary safety status assessment method as described in any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that, include: Visualization Module: The visualization module visually displays the safety status of each key component of the primary coolant system of the nuclear reactor in a visual graphical format. The visualization graphics are drawn using Unity 3D. Key Link Safety Status Assessment Model Management Module: This module contains safety status assessment models for each key link of the pressure-bearing boundary. Using this assessment model, based on the relevant information of each key link input by the system, the current safety status analysis of each key link is completed, and the analysis results are correlated with the corresponding links of the pressure-bearing boundary and displayed in a visual form in the pressure-bearing boundary visualization structure diagram. Data Management Module: This module manages data, including historical data, for each key aspect of the pressure boundary. Users can query historical data for each key aspect within a specified time range in this module to gain a clear understanding of the historical safety status and development trends of each key aspect. User Management Module: This module manages system users. System users are divided into two main categories: administrators and ordinary users. Administrators have system maintenance and management privileges, while ordinary users have the privileges of nuclear power plant operation and management personnel, i.e., system usage and management privileges.

6. The reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment system as described in claim 5, characterized in that, A visualization module displays a structural diagram of the pressure boundary of the reactor primary coolant system. In this diagram, key components that may affect the integrity of the pressure boundary are marked with colors and colored markers, with the color of each component and its marker representing its corresponding safety status. All key components and their markers in the visualization diagram constitute the overall safety situation diagram of the reactor primary coolant pressure boundary. This safety situation diagram allows for direct observation and understanding of the current overall safety situation and the safety status of key components at the pressure boundary. This enables nuclear power operation and management personnel to view the current overall safety situation and the safety status of each key component at any time through the management system. Based on the safety status map of the pressure boundary, nuclear power operation and management personnel can observe and grasp the weak links of the pressure boundary, predict the safety status of each key link of the pressure boundary, and take appropriate disposal decisions and measures in a timely manner before problems occur at the pressure boundary, so as to prevent and eliminate the hidden dangers existing at the pressure boundary. Using the data management module, nuclear power operation and management personnel can observe the current overall safety status of the pressure boundary and the safety status of each key link through the system display terminal equipment at any time, and identify the weak links of the pressure boundary; newly appointed operation and management personnel can also use the data management module to understand the development and changes of the safety status of each key link of the pressure boundary over time, and grasp the safety status of the pressure boundary and the safety status of each key link.

7. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein when the computer program is executed by a processor, the processor performs the steps of the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment method as described in any one of claims 1 to 4.

8. An information data processing terminal, comprising the reactor primary loop pressure boundary safety status assessment system as described in any one of claims 5 to 6.

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