Evaluation method, device and equipment for transportation real object protection system

Abstract

The invention discloses an evaluation method, device and equipment for a transportation real object protection system. The evaluation method for the transportation real object protection system comprises the following steps: acquiring personnel configuration parameters, protection equipment parameters and opponent settings of the transportation real object protection system; creating an intrusion action sequence diagram; according to the personnel configuration parameters, the protection equipment parameters and opponent settings, determining evaluation parameters of each attack node by using the intrusion action sequence diagram; and according to the evaluation parameter of each attack node, evaluating the protection effectiveness of the transportation process of the real object to obtain an evaluation result of the transportation real object protection system. Therefore, the accuracy of evaluation of the transportation material object protection system can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of nuclear power technology, and in particular relates to an evaluation method, device and equipment for a transport physical protection system. Background Art

[0002] The physical protection system consists of three parts: detection, delay and response, and is used to prevent or stop malicious acts against nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

[0003] Current methods for evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection systems primarily target fixed facilities (such as nuclear power plants and nuclear material repositories), using physical delay mechanisms like perimeter barriers and building walls in conjunction with reactive forces to achieve protection. However, physical protection systems for road transport scenarios present significant differences: upon detecting an adversary attack, onboard escorts can directly respond; however, if escorts are unable to stop the adversary, they rely on the timely arrival of reinforcements.

[0004] Existing effectiveness evaluation models for fixed facilities cannot accurately describe the dynamic interaction process of detection-delay-response in transportation scenarios, resulting in the inability to quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of road transport physical protection systems. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to address the above-mentioned deficiencies in the prior art and to provide a method, device and equipment for evaluating a transport physical protection system. The method can improve the accuracy of the evaluation of a transport physical protection system.

[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for evaluating a transport physical protection system, comprising:

[0007] Obtaining personnel configuration parameters and protective equipment parameters as well as adversary settings of the transport physical protection system;

[0008] Creating an intrusion action sequence diagram, wherein the intrusion action sequence diagram is used to represent all attack nodes of the adversary's attack process;

[0009] Determine the evaluation parameters of each attack node using the intrusion action sequence diagram according to the personnel configuration parameters, protection equipment parameters, and adversary settings;

[0010] The protection effectiveness of the transportation process of the physical object is evaluated according to the evaluation parameters of the various attack nodes to obtain an evaluation result of the transportation physical protection system.

[0011] Optionally, the attack nodes in the intrusion action sequence diagram include at least a reconnaissance and positioning node, a personnel confrontation node, a physical barrier breakthrough node, and a reinforcement response node, and the personnel configuration parameters include the number of escort personnel and the number of reinforcement personnel.

[0012] Based on the personnel configuration parameters, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings, the intrusion action sequence diagram is used to determine the evaluation parameters of each attack node, including:

[0013] Determine the first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting the adversary's attack behavior based on the protection device parameters and adversary settings;

[0014] Based on the personnel configuration parameters and the enemy settings, the second probability and third probability of the personnel confrontation node and the duration of the confrontation between the escort personnel and the enemy are determined. The second probability is the probability that the escort personnel will defeat the enemy, and the third probability is the probability that the enemy will defeat the escort personnel.

[0015] Determine the delay time of the adversary attack at the physical barrier breakthrough node based on the protection device parameters and adversary settings;

[0016] Based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time, and the delay time of the enemy attack, the fifth probability of the reinforcement response node arriving at the scene in time is determined. The fourth probability is the probability that the reinforcements successfully receive the alarm information.

[0017] Optionally, based on the evaluation parameters of each attack node, the protection effectiveness of the transport process of the physical object is evaluated to obtain an evaluation result of the transport physical protection system, specifically including:

[0018] An assessment result of the transport physical protection system is determined based on the first probability, the second probability and the fifth probability.

[0019] Optionally, determining a first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting an adversary attack behavior based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings specifically includes:

[0020] The first probability is calculated by formula (1):

[0021]

[0022] Among them, PI is the first probability, P 设备i is the probability that device i detects the adversary’s attack behavior, P 设备j is the probability that device j detects the adversary's attack behavior.

[0023] Optionally, determining a second probability of a person confronting a node based on the person configuration parameters and the adversary settings may include:

[0024] The second probability is calculated by formula (2):

[0025]

[0026] Among them, P(A) is the second probability, P(m, 0) is the probability that the vehicle escort personnel of a single attack node in the personnel confrontation node defeats the adversary, M ≥ m ≥ 0, N ≥ n ≥ 0, M is the initial number of vehicle escort personnel, N is the initial number of adversaries, m is the remaining number of escort personnel after the engagement, and n is the remaining number of adversaries after the engagement.

[0027] Optionally, the physical barrier breakthrough node includes multiple physical defense devices,

[0028] Determine the delay time for the adversary to attack the node that breaks through the physical barrier based on the parameters of the protection device and the adversary settings. Specifically,

[0029] For independent physical defense equipment, the delay time of the enemy attack is calculated using the following formula (3):

[0030] T 物防措施 =∑T 设备j (3)

[0031] Among them, T 物防措施 To delay the enemy’s attack, T 设备j The delay time of the independent physical defense device j;

[0032] The delay time of the enemy attack is calculated by the following formula (4) for the physical defense equipment that works together:

[0033] T 物防措施 =min(T 设备 1. T 设备 2, ..., T 设备k ) (4)

[0034] Among them, T 设备k is the delay duration of the physical security device k that works together.

