Navigation signal forging method and device for Galileo OSNMA

Abstract

The invention discloses a navigation signal forgery method and device for Galileo OSNMA, and the method comprises the steps: modifying the positioning information in an original navigation signal into forgery positioning information through a forgery algorithm, and obtaining an initial forgery navigation signal; filling the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into an OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time; analyzing the filled OSNMA field so as to determine an original tag value in each sub-frame; calculating a target tag value of each sub-frame by using a preset tag calculation mode; replacing the original tag value in the sub-frame with the target tag value of each sub-frame to obtain a plurality of pieces of modified navigation page data; and integrating all the modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal which can pass the OSNMA authentication so as to realize high-safety performance training of the navigation safety system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of communication technology, and in particular relates to a navigation signal forging method and device for Galileo OSNMA. Background Art

[0002] Navigation is a general term for technologies used to guide people, equipment, vehicles, and other objects from one point to another. In a narrow sense, navigation involves monitoring and controlling a vehicle's position and speed, comparing them to a target point, and ultimately guiding it to a desired destination. More broadly, navigation encompasses all science and technology related to determining position and direction. Navigation technology was first used in the military for mapping and missile positioning. As navigation technology matured, it began to migrate from military use to civilian use, from in-car navigation systems to mobile phone positioning. Navigation technology has become increasingly integrated into every aspect of our lives, greatly facilitating our daily lives.

[0003] Galileo is a satellite positioning system under construction. Its basic low-precision service is free to all users, while its high-precision service is available only to paying subscribers. The Galileo system aims to provide positioning services with an accuracy of less than 1 meter in both horizontal and vertical directions, and to offer better positioning services than other systems in high-latitude areas.

[0004] The Open Authentication Service for Navigation Messages (OSNMA) is a message authentication service provided by the Galileo navigation and positioning system to users. The OSNMA mechanism ensures that the messages received by the receiver come from the system itself and have not been modified.

[0005] Traditional navigation signal forgery methods currently used in security testing of the Galileo navigation and positioning system have significant flaws: while they can tamper with navigation messages to generate false positioning signals, they cannot pass Galileo's OSNMA authentication. This technical limitation makes it difficult for existing detection methods to effectively identify complex attacks that can disguise themselves through the OSNMA authentication mechanism in critical scenarios where navigation systems are used.

[0006] Therefore, how to provide a navigation signal forgery method that can pass the Galileo OSNMA authentication to improve the navigation safety system's ability to identify navigation forgery signals has become an important issue. Summary of the Invention

[0007] In order to solve the above problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a navigation signal forgery method and device for Galileo OSNMA.

[0008] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0009] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA, the navigation signal forgery method comprising:

[0010] Using a forging algorithm to modify the positioning information in the original navigation signal into forged positioning information, thereby obtaining an initial forged navigation signal;

[0011] Filling the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time;

[0012] Parsing the filled OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe; one subframe corresponds to 15 navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal;

[0013] Calculate the target tag value for each subframe using the preset tag calculation method;

[0014] The target tag value of each subframe is used to replace the original tag value in the subframe to obtain multiple modified navigation page data;

[0015] All modified navigation page data are integrated to obtain a forged navigation signal, so as to implement safety performance training of the navigation safety system based on the forged navigation signal.

[0016] Optionally, the populated OSNMA field is parsed to determine the original tag value in each subframe, including:

[0017] Parsing the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in units of subframes to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field;

[0018] Determine the original tag value from each MACK field.

[0019] Optionally, parsing the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in subframe units to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field includes:

[0020] Taking subframes as units, bits 9 to 40 of the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal are parsed to obtain a MACK field.

[0021] Optionally, a preset tag calculation method is used to calculate the target tag value for each subframe, including:

[0022] Based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST, a target tag value of each subframe is calculated using a preset tag calculation method.

[0023] Optionally, the target tag value of each subframe is used to replace the original tag value in the subframe to obtain multiple modified navigation page data, including:

[0024] Determine the location information of the original tag value in each subframe in each navigation page data;

[0025] According to the position information, the original tag value of each subframe is replaced with the corresponding target tag value to obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data.

