A method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar

Abstract

The present invention provides a method for assessing the electromagnetic environment impact of artificial obstacles on air traffic control radars. This method belongs to the technical field of electromagnetic environment impact assessment for air traffic control radars at military and civil airports, and addresses the problem that existing assessment methods only analyze a certain performance indicator of the air traffic control radar, failing to systematically and comprehensively assess the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar. The method includes an information collection step, a protective spacing determination step, a shielding angle determination step, a signal interference determination step, and an optimization determination step. The present invention more comprehensively, comprehensively, and accurately assesses whether the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar meets safe operation requirements, and provides optimization suggestions for artificial obstacle design schemes that do not meet the requirements, thereby improving the feasibility of the design schemes.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of electromagnetic environment impact assessment of air traffic control radars at military and civil airports, and in particular to a method for assessing the electromagnetic environment impact of artificial obstacles on air traffic control radars at military and civil airports. Background Art

[0002] Air traffic control radars at military and civil airports are flight surveillance devices used in aviation. They monitor aircraft's position and status in real time, playing a vital role in ensuring flight safety. With my country's rapid economic development and accelerated modernization, the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars is increasingly affected by man-made obstacles, seriously impacting their safe operation and, in turn, threatening aircraft flight safety. Given the importance of the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars at military and civil airports, it is crucial to conduct research and assess their impact.

[0003] Air traffic control radars transmit messages wirelessly via electromagnetic radiation. Their detection range is limited by line-of-sight, transmit power, and terrain. Large man-made obstacles, in particular, reflect and block radio signals, directly impacting the radar's airspace coverage. Currently, there is limited literature in China on the impact of man-made obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars at military and civil airports. Pan Hao et al. conducted electromagnetic environment analysis by calculating the radar's safe protection zone and distance, while Xu Chao et al. analyzed active interference to assess the electromagnetic environment for safe operation. Literature indicates that limited research is currently underway on electromagnetic environmental impact assessment for air traffic control radars. While some technical guidance is sporadically provided in the standards, detailed indicators are lacking and the scope of the research is limited. Consequently, a systematic and comprehensive approach to electromagnetic environmental impact assessment for air traffic control radars is lacking.

[0004] Considering the limitations of the above research, there has been no systematic and comprehensive assessment of the electromagnetic environment impact of air traffic control radars. Therefore, it is impossible to rigorously and accurately assess whether the electromagnetic environment impact of artificial obstacles on air traffic control radars meets the requirements for safe operation. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, which solves the problem that existing evaluation methods only analyze a certain performance indicator of the air traffic control radar and cannot achieve a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for assessing the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, comprising the following steps:

[0007] Information collection step: collecting basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information and artificial obstacle information;

[0008] A protection distance determination step is used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar protection distance requirements; if so, a shielding angle determination step is performed; if not, an optimization determination step is performed;

[0009] The shielding angle determination step determines whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar shielding angle limit requirements; if so, the signal interference determination step is executed; if not, the optimization determination step is executed;

[0010] A signal interference judgment step is performed to judge whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the air traffic control radar safe operation requirements; if so, the evaluation is terminated and the evaluation result of whether the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar is output; if not, the optimization judgment step is performed;

[0011] The optimization judgment step determines whether the artificial obstacle design scheme can be optimized. If so, the artificial obstacle design scheme is optimized and the process returns to the information collection step. If not, the electromagnetic environment impact assessment is terminated and an assessment result is output indicating that the artificial obstacle design scheme does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0012] Furthermore, the basic information of the military and civil airports includes airport runways, flight procedure plans, minimum surveillance and guidance altitudes, surrounding air routes, and regional control area information; the air traffic control radar information includes the geographical location of the air traffic control radar, antenna altitude, equipment model, and antenna parameters; and the artificial obstacle information includes the design plan for the geographical location, elevation, and type of the artificial obstacles to be evaluated.

[0013] Furthermore, the protective distance determination step specifically includes:

[0014] Calculation of the maximum allowable interference voltage at the input of the air traffic control radar receiver:

[0015]

[0016] in, is the maximum allowable interference voltage effective value, in μV; C is the incremental coefficient relative to the maximum allowable interference voltage of white noise; is the effective value of the system noise voltage equivalent to the receiver input, in μV, and is 0.85 μV for 300 MHz to 3000 MHz;

[0017] Calculation of the maximum permissible interference field strength of air traffic control radar to high-voltage overhead transmission lines, substations, railways, highways, and industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment:

[0018]

[0019] in, is the maximum permissible interference field strength, in dBμV / m; The maximum allowable interference voltage effective value, the unit is dBμV; is the operating frequency, in MHz; is the antenna gain, in dB; is the receiver input impedance, in Ω; represents the logarithmic function with base 10; It is the difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength, in dB; is the antenna feed system loss, in dB;

[0020] Then the protection distance between different types of artificial obstacles and air traffic control radar is calculated;

[0021] Calculation of interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and high-voltage overhead transmission lines and substations:

[0022]

[0023] Calculation of air traffic control radar interference protection distance to railways:

[0024]

[0025] Calculation of the protection distance between air traffic control radar and highway interference:

[0026]

[0027] Calculation of the interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and high-frequency heat sealing machine:

[0028]

[0029] Calculation of the interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and ultra-high frequency therapy machine:

[0030]

[0031] Calculation of the protection distance between air traffic control radar and high frequency furnace interference:

[0032]

[0033] in, is the radio interference field strength, in units of ; is the protection distance, in km; is the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver, in kHz; is the maximum permissible interference field strength, in dBμV / m; is the rated power of the high-frequency furnace, in kW;

[0034] Compare the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar with the calculated protection distance value; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is not less than the calculated protection distance value, execute the shielding angle judgment step; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is less than the calculated protection distance value, execute the optimization judgment step.