[0035] Optionally, a fifth probability that the reinforcements of the reinforcement response node arrive at the scene in time is determined based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of the reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time, and the delay time, specifically including:

[0036] The fifth probability is calculated by formula (5):

[0037] P(B)=P 报警 *∑P(0,n)(5)

[0038] Among them, P(B) is the probability that reinforcements arrive at the scene in time, and P(0,n) is the probability that T 押运人员 >T 增援时间 -T 物防措施 The third probability of attacking the node, T 押运人员 T is the duration of the confrontation between the escort and the enemy, 增援时间is the time it takes for reinforcements to arrive, T 物防措施 To delay the enemy’s attack time, P 报警 The fifth probability.

[0039] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides an evaluation device for a transport physical protection system, comprising:

[0040] an acquisition module, configured to acquire personnel configuration parameters and protective equipment parameters as well as adversary settings of the transport physical protection system;

[0041] a creation module connected to the acquisition module, for creating an intrusion action sequence diagram, wherein the intrusion action sequence diagram is used to represent all attack nodes of the adversary's attack process;

[0042] a first evaluation module, connected to the creation module, for determining evaluation parameters of each attack node using the intrusion action sequence diagram according to the personnel configuration parameters, protection equipment parameters, and adversary settings;

[0043] The second evaluation module is connected to the first evaluation module and is used to evaluate the protection effectiveness of the transportation process of the physical object according to the evaluation parameters of each attack node to obtain the evaluation result of the transportation physical protection system.

[0044] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides an evaluation device for a transport physical protection system, the device comprising: a processor and a memory storing computer program instructions;

[0045] When the processor executes the computer program instructions, the transport physical protection system evaluation method as shown in the first aspect is implemented.

[0046] The transport physical protection system assessment method of this invention introduces an intrusion action sequence diagram to break down the complex transport protection process into specific attack nodes. Combining personnel configuration, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings, it quantitatively evaluates each node, ultimately yielding a security assessment of the entire transport system. This method achieves a quantitative assessment of the entire transport protection system process, improving the accuracy of the assessment. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0047] Figure 1 : A flow chart of a method for evaluating a transport physical protection system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 : A flow chart of another method for evaluating a transport physical protection system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 : A structural diagram of an evaluation device for a transport physical protection system provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 4 : A structural diagram of a device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0051] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0052] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article, or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further limitations, the elements defined by the phrase "comprising..." do not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the elements.

[0053] A physical protection system consists of three components: detection, delay, and response. It is a security system designed to prevent or deter individuals or groups from looting, stealing, or illegally transferring nuclear materials, as well as sabotaging nuclear facilities and materials. Physical protection system effectiveness evaluation involves analyzing and assessing the system's ability to achieve its intended design objectives using qualitative or quantitative methods.

[0054] Physical protection systems are categorized as fixed-facility physical protection systems and transport-based physical protection systems. Existing quantitative effectiveness evaluation methods are all focused on fixed-facility physical protection systems. Upon detecting an adversary attack, fixed-facility physical protection systems delay the attack through physical barriers such as perimeters and building walls. Reaction forces, upon receiving an alert, respond and stop the attack.

[0055] After a transport physical protection system detects an adversary attack, onboard escorts can respond directly and stop the attacker. If the onboard escorts are unable to stop the attack, the possibility of reinforcements arriving at the scene should be considered. Therefore, the detection, delay, and response processes of a transport physical protection system differ significantly from those of a fixed-facility physical protection system. Therefore, the quantitative evaluation methods for fixed-facility physical protection system effectiveness are not applicable to the quantitative evaluation of transport physical protection system effectiveness.

[0056] Example 1:

[0057] Based on the above research, in order to solve the above technical problems, such as Figure 1As shown, this embodiment provides a method for evaluating a transport physical protection system, including the following steps 101 to 104 .

[0058] Step 101: Obtain personnel configuration parameters, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings of a transport physical protection system.

[0059] Here, personnel configuration parameters may include structured data such as the number of escort personnel, skill levels, and shift schedules;

[0060] Protective equipment parameters may include: armor level of transport vehicles, GPS tracking system status, alarm device sensitivity and other equipment status data;

[0061] Adversary settings may include: attacker capability models (equipment level, action mode, and number of people) generated based on historical threat databases.

[0062] Specifically, a road transport physical protection system evaluation scenario model can be constructed based on the personnel configuration parameters, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings of the transport physical protection system. By establishing a complete scenario model, the various elements and parameters of the protection system can be quantitatively described, providing a data basis for subsequent probability calculations.

[0063] In some embodiments, the road transportation physical protection system evaluation scenario model may include: a physical protection system model and an adversary model.

[0064] The physical protection system model includes: (1) human defense measures model: specifically, it can include the number of vehicle escort personnel (M), the number of reinforcement personnel, the weapons and equipment carried, the response strategy, etc.; (2) physical defense measures model: specifically, it can include the vehicle cabin, hatch, lock body, transport container, tethered structure, etc.; (3) technical defense measures model: specifically, it can include intrusion detection equipment, access control detection equipment, etc.

[0065] The adversary model includes: the number of adversaries (N), weapons and equipment carried, attack strategies, etc.

[0066] Step 102: Create an intrusion action sequence diagram. The intrusion action sequence diagram is used to represent all attack nodes of the adversary's attack process.

[0067] Specifically, an intrusion action sequence diagram is a flow chart or event sequence diagram that details all possible action nodes an adversary might take from the initiation of an attack to its conclusion (success or failure). Each node represents a specific attack phase or action step, such as approaching a transport, breaching outer defenses, engaging escorts, or seizing physical objects.

