An image asymmetric encryption method based on chaotic system

Abstract

The present application discloses an asymmetric encryption method for images based on a chaotic system, which implements image encryption based on the Baker's Map chaotic system. The chaotic system implements image encryption based on the natural laws embodied by nonlinear dynamics, entropy increase principle, initial condition sensitivity, and self-organized criticality, which is conducive to ensuring the security of the image transmission process between ends and can avoid the leakage of image information. In addition, the private key and public key generated by the Baker's Map chaotic system are obtained based on the log data of the storage end. Since the log data is continuously generated, the public key and private key obtained at different times are different, which is conducive to the realization of autonomous key update. Moreover, the storage end itself has a certain degree of privacy, and its log data can be considered to be non-leakage. In addition, the working conditions and interactive behaviors of the storage end are difficult to predict, which makes the sources of the public key and private key sufficiently random and secure.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of electronic digital data processing technology, and in particular to a method of digital computing or data processing specifically suitable for specific applications, specifically an asymmetric image encryption method based on a chaotic system. Background Art

[0002] Image encryption is primarily used to protect image content during transmission or storage, preventing unauthorized access. Image encryption transforms a recognizable image into something resembling random noise by altering the pixel positions or values. Only those with the correct key can decrypt the original image. This technology aims to prevent unauthorized access to image content during transmission or storage.

[0003] With the development of technology, criminals have gradually developed methods to use images to attack at least some of the ends involved in the image transmission process, such as spreading viruses, which makes images an attack tool for criminals.

[0004] How to ensure the security of the end while ensuring the security of the image has become an urgent problem to be solved.

[0005] For example, the publication (announcement) number is CN115408665A, and the patent title is: "Patent title: An image encryption technology based on chaos theory" (main classification number: G06F21 / 10). A Logistic chaotic sequence is generated by a key, and then a Henon chaotic sequence is generated by randomly selecting the value of the Logistic chaotic sequence as the initial value of the Henon map, thereby finally achieving encryption of the image.

[0006] On the one hand, it can be shown that the technology applicable to electronic digital data processing has great potential in the field of image encryption related technologies; on the other hand, it can also be shown that the technology exploration in this field still has relatively broad expansion prospects. Summary of the Invention

[0007] An embodiment of the present application provides an image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system to at least partially solve the above technical problems.

[0008] The embodiments of this application adopt the following technical solutions:

[0009] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an asymmetric image encryption method based on a chaotic system. The method is based on a composite encryption system, which includes a management terminal, a terminal, and a storage terminal based on a Baker's Map chaotic system. The method includes:

[0010] After receiving the resolution of the target image sent by the terminal, the storage end performs graph processing on the log data of the specified historical time period to obtain the original image, and uses the initial state of the original image as the private key;

[0011] Iterate the private key a specified number of times to obtain a public key;

[0012] Sending a reference image and the public key to the terminal, and sending the private key to the management end; the reference image is obtained by encrypting the original image; the reference image has the same resolution as the target image;

[0013] receiving an obfuscated image returned by the management terminal; the obfuscated image is obtained by the management terminal decrypting the first encrypted image sent by the terminal based on the private key; the first encrypted image is obtained by the terminal encrypting the obfuscated image based on the public key; the obfuscated image is obtained by the terminal mapping the target image onto the reference image according to pixel coordinates to perform obfuscation processing;

[0014] The obfuscated image is subjected to deobfuscation processing based on the reference image, and the obtained image is used as the target image.

[0015] In an optional embodiment of the present specification, the pixels of the original image correspond to hexadecimal values ​​respectively; and the method further includes:

[0016] For each character contained in each pixel of the original image, determining its distribution in the original image;

[0017] The character with the farthest distance between its distribution density centers is used as the target character; the distance between the distribution density centers of the target characters is used as the target distance;

[0018] The binary value corresponding to the target character is used as the private key.

[0019] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes:

[0020] The specified number of times is positively correlated with the target distance.

[0021] In an optional embodiment of the present specification, encrypting the original image includes:

[0022] Using the MurmurHash algorithm, a hash calculation is performed on the hexadecimal value corresponding to each pixel of the original image;

[0023] The obtained hash value is mapped to the corresponding pixel on the original image to obtain the reference image.

