Internet of vehicles attack and defense test system, electronic equipment and readable storage medium
Through the Internet of Vehicles attack and defense testing system combining virtual and real, the limitations of the existing Internet of Vehicles simulation testing tools are solved, and the full process testing of the inside and outside networks is realized, which reduces costs and improves testing efficiency, and meets the systemized safety testing needs of all links of the Internet of Vehicles.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510476755.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-04-16
- Publication Date
- 2025-07-18
AI Technical Summary
Existing Internet of Vehicle simulation testing tools are difficult to conduct comprehensive and systematic security simulation testing, especially in the connection environment between the in-vehicle network and the out-vehicle network, and the testing cost is high, making it difficult to cover the overall safety test of the entire life cycle of smart cars.
Design a vehicle attack and defense testing system based on virtual and real-world combined with parallel simulation, including on-board infotainment system and CAN network simulation module, OTA upgrade module and CAN intrusion detection module. By combining virtual car machines with real in-vehicle environments, simultaneous simulation of in-vehicle networks and out-vehicle networks is achieved, and security testing functions are provided.
It reduces the cost of safety testing, improves the test speed and breadth, meets the system testing needs of OEM manufacturers and car companies for all links and nodes of the Internet of Vehicles, and improves the comprehensiveness and efficiency of Internet of Vehicles security testing.
Smart Images
Figure CN120342682A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention mainly relates to the field of vehicle networking, and particularly relates to a vehicle networking attack and defense test system, an electronic device, and a readable storage medium based on virtual-real combined parallel simulation. Background Art
[0002] Nowadays, the global digital industry is undergoing rapid transformation. New generation information and communication technologies such as 5G, big data, cloud-edge-cloud collaboration, artificial intelligence, etc. are accelerating the integration with all walks of life, promoting the intelligent, networked, and digital development of vehicle networking, Internet of Things, and industrial Internet. The vehicle networking industry has also given rise to emerging digital industries such as vehicle-road collaboration, intelligent driving, intelligent transportation systems, V2X, etc. The construction of vehicle networking is also becoming the focus of the global intelligent industry and digital development.
[0003] For the automotive manufacturing industry, the improvement of traditional vehicle physical and mechanical performance has reached a bottleneck stage and it is difficult to achieve a significant improvement in a short period of time. The traditional automotive market is approaching saturation, and new product highlights are urgently needed to stimulate the automotive market. Promoting vehicle networking and intelligence has become a very promising and important development direction. With the gradual improvement of vehicle networking intelligence and networking, the functions of intelligent vehicles are becoming increasingly rich, and networked services have greatly improved our driving experience. However, the rapid intelligent development has also led to an increase in the openness of vehicles and the number of vehicle networking nodes, exposing more attack surfaces. In the intelligent transportation architecture of vehicle-road-cloud, each node of vehicle networking may become the target for attackers to break through, such as vehicle external interfaces WiFi, Bluetooth, mobile phone APP, TBOX; in-vehicle bus interfaces OBD, CAN bus; vehicle services and platforms OTA, TSP, RSU, etc. It is statistically shown that the code volume of modern vehicles has exceeded hundreds of millions of lines, and these codes constitute the firmware of each ECU, the software services and operating systems of in-vehicle information interaction systems. The increase in code volume makes it easier to discover possible security vulnerabilities in software and hardware. Due to the connectivity between in-vehicle networks and out-vehicle networks, a single security vulnerability may lead to the collapse of the entire network, and vehicle networking as a whole faces more security threats. At the same time, automotive architecture technology has also been updated with the development of networking technology. The electrical and electronic architecture (E / E) of vehicles has evolved from distributed to domain centralized, and then to the current central centralized. The in-vehicle ECUs communicate and integrate with each other, with fewer in-vehicle nodes, providing higher flexibility and computing power, but it also means that once the central node is controlled by attackers, more serious attack consequences will occur.