[0068] Leveraging the knowledge of security experts, historical attack cases, or simulation analysis, we can decompose the adversary's attack process into a series of attack nodes, each representing a specific attack behavior. By discretizing the continuous attack process through sequence diagrams, we can facilitate analysis of the protection effectiveness and time delay at each stage.

[0069] In an example, attack nodes may include: attacking vehicle escort personnel, destroying vehicle cabin, destroying cabin door, destroying lock body, destroying tethered structure, destroying transport container, etc. The specific attack node settings can be set according to actual conditions and are not limited in this application.

[0070] In one example, a graph theory algorithm can be used to construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where each node represents a specific attack stage (such as "breaking through the carriage" or "releasing the positioning device"), and the edges represent the attack process transfer conditions (such as "blasting successful → entering the cargo area"), automatically generating standard operating paths (SOPs) and variant paths (such as backup plans when equipment fails).

[0071] Step 103 : According to the personnel configuration parameters, the protection equipment parameters and the adversary settings, the evaluation parameters of each attack node are determined using the intrusion action sequence diagram.

[0072] Specifically, the evaluation parameters are indicators used to quantify the effectiveness of the physical protection system at each attack node, such as the probability of successfully resisting the attack, the time to detect the attack, the response time, the success rate of blocking the attack, etc.

[0073] For each node in the intrusion action sequence diagram, these parameters are determined using computational models (such as probabilistic models, simulation models, etc.) or expert scoring, combined with personnel configuration, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings. For example, at a certain attack node, the probability of the adversary being detected or successfully blocked is calculated based on the strength of the protective equipment and the response capabilities of the personnel.

[0074] Step 104 : Evaluate the protection effectiveness of the transport process of the physical object based on the evaluation parameters of each attack node, and obtain an evaluation result of the transport physical protection system.

[0075] Specifically, the evaluation parameters of each attack node are integrated and the protection effectiveness of the entire transportation process is evaluated through comprehensive evaluation methods (such as weighted average, decision tree, and minimum path). The evaluation result can be a comprehensive score, a level (such as high, medium, or low risk), or a specific risk value to represent the security of the entire transportation system.

[0076] In this example, by introducing an intrusion action sequence diagram, the complex transport protection process is broken down into specific attack nodes. Combined with personnel configuration, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings, a quantitative assessment is performed on each node, resulting in a security assessment of the entire transport system. This achieves a quantitative assessment of the entire process of the transport physical protection system.

[0077] Optionally, the attack nodes in the intrusion action sequence diagram include at least a reconnaissance and positioning node, a personnel confrontation node, a physical barrier breakthrough node, and a reinforcement response node. The personnel configuration parameters include the number of escort personnel and the number of reinforcement personnel. The above step 103 may specifically include the following steps:

[0078] Based on the personnel configuration parameters, protective equipment parameters, and adversary settings, the intrusion action sequence diagram is used to determine the evaluation parameters of each attack node, including:

[0079] Determine the first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting the adversary's attack behavior based on the protection device parameters and adversary settings;

[0080] Based on the personnel configuration parameters and the enemy settings, the second probability and third probability of the personnel confrontation node and the duration of the confrontation between the escort personnel and the enemy are determined. The second probability is the probability that the escort personnel will defeat the enemy, and the third probability is the probability that the enemy will defeat the escort personnel.

[0081] Determine the delay time of the adversary attack at the physical barrier breakthrough node based on the protection device parameters and adversary settings;

[0082] The fifth probability that the reinforcements will arrive at the scene in time is determined based on the number of reinforcements, the time it takes for the reinforcements to arrive, the third probability, the fourth probability, the duration of the confrontation, and the time it takes to delay the enemy's attack. The fourth probability is the probability that the reinforcements will successfully receive the alarm information.

[0083] Here, the intrusion action sequence diagram includes at least three types of core nodes:

[0084] Reconnaissance and positioning node: the stage of detecting and locating the adversary;

[0085] Personnel confrontation node: the stage where the escort personnel directly confront the enemy;

[0086] Physical barrier breach node: the stage where the adversary destroys the physical protective barrier;

[0087] Reinforcement response node: The stage where reinforcement personnel conduct reinforcement response.

[0088] Specifically, for the reconnaissance and positioning nodes, according to the protection equipment parameters and the enemy settings, a mathematical model (such as signal strength and covert behavior analysis) is established to calculate the probability (first probability) of the escort system detecting the enemy's attack behavior;

[0089] For the personnel confrontation node, the number of escort personnel, skill parameters, and enemy settings can be used to calculate the second probability (the probability of the escort personnel defeating the enemy) and the third probability (the probability of the enemy personnel defeating the escort personnel) based on confrontation game theory or probability statistics, and at the same time, estimate the possible duration of the confrontation between the escort personnel and the enemy.

[0090] For physical barrier breach nodes, the delay time (time required for the adversary to breach the barrier) is calculated based on the parameters of the protective equipment (such as door locks, armor materials, and other delay devices) and the capabilities of the adversary's tools.

[0091] For the reinforcement response node, a conditional probability model can be established to determine whether the reinforcement team can arrive at the scene before the enemy breaks through the physical barrier, thereby calculating the fifth probability (the probability that the reinforcement can arrive in time).

[0092] This example addresses the coarse granularity and lack of dynamic response in traditional physical transport protection assessments by modeling the attack process in stages, quantifying various parameters, and introducing a dynamic response mechanism. This not only enables detailed identification of risk vulnerabilities but also models the normalized probability of reinforcement response effectiveness, improving the accuracy and relevance of the assessment.

[0093] Optionally, the above step 104 specifically includes:

[0094] An assessment result of the transport physical protection system is determined based on the first probability, the second probability and the fifth probability.

