Image asymmetric encryption method based on chaotic system

Abstract

The invention discloses an image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system. According to the image encryption method based on the Baker's Map chaotic system, image encryption based on the Baker's Map chaotic system is achieved, the chaotic system achieves image encryption based on natural laws embodied by nonlinear dynamics, the entropy increase principle, initial condition sensitivity and self-organizing criticality, security of the image in the end-to-end transmission process can be guaranteed, and leakage of image information can be avoided. Besides, the private key and the public key generated by the Baker's Map chaotic system are obtained based on the log data of the storage end, and the log data are continuously generated, so that the public key and the private key obtained at different moments are different, and autonomous key updating can be realized. Moreover, the storage end has certain privacy, the log data of the storage end can be considered not to be leaked, and the working condition and the interaction behavior of the storage end are difficult to predict, so that the sources of the public key and the private key have enough randomness and security.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the technical field of electronic digital data processing, and in particular, to a method for digital computing or data processing specifically applicable to specific applications, specifically an image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system. Background Art

[0002] The main purpose of image encryption is to protect the security of image content during transmission or storage and prevent unauthorized personnel from accessing it. Image encryption transforms the recognizable image into an image similar to random noise by changing the pixel positions or values of the image, and only those who obtain the correct key can decrypt the original image. This technology aims to protect image content from being accessed by unauthorized personnel during transmission or storage.

[0003] With the development of technology, lawbreakers have gradually developed attack behaviors such as virus propagation on at least some of the terminals involved in the image transmission process through images, making images become tools for lawbreakers to attack.

[0004] How to ensure the security of the terminals while ensuring the security of the images has become an urgent problem to be solved.

[0005] For example, Publication (Announcement) No.: CN115408665A, Patent Title: "A Patent Title: An Image Encryption Technology Based on Chaotic Theory" (Main Classification Number: G06F21 / 10), generates a Logistic chaotic sequence through a key, and then randomly selects the value of the Logistic chaotic sequence as the initial value of the Henon map to generate a Henon chaotic sequence, ultimately realizing the encryption of the image.

[0006] On the one hand, it can illustrate that the technology applicable to electronic digital data processing has great potential in the related technical field of image encryption; on the other hand, it can also illustrate that there is a relatively broad expansion prospect for technology mining in this field. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The embodiments of this application provide an image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system to solve at least part of the above technical problems.

[0008] The embodiments of this application adopt the following technical solutions: In a first aspect, the embodiments of this application provide an image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system. The method is based on a composite encryption system, and the composite encryption system includes a management terminal, a terminal, and a storage terminal based on the Baker’s Map chaotic system. The method includes: After receiving the resolution of the target image sent by the terminal, the storage end performs atlas processing on the log data in a specified historical period to obtain an original image, and uses the initial state of the original image as the private key; Perform iterative processing on the private key a specified number of times to obtain the public key; Send the reference image and the public key to the terminal, and send the private key to the management end; the reference image is obtained after encrypting the original image; the reference image has the same resolution as the target image; Receive the confused image returned by the management end; the confused image is obtained by the management end decrypting the first encrypted image sent by the terminal based on the private key; the first encrypted image is obtained by the terminal encrypting the confused image based on the public key; the confused image is obtained by the terminal mapping the target image to the reference image according to pixel coordinates for confusion processing; Perform inverse confusion processing on the confused image based on the reference image, and use the obtained image as the target image.

[0009] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the pixels of the original image respectively correspond to hexadecimal values; the method further includes: For each type of character included in each pixel of the original image, determine its distribution in the original image; Among the characters, the one with the farthest distance between the density centers of the distribution is used as the target character; the distance between the density centers of the distribution of the target character is used as the target distance; Use the binary value corresponding to the target character as the private key.

[0010] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes: The specified number of times is positively correlated with the target distance.

[0011] In an optional embodiment of this specification, encrypting the original image includes: Use the MurmurHash algorithm to perform hash calculation on the hexadecimal value corresponding to each pixel of the original image; Map the obtained hash value to the pixel corresponding to it on the original image to obtain the reference image.

[0012] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the confusion processing includes: For each pixel on the target image, perform a specified calculation on the value of the pixel and the value of the pixel with the corresponding coordinate on the reference image to obtain the value of the pixel at the corresponding coordinate on the scrambled image, so as to obtain the scrambled image.