[0024] In an optional embodiment of this specification, performing obfuscation processing includes:

[0025] For each pixel on the target image, a specified calculation is performed on the pixel value and the pixel value of the corresponding coordinate on the reference image to obtain the pixel value of the corresponding coordinate on the obfuscated image, so as to obtain the obfuscated image.

[0026] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes:

[0027] After receiving the obfuscated image, the storage end compares the resolution of the obfuscated image with the resolution of the image sent by the terminal previously received. If the resolutions do not match, the storage end does not perform deobfuscation processing on the obfuscated image.

[0028] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes:

[0029] sending the reference image and the public key to the terminal and also sending the verification image to the terminal, so that when the terminal generates the first encrypted image, it also generates the second encrypted image based on the verification image;

[0030] When receiving the obfuscated image returned by the management end, also receiving a decrypted image obtained by the management end decrypting the second encrypted image;

[0031] If the decrypted image matches the verification image, deobfuscation processing is performed on the obfuscated image.

[0032] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes:

[0033] If the decrypted image does not match the verification image, the management terminal is marked as high risk.

[0034] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes:

[0035] The storage end updates the method adopted by the specified calculation according to a preset update rule, and sends the updated specified calculation method to the terminal.

[0036] In an optional embodiment of this specification, the method further includes:

[0037] After receiving the obfuscated image returned by the management end, the storage end reads values ​​corresponding to pixels of the obfuscated image one by one;

[0038] If it is detected that the values ​​corresponding to the pixels of the obfuscated image are not obtained by calculation according to the designation after the most recent update, the reading of the obfuscated image is stopped and the terminal is marked as high risk.

[0039] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an image asymmetric encryption device based on a chaotic system, which is used to implement the method in the first aspect.

[0040] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an electronic device, including:

[0041] processor; and

[0042] A memory arranged to store computer executable instructions which, when executed, cause the processor to perform the method steps of the first aspect.

[0043] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores one or more programs. When the one or more programs are executed by an electronic device including multiple applications, the electronic device executes the method steps described in the first aspect.

[0044] At least one of the above technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of the present application can achieve the following beneficial effects:

[0045] The method disclosed in this application implements image encryption based on a Baker's Map chaotic system. This chaotic system, based on the natural laws of nonlinear dynamics, entropy increase, initial condition sensitivity, and self-organized criticality, achieves image encryption, helping to ensure the security of image transmission between terminals and preventing the leakage of image information. Furthermore, the private and public keys generated by the Baker's Map chaotic system are based on the log data of the storage terminal. Since the log data is continuously generated, the public and private keys obtained at different times are different, which facilitates autonomous key updates. Furthermore, the storage terminal itself has a certain degree of privacy, and its log data can be considered to be non-leakable. Furthermore, the working conditions and interactive behaviors of the storage terminal are difficult to predict, which ensures that the sources of the public and private keys are sufficiently random and secure. Furthermore, the method disclosed in this specification involves interaction between three terminals. Therefore, even if an attacker launches an attack, with the support of encryption technology based on the Baker's Map chaotic system, they must conquer all three terminals to achieve the attack effect. In other words, the method disclosed in this specification can achieve image and terminal protection by increasing the cost of the attack. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0046] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The present application is used to explain the present application and does not constitute an improper limitation of the present application. In the drawings:

[0047] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a process of an asymmetric image encryption method based on a chaotic system provided in an embodiment of this specification;

[0048] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in an embodiment of this specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The present invention will be further described in detail below by means of specific embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Similar elements in different embodiments are numbered with associated similar elements. In the following embodiments, many detailed descriptions are provided to enable the present application to be better understood. However, those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that some of the features may be omitted in different circumstances, or may be replaced by other elements, materials, or methods. In some cases, some operations related to the present application are not shown or described in the specification. This is to avoid the core portion of the present application being overwhelmed by excessive descriptions. For those skilled in the art, it is not necessary to describe these related operations in detail, and the related operations can be fully understood based on the description in the specification and the general technical knowledge in the art.

[0050] In addition, the features, operations, or characteristics described in the specification may be combined in any appropriate manner to form various embodiments. Furthermore, the steps or actions in the method description may be reordered or adjusted in a manner readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the various sequences in the specification and drawings are provided solely for the purpose of clearly describing a particular embodiment and are not intended to be mandatory, unless otherwise specified.

