A RSMA data security transmission method to resist internal eavesdropping

Abstract

The present invention discloses a RSMA data security transmission method that resists internal eavesdropping, and relates to the field of data transmission. The method comprises: based on a generalized RSMA system, in a multi-user multi-input single-output wireless channel, establishing an optimization problem with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate, and determining constraints based on the transmission rate and power of user messages; wherein, at the receiving end of the RSMA system, users in each user group treat user messages about other user groups as noise and decode user messages about their user group, which include public messages and private messages for the corresponding user group; transforming the optimization problem and solving it based on the SCA method; and allocating resources to each user group for data transmission based on the solution result. Compared with the existing technology, the present invention not only takes into account the security performance of the entire system, but also considers the fairness of each user.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data transmission, and more particularly to an RSMA data security transmission method capable of resisting internal eavesdropping. Background Art

[0002] Rate-Splitting Multiple Access (RSMA) is an advanced multiple access technology based on a rate-splitting scheme. Due to its outstanding performance, strong potential, and efficient data processing capabilities, RSMA has attracted significant research attention in recent years. It provides a powerful interference management strategy for next-generation wireless communications. At the transmitter, an RSMA system splits the information sent to each user into a public and private portion. Each user's private portion is then independently encoded into a separate private stream. The public portion of each user is jointly encoded using the same codebook, resulting in a single public stream. Both public and private streams are then fed into a precoder, processed, and then transmitted into the wireless channel. At the receiver, the user first decodes the public stream, treating the interference from the private stream as noise. Successive interference cancellation techniques are then used to remove the public stream, minimizing the interference caused by the public stream when decoding the private stream. The system then decodes the private stream, treating interference from other private streams as noise. RSMA bridges the gap between the two extreme interference management strategies of fully decoding interference and treating interference as noise. It adopts a strategy of partially fully decoding interference and partially treating interference as noise. Due to its rich and more flexible interference management strategy, RSMA shows superior performance compared with other multiple access schemes such as non-orthogonal multiple access and space division multiple access.

[0003] Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, privacy and security are among the most challenging and critical issues in wireless communications. Physical layer security exploits the fact that an eavesdropper's channel is at a lower level than that of legitimate users to achieve secure communication. Protecting physical layer data transmission by preventing eavesdroppers from decoding while ensuring successful decoding by legitimate users is a promising approach to enhancing security. Over the past few decades, physical layer security has garnered significant attention in the industry. Because RSMA serves multiple users at the same time and frequency, base stations are vulnerable to potential eavesdroppers when sending messages to legitimate users. Due to the concealment of potential eavesdroppers, this poses a significant threat to the security of the entire system. Furthermore, from an information theoretic perspective, physical layer security offers significant performance advantages by leveraging the inherent randomness and noise of wireless channels. It also demonstrates great potential for reducing computational complexity and complementing traditional secret key encryption schemes.

[0004] External eavesdropping and internal eavesdropping are two hot research topics in RSMA physical layer security. When the eavesdropper is not a legitimate user within the RSMA system, it is considered external eavesdropping and cannot directly decrypt public information. RSMA has demonstrated excellent resistance to external eavesdropping. An eavesdropper will first decode the public message and then the private message. However, if the eavesdropper is unable to fully decrypt the public message, the undecoded public message can be treated as interference when decoding the private message, preventing the eavesdropper from decoding it, thereby achieving eavesdropping suppression. Conversely, when the eavesdropper is a legitimate user within the RSMA system, it is considered internal eavesdropping. Since the eavesdropper is a legitimate user within the RSMA system, it can directly decrypt the public message. However, in RSMA systems, public messages are only used for interference management and do not imply message sharing. Therefore, in the presence of internal eavesdroppers, RSMA cannot guarantee the security of public messages nor prevent eavesdroppers from eavesdropping on private messages. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In order to overcome the defect of RSMA in the prior art that it cannot resist internal eavesdropping, the present invention provides a RSMA data security transmission method that resists internal eavesdropping.