[0026] Optionally, integrate all modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal, including:

[0027] All modified navigation page data are integrated according to the Galileo navigation message format to obtain a forged navigation signal.

[0028] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a navigation signal forgery device for Galileo OSNMA, the navigation signal forgery device comprising:

[0029] A modification module, configured to modify the positioning information in the original navigation signal into forged positioning information using a forging algorithm to obtain an initial forged navigation signal;

[0030] A filling module, configured to fill the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time;

[0031] A parsing module, configured to parse the filled OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe; one subframe corresponds to 15 navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal;

[0032] A calculation module, configured to calculate a target tag value for each subframe using a preset tag calculation method;

[0033] A replacement module, configured to replace the original tag value in each subframe with the target tag value of the subframe to obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data;

[0034] The integration module is used to integrate all modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal, so as to implement safety performance training of the navigation safety system based on the forged navigation signal.

[0035] In a third aspect, the present invention provides an electronic device comprising a processor, a communication interface, a memory, and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the communication interface, and the memory communicate with each other via the communication bus;

[0036] Memory for storing computer programs;

[0037] The processor is configured to implement the method steps described in any one of the above-mentioned methods for forging navigation signals of the Galileo OSNMA when executing the computer program stored in the memory.

[0038] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method steps described in any of the above-mentioned methods for forging navigation signals for Galileo OSNMA.

[0039] The present invention provides a navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA. The method can determine the original tag value in each subframe by parsing the OSNMA field obtained by filling the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time. Then, based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST, the target tag value of each subframe is recalculated, and the original tag value is replaced by the target tag value. When forging the navigation positioning information, the authentication tag of the OSNMA is synchronously tampered with to obtain a forged navigation signal that can be authenticated by the OSNMA, so that the safety performance training of the navigation safety system can be realized based on the forged navigation signal, thereby improving the defense performance of the navigation safety system.

[0040] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] Figure 1 1 is a flowchart of a navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a positioning result after the Galileo navigation data provided by an embodiment of the present invention is forged;

[0043] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the authentication result of the Galileo navigation message authentication mechanism after the tag is modified;

[0044] Figure 4 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a navigation signal forgery device for Galileo OSNMA provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 5It is a structural diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific examples, but the embodiments of the present invention are not limited thereto.

[0047] In order to solve the problem that the traditional forged navigation signal cannot pass the OSNMA authentication mechanism, resulting in the inability to guarantee the security of the navigation safety system based on the traditional forged navigation signal training, the embodiment of the present invention provides a navigation signal forging method for Galileo OSNMA, see Figure 1 , Figure 1 The flowchart of a navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA provided by an embodiment of the present invention specifically includes the following steps:

[0048] Step S101: Using a forging algorithm, the positioning information in the original navigation signal is modified into forged positioning information to obtain an initial forged navigation signal.

[0049] In this embodiment of the present invention, a Galileo navigation message file is used as the original navigation signal to be modified. Then, using the Galileo-sim forgery algorithm, navigation data can be obtained at any time and location. The Galileo-sim forgery algorithm is an existing Galileo navigation signal forgery algorithm. By inputting information such as an ephemeris file into the algorithm, the positioning information in the original navigation signal can be modified to the desired positioning information, completing the navigation signal forgery operation.

[0050] Specifically, the program first passes the Galileo navigation message file into the program. It then parses the Galileo navigation data, extracts the data used for navigation and positioning, discards irrelevant data such as authentication and ionospheric information, and replaces the data used for positioning with the desired positioning signal, generating the initial forged navigation signal.

[0051] The Galileo navigation message file may include original navigation data or an ephemeris file, which must comply with the file format requirements of the Galileo navigation system.

[0052] At the start of the program, enter the latitude, longitude, altitude, and time of the target location. The program then receives a navigation message for the target location. This navigation message lacks the OSNMA field, which does not affect the receiver's interpretation of the positioning information.

[0053] See also Figure 2 , Figure 2This is a schematic diagram of the positioning results after the Galileo navigation data provided by an embodiment of the present invention is forged. After the navigation data is forged, the forged navigation data is parsed using GNSS. The original positioning is changed to a position with a latitude of -5.999993 and a longitude of 50.999976. The time corresponding to the forged positioning information is 04:59:59 on August 16, 2023.