[0051] The serial numbers assigned to components herein, such as "first," "second," etc., are used solely to distinguish the objects being described and do not convey any sequential or technical meaning. References to "connection" and "coupling" herein, unless otherwise specified, include both direct and indirect connections (couplings).

[0052] The following describes in detail the technical solutions provided by various embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0053] The method described in this specification is based on a composite encryption system, which includes a management end, a terminal, and a storage end based on a Baker's Map chaotic system. Among them, one-way communication is possible between the management end and the terminal, that is, data is sent from the terminal to the management end. Two-way communication is possible between the management end and the storage end. The size of the data packet sent by the terminal to the storage end is limited. For example, the size of the data packet cannot exceed 1Kb. When the storage end receives data sent by the terminal that is larger than this limit, it can directly discard the data packet. Data packets sent by the storage end to the terminal are not subject to this limit.

[0054] The following describes the method in this manual with the storage end as the execution subject. Figure 1 As shown, the image asymmetric encryption method based on chaotic system in this specification includes the following steps:

[0055] S100: After receiving the resolution of the target image sent by the terminal, the storage end performs graph processing on the log data of the specified historical time period to obtain the original image and uses the initial state of the original image as a private key.

[0056] The storage end described in this manual is based on the Baker's Map chaotic system. This is a complex system dominated by nonlinear dynamics, whose behavior appears random but obeys certain physical laws. The following are the main natural laws and related theories involved in chaotic systems:

[0057] 1. Nonlinear dynamics

[0058] The core of chaotic systems lies in nonlinear interactions. Their mathematical models contain nonlinear terms, making their behavior impossible to predict through simple linear superposition. For example, the Lorentz equations, which describe chaotic phenomena in atmospheric convection, contain nonlinear terms that make the system extremely sensitive to initial conditions. While studying the three-body problem, Poincaré discovered that even small perturbations could cause orbits to deviate completely from predictions, a finding that marked an early prototype of chaos theory.

[0059] 2. The Second Law of Thermodynamics (Principle of Entropy Increase)

[0060] The evolution of chaotic systems is closely related to energy dissipation and entropy growth: the second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy (disorder) of an isolated system increases over time. Energy dissipation in chaotic systems (such as the damping effect) exacerbates this disorder. For example, the foam damping experiment shown in webpage 1 shows that the foam layer reduces liquid vibrations through energy dissipation, demonstrating the laws of energy conservation and dissipation in nonlinear systems.

[0061] 3. Butterfly Effect (Sensitivity to Initial Conditions)

[0062] A hallmark of chaotic systems is their extreme sensitivity to initial conditions: Edward Lorenz's weather model demonstrated that small differences in initial values ​​(like the flapping of a butterfly's wings) can lead to large deviations from long-term forecasts. Mathematically, the Li-Yorke Theorem rigorously defines "period three implies chaos," revealing the inherent randomness of deterministic systems.

[0063] 4. Fractal geometry and self-similarity

[0064] The phase space trajectory of chaotic systems often exhibits fractal structures, characterized by infinite levels of self-similarity. Mandelbrot's fractal geometry is used to describe the morphology of chaotic attractors (such as the Lorenz attractor), whose complex structure reflects the inherent order of the system. Fractal properties are also widely found in natural phenomena such as fluid turbulence and coastline morphology.

[0065] 5. Phase transition hysteresis and polymorphism

[0066] The phase transitions of some physical systems are similar to the state transitions in chaos. For example, the hysteresis in the phase transitions between chocolate melting and solidification (the homogeneous polymorphism of cocoa butter) reflects the thermal sensitivity and path dependence of nonlinear systems. This phenomenon can be compared to the irreversibility of state transitions in chaotic systems.

[0067] 6. Self-Organized Criticality

[0068] Complex systems may reach a critical state through nonlinear interactions, triggering chain reactions: the sandpile model is a typical example, where small disturbances may trigger avalanche-like changes, similar to the cascade effect in chaotic systems.