[0035] Furthermore, the shielding angle determination step specifically includes:

[0036] Based on the collected artificial obstacle information and air traffic control radar information, the vertical and horizontal obstruction angles of the artificial obstacle to the air traffic control radar are calculated. The algorithm is as follows:

[0037] Vertical shielding angle calculation:

[0038]

[0039] in, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0040] If the calculated vertical obstruction angle is greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the vertical obstruction angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated vertical obstruction angle is not greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the vertical obstruction angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0041] Calculation of horizontal shielding angle:

[0042]

[0043] Where W is the horizontal width of the artificial obstacle, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0044] If the calculated horizontal obstruction angle is greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar horizontal obstruction angle limit requirements; if the calculated horizontal obstruction angle is not greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar horizontal obstruction angle limit requirements;

[0045] The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the vertical and horizontal obstruction angle limits of the air traffic control radar;

[0046] If at least one of the calculated vertical shielding angle and horizontal shielding angle meets the requirements, the signal interference judgment step is executed; if both the vertical shielding angle and the horizontal shielding angle do not meet the requirements, the optimization judgment step is executed.

[0047] Furthermore, the signal interference determination step specifically includes:

[0048] Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal quality of the air traffic control radar is evaluated using the Fresnel zone calculation model and the line-of-sight obstruction calculation model.

[0049] Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal strength of the air traffic control radar is evaluated by superimposing the signal coverage obtained by simulation with the airport flight procedure plan, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, surrounding airways, and regional control areas.

[0050] If the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the requirements for safe operation of the air traffic control radar, the evaluation is terminated and the output shows that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar cannot meet the requirements for safe operation of the air traffic control radar, the optimization judgment step is executed.

[0051] Furthermore, the signal quality assessment method includes a Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation model, specifically as follows:

[0052] Calculation of Fresnel zone radius of air traffic control radar:

[0053]

[0054] in, is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the receiving end, in km; is the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, in km; is the propagation speed of electromagnetic waves, in km / s; is the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar, in MHz;

[0055] Calculation of the theoretical altitude of the signal above the artificial obstacle:

[0056]

[0057] in, is the altitude of the transmitting antenna of the air traffic control radar, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m;

[0058] Further calculation of the air traffic control radar Fresnel zone limit height:

[0059]

[0060] Compare the artificial obstacle elevation data with the calculated Fresnel zone limit height of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is less than the artificial obstacle elevation, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is not less than the artificial obstacle elevation, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0061] The line-of-sight obstruction calculation model is as follows:

[0062] Calculation of vertical shielding angle of artificial obstacles:

[0063]

[0064] in, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0065] Further calculation of the corrected shielding angle:

[0066]

[0067] in, To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the vertical shielding angle of artificial obstacles, in degrees; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0068] Air traffic control radar line-of-sight coverage calculation:

[0069]

[0070] in, The air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance, in km; To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m;

[0071] Compare the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver with the calculated air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance. If the calculated limit distance is smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement. If the calculated limit distance is not smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement.

[0072] The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0073] If it is assessed that the artificial obstacle meets both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is assessed that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0074] Furthermore, the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end must be included in the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation models of the air traffic control radar. and the receiving end elevation Information is a known condition. At present, there is no research on the distance between air traffic control radar and receiving end in China. and the receiving end elevation Make clear requirements on the specific indicators of the air traffic control radar and the receiving end; and the receiving end elevation As one of the key and difficult processes in the evaluation model, the scientific acquisition method is analyzed as follows:

[0075] Air traffic control radar is mainly used to provide surveillance data information services to controllers within the airport approach control area, while also taking into account the surveillance services of the air routes and routes around the airport and the regional control area; based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of air traffic control radar, the corresponding parameter acquisition methods for different application scenarios are studied, including analysis based on flight procedure plans, analysis based on minimum surveillance guidance altitude, analysis based on air routes and routes around the airport, and analysis based on regional control areas.

[0076] Furthermore, the analysis based on the flight procedure plan is as follows:

[0077] The flight procedure is one of the main reference bases for aircraft in the approach and departure phases. It is mainly composed of several lines representing the flight path, key points and procedure altitude representing the flight altitude, including traditional departure procedure, traditional approach procedure, traditional approach and missed approach procedure, PBN departure procedure, PBN approach procedure and PBN approach and missed approach procedure. In most cases, the aircraft will fly along the flight procedure plan; the positions of the key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional approach procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN approach procedures and PBN approach and missed approach procedures involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. ; At the same time, the program height corresponding to each key point is used as the analysis height of the air traffic control radar receiving end .

[0078] Furthermore, the analysis based on the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude is as follows:

[0079] The minimum surveillance guidance altitude usually includes several sectors with different altitude restrictions. Under radar guidance, the controller and the crew use the minimum surveillance guidance altitude to interactively check and monitor whether the aircraft's flight altitude is higher than the minimum restricted altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector; the boundary line of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle is used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest limit altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

[0080] Furthermore, the analysis based on the air routes around the airport is as follows:

[0081] There are usually air routes in the air around the airport. Air routes are mainly composed of several lines representing the flight path, waypoints and the lowest safe altitude representing the lowest flight altitude. Aircraft will fly along the air routes at high altitudes. All air routes and waypoints involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacles are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the minimum safety altitude corresponding to each route is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

[0082] Furthermore, the analysis based on the regional control zone is as follows:

[0083] The regional control area usually contains several sectors with different height restrictions, and the coverage area is relatively large. The sector boundary lines of each regional control area involved in the direction of the connection between the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest restricted altitude of each regional control area sector is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

[0084] Furthermore, the signal strength evaluation method specifically includes:

[0085] Based on the design scheme of the air traffic control radar's geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model and antenna parameters, as well as the geographical location, elevation and type of artificial obstacles, the radar signal is simulated using internationally recognized electromagnetic simulation tools to obtain the radar electromagnetic signal coverage range. Currently, there are no specific evaluation requirements for the comprehensive analysis of radar signal coverage range and air traffic control radar signal strength in China. Based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of air traffic control radar, it is studied whether the signal strength meets the safe operation requirements in different application scenarios, including the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and flight procedure plan, the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and airway routes around the airport, and the superposition analysis of signal coverage range and regional control area.

[0086] If, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle simultaneously meets the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength meets the safety operation requirements; if, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0087] Furthermore, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage and the flight procedure plan is as follows:

[0088] According to the procedure altitudes corresponding to different key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. Then the signal coverage range map is superimposed with all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport. Signal coverage analysis is performed on all key points of each flight procedure to determine whether each key point is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the flight procedure operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the flight procedure operation requirements.

[0089] Furthermore, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the minimum surveillance guidance altitude is as follows:

[0090] According to the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. Then the signal coverage range map is superimposed with all sectors of the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, and the signal coverage analysis is performed on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it means that the signal strength meets the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude operation requirements.