[0095] Among them, the first probability is the probability that the reconnaissance and positioning node discovers the adversary;

[0096] Second probability: the probability that the escort personnel defeat the enemy in the personnel confrontation node;

[0097] Fifth probability: the probability that reinforcements arrive in time.

[0098] In this embodiment, decentralized local risk assessments (reconnaissance, confrontation, reinforcement) are converted into quantitative indicators of overall protection effectiveness.

[0099] Optionally, the first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting an adversary attack behavior is determined based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings, specifically including:

[0100] The first probability is calculated by formula (1):

[0101]

[0102] Among them, PI is the first probability, P 设备i is the probability that device i detects the adversary’s attack behavior, P 设备jis the probability that device j detects the adversary's attack behavior.

[0103] Specifically, the protective device parameters are first determined, including: the detection probability of multiple devices (such as sensors, cameras, radars, etc.), each device is marked with index j (j = 1, 2, ..., i-1) and i. The adversary settings include the adversary's skills, tools or strategies that directly affect the detection probability value of the device (for example, it has been verified that the adversary may use interference technology to reduce the detection probability). The detection probability of each device (such as P 设备j and P 设备i ) can usually be obtained through experiments or historical data, indicating the probability of the device successfully identifying threats under adversary attack.

[0104] The first probability is the overall probability that the reconnaissance and positioning node successfully detects the adversary's attack behavior. Formula (2) is based on the probability independence assumption (device detection events are independent of each other) and calculates the probability that device i is the "first successful detector", that is, device i detects successfully, while all devices before it (j = 1 to i-1) fail to detect.

[0105] Formula (1) provides an efficient and accurate algorithm to calculate the detection probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node, taking into account the device order and conditional probability, significantly improving the accuracy of the quantitative evaluation of the detection behavior and avoiding the deviation caused by ignoring the dependency between devices in the traditional method.

[0106] Optionally, the second probability of the personnel confronting the node is determined based on the escort personnel configuration parameters and the adversary settings, specifically including:

[0107] The second probability is calculated by formula (2):

[0108]

[0109] Among them, P(A) is the second probability, P(m, 0) is the probability that the vehicle escort personnel of a single attack node in the personnel confrontation node defeats the adversary, M ≥ m ≥ 0, N ≥ n ≥ 0, M is the initial number of vehicle escort personnel, N is the initial number of adversaries, m is the remaining number of escort personnel after the engagement, and n is the remaining number of adversaries after the engagement.

[0110] Specifically, all possible adversarial outcomes (m, n) are generated based on M and N using formula (2). The probability P(m, 0) of each state (m, 0) is calculated using a predefined model (e.g., a probability transition matrix). The P(m, 0) values ​​for states m = 1 to M are accumulated to obtain the second probability P(A) of the escort defeating the adversary.

[0111] In one example, the confrontation process between the escort personnel and the enemy can be simulated by methods such as Markov chain, game theory or dynamic equations (such as Lanchester equation), and the probability that there are m escort personnel remaining and the enemy is completely eliminated (n=0) in a single attack node can be determined, that is, the probability that the vehicle escort personnel defeats the enemy.

[0112] Optionally, the physical barrier breakthrough node includes multiple physical defense devices.

[0113] Determine the delay time for the adversary to attack the node that breaks through the physical barrier based on the parameters of the protection device and the adversary settings. Specifically,

[0114] For independent physical defense equipment, the delay time of the enemy attack is calculated using the following formula (3):

[0115] T 物防措施 =∑T 设备j (3)

[0116] Among them, T 物防措施 To delay the enemy’s attack, T 设备j The delay time of the independent physical defense device j;

[0117] The delay time of the enemy attack is calculated by the following formula (4) for the physical defense equipment that works together:

[0118] T 物防措施 =min(T 设备1 , T 设备 2, ..., T 设备k ) (4)

[0119] Among them, T 设备k is the delay duration of the physical security device k that works together.

[0120] The physical barrier breakthrough node includes multiple physical defense devices (such as access control systems, explosion-proof walls, electronic locks, etc.), and each device has independent protection parameters (material strength, response time, etc.).

[0121] Specifically, formula (3) is used for independent devices (such as multi-layer access control systems that need to be broken through one by one). By accumulating the independent delay time of each device (for example, device 1 takes 30 seconds, device 2 takes 40 seconds, and the total time is 70 seconds), the cumulative time required for the adversary to break through in sequence is simulated.

[0122] For devices that work together (such as sensors or locks connected in parallel), use formula (4) to take the shortest delay among all devices (for example, the fastest response of the three sensors only takes 10 seconds), reflecting that the adversary only needs to break through the weakest link to pass.

[0123] In this embodiment, the duration of independent devices is accumulated (rather than taking the average value) to truly reflect the actual time consumption of multi-layer protection; the minimum value is taken for the co-operating devices to directly expose the devices with the most vulnerable weaknesses; this can accurately determine the delay duration of the physical defense equipment against enemy attacks, and further guide resource allocation (such as adding independent devices to extend the total duration, or strengthening the weakest point in the common equipment) by quantifying the protection efficiency of different equipment combinations.

[0124] Optionally, the fifth probability that the reinforcements of the reinforcement response node arrive at the scene in time is determined based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of the reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time, and the delay time, specifically including:

[0125] The fifth probability is calculated by formula (5):

[0126] P(B)=P 报警 *∑P(0,n)(5)

[0127] Among them, P(B) is the probability that reinforcements arrive at the scene in time, and P(0,n) is the probability that T 押运人员 >T 增援时间 -T 物防措施 The third probability of attacking the node, T 押运人员 T is the duration of the confrontation between the escort and the enemy, 增援时间 is the time it takes for reinforcements to arrive, T 物防措施 To delay the enemy’s attack time, P 报警 The fifth probability.