[0069] Log data is generated during the daily operation of the storage end. Some log data is generated under the time management of the crystal oscillator. For example, a communication with the metadata center was conducted at 10:29 on xx / xx / xx. The communication result indicates that the communication with the metadata center is good (recorded as "1"; if the communication is interrupted, it is recorded as "0"). This log data can be recorded as log data A: "xx / xx / xx / 1029 / 1 / 003", where "003" is the metadata center code.

[0070] Some events occur randomly. For example, at 4:03 PM on xx / xx / xx, a communication occurred with terminal number YYY (data sent from the storage device to the terminal is recorded as "1," and data sent from the terminal to the storage device is recorded as "0"). This communication is not a scheduled event. The log data for this event can be recorded as log data B: "xx / xx / xx / 1603 / 1 / YYY." Alternatively, only certain bits of the log data can be captured for subsequent raw image generation, for example, only the last six digits, making the log data more concealed.

[0071] The method described in this specification is executed on the premise that the state of the storage end is safe and normal, that is, the storage end can generate log data normally and ensure that the log data will not be leaked. Among them, the encoding of the end interacting with it can also be assigned and / or updated by the storage end according to its own rules, which can also make the encoding have a certain degree of concealment from other ends. In addition, because the original image is obtained from the log data, even if the original data needs to be restored in the event of subsequent verification, the data conditions are met.

[0072] Assume that the target image sent by the terminal (i.e., the image to be encrypted) has a resolution of 3×4 and contains 12 pixels, that is, 3 columns and 4 rows. Then, the first column and first row of the original image obtained by the graph processing of the log data is log data A, the second column and first row is log data B, the third column and first row is log data C, the first column and second row is log data D... and so on.

[0073] The resulting original image is unique, which helps ensure the confidentiality of the subsequently generated private key. The specified historical time period can be a historical time period of a specified duration, starting from the moment the resolution signal sent by the terminal is received. This can be determined based on experience.

[0074] The original state of the original image is data that can represent the characteristics of the original image. Simple characters may not convey information, and neither may an image formed by character arrangements. However, they can demonstrate certain characteristics. The private key is derived based on these characteristics.

[0075] In an optional embodiment of the present specification, the log data contained in each pixel of the aforementioned image arranged by log data is processed to obtain the hexadecimal value corresponding to the pixel, and the original image is obtained (to further improve the concealment of the log data). For each character contained in each pixel of the original image, its distribution in the original image is determined. Among the characters, the character with the farthest distance between the distribution density centers is used as the target character, and the distance between the distribution density centers of the target characters is used as the target distance. The binary value corresponding to the target character is used as the private key. For example, the target characters are 5 and B. Then the private key is (101, 1011), which is (x0, y0) in the Baker's Map chaotic system (as shown in the following formula, the value range of n is [0, k-1]). Indicates 2x n Rounding;

[0076] ;

[0077] Optionally, the specified number (k) is positively correlated with the target distance.

[0078] Due to the randomness and non-disclosure nature of log data, the security of private keys can be guaranteed by properly implementing rules. Unless both the storage device (obtaining log data and historical time periods) and the terminal or the communication link between the terminal and the storage device (obtaining resolution) are compromised, the private key remains secure. This attack is obviously very costly and has a very low success rate. The following section further explains how the management side protects private keys.

[0079] S102: Performing iterative processing on the private key for a specified number of times to obtain a public key.

[0080] S104: Send the reference image and the public key to the terminal, and send the private key to the management end.

[0081] In actual application scenarios, the terminals included in the composite encryption system may not be unique, and this specification only takes one of the terminals as an example for explanation.

[0082] The reference image is obtained by encrypting the original image. Any related technical means capable of encrypting each pixel of an image are applicable to this specification, as conditions permit. In an optional embodiment of this specification, a MurmurHash algorithm can be used to perform a hash calculation on the hexadecimal value corresponding to each pixel of the original image. The resulting hash value is mapped to the corresponding pixel on the original image to obtain the reference image. The reference image thus obtained can further encrypt the log data.

[0083] The MurmurHash algorithm mainly applies the following natural laws:

[0084] 1. Multiplication and rotation operations: The core of the MurmurHash algorithm lies in multiplication and rotation operations. The algorithm multiplies the input data by a constant through multiple multiplication operations, and then performs a right rotation operation on the result to mix the data and generate a hash value.