[0091] Furthermore, the signal coverage and the air routes around the airport are analyzed as follows:

[0092] Based on the minimum safe altitude corresponding to the airways around the airport, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. The signal coverage range map is then superimposed with all the airways around the airport, and a signal coverage analysis is performed on the location of each airway to determine whether each airway is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the operation requirements of the airways around the airport; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the operation requirements of the airways around the airport.

[0093] Furthermore, the superposition analysis of the signal coverage and the regional control area is as follows:

[0094] Based on the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the regional control area, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. The signal coverage range map is then superimposed with all sectors of the regional control area, and a signal coverage analysis is performed on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the regional control area operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the regional control area operation requirements.

[0095] Furthermore, the optimization judgment step specifically includes:

[0096] The air traffic control radar protection distance, shielding angle, and signal interference assessment model are used to calculate the limit values ​​that meet safety requirements. These values ​​are then fed back to the designer to determine whether they are reasonable and feasible, and whether the proposed artificial obstacle design can be modified, such as reducing the construction height or relocating the site.

[0097] If yes, after the designer provides a new design plan, return to the information collection step to evaluate the new design plan; if no, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the assessment result that the artificial obstacle design plan does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0098] In a second aspect, the present invention further provides a device for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, comprising:

[0099] Information collection module, used to collect basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information and artificial obstacle information;

[0100] The protection distance judgment module is used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar protection distance requirements; if so, the shielding angle judgment module is executed; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0101] The shielding angle judgment module is used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar shielding angle limit requirements; if so, the signal interference judgment module is executed; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0102] The signal interference judgment module is used to determine whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the air traffic control radar's safe operation requirements. If so, the evaluation is terminated and the evaluation result of whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar's electromagnetic environment requirements is output; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0103] The optimization judgment module is used to determine whether the artificial obstacle design scheme can be optimized; if so, the artificial obstacle design scheme is optimized and returned to the information collection module; if not, the electromagnetic environment impact assessment is terminated and the assessment result that the artificial obstacle design scheme does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar is output.

[0104] In a third aspect, the present invention further provides an electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program running on the processor, and the electronic device is characterized in that the processor implements the steps of the above method when executing the computer program.

[0105] The present invention provides a method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars. The method evaluates the impact of artificial obstacles on air traffic control radars from multiple angles, and more comprehensively, comprehensively, and accurately evaluates whether the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radars meets the requirements for safe operation. It also provides optimization suggestions for artificial obstacle design schemes that do not meet the requirements, thereby improving the feasibility of the design schemes.

[0106] Correspondingly, an embodiment of the present invention provides an apparatus and electronic device for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, which also has the above-mentioned technical effects. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0107] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the specific embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0108] Figure 1 This is a workflow diagram of a method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar provided in Example 1 of the present invention;

[0109] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of horizontal shielding of an air traffic control radar by a proposed artificial obstacle according to the method provided in the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0110] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding analysis based on the minimum monitoring and guidance altitude according to the method provided in the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0111] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the signal coverage range corresponding to an altitude of 3600m according to the method provided in the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0112] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of superimposed analysis of the sector with the minimum monitoring and guidance altitude of 3600m and the signal coverage range according to the method provided in the second embodiment of the present invention;

[0113] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the structure of an evaluation device provided in Embodiment 3 of the present invention;

[0114] Figure 7 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device provided in Example 4 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0115] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more clear, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. All other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field based on the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0116] The terms "including," "having," and any variations thereof, as used in the embodiments of the present invention are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus comprising a series of steps or units is not limited to the listed steps or units, but may optionally include other steps or units not listed, or may optionally include other steps or units inherent to the process, method, product, or apparatus.

[0117] Example 1:

[0118] like Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, including the following steps:

[0119] S101: Information collection step, collecting basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information and artificial obstacle information;

[0120] S102: A protection distance determination step is performed to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar protection distance requirement; if so, step S103 is executed; if not, step S105 is executed;

[0121] S103: Shielding angle determination step, determining whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar shielding angle limit requirements; if so, executing step S104; if not, executing step S105;

[0122] S104: Signal interference determination step, determining whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal quality and signal strength meets the air traffic control radar's safe operation requirements; if so, the assessment is terminated and an assessment result is output indicating whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar's electromagnetic environment requirements; if not, executing step S105;

[0123] S105: Optimization judgment step, judging whether the artificial obstacle design scheme can be optimized; if so, the artificial obstacle design scheme is optimized and the process returns to step S101; if not, the electromagnetic environment impact assessment is terminated and an assessment result is output indicating that the artificial obstacle design scheme does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0124] Evaluate the impact of artificial obstacles on air traffic control radar from multiple angles, and more comprehensively and accurately assess whether the electromagnetic environment of the air traffic control radar meets the requirements for safe operation. Optimize the design schemes of artificial obstacles that do not meet the requirements and improve the feasibility of the design schemes.

[0125] In one possible implementation, basic information on military and civil airports includes airport runways, flight procedure plans, minimum surveillance and guidance altitudes, surrounding air routes, and regional control area information; air traffic control radar information includes the geographical location of the air traffic control radar, antenna altitude, equipment model, and antenna parameters; and artificial obstacle information includes the geographical location, elevation, and type design plan of the artificial obstacle to be evaluated; the above information is collected to complete subsequent evaluation work.