[0128] Specifically, formula (5) integrates the alarm information reception probability P 报警 and the conditional aggregated adversary win rate P(0,n), which only includes adversaries that satisfy T 押运人员 >T 增援时间 -T 物防措施 This enables a more accurate assessment of system protection by quantifying key elements of the reinforcement response mechanism, such as escort personnel persistence time, reinforcement arrival time, physical barrier delay, and alarm reliability.

[0129] In this example, by quantitatively modeling the synergistic effects of multiple factors (such as the time window for physical defense delays, the reliability of the alarm system, and the resistance limit of escort personnel), the probability of reinforcement response is accurately calculated. This overcomes the flaw in traditional assessments that ignores "time window matching" (e.g., reinforcements arrive but miss the critical defense period), thereby improving assessment accuracy.

[0130] In order to facilitate the understanding of the evaluation method of the transport physical protection system provided in this embodiment, a practical application description of the above method is provided here. Figure 2 For details, see the following example:

[0131] (1) Construct a scenario model for evaluating the physical protection system of highway transportation.

[0132] The constructed evaluation scenario model of the road transport physical protection system includes a physical protection system model and an adversary model.

[0133] The physical protection system model includes models for civil defense measures, such as the number of vehicle escorts and reinforcements, the weapons and equipment carried, and response strategies; physical defense measures, such as the delay time of the vehicle cabin, doors, locks, transport containers, and tethered structures; and technical defense measures, such as the detection probability of intrusion detection and access control. The adversary model includes models for the number of adversaries, the weapons and equipment carried, and attack strategies.

[0134] (2) Constructing an intrusion action sequence diagram

[0135] The constructed adversary intrusion action sequence diagram describes the attack process carried out by the adversary to reach the attack target. This process consists of a series of attack nodes. These attack nodes include the adversary defeating the vehicle escort and destroying the vehicle cabin, doors, locks, tie-down structures, and transport containers. The action sequence diagram uses physical protection system model data and adversary model data to describe the attack process.

[0136] Specific as Figure 2 As shown, the process from device 1 failing to detect the adversary until device i discovers the adversary represents the system's detection of the adversary's attack. The engagement result states F(m,0) and F(0,n) represent the escort defeating the adversary and the adversary defeating the escort, respectively. The process from device i+1 delaying the adversary until device j delays the adversary represents the process of independent physical defense devices delaying the adversary's attack. The process from device j+1 delaying the adversary until device k delays the adversary represents the process of combined physical defense devices delaying the adversary's attack.

[0137] (3) Define the status of the combat result between the vehicle escort and the enemy

[0138] Define the outcome of the battle between the vehicle escort and the adversary, F(m,n), where m and n represent the remaining number of vehicle escort and adversary personnel after the battle, respectively. M and N represent the initial number of vehicle escort and adversary personnel, respectively, with M ≥ m ≥ 0 and N ≥ n ≥ 0. F(m,0) indicates that the vehicle escort defeated the adversary, with M ≥ m > 0. F(0,n) indicates that the adversary defeated the vehicle escort, with N ≥ n > 0.

[0139] The probability of the combat result state F(m,n) is defined as P(m,n), and the duration of the corresponding combat state is T(m,n). The combat result only includes the vehicle escort defeating the enemy or the enemy defeating the vehicle escort, that is,

[0140]

[0141] (4) Calculate the probability of the adversary being discovered attacking

[0142] The probability of the adversary being discovered in the attack behavior is the probability of the adversary being discovered by the i-th detection device, that is, the discovery probability PI is calculated by the following formula (1):

[0143]

[0144] (5) Calculate the probability that the vehicle escort successfully stops the enemy

[0145] Define the event A where the vehicle escort successfully stops the enemy, and the probability of event A is P(A). Event A means that the result of the battle is the sum of all states where the vehicle escort defeats the enemy, that is, ∑F(m,0). The probability of the vehicle escort stopping the enemy is

[0146]

[0147] (6) Calculate the probability that reinforcements will arrive at the scene before the enemy achieves its attack objective

[0148] Define the event B as the arrival of reinforcements before the enemy achieves their attack objective, and the probability of reinforcements arriving before the enemy achieves their attack objective as P(B). The number of reinforcements far exceeds the number of enemies, meaning that the reinforcements will be able to defeat the enemy upon arrival. Therefore, P(B) is also the probability that the reinforcements will defeat the enemy if they arrive in time.

[0149] Calculate the time T that the vehicle escort delays the enemy's attack 押运人员 This time is equal to the duration of the engagement under the engagement result state F(0,n), that is, T 押运人员 =T(0,n).

[0150] Calculate the time T that the physical defense measures of the vehicle cabin, hatch, lock, transport container, and tethered structure delay the enemy attack 物防措施 Physical defense measures can delay an adversary by either acting independently or acting together.

[0151] The delay time of an independent physical defense measure is the sum of the delay times of the physical defense devices, that is,

[0152] T 物防措施 =∑T 设备j (3)

[0153] The delay time of the combined physical defense measures is the minimum value of the physical defense measures equipment, that is,

[0154] T 物防措施 =min(T 设备1 , T 设备2 , ...,T设备k ) (4)

[0155] Calculate the time T for reinforcements to arrive at the scene 增援时间 The time it takes for reinforcements to arrive at the scene is the ratio of the reinforcement distance S to the reinforcement speed V, T 增援时间 =S / V.