[0085] 2. Random distribution properties: The MurmurHash algorithm places special emphasis on maintaining good random distribution properties when dealing with keys with strong regularity. This allows the algorithm to generate relatively random hash values ​​when processing inputs with obvious regularity, thereby reducing the possibility of hash collisions.

[0086] 3. Low collision rate and high obfuscation characteristics: The MurmurHash algorithm, through its unique multiplication and rotation operations, can significantly reduce the occurrence rate of hash collisions while maintaining high obfuscation characteristics. This enables the algorithm to maintain high efficiency and accuracy when processing large amounts of data.

[0087] The reference image in this specification has the same resolution as the target image.

[0088] Other hash algorithms are also applicable to this specification when conditions permit.

[0089] This concludes the main communication process between the storage device and the terminal in the method described in this manual (subsequent updates will be discussed separately). Clearly, the data packets sent from the terminal to the storage device in this manual are very limited, with the maximum size of a transmitted packet never exceeding 1 kilobyte. Attacking the storage device with such a data volume is virtually impossible. Even if the terminal is an illegal one, it cannot directly attack the storage device.

[0090] S106: Receive the obfuscated image returned by the management terminal.

[0091] The obfuscated image in this specification is obtained by the management end decrypting the first encrypted image sent by the terminal using the private key. The first encrypted image is obtained by the terminal encrypting the obfuscated image using the public key. The obfuscated image is obtained by the terminal mapping the target image onto the reference image according to pixel coordinates to perform obfuscation processing.

[0092] This manual introduces the management terminal. If a criminal attacks the management terminal and obtains the private key, decrypting the first encrypted image will only yield an obfuscated image. The obfuscated image is a product of the obfuscation process and cannot reflect the valid information of the target image, thus ensuring the security of the target image. Alternatively, if the terminal is an illegal terminal and uses the image to spread a virus, since the decryption process is performed by the management terminal, the virus will attack the management terminal instead of the storage terminal, thus improving the security of the storage terminal.

[0093] In an optional embodiment of the present specification, for each pixel on the target image, a specified calculation is performed on the value of the pixel and the value of the pixel corresponding to the coordinate on the reference image to obtain the value of the pixel at the corresponding coordinate on the obfuscated image, so as to obtain the obfuscated image. Specified calculation refers to a calculation that can be backtracked (for example, calculations such as rounding are not within the scope of specified calculations), such as addition, multiplication, etc. The algorithms in the related art that can implement backtracking are applicable to this specification when conditions permit. Even if the specified calculation can be backtracked, if the reference image is unknown, even if the management end is attacked, the target image cannot be obtained by backtracking. In other words, the probability of success for criminals to simultaneously attack the management end and the terminal is very low.

[0094] The algorithm for the specified calculation is pre-stored locally on the terminal. In an optional embodiment of this specification, the storage end can verify the security of the terminal by updating the specified calculation. In this embodiment, the storage end updates the method used for the specified calculation according to a preset update rule and sends the updated specified calculation method to the terminal. After receiving the obfuscated image returned by the management end, the storage end reads the values ​​corresponding to the pixels of the obfuscated image one by one. If it is detected that the values ​​corresponding to the pixels of the obfuscated image are not obtained according to the specified calculation after the most recent update (for example, if the specified calculation is a sum, it is impossible for the value of a pixel in the obfuscated image to be less than the value of the corresponding pixel in the reference image), the reading of the obfuscated image is stopped and the terminal is marked as high risk. This technical approach of reading and verifying each pixel one by one can effectively avoid attacks launched through images and prevent the storage end from being attacked.

[0095] Before performing the verification based on the specified calculation, in an optional embodiment of this specification, after receiving the obfuscated image, the resolution of the obfuscated image can be compared with the resolution previously received from the terminal. If the resolution does not match, the obfuscated image is not deobfuscated. This verification method is more efficient and convenient.

[0096] S108: Performing deobfuscation processing on the obfuscated image based on the reference image, and using the obtained image as the target image.

[0097] At this point, the target image is sent to the storage end, which not only realizes the encrypted transmission of the image, but also can combine with other ends in the composite system to jointly defend against attack behaviors and share the prevention and control pressure on the storage end.