[0126] In a possible implementation manner, the step S102 specifically includes:

[0127] Calculation of the maximum allowable interference voltage at the input of the air traffic control radar receiver:

[0128]

[0129] in, is the maximum allowable interference voltage effective value, in μV; C is the incremental coefficient relative to the maximum allowable interference voltage of white noise, the value is shown in Table 1; is the effective value of the system noise voltage equivalent to the receiver input, in μV, and is 0.85 μV for 300 MHz to 3000 MHz;

[0130] Table 1 Incremental coefficients corresponding to different types of interference

[0131]

[0132] Calculation of the maximum permissible interference field strength of air traffic control radar to high-voltage overhead transmission lines, substations, railways, highways, and industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment:

[0133]

[0134] in, is the maximum permissible interference field strength, in dBμV / m; The maximum allowable interference voltage effective value, the unit is dBμV; is the operating frequency, in MHz; is the antenna gain, in dB; is the receiver input impedance, in Ω; represents the logarithmic function with base 10; The difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength, in dB, is shown in Table 2; is the antenna feed system loss, in dB;

[0135] Table 2 Difference between quasi-peak field strength and peak field strength

[0136]

[0137] Then the protection distance between different types of artificial obstacles and air traffic control radar is calculated;

[0138] Calculation of interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and high-voltage overhead transmission lines and substations:

[0139]

[0140] Calculation of air traffic control radar interference protection distance to railways:

[0141]

[0142] Calculation of the protection distance between air traffic control radar and highway interference:

[0143]

[0144] Calculation of the interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and high-frequency heat sealing machine:

[0145]

[0146] Calculation of the interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and ultra-high frequency therapy machine:

[0147]

[0148] Calculation of the protection distance between air traffic control radar and high frequency furnace interference:

[0149]

[0150] in, is the radio interference field strength, in units of ; is the protection distance, in km; is the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver, in kHz; is the maximum permissible interference field strength, in dBμV / m; is the rated power of the high-frequency furnace, in kW;

[0151] Compare the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar with the calculated protection distance value; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is not less than the calculated protection distance value, execute step S103; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is less than the calculated protection distance value, execute step S105.

[0152] In a possible implementation manner, the step S103 specifically includes:

[0153] Based on the collected artificial obstacle information and air traffic control radar information, calculate the vertical and horizontal obstruction angles of the artificial obstacle to the air traffic control radar:

[0154] Vertical shielding angle calculation:

[0155]

[0156] in, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0157] If the calculated vertical obstruction angle is greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the vertical obstruction angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated vertical obstruction angle is not greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the vertical obstruction angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0158] Calculation of horizontal shielding angle:

[0159]

[0160] Where W is the horizontal width of the artificial obstacle, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0161] If the calculated horizontal obstruction angle is greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar horizontal obstruction angle limit requirements; if the calculated horizontal obstruction angle is not greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar horizontal obstruction angle limit requirements;

[0162] The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the vertical and horizontal obstruction angle limits of the air traffic control radar;

[0163] If at least one of the calculated vertical shielding angle and the calculated horizontal shielding angle meets the requirements, step S104 is executed; if both the vertical shielding angle and the calculated horizontal shielding angle do not meet the requirements, step S105 is executed.

[0164] In a possible implementation manner, the step S104 specifically includes:

[0165] Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal quality of the air traffic control radar is evaluated using the Fresnel zone calculation model and the line-of-sight obstruction calculation model.

[0166] Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal strength of the air traffic control radar is evaluated by superimposing the signal coverage obtained by simulation with the airport flight procedure plan, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, surrounding airways, and regional control areas.

[0167] If the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the requirements for safe operation of the air traffic control radar, the evaluation is terminated and the output is output that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar cannot meet the requirements for safe operation of the air traffic control radar, step S105 is executed.

[0168] Based on the relevant survey data, the air traffic control radar signal quality and signal strength are analyzed and calculated to evaluate the impact of artificial obstacles on the air traffic control radar.

[0169] In one possible implementation, the signal quality assessment method includes a Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation model, specifically as follows:

[0170] Calculation of Fresnel zone radius of air traffic control radar:

[0171]

[0172] in, is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the receiving end, in km; is the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, in km; is the propagation speed of electromagnetic waves, in km / s; is the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar, in MHz;

[0173] Calculation of the theoretical altitude of the signal above the artificial obstacle:

[0174]

[0175] in, is the altitude of the transmitting antenna of the air traffic control radar, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m;

[0176] Further calculation of the air traffic control radar Fresnel zone limit height:

[0177]

[0178] Compare the artificial obstacle elevation data with the calculated Fresnel zone limit height of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is less than the artificial obstacle elevation, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is not less than the artificial obstacle elevation, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0179] The line-of-sight obstruction calculation model is as follows:

[0180] Calculation of vertical shielding angle of artificial obstacles:

[0181]

[0182] in, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0183] Further calculation of the corrected shielding angle:

[0184]

[0185] in, To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the vertical shielding angle of artificial obstacles, in degrees; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km;

[0186] Air traffic control radar line-of-sight coverage calculation:

[0187]

[0188] in, The air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance, in km; To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m;

[0189] Compare the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver with the calculated air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance. If the calculated limit distance is smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement. If the calculated limit distance is not smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement.

[0190] The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction requirements of the air traffic control radar;

[0191] If it is assessed that the artificial obstacle meets both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is assessed that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0192] In a possible implementation, the air traffic control radar Fresnel zone and the line-of-sight shielding calculation model must both include the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end. and the receiving end elevation Information is a known condition. At present, there is no research on the distance between air traffic control radar and receiving end in China. and the receiving end elevation Make clear requirements on the specific indicators of the air traffic control radar and the receiving end; and the receiving end elevation As one of the key and difficult processes in the evaluation model, the scientific acquisition method is analyzed as follows:

[0193] Air traffic control radar is primarily used to provide surveillance data and information services to controllers within the airport approach control area. It also provides surveillance services for air routes and regional control areas surrounding the airport. Based on an analysis of the actual use and operational characteristics of air traffic control radar, this study studies the corresponding parameter acquisition methods for different application scenarios, including analysis based on flight procedures, analysis based on minimum surveillance guidance altitudes, analysis based on air routes and routes surrounding the airport, and analysis based on regional control areas.

[0194] Analysis based on the flight procedure plan: The flight procedure is one of the main references for aircraft in the approach and departure phases. It is mainly composed of several lines representing the flight path, key points and procedure altitude representing the flight altitude, including traditional departure procedure, traditional approach procedure, traditional approach and missed approach procedure, PBN departure procedure, PBN approach procedure and PBN approach and missed approach procedure. In most cases, the aircraft will fly along the flight procedure plan; all flight procedures of the airport are drawn with the help of AutoCAD; the positions of the key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional approach procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN approach procedures and PBN approach and missed approach procedures involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. ; At the same time, the program height corresponding to each key point is used as the analysis height of the air traffic control radar receiving end .