[0013] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes: After receiving the scrambled image, the storage end compares the resolution of the scrambled image with the resolution sent by the terminal received previously. If the two do not match, the scrambled image is not de-scrambled.

[0014] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes: When sending the reference image and the public key to the terminal, a verification image is also sent to the terminal, so that when the terminal generates the first encrypted image, a second encrypted image is also generated based on the verification image; When receiving the scrambled image returned by the management end, the decrypted image obtained by decrypting the second encrypted image by the management end is also received; If the decrypted image matches the verification image, the scrambled image is de-scrambled.

[0015] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes: If the decrypted image does not match the verification image, the management end is marked as high-risk.

[0016] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes: The storage end updates the method adopted for the specified calculation according to a preset update rule, and sends the updated method of the specified calculation to the terminal.

[0017] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes: After the storage end receives the scrambled image returned by the management end, it sequentially reads the values corresponding to the pixels of the scrambled image; If it is detected that the value corresponding to the pixel of the scrambled image is not obtained according to the specified calculation updated most recently, the reading of the scrambled image is stopped, and the terminal is marked as high-risk.

[0018] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an image asymmetric encryption device based on a chaotic system, which is used to implement the method in the first aspect.

[0019] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an electronic device, including: A processor; and A memory arranged to store computer executable instructions which, when executed, cause the processor to perform the method steps described in the first aspect.

[0020] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores one or more programs. When the one or more programs are executed by an electronic device including multiple applications, the electronic device executes the method steps described in the first aspect.

[0021] At least one of the above technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of the present application can achieve the following beneficial effects: The method in the present application realizes image encryption based on Baker's Map chaotic system. The chaotic system realizes encryption of images based on natural laws reflected by nonlinear dynamics, entropy increase principle, initial condition sensitivity, and self-organized criticality, which is conducive to ensuring the security of the image transmission process between ends and avoiding the leakage of image information. In addition, the private key and public key generated by the Baker's Map chaotic system are obtained based on the log data of the storage end. Since the log data is continuously generated, the public key and private key obtained at different times are different, which is conducive to realizing autonomous key update. Moreover, the storage end itself has a certain degree of privacy, and its log data can be considered not to be leaked. In addition, the working status and interactive behavior of the storage end are difficult to predict, which makes the source of the public key and private key have sufficient randomness and security. Further, the method of this specification involves the interaction between three ends. Even if the criminals carry out the attack, under the support of the encryption technology based on the Baker's Map chaotic system, the three ends must be conquered to achieve the attack effect. That is to say, the method in this specification can achieve the protection of the image and the end by increasing the attack cost. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application, constitute a part of the present application, are used to explain the present application, and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings: Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a process of an asymmetric image encryption method based on a chaotic system provided in an embodiment of this specification; Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in an embodiment of this specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0023] The present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the specific embodiments and the accompanying drawings. Similar elements in different embodiments are denoted by related similar element numbers. In the following embodiments, many detailed descriptions are provided to enable a better understanding of the present application. However, those skilled in the art can easily recognize that some of the features can be omitted in different situations, or can be replaced by other elements, materials, or methods. In some cases, some operations related to the present application are not shown or described in the specification to avoid overwhelming the core part of the present application with excessive descriptions. For those skilled in the art, it is not necessary to describe these related operations in detail, and they can be fully understood based on the descriptions in the specification and the general technical knowledge in the art.

[0024] In addition, the features, operations, or characteristics described in the specification can be combined in any suitable manner to form various embodiments. At the same time, the steps or actions in the method description can also be reordered or adjusted in a manner obvious to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the various sequences in the specification and the drawings are only for clearly describing a certain embodiment and do not mean that they are the necessary sequences, unless it is stated that a certain sequence must be followed.

[0025] The numbers assigned to the components herein, such as "first", "second", etc., are only used to distinguish the described objects and do not have any sequential or technical meaning. And the "connection" and "coupling" mentioned in the present application, unless otherwise specified, both include direct and indirect connection (coupling).