[0006] In order to solve the above technical problems, the technical solutions of the present invention are as follows:

[0007] In a first aspect, a RSMA data secure transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping includes:

[0008] Based on a generalized RSMA system, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum secure rate over a multi-user, multi-input, single-output wireless channel, and constraints are determined based on the transmission rate and power of user messages. At the receiving end of the RSMA system, users in each user group treat user messages from other user groups as noise and decode the user messages for their user group, which include public and private messages corresponding to the user group.

[0009] Transform and solve the optimization problem based on the SCA method;

[0010] Based on the solution results, resources are allocated to each user group for data transmission.

[0011] In a second aspect, an electronic device includes:

[0012] a memory for storing computer-executable instructions or computer programs;

[0013] The processor is configured to implement the method of the first aspect when executing the computer-executable instructions or computer program stored in the memory.

[0014] In a third aspect, a computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, at least one program, code set or instruction set, and the at least one instruction, at least one program, code set or instruction set is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the method described in the first aspect.

[0015] In a fourth aspect, a computer program product comprises a computer program or computer executable instructions, wherein when the computer program or computer executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method of the first aspect is implemented.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the technical solution of the present invention are:

[0017] This application proposes a group-based RSMA framework, in which each user can only decode user messages in their own group and cannot decode user messages in other groups. This reduces the threat of internal eavesdroppers to public messages to a certain extent. In the case of an internal eavesdropper in RSMA, when the eavesdropper eavesdrops on public or private messages of users in other groups, the public messages that cannot be decoded can be regarded as interference, thereby suppressing the threat of the eavesdropper. In addition, this application takes into account the fairness and security of users and establishes an optimization problem with the goal of maximizing the minimum safe rate of the entire system. It not only takes into account the security performance of the entire system, but also the fairness of each user. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the framework of the RSMA transmission system in Example 1 of the present application.

[0019] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the data security transmission method in Example 1 of the present application.

[0020] Figure 3 This is another flowchart of the data security transmission method in Example 1 of the present application.

[0021] Figure 4 This is a worst-case simulation result diagram of the data security transmission method in Example 2 of this application.

[0022] Figure 5 This is a simulation result diagram of the general situation of the data security transmission method in Example 2 of this application.

[0023] Figure 6 This is a beam diagram of the data security transmission method in Example 2 of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] The terms "first", "second" etc. in the specification and claims of the present application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequential order. It should be understood that the terms used in this way can be interchangeable in appropriate circumstances, and this is merely a way of distinguishing the objects of the same attribute when describing them in the embodiments of the present application. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any of their variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions, so that the process, method, system, product or equipment comprising a series of units need not be limited to those units, but may include other units that are not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or equipment. The term "determine" widely covers various actions, may include obtaining, calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, searching (for example, searching in a table, a database or other data structure), ascertaining and similar actions, may also include receiving (for example, receiving information), accessing (for example, accessing data in a memory) and similar actions, may also include generating, creating, establishing and similar actions, and parsing, selecting, selecting and similar actions etc. The relevant definitions of other terms will be provided in the following description.

[0025] It should be noted that when an element is considered to be "connected" to another element, it can be directly connected to the other element or connected to the other element through an intermediate element. In addition, the "connection" in the following embodiments should be understood as "electrical connection", "communication connection", etc., if there is transmission of electrical signals or data between the connected objects.

[0026] The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not to be construed as limiting this patent;

[0027] In order to better illustrate this embodiment, some parts in the drawings may be omitted, enlarged, or reduced, and do not represent the actual product size;

[0028] It is understandable to those skilled in the art that some well-known structures and descriptions thereof may be omitted in the drawings.

[0029] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0030] Example 1

[0031] Figure 1 Provides a RSMA transmission system framework, including two parts: the transmitter and the receiver.

[0032] The transmitter includes

[0033] Message splitter: Splits user messages into public and private parts.

[0034] Message combiner: combines the public messages of users in each user group;

[0035] Encoder: Encodes the user's corresponding message into the corresponding data stream;

[0036] Linerprecoder: Linear precodes the encoded data stream to reduce the interference of other signals on the target user.