[0004] To verify the security of various components, software, and vehicle-cloud services in the vehicle networking, reduce the security threats faced by the automotive supply chain, and improve the security level of connected vehicles, information security testing of all aspects of vehicle networking is the key to ensuring vehicle networking information security. However, currently in the field of vehicle networking security detection technology, there is still a lack of a complete and integrated security evaluation tool. Vehicle networking security researchers can often only conduct security tests on automotive components of specific brands. With a large number of vehicle brands and numerous links and components in the vehicle networking design, a great deal of time is often consumed in dealing with the heterogeneity of products and services of different brands and different systems in vehicle networking security evaluation work, and there is a lack of a general security test platform. At the same time, the test objects are generally limited to a certain vehicle networking node, such as the OEM cloud platform, in-vehicle information interaction system, in-vehicle TBOX, in-vehicle network, etc., making it difficult to form a systematic, global, and overall security test covering the entire life cycle of intelligent vehicles. At the same time, for each equipment supplier and vehicle networking researcher, there are still relatively high thresholds and technical difficulties in carrying out vehicle networking security tests. First, it is difficult to conduct complete functional and security tests on individual components in the absence of a connected environment for the in-vehicle network and the external vehicle network. Second, the actual purchase and construction costs of each vehicle networking node in security testing are relatively high. For example, to conduct a compliance test on OTA technology, a complete cloud-vehicle system, as well as actual in-vehicle units, automotive gateways, and multiple ECUs, are required to complete the OTA upgrade process, and the configuration of these services and nodes is too costly for ordinary researchers to test.
[0005] Currently, the existing software for vehicle networking simulation testing mainly includes venis for simulating the vehicle networking traffic network, ICSim and CANoe for simulating the communication CAN bus, and the Eclipse Kuksa open platform that provides an in-vehicle platform, a cloud platform, and an IDE, etc. These simulation testing tools are mainly used for functional simulation oriented to traffic and driving, and it is difficult to conduct complete security simulation testing that maps to real physical devices.
[0006] To solve the problem that most current simulation and testing tools for vehicle networking only target a single in-vehicle network or external vehicle network, a scalable and open vehicle networking test architecture is needed, which can simulate both the in-vehicle network and the external vehicle network simultaneously, including the in-vehicle CAN bus, in-vehicle infotainment system, vehicle-cloud OTA function, and at the same time provide security testing functions for the in-vehicle network and OTA services. Summary of the Invention
[0007] In view of the above-mentioned defects of the prior art, the technical problems to be solved by the present invention include:
[0008] How to design a vehicle networking attack and defense test system based on virtual-real combined parallel simulation to overcome the above technical problems.
[0009] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a vehicle networking attack and defense test system, including an in-vehicle infotainment system, a CAN network simulation module, an OTA upgrade module, and a CAN intrusion detection module;
[0010] The in-vehicle infotainment system and the CAN network simulation module are used for the human-computer interaction of the in-vehicle infotainment system and the simulation of CAN network communication;
[0011] The OTA upgrade module is used to build an OTA upgrade platform according to the Uptane standard;
[0012] The CAN intrusion detection module is used to collect CAN messages in real time and detect anomalies.
[0013] Further, the in-vehicle infotainment system and the CAN network simulation module are also used to deploy a virtual vehicle head unit on development boards such as QEMU or Raspberry Pi according to different test requirements through Automotive Grade Linux (AGL), and realize human-computer interaction through the QEMU UI interface or the Raspberry Pi touch display screen.
[0014] Further, the in-vehicle infotainment system and the CAN network simulation module are also used to simulate the CAN network in the vehicle head unit by analyzing the in-vehicle CAN protocol and architecture, realize the sending, receiving, and parsing of CAN messages, and construct messages for different attacks on CAN messages.
[0015] Further, the OTA upgrade module is also used to provide an OEM cloud web platform, and users can perform operations such as firmware uploading, configuration updating, and historical update viewing through a browser.
[0016] Further, the OTA upgrade module is also used to provide an in-vehicle OTA service, and in combination with the virtual vehicle head unit, realize software OTA upgrade from the cloud to the actual vehicle head unit.
[0017] Further, the OTA upgrade module is also used to provide signature hashes for the OTA cloud and authentication and integrity check security services for the vehicle end according to the security standards of Uptane, and simulate and test various attack methods in OTA.
[0018] Further, the CAN intrusion detection module is also used to manually construct, Fuzzing attacks, and Flooding attacks on the virtual vehicle head unit AGL, and test the impact of the virtual vehicle head unit after a CAN bus attack.
[0019] Further, the CAN intrusion detection module is also used for real-time CAN message listening, real-time collection of CAN network data of the virtual vehicle head unit, and intrusion detection security testing of manually constructed attack messages.
[0020] An electronic device includes
[0021] a memory,
[0022] a processor, and
[0023] a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the vehicle networking attack and defense test system as described above.
[0024] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the program is executed by a processor, it implements the vehicle networking attack and defense test system as described above.