[0026] The following will describe in detail the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0027] The method in this specification is based on a composite encryption system, which includes a management end, a terminal, and a storage end based on the Baker’s Map chaotic system. Among them, one-way communication can be carried out between the management end and the terminal, that is, the terminal sends data to the management end. Two-way communication can be carried out between the management end and the storage end. The size of the data packet sent from the terminal to the storage end is limited. For example, the size of the data packet cannot exceed 1Kb. When the storage end receives data sent by the terminal that is larger than this limit, the data packet can be directly discarded. The data packet sent from the storage end to the terminal is not subject to this limit.

[0028] The following takes the storage end as the execution subject to describe the method in this specification. As Figure 1 shown, the image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system in this specification includes the following steps: S100: After receiving the resolution of the target image sent by the terminal, the storage end performs spectral mapping processing on the log data of a specified historical time period to obtain an original image and uses the initial state of the original image as the private key.

[0029] The storage end in this specification is based on the Baker’s Map chaotic system (Baker's chaos system), which is a complex system dominated by nonlinear dynamics. Its behavior seems random but follows certain physical laws. The following are the main natural laws and related theories involved in the chaotic system: 1. Nonlinear dynamics The core of the chaotic system is nonlinear interaction. Its mathematical model contains nonlinear terms, resulting in the inability to predict the system behavior through simple linear superposition. For example, the Lorenz equation describes the chaotic phenomenon in atmospheric convection, and its nonlinear terms make the system extremely sensitive to initial conditions. Poincaré found when studying the three-body problem that a tiny perturbation would cause the orbit to deviate completely from the prediction, which is an early prototype of chaos theory.

[0030] 2. The Second Law of Thermodynamics (entropy increase principle) The evolution of the chaotic system is closely related to energy dissipation and entropy increase: The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy (degree of disorder) of an isolated system increases over time. Energy dissipation in the chaotic system (such as the damping effect) exacerbates this disorder. For example, the foam damping experiment in Web Page 1 shows that the foam layer reduces liquid vibration through energy dissipation, reflecting the laws of energy conservation and dissipation in nonlinear systems.

[0031] 3. Butterfly effect (sensitivity to initial conditions) The iconic feature of the chaotic system is its extreme sensitivity to initial conditions: Edward Lorenz's weather model shows that a tiny difference in the initial value (such as a butterfly flapping its wings) will lead to a huge deviation in the long-term prediction result. Mathematically, the Li-Yorke Theorem strictly defines that "period three implies chaos", revealing the inherent randomness in deterministic systems.

[0032] 4. Fractal geometry and self-similarity The phase space trajectory of the chaotic system often shows a fractal structure with infinite levels of self-similarity: The fractal geometry proposed by Mandelbrot is used to describe the morphology of chaotic attractors (such as the Lorenz attractor), and its complex structure reflects the internal order of the system. Fractal characteristics are widely present in natural phenomena such as fluid turbulence and coastline morphology.

[0033] 5. Phase transition hysteresis and polycrystalline phenomenon The phase transition characteristics of certain physical systems are similar to the state transitions in chaos: for example, the phase transition hysteresis during the melting and solidification of chocolate (the polymorphism of cocoa butter) reflects the thermal sensitivity and path dependence of nonlinear systems. This phenomenon can be analogized to the irreversibility of state switching in chaotic systems.

[0034] 6. Self-organized criticality Complex systems may reach a critical state through nonlinear interactions, triggering a chain reaction: the sandpile model is a typical example, where a small perturbation may trigger an avalanche-like change, similar to the cascade effect in chaotic systems.

[0035] During the daily work process of the storage end, log data will be formed. Some log data occurs under the time management of the crystal oscillator. For example, on xx / xx / xx at 10:29, a communication with the metadata center was carried out, and the result of the communication indicates that the communication with the metadata center is good (recorded as "1", if the communication is interrupted, it is recorded as "0"). Its log data can be recorded as log data A: "xx / xx / xx / 1029 / 1 / 003", where "003" is the code of the metadata center.

[0036] Some events occur randomly. For example, on xx / xx / xx at 16:03, a communication was carried out with the terminal numbered YYY (if the storage end sends data to the terminal, it is recorded as "1", if the terminal sends data to the storage end, it is recorded as "0"), and this communication is not a pre-agreed event. Its log data can be recorded as log data B: "xx / xx / xx / 1603 / 1 / YYY". Of course, only a few digits of the log data can be intercepted as the data used for subsequent generation of the original image, for example, only the last six digits are intercepted, making the log data more concealed.