[0054] Step S102: Fill the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time.

[0055] In this embodiment of the present invention, Galileo navigation data, including both the original navigation signal and the initial forged navigation signal, is divided into pages. Each page contains 240 bits of binary data, and 15 navigation page data constitutes a subframe. After the positioning forgery, the OSNMA field of each page is all zeros, and the OSNMA data corresponding to the time of the positioning forgery is added. The OSNMA authentication result is related to the time corresponding to the navigation page. If the navigation page corresponds to incorrect OSNMA data during authentication, the authentication will fail.

[0056] OSNMA is a data authentication method provided by the Galileo navigation system to prevent data falsification. At the same time globally, all Galileo navigation messages use the same OSNMA root key and other data, allowing OSNMA data to be derived from other Galileo navigation signals. When requesting OSNMA data to be populated, the OSNMA data must correspond to the navigation data to be populated. A mismatch in timing will result in authentication failure.

[0057] Step S103: Parse the filled OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe; one subframe corresponds to 15 navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal.

[0058] When the OSNMA mechanism is used to authenticate the Galileo navigation message, the tag field in the OSNMA data is actually authenticated.

[0059] In this embodiment of the present invention, OSNMA data is fixed as 40 bits of binary data in each navigation signal. Bits 0 to 7 are the HKROOT field, which stores authentication information including the root key. Bits 9 to 40 are the MACK field, which contains the tag value required for Galileo navigation message authentication.

[0060] In one implementation, parsing the populated OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe includes:

[0061] Parsing the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in subframe units to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field;

[0062] Determine the original tag value from each MACK field.

[0063] Specifically, 15 navigation page data are used as a subframe. The OSNMA field in each navigation page data is parsed in subframe units to extract the MACK field of each OSNMA field. In each navigation page data, the length of the OSNMA field is fixed at 40, and bits 9 to 40 are the MACK field. The MACK field stores information used for authentication, such as the message authentication code (MAC), tag, and TESLA key. The MACK field of each page is a 32-bit binary data in bits 146 to 178 of the current page.

[0064] In Galileo navigation messages, authentication is performed in subframes, with one subframe consisting of 15 navigation pages. Therefore, when authenticating the MACK field, the 32-bit MACK data on each page is converted into 480 bits of binary data for processing.

[0065] Specifically, all MACK fields in a subframe can be combined to form a subframe MACK field, which is binary data with a length of 480. The tag value is extracted from the subframe MACK field. Typically, the MACK data of a subframe contains 2 to 4 tag values. After the tag value is extracted, the distribution position of the tag field where the tag value is located is determined for subsequent navigation data authentication.

[0066] Step S104: Calculate the target tag value using a preset tag calculation method.

[0067] In the embodiment of the present invention, the target tag value is a tag value obtained by calculation and can be authenticated by OSNMA.

[0068] In an embodiment of the present invention, a target tag value for each subframe is calculated using a preset tag calculation method, including:

[0069] Based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST (Galileo System Time), a target tag value for each subframe is calculated using a preset tag calculation method.

[0070] In the embodiment of the present invention, the preset tag value calculation formula is:

[0071] tag=trunc(l t ,mac(K,m));

[0072] m=(PRN D ||PRN A ||GST SF ||CTR||NMAS||navdata||P);

[0073] Among them, tag represents the target tag value; trunc(·) represents the truncation function; l t Indicates the length of the tag to be truncated; mac(·) represents the hash function; K represents the Tesla key at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information; m represents the summary of all messages for calculating the tag; PRN D Indicates the satellite number of the authenticated navigation data; PRN A Satellite information indicating transmission authentication; GST SF Indicates the time information of the start of each subframe; CTR is used to identify the distribution position of the tag in the MACK message; NMAS, namely NMA Status, indicates the current status of OSNMA; navdata indicates the navigation data of the previous subframe being authenticated; P represents the zero-padding operation, which is used to add zeros to the end of the data; the symbol ‖ indicates that these data are spliced ​​together after being converted to binary.

[0074] It should be noted that changes in navigation data and other information will cause changes in the calculated target tag value.