[0037] And, the receiving end includes:

[0038] Decoder: decodes the information in the data stream;

[0039] SIC (Successive Interference Cancellation): reconstructs the decoded signal after encoding, precoding, and channel processing, and removes it from the received signal.

[0040] Split (rate split): Split the public message to which it belongs from the decoded message;

[0041] Eavesdrop: A message that a user, acting as an eavesdropper, can eavesdrop on.

[0042] The precoded data stream (ie, user message, including public message and private message) is sent to the receiving end through a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) wireless channel.

[0043] Among them, at the sending end, the base station sends the message {W1,...,W K} is sent to K receiving users with the same time and frequency resources. Each user’s message W k It should only be decrypted by the user and should be kept secret from other users. At the sending end, the user's message needs to be split into Two major parts. Among them, represents the gth group, there are G groups in total, and the set of all groups is expressed as represents the public message provided by user k to group g; W p,k represents the private message transmitted by user k, and the set of all users is represented as In group g, all users in the group give The provided public messages are combined into a super public message Therefore, at the sending end, all users' messages are divided into public messages and private message w p ={W p,1 ,...,W p,K}. After all messages are encoded, they become corresponding data streams. The corresponding data stream is precoded and sent to the transmitting antenna as a transmission signal.

[0044] Based on the above system framework, this embodiment provides a RSMA data security transmission method to resist internal eavesdropping. Figure 2 ,include:

[0045] Based on a generalized RSMA system, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum secure rate over a multi-user, multiple-input, single-output (MISO) wireless channel. Constraints are determined based on the transmission rate and power of user messages. At the receiving end of the RSMA system, users in each user group treat user messages from other user groups as noise and decode the user messages for their user group. The user messages include public messages corresponding to the user group (i.e., public messages within the group) and private messages.

[0046] Transform and solve the optimization problem based on the SCA method;

[0047] Based on the solution results, resources are allocated to each user group for data transmission.

[0048] It is worth noting that because inter-group public messages (defined as public messages that can be decoded by users of all user groups) can be decoded by all users, inter-group public messages can be decoded by internal eavesdroppers and are not confidential. Therefore, inter-group public messages are not provided in the use of the system described in this embodiment.

[0049] It should be noted that, for any user in the system, the user messages received include not only the public messages of the user group to which the user belongs and the user's own private messages, but also the private messages of other users and the public messages of other user groups.

[0050] In this embodiment, each user can only decode public messages within their own group and cannot decode public messages from other groups. This reduces the threat posed by internal eavesdroppers to public messages. When an eavesdropper eavesdrops on public or private messages from users in other groups, the undecoded public messages can be treated as interference, thus suppressing the threat. Furthermore, considering both user fairness and security, an optimization problem is formulated with the goal of maximizing the minimum secure rate, taking into account not only the security performance of the entire system but also the fairness of each user.

[0051] The method described in this embodiment enables RSMA public messages to not only transmit useful information within the system but also suppress internal eavesdroppers in the presence of such eavesdroppers. Compared to existing technologies, this embodiment improves RSMA's ability to handle internal eavesdroppers and lays a solid foundation for research on RSMA physical layer security.

[0052] In some preferred embodiments, establishing an optimization problem with the goal of maximizing the minimum security rate under a multi-user multi-input single-output wireless channel includes:

[0053] The sending signal of the transmitter is expressed as:

[0054]

[0055] Where P represents the precoding matrix,

[0056] s represents the data flow vector sent, N t Indicates the number of transmitting antennas; Represents the i-th user group Public flow within the group The precoding vector, p k represents user k's private flow s k Precoding vector of represents the set of all user groups; G represents the number of groups into which all users are grouped; represents the set of all users, K represents the number of users in the system;

[0057] The received signal at the receiving end is expressed as:

[0058]

[0059] Where, represents the wireless channel between the transmitter and the receiver, n k Represents the Gaussian white noise generated by the receiving end during reception, Represents the set of all users;

[0060] At the receiving end, user k regards the public and private messages of other user groups as noise in a certain decoding order, and first decodes the public message of his own user group, that is, the public message within the group. The transmitted signal s is independent, and the power is E{ss H When decoding the public message within the group, the SINR of the signal segment is:

[0061]

[0062] User k uses SIC to remove the decoded public message to prevent it from interfering when decoding the private signal.