[0025] Compared with the prior art solutions, the technical effect of the present invention is as follows:
[0026] The present invention proposes a full-process vehicle networking test bed covering vehicle cloud and in-vehicle networks. Taking the infotainment system as the key communication node between the vehicle cloud and the in-vehicle network, the OTA service, CAN network and CAN IDS are organically combined to construct a complete and comprehensive vehicle networking test process. It effectively meets the system test requirements of OEM manufacturers and vehicle enterprises for various links and nodes of vehicle networking.
[0027] The present invention utilizes the technology of combining virtual and real. Using the real vehicle machine system to simulate the in-vehicle network, which is similar to the real in-vehicle environment and has the advantages of parallel simulation. Virtualize some non-critical nodes and retain the key nodes for testing with real hardware. It reduces the cost of security testing, improves the speed of security testing, improves economic benefits, increases the breadth of the test surface, and accelerates enterprises' occupation of the user market.
[0028] The following will further illustrate the concept, specific structure and technical effects of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings to fully understand the purpose, features and effects of the present invention. Description of the Drawings
[0029] Figure 1 is the system architecture diagram of the present invention;
[0030] Figure 2 is the schematic diagram of the test process of the present invention;
[0031] Figure 3 is the CAN network architecture and parsing communication schematic diagram of the virtual vehicle machine of the present invention;
[0032] Figure 4 is the schematic diagram of the OTA upgrade process of the present invention;
[0033] Figure 5 is the IDS detection flow chart of the present invention. Detailed Embodiments
[0034] The following describes several preferred embodiments of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings of the specification to make its technical content clearer and easier to understand. The present invention can be embodied in many different forms of embodiments, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the embodiments mentioned in the text.
[0035] The present invention is an in-vehicle network attack and defense test bed based on virtual-real combined parallel simulation. Using virtual-real combined technology, it can simultaneously simulate in-vehicle networks and out-of-vehicle networks, including in-vehicle CAN buses, in-vehicle infotainment systems, and vehicle-cloud OTA functions, and at the same time provide security test functions for in-vehicle networks and OTA services. It includes three major modules: an in-vehicle infotainment system and CAN network simulation module, an OTA upgrade module, and a CAN intrusion detection module.
[0036] In the in-vehicle infotainment system and CAN network simulation module, it is responsible for implementing simulation functions such as the human-computer interaction of the in-vehicle infotainment system and CAN network communication; through Automotive Grade Linux (AGL), according to different test requirements, deploy a virtual car head unit on development boards such as QEMU or Raspberry Pi, and implement human-computer interaction through the QEMU UI interface or the Raspberry Pi touch display screen. And by analyzing the in-vehicle CAN protocol and architecture, simulate the CAN network in the car head unit to realize the sending, receiving, and parsing of CAN messages, and the construction of messages for different attacks on CAN messages;
[0037] In the OTA upgrade module, build an OTA upgrade platform according to the Uptane standard. Provide an OEM cloud web platform, and users can perform operations such as firmware upload, configuration update, and historical update viewing through a browser. At the same time, provide an in-vehicle OTA service. Combined with the virtual car head unit mentioned above, it can realize software OTA upgrade from the cloud to the actual car head unit. On this basis, according to the security standard of Uptane, provide signature hashes for the OTA cloud and authentication and integrity check security services for the in-vehicle side, and conduct simulation tests on various attack methods in OTA.
[0038] In the CAN intrusion detection module, collect CAN messages in real time and perform anomaly detection. Use open-source real vehicle CAN data to test and verify the effectiveness of this intrusion detection module. And on this basis, manually construct Fuzzing attacks and Flooding attacks on the virtual car head unit AGL to test the impact of the virtual car head unit after CAN bus attacks. And a real-time CAN message listening function is added to the CAN intrusion monitoring module to collect the CAN network data of the virtual car head unit in real time and conduct intrusion detection security tests on the manually constructed attack messages.
[0039] Meanwhile, the platform also provides a variety of test equipment, protocol access interfaces and solutions, including: in the in-vehicle infotainment system, the vehicle head unit that needs to be actually tested can be replaced and connected to the CAN interface and the remote OTA upgrade interface of this test bed to implement the function and security tests of the CAN protocol and OTA; at the same time, the virtual CAN network in the in-vehicle infotainment system can also be replaced with an actual CAN device or a real CAN bus to achieve real-time parsing, UI display and intrusion detection of CAN data; in terms of OTA upgrade, the OTA platform and remote upgrade protocol that need to be tested can also be connected, and the OTA security test module of this test bed can be called to conduct a security assessment on the platform and protocol under test, and the attack defense effect can be verified through the vehicle head unit and the in-vehicle CAN network part of this test bed.