[0075] During signal analysis and forgery, two types of tags are generated. One type is generated by parsing the MACK field of a subframe and directly extracting several tags from it. The other type is generated by using a MAC function to calculate the tags, combining current navigation data, satellite data, GST, and other information. In the Galileo navigation message authentication mechanism, the first type of tag is used as the standard value to authenticate the second type of tag. If the two tags have the same value, authentication is successful.

[0076] Step S105 : Using the target tag value of each subframe to replace the original tag value in the subframe, a plurality of modified navigation page data are obtained.

[0077] In the embodiment of the present invention, the MACK field of a subframe is composed of the MACK fields of 15 pages belonging to the current subframe, so a tag value may come from the MACK fields of two pages.

[0078] In an embodiment of the present invention, the original tag value can be accurately replaced with the target tag value based on the position information of the original tag value, wherein the position information is used to determine the position of the original tag value in the binary data.

[0079] Specifically, the target tag value of each subframe is used to replace the original tag value in the subframe to obtain multiple modified navigation page data, including:

[0080] Determine the location information of the original tag value in each subframe in each navigation page data;

[0081] According to the position information, the original tag value of each subframe is replaced with the corresponding target tag value to obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data.

[0082] In an embodiment of the present invention, the original tag value is replaced based on the position information of the original tag value in each subframe in each navigation page data. The calculated target tag value can be replaced to the position of the original tag value while ensuring one-to-one correspondence.

[0083] Step S106 , integrating all modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal, so as to implement safety performance training of the navigation safety system based on the forged navigation signal.

[0084] In the embodiment of the present invention, all modified navigation page data are integrated to obtain forged navigation data, which are then packaged into a file that can be parsed by a receiver, that is, a forged navigation signal is transmitted.

[0085] In one implementation, integrating all modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal includes:

[0086] All modified navigation page data are integrated according to the Galileo navigation message format to obtain a forged navigation signal.

[0087] Specifically, the forged navigation data can be integrated into subframe messages according to the Galileo navigation message format to obtain a forged navigation signal, and then the file can be transmitted through a transmission tool such as USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral).

[0088] On this basis, the security test system including the receiver can be trained and improved according to the forged navigation signal that can be authenticated by OSNMA provided by the embodiment of the present invention, thereby improving the security of the security test system.

[0089] The forged navigation data will not have any impact on the positioning during the analysis process and can be authenticated by the receiver.

[0090] In an embodiment of the present invention, by parsing the filled OSNMA field obtained by filling the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at that time, the original tag value in each subframe can be determined, and then the target tag value of each subframe is recalculated based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST, and the original tag value is replaced by the target tag value, so that while forging the navigation positioning information, the authentication tag of OSNMA is synchronously tampered to obtain a forged navigation signal that can be authenticated by OSNMA, so that the safety performance training of the navigation safety system can be realized based on the forged navigation signal, thereby improving the defense performance of the navigation safety system.

[0091] See also Figure 3 , Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the authentication result of the Galileo navigation message authentication mechanism after the tag is modified. A simulation experiment is carried out using a navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The forged navigation signal processed by this method is sent to the receiver for authentication. When all tag authentications are True (correct), it means that the OSNMA authentication has passed. Therefore, the navigation safety system can be improved through the complex attack behavior that can be disguised by the OSNMA authentication mechanism provided by the embodiment of the present invention, thereby improving the navigation safety system's ability to identify forged navigation signals and making the safety performance of the navigation safety system more reliable.

[0092] In an embodiment of the present invention, navigation information of any location and any time can be forged, and specific fields of the navigation message can be changed according to the Galileo OSNMA authentication mechanism, so that the forged navigation information can pass the OSNMA authentication without affecting the positioning.

[0093] Furthermore, the navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA provided by the present invention can process navigation messages in batches. For multiple consecutive navigation messages, the forgery, tag modification, and data packaging and transmission operations are completed in batches, thereby improving efficiency.