[0063] After user k decodes the public message of its user group, it decodes its own private message by treating the public messages of other user groups (i.e., undecoded public messages) and the private messages of other users as noise. The SINR of this signal is expressed as:

[0064]

[0065] Then, the public message reachable rate and private message reachable rate of user k in the group are expressed as:

[0066]

[0067] R p,k =log2(1+γ p,k ) (60)

[0068] To ensure that public messages within the group can be All users in the group are decoded The transmission rate of public messages is:

[0069]

[0070] Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, messages transmitted by all users may be subject to noise threats from potential eavesdroppers. When user k is a potential eavesdropper within RSMA, an additional layer of SIC will be referenced to reduce the interference caused by private messages to eavesdropping. When user k acts as an eavesdropper, he or she will eavesdrop on public messages of other user groups. SINR and private messages n SINRγ e,n←k They are:

[0071]

[0072] Where, represents the set of user groups to which user k belongs;

[0073] User k has access to public flows in other user groups. and private streams n Achievable rate and R e,n←k They are:

[0074]

[0075]

[0076] The safe rate of public messages within a group is defined as:

[0077]

[0078] Where, Indicates that user k is in the user group The proportion of satisfy and [x] + =max{x,0};

[0079] The safe rate for private messages is defined as:

[0080]

[0081] Therefore, the safety rate of the RSMA system is defined as:

[0082]

[0083] Then, the optimization problem is established as:

[0084]

[0085] tr(PP H )≤P t (72)

[0086] Among them, formula (70) is used to ensure that the public stream within the group will not be decoded by users outside the group, formula (71) is used to ensure that users within the group can decode the public stream within the group; formula (72) is the power constraint.

[0087] It should be emphasized that in the above embodiment, users in each user group first decode the public messages of their user group (i.e., public messages within the group), and at this time, the public streams of other user groups and all private streams are regarded as noise; after decoding the public messages within the group, the private messages of their user group are decoded (recorded as private messages within the group), and at this time, the public streams that cannot be decoded (i.e., public streams not belonging to their user group) and the private streams of other user groups are regarded as noise.

[0088] It should be noted that the above problem is a non-convex problem and is usually difficult to solve. In order to solve this problem, this embodiment adopts the SCA method to transform the above optimization problem. Figure 3 ,include:

[0089] First, introduce the first auxiliary variable λ and transform the original problem into a maximization problem:

[0090] (70)(71)(72)

[0092] Since equations (70), (71), and (74) are still non-convex problems, the second auxiliary variable group is introduced α p,k , α e,k←n ,have:

[0093]

[0094] R p,k ≥α p,k (77)

[0095] R e,k←n ≤α e,k←n (78)

[0096] Introducing the third auxiliary variable To solve equation (75), and satisfy:

[0097]

[0098] Substituting equations (79) and (80) into equation (75), we get

[0099]

[0100] Formula (81) is equivalent to

[0101]

[0102] Formulas (76), (77), (78), and (80) are non-convex functions. To facilitate the solution, these functions are decomposed into two groups and grouped and transformed to solve them.

[0103] For equations (77) and (80), a fourth auxiliary variable group is introduced and approximated by a single Taylor expansion to convert equations (77) and (80) into convex functions; and,

[0104] For equations (76) and (78), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced and approximated by a single Taylor expansion to convert equations (76) and (78) into convex functions;

[0105] Combined with the grouping conversion results, the optimization problem is converted into a convex problem.

[0106] In the above embodiment, the continuous convex approximation scheme can effectively transform the originally difficult non-convex optimization problem into a convex optimization problem with good convergence.