[0037] The method in this specification is executed on the basis that the state of the storage end is secure and normal, that is, the storage end can normally generate log data and ensure that the log data will not be leaked. Among them, the encoding of the end interacting with it can also be self-coded and / or updated by the storage end according to its rules, and it can also make the encoding have a certain degree of concealment for other ends. In addition, since the original image is obtained from the log data, even in the case of subsequent verification when the original data needs to be restored, there are data conditions.

[0038] Suppose the resolution of the target image (i.e., the image to be encrypted) sent by the terminal is 3×4, containing 12 pixels, that is, 3 columns and 4 rows. Then, for the log data, the first row and first column of the original image obtained by the spectral mapping process is log data A, the first row and second column is log data B, the first row and third column is log data C, the second row and first column is log data D... and so on.

[0039] The resulting original image is unique, which is conducive to ensuring the concealment of the subsequent generated private key. Among them, the specified historical time period can be a historical time period of a specified duration starting from the moment when the resolution sent by the terminal is received, which can be determined according to experience.

[0040] The initial state of the original image is data that can characterize the features of the original image. Simple characters may not be able to convey information, and the images obtained by arranging characters may not be able to convey information either, but they can show certain features. The private key is obtained based on these features.

[0041] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the log data contained in each pixel of the aforementioned image arranged by log data is processed to obtain the hexadecimal value corresponding to this pixel, thereby obtaining the original image (to further improve the concealment of the log data). For each type of character contained in each pixel of the original image, determine its distribution in the original image. Among these characters, the ones with the farthest distance between the density centers of the distribution are used as the target characters, and the distance between the density centers of the distribution of the target characters is used as the target distance. The binary value corresponding to the target character is used as the private key. For example, the target characters are 5 and B. Then the private key is (101, 1011), that is, (x0, y0) in the Baker’sMap chaotic system (as shown in the following formula, the value range of n is [0, k - 1]). Denote taking the integer part of 2x n Rounding; ; Optionally, the specified number of times (k) is positively correlated with the target distance.

[0042] Due to the randomness and non-disclosure of the log data, with appropriate compilation rules, the security of the private key can be ensured. Unless both the storage end (obtaining the log data and the historical time period) and one of the communication links between the terminal and the storage end (obtaining the resolution) are compromised simultaneously, the private key is secure. Obviously, the cost of such an attack is extremely high and the success rate is extremely low. In the following text, another description of the protection method of the private key by the management end is also provided.

[0043] S102: Perform iterative processing on the private key for a specified number of times to obtain the public key.

[0044] S104: Send the reference image and the public key to the terminal, and send the private key to the management end.

[0045] In an actual application scenario, the terminals included in the composite encryption system may not be unique. This specification only takes one of the terminals as an example for illustration.

[0046] The reference image is obtained by encrypting the original image. In related technologies, any technical means capable of encrypting each pixel of an image is applicable to this specification under permitted conditions. In an optional embodiment of this specification, the MurmurHash algorithm can be used to perform a hash calculation on the hexadecimal value corresponding to each pixel of the original image. The obtained hash value is mapped to the corresponding pixel on the original image to obtain the reference image. The reference image obtained in this way can further encrypt the log data.

[0047] The MurmurHash algorithm mainly applies the following natural laws: 1. Multiplication and rotation operations: The core of the MurmurHash algorithm lies in multiplication and rotation operations. The algorithm multiplies the input data by a constant through multiple multiplication operations, and then performs a right rotation operation on the result to mix the data and generate a hash value.

[0048] 2. Random distribution characteristics: The MurmurHash algorithm pays particular attention to maintaining good random distribution characteristics when facing keys with strong regularity. This enables the algorithm to generate relatively random hash values when processing inputs with obvious patterns, thereby reducing the possibility of hash collisions.

[0049] 3. Low collision rate and high confusion characteristics: Through its unique multiplication and rotation operations, the MurmurHash algorithm can significantly reduce the incidence of hash collisions while maintaining high confusion characteristics. This enables the algorithm to maintain high efficiency and accuracy when processing large amounts of data.