[0195] Analysis based on the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude: The minimum surveillance and guidance altitude usually includes several sectors with different altitude restrictions. Under radar guidance, the controller and the crew use the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude to interactively check and monitor whether the aircraft's flight altitude is higher than the minimum restricted altitude of each minimum surveillance and guidance altitude sector; the airport minimum surveillance and guidance altitude is drawn with the help of AutoCAD; the boundary lines of each minimum surveillance and guidance altitude sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest limit altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

[0196] Analysis based on airways around airports: There are usually airways around airports. Airways are mainly composed of several lines representing flight paths, waypoints and the lowest safe altitude representing the lowest flight altitude. Aircraft will fly along the airways at high altitudes. Use AutoCAD to draw airways around airports. Take all airways and waypoints involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and artificial obstacles as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then get the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end. At the same time, the minimum safety altitude corresponding to each route is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

[0197] Analysis based on regional control zones: Regional control zones usually contain several sectors with different height restrictions, and their coverage is relatively large. Use AutoCAD to draw regional control zones. Use the boundary lines of each regional control zone sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then obtain the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end. At the same time, the lowest restricted altitude of each regional control area sector is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

[0198] In a possible implementation, the signal strength evaluation method specifically includes:

[0199] Based on the design plan of the air traffic control radar's geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model and antenna parameters, as well as the geographical location, elevation, and type of artificial obstacles, the radar's electromagnetic signal coverage was determined using software with electromagnetic wave propagation simulation and analysis capabilities, specifically EMACS. Then, based on an analysis of the actual use and operational characteristics of the air traffic control radar, the authors studied whether the signal strength met safe operational requirements under different application scenarios. This included overlay analysis of signal coverage with flight procedures, signal coverage with minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, signal coverage with air routes around the airport, and signal coverage with regional control zones.

[0200] Overlay analysis of signal coverage and flight procedure plans: Based on the procedure altitudes corresponding to different key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, the radar signal coverage under different altitude scenarios is simulated; with the help of AutoCAD, the traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport are drawn; then the signal coverage map is overlaid with all flight procedures at the airport, and signal coverage analysis is performed on all key points of each flight procedure to determine whether each key point is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it means that the signal strength meets the flight procedure operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the flight procedure operation requirements;

[0201] Overlay analysis of signal coverage and minimum surveillance altitude: Based on the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the minimum surveillance altitude, simulate and obtain radar signal coverage under different altitude scenarios. Use AutoCAD to draw the airport minimum surveillance altitude. Then, overlay the signal coverage map with all sectors of the minimum surveillance altitude and perform signal coverage analysis on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the minimum surveillance altitude operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the minimum surveillance altitude operation requirements.

[0202] Overlay analysis of signal coverage and airways around the airport: Based on the minimum safe altitude corresponding to the airways around the airport, simulate and obtain the radar signal coverage under different altitude scenarios; use AutoCAD to draw the airways around the airport; then overlay the signal coverage map with all airways around the airport, and perform signal coverage analysis on the location of each airway to determine whether each airway is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it means that the signal strength meets the operation requirements of the airways around the airport; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the operation requirements of the airways around the airport;

[0203] Overlay analysis of signal coverage and regional control areas: Based on the minimum restricted altitudes corresponding to different sectors of the regional control area, simulate and obtain radar signal coverage under different altitude scenarios. Use AutoCAD to draw the regional control area. Then, overlay the signal coverage map with all sectors of the regional control area and perform signal coverage analysis on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the regional control area operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the regional control area operation requirements.

[0204] If, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle simultaneously meets the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength meets the safety operation requirements; if, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength does not meet the safety operation requirements.

[0205] In a possible implementation manner, the step S105 specifically includes:

[0206] The air traffic control radar protection distance, shielding angle, and signal interference assessment model are used to calculate the limit values ​​that meet safety requirements. These values ​​are then fed back to the designer to determine whether they are reasonable and feasible, and whether the proposed artificial obstacle design can be modified, such as reducing the construction height or relocating the site.

[0207] If so, after the designer provides a new design plan, return to step S101 to evaluate the new design plan; if not, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the assessment result that the artificial obstacle design plan does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

[0208] Example 2:

[0209] By combining query data with actual sampling, basic information of a certain airport and related air traffic control radars was collected.

[0210] By querying the construction project design plan, basic information about the artificial obstacles to be evaluated can be obtained.

[0211] Table 3 Relative position relationship between proposed artificial obstacles and air traffic control radar

[0212]

[0213] The following parameters of the ATC radar and substation were obtained through reference and field research: the ATC radar antenna is 35m above sea level; the ATC radar operating frequency is 1030MHz; the antenna gain is 2. 3dB; receiver input impedance is 50Ω; the difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength -14dB; antenna feed system loss 1dB; receiver equivalent noise bandwidth is 15MHz; the increment coefficient C relative to the maximum allowable interference voltage of white noise is 3; the substation level is 220kV, corresponding to the radio interference field strength limit The data is 53dBμV / m. Substitute this data into the calculation model to calculate the protective distance between the substation and the air traffic control radar.

[0214] Maximum permissible interference voltage at the input of air traffic control radar receiver ;

[0215] Maximum permissible interference field strength of air traffic control radar to substation ;

[0216] Air traffic control radar interference protection distance to substation .

[0217] After analysis, the closest distance of the proposed artificial obstacle to the air traffic control radar is 2660m, which is greater than the protection distance limit. Therefore, the proposed artificial obstacle meets the protection distance requirements of the air traffic control radar, and further shielding angle assessment is needed.

[0218] Calculate the vertical shielding angle based on the shortest distance between the project boundary point and the air traffic control radar:

[0219]

[0220] Based on the collected data, draw a horizontal shielding diagram of the proposed project to the air traffic control radar, such as Figure 2 As shown, Figure 2 Where A is the air traffic control radar and B is the proposed project. The horizontal width of the proposed project relative to the air traffic control radar is 150m. The horizontal shielding angle is further calculated as follows:

[0221]

[0222] After analysis, the horizontal shielding angle of the proposed artificial obstacle exceeds the limit requirements, while the vertical shielding angle meets the limit requirements. Comprehensive assessment shows that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar shielding angle requirements, and further signal interference assessment is needed.

[0223] Signal interference assessment includes signal quality assessment and signal strength assessment. First, the air traffic control radar signal quality is evaluated and analyzed.