[0107] In some optional embodiments, for equations (77) and (80), a fourth auxiliary variable group is introduced: ρ p,k ,have:

[0108]

[0109] (85) and (86) are still non-convex functions, and the fifth auxiliary variable group is introduced

[0110]

[0111] Since equations (87) and (88) are still non-convex, this embodiment uses a Taylor expansion to replace the original function have:

[0112]

[0113] Substituting (87) and (88) into (91), we have:

[0114]

[0115] ρ p,k ≤Ω [t] (p k ,h k ,β p,k ) (93)

[0116] At this point, the conversion between (77) and (80) is completed.

[0117] For equations (76) and (78), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced and ρ e,k←n ,have:

[0118]

[0119] Since Equations (94) and (95) are non-convex functions, we use the first-order Taylor expansion approximation and define:

[0120]

[0121] Substituting equations (94) and (95) into equation (98), we have:

[0122]

[0123] 1+ρ e,k←n ≤Ψ [t] (α e,k←n ) (100)

[0124] Introducing the seventh auxiliary variable group and ρ e,k←n Equivalence of equations (96) and (97) yields:

[0125]

[0126] Equations (103) and (104) are still non-convex functions and are approximated using first-order Taylor expansion:

[0127]

[0128] Substituting (103) and (104) into (105) yields

[0129]

[0130]

[0131] This completes the transformation of (76) and (78) into convex functions.

[0132] Furthermore, define

[0133] Then the original optimization problem (69) is equivalent to:

[0134]

[0135] Subject to(72)(82)(83)(84)(89)(90)(92)(93)(99)(100)(101)(102)(106)(107).

[0136] In some preferred embodiments, a convex optimization tool is used to solve the converted optimization problem, such as CVX.

[0137] In some specific implementations, the pseudo code of the iterative solution algorithm proposed to solve the optimization problem (69) is shown in Table 1:

[0138] Table 1 Pseudocode of iterative solution algorithm for optimization problem

[0139]

[0140] Example 2

[0141] This embodiment conducts a simulation experiment based on the method described in Embodiment 1 and a spatial division multiple access scheme based on linear precoding.

[0142] In a scenario with three antennas and three users on a fixed channel, simulation was performed under the condition that the channel strength ||h1||:||h2||:||h3||=1:1:1. Figure 4 The worst case scenario with three users is simulated. All three users are eavesdroppers within the system and try to eavesdrop on other users' messages. Figure 5The simulation is conducted under the condition of only one eavesdropper, in which user 3 attempts to eavesdrop on messages of other users. It can be seen that the method described in the embodiment outperforms the linear precoding-based spatial division multiple access scheme in terms of minimum rate security rate performance.

[0143] To facilitate implementation by those skilled in the art, this embodiment also provides a schematic diagram of the beams of the method described in Example 1 in a three-user scenario, see Figure 6 In a three-user scenario, this embodiment divides members 1, 2, and 3 into user groups {1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 3}. User 1 is a legitimate user of user groups {1, 2} and {1, 3} and can normally decode public messages between groups. When user 1 acts as an eavesdropper, the public messages of user group {2, 3} cannot be decoded by user 1. At this time, the public messages of user group {2, 3} can serve as interference to prevent user 1 from eavesdropping on the confidential messages of users 2 and 3.

[0144] Example 3

[0145] This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which is stored at least one instruction, at least one program, code set, or instruction set. The at least one instruction, at least one program, code set, or instruction set is loaded and executed by a processor, so that the processor performs some or all steps of the method provided in Example 1 of the present application.

[0146] It is understood that the storage medium may be transient or non-transient. Exemplarily, the storage medium includes, but is not limited to, a USB flash drive, a mobile hard drive, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, among other media capable of storing program code.

[0147] Exemplarily, the processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor (MPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), or a field programmable gate array (FPGA).

[0148] Exemplarily, the read-only memory includes but is not limited to MASKROM, PROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash, etc.

[0149] Exemplarily, the random access memory includes but is not limited to DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, DDR SDRAM, etc.

[0150] In some examples, a computer program product is provided, which can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination thereof. As a non-limiting example, the computer program product can be embodied as the storage medium, or as a software product, such as an SDK (Software Development Kit).

[0151] As a non-limiting example, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program or computer-executable instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium. A processor of an electronic device reads the computer program or computer-executable instructions from the computer-readable storage medium and executes the computer-executable instructions, causing the electronic device to perform some or all of the steps of the method described in the embodiments of the present application.