[0040] This platform is divided into three modules: the AGL virtual vehicle head unit and CAN network simulation module, the CAN bus intrusion detection module, and the OTA upgrade security test module. The overall architecture is as Figure 1 shown.
[0041] As Figure 2 shown, this test bed is divided into two major parts: the vehicle cloud and the in-vehicle part. For the vehicle cloud OTA part, the process is as follows: 1. The OTA cloud service stores each version of the firmware in the firmware repository and stores the correspondence between the firmware and the vehicle to be updated in the update guidance library. 2. The vehicle end requests an update from the OTA cloud service. The OTA cloud service queries the firmware to be updated for this vehicle in the update guidance library and signs and authenticates the firmware using the keys of the update guidance library and the firmware repository; 3. The vehicle end downloads the firmware from the OTA cloud service and conducts a security verification; 4. After the vehicle end completes the verification, it transfers the software to the vehicle head unit for in-vehicle software update. The in-vehicle test of this test bed consists of three parts: vehicle head unit application display, simulated in-vehicle CAN network and CAN intrusion detection. The interaction relationship is: the vehicle head unit application parses and converts the in-vehicle CAN network data and realizes visual display on the dashboard application; the CAN intrusion detection monitors the in-vehicle CAN network in real time, detects the anomaly score of each message, and generates an anomaly report.
[0042] The AGL virtual vehicle head unit and CAN network simulation uses the AGL system architecture on the QEMU virtual machine and simulates the in-vehicle CAN network using SocketCAN to provide custom CAN interfaces, message parsing and signal transmission services. The construction of the AGL virtual vehicle head unit includes the following steps: prepare the host for construction and the tools required for compiling the image, download the AGL software to the local Git repository of the host, initialize the compilation environment and customize it, and compile the image. The CAN network architecture and parsing communication of the virtual vehicle head unit are as Figure 3As shown in the figure. By establishing a virtual CAN interface vcan0 for the in-vehicle unit through SocketCAN, or connecting to an actual CAN device or a real CAN bus, different CAN buses can be parsed and communicated with simply by changing the bus mapping configuration file in the virtual in-vehicle unit. Then, the AGLLow Level CAN service parses the CAN network data in real time through the defined CAN communication matrix, such as vehicle speed, engine speed, tire pressure, etc. And the parsed signals are transmitted to the upper-layer application through the Signal Composer protocol for UI display. At the same time, the AGL simulation in-vehicle unit opens an interactive interface and a SHELL console for users. Users can use in-vehicle applications for human-machine interaction and execute commands and configure the environment through the console.
[0043] The OTA upgrade security test module provides a Web platform, with the front end built using vue and the back end connected by flask. Users can perform OTA update configurations on the web page, including image upload, update policy setting, and attack testing, as well as OTA service management, including cloud, vehicle, and ECU sides. The back end of the OTA upgrade security test module is divided into cloud OTA, vehicle OTA, and ECU OTA.
[0044] Cloud OTA consists of three parts: software repository, time signature service, and guidance library. The firmware sent from the cloud will be stored locally on the vehicle side after going through processes such as download and update, integrity check, and signature verification by the vehicle OTA. Among them, the vehicle side uses the HTTP protocol to download the firmware, and then the vehicle side sends the firmware to the ECU side for update. During the update authentication on the vehicle side and the ECU side, time verification is also required to verify the validity of the signature. During the ECU side firmware update service, the updated file will be transferred to the AGL simulation in-vehicle unit for software update of in-vehicle applications.
[0045] Cloud OTA includes the following four sub-modules:
[0046] Software repository: Used to store all versions of software / firmware, as well as basic metadata, including the public and private keys of the OEM, the algorithms used for the keys, the signature algorithm, the file names corresponding to the stored software, file sizes, file hashes, etc.;
[0047] Guidance library: Generates update metadata for specific vehicles to guide which software should be installed on each ECU of different vehicles (obtained from the software repository and verified). And receives the vehicle list sent from different vehicles and the ECU list of each vehicle to identify the software information running on the ECU;
[0048] Time signature service: Receives requests for time signatures from the vehicle side. This request includes random numbers (nonces) to be used by the ECU to verify whether the request result is real-time and avoid attackers from replaying historical messages;
[0049] Web service: Provides functions such as OTA distribution, update policy configuration, online vehicle and ECU status viewing for users.