[0156] The judgment condition for reinforcements to arrive at the scene before the enemy achieves its attack target is that the reinforcements can receive the alarm, and the sum of the time the vehicle escort and physical defense measures delay the enemy's attack is greater than the time it takes for the reinforcements to arrive at the scene, that is, T 押运人员 +T 物防措施 >T 增援时间 .

[0157] When the judgment conditions are met, the probability of event B occurring is calculated using the following formula (5):

[0158] P(B)=P 报警 *∑P(0,n)(5)

[0159] Among them, P 报警 Indicates the probability that reinforcements can receive the alarm, which is determined by the connection status of the communication equipment.

[0160] ∑P(0,n) means that: T(0,n)=T 押运人员 >T 增援时间 -T 物防措施 The sum of the probabilities of all engagement outcome states F(0,n) under the given conditions.

[0161] (7) Calculate the probability of the road transport physical protection system stopping the adversary

[0162] The probability PN of a road transport physical protection system stopping an adversary is equal to the product of the probability of the transport physical protection system detecting an adversary's attack and the probability of defeating the adversary. The conditions for the transport physical protection system to defeat the adversary include either the vehicle escort directly defeating the adversary or reinforcements arriving at the scene in a timely manner to defeat the adversary. In other words, the probability of defeating the adversary is the sum of the probability of event A occurring, P(A), and the probability of event B occurring, P(B). Therefore, PN = PI * {P(A) + P(B)}.

[0163] The road transport physical protection system effectiveness evaluation method in this embodiment can construct a road transport physical protection scenario model and an adversary intrusion action sequence diagram, and calculate the probability of the transport physical protection system detecting the adversary, as well as the probability of stopping the adversary in two situations: the vehicle escort personnel directly defeat the adversary and the reinforcement personnel arrive at the scene in time to defeat the adversary, thereby realizing the quantitative calculation of the effectiveness of the road transport physical protection system.

[0164] Example 2:

[0165] like Figure 3 As shown, this embodiment provides a transport physical protection system evaluation device 300, which is used to implement the transport physical protection system evaluation method provided by any of the above embodiments.

[0166] The transport physical protection system evaluation device 300 specifically includes:

[0167] An acquisition module 301 is used to acquire personnel configuration parameters and protective equipment parameters and adversary settings of a transport physical protection system;

[0168] The creation module 302 is connected to the acquisition module 301 and is used to create an intrusion action sequence diagram, which is used to represent all attack nodes of the adversary's attack process;

[0169] The first evaluation module 303 is connected to the creation module 302 and is used to determine the evaluation parameters of each attack node using the intrusion action sequence diagram according to the personnel configuration parameters, the protection equipment parameters and the adversary settings;

[0170] The second evaluation module 304 is connected to the first evaluation module 303 and is used to evaluate the protection effectiveness of the transportation process of the physical object according to the evaluation parameters of each attack node, and obtain an evaluation result of the transportation physical protection system.

[0171] Optionally, the attack nodes in the intrusion action sequence diagram include at least a reconnaissance and positioning node, a personnel confrontation node, a physical barrier breakthrough node, and a reinforcement response node. The personnel configuration parameters include the number of escort personnel and the number of reinforcement personnel. The first evaluation module includes:

[0172] A first calculation unit is used to determine a first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting an adversary attack behavior based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings;

[0173] The second calculation unit is used to determine the second probability and third probability of the personnel confrontation node and the duration of the confrontation between the escort personnel and the enemy according to the personnel configuration parameters and the enemy settings, wherein the second probability is the probability that the escort personnel defeats the enemy, and the third probability is the probability that the enemy defeats the escort personnel;

[0174] a third calculation unit, for determining a delay time of an adversary attack at a node that breaks through the physical barrier based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings;

[0175] The fourth calculation unit is used to determine the fifth probability that the reinforcements of the reinforcement response node arrive at the scene in time based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of the reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time and the delay time of the enemy attack, where the fourth probability is the probability that the reinforcements successfully receive the alarm information.

[0176] Optionally, the second evaluation module 304 is specifically configured to:

[0177] An evaluation result of the transport physical protection system is determined according to the first probability, the second probability and the fifth probability.

[0178] Optionally, the first calculation unit is specifically configured to:

[0179] The first probability is calculated by formula (1):

[0180]

[0181] Among them, PI is the first probability, P 设备i is the probability that device i detects the adversary’s attack behavior, P 设备j is the probability that device j detects the adversary's attack behavior.

[0182] Optionally, the second calculation unit includes:

[0183] The first calculation subunit is configured to calculate the second probability using formula (2):

[0184]

[0185] Among them, P(A) is the second probability, P(m, 0) is the probability that the vehicle escort personnel of a single attack node in the personnel confrontation node defeats the adversary, M ≥ m ≥ 0, N ≥ n ≥ 0, M is the initial number of vehicle escort personnel, N is the initial number of adversaries, m is the remaining number of escort personnel after the engagement, and n is the remaining number of adversaries after the engagement.

[0186] Optionally, the physical barrier breakthrough node includes multiple physical defense devices,

[0187] The third calculation unit is used to calculate the delay time of the enemy attack for the independent physical defense device using the following formula (3):

[0188] T 物防措施 =∑T 设备j (3)

[0189] Among them, T 物防措施 is the delay time of the adversary attack, T 设备j The delay time of the independent physical defense device j;

[0190] The delay time of the enemy attack is calculated by the following formula (4) for the physical defense equipment that works together:

[0191] T 物防措施 =min(T 设备1 , T 设备 2, ..., T 设备k ) (4)

[0192] Among them, T 设备k is the delay duration of the physical security device k that works together.