[0152] In some examples, a computer program is provided, comprising a computer-readable code. When the computer-readable code is run in a computer device, a processor in the computer device executes the code to implement part or all of the steps in the method.

[0153] This embodiment also proposes an electronic device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores at least one instruction, at least one program, code set or instruction set, and when the processor executes the at least one instruction, at least one program, code set or instruction set, it implements part or all of the steps of the method described in Example 1.

[0154] In some examples, a hardware entity of the electronic device is provided, including: a processor, a memory and a communication interface; wherein the processor generally controls the overall operation of the electronic device; the communication interface is used to enable the electronic device to communicate with other terminals or servers through a network; the memory is configured to store instructions and applications executable by the processor, and can also cache data to be processed or processed by the processor and various modules in the electronic device (including but not limited to image data, audio data, voice communication data and video communication data), which can be implemented by flash memory (FLASH), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) or random access memory (RAM).

[0155] A processor may include one or more processing elements. Thus, a processor may include one or more integrated circuits (ICs) configured to perform the functions of the processor. Furthermore, each integrated circuit may include circuits (e.g., a first circuit, a second circuit, and other circuits) configured to perform the functions of the processor.

[0156] Furthermore, data may be transmitted between the processor, the communication interface and the memory via a bus, which may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, connecting various circuits of one or more processors and memories.

[0157] It can be understood that the options in the above embodiment 1 are also applicable to this embodiment, so they will not be described again here.

[0158] The same or similar reference numerals correspond to the same or similar components;

[0159] The terms used in the drawings to describe positional relationships are for illustrative purposes only and are not to be construed as limiting the present application.

[0160] It should be noted that, unless there is any conflict, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of this application can be combined with each other.

[0161] In different specific implementations, the method or system described in this application can be implemented in software, hardware or a combination thereof. In addition, the order of the steps of the method can be changed, and various elements can be added, reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc.

[0162] Obviously, the above embodiments of the present application are merely examples for clearly illustrating the present application, and are not intended to limit the implementation methods of the present application, and are not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, other different forms of changes or modifications can be made based on the above description. Each discrete structural / functional module or unit can be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module can exist alone, or two or more modules can be integrated to form an independent part, and the structure and function of the discrete components can be implemented as a combined structure or component. It is not necessary and impossible to enumerate all the implementation methods here. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present application should be included in the scope of protection of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping, characterized in that: include: Based on a generalized RSMA system, an optimization problem is established with the goal of maximizing the minimum secure rate over a multi-user, multi-input, single-output wireless channel, and constraints are determined based on the transmission rate and power of user messages. At the receiving end of the RSMA system, users in each user group treat user messages from other user groups as noise and decode the user messages for their user group, which include public and private messages corresponding to the user group. Transform and solve the optimization problem based on the SCA method; Based on the solution results, resources are allocated to each user group for data transmission; The optimization problem is established under a multi-user multi-input single-output wireless channel with the goal of maximizing the minimum safe rate, including: The sending signal of the transmitter is expressed as: Where P represents the precoding matrix, s represents the data flow vector sent, N t Indicates the number of transmitting antennas; Represents the i-th user group Public flow within the group The precoding vector, p k represents user k's private flow s k Precoding vector of represents the set of all user groups, G represents the number of groups into which all users are grouped; represents the set of all users, K represents the number of users in the system; The received signal at the receiving end is expressed as: Where, represents the wireless channel between the transmitter and the receiver, n k Represents the Gaussian white noise generated by the receiving end during reception, Represents the set of all users; The public message within the user group to which user k belongs is defined as the intra-group public message. At the receiving end, user k first decodes the intra-group public message and regards the private stream and the public stream of other user groups as noise. The SINR of this signal segment is: User k uses SIC to remove the public stream within the decoded group to prevent interference when decoding private signals. After decoding the public message of its user group, it decodes its own private message by treating the public streams of other user groups and the private streams of other users as noise. The SINR of this signal segment is expressed as: Then, the public message reachable rate and private message reachable rate of user k in the group are expressed as: R p,k =log2(1+γ p,k ) (6) To ensure that public messages within the group can be All users in the group are decoded The transmission rate of public messages is: When user k is a potential eavesdropper within RSMA, an additional layer of SIC will be referenced to reduce the interference of private messages on eavesdropping; when user k is an eavesdropper, he can eavesdrop on public messages of other user groups. SINR and private messages n SINRγ e,n←k They are: Where, represents the set of user groups to which user k belongs; User k has access to public flows in other user groups. and private streams n Achievable rate and R e,n←k They are: The safe rate of public messages within a group is defined as: Where, Indicates that user k is in the user group The proportion of satisfy and [x] + =max{x,0}; The safe rate for private messages is defined as: Therefore, the safety rate of the RSMA system is defined as: Then, the optimization problem is established as: tr(PP H )≤P t (18) Among them, formula (16) is used to ensure that the public flow within the group will not be decoded by users outside the group, formula (17) is used to ensure that users within the group can decode the public message; formula (18) is the power constraint.

2. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 1, characterized in that: The SCA-based method is used to convert and solve the optimization problem, including: Since the optimization problem is non-convex, the first auxiliary variable λ is introduced to transform the optimization problem into a maximization problem: Since equations (16), (17), and (20) are still non-convex problems, the second auxiliary variable group is introduced α p,k , α e,k←n ,have: R p,k ≥α p,k (23) R e,k←n ≤α e,k←n (24) Introducing the third auxiliary variable To solve equation (21), and satisfy: Substituting equations (25) and (26) into equation (21), we get Formula (27) is equivalent to Formulas (22), (23), (24), and (26) are non-convex functions that perform grouping transformations; among them, For equations (23) and (26), a fourth auxiliary variable group is introduced and approximated by a single Taylor expansion to convert equations (23) and (26) into convex functions; and, For equations (22) and (24), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced and approximated by a single Taylor expansion to convert equations (22) and (24) into convex functions; Combined with the grouping conversion results, the optimization problem is converted into a convex problem.

3. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 2, characterized in that: The introduction of the fourth auxiliary variable group and the use of a Taylor expansion for approximation include: For equations (23) and (26), the fourth auxiliary variable group is introduced have: (31) and (32) are still non-convex functions, and the fifth auxiliary variable group is introduced Since Equations (33) and (34) are still non-convex, we use a Taylor expansion to replace the original function have: Substituting (33) and (34) into (37), we have: r p,k ≤Ω [t] (p k ,h k ,b p,k ) (39).

4. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The introduction of the sixth auxiliary variable group and the use of a Taylor expansion for approximation include: For equations (22) and (24), the sixth auxiliary variable group is introduced and ρ e,k←n ,have: Since Equations (40) and (41) are non-convex functions, we use the first-order Taylor expansion approximation and define: Substituting equations (40) and (41) into equation (44), we have: 1+r e,k←n ≤Ψ [t] (a e,k←n ) (46) Introducing the seventh auxiliary variable group and ρ e,k←n Equivalent equations (42) and (43) yield: Equations (49) and (50) are still non-convex functions and are approximated using first-order Taylor expansion: Substituting (49) and (50) into (51) we get 5. The RSMA data security transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to claim 4 is characterized in that: Converting the optimization problem into a convex problem comprises: definition Then the original optimization problem (15) is equivalent to: Subject to(18)(28)(29)(30)(35)(36)(38)(39)(45)(46)(47)(48)(52)(53).

6. A RSMA data secure transmission method for resisting internal eavesdropping according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The convex optimization tool CVX is used to solve the converted optimization problem.

7. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: a memory for storing computer-executable instructions or computer programs; The processor is configured to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 when executing the computer-executable instructions or computer program stored in the memory.

8. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The storage medium stores at least one instruction, at least one program, code set or instruction set, and the at least one instruction, at least one program, code set or instruction set is loaded and executed by the processor to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer program product comprising a computer program or computer executable instructions, characterized in that When the computer program or computer executable instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

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