[0224] With the help of AutoCAD, the flight procedures, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, air routes around the airport, and regional control areas involved in the connection direction between the air traffic control radar and the proposed project were drawn. Figure 3 It is the minimum surveillance guidance altitude chart, Figure 3 Sector 01 is the 900m altitude sector, sector 02 is the 2100m altitude sector, sector 07 is the 3000m altitude sector, and sector 08 is the 3600m altitude sector. Taking the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude as an example, we analyze the altitude of the receiving end corresponding to each sector and its distance from the air traffic control radar. Then, we substitute this data into the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction calculation model. The results are as follows:

[0225] Table 4 Fresnel zone calculation results based on the minimum monitoring and guidance altitude

[0226]

[0227] Table 5 Calculation results of sight obstruction based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude

[0228]

[0229] After analysis, it was found that the artificial obstacles met the restriction requirements for the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction of the air traffic control radar based on the minimum surveillance guidance altitude; similarly, the data extracted based on the flight procedures, air routes around the airport, and regional control areas were analyzed and imported into the calculation model. A comprehensive assessment showed that the artificial obstacles met the air traffic control radar signal quality requirements, and it was necessary to continue signal strength evaluation.

[0230] Based on the design scheme of the ATC radar’s geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model and antenna parameters, as well as the geographical location, elevation and type of artificial obstacles, the radar signal is simulated using the EMACS simulation tool to obtain the coverage of the radar electromagnetic signal at different receiving altitudes. Figure 4 The following is a signal coverage map at an altitude of 3600m. The red area indicates the signal coverage area.

[0231] Next, we use AutoCAD to draw all the flight procedures, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, air routes around the airport, and regional control areas of the airport. Then we overlay the signal coverage maps at different receiving altitudes with the corresponding flight procedures, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, air routes around the airport, and regional control areas for analysis. Figure 5 The air traffic control radar signal strength is evaluated by taking the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude 3600m sector and the signal coverage map as an example. Figure 5 Zhong 08 is the 3600m altitude sector, and the evaluation result shows that the signal strength requirements are met. Similarly, other altitude sectors and flight procedures, air routes around the airport, and regional control areas are superimposed and analyzed with the signal coverage range maps at different receiving altitudes. A comprehensive evaluation shows that artificial obstacles meet the air traffic control radar signal strength requirements.

[0232] Finally, the evaluation is completed and the evaluation results are output to show whether the proposed artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar of the airport to be evaluated.

[0233] Example 3:

[0234] like Figure 6 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a device for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, comprising:

[0235] Information collection module 1 is used to collect basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information and artificial obstacle information;

[0236] The protection distance judgment module 2 is used to judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar protection distance requirement; if so, the shielding angle judgment module is executed; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0237] The shielding angle judgment module 3 is used to judge whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar shielding angle limit requirements; if so, the signal interference judgment module is executed; if not, the optimization judgment module is executed;

[0238] Signal interference judgment module 4 is used to judge whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the air traffic control radar safe operation requirements; if so, it ends the evaluation and outputs the evaluation result of whether the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if not, it executes the optimization judgment module;

[0239] The optimization judgment module 5 is used to determine whether the artificial obstacle design scheme can be optimized. If so, the artificial obstacle design scheme is optimized and returned to the information collection module. If not, the electromagnetic environment impact assessment is terminated and the assessment result that the artificial obstacle design scheme does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar is output.

[0240] Example 4:

[0241] An embodiment of the present invention further provides an electronic device, such as Figure 7 As shown, the electronic device 800 includes a memory 801 and a processor 802. The memory stores a computer program running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method provided in the above embodiment are implemented.

[0242] like Figure 7 As shown, the electronic device further includes: a bus 803 and a communication interface 804, and the processor 802, the communication interface 804 and the memory 801 are connected via the bus 803; the processor 802 is used to execute the executable modules stored in the memory 801, such as computer programs.

[0243] The memory 801 may include a high-speed random access memory and may also include a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage. The communication connection between the storage system network element and at least one other network element is achieved through at least one communication interface 804, which may use the Internet, a wide area network, a local area network, or a metropolitan area network.

[0244] The bus 803 may be an ISA bus, a PCI bus, or an EISA bus. The bus may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, and a control bus. For ease of representation, Figure 7 Only one bidirectional arrow is used in the diagram, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0245] Among them, the memory 801 is used to store programs, and the processor 802 executes the program after receiving the execution instruction. The method executed by the process definition device disclosed in any embodiment of the present invention can be applied to the processor 802 or implemented by the processor 802.

[0246] Processor 802 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, each step of the above method may be completed by hardware integrated logic circuits within processor 802 or by software instructions. Processor 802 may be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (CPU) or a network processor; it may also be a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an off-the-shelf programmable gate array (PGM), other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. It may implement or execute the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the methods disclosed in conjunction with the embodiments of the present invention may be directly implemented and executed by a hardware decoding processor, or by a combination of hardware and software modules within the decoding processor. The software modules may be located in a storage medium known in the art, such as random access memory (RAM), flash memory, read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), electrically erasable programmable memory (EEPM), or registers. The storage medium is located in memory 801. Processor 802 reads information from memory 801 and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above method.

[0247] Corresponding to the above method, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores machine-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are called and executed by a processor, the computer-executable instructions prompt the processor to execute the steps of the above method.

[0248] The device provided in the embodiment of the present invention can be specific hardware on the device or software or firmware installed on the device. The implementation principle and technical effects of the device provided in the embodiment of the present invention are the same as those of the aforementioned method embodiment. For the sake of brief description, for matters not mentioned in the device embodiment, reference can be made to the corresponding content in the aforementioned method embodiment. Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can all refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0249] In the several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can also be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings show the possible architectures, functions, and operations of the devices, methods, and computer program products according to multiple embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each box in the flowchart or block diagram can represent a module, program segment, or part of the code, which contains one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical functions. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the boxes can also occur in an order different from that marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two consecutive boxes can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each box in the block diagram and / or flowchart, as well as the combination of boxes in the block diagram and / or flowchart, can be implemented using a dedicated hardware-based system that performs the specified functions or actions, or can be implemented using a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0250] For example, the division of units described herein is merely a logical functional division; actual implementations may employ different divisions. For another example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted or not implemented. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units via some communication interface, and may be electrical, mechanical, or other.