[0050] The vehicle-side OTA includes the following two sub-modules:
[0051] Cloud download module: Updates the current time from a secure source, downloads and verifies metadata, downloads and verifies the updated software, and sends the current time, metadata, and updated software to the corresponding ECU side.
[0052] Vehicle and ECU status update module: Generates an initial vehicle list, accepts the ECU list, signs it with its own private key, and then sends it to the cloud OTA guidance library.
[0053] The ECU-side OTA only needs to complete time sharing with the vehicle side, transfer the ECU list, and download the update file and metadata.
[0054] Overall, the OTA upgrade process of the present invention is as Figure 4 shown, which can be divided into three stages: The cloud adds firmware and metadata and assigns them to the vehicle and ECU. The vehicle side enters the update process to download and verify the firmware. The ECU side obtains the firmware from the vehicle side and verifies to complete the update process. The specific upgrade and verification processes are as follows:
[0055] The user uploads the firmware file to be updated on the OEM cloud platform and performs OTA update configuration
[0056] The cloud OTA service will first add the firmware to the software repository. The software repository uses its own private key to sign the file information (file name, file size, file hash) to generate firmware metadata
[0057] The cloud OTA service assigns the updated firmware to the specified vehicle and ECU in the guidance library according to the user's update configuration, that is, adds the firmware as a target in the repo of the corresponding vehicle, sets the ECU identifier, and signs it with the key of the guidance library itself to generate guidance metadata. It should be noted that the vehicle here should be registered in the guidance library in advance, that is, its vehicle side has completed the initialization process and submitted a vehicle list to the guidance library once.
[0058] The vehicle side enters the update cycle. The vehicle side first sends a time signature request to the time signature server using the previous nonces from the ECU to obtain the correct time for subsequent metadata expiration check. The signature will be verified with the public key of the time signature service and compared with the sent nonces to determine the validity and timeliness of the time signature
[0059] The vehicle terminal downloads metadata and updates firmware from the OEM cloud. First, obtain the list of all firmware to be installed on this vehicle from the guidance library, and obtain the metadata of these files from the guidance library and the software repository respectively (file information signed by the private key of the guidance library and the software repository signature, including file name, file size, file hash, etc.), and download the updated firmware from the software repository.
[0060] The vehicle terminal updates the vehicle inventory file and uploads it to the guidance library.
[0061] The ECU terminal obtains the correct time signature from the vehicle terminal, updates the time, and ensures the validity of subsequent signature authentication. The time signature will be verified using the public key of the time signature service and compared with the nonces sent to the vehicle terminal last time. If correct, the time signature will be accepted.
[0062] The ECU terminal obtains the metadata of the updated files from the guidance library and the software repository from the vehicle terminal for file authentication
[0063] Call the XMLRPC interface of the vehicle terminal to download the updated firmware from the vehicle terminal. And check whether the file is the file indicated by the guidance library to be installed by comparing with the metadata of the guidance library
[0064] Check whether the file length and file hash of the updated firmware are correct according to the metadata of the guidance library and the software repository (the file name has been checked in the previous step). If correct, install the updated firmware; otherwise, it will prompt that there is a problem with the file length or file hash and reject the installation of the firmware.
[0065] The ECU terminal updates the ECU inventory file and uploads it to the vehicle terminal.
[0066] The OTA attack test part provides various attack verification methods, including man-in-the-middle attack, image tampering, replay attack and key leakage.
[0067] Man-in-the-middle attack: It means that the mirror file stored in the guidance library is replaced by a malicious file before being transmitted to the vehicle terminal, that is, the content of the default updated mirror file firmware will be replaced by a malicious mirror. In this OTA platform, since the attacker does not update the metadata file, the vehicle terminal OTA service will find that the guidance library mirror is updated, but the metadata is not updated and cannot pass the metadata verification.
[0068] Image tampering attack: It means that the mirror stored in the software repository is tampered with and replaced by a malicious mirror. Different from the man-in-the-middle attack which only targets the ECU of a specific vehicle, this attack method will affect all ECUs that need to update this mirror. In this OTA platform, although the vehicle terminal downloads a malicious mirror, when checking the file metadata, it will find that its file hash does not match the metadata provided by the guidance library and the software repository, and reject the update of this file.
[0069] Replay attack: It refers to an attacker capturing historical metadata and updated firmware, replaying them to the vehicle ECU, and causing the ECU to install an old version of the image that may have security vulnerabilities. In this OTA platform, since the version (version field) is updated each time the guidance library generates a metadata file by incrementing the version number by 1, it is only necessary to check whether the version number of the currently received timestamp signature file is lower than the historical timestamp version number to determine whether the current metadata is the latest. Therefore, when the vehicle end detects a problem with the timestamp signature, it will consider being under a replay attack and reject the update of this metadata file.