[0193] Optionally, the fourth calculation unit is specifically configured to calculate the fifth probability using formula (5):

[0194] P(B)=P 报警 *∑P(0,n)(5)

[0195] Among them, P(B) is the probability that reinforcements arrive at the scene in time, and P(0,n) is the probability that T 押运人员 >T 增援时间 -T 物防措施 The third probability of attacking the node, T 押运人员 T is the duration of the confrontation between the escort and the enemy, 增援时间 is the time it takes for reinforcements to arrive, T 物防措施 To delay the enemy’s attack time, P 报警 is the fifth probability.

[0196] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0197] The electronic device may include a processor 401 and a memory 402 storing computer program instructions.

[0198] Specifically, the processor 401 may include a central processing unit (CPU), or an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or may be configured to implement one or more integrated circuits of the embodiments of the present application.

[0199] Memory 402 may include a large capacity memory for data or instructions. By way of example and not limitation, memory 402 may include a hard disk drive (HDD), a floppy disk drive, a flash memory, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a magnetic tape, or a universal serial bus (USB) drive, or a combination of two or more of these. Where appropriate, memory 402 may include removable or non-removable (or fixed) media. Where appropriate, memory 402 may be inside or outside the integrated gateway disaster recovery device. In a specific embodiment, memory 402 is a non-volatile solid-state memory.

[0200] The memory may include read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk storage media devices, optical storage media devices, flash memory devices, electrical, optical or other physical / tangible memory storage devices. Thus, generally, the memory includes one or more tangible (non-transitory) computer-readable storage media (e.g., memory devices) encoded with software including computer-executable instructions, and when the software is executed (e.g., by one or more processors), it is operable to perform the operations described with reference to the method according to an aspect of the present disclosure.

[0201] The processor 401 reads and executes computer program instructions stored in the memory 402 to implement any one of the transport physical protection system evaluation methods in the above embodiments.

[0202] In one example, the electronic device may further include a communication interface 403 and a bus 404. Figure 3 As shown, the processor 401 , the memory 402 , and the communication interface 403 are connected via a bus 404 and communicate with each other.

[0203] The communication interface 403 is mainly used to implement communication between various modules, devices, units and / or equipment in the embodiments of the present application.

[0204] Bus 404 includes hardware, software or both, and the parts of online data flow metering equipment are coupled to each other. For example, but not limitation, bus can include accelerated graphics port (AGP) or other graphics bus, enhanced industry standard architecture (EISA) bus, front side bus (FSB), hypertransport (HT) interconnection, industry standard architecture (ISA) bus, infinite bandwidth interconnection, low pin count (LPC) bus, memory bus, micro channel architecture (MCA) bus, peripheral component interconnection (PCI) bus, PCI-Express (PCI-X) bus, serial advanced technology attachment (SATA) bus, video electronics standard association local (VLB) bus or other suitable bus or two or more of these combinations. In appropriate cases, bus 404 can include one or more buses. Although the present application embodiment describes and shows specific bus, the application considers any suitable bus or interconnection.

[0205] In addition, in conjunction with the transport physical protection system assessment method described in the above embodiments, embodiments of the present application may provide a computer storage medium for implementation. The computer storage medium stores computer program instructions; when executed by a processor, the computer program instructions implement any of the transport physical protection system assessment methods described in the above embodiments.

[0206] It should be understood that the present application is not limited to the specific configurations and processes described above and illustrated in the figures. For the sake of brevity, a detailed description of known methods is omitted here. In the above embodiments, several specific steps are described and illustrated as examples. However, the method process of the present application is not limited to the specific steps described and illustrated. Those skilled in the art can make various changes, modifications, and additions, or change the order of the steps after understanding the spirit of the present application.

[0207] The functional blocks shown in the above block diagram can be implemented as hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof. When implemented in hardware, they can be, for example, electronic circuits, application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), appropriate firmware, plug-ins, function cards, etc. When implemented in software, the elements of the present application are programs or code segments that are used to perform the required tasks. Programs or code segments can be stored in machine-readable media, or transmitted on a transmission medium or a communication link by a data signal carried in a carrier wave. "Machine-readable media" can include any medium capable of storing or transmitting information. Examples of machine-readable media include electronic circuits, semiconductor memory devices, ROMs, flash memories, erasable ROMs (EROMs), floppy disks, CD-ROMs, optical disks, hard disks, optical fiber media, radio frequency (RF) links, etc. The code segments can be downloaded via computer networks such as the Internet, intranets, etc.

[0208] It should also be noted that the exemplary embodiments mentioned in this application describe some methods or systems based on a series of steps or devices. However, this application is not limited to the order of the above steps. In other words, the steps can be performed in the order mentioned in the embodiments, or in a different order, or several steps can be performed simultaneously.