[0251] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0252] If the functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the portion that contributes to the prior art, or the portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: USB flash drives, mobile hard drives, read-only memories, random access memories, magnetic disks, or optical disks, various media that can store program code.

[0253] Finally, it should be noted that the above-described embodiments are only specific implementations of the present invention, which are used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit them. The scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above-described embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that any person skilled in the art can modify or easily conceive of changes to the technical solutions described in the above-described embodiments within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, or replace some of the technical features therein. Such modifications, changes, or replacements do not deviate from the essence of the corresponding technical solutions within the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention. They should all be included in the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for evaluating the impact of artificial obstacles on the electromagnetic environment of air traffic control radar, characterized in that: The steps include: Information collection step: collecting basic information of military and civil airports, air traffic control radar information and artificial obstacle information; A protection distance determination step is used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar protection distance requirements; if so, a shielding angle determination step is performed; if not, an optimization determination step is performed; The shielding angle determination step determines whether the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar shielding angle limit requirements; if so, the signal interference determination step is executed; if not, the optimization determination step is executed; A signal interference judgment step is performed to judge whether the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the air traffic control radar safe operation requirements; if so, the evaluation is terminated and the evaluation result of whether the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar is output; if not, the optimization judgment step is performed; An optimization judgment step is used to judge whether the artificial obstacle design scheme can be optimized; if so, the artificial obstacle design scheme is optimized and the process returns to the information collection step; If not, the electromagnetic environment impact assessment is terminated and an assessment result is outputted indicating that the artificial obstacle design does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; The signal interference judgment step specifically includes: Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal quality of the air traffic control radar is evaluated using the Fresnel zone calculation model and the line-of-sight obstruction calculation model. Based on the collected airport basic information, air traffic control radar information, and artificial obstacle information, the signal strength of the air traffic control radar is evaluated by superimposing the signal coverage obtained by simulation with the airport flight procedure plan, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, surrounding airways, and regional control areas. If the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar meets the requirements for safe operation of the air traffic control radar, the evaluation is terminated and the output shows that the artificial obstacle meets the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality and signal strength of the air traffic control radar cannot meet the requirements for safe operation of the air traffic control radar, the optimization judgment step is executed.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The basic information of the military and civil airports includes the airport runway, flight procedure plan, minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, surrounding routes and flight paths, and regional control area information; the air traffic control radar information includes the geographical location of the air traffic control radar, antenna altitude, equipment model and antenna parameters; the artificial obstacle information includes the geographical location, elevation and type of the artificial obstacle to be evaluated.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The protective distance determination step specifically includes: Calculation of the maximum allowable interference voltage at the input of the air traffic control radar receiver: ； in, The maximum permissible interference voltage effective value, unit is ; C is the incremental coefficient relative to the maximum allowable interference voltage of white noise; is the effective value of the system noise voltage equivalent to the receiver input, in units of , 0.85 for 300MHz~3000MHz ; Calculation of the maximum permissible interference field strength of air traffic control radar to high-voltage overhead transmission lines, substations, railways, highways, and industrial, scientific, and medical radio frequency equipment: ； in, is the maximum permissible interference field strength, in units of ; The maximum permissible interference voltage effective value, unit is ; is the operating frequency, in units of ; is the antenna gain, in units of ; is the receiver input impedance, in units of ; represents the logarithmic function with base 10; The difference between the quasi-peak field strength and the peak field strength, in units of ; is the antenna feed system loss, in units of ; Then the protection distance between different types of artificial obstacles and air traffic control radar is calculated; Calculation of interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and high-voltage overhead transmission lines and substations: ； Calculation of air traffic control radar interference protection distance to railways: ； Calculation of the protection distance between air traffic control radar and highway interference: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and high-frequency heat sealing machine: ； Calculation of the interference protection distance between air traffic control radar and ultra-high frequency therapy machine: ； Calculation of the protection distance between air traffic control radar and high frequency furnace interference: ； in, is the radio interference field strength, in units of ; is the protection distance, in km; is the equivalent noise bandwidth of the receiver, in kHz; is the maximum permissible interference field strength, in units of ; is the rated power of the high-frequency furnace, in kW; Compare the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar with the calculated protection distance value; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is not less than the calculated protection distance value, execute the shielding angle judgment step; if the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar is less than the calculated protection distance value, execute the optimization judgment step.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The shielding angle determination step specifically includes: Based on the collected artificial obstacle information and air traffic control radar information, the vertical and horizontal obstruction angles of the artificial obstacle to the air traffic control radar are calculated. The algorithm is as follows: Vertical shielding angle calculation: ； in, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; If the calculated vertical obstruction angle is greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the vertical obstruction angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; if the calculated vertical obstruction angle is not greater than 0.25°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the vertical obstruction angle limit requirements of the air traffic control radar; Horizontal shielding angle calculation: ； in, is the horizontal width of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; If the calculated horizontal obstruction angle is greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar horizontal obstruction angle limit requirements; if the calculated horizontal obstruction angle is not greater than 1.5°, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar horizontal obstruction angle limit requirements; The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the vertical and horizontal obstruction angle limits of the air traffic control radar; If at least one of the calculated vertical shielding angle and horizontal shielding angle meets the requirements, the signal interference judgment step is executed; if both the vertical shielding angle and the horizontal shielding angle do not meet the requirements, the optimization judgment step is executed.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The signal quality assessment method includes the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation models, as follows: Calculation of Fresnel zone radius of air traffic control radar: ； in, is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the receiving end, in km; is the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end, in km; is the electromagnetic wave propagation speed, in units of ; is the operating frequency of the air traffic control radar, in MHz; Calculation of the theoretical altitude of the signal above the artificial obstacle: ； in, is the altitude of the transmitting antenna of the air traffic control radar, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m; Further calculation of the air traffic control radar Fresnel zone limit height: ； Compare the artificial obstacle elevation data with the calculated Fresnel zone limit height of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is less than the artificial obstacle elevation, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar. If the calculated limit height is not less than the artificial obstacle elevation, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone limit requirements of the air traffic control radar. The line-of-sight obstruction calculation model is as follows: Calculation of vertical shielding angle of artificial obstacles: ； in, is the elevation of the artificial obstacle, in m; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; Further calculation of the corrected shielding angle: ； in, To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the vertical shielding angle of artificial obstacles, in degrees; is the distance between the artificial obstacle and the air traffic control radar, in km; Air traffic control radar line-of-sight coverage calculation: ； in, The air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance, in km; To correct the shielding angle, the unit is °; is the altitude of the air traffic control radar antenna, in meters; is the receiving end elevation, in m; Compare the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver with the calculated air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit distance. If the calculated limit distance is smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle does not meet the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement. If the calculated limit distance is not smaller than the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiver, it means that the artificial obstacle meets the air traffic control radar line-of-sight obstruction limit requirement. The above calculations are used to determine whether the artificial obstacle meets the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction requirements of the air traffic control radar; If it is assessed that the artificial obstacle meets both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar meets the safety operation requirements; if it is assessed that the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet both the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight obstruction limit requirements of the air traffic control radar, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the signal quality of the air traffic control radar does not meet the safety operation requirements.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end must be taken into account in the Fresnel zone and line-of-sight shielding calculation models of the air traffic control radar. and the receiving end elevation The information is a known condition, and the acquisition method is analyzed as follows: Air traffic control radar is used to provide surveillance data information services to controllers within the airport approach control area, while also providing surveillance services for air routes and regional control areas around the airport. Based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of air traffic control radar, the corresponding parameter acquisition methods for different application scenarios are studied, including analysis based on flight procedure plans, analysis based on minimum surveillance guidance altitude, analysis based on air routes and routes around the airport, and analysis based on regional control areas.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The analysis based on the flight procedure plan is as follows: The flight procedure is composed of several lines representing the flight path, key points and procedure altitude representing the flight altitude, including traditional departure procedure, traditional approach and missed approach procedure, PBN departure procedure, PBN approach procedure and PBN approach and missed approach procedure. The aircraft will fly along the flight procedure plan; the positions of the key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional approach procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN approach procedures and PBN approach and missed approach procedures involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the program height corresponding to each key point is used as the analysis height of the air traffic control radar receiving end .

8. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The analysis based on the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude is as follows: The minimum surveillance guidance altitude includes several sectors with different height restrictions. Under radar guidance, the controller and the crew use the minimum surveillance guidance altitude to interactively check and monitor whether the aircraft's flight altitude is higher than the minimum restricted altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector; the boundary line of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle is used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest limit altitude of each minimum surveillance guidance altitude sector is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

9. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The analysis based on the air routes around the airport is as follows: There will be air routes in the air around the airport. The air routes are composed of several lines representing the flight path, waypoints and the lowest safe altitude representing the lowest flight altitude. Aircraft will fly along the air routes at high altitudes. All air routes and waypoints involved in the direction of the line connecting the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacles are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the minimum safety altitude corresponding to each route is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

10. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The analysis based on regional control zones is as follows: The regional control area contains several sectors with different height restrictions. The sector boundary lines of each regional control area involved in the direction of the connection between the air traffic control radar and the artificial obstacle are used as the analysis position of the air traffic control radar receiving end, and then the distance between the air traffic control radar and the receiving end is obtained. At the same time, the lowest restricted altitude of each regional control area sector is used as the analysis altitude of the air traffic control radar receiving end. .

11. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The signal strength evaluation method specifically includes: Based on the design plan of the air traffic control radar's geographical location, antenna altitude, equipment model and antenna parameters, as well as the geographical location, elevation and type of artificial obstacles, the radar signal is simulated using internationally recognized electromagnetic simulation tools to obtain the radar's electromagnetic signal coverage. Based on the analysis of the actual use and operating characteristics of the air traffic control radar, the signal strength in different application scenarios is studied to determine whether it meets the requirements for safe operation. This includes superimposition analysis of signal coverage with flight procedures, superimposition analysis of signal coverage with minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, superimposition analysis of signal coverage with air routes around the airport, and superimposition analysis of signal coverage with regional control areas. If, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle simultaneously meets the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength meets the safety operation requirements; if, after evaluation, the artificial obstacle cannot simultaneously meet the air traffic control radar's signal coverage requirements for the flight procedure plan, the minimum surveillance guidance altitude, the air routes around the airport, and the regional control zone, it means that the impact of the artificial obstacle on the air traffic control radar's signal strength does not meet the safety operation requirements.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The superposition analysis of the signal coverage and flight procedure plan is as follows: According to the procedure altitudes corresponding to different key points of all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. Then the signal coverage range map is superimposed with all traditional departure procedures, traditional arrival procedures, traditional approach and missed approach procedures, PBN departure procedures, PBN arrival procedures, and PBN approach and missed approach procedures at the airport. Signal coverage analysis is performed on all key points of each flight procedure to determine whether each key point is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the flight procedure operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the flight procedure operation requirements.

13. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the minimum surveillance guidance altitude is as follows: According to the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. Then the signal coverage range map is superimposed with all sectors of the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude, and the signal coverage analysis is performed on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range; if so, it means that the signal strength meets the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the minimum surveillance and guidance altitude operation requirements.

14. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The superposition analysis of the signal coverage and the air routes around the airport is as follows: Based on the minimum safe altitude corresponding to the airways around the airport, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. The signal coverage range map is then superimposed with all the airways around the airport, and a signal coverage analysis is performed on the location of each airway to determine whether each airway is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the operation requirements of the airways around the airport; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the operation requirements of the airways around the airport.

15. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that The superposition analysis of the signal coverage range and the regional control area is as follows: Based on the minimum restricted altitude corresponding to different sectors of the regional control area, the radar signal coverage range under different altitude scenarios is simulated. The signal coverage range map is then superimposed with all sectors of the regional control area, and a signal coverage analysis is performed on all sectors to determine whether each sector is included in the signal coverage range. If so, it means that the signal strength meets the regional control area operation requirements; if not, it means that the signal strength does not meet the regional control area operation requirements.

16. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The optimization judgment step specifically includes: The air traffic control radar protection distance, shielding angle, and signal interference assessment model are used to calculate the limit values ​​that meet safety requirements. These values ​​are then fed back to the designer to determine whether they are reasonable and feasible, and whether the proposed artificial obstacle design can be modified. If yes, after the designer provides a new design plan, return to the information collection step to evaluate the new design plan; if no, end the electromagnetic environment impact assessment and output the assessment result that the artificial obstacle design plan does not meet the electromagnetic environment requirements of the air traffic control radar.

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