[0098] The method disclosed in this application implements image encryption based on a Baker's Map chaotic system. This chaotic system, based on the natural laws of nonlinear dynamics, entropy increase, initial condition sensitivity, and self-organized criticality, achieves image encryption, helping to ensure the security of image transmission between terminals and preventing the leakage of image information. Furthermore, the private and public keys generated by the Baker's Map chaotic system are based on the log data of the storage terminal. Since the log data is continuously generated, the public and private keys obtained at different times are different, which facilitates autonomous key updates. Furthermore, the storage terminal itself has a certain degree of privacy, and its log data can be considered to be non-leakable. Furthermore, the working conditions and interactive behaviors of the storage terminal are difficult to predict, which ensures that the sources of the public and private keys are sufficiently random and secure. Furthermore, the method disclosed in this specification involves interaction between three terminals. Therefore, even if an attacker launches an attack, with the support of encryption technology based on the Baker's Map chaotic system, they must conquer all three terminals to achieve the attack effect. In other words, the method disclosed in this specification can achieve image and terminal protection by increasing the cost of the attack.

[0099] In an optional embodiment of this specification, to further increase the cost of attack for criminals, a verification image (which can be a random image filled with pixels containing simple values ​​such as 0 and 1, or the storage address of an existing public image, such as a website, from which the terminal can obtain the verification image) is sent to the terminal at the same time as the reference image and the public key are sent to the terminal. This allows the terminal to generate a second encrypted image based on the verification image when generating the first encrypted image (the second encrypted image is not obfuscated, but requires encryption using the public key). Optionally, the verification image and the target image have different resolutions.

[0100] Subsequently, the storage terminal receives the obfuscated image returned by the management terminal and also receives the decrypted image obtained by the management terminal by decrypting the second encrypted image (the storage terminal can identify the decrypted image by resolution). If the decrypted image matches the verification image (identical means matching), the obfuscated image is deobfuscated. In this embodiment, if a criminal compromises the management terminal, since they cannot determine which of the first and second encrypted images corresponds to the target image, their attack will target both the obfuscated and decrypted images. Since the storage terminal knows the verification image in advance, verification based on the matching between the verification image and the decrypted image can be achieved by limited reading of the decrypted image, for example, by reading only the values ​​of a few scattered pixels. If the decrypted image is detected to have been attacked (pixel values ​​do not match), then the obfuscated image is also attacked. This prevents the attack from spreading to the storage terminal, disperses the attack, and reduces losses. If the decrypted image does not match the verification image, the management terminal is marked as high risk.

[0101] In a further optional embodiment of this specification, to further enhance protection of the storage end, image files received from the terminal are directly stored in a sandbox, which then reads the image file data for deobfuscation and verification. This way, even if the deobfuscation process activates a virus carried in the image file, a certain degree of virus isolation can be achieved.

[0102] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application. Figure 2 At the hardware level, the electronic device includes a processor and, optionally, an internal bus, a network interface, and memory. The memory may include internal memory, such as high-speed random-access memory (RAM), or non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk drive. Of course, the electronic device may also include other hardware required for its services.

[0103] The processor, network interface, and memory can be interconnected via an internal bus, which can be an ISA (Industry Standard Architecture) bus, a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus, or an EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) bus. The bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, and the like. For ease of representation, Figure 2 Only one bidirectional arrow is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0104] The memory is used to store programs. Specifically, the program may include program code, which includes computer operating instructions. The memory may include internal memory and non-volatile memory, and provides instructions and data to the processor.

[0105] The processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into the internal memory and then runs it, forming a chaotic system-based asymmetric image encryption device at the logical level. The processor executes the program stored in the memory and is specifically configured to perform any of the aforementioned chaotic system-based asymmetric image encryption methods.

[0106] The above application Figure 1 The chaotic system-based asymmetric image encryption method disclosed in the illustrated embodiment can be applied to or implemented by a processor. The processor may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, the steps of the above method can be performed by hardware integrated logic circuits in the processor or by software instructions. The above processor can be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), etc.; it can also be a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. The methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this application can be implemented or executed. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of this application can be directly executed by a hardware decoding processor or by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module can be located in a storage medium well-known in the art, such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, etc. The storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above method.