[0094] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a navigation signal forgery device for Galileo OSNMA, see Figure 4 , Figure 4 : This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a navigation signal forgery device for Galileo OSNMA provided by an embodiment of the present invention. The navigation signal forgery device includes:

[0095] The modification module 401 is configured to modify the positioning information in the original navigation signal into forged positioning information using a forging algorithm to obtain an initial forged navigation signal;

[0096] A filling module 402 is configured to fill the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time;

[0097] The parsing module 403 is used to parse the filled OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe; one subframe corresponds to 15 navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal;

[0098] The calculation module 404 is used to calculate the target tag value of each subframe using a preset tag calculation method;

[0099] A replacement module 405 is configured to replace the original tag value in each subframe with the target tag value of the subframe to obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data;

[0100] The integration module 406 is configured to integrate all modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal, so as to implement safety performance training of the navigation safety system based on the forged navigation signal.

[0101] In an embodiment of the present invention, by parsing the filled OSNMA field obtained by filling the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at that time, the original tag value in each subframe can be determined, and then the target tag value of each subframe is recalculated based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST, and the original tag value is replaced by the target tag value, so that while forging the navigation positioning information, the authentication tag of OSNMA is synchronously tampered to obtain a forged navigation signal that can be authenticated by OSNMA, so that the safety performance training of the navigation safety system can be realized based on the forged navigation signal, thereby improving the defense performance of the navigation safety system.

[0102] Optionally, the parsing module is specifically used to:

[0103] The filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal is parsed in subframe units to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field; and the original tag value is determined from each MACK field.

[0104] Optionally, the parsing module parses the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in subframe units to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field, including:

[0105] Taking subframes as units, bits 9 to 40 of the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal are parsed to obtain a MACK field.

[0106] Optional computing module, specifically used for:

[0107] Based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST, a target tag value of each subframe is calculated using a preset tag calculation method.

[0108] Optional replacement modules, specifically for:

[0109] Determine the position information of the original tag value in each subframe in each navigation page data; replace the original tag value of each subframe with the corresponding target tag value according to the position information, and obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data.

[0110] Optional integration module, specifically for:

[0111] All modified navigation page data are integrated according to the Galileo navigation message format to obtain a forged navigation signal.

[0112] The embodiment of the present invention further provides an electronic device, such as Figure 5 As shown, Figure 5 5 is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention, including a processor 501, a communication interface 502, a memory 503 and a communication bus 504, wherein the processor 501, the communication interface 502, and the memory 503 communicate with each other through the communication bus 504.

[0113] Memory 503, used for storing computer programs;

[0114] The processor 501 is configured to implement any of the above-mentioned steps of the navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA when executing the program stored in the memory 503 .

[0115] The communication bus mentioned in the electronic device mentioned above may be a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus. This communication bus can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of illustration, only one thick line is used in the figure, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or only one type of bus.

[0116] The communication interface is used for communication between the above electronic device and other devices.

[0117] The memory may include random access memory (RAM) or non-volatile memory (NVM), such as at least one disk storage. Alternatively, the memory may be at least one storage device located away from the processor.

[0118] The above-mentioned processor can be a general-purpose processor, including a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), etc.; it can also be a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, and discrete hardware components.

[0119] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored therein, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of any of the above-mentioned methods for forging navigation signals against the Galileo OSNMA.

[0120] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium may be a non-volatile memory (NVM), such as at least one disk memory.

[0121] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium may also be at least one storage device located away from the processor.

[0122] In yet another embodiment of the present invention, a computer program product comprising instructions is provided, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the method steps of any of the above-mentioned methods for forging navigation signals of the Galileo OSNMA.

[0123] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," and the like are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a particular order or precedence. It should be understood that the terms used in this manner are interchangeable where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the present invention described herein can be implemented in sequences other than those illustrated or described herein. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with the present invention. Instead, they are merely examples of devices and methods consistent with some aspects of the present invention.

[0124] In the description of this specification, the reference terms "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples" mean that the specific features or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features or characteristics described can be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples. In addition, those skilled in the art can combine and combine different embodiments or examples described in this specification.

[0125] Although the present invention is described herein in conjunction with various embodiments, in the process of implementing the claimed invention, those skilled in the art can understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments by viewing the drawings and the disclosed content. In the description of the present invention, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, "one" or "a" does not exclude multiple situations, and "multiple" means two or more, unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined. In addition, certain measures are recorded in different embodiments, but this does not mean that these measures cannot be combined to produce good results.