[0050] The reference image in this specification has the same resolution as the target image.

[0051] Other hash algorithms are also applicable to this specification under permitted conditions.

[0052] So far, the main communication process between the storage end and the terminal in the method of this specification has been introduced (subsequent updates will be introduced separately). It can be seen that the data packets sent by the terminal to the storage end in this specification are very limited, and the size of the data packets that can be transmitted will not exceed 1 kb. It is almost impossible to launch an attack on the storage end with such a small amount of data. Even if the terminal is an illegal terminal, it cannot directly launch an attack on the storage end.

[0053] S106: Receive the obfuscated image returned by the management end.

[0054] The obfuscated image in this specification is obtained by the management end decrypting the first encrypted image sent by the terminal based on the private key. The first encrypted image is obtained by the terminal encrypting the obfuscated image based on the public key. The obfuscated image is obtained by the terminal mapping the target image to the reference image according to the pixel coordinates for obfuscation processing.

[0055] This manual introduces the management end. Assuming that the criminals launch an attack on the management end and obtain the private key, the decryption of the first encrypted image will only result in an obfuscated image. The obfuscated image is the product of the obfuscation process and cannot reflect the effective information of the target image, which can ensure the security of the target image. In other words, the terminal is an illegal terminal and spreads viruses through images. Since the decryption process is performed by the management end, the virus will also attack the management end instead of the storage end, which can improve the security of the storage end.

[0056] In an optional embodiment of the present specification, for each pixel on the target image, a specified calculation is performed on the value of the pixel and the value of the pixel corresponding to the coordinate on the reference image to obtain the value of the pixel at the corresponding coordinate on the obfuscated image, so as to obtain the obfuscated image. Specified calculation refers to a calculation that can be backtracked (for example, calculations such as rounding are not within the scope of specified calculations), such as addition, multiplication, etc. The algorithms in the related art that can be backtracked are applicable to the present specification when conditions permit. Even if the specified calculation can be backtracked, if the reference image is unknown, even if the management end is attacked, the target image cannot be obtained by backtracking. In other words, the probability of success for criminals to simultaneously capture the management end and the terminal is very low.

[0057] The algorithm of the specified calculation is pre-stored locally in the terminal. In an optional embodiment of the present specification, the storage end can verify the security of the terminal by updating the specified calculation. In this embodiment, the storage end updates the method used by the specified calculation according to the preset update rules, and sends the updated specified calculation method to the terminal. After the storage end receives the obfuscated image returned by the management end, it reads the values corresponding to the pixels of the obfuscated image one by one. If it is detected that the value corresponding to the pixel of the obfuscated image is not obtained according to the specified calculation after the most recent update (for example, if the specified calculation is a sum, it is impossible for the value of a pixel in the obfuscated image to be less than the value of the corresponding pixel on the reference image), the reading of the obfuscated image is stopped and the terminal is marked as high risk. This technical means of reading and checking each pixel one by one can effectively avoid attacks initiated through images and prevent the storage end from being attacked.

[0058] Before performing the verification based on the specified calculation, in an optional embodiment of the present specification, after receiving the obfuscated image, the resolution of the obfuscated image can be compared with the resolution sent by the terminal previously received, and if the two do not match, the obfuscated image is not deobfuscated. This verification is more efficient and convenient.

[0059] S108: Performing a deobfuscation process on the obfuscated image based on the reference image, and using the obtained image as the target image.

[0060] At this point, the target image is sent to the storage end, which not only realizes the encrypted transmission of the image, but also can be combined with other ends in the composite system to jointly defend against attack behaviors and share the prevention and control pressure on the storage end.

[0061] The method in the present application realizes image encryption based on Baker's Map chaotic system. The chaotic system realizes encryption of images based on natural laws reflected by nonlinear dynamics, entropy increase principle, initial condition sensitivity, and self-organized criticality, which is conducive to ensuring the security of the image transmission process between ends and avoiding the leakage of image information. In addition, the private key and public key generated by the Baker's Map chaotic system are obtained based on the log data of the storage end. Since the log data is continuously generated, the public key and private key obtained at different times are different, which is conducive to realizing autonomous key update. Moreover, the storage end itself has a certain degree of privacy, and its log data can be considered not to be leaked. In addition, the working status and interactive behavior of the storage end are difficult to predict, which makes the source of the public key and private key have sufficient randomness and security. Further, the method of this specification involves the interaction between three ends. Even if the criminals carry out the attack, under the support of the encryption technology based on the Baker's Map chaotic system, the three ends must be conquered to achieve the attack effect. That is to say, the method in this specification can achieve the protection of the image and the end by increasing the attack cost.