[0209] It will be understood that the above embodiments are merely exemplary embodiments for illustrating the principles of the present invention, and the present invention is not limited thereto. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that various modifications and improvements can be made without departing from the spirit and substance of the present invention, and such modifications and improvements are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for evaluating a transport physical protection system, characterized in that: include: Obtaining personnel configuration parameters and protective equipment parameters as well as adversary settings of the transport physical protection system; Creating an intrusion action sequence diagram, wherein the intrusion action sequence diagram is used to represent all attack nodes of the adversary's attack process; Determine the evaluation parameters of each attack node using the intrusion action sequence diagram according to the personnel configuration parameters, protection equipment parameters, and adversary settings; The protection effectiveness of the transportation process of the physical object is evaluated according to the evaluation parameters of the various attack nodes to obtain an evaluation result of the transportation physical protection system.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The attack nodes in the intrusion action sequence diagram include at least a reconnaissance and positioning node, a personnel confrontation node, a physical barrier breakthrough node, and a reinforcement response node. The personnel configuration parameters include the number of escort personnel and the number of reinforcement personnel. The step of determining the evaluation parameters of each attack node using the intrusion action sequence diagram according to the personnel configuration parameters, the protection equipment parameters, and the adversary settings specifically includes: Determining a first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting an adversary attack behavior based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings; Determining, based on the personnel configuration parameters and the enemy settings, a second probability and a third probability of the personnel confrontation node and a duration of confrontation between the escort personnel and the enemy, wherein the second probability is the probability that the escort personnel defeats the enemy, and the third probability is the probability that the enemy defeats the escort personnel; Determining a delay time for an adversary attack at a node where the physical barrier breaks through, based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings; A fifth probability that the reinforcements of the reinforcement response node arrive at the scene in time is determined based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of the reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time, and the delayed enemy attack time. The fourth probability is the probability that the reinforcements successfully receive the alarm information.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The evaluation of the protection effectiveness of the transport process of the physical object based on the evaluation parameters of each attack node to obtain the evaluation result of the transport physical protection system specifically includes: An evaluation result of the transport physical protection system is determined according to the first probability, the second probability and the fifth probability.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The determining, based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings, a first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting an adversary attack behavior specifically includes: The first probability is calculated by formula (1): Among them, PI is the first probability, P 设备i is the probability that device i detects the adversary’s attack behavior, P 设备j is the probability that device j detects the adversary's attack behavior.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that: Determining the second probability of the person confronting the node based on the person configuration parameter and the adversary setting specifically includes: The second probability is calculated by formula (2): Among them, P(A) is the second probability, P(m, 0) is the probability that the vehicle escort personnel of a single attack node in the personnel confrontation node defeats the adversary, M ≥ m ≥ 0, N ≥ n ≥ 0, M is the initial number of vehicle escort personnel, N is the initial number of adversaries, m is the remaining number of escort personnel after the engagement, and n is the remaining number of adversaries after the engagement.

6. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The physical barrier breakthrough node includes multiple physical defense devices, The step of determining the delay time of the adversary attack at the physical barrier breakthrough node according to the protection device parameters and the adversary settings specifically includes: For independent physical defense equipment, the delay time of the enemy attack is calculated using the following formula (3): T 物防措施 =∑T 设备j (3) Among them, T 物防措施 is the delay time of the adversary attack, T 设备j The delay time of the independent physical defense device j; The delay time of the enemy attack is calculated by the following formula (4) for the physical defense equipment that works together: T 物防措施 =min(T 设备1 ,T 设备 2,...,T 设备k ) (4) Among them, T 设备k is the delay duration of the physical security device k that works together.

7. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Determining a fifth probability that the reinforcements of the reinforcement response node arrive at the scene in time based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of the reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time, and the delay time specifically includes: The fifth probability is calculated by formula (5): P(B)=P 报警 *∑P(0,n)(5) Among them, P(B) is the probability that reinforcements arrive at the scene in time, and P(0,n) is the probability that T 押运人员 >T 增援时间 -T 物防措施 The third probability of attacking the node, T 押运人员 T is the duration of the confrontation between the escort and the enemy, 增援时间 is the time it takes for reinforcements to arrive, T 物防措施 To delay the enemy’s attack time, P 报警 is the fifth probability.

8. An evaluation device for a transport physical protection system, characterized in that: The device comprises: an acquisition module, configured to acquire personnel configuration parameters and protective equipment parameters as well as adversary settings of the transport physical protection system; a creation module connected to the acquisition module, for creating an intrusion action sequence diagram, wherein the intrusion action sequence diagram is used to represent all attack nodes of the adversary's attack process; a first evaluation module, connected to the creation module, for determining evaluation parameters of each attack node using the intrusion action sequence diagram according to the personnel configuration parameters, protection equipment parameters, and adversary settings; The second evaluation module is connected to the first evaluation module and is used to evaluate the protection effectiveness of the transportation process of the physical object according to the evaluation parameters of each attack node to obtain the evaluation result of the transportation physical protection system.

9. The device according to claim 8, characterized in that The attack nodes in the intrusion action sequence diagram include at least a reconnaissance and positioning node, a personnel confrontation node, a physical barrier breakthrough node, and a reinforcement response node. The personnel configuration parameters include the number of escort personnel and the number of reinforcement personnel. The first evaluation module includes: A first calculation unit is configured to determine a first probability of the reconnaissance and positioning node detecting an adversary attack behavior based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings; a second calculation unit, configured to determine, based on the personnel configuration parameters and the enemy settings, a second probability and a third probability of the personnel confrontation node and a duration of confrontation between the escort personnel and the enemy, wherein the second probability is a probability that the escort personnel defeats the enemy, and the third probability is a probability that the enemy defeats the escort personnel; a third calculation unit, configured to determine a delay time of an adversary attack on the physical barrier breakthrough node based on the protection device parameters and the adversary settings; The fourth calculation unit is used to determine the fifth probability that the reinforcements of the reinforcement response node arrive at the scene in time based on the number of reinforcements, the arrival time of the reinforcements, the third probability, the fourth probability, the confrontation time and the delayed enemy attack time, where the fourth probability is the probability that the reinforcements successfully receive the alarm information.

10. A transport physical protection system evaluation device, characterized in that: The device includes: a processor and a memory storing computer program instructions; When the processor executes the computer program instructions, the method for evaluating the transport physical protection system according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.

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