[0107] The electronic device may also perform Figure 1 An image asymmetric encryption method based on chaotic system is implemented Figure 1The functions of the illustrated embodiment will not be described in detail in the embodiments of the present application.

[0108] An embodiment of the present application also proposes a computer-readable storage medium, which stores one or more programs, and the one or more programs include instructions. When the instructions are executed by an electronic device including multiple applications, any one of the aforementioned chaotic system-based image asymmetric encryption methods is executed.

[0109] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0110] The present application is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0111] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0112] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operational steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device for implementing the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0113] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPUs), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0114] Memory may include non-permanent storage in a computer-readable medium, in the form of random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of a computer-readable medium.

[0115] Computer-readable media includes both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media that can be implemented using any method or technology to store information. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change RAM (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transmission media that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transitory computer-readable media such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0116] It should also be noted that the terms "comprises," "includes," or any other variations thereof are intended to encompass non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, commodity, or apparatus that includes a series of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not explicitly listed, or includes elements inherent to such process, method, commodity, or apparatus. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprises a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, commodity, or apparatus that includes the element.

[0117] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0118] The foregoing is merely an embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application may have various changes and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present application should be included within the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. An image asymmetric encryption method based on a chaotic system, characterized in that: The method is based on a composite encryption system, which includes a management terminal, a terminal, and a storage terminal based on a Baker's Map chaotic system. The method includes: After receiving the resolution of the target image sent by the terminal, the storage end performs graph processing on the log data of the specified historical time period to obtain the original image, and uses the initial state of the original image as the private key; the log data is generated by the storage end; Iterate the private key a specified number of times to obtain a public key; Sending a reference image and the public key to the terminal, and sending the private key to the management end; the reference image is obtained by encrypting the original image; the reference image has the same resolution as the target image; receiving an obfuscated image returned by the management terminal; the obfuscated image is obtained by the management terminal decrypting the first encrypted image sent by the terminal based on the private key; the first encrypted image is obtained by the terminal encrypting the obfuscated image based on the public key; the obfuscated image is obtained by the terminal mapping the target image onto the reference image according to pixel coordinates to perform obfuscation processing; The obfuscated image is subjected to deobfuscation processing based on the reference image, and the obtained image is used as the target image.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The pixels of the original image correspond to hexadecimal values ​​respectively; the method further comprises: For each character contained in each pixel of the original image, determining its distribution in the original image; The character with the farthest distance between its distribution density centers is used as the target character; the distance between the distribution density centers of the target characters is used as the target distance; The binary value corresponding to the target character is used as the private key.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The method further comprises: The specified number of times is positively correlated with the target distance.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The encryption process is performed on the original image, comprising: Using the MurmurHash algorithm, a hash calculation is performed on the hexadecimal value corresponding to each pixel of the original image; The obtained hash value is mapped to the corresponding pixel on the original image to obtain the reference image.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Obfuscation includes: For each pixel on the target image, a specified calculation is performed on the pixel value and the pixel value of the corresponding coordinate on the reference image to obtain the pixel value of the corresponding coordinate on the obfuscated image, so as to obtain the obfuscated image.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method further comprises: After receiving the obfuscated image, the storage end compares the resolution of the obfuscated image with the resolution of the image sent by the terminal previously received. If the resolutions do not match, the storage end does not perform deobfuscation processing on the obfuscated image.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method further comprises: sending the reference image and the public key to the terminal and also sending the verification image to the terminal, so that when the terminal generates the first encrypted image, it also generates the second encrypted image based on the verification image; When receiving the obfuscated image returned by the management end, the management end also receives the pending image obtained by decrypting the second encrypted image; If the pending image matches the verification image, deobfuscation processing is performed on the obfuscated image.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein: The method further comprises: If the pending image does not match the verification image, the management terminal is marked as high risk.

9. The method according to claim 5, wherein: The method further comprises: The storage end updates the method adopted by the specified calculation according to a preset update rule, and sends the updated specified calculation method to the terminal.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein: The method further comprises: After receiving the obfuscated image returned by the management end, the storage end reads values ​​corresponding to pixels of the obfuscated image one by one; If it is detected that the value corresponding to the pixel of the obfuscated image is not calculated according to the specified calculation after the most recent update, the reading of the obfuscated image is stopped and the terminal is marked as high risk.

Images