[0062] In an optional embodiment of the present specification, in order to further increase the attack cost of criminals, while sending the reference image and the public key to the terminal, a verification image (which can be a random image filled with pixels with simple values such as 0 and 1. It can also be the storage address of an existing public image, such as a certain website, and the terminal can obtain the verification image by itself according to this website) is also sent to the terminal, so that when the terminal generates the first encrypted image, it also generates a second encrypted image based on the verification image (the second encrypted image is not obfuscated, but needs to be encrypted using the public key). Optionally, the resolution of the verification image is different from that of the target image.

[0063] After that, while receiving the obfuscated image returned by the management end, the storage end also receives the decrypted image obtained by the management end decrypting the second encrypted image (the storage end can identify which is the decrypted image through the resolution). If the decrypted image matches the verification image (matching means the same), the obfuscated image is de-obfuscated. In this embodiment, if a malicious actor compromises the management end, since the malicious actor cannot know which of the first encrypted image and the second encrypted image corresponds to the target image, their attack behavior will target both the obfuscated image and the decrypted image. Since the storage end knows in advance what the verification image is, the matching verification based on the verification image and the decrypted image can be achieved by limited reading of the decrypted image. For example, only the values of a few scattered pixels on it are read. If it is detected that the decrypted image has been attacked (the pixel values do not match), then the obfuscated image must also have been attacked. This can prevent the attack behavior from spreading to the storage end and can also disperse the attack behavior to reduce losses. If the decrypted image does not match the verification image, the management end is marked as high risk.

[0064] In a further optional embodiment of this specification, to further strengthen the protection of the storage end, image files received from the terminal are directly stored in a sandbox, and the sandbox performs data reading on the image files to implement de-obfuscation and verification. In this way, even if the virus carried in the image file is activated during the de-obfuscation process, virus isolation can be achieved to a certain extent.

[0065] Figure 2 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. Please refer to Figure 2 , at the hardware level, the electronic device includes a processor, and optionally also includes an internal bus, a network interface, and a memory. Among them, the memory may include internal memory, such as high-speed random access memory (Random-Access Memory, RAM), and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk memory, etc. Of course, the electronic device may also include other hardware required for other services.

[0066] The processor, network interface, and memory can be interconnected through the internal bus, and the internal bus can be an ISA (Industry Standard Architecture) bus, a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus, or an EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) bus, etc. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For the convenience of representation,Figure 2 is represented by only one bidirectional arrow, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0067] A memory for storing programs. Specifically, the program may include program codes, and the program codes include computer operation instructions. The memory may include a memory and a non-volatile memory, and provide instructions and data to the processor.

[0068] The processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into the memory and then runs it, forming an image asymmetric encryption device based on a chaotic system at the logical level. The processor executes the program stored in the memory and is specifically used to execute any one of the aforementioned image asymmetric encryption methods based on a chaotic system.

[0069] The above as in this application Figure 1 An image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system disclosed in the embodiments shown can be applied to a processor or implemented by a processor. The processor may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, each step of the above method can be completed by the integrated logic circuit in the hardware of the processor or by instructions in software form. The above processor may be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), etc.; it may also be a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components. It can implement or execute each method, step, and logic block diagram disclosed in the embodiments of this application. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may also be any conventional processor, etc. The steps of the method disclosed in combination with the embodiments of this application can be directly embodied as being executed by a hardware decoding processor or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module may be located in a mature storage medium in the art such as a random access memory, a flash memory, a read-only memory, a programmable read-only memory, or an electrically erasable programmable memory, a register, etc. This storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and combines its hardware to complete the steps of the above method.

[0070] The electronic device can also execute Figure 1 an image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system in Figure 1The functions of the embodiments shown are not elaborated herein for the embodiments of the present application.