[0070] Key leakage: When the guidance library key leaks, an attacker can, based on a man-in-the-middle attack, use the guidance library key to regenerate metadata for a replaced malicious image of the guidance library, or, based on a replay attack, generate metadata for an old version of the image file to deceive the vehicle end into installing an historical version of the image file. In this way, when the vehicle ECU receives a replaced malicious image or an historical version image, it will also receive the metadata of this image signed by the guidance library.
[0071] The CAN intrusion detection system uses a service that provides real-time monitoring of the CAN network interface, records CAN messages, and uses the HTM algorithm for prediction and anomaly detection. This module connects to the virtual vehicle CAN network of the test bed through a socket socket and performs anomaly detection according to Figure 5 the IDS detection process shown. After receiving CAN data through the CAN interface, the CAN IDS module encodes the CAN messages. Each CAN ID is regarded as an independent category. The message IDs that appear in the normal data are encoded by the category encoder provided by the HTM open source platform Nupic and converted into the SDR data format. For the data payload of the CAN message, it is converted from hexadecimal data into a 64-bit binary bitstream and directly input into the spatial pooling layer. If the number of bits of the original data payload is less than 8 bits, it is filled with 0s. The sparsity of the SDR is adjusted to reduce it to about 2% level, and then the normal SDR is learned through the temporal memory layer, and the CLA classifier is used for prediction and anomaly detection.
[0072] The present invention is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatuses (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, and the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to the processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing devices to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing devices generate for implementing the processes in Figure 1one or more processes and / or blocks Figure 1 means for the functions specified in one or more blocks.
[0073] These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a manufacture including an instruction means that implements the functions in the process Figure 1 one or more processes and / or blocks Figure 1 specified in one or more blocks.
[0074] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, such that a series of operational steps are performed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, whereby the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the process Figure 1 one or more processes and / or blocks Figure 1 specified in one or more blocks.
[0075] The specific embodiments described above further elaborate on the objectives, technical solutions, and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above are only specific embodiments of the present invention and are not used to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent replacements, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention shall be included within the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. A vehicle networking attack and defense test system, characterized in that It includes an in-vehicle infotainment system, a CAN network simulation module, an OTA upgrade module, and a CAN intrusion detection module; The in-vehicle infotainment system and CAN network simulation module are used for the human-machine interaction of the in-vehicle infotainment system and the simulation of CAN network communication; The OTA upgrade module is used to build an OTA upgrade platform according to the Uptane standard; The CAN intrusion detection module is used for real-time collection and anomaly detection of CAN messages.
2. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 1, wherein: The in-vehicle infotainment system and CAN network simulation module are also used to deploy a virtual car head unit on development boards such as QEMU or Raspberry Pi through automotive-grade Linux according to different test requirements, and realize human-machine interaction through the QEMU UI interface or the Raspberry Pi touch display screen.
3. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 2, characterized in that: The in-vehicle infotainment system and CAN network simulation module are also used to simulate the CAN network in the car head unit by parsing and analyzing the in-vehicle CAN protocol and architecture, realize the sending, receiving, and parsing of CAN messages, and construct messages for different attacks on CAN messages.
4. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 1, wherein The OTA upgrade module is also used to provide an OEM cloud web platform for users to perform operations such as firmware upload, configuration update, and historical update viewing through a browser.
5. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 4, wherein The OTA upgrade module is also used to provide an in-vehicle OTA service, and in combination with the virtual car head unit, realize software OTA upgrade from the cloud to the actual car head unit.
6. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 5, wherein The OTA upgrade module is also used to provide signature hashes for the OTA cloud, authentication and integrity check security services for the in-vehicle side according to the security standards of Uptane, and simulate and test various attack methods in OTA.
7. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The CAN intrusion detection module is also used to manually construct, Fuzzing attacks, and Flooding attacks on the virtual car head unit AGL, and test the impact of the virtual car head unit after a CAN bus attack.
8. The vehicle networking attack and defense test system according to claim 7, wherein The CAN intrusion detection module is also used for real-time CAN message monitoring, real-time collection of CAN network data of the virtual car head unit, and intrusion detection security testing of manually constructed attack messages.
9. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the vehicle networking attack and defense test system as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.
10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the vehicle networking attack and defense test system as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.