[0126] The method provided in the embodiments of the present invention can be applied to electronic devices. Specifically, the electronic devices can be desktop computers, portable computers, smart mobile terminals, servers, etc. This is not limited here; any electronic device that can implement the present invention falls within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0127] As for the device / electronic device / storage medium embodiment, since it is basically similar to the method embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the partial description of the method embodiment.

[0128] It should be noted that the device, electronic device and storage medium of the embodiments of the present invention are respectively the device, electronic device and storage medium that apply the above-mentioned method for forging navigation signals for Galileo OSNMA. All embodiments of the above-mentioned method for forging navigation signals for Galileo OSNMA are applicable to the device, electronic device and storage medium, and can achieve the same or similar beneficial effects.

[0129] The above is a further detailed description of the present invention in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, and the specific implementation of the present invention should not be considered to be limited to these descriptions. For those skilled in the art of the present invention, without departing from the concept of the present invention, several simple deductions or substitutions can be made, which should be considered to fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A navigation signal forgery method for Galileo OSNMA, characterized in that: The navigation signal forging method comprises: Using a forging algorithm to modify the positioning information in the original navigation signal into forged positioning information, thereby obtaining an initial forged navigation signal; Filling the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time; Parsing the filled OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe; one subframe corresponds to 15 navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal; Calculate the target tag value for each subframe using the preset tag calculation method; The target tag value of each subframe is used to replace the original tag value in the subframe to obtain multiple modified navigation page data; All modified navigation page data are integrated to obtain a forged navigation signal, so as to implement safety performance training of the navigation safety system based on the forged navigation signal.

2. The navigation signal forgery method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Parse the populated OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe, including: Parsing the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in units of subframes to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field; Determine the original tag value from each MACK field.

3. The navigation signal forgery method according to claim 2, characterized in that: Parsing the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in subframe units to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field includes: Taking subframes as units, bits 9 to 40 of the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal are parsed to obtain a MACK field.

4. The navigation signal forgery method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The target tag value for each subframe is calculated using the preset tag calculation method, including: Based on the initial forged navigation signal, satellite data and GST, a target tag value of each subframe is calculated using a preset tag calculation method.

5. The navigation signal forgery method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The target tag value of each subframe is used to replace the original tag value in the subframe to obtain multiple modified navigation page data, including: Determine the location information of the original tag value in each subframe in each navigation page data; According to the position information, the original tag value of each subframe is replaced with the corresponding target tag value to obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data.

6. The navigation signal forgery method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Integrate all modified navigation page data to obtain forged navigation signals, including: All modified navigation page data are integrated according to the Galileo navigation message format to obtain a forged navigation signal.

7. A navigation signal forgery device for Galileo OSNMA, characterized in that: The navigation signal forging device comprises: A modification module, configured to modify the positioning information in the original navigation signal into forged positioning information using a forging algorithm to obtain an initial forged navigation signal; A filling module, configured to fill the OSNMA data at the time corresponding to the forged positioning information into the OSNMA field of the initial forged navigation signal at the time; A parsing module, configured to parse the filled OSNMA field to determine the original tag value in each subframe; one subframe corresponds to 15 navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal; A calculation module, configured to calculate a target tag value for each subframe using a preset tag calculation method; A replacement module, configured to replace the original tag value in each subframe with the target tag value of the subframe to obtain a plurality of modified navigation page data; The integration module is used to integrate all modified navigation page data to obtain a forged navigation signal, so as to implement safety performance training of the navigation safety system based on the forged navigation signal.

8. The navigation signal forgery device according to claim 7, characterized in that: The parsing module is specifically used to: Parsing the filled OSNMA field in each navigation page data in the initial forged navigation signal in units of subframes to extract the MACK field of each filled OSNMA field; Determine the original tag value from each MACK field.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: It includes a processor, a communication interface, a memory and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the communication interface and the memory communicate with each other via the communication bus; Memory for storing computer programs; The processor is configured to implement the navigation signal forgery method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 when executing a computer program stored in the memory.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the navigation signal forgery method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

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