[0071] The embodiments of the present application also propose a computer-readable storage medium that stores one or more programs. The one or more programs include instructions that, when executed by an electronic device including multiple application programs, perform any of the foregoing image asymmetric encryption methods based on a chaotic system.

[0072] Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present application can be provided as a method, a system, or a computer program product. Therefore, the present application can take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Moreover, the present application can take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) that contain computer-usable program code.

[0073] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each flow and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of flows and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to the processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing devices to generate a machine, such that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing devices generate means for implementing the specified functions in Figure 1 one process or multiple processes and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0074] These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory generate a manufactured article including instruction means that implement the specified functions in Figure 1 one process or multiple processes and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0075] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, such that a series of operation steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to generate a computer-implemented process, so that the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device provide steps for implementing the specified functions in Figure 1 one process or multiple processes and / or blocks Figure 1 one block or multiple blocks.

[0076] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0077] Memory may include non-permanent storage in a computer-readable medium, in the form of random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

[0078] Computer readable media include permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can be implemented by any method or technology to store information. Information can be computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer readable media does not include temporary computer readable media (transitory media), such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0079] It should also be noted that the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, commodity or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, commodity or device. In the absence of more restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, commodity or device including the elements.

[0080] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes.

[0081] The above are only embodiments of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, various changes and modifications can be made to the present application. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included within the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. An image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system, characterized in that, The method is based on a composite encryption system, which includes a management end, a terminal, and a storage end based on the Baker’s Map chaotic system. The method includes: After receiving the resolution of the target image sent by the terminal, the storage end performs spectral mapping on the log data for a specified historical period to obtain an original image, and uses the initial state of the original image as the private key; Performing iterative processing on the private key for a specified number of times to obtain the public key; Sending the reference image and the public key to the terminal, and sending the private key to the management end; the reference image is obtained after encrypting the original image; the reference image has the same resolution as the target image; Receiving the confused image returned by the management end; the confused image is obtained by the management end decrypting the first encrypted image sent by the terminal based on the private key; the first encrypted image is obtained by the terminal encrypting the confused image based on the public key; the confused image is obtained by the terminal mapping the target image to the reference image according to pixel coordinates for confusion processing; Performing inverse confusion processing on the confused image based on the reference image, and using the obtained image as the target image.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The pixels of the original image respectively correspond to hexadecimal values; the method further includes: For each type of character included in each pixel of the original image, determining its distribution in the original image; Taking the character with the farthest distance between the density centers of its distribution among the characters as the target character; taking the distance between the density centers of the distribution of the target character as the target distance; Taking the binary value corresponding to the target character as the private key.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein The method further includes: The specified number of times is positively correlated with the target distance.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein The encryption processing of the original image includes: Using the MurmurHash algorithm to perform hash calculation on the hexadecimal value corresponding to each pixel of the original image; Mapping the obtained hash value to the corresponding pixel on the original image to obtain the reference image.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein The confusion processing includes: For each pixel on the target image, performing a specified calculation on the value of the pixel and the value of the pixel with the corresponding coordinate on the reference image to obtain the value of the pixel at the corresponding coordinate on the confused image, so as to obtain the confused image.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein The method further includes: After receiving the confused image, the storage end compares the resolution of the confused image with the resolution previously received from the terminal. If the two do not match, the storage end does not perform inverse confusion processing on the confused image.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein The method further includes: When sending the reference image and the public key to the terminal, also sending a verification image to the terminal, so that when the terminal generates the first encrypted image, it also generates a second encrypted image based on the verification image; When receiving the confused image returned by the management end, also receiving the decrypted image obtained by the management end decrypting the second encrypted image; If the decrypted image matches the verification image, perform inverse obfuscation processing on the obfuscated image.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein The method further includes: If the decrypted image does not match the verification image, mark the management end as high risk.

9. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The method further includes: The storage end updates the manner adopted by the specified calculation according to a preset update rule, and sends the updated manner of the specified calculation to the terminal.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein The method further includes: After the storage end receives the obfuscated image returned by the management end, successively read the values corresponding to the pixels of the obfuscated image; If it is detected that the values corresponding to the pixels of the obfuscated image are not obtained according to the specified calculation after the most recent update, stop reading the obfuscated image and mark the terminal as high